EUROPE IN MODERN GREEK HISTORY
Europe in Modern Greek History

Edited by

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ABBREVIATIONS

ASEP Higher Council for the Selection of Personnel
(ΑΣΕΠ: Ανώτατο Συμβούλιο Επιλογής Προσωπικού)

CDSP Common Defence and Security Policy

CESR Centre for Economic and Social Rights

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CoE Council of Europe

DG Directorate General

EA-12 Euro-area12 (the twelve initial members of the Euro-area)

EC European Community

ECB European Central Bank

ECHR European Court of Human Rights

ECRI European Commission against Racism and Intolerance

EEC European Economic Community

EMU European Monetary Union

EPC European Political Co-operation

EPU European Payments Union

ESC Economic and Social Committee

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy

ESPA National Strategic Reference Framework
(ΕΣΠΑ: Εθνικό Στρατηγικό Πλαίσιο Αναφοράς)

EU European Union

FCPNM Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GSEE General Confederation of Greek Labour
(ΓΣΕΕ: Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδος)

IMF International Monetary Fund
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>IOBE</td>
<td>Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (ΙΟΒΕ: Ιδρυμα Οικονομικών και Βιομηχανικών Ερευνών)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KEP</td>
<td>Citizens Advice Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKE-Interior</td>
<td>Communist Party of Greece-Interior (ΚΚΕ εσωτ.: Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος Εσωτερικού)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally (ΛΑ.ΟΣ: Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP(s)</td>
<td>Member(s) of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy (ΝΔ: Νέα Δημοκρατία)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (ΠΑΣΟΚ: Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEM</td>
<td>Project for the Reform of Education of Muslim Minority Children (ΠΕΜ: Προγράμμα Εκπαίδευσης Μουσουλμανοπαιδών)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI(I)GS</td>
<td>Portugal, Ireland, (Italy), Greece, Spain</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>SYRIZA</td>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ: Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US(A)</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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For much of the last decade or more, Europe is said to have lacked leadership. In this context ‘Europe’, of course, is normally equated with the European Union (EU). Several examples can be cited to support this criticism: the drawn-out process of trying to establish a constitution for the EU, ending in the much-diluted Treaty of Lisbon; the split between what Donald Rumsfeld identified as ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe over the Iraq War; and the divisions between governments in the response to the international economic crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Each case showed the disagreements over the EU’s role and purpose in relation to major international events.

Underlying these differences have been the contrasting notions of what ‘Europe’ is or should be. Fundamentally, ‘Europe’ is socially constructed with different meanings, identities, instrumentalities, and legitimation across the continent’s distinct national settings and, within them, between the various spheres of the arts, culture, society, politics, and economics. Crudely, the EU’s predicament is that across its now twenty-seven member states there are simply too many ‘Europes’, defined so differently, and this shapes the understanding of its activities and purpose.

Even before the onset of its sovereign debt crisis in 2009, Greece was a case of unusual interest in these respects. ‘Europe’, in its different guises, has been a major factor in the development of modern Greece. It has set an agenda for Greece’s own ‘modernity’ and highlighted its failings and vulnerabilities, but it has also supported and funded Greece. At the same time, Greece can claim much ‘copyright’ over the cultural inheritance of Europe and what it has sought to export to the rest of the world. Yet, Greeks still talk about going to ‘Europe’ as if it is a very different place. How Greece thinks of ‘Europe’ clearly embraces contradictory characteristics. Now, in the context of two financial bail-outs and the imposition of tough austerity measures, it is Europe (in the
form of the Eurozone) that is shaking the Greek economy, state and society to its roots.

The present volume seeks to address these issues by examining how Greece has defined, experienced and responded to ‘Europe’ and with what consequences. The perspective is historical—from the years immediately prior to World War I to the present—and also broadly set: incorporating the arts, society, politics, foreign policy, and economics. The aim is to gauge patterns of continuity and change across these periods and spheres in order to better understand what ‘Europe’ has meant to the Greeks.

The volume stems from a discussion that took place within an advisory committee to the British School at Athens in mid-2009, when we were planning the upcoming programme of activities. We recognized not only the importance of studying how modern Greece has thought of ‘Europe’, but also the need to do so on a cross-disciplinary basis. I was very heartened by the encouragement of my colleagues to pursue such a project and very grateful to Cathy Morgan, director of the British School at Athens, for her willingness to support and facilitate a workshop for it. The latter was held on 28–29 January 2011 at the School’s premises and I would like to thank the School’s staff for their hospitality. The School constitutes a valuable resource for this kind of international activity. Papers were commissioned from leading academic authorities on different aspects of the subject, from both the UK and Greece, making the project a very stimulating exchange between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The discussion was greatly enriched by the active participation of a number of leading figures from different spheres of Greek life. We all very much appreciated a lecture to mark the workshop given by the former prime minister Costas Simitis at the Residence of the British ambassador, David Landsman, and a dinner hosted by the latter.

The contributors to this volume have fully engaged with the workshop discussion and responded to editorial comments. Following the workshop, we felt it important to receive two additional papers in order to balance out the discussion: one on recent Greek foreign policy, the other on the response to multiculturalism in the context of immigration. I am pleased that Anna Triandafyllidou and Spyros Economides have filled these gaps.

The production of a volume like this incurs a number of debts. I would like to thank Eleni Xiarchogiannopoulou for her expert assistance, my colleagues within the LSE’s Hellenic Observatory for their support, and Michael Dwyer at Hurst for his encouragement.

Kevin Featherstone

London, September 2013
INTRODUCTION

Kevin Featherstone

‘Europe’, ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Europeans’ have been important themes in the history of modern Greece, from the establishment of the new state in 1832 to the sovereign debt crisis of 2010. As elsewhere, these notions have served as référentiels in questions of identity, progress, capability, legitimation and strategic interest. Yet, in modern Greece they have taken a particularly acute form. If a national mood can be thus characterized, when Greeks have looked towards ‘Europe’ the act has often seemed to be to one of self-torture: leading to an exposure of domestic weaknesses, pointing to difficult adjustments required. But while Europe has both highlighted and penetrated Greece’s vulnerability, it has also sustained and nurtured it with the flow of ideas, new opportunities for engagement, economic aid, etc. The interaction has had a varied character. Indeed, Greece’s entanglement has been further complicated by the endemic Greek sense of holding ‘copyright’ over much that is associated with the term ‘European’: both its name and much of its cultural heritage. Together, these factors create a unique and somewhat paradoxical relationship, of both pride and angst, but also, undoubtedly, one of far-reaching consequence.

This volume seeks to address the variety and complexity of this relationship in order to learn more about modern Greece—its culture, society, politics, and economy—but also to appreciate how ‘Europe’, what it is and what it represents, may be viewed so distinctively within a domestic context. The
chapters that follow provide a cross-disciplinary perspective on this multifaceted relationship over different historical periods since the eve of the First World War and to the present day. Each chapter is written by an acknowledged expert in the field, providing their distinct insights and reflections.

Indeed, the agenda of examining how ‘Europe’ has been viewed is very wide-ranging. By way of introduction, the purpose of this chapter is to sketch the different dimensions of ‘Europe’ and how these relate to Greece’s development, providing a common thematic framework for those that follow. Section 1 sets out the questions that may be posed when assessing how a nation has responded to ‘Europe’. Section 2 examines these questions in the context of the historical experience of Greece. Section 3 considers how recent Greek discourses on Europe have attributed meanings and instrumentalities to it. Section 4 concludes with the purpose and reach of the present volume.

The problématique

‘Europe’ is a far from simple, singular or consistent notion. To understand its position in relation to any national context requires a number of fundamental questions to be addressed:

- Where is ‘Europe’? Where does it stop? That is, ‘Europe’ as a socio-geographical notion with an exclusionary boundary has been defined in very different ways.
- Who are ‘Europeans’? Here we refer to ‘Europe’ as an exclusive identity in relation to ‘other(s)’, at home or abroad. It may involve the impact of Europe in reinforcing a national distance from the ‘other’ and/or in stimulating rapprochement/integration.
- Which ‘Europe’ is being referred to? In foreign policy, for example, it may cover the different constellations of the great/major powers or organizations exercising leverage over the continent. In the recent period, it has become increasingly synonymous with the European Union (EU), given the expansion of EU membership. In socio-historical terms, the narration of Europe may involve, alternatively, its ethno-symbolism (its myths, memories, traditions and symbols) and the extent to which this has been ‘nationalized’.

Thus, also:
- When does ‘Europe’ have a greater or lesser relevance? What is, the relevance of temporal comparisons in the intensity with which a domestic impact or référentiel is evident?
- Why ‘Europe’? Why do domestic actors refer to ‘Europe’: the content and purpose of identification or rejection and its consequence? Thus, also:
- What is ‘Europe’? Here, ‘Europe’ can refer to an economic force, a socio-cultural movement or lifestyle, a normative influence, a source of (de-)legitimation, and/or the body of law and policies, and associated processes,
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consequent on membership of the EU. The impact of the latter, in particular, is now often described as ‘Europeanization’.

- *How is ‘Europe’?* This refers to the capability of Europe (most notably, the EU) to act or intervene domestically: its will, instruments and power; the strategic opportunities created, the reactions provoked, and the constraints imposed.

These seven sets of questions sketch out the complexity and variation involved in referring to the ways any nation has viewed or experienced ‘Europe’ in the modern period. The focus here is deliberately set broadly: the relevance of ‘Europe’ as a set of référentiels extends well beyond the impact of the EU, for example, and the present volume discusses Greece’s engagement within this wider context. When ‘Europe’ is seen as an independent factor or resource it may have many different meanings, images, forms, instrumentalities and characters. Indeed, the ramifications of these differences are evident from a brief examination of the Greek case.

The many ‘Europes’ of modern Greek history

The perception and impact of Europe in modern Greek history have shown important variation. The ‘Europe’ of specific Great Powers, the ‘Europe’ of the EU and the ‘Europe’ of a frame of identity have each left their mark on what the continent means to the Greeks.

The evolution of foreign policy interests and the changing structures of international relations have prompted different forms of entanglement. This is evident from the role of the ‘Concert’ of Europe in the early nineteenth century and the emergence of the new Greek state; the actions (and inactions) of the Great Powers in defining the scope for Greek territorial expansion or in the ‘catastrophe’ of Greece’s military defeat by the new Turkish Republic in Asia Minor in 1922; the accommodation of Greece after 1945 into the Western orbit via the Truman Doctrine, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the European Payments Union and the Council of Europe; the relevance of the Cold War to Greece’s relations within the Balkans or of (post-)colonialism to its interests in Cyprus; or, latterly the accession and performance of Greece in the European Community after 1981 (now the European Union). Greeks have often seen their fate as being disrupted by the interventions of foreign powers. Greece has been seen as a ‘penetrated’ state in international relations; as a ‘dependent’ state on the semi-periphery in the world economy; and, more recently, as a ‘failing’ state within the EU. Notwithstanding conspiracy theories and neo-Marxian notions of capitalist exploitation, Greek foreign policy has had to carve out space for the pursuit of its strategic interests in a rather more complex environment and neighbourhood than many, and ‘Europe’ in its various guises has been a frequent factor in these endeavours.
Moreover, Europe in the form of the EU has been a pole of attraction as an alternative to what has been perceived domestically since (at least) 1974 as the United States’ malevolence. Popular anti-Americanism fanned Europeanism in the hope that it would be a substitute frame for security within the region and the pursuit of key national interests. Europe was seen, in various ways, as having qualities that the US lacked—a broader and more proximate ideological base, the relative absence of entanglement in neo-imperialist ventures, a fresh and seemingly more ethical foreign policy stance, and an inclusiveness treating countries as partners not satellites—as the new ‘New’ replaced the old ‘New’ and Greece redefined the part of the ‘West’ to which it belonged. Greece grew more comfortable over the Metapolitefsi with a European frame as the earlier US relationship was increasingly wrapped in a discourse of American tutelage. But in reality, Greek reactions to both have created complex cleavages within domestic politics that have sometimes intersected and have often proved unstable. Anti-Americanism across Europe in the post-war world has been a variegated phenomenon (Katzenstein and Keohane, 2007), but in Greece the belief that the US facilitated and then sustained the Colonels’ junta (1967–74) became widespread (Stefanidis, 2007; Papandreou, 1971). The associated policy shift has, inevitably perhaps, mixed both strategic and normative motivations. Economides, in this volume, argues that the former motivation has been pre-eminent—Greece’s European embrace provided a platform and new opportunities to gain advantage over neighbours.

Be that as it may, beyond matters of foreign policy content, the relevance of ‘Europe’ to the sense of Greek identity in the world has been evident in the construction of national identity. The linkage of the present with the past was intrinsic to the legitimacy and self-identity of the modern Greek state, as Skopetea (1988) explored. Liberated from the Ottoman yoke, Greece—so the dominant narrative has it—could once again take up its place within the European family. Conflating ‘Greekness’ and Europe became a recurring theme in domestic debates, from Adamantios Korais onwards. The conflicting national/external orientations of Charilaos Trikoupis and Theodoros Deligiannis as Greek prime ministers at the end of the nineteenth century are seen by some as matching those of Constantine Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou in the 1970s—and their conflicting rhetorics of ‘Greece belongs to the West’ versus ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’. Here, Llewellyn-Smith outlines Venizelos’ diplomatic orientation towards Britain and France, but also his attraction towards matters of European cooperation. More recently, both Constantine Karamanlis and Costas Simitis defined the national mission as involving convergence with (western) Europe.

Moreover, the focus of emulation has not only been ‘Europe’ but also what are seen as its more successful states. Historically, the Napoleonic code was
taken from France and much of the legal philosophy from Germany. In recent years, political leaders have referred to Ireland as an economic model from which to learn (Costas Karamanlis) and to Sweden for its combination of economic success and welfare provision (George Papandreou). The choice has had an ideological basis. At the same time, as Llewellyn-Smith comments, Greeks have shown an exceptional interest—he calls it an obsession—in the way Greece is viewed by the rest of Europe: a kind of ‘double loop’ or reflection back of its subject.

In other respects, the emulation of ‘Europe’ came with a rejection of the near-neighbours: as Pesmazoglou argues in this volume, the construction of a ‘Euro-centric’ mindset of ‘Greekness’—‘we belong to Europe and the West’—was undertaken alongside the stigmatization as ‘other’ of the Turk, Turkishness and the despised Ottoman legacy. Walker Connor’s now classic question of ‘when is a nation?’ (Connor, 1994) was answered to the exclusion of everything Turkish or Ottoman, which did not filter into the Greek narration of Greece or Europe. To the Greeks, Turks and the Ottoman empire had a strong ethno-symbolic character (Anastasakis, Nicolaidis and Öktem, 2009). The historical roots of the rejection of them returned Greece to some extent to the ex-ante frame of Byzantium. Hélène Ahrweiler has shown how the latter viewed the ‘foreigner’ (ξένος) with contempt—a perfect representation of a Kulturnation, akin to a ‘superiority complex’ (1998:2–3). Yet it is also ‘Europe’—in the form, primarily, of the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights—that has today prompted Greece to tackle the problems of social exclusion of local ‘Turks’ in Western Thrace. Dragonas shows how the Ministry of Education has launched projects to overcome the stigmatization of the ‘other’ (for an earlier history, see Featherstone et al., 2011).

The creation of new minorities at home as a result of the influx of very large numbers of immigrants—both legal and illegal—over the last decade (the total number of legal immigrants resident in Greece being approximately one million, and the estimated number of illegal migrants 470,000 in 2011) also has to be contextualized within a European frame. The modern Greek nation after 1922 was one of the most ethnically homogeneous in Europe. The migration that occurred was outward as large numbers emigrated to North America and Australia, left the homeland amidst the struggles of the Civil War, or travelled to be Gastarbeiter in Germany and sent valuable remittances home—the latter significant enough to be recorded separately in the ‘Balance of Payments’ accounts. However, in the 1990s, the collapse of its neighbouring Communist regimes prompted thousands of (economic) refugees from Albania and elsewhere to arrive in the urban centres of Greece. Greece now became a net importer of people. Its borders—with a total coastline close in length to that of the entire continent of Africa—were notoriously difficult to police. This was especially the case for the increasing
numbers of immigrants arriving from or via Turkey. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU exacerbated the problem. France, and other EU member states, blocked the participation of both countries in the Schengen Area of open internal travel. Their entry would increase the pressure on Greece’s borders, as a crossing favoured by illegal immigrants was at Nea Vyssa-Orestiada, which is only a few kilometres from the Greek-Bulgarian border. Once inside the Schengen Area, many immigrants could travel without restriction to most EU states. The EU offered funding and assistance (in the form of supplying border guards) to Greece to strengthen its border controls, and in January 2011 Christos Papoutsis, the Greek interior minister, suggested the building of a 128km wall near the Evros River to keep immigrants out. The ramifications of these developments—a consequence of the changing politics of the region and the adoption of new European policies—for the sense of identity and society within Greece are explored in this volume by Triandafyllidou. Greek governments are obliged to confront new issues of integration and multi-culturalism, with implications for the connections made between ‘Greekness’ and what it is to be ‘European’.

The sense of Greece having contributed so much to the cultural heritage of Europe—‘epic poetry, history and drama; philosophy in all its branches, from metaphysics to economics; mathematics and many of the natural sciences—all these begin with the Greeks’ (Kitto, 1974:9)—is, by its nature, exceptional. The validity of the lineage from ancient times to the modern Greek state can be contested—with differing assessments of the impact of Byzantium and of the Ottoman Empire, most notably—though the claim is an integral part of the hegemonic national narrative of a ‘Helleno-Christian’ civilization (see, for example, Koliopoulos and Veremis, 2002). Only Italy can match the ‘glorious past’: as the cliché has it, Europe is ‘the Greeks, the Romans and the Bible’. Yet, in Italy, the invocation of Rome remains tarnished by Mussolini and his fascist fantasies; the sense of modern failure has been much less; and Italy has been a constant participant in the ‘core’ of the EU, not one threatened with exclusion. Further, modern Italy has had no parallel to ‘Europe’ being used to reject a near and powerful ‘other’, as it has been used by Greeks to reject Turkey as described by Pesmazoglou in this volume. Although the Colonels’ junta after 1967 had absurd notions of a phoenix rising again (Clogg, 1972), and generalized nationalistic appeals reminding Greeks of the debt owed to them by Europe still have resonance, the relationship between Greece and Europe has been one of angst rather than triumphalism, even before the 2010 crisis. Perhaps a closer parallel is with Spain and Portugal: Malefakis (1995) has argued, similarly, that they both share with Greece a deeply-ingrained self-contempt stemming from the contrast of historical glories with the disappointments of the recent past and the present.

But Greece’s inheritance with respect to Europe is not only one that juxtaposes pride and failure; it also incorporates senses of cultural difference.
Many such differences are identified and are attributed to various causes—the subjugation under four centuries of Ottoman rule; the distinctiveness of Orthodox Christianity and its social impact; countervailing strategic interests in the Balkans and Near East; and retarded economic development, amongst others. Even so, of course the importation into Greece of the values and philosophies of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution constituted a major intellectual contribution to the rise of the modern Greek nation (Wolff, 2001). In this volume, Hirschon provides an anthropological perspective on cultural norms and practices that have survived for generations within Greece and remain central to the ‘misapprehensions’ that underpin the controversies between Greece and its European partners in the context of the 2010-economic crisis. Such habits are part of a pre-modern legacy, and here ‘Europe’ may be feared as a force for disavowing that past. Similarly, the ‘anti-Europeanism’ expressed in the context of the domestic protests over the disputed use of the name ‘Macedonia’ in the early 1990s, or over the removal of religious identity from the Greek national identity card at the end of the decade, resonated with this sense of cultural difference from ‘Europe’.

In her chapter, Hirschon highlights a different set of attitudes within Greece towards time and time-perception, personal identity, and authority. Historians have taken up similar themes: Koliopoulos and Veremis (2002: 2), for example, also identify Greek idiosyncrasies in ‘the perception of cyclical and therefore immutable time’ and the ‘absence of the concept of individualism’. This distinctive Weltanschauung has traditionally affected the ‘ways of doing things’, how ‘we’ relate to others, and the relationship between the citizen and the state (obligations, law). Thus, Hirschon contends, the imposition of an economic paradigm with roots in northern Europe and the West confronts awkward cultural barriers and provokes misunderstandings even around common terms of reference.

Today, the questions of culture in relation to both the economy and the state are inextricably bound up with the ‘Europe’ of the EU and its terms of membership. Pagoulatos, in this volume and elsewhere (2003), has outlined the EU’s role in Greece’s transition from being a ‘developmental’ to a ‘stabilization’ state. The single European market programme—with its abolition of national regulatory barriers to open competition—and the single European currency’s disciplinary rules have transformed the environment of the Greek economy. Added to these, the EU’s structural funds (for regional development assistance) and its Common Agricultural Policy have also changed Greece, not least with new funding support. Yet, it would be misleading to simply assert that the EU’s impact has been consistently profound. There is much variation in the type of policy instrumentation involved in EU law, the constraints of regulation, and the spread of funding, producing asymmetric domestic effects. In contemporary political science, these variations of domestic impact are
typically described as outcomes of ‘Europeanization’: a term created, in part, to gauge asymmetries and contrasts (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). Over the last decade or more there have been an increasing number of academic papers and doctoral theses examining Greece’s Europeanization: many have asserted the significant role of the EU in stimulating domestic change (cf. Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008).

EU actions have also constituted new sets of benchmarks by which the domestic state could be judged, and new rules that Greece found difficult to match. Falkner et al. (2005) identified Greece with a ‘world of neglect’ with respect to domestic compliance with EU law. Official EU data have consistently shown Greece to have one of the worst records in terms of the infringement procedures instigated against it, in the transposition of single market legislation, and in adoption of the provisions of the Lisbon Programme of 2000 on socio-economic structural reform (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008: 5–11). Greece’s sovereign debt crisis in 2010 produced further exposure. After the revelations in a 2004 audit carried out by the economy minister Giorgos Alogoskoufis—accepted by the European Union (amidst much controversy within Greece) as showing that Greece had actually failed to comply with the Eurozone deficit rule since acceding to the currency bloc (Featherstone, 2008)—came the announcement in October 2009 by his successor (but one), Giorgos Papakonstantinou, that Greece’s budget deficit had been underestimated by a factor of 3. This further strengthened the belief in the international financial markets (and the EU institutions) that Greece could not be relied upon and was too weak to stay in the EU’s core. ‘Europeanization’—a process of emulation so lauded under Premier Simitis and his ‘Europeanizers’—was now exposing Greece as a failing state (Featherstone, 2011).

The crisis rekindled the historical parallels of Greece needing international help in previous eras to rescue its credit position and re-establish stability. Greece has effectively defaulted three times before in the modern era: in the 1830s, in 1893, and in 1932 (see Lykogiannis, 2002: 27, 35–36; Mazower, 1991). Following Greece’s humiliating defeat in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897—and the damage to the fiscal position of the Athens’ government following the war indemnity it was obliged to pay Turkey—British (and French) creditors insisted on the creation of the International Financial Control Commission to oversee Greece’s finances. A programme of fiscal consolidation and monetary discipline ensued, though it did not last long (Lazaretou, 2005). Later, foreign creditors via the League of Nations were able to insist on the creation of an independent central bank in 1927 in Athens, which was itself linked to Greece’s adoption of the inter-war gold standard.

Greece’s difficulties in 2010–11 with the disciplinary strictures of the Eurozone may be regarded as a barometer of its own domestic failure or, alterna-
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tively, as part of the cause of that failure. Tsakalotos, in this volume, takes the latter view (Anastasakis and Singh, 2012; Allison and Nicolaïdis, 1997). He argues that, indeed, the structural provisions of the Eurozone and wider EU policies constitute an ideological imposition of neo-liberalism that serves to exploit and undermine Greece’s economic development. In short, the crisis is seen as inevitable for a country in the position of Greece, and the solution, he argues, is not the May 2010 bailout and its ‘Memorandum’, laying down further economic liberalization, but rather the choice of a different path. Similar sentiments marked many of the street protests in Greece against the austerity measures imposed by the Papandreou government. These protests were often violent and received much television coverage across the world. Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, whilst prevaricating at crucial points, was seen in the Greek press in the spring of 2010 as intent on forcing extreme punishment on Greece for its self-indulgent laxity in the past in failing to control public spending and borrowing. The popular press in Germany, like Bild, suggested that the Greek government should ease its fiscal position by selling off a few islands or turning the Acropolis into a theme park for tourists. Never slow to rise to the challenge, the Greek Deputy PM, Theodoros Pangalos, responded by reviving complaints about the inadequacy of German reparations to the country after 1945 (Guardian, 28 February 2010). The reactions on both sides simply underscored the difference of philosophy (and cultural norms) affecting the single currency regime: in particular, the German tradition of ‘ordoliberalism’, with its stress on discipline and stability being created at home, contrasted with those of Greece and others that wished to share in the monetary credibility established by the German authorities (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999). With a further bail-out needed in 2011, the German chancellor seemed to become a little more flexible (some would say ‘solidaristic’) in her stance on the euro’s rules and governance. More specifically, Tsakalotos makes the telling point that the high savings ratio and export orientation of the German economy prompt structural imbalances that imperil the position of smaller, peripheral economies by exporting credit dependency.

The popular backlash against the ‘rescue’ package of 2010 threatened to alter the balance of Greek public attitudes to membership of the European Union. The introduction of the euro in 2002 had been accompanied by a dip in public support and by the rise of LA.OS as a right-wing populist splinter party breaking away from New Democracy and following a type of euroscepticism (mainly calling for Greece to not pull its punches at the EU level) (Vasilopoulou, 2011; Verney, 2011; Featherstone, 2008). The austerity measures of 2010 onwards were fanning the ‘underdog culture’ identified by Diamandouros (2000), increasing the sense of vulnerability and victimhood as wages and jobs were cut. The ‘Indignados’—the protestors camped in Syntagma Square outside Parliament in 2011—emulated a popular protest first wit-
Asserting their non-party stance, they were, in fact, a rather motley collection—comprising among others both the nationalist Right and leftists, as well as public servants threatened by the cuts and ‘perpetual’ students fearing university reforms—coalescing in their opposition to the reform packages that presaged less statism and more market competition in the name of ‘Europe’. Whilst the austerity measures involved real pain, populist opposition indicated that the crisis with Europe had both a cultural and an economic dimension.

The Greek bail-out of May 2010 now involved the EU in an unprecedented quasi-colonial role. The loan agreed by Eurozone governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave rise to the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the IMF, which established an office in Athens to monitor very closely (on a quarterly basis) the extent to which the Papandreou government was abiding by the terms of the ‘Memorandum’—the infamous ‘Μνημόνιο’—attached to the rescue. Not since the Civil War and its early aftermath had a foreign ‘embassy’ intervened so closely. In September 2011, the EU Commission further established its own ‘Task Force’ to help Greece avail itself more readily of EU resources and opportunities—compensating for the ineffectiveness of state bureaucracy in Athens. The Greek crisis was certainly pulling the EU into areas previously unknown to it, obliging it in particular to review and extend its system of governance for the Eurozone. But the 2010 bail-out and the second bail-out of 2011 also changed the domestic perspectives on ‘Europe’. The very same countries that ‘modernizing’ Greece had sought to emulate for the last century or more were now the instigators of massive domestic austerity. Europe per se had never been such a tight, determinant constraint than it appeared after the 2010 debt crisis.

Dominant discourses on European integration

The present controversies over the EU’s role in Greece’s economic woes need to be contrasted with earlier notions of the utility of Europe to Greece. For the EU is also represented domestically by dominant discourses that structure and facilitate its effects. In the Greek case, these show significant historical variation even in the period of the metapolitefsi (post-1974). The discourse in Greece also differs from those of many of its partners. The British, Irish and Scandinavian discourses on the value of the EU in terms of access to markets and their concerns with issues of sovereignty (and neutrality) have been relatively absent in the Greek case. Similarly, the relevance of Europe in matters of human and civil rights has been much more limited and local than in Turkey or Kosovo, at least until recently. The French and German narrative of Europe as a frame for rapprochement has been relevant only latterly in relation to the endorsement under Simitis of Turkey’s bid to join the EU.
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The dominant Greek discourses have combined the strategic and the ideational. European integration has been a strategic interest in relation to the consolidation of the new democratic regime after 1974; as a means of gaining protection and advantage over Turkey; and, as a source of economic aid—to some, a ‘cash-cow’. But Europe has also exerted a normative influence within Greek politics. Whilst it may be said to have imposed economic reforms, it has also shaped and legitimized the advocacy of ‘modernizing’ or liberal reforms. Further, as already noted, participation in Europe has impacted on Greek identity—with the strategic consequence of being equated with Europe’s core, avoiding marginalization within the EU.

These thematic emphases are evident from a brief comparison of the discourses of successive Greek prime ministers since 1974. Europe as a buttress to the consolidation of the new democratic regime was of unique relevance to Constantine Karamanlis, as was the perceived gain in terms of national defence against Turkey. There was also a time imperative: Greece had to join the European Community (as it then was) before Spain or Portugal, also newly democratizing, to gain full advantage. Karamanlis introduced the theme of Europe as a force for modernization—indeed, he had begun to do so at the start of the 1960s (in the context of what became Greece’s Association Agreement)—and this was taken up most notably by Costas Simitis much later, especially after 1996. For both Karamanlis and Simitis, the modernizing effects were seen as embracing economic, social, and institutional changes.

It was the discourse of Andreas Papandreou in the 1970s and early 1980s that represented an abrupt break in the equation of the EC with the modernization of Greece. Not only did he reject the malevolent influence of the US on Greece’s internal affairs, he was also dismissive of the European Community (EC) as an alternative frame: indeed, it was a modern Trojan horse of American capitalist hegemony. According to his party, PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement), EC entry would ‘consolidate the peripheral role of the country as a satellite of the capitalist system; will render national planning impossible; will seriously threaten Greek industry; and will lead to the extinction of Greek farmers’ (Featherstone, 1988: 178). Instead, PASOK proposed in March 1976 that Greece instigate the creation of a Mediterranean Community as an alternative to EC entry (Featherstone, 1988: 177). It was only in the aftermath of the EC providing a much-needed economic loan in October 1985—paralleled by a domestic austerity package—that Papandreou’s narrative on the EC changed. After returning from the Luxembourg summit of December of the same year (which had settled the Single European Act and its provisions on the ‘neo-liberal’ single market programme), Papandreou asked, rhetorically, whether a ‘united Europe’ was actually so opposed to the aims of PASOK and his government, arguing that it was not. In addition to the loan, Papandreou had secured exceptional EC funding for
Greece in the form of the ‘Integrated Mediterranean Programmes’ as the price for his agreement to the entry of Spain and Portugal. Funding gains had triumphed over domestic rhetorical flirtations on the Left. Thus, before its participation within the single European market and the ‘euro’ currency, Europe was seen as a more acceptable source of financial rescue than the IMF, and Europe thus levered Greece’s stabilization programme of the time.

To the centre-right, Papandreou had left a legacy that threatened Greece’s marginalization. As prime minister, Constantine Mitsotakis saw Greece as slipping behind the quickening pace of developments in Europe:

Greece is behind in the European race towards ‘1992’ and Economic and Monetary Union. It is necessary to immediately implement a four year economic policy that will guarantee the reconstruction, the structural adjustment, the economic and social development, [and] convergence with our European partners…There is no other alternative for our country. Either we will follow the rest of the European people, or we will be marginalised… (Mitsotakis 1990: 15 & 18, quoted in Xiarchogiannopoulou, 2011: 90).

His short-lived government, with a precarious parliamentary majority, was fixated with this strategic imperative. Indeed, the speed of its intended adjustment contributed to its increasing unpopularity and the return of Andreas Papandreou in 1993, advocating a softer convergence process.

It was also Europe that defined the overriding project of Costas Simitis as prime minister (PM). It crafted his notion of ‘modernization’ and it identified his factional supporters within PASOK. Again, the discourse stressed time: the need for Greece to embark on a big leap to catch up with its partners. Real convergence meant structural reform at home. Greece had suffered from lost opportunities and indulged in internal divisions which had kept it distant from the new trends in Europe. The new uncertainties of the contemporary world—technology, globalization, demography—would be mitigated by participation within the EU’s core. At the same time, Greece needed to emulate others—Romano Prodi was talking in the same vein—and build a new ‘social state’. ‘Europe’ to Simitis was thus both a lever and a normative influence.

Though similarly well-disposed towards the EU, George Papandreou as PM had to respond to Greece’s changed relationship in the context of the sovereign debt crisis. Papandreou told Parliament that the future of Greece was ‘at stake’ (30 April 2010). There was much confession of past ‘sins’ by the Greek state with respect to fiscal profligacy, corruption and waste (Der Spiegel, 22 February 2010). Later, there was more reflexivity: the continuing difficulties of Greece to resolve its debt crisis were defined as a test of the appropriateness of the rules and governance of the Eurozone more generally (Time, 9 April 2010). Internationally, observers saw the very survival of the euro as in question because of the Greek debt crisis: a default by Athens threatened a financial crisis akin to that following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008. Greece had become the test-case for the future survival of the euro. After the negotiation of a second ‘bail-out’ in July 2011, the tone shifted: Greece’s failings appeared all the greater, but the reaction was now tempered by Europe’s sense that its weak partner should not be pushed any harder. Europe’s frustration with the rejection of the second bail-out by Antonis Samaras, leader of Nea Demokrateia/New Democracy (ND), created sympathy for Papandreou’s dilemma and a recognition of the force of the domestic protests. Europe and Greece were, more than ever, two levels for a delicate and complex strategic interaction.

Thus, over the course of the metapolitefsi, the dominant discourses on Europe have shifted. The unpredictable outcome of the 2010 crisis notwithstanding, the early Andreas Papandreou represented something of a break in a longer pattern of the EC/EU as an ally of the country’s democratic consolidation and its modernization. Both strategically and normatively, Europe served to bring Greece more in step with key developments in the advanced international economies and give it increased confidence. The fact that Europe also provided much desired subsidies and investment funding simply added to the list of positives with which it was synonymous.

Popularly, the perceived effects of Greece being ‘more European’ were extensive, ranging over the role and functioning of the state; a more technocratic orientation to effective governance; the empowerment of civil society; revised notions of citizenship; participation in various pan-European networks; and a different mode of cultural behaviour. What was ascribed to Europe was far more than Europe (that is, the EU) had reason to claim, given the limitations of its own competences.

The shock of the 2010 crisis was to disturb these comfortable assumptions and to confront the Greek public with awkward questions about Greece’s ability to abide by European rules and standards. The shock reawakened longer-term ambiguities and tensions over Greece’s relations with Europe.

The present volume

In an insightful recent paper, Pagoulatos and Yataganas (2011) summed up modern Greece’s entanglement as ‘Europe Othered, Europe Enlisted, Europe Possessed’. ‘Othered’ includes the fear of Greece being marginalized by Europe; ‘enlisted’ refers to Europe as a source of empowerment; and ‘possessed’ signals Europe’s debt to Greece’s glorious past. A longer and broader perspective, looking at and beyond EU membership to examine the different dimensions of what ‘Europe’ has meant over the last century to Greece, might revise and expand the sequence as: Europe possessed (that is, Greece’s legacy); Europe ‘othering’ (referring to the othering of the Turks); Europe discriminating and legitimating (that is, a modernizing référentiel); and Europe constraining (strategically) and instrumentalizing (actual laws and policy reforms).
The focus of Pagoulatos and Yataganas is on public intellectuals, and of course this is, in many respects, apposite. Those they define as academics, prominent journalists, artists, novelists, poets, and musicians have had relatively more prominence in Greek public debate than elsewhere. In this volume several authors focus on them—Beaton necessarily so, for example. But the scope of the present volume is wider and systemic: the conduct of foreign policy; the domestic political economy of the state; the implications of the 2010 crisis; the position of minorities; the creation of a Greek identity in relation to Turkey, and so on. Social contrasts are important: crudely, the embrace of ‘Europe’ by many of Greece’s professional and artistic elites contrasts with the fear and introversion of Diamandouros’ ‘underdogs’.

A differentiation by time is also relevant here (Goetz, 2006). Oscillation between an inwardness and an outwardness of perspective has structured social and political identities. Beaton, in his chapter, refers to the essay of Giorgos Theotokas (‘Free Spirit’, 1929) which confidently asserted the need for Greek writers and intellectuals to engage and embrace with the rest of Europe. Tellingly, after the traumatic events of the 1922 ‘catastrophe’, Beaton reports Theotokas as arguing that ‘No one expects anything of Greece. There’s no hope anywhere. This moment is a truly wonderful moment. At moments like these, if the right people are found, sometimes the most beautiful things happen.’ The time offered an opportunity. Later, from the 1940s to the beginning of the 1960s, the perspective on Europe shifted ground: the artistic impetus was to move beyond modernism and attack Greece’s cultural dependence on Europe. The lack of synchronization between the cycles of the arts and politics is a fascinating subject in itself. Variation over time is very evident, of course, in the fluctuating fortunes of the Great Powers or the rise of the EU. Europe ‘hit home’ far more strongly with the single market and the ‘euro’ than could have been forecast when Greece joined the European Community in 1981.

It is evident from the overview of this chapter that what ‘Europe’ has meant to modern Greece has displayed contrasts and fluctuations. The domestic discourse on Europe has sought inclusion; aspired to a normative assimilation; and favoured the reform empowerment from Europe. But juxtaposed with this positive, voluntaristic attachment has been an underlying sense of vulnerability—fearing marginalization, disappointed with a laggardly performance, aware of economic dependence, and sensitive to regional security threats. The discourse has been prone to swings of pride and achievement contrasted with embarrassment and failure. Such swings feed on the bifurcating self-image and sense of purpose that are at the heart of the modern Greek psyche. Few other European states have experienced the angst, the constraints, and the adjustment associated with ‘Europe’ as much as modern Greece. Understanding the contours of the recent economic crisis in Greece requires the present to be
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contextualized in the many ‘Europe’ of modern Greek history. And this is the purpose of the current volume. In doing this, the understanding of what ‘Europe’ entails more generally is enhanced.
The aim of this chapter is to explore Greek attitudes to Europe and European ideas in the later part of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth, and to consider how they bear on the more recent integration of Greece in European organizations.

A number of overlapping concepts are in play in the nineteenth century in Greece’s relations with Europe. They include progress, civilization and modernization. The Great Powers of Europe are major players, engaging with Greece both separately and together in various combinations. I aim to disentangle some of these concepts for the period from the 1890s to the 1920s, and in doing so to throw light on the attraction for Greece of the ‘European idea’ or ideas. For the purposes of this chapter Europe is a cultural and political idea or construct, not primarily a geographical expression.

The period falls into two distinct halves: that which ends in 1922–23, in which the prevailing Greek ideology is that of the Great Idea (Megali Idea); and that of the later 1920s, in which policies are cautious, non-expansionary, and ideas of Balkan and wider European federations are advanced but fail.

From the time of the war of independence, Europe plays a crucial role in Greek conceptions of the nature of the new state and its institutions, and in political calculations of how to institute and develop the free state. This dou-
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The aspect of Europe—the ideal and the practical—has been present ever since. Europe is on the one hand a source of enlightened values, institutions, constitutional thought, all of them things that are of value to Greece in state building; and on the other a source of diplomatic, political, economic and financial support in the achievement of Greece’s secular ends. In the first basket the values come from a common European stock deriving ultimately from Locke and other Enlightenment thinkers. In the second basket the support, or interference, comes from individual states, which though they are sometimes indiscriminately called ‘Europe’ are joined together, if at all, only in temporary groupings, called ‘the Concert of Europe’, or ‘The Protecting Powers’, or simply ‘the Great Powers’ or ‘the Powers’.

The connection between Greece and these European powers was explored by Elli Skopetea in her book *To Protypo Vasileio* (‘The Model Kingdom’) (Skopetea, 1988). She conveys very well the feeling of Greeks that they were under observation by the Europeans, and expected to live up to a standard. Greeks internalized this feeling. This is why the Greek press monitored obsessively—and still monitors—the European press, reporting every last word of praise or blame. The Greek end of this relationship was composed of a mixture of respect for power and for ‘civilization’ and resentment at Europe’s neglect of Greek interests. In Skopetea’s account the Greeks had two standards of comparison for themselves: their glorious ancestors, who were their ticket of admission to the European train—and the modern Europeans whom they wished to emulate.

Ambivalence about Europe and Europeans—Makriyannis’s ‘hateful foreigners’—extended to the *heterochthon* Greeks, those from outside the Kingdom. The Greeks, it was thought, must behave themselves so as to win respect of the civilized nations and show themselves different from the barbarian Turks. At the same time the Greeks are superior, since it was they who passed on to Europe the legacy of ancient Greece, while the enlightened West incurred a debt which it does not repay. For the poet Tertsetis, Europe is the trustee of this ancient legacy, and the young people of Greece must compete in virtue with the civilized nations of Europe (Delivoria, 2009).

The ‘Europe’ that Greeks refer to in the later nineteenth century is a flexible concept. Sometimes they mean the Great Powers of Europe. Sometimes, when talking of the civilized world, they mean something wider and vaguer, which would include for example Denmark, homeland of King George I and of some of those who adorned Athens with its architectural masterpieces, and Switzerland, a main source of Philhellenism and of codified law. Rarely do they mean the neighbouring countries of the Balkan Peninsula, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Romania, or those old European nations swallowed up by the Russian and Hapsburg empires.

Taking Crete as an example, I wish to show how the idea of Europe encompassed the actions and values of the Great Powers. Because of the inter-
communal troubles in Crete, the island was occupied by the Powers in 1897: Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and also Germany and Austria, though the latter two soon dropped out of the consortium. The interallied occupation soon generated a novel form of governance, in the form of a high commissioner, Prince George, with a mandate from the Powers, with a Council of advisers (including the thirty-five-year-old Eleftherios Venizelos, until he fell out with the prince), and with a constitution that gave the prince virtually absolute powers. It could hardly last and it broke down with Venizelos’ ‘revolution’ at Theriso. Here is Venizelos on the dynamics of Great Power involvement in the struggle for Cretan enosis:

…despite the theoretical recognition by International Law of the equality of different states, the Great Powers have long adopted the right of intervention in the internal affairs of the weaker states. However much this touches the pride of the latter, it is impossible to deny that through the systematication of such intervention there is coming about a change in International Law which serves the interests of civilisation (politismos) and tends towards the organisation of the European family, on a system analogous to that of the American (con)federation (sympoliteia) (Venizelos in Kiryx, Chania, 11 August 1909, quoted in Svolopoulos, 2005: 47).

Earlier he said that there could be no Chinese walls between states in the present family of civilized states.

On this account Great Power intervention served the cause of civilization. Europe represented progress and civilization (even, one may say, if European powers beat each other to pulp, as Germany did France in 1870–71). Greece aspired to join the family of civilized European states. Within the broad European spectrum, Greeks distinguished between the Powers according to their own political preferences and the demands of the moment. Venizelos, for instance, for the most part chose England and France as his preferred models or sources, France for law and political thought and the finer aspects of civilization, England for experience in parliamentary democracy. This choice only became crystallized during World War I, when for proponents of liberal values Germany became identified with barbarism. But the streams of European culture flowing into Greece came from many different European sources.

The state had to demonstrate its credentials to the Europeans, and to its own internal Greek audience. The comparisons, as Skopetea argued, were both with the ancient Greeks and with the modern Europeans. The Olympic Games of 1896 were a good example of the process. These were intended to be a sign of the privileged relationship of Greece to the ancient world and the way Greece respected—and projected—its ancient legacy, and also of the growing civility and Europeanness of Greek society and institutions. They were an aspect of modernity but closely related to antiquity and dependent on it for most of their allure. In taking to sports ahead of its Balkan neighbours Greece was borrowing a feature of the industrialized West. In its own
terms, it was joining the ‘civilized world’ in this pursuit. Athens would not have been chosen if Greece had not been developing rapidly as a European nation state, with accommodation, transport, infrastructure and the appurtenances of civilization. At the opening ceremony Constantine, the crown prince, put this unambiguously: through these Games Greece was ‘binding herself more closely to the rest of the civilised world’ (Llewellyn-Smith, 2004: 159). And who represented the civilized world? A handful of European countries, and the United States of America.

The best expression of these Greek ambitions was the splendid lefkoma published by the newspaper Akropolis on the occasion of the Games (Akropolis, 1896). It was designed to show, in the words of the historian and future Prime Minister Spyridon Lambros, that ‘the Greece of 1896 has far outdistanced the Greece of 1862’ (Llewellyn-Smith, 2004: 198 and 272 n7). The great and good of Greek politics and society and literature praised the contribution of the Games to Greece’s reputation as a civilized nation and its ability to carry through a major project. Some of the greatest Greek writers were willingly harnessed to this nationalist project, including Papadiamantis and Palamas, with results that have been interestingly analyzed by David Ricks (Ricks, 2009).

The main intellectual propagandist of Greece’s contribution to the Olympic Games was Dimitrios Vikelas, who was one of the early proponents of the importance of tourism to the Greek economy. As a prominent member of the London Greek community, and then the Paris one, before settling in Greece, Vikelas was well placed to mediate between ‘Europe’ and Greece. He said, ‘Through more frequent contact with foreigners, there will come about a more rapid and complete integration in the general community of Europe. I am not looking merely to the wallets of the travellers. I expect a moral benefit from the increasing association with civilisation from outside’ (Vikelas, 1997: 138–9).

The crown prince picked up this theme with the observation that the foreign athletes would ‘carry home with them excellent memories of our country. We are in a position to show them real progress in all the branches of human activity…That is why the celebration of the Olympic Games at Athens will have an undoubted moral utility for us’ (crown prince’s speech quoted in Llewellyn-Smith, 2004: 247–8).

Viewed in these terms, the Games were not simply an athletic festival; hosting them was a moral duty for the Greeks, imposed by the quest for progress in a world where Europe, inspired by ancient Greece, was seen as the modern source of progress and civilization.

The United States, as a highly successful participant in these first Olympic Games of the modern era, was of course an object of this propaganda drive of the Greek state, as well as the Europeans. But it is fair to say that Europe
remained at this stage and for many years to come the main object of Greek emulation and aspiration, even while Greeks increasingly looked to the United States as the destination of preference for emigration—a phenomenon which was to have profound consequences in the mid twentieth century in the shape of a Greek American community that exercised influence on US foreign policy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the term ‘Great Powers’ normally encompassed the larger European powers and not the United States; and by the time of the Paris Peace Conference, when the wealth and power of the US made it a major factor in post-war reconstruction, the term was going out of fashion in the transitory post-war world of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points.

As well as being the fount of progress and civilization, the Powers were the key to achieving Greece’s foreign policy objectives. Venizelos saw this more clearly, and drew the consequences more quickly, than others. He also differed from his peers in drawing wider conclusions. He wrote, with reference to Crete, ‘I am convinced that the good will of the Powers is a necessary condition not only of the solution of the Cretan question through the lifting of the military occupation but also of the solution of all our national questions’ (Venizelos speech before the Cretan Assembly, October 1906, quoted in Svolopoulos, 2005: 47 and footnote 4). There you have Venizelos’s later foreign policy in embryo—which means the main thrust of Greece’s foreign policy until 1922, because there was no other coherent stream of policy, only a kind of hopeful and introverted neutralism.

The Great Powers of Europe, referred to sometimes as the Great Powers and sometimes simply as Europe, thus represented both civilization and coercion. If their power and influence, both peaceable and coercive, could be harnessed to the Greek chariot carrying Greek interests, that would foreshadow the solution of Greece’s foreign policy problems. The question was how to harness them. One answer, growing directly out of nineteenth century debates, was to show that Greece was a serious power in the east, reform the finances, reform the armed forces—that is, come closer to the Great Powers themselves and borrow from them, and thus come closer to ‘Europe’. And that is what Greece set out to do, and did, in Venizelos’s first administrations, between 1910 and 1914.

This idea of coming closer is seen as a connection between unequal and sovereign nation states. It does not contain the idea of incorporation or membership of a club, despite Venizelos’ passing reference to a *sympoliteia* or confederation. Choices had to be made between the Powers, by Greece and its Balkan neighbours, according to political and cultural and technological preferences. But even when Europe was divided by the Great War, Greece’s choice under Venizelos to go with the Entente could be seen as a ‘European’ choice, because the Entente’s prevailing values, of democracy and parliamen-
tarianism, could be seen as Europe’s true values, German militarism being an aberration. And no doubt some of Venizelos’ Royalist opponents would have seen things in similar terms of values, but upside down, for example Metaxas.1

The policy for which Venizelos needed this Great Power support was the policy of the Great Idea. The agonizing question posed towards the end of the nineteenth century was why that policy had been so unsuccessful. Venizelos thought he had the answer, in the romanticism of the Idea and the lack of systematic work on the part of Greece and Crete to solve internal problems, develop the economy, and thus create a platform for a successful foreign policy.

But was there any idea of Europe as something more than the main source of civilization, money, kings, military technology and military intervention, whether for humanitarian or less idealistic purposes (usually the purposes were mixed)? The quotation above by Venizelos about the organization of the European family in a sympoliteia is suggestive. Throughout Venizelos’ career he was always attracted to ideas of cooperation between states, whether the League of Nations, of which Greece was a founding member, or the series of treaties of friendship with neighbours of 1928–30. But at this early stage, before the Great War, such ideas were idealistic abstractions. They did not belong within the domain of practical politics.

Practical politics was to harness Greece to those Great Powers that could be most helpful in securing Greece’s nationalist ends and the achievement of the Great Idea. We see this first in the rapidity with which Venizelos moved to invite military missions to Greece before securing the treaty with Bulgaria that made the first Balkan War possible in 1912: the French military mission, the British naval mission and the Italian gendarmerie mission.

These ‘European’ missions were part of the answer to Greece’s search for expertise and technology, as factors of modernization. But the three Powers were seen as separate entities, members of a European ‘family’, but autonomous states to be balanced and played off against each other, certainly not as part of an incipient federal or confederal system. The appeal to the superior technology and ‘progress’ of Europe could not disguise that uncomfortable choices had to be made between patrons; and this naturally led to friction between foreign advisers and Greek staffs and politicians, for example over naval procurement. The European powers were in sharp competition.

The Great War changed everything. Existential choices were posed for all the countries of the European periphery, Spain no less than Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria (and of course Turkey). Venizelos’ choice was couched in the language of European values, democracy, and parliamentary institutions, as opposed to German militarism. It is difficult to know how much weight to give this value-laden approach in comparison with the strategic argument that Britain as the greatest maritime power would not be beaten. Perhaps all
one can say is that it was convenient that strategic arguments coincided with values. With the end of the war and the reshaping of Europe through the peace conference, the small countries of the European periphery had to adjust to new balances between themselves, a new political geography, new international organizations, and above all a changed relationship with the former Great Powers.

For Greece the shocking events of 1922–23 were, as has often been said, a watershed. From that time on the Great Idea was dead. Greece was deprived of a master narrative of foreign policy, and had to look for a new one. The demands of economic reconstruction and refugee settlement were paramount. Greece needed security, which meant resolving outstanding issues with neighbours and looking for a more distanced relationship with the Great Powers, including Britain, in the desire to maintain as much freedom of action for Greece as possible in a threatening international climate.

The new post-war international institutions attracted Venizelos out of practical necessity (refugee settlement demanded close involvement with the League of Nations, and there was always a pressing need for loans) and out of a hope that they might contribute to collective security. In this he was typical. Greek foreign policy tends to look favourably in principle to regional, European, or wider groupings. But his approach to security in south-east Europe was pragmatic. Greece needed the treaties with its neighbours so as to free its hands for reconstruction.

In practice, this led to a search by Greece for security primarily by a chain of agreements and adjustments with neighbours: hence the friendship treaties of the late 1920s and 1930 with Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey. But alongside this, in keeping with the spirit of the times, Greece showed a new interest in collective security and regional arrangements. The main expression of this was the discussion of a Balkan Federation in the four Balkan Conferences launched and presided over by Alexandros Papanastasiou between 1930 and 1933 (Svolopoulos, 1999; Rozakis, 1987).

Papanastasiou saw security in terms of concentric circles: a Balkan federation within a larger European grouping. In the same spirit Greece favoured Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s ideas of ‘Pan Europe’ and Aristide Briand’s proposals for a European Federation, launched at the League of Nations in September 1928 and developed in May 1930 in a detailed memorandum.

Coudenhove called Venizelos the most impressive of all the foreign statesmen who visited Vienna and discussed Pan Europe with him (Coudenhove-Kalergi 1953: 130–31). And Greece was among those countries that supported Briand’s proposals (on Greece’s response to the European initiative, see Svolopoulos 1999: 219–37). But while expressing general support for the idea, Venizelos insisted both to Coudenhove and to Briand on the need to include Turkey in any such European Federation. His attitude was fundamentally
pragmatic and linked to the security policies that led him to the Greek-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1930. He therefore sought actively to extract from discussions of new forms of interstate cooperation what was of specific value to Greece in its regional setting.

Venizelos wrote in December 1929 that the fact that a statesman of Briand’s prestige had embraced such ideas showed they had moved from the hands of poets to those of practical doers. The Greek government’s reply to Briand’s memorandum—despatched while Venizelos was still prime minister—stated that the government ‘considers that the idea of organising among the states of Europe a state of permanent and systematic economical and political cooperation, in the spirit and within the framework of the League of Nations, answers to the most noble of inspirations and to the true interests of the European peoples’ (Svolopoulos, 1999: 224–5). It added that ‘Greece would view with sympathy the participation of Turkey, which like Greece is a Balkan and Mediterranean country, in the European Federal Union.’

Venizelos had the support of most of Greece’s experienced foreign policy politicians including Nikolaos Politis, Andreas Michalakopoulos, Alexandros Zaimis, and Papanastasiou; Dimitrios Maximos, foreign minister in the populist Tsaldaris government which succeeded the Liberals, shared these European views. Venizelos was well aware of the practical difficulties of Briand’s ideas. But the door tantalizingly pushed half open by Briand was one that Greece wanted to keep open for itself to be able to pass through when the time was right.

Was Venizelos or Papanastasiou being naïve? Papanastasiou possibly, Venizelos no. They both saw clearly that Greek security and economic progress required a stable international environment in Europe. One way to achieve this was through bilateral agreements with neighbours. Another was to support attempts at a European federation which might avert another great war. If the attempt failed, as it did, that need not be the end of the story. There was no downside for Greece in visionary Europeanism provided it was salted with caution, and approached with a close eye on Greece’s particular regional interests.

With the collapse of the Great Idea in 1922–23, and the end of Hellenism in Asia Minor, there was no place any longer for an expansionary approach to foreign policy, nor for a Greek national civilizing mission. Yet idealism was not dead. Amidst all the practical preoccupations of reconstruction, refugee settlement, economic problems, and refighting the old battles of the Schism, the ideas of ‘progress and civilization’ became loosely linked with ideas about European federation. This was an area into which the earlier aspirations for progress and civilization could be channelled, and in which the moral concerns identified by Vikelas found a place. In this way Greece could come closer to Europe. Greece was a minor player, hardly more than an observer, in
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the larger European discussions of the Briand initiative. Even so, we can
glimpse in the Greek response to Briand a foretaste of Greek responses to the
European idea as it developed, rapidly and intensively, after World War II.

The ideas explored in this chapter are still alive today. Europe is still seen as
a source of political, social and cultural ideas, and of financial, economic and
technological expertise and support. The difference from earlier times is that
as a member of the European Union Greece has a share in decisions bearing
on these matters. But while the view of Europe as a repository and source of
values is still alive, so is the ambivalence about Europe which emerged in
nineteenth-century Greek attitudes to the larger European Powers’ interfer-
ence in Greece’s internal affairs, and to the materialism and lack of spiritual-
ity of Western culture as compared with the Orthodox tradition. Such
negative perceptions have been revived in some parts of Greek society as a
result of the perceived encroachment of Europe on Greek independence
through the Mnemonio (Memorandum) and the monitoring of Greece’s
behaviour by outsiders from the European Commission and the IMF. On the
other side of the balance, and probably more lasting, is the positive sense of
belonging to the main European club, as an equal sovereign member.

The conclusion of this chapter is that, despite the undercurrent of ambiv-
alance in Greek attitudes to European institutions and aspects of European
policies, European ideas and values are strongly rooted in Greek culture and
the Greek view of the world. This is not surprising given that Greeks see
European ideas as springing from Greek sources and that Greece is a part of
the European family and of European institutions. The main thrust of Greek
history since the time of the Enlightenment, and the direction of Greece’s
view, have been mainly towards Europe and recently towards the United
States also. The consequences, in consumerism, materialism and vulgarity, may
be disturbing for those who see the West as subversive of Greek traditional
values (for a British example of such thinking, see Sherrard, 1959/1992). Therefore some ambivalence and tension will no doubt remain in Greek atti-
tudes to Europe. That is true also, albeit for very different reasons, of the
peripheral country on the other side of Europe, the United Kingdom!
Europe, Modernity, Modernism

In Greece, Modernity has always been more or less synonymous with Europe—not least because the achievement of nation-statehood in 1830 was itself a local triumph for the modernizing politics of liberal nationalism that were emerging in western Europe at the time. Ever since, Greeks in all walks of life have tended to equate a usually undefined ‘Europe’ with ‘progress’, with ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ (the Greek word for both, politismos, was coined by Adamandios Korais in Paris in the early nineteenth century), or least as a kind of superior benchmark, in varying degrees to be emulated, feared and resented.

This was never more true than during the decades when the self-defining ‘high’ arts in Greece were dominated by the movement now known as Modernism—roughly from the late 1920s to the early 1960s. Modernism is a cultural phenomenon originating in western Europe. It emerged in literary Paris during the 1860s and had spread to every European country and the United States by the early twentieth century. Modernism in this sense is understood as the artistic response to Modernity, and involved radical, sometimes revolutionary shifts at once formal (atonal music, non-representative painting and sculpture, free verse in poetry, stream-of-consciousness in fiction) and thematic. These artistic phenomena in their turn came to be rec-
recognized as further symptoms of a developing Modernity. In this way, Modernism in the arts does not merely reflect Modernity in the world; it also contributes directly to it.

Literary Modernism gave Greek writers and intellectuals a medium in which to articulate the changing perspectives of their time on Europe, as seen specifically from the southeastern corner of the continent, from Greece. For the writers I shall be discussing here, this involves a high degree of self-consciousness about their own art. To what extent are European-derived forms of artistic expression the best ones, or even appropriate at all, to articulate a uniquely Greek perspective on the Siamese twins Europe and Modernity? As we shall see, a critique of Europe as a model for emulation immediately places the literary values and techniques of Modernism, too, under the spotlight.

The three decades during which Modernism dominated literary production in Greece saw momentous events in the country and huge shifts in attitudes to Europe. To what extent ‘high’ art of this sort can be said to reflect wider social attitudes is of course debatable. Self-consciously literary writers may be among society’s most articulate members, but this does not necessarily mean that they are particularly attuned to what others are thinking around them. Sometimes, surely, they are—and this was never more true in Greece than during the Second World War and the Occupation. And after the war, the polar divisions in society between the Left and the non-Left, the legacy of six years of civil war, are fairly accurately reflected in the literary production of the time. It would be naïve, though, to read poetry or novels as a substitute for public opinion polls.

A broader picture would have to be expanded to take account of popular art-forms during the same period. Almost certainly such an approach would reveal significant differences. For instance, the values that emerge from the rebetika songs of the urban sub-culture have rather little to do with western Europe. These songs emerged among the poorest classes of the late Ottoman cities and perpetuate values and attitudes associated with Greece’s ‘Romaic’ (Ottoman and Byzantine) heritage (Gauntlett 1985; Tragaki 2007). Similar things could be said about other non-elite art-forms. These include the Karagiozis shadow-puppet theatre, which held its place in popular culture at least until the 1960s, the huge production of popular black-and-white films in the 1950s, perhaps even the ‘new wave’ or ‘popular art song’ of the 1960s, associated with the music of Manos Hadjidakis and Mikis Theodorakis and representing Greece’s most distinctive and successful bid for cultural recognition around the world (Myrsiades 1988; Papanikolaou 2007).

So it is a deliberate choice that restricts the scope of this chapter to ‘high’ literature and the heyday of a particular movement. There are particular reasons for this choice. At least in this specific instance, the literary production in question has had an exceptionally long ‘reach’. Ever since the mid-1930s,
most of the writers discussed in this chapter have been promoted to canonical status (paradoxically, given that some of them were political outlaws until 1974). University students since at least the 1970s, and secondary school students since probably the late 1980s, have been introduced to these writers as representative and expressive of the Greek literary imagination during these decades. In this way, the attitudes and opinions expressed by a relatively small circle of individuals, and others not even connected with any particular coterie, have come to exercise an enormous influence over the way future generations think.

What the literary Modernists of the ‘Generation of the Thirties’ thought about Europe at the time has come to shape the preconceptions of several generations of young Greeks since the eve of World War II. Even if some of these writers reached only a very small public at the time, their influence since has been enormous, and often subliminal. Many Greeks who have never been to a university can quote lines of poetry such as:

*Wherever I travel, Greece wounds me* (Seferis 1972: 99, 101 [1936])

or

*Greek is the language I was given:*

*A poor man’s house on Homer’s shores* (Elytis 1959: 28)

or again

*Don’t weep for Romiosini [the Greek people/Greek culture] even when it bows low There, it flies up and becomes strong and fierce once more* (Ritsos 1989: 10. 160 [1969]).

Even if none of these famous lines mentions Europe, these snapshots of Greek identity have become internalized by very many Greeks—and of course imply a corresponding snapshot of the European ‘other’ against which any sense of Greek identity has always to be measured.

In the rest of this chapter, I chart the changing fortunes of ‘Europe’ in the literary writings of two generations of essayists, poets, and novelists over three decades—attitudes which, I believe, have contributed significantly to the spectrum of opinions to be found throughout Greece today.

**Free Spirit and free trade**

In 1929 a hitherto unknown writer, writing under the aggressive pseudonym of Orestes Digenes, published a withering critique of everything that had been wrong with Greek literature and culture for the past half-century. This was the long polemical essay *Free Spirit*, with which the future novelist and playwright Giorgos Theotokas made his literary debut. *Free Spirit* is not just a critique of the past; it also proclaimed a new beginning. Theotokas wanted Greek artists and intellectuals to reach out towards Europe. Thanks to recent technology, Greece at the end of the 1920s was connected to the rest of the
continent as never before; ideas of European political integration, such as the Briand Plan, had recently been in the news.

In a striking opening image, the first section of Free Spirit imagines a traveller looking down at the changing European landscape from the air—this was still a novelty in this part of the world in 1929. Instead of being a patchwork of different nations, as it appears in school maps, with each marked off by its own distinctive colour, the cultures of the continent shade into one another. For the first time (perhaps), it is possible to imagine Europe as a single composite entity: defined by its variety, to be sure—there is nothing uniform about this idea of Europe. But Europe is a variegated whole to which Greece belongs by virtue of history and geography:

European is like a garden that gathers together the most varied blooms, the most heterogeneous colours. … When you wander through the byways and woods of the garden of Europe, you notice the differences and the oppositions at close range, you can analyse them in detail. We need, after the analytical examination of differences, to dare to take a turn about the garden in an aeroplane. … The airborne eye is treated to the panoramic view. It can distinguish the undulations of the ground, lines of hills and plains, peaks and troughs, the major arteries, directions, crossroads. The airborne eye embraces the whole in its most general lines and broadest horizons. The sight that a capable pilot is able to enjoy is one of true grandeur; the information he brings back serves those on foot to realise where they’re going and what is the point of their efforts (Theotokas 1973: 5–6).

Free Spirit as a whole is marked by a tone of sometimes strident optimism. For its author, writing during the first year after the return to power of Eleftherios Venizelos and before the Great Crash of October 1929, Greece has everything to play for by widening its cultural horizons. It is high time, declares Theotokas, to discard the introverted obsessions of the past and embrace what today we would call Modernity. The new generation of Greeks must learn to define its culture and its values by looking outwards to Europe, not inwards to its rural roots or backwards to either the classical or the Byzantine past.

Theotokas and his generation were well aware of the enormous cultural readjustment that had been taking place during the previous ten years throughout a Europe devastated by what was then called the ‘Great War’. For Greeks, the war had brought trauma enough, in the form of the ‘Schism’ that between 1915 and 1917 had amounted to an undeclared state of internal war, and the horrors of the Macedonian front once Venizelos had finally prevailed and committed his country to the side of the Entente. In literature those horrors had been brought to life in the classic war-novel by Stratis Myrivilis, Life in the Tomb, whose first version appeared in 1924 but which would not be published in full until two years after Free Spirit, in 1931. But Greeks had been traumatized, far more than by the world war, by defeat in Anatolia at the
hands of the Turkish Nationalists in August and September 1922. The ‘Asia Minor Catastrophe’, as the event has been known to Greeks ever since, was the real counterpart to the trauma suffered by most European countries, winners as well as losers, during the war of 1914–18. The Greek experience of collective humiliation, loss of life on a horrific scale, and the economic devastation resulting from defeat—in this case caused by the urgent need to house more than a million refugees—is directly comparable to that experienced by subjects of the defeated Central Powers in the world war.

In culture and the arts, as in other spheres, it took Greece the rest of the decade of the 1920s to recover from the ‘Catastrophe’ of 1922. By 1929, Theotokas could go so far as to claim that for his own generation the national trauma even represented a challenge and an opportunity:

We [Greeks] are broken, exhausted, consumed by the drug of contemporary life. No one expects anything of Greece. There’s no hope anywhere. This moment is truly a wonderful moment.

At moments like these, if the right people are found, sometimes the most beautiful things happen. Youthful energies, unharnessed, undirected, are loose in the atmosphere, going nowhere. None of those young people knows what exactly it is that they want, but they do all want most powerfully. A force-field of young wills is coming into being around us, without defined objective. A seed sown in such soil can grow one day into the most unlooked-for fruit (Theotokas 1973: 63–4).

Of necessity, much that was self-defeating and stultifying in Greek life and culture had been devalued or swept away. Disaster on such a scale created a tabula rasa, on which the ‘free spirit’ of modernity would build. As an indication of what he meant, Theotokas thought first of ‘an aeroplane, in the Greek sky, above the Parthenon’ and then of the broad new highway that was being opened out from central Athens to the sea at Faliro, Syngrou Avenue:

Syngrou Avenue pours out, day and night towards the shore of Faliron, the newborn and as yet inexpressible rhythms of a powerful lyrical voice that seeks strong poets [to give it expression]. This ‘pedestrian and materialist’ century conceals in its unexplored soul a great deal more poetry than our teachers imagine. But someone has to take the trouble to discover it. The time is ripe for bold pioneers (Theotokas 1973: 70).

Inspired by this version of a newly Europeanizing Greece, Theotokas’ friend the poet George Seferis devoted a poem to the same subject in 1930. ‘Syngrou Avenue’ is the first poem in which Seferis used the characteristically Modernist form known as free verse, which would soon after become part of the distinctive poetic voice that would win the Nobel Prize for Literature for Seferis three decades later. Dedicated ‘to Giorgos Theotokas who discovered it,’ the poem ends defiantly:

Snap Ariadne’s thread and behold! 
The sky-blue body of the mermaid (Seferis 1972: 85–6).
Theotokas’ remedy for the past ills of Greece is a liberation of what he calls the ‘spirit’. Young Greek minds should be set free from the ideological bonds of the past, but also, no less, of the competing dogmas that Modernity has brought in its train: communism, fascism, nationalism, even avant-gardisme. A free exchange of ideas is Theotokas’ ideal. And this metaphor of exchange carries over even into the future relationship that Theotokas envisages between the arts in Greece and those of the rest of Europe:

Modern Greece has contributed nothing as yet to the cultural achievement of Europe. … Of course, only the narrowest scholasticism would condemn Greek literature for having received influences from all over the place. All literatures exert influences on one another, and today more than ever. … The trouble with Greek literature is not that it has been at the receiving end of many influences, but that it has given nothing back. A literature acquires international significance once it begins also to exert an influence, without at the same time ceasing to be influenced itself (Theotokas 1973: 37).

This kind of open and free exchange of cultural goods between Greece and Europe has nothing to do, I believe, with traditional conventions of gift-giving in a patron-client relationship. *Free Spirit* was written a few months before the great economic crash of 1929. Internationalism was becoming the norm, international systems of exchange had not yet foundered in the crisis that began later that year. Theotokas’ metaphor seems to invoke emerging ideas about free trade rather than the traditional, unequal, exchange of favours. Greece is being invited to become an equal trading partner in ideas.

According to Theotokas’ model, there is nothing wrong with imports so long as you also have something to export. Where an earlier generation had envisaged the expansion of Greek cultural influence in terms of military conquest, Theotokas, adjusting to the realities of the post-1922 world, proposes instead a balance of trade—an idea to which I shall return at the end of this chapter.

**Autarky and repatriation**

Two years after the publication of *Free Spirit*, the world economic crisis engulfed Greece. As Mark Mazower demonstrated very effectively some years ago, Greece during the first half of the 1930s would adjust with remarkable resilience to the new economic reality, based on self-sufficiency, but at the cost of the political disintegration that would culminate in the dictatorship of the Fourth of August 1936 (Mazower 1991). What the historians have not considered, however, is how that pattern came to be replicated in the field of culture, and particularly creative literature.

The widening of cultural horizons urged in *Free Spirit* and celebrated in Seferis’ poem on Syngrou Avenue could not survive the new economic and
political realities of the 1930s. Several groups of writers had responded enthusiastically and productively to the challenge thrown down in Theotokas’ essay, or had already been thinking independently along similar lines, during the first half of the decade. They include Theotokas himself, his friend Seferis, the novelists Kosmas Politis and Angelos Terzakis, the surrealists Andreas Embirikos and Nikos Engonopoulos, and two of Greece’s best-known poets of the century after Seferis, Odysseus Elytis and Yannis Ritsos. In Greece’s second city or ‘co-capital’, Thessaloniki, a whole ‘school’ of letters emerged during the late 1920s and early 1930s, whose distinguishing feature was engagement with the innovative techniques and art-forms of contemporary European Modernism, such as stream-of-consciousness in fiction and free verse in poetry.

But although most of these writers went on to have long and productive careers, in some cases reaching into the 1990s, all of them, before the decade of the thirties was over, had drastically changed the perspective through which they looked out from Greece towards the rest of Europe. After 1936, the autarky that had become a necessity for the national economy had found its crude political counterpart in the proclamation of a ‘Third Hellenic Civilization’. In different and subtler ways the horizons available to literary writers had altered too. Ancient Hellenic myths were revived and juxtaposed to contemporary realities—often sardonically, as in Seferis’ sequence of twenty-four poems entitled *Mythistorema* (*Novel*) of 1935 (Seferis 1972: 41–71)—but increasingly as a bulwark of support against an intolerable and unmentionable present.

The subtlest indication of this shift is to be found in an essay published by Seferis in 1938, just under a decade after *Free Spirit*. ‘Dialogue on Poetry’ forms part of an extended dialogue between Seferis and his brother-in-law, the academic philosopher and future president of the Republic Konstantinos Tsatsos, in which the poet sets himself to defend the innovative tendencies of the ‘new’ poetry of the decade against the charge of being insufficiently ‘Hellenic’.

In a famous passage towards the end of this essay, Europe appears again, and in a rather different role from that imagined by Theotokas a decade earlier. Hellenic culture (‘Hellenism’ is Seferis’ term for this) had been spread around the ancient world by the conquests of Alexander the Great. Thereafter:

> it was worked upon, shaped, given new life by temperaments sometimes Hellenic, sometimes not, up till the Renaissance, and from that time on … by temperaments not Hellenic at all, that were active outside Hellenic lands. And I would like us not to forget: from that time onwards have been created those works of art that crystallised the shape of the thing that today we call European civilisation (Seferis 1981: 99).

So far so open-ended: Hellenic culture is in dialogue, a process of open and free exchange, with the other cultures of Europe across time. But when it
comes to the present, the metaphor that Seferis uses is not that of import and export, but of appropriation and repatriation. Europeans have taken over, adopted, and adapted much that was originally Hellenic, to create something that, according to Seferis, is not Hellenic at all, or only superficially so. The neoclassical building of the Athens Academy, designed by a Danish architect, is Seferis’ emblematic target here. Like Theotokas, Seferis had been a student during the 1920s in Paris. But he fears that what many of his contemporaries have absorbed from Europe has been precisely the wrong thing:

The best of us, studying or going to the West, tried to bring back to liberated Greece the riches that had fled our country in order to be kept alive. … But we, urged on by the worthiest of intentions, fired up with the desire to bring back to Greece whatever was Hellenic, wherever we saw anything that superficially looked Hellenic, lugged back with us, without searching any more deeply, a thousand alien values that assuredly had nothing to do with our country (Seferis 1981: 100–1).

In this way the internationalism of *Free Spirit* becomes subordinated to the autarky demanded by the last years of the 1930s. What Seferis proposed was to replace what he called ‘European Hellenism’ (foreigners’ interpretation and appropriation of Hellenic culture) with ‘Greek Hellenism’, which he defined like this:

[Greek] Hellenism will acquire a physiognomy, when today’s Greece acquires a cultural physiognomy of its own. And its features will be precisely the synthesis of characteristics of the true works that will have been produced by Greeks. In the meantime, we should … counsel the young to seek after truth, …not by asking how they can be Greeks, but with the faith that since they are Greeks, the works to which their innermost selves actually give birth cannot but be Greek (Seferis 1981: 102).

It was an intelligent and thoughtful response to the times. At a time when much of continental Europe had fallen under the control of dictatorial regimes, and the assertiveness of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy had raised national self-determination to new heights of fetishism, it articulated the creative response of a generation of Greeks who were still under forty, who had launched their own careers after studying abroad in Europe, and who now feared what closer engagement with the continent’s centres of power might bring. They were right to be afraid.

**Resistance and renewal**

During World War II, most of Greece was under enemy occupation from April 1941 to October 1944. The sort of European integration that came with the Nazi ‘New Order’ had little to offer to Greeks; this story has again been best documented and analyzed by Mark Mazower (1993). The years of Occupation saw an extraordinary productivity in literature, particularly and
most unexpectedly in the genre of the longer poem. The writing, publication, circulation, recital and reading of dense and difficult poetry by Seferis, Elytis, Ritsos, Engonopoulos, Papatsonis and Gatsos during these years deserves to be properly studied as a social as well as a literary phenomenon.

When it was over, and during the period of reconstruction that followed the end of the Civil War in 1949, Greek cultural attitudes to Europe had shifted once again. Throughout the ‘long civil war’—the period of political polarization that lasted from the mid-1940s until the fall of the ‘Colonels’ in 1974—attitudes to almost everything were split between what may be termed the Left and the ‘non-Left’. Europe is no exception. For writers who identified with the political Left, the new international horizon that the Cold War opened up was defined by the Soviet bloc. Many were themselves political exiles, such as Dimitris Hatzis and Melpo Axioti, or else chose to spend time in the more politically congenial environment of communist Eastern Europe, as did Ritsos during the 1950s.

For those on the Left, at least until the split of the Greek Communist Party in 1968 occasioned by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in that year, ‘Europe’ was least problematically defined as the eastern bloc. How to engage with the literary and cultural legacy of the West, now identified with the capitalist enemy, was less straightforward. The novelist Stratis Tsirkas, in his trilogy *Drifting Cities*, set in the Middle East during World War II and published between 1960 and 1965, highlights the intellectual and moral dilemma of a Greek Marxist whose experiences bring him into contact with Westerners, many of whom he admires, and whose classical and modern literary education he shares. The chief character in the novels, who more or less represents the position of Tsirkas himself, signal fails to resolve this dilemma; the complex narrative structure and Modernist techniques used throughout the three novels suggest rather a creative tension between the historical and political allegiances of a Greek Marxist writer during the Cold War, on the one hand, and the literary and cultural tradition that is Greece’s inheritance from western Europe on the other.

The same creative tension is also central to the later poetry of Ritsos, the uncontested doyen of the Greek literary Left. Although (western) Europe plays little overt part in the subject matter of Ritsos’s enormous poetic output, it was his distinctive achievement to marry a committed Marxist viewpoint to techniques of verbal art that had been pioneered by the Western movement of Modernism, and particularly by its French-inspired offshoot Surrealism. As in Tsirkas’ trilogy, so also in Ritsos’ best work of the 1960s—the short poems of *Testimonies* and *Repetitions*, the long dramatic monologues collected in *Fourth Dimension*—this unresolved tension between form and content energizes the poems. Europe and the Western tradition are very much present, but little talked of. Often, the Marxist Ritsos seems to be giving his
own left-wing twist to the quest outlined by Seferis from just before the war: to create a ‘Greek Hellenism’ or an indigenous, modern version of Greek culture. Ancient Greek myths provide the foundation for more than half of the monologues that make up Fourth Dimension. The short poems of Repetitions pick up moments from myth and from ancient history, often vividly embedding them in a contemporary Greek landscape, and reinterpreting them in unexpected, epigrammatic ways.

It is probably fair to say that the Greek intellectual Left never fully came to terms with its artistic legacy from the ‘bourgeois’ cultures of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. Needless to say, the free-trade metaphor used by Theotokas a generation earlier was not likely to appeal to the committed writer of the Left after World War II. But for politically non-aligned writers, too, of whom there were many during the 1950s and 1960s, the relatively effortless give-and-take of credit and debit between Greece and the rest of Europe envisaged in Free Spirit was no longer a tenable model either.

The prevailing perception among post-war writers and intellectuals in Greece, whether of the Left or the non-Left, was overwhelmingly, if usually not quite explicitly, that whatever the term ‘Europe’ might once have meant or had seemed to offer, Europeans during the 1940s had exported only barbarism to Greece. Ritsos touches on this idea in one of his best-known poems, Romiosini, written between 1945 and 1947 (Ritsos 1989: 2.59–72). But it was the non-aligned, though leftward-leaning Odysseus Elytis who put it more starkly in his magnum opus of the 1950s, The Axion Esti, published in 1959:

*They came*
*times without number my enemies*
*and the age-old soil they trampled.*

*They arrived*
*times without number my enemies*
*and the age-old gifts they offered.*
*And the gifts they brought were none other*
*than only fire and the sword …*
*Only weapons and fire and the sword* (Elytis 1959: 42).

This long poem is at one level a retrospect on the sufferings of Greece during the 1940s. The country and its artistic voice, the ‘I’ who speaks throughout the poem, have become in Elytis’s imagination a Christ-like sacrificial victim. Immortality and the power of redemption are the rewards for poet and people alike, earned through the martyrdom of invasion, defeat, occupation, and civil collapse. As the closing section of the poem puts it, echoing the liturgical title, ‘Worthy is the price paid.’
During the late 1940s and 1950s, even beyond the circles of the Left, the idea was gaining ground that ‘Europe’, now elided with Cold-War perceptions of ‘the West’, was something inherently foreign to Greece and Greeks, and potentially even harmful. The postwar map of Europe already imposed a distorted political geography, whereby politically and militarily Greece belonged (along with Turkey) to the West, in defiance of physical geography—and, some began to assert, also of history.

The first writer outside the Left to suggest this was T.K. Papatsonis in 1948. Like Seferis a senior civil servant, and also a personal friend, Papatsonis had himself written dense and often obscure poems in the Western Modernist tradition. Now, in a pair of rather wordy articles in that year, Papatonis rounded on Seferis and many of their friends, who had in the meantime become known collectively as the ‘Generation of the 1930s’, and castigated them for their slavish dependence on Western models and Western influences, and most of all for ignoring the cultural values that had come down to Greece through the decidedly non-Western traditions of the thousand-year Byzantine empire. The realignment proposed by Papatsonis went well beyond the quest for cultural self-sufficiency that had come to predominate since the late thirties. This was not merely a matter of ‘going it alone’, of defending and upholding indigenous culture. It aligned twentieth century Greece explicitly with the legacy of eastern Orthodoxy and the political and cultural inheritance of Byzantium. In Papatsonis’ eyes, his own generation of writers had done a great disservice to Greece by aligning themselves with a Europe whose Modernity had brought only the horrors of the 1940s and whose new identification with only the western half of the continent threatened to cut Greeks off from their own cultural hinterland which lay elsewhere. As Papatonis put it in 1948: ‘Our immediate tradition is the Byzantine world, but the true and entire Byzantine world and not at all just a single part of it, arbitrarily taken and cut off from its tree’ (Papatsonis 1948: 662; cf. Beaton 1998).

This reaction against western Europe, from the artistic ranks of the non-Left, reached its fullest articulation in 1961, in an influential long essay by Zisimos Lorentzatos, The Lost Centre (1961; 1980). Lorentzatos was also, like Papatsonis, a friend of Seferis; the context for his essay was a collective volume published that year to honour the thirtieth anniversary of Seferis’ first book of poems. In hindsight, Lorentzatos’ essay has become as much of a landmark as Theotokas’ Free Spirit of just over thirty years before. The best account of Greek literary Modernism so far, by Dimitris Tziovas, actually takes these two essays as respectively the starting and finishing points that define the movement (Tziovas 1997; cf. Beaton 2011). But Lorentzatos does more than bring closure to a literary trend that had perhaps begun with Theotokas; he takes issue with the basic premises of the earlier essay, as well as with much of the poetry and fiction that had attracted the greatest amount
of critical attention during the intervening three decades. At the heart of Lorentzatos’ attack on the ‘Generation of the Thirties’ (on what today we term Greek Modernism) lies an attack on the whole cultural tradition of western Europe since the Renaissance and its cultural dominance in Greece.

Dependence on artistic values, as they have developed in western Europe since the Renaissance, has brought Greece in the 1950s to the same cultural impasse as the West. The mistake, according to Lorentzatos, was to place the arts on a pedestal, to elevate aesthetics to become an end in itself. How the rest of Europe extricates itself from the impasse is not the writer’s affair; Greece has, or ought to have, its own answer:

What has been lacking is the centre or the lost vision, and without that, nothing can be done: All things were made by him; and—as the Gospel [John 1.3] continues—without him was not any thing made that was made. From out of this divine sustenance the arts at some point emerged and must return there, to the lost centre or their heavenly root. … Art must once again become a more serious business, as it always used to be. Art must be baptised in the waters of metaphysical faith …. (Lorentzatos 1961: 107, 108).

Or, as he recapitulates this idea a little later:

Since modern art has lost its metaphysical centre, or in other words its life, there is no need to turn to art, but rather to the centre, to find, first, ways of life and, later, manners of art. What has been missing is so important that everything else, on its own, art and technique and so on, is laughable by comparison (Lorentzatos 1961: 121).

The way to achieve this for Greeks, Lorentzatos argues, is to question every stage of the country’s cultural dependence on Europe since the time of the Renaissance. The ‘living tradition’ and spiritual roots of Greek culture are to be found, as Papatsonis had first suggested a little over a decade before, not in the legacies of the West but in those of the Byzantine empire, and particularly, for Lorentzatos, of the Christian Orthodox tradition (1961: 118), which he contrasts with the ‘misguided’ humanism of the European Renaissance (1961: 130–31, 144). ‘Our own Orthodox tradition of the East,’ Lorentzatos concludes, ‘directly or indirectly, has given to the West whatever of profundity it [the West] has to offer in the spiritual [or: cultural] domain’ (1961: 146).

**Beyond Europe**

Since the 1960s and the gradual displacement of Modernism by Postmodernism in the arts, it is doubtful whether Europe has kept the primacy of importance that it had in the literary imagination of preceding decades. It may seem paradoxical, but during the very years that Greece has been becoming socially and economically far more ‘European’ than it ever was before—a development documented extensively elsewhere in this volume—literary writers have been extending their imaginative horizons in other directions. The lead
given by Lorentzatos in that influential essay of 1961 is only one example. It would not be true to say that a majority of literary artists have followed the course prescribed by Lorentzatos. But in the arts as in other walks of life, the Orthodox revival that he envisioned would soon be under way. The effects of that movement have been more evident in other spheres of public life than the literary or artistic. But the religious and specifically Orthodox revival of the last half-century has certainly been an important counterweight to integrationist attitudes towards the European Union and the European Communities that preceded it.

As well as looking to re-connect with their Orthodox, Byzantine, and eastern European heritage, Greek writers and intellectuals since the early 1970s have increasingly come to regard Europe as no longer the only cultural player on an increasingly global stage. South America, often considered the home of Postmodernism, first began to attract Greek writers as early as 1943, when Engonopoulos’s brave poem in praise of liberty, *Bolivár: A Greek Poem*, was first read aloud in Axis-occupied Athens ‘at gatherings of a resistance character’ (Engonopoulos 1985: 25). During the years of military dictatorship in Greece (1967–74), Theodorakis set to music sections of *Canto General* by the Chilean Marxist poet Pablo Neruda, in the original Spanish. In the volume *Eighteen Texts*, published in 1970 as a form of collective literary protest against censorship and the suppression of civil liberties, the Greek predicament is transparently reflected in that of a fictional ‘Boliguay’. At the same time as the sociologist Nikos Mouzelis (1978) was comparing the ‘facets of underdevelopment’ that he found in South American countries, mostly at that time under dictatorships, with what was happening in Greece, writers were not only satirically imagining Greece as a banana republic, they were beginning to exploit in their own way the mix of political satire, absurdist humour, and the possibilities afforded by the fantastic that within a few years would come to define global Postmodernism.

In this chapter I have deliberately avoided giving a definition of ‘Europe’ as it was projected by the Greek literary imagination over three decades. I hope to have shown that the writers themselves, and presumably their readers as well, were neither consistent nor often very clear themselves about what they meant when they wrote of ‘Europe’. Sometimes in their writings ‘Greece’ is contrasted with a ‘Europe’ from which it would seem therefore to be separate. Sometimes, as in Theotokas’s essay *Free Spirit*, Europe is the sum of many disparate parts of which Greece is one. This ambiguity (which runs through much British discourse on the subject as well) is part of my subject and cannot be simply resolved. In the terms of the title of the conference on which this volume is based, ‘conceptions’, just like ‘meanings and identities’, are fluid. If the literary imagination and its products in some sense ‘legitimate’ these in the minds of the public, then literature has certainly played its part here too.
But the results are not fixed by any formal process. So the ‘legitimation’ of ideas about Europe, even in anything so abstract as a consolidated ‘Greek literary imagination’, is equally fluid.

To revert to Theotokas’ metaphor of an optimum balance of trade between Greece and the centres of cultural capital elsewhere in Europe, these terms, which for a variety of reasons became unusable for much of the intervening period, are perhaps appropriate once more today. As Greece once again finds itself overshadowed by the hegemony of Germany, this time economic rather than military, and while the tension that exists between the centrifugal and centripetal tendencies inherent in the European Union, and more particularly within the Eurozone, seem unlikely to be resolved any time soon, it is once again worth asking the question first put by Theotokas on the eve of the 1929 Crash: what has Greece given back to Europe?

The trade imbalance in culture between Greece and the rest of Europe, which Theotokas diagnosed then, still exists today. Now, as then, it can be attributed to the dominance of the ancient, and to a lesser extent of the Byzantine, legacy: modern Greece still relies heavily on the capital accrued in earlier ages for its present-day cultural exports. A result is that the achievements of Modernist writers such as Theotokas and Seferis, of Modernist composers such as Kalomoiris and Skalkottas, of Modernist painters such as Hatzikyriakos-Gikas and Tsarouchis, are shamefully little known and under-appreciated in the rest of Europe.

Of course, during the intervening period, there has been progress. Greek paintings regularly command surprisingly high prices in the auction-rooms of London and New York. In the concert hall the names of Greek singers and instrumentalists are appearing more frequently (and we should not forget the isolated example of the conductor Dimitris Mitropoulos, who rose to prominence in New York in the 1950s). Composers of art-music have perhaps been overshadowed by the popular successes of Theodorakis, Hadjidakis and (for a time) the evanescent Vangelis. In literature, only the poet C.P. Cavafy today commands the ‘name recognition’ that sets the threshold for access to the world’s major publishing houses and mass media. Since 2000, more than half a dozen new translations of Cavafy’s complete poems have been published in English. The novels of Kazantzakis, written in the 1940s and early 1950s, have retained a hold on an international readership, not least through the films based on two of them, *Zorba the Greek* and *The Last Temptation of Christ*. Two Greek poets, both of the Modernist generation, were awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature during the second half of the twentieth century (Seferis in 1963 and Elytis in 1979). Many more poets, novelists, and a few dramatists and essayists have had their work translated into English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish during the same period. But none (with the possible exception of the crime writer Petros Markaris) has made any kind
of impact internationally. In the US and Britain, translations from Modern Greek are published more frequently than is sometimes supposed—but almost never reprinted.

So progress has a long way to go. But if the model of free exchange that Theotokas proposed back in 1929 still (or again) applies, the terms of the exchange are no longer what they were then. Influences upon the arts in Greece came from Europe, at first from Paris, latterly from London and then from outside Europe altogether, from the USA. In the last forty years or so they have become much more global, with South America occupying a new and important position. In the early twenty-first century it will not be enough merely for Greek artistic production to be recognized and valued throughout Europe. At the very time that Greece has succeeded in becoming in so many ways European, the market-place for cultural exchange has become a worldwide one. Today the horizons of contemporary Greek writers are more often global than merely, or mainly, European.

In the artistic imagination, at least, the centres of Modernity are no longer exclusively to be identified with Europe. The old equation between Europe and Modernity may at last be beginning to break down, at least in the ‘high’ arts, in Greece.
‘EUROPE’, ‘TURKEY’ AND GREEK SELF-IDENTITY
ANTINOMIC MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS

Stephanos Pesmazoglou

Introductory Remarks

Since the early 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the appearance of dozens of new nation-states, nationalist feelings have re-emerged more or less all over the globe. The consequent destabilization has increased and spread in Europe since the mid-2000s with the explosion of the financial crisis—initially the collapse of banks and insurance companies, followed by some European Union countries (Greece first and foremost) verging on bankruptcy. If we add the explosion and destabilization in the Arab-Mediterranean countries in early 2011, I have no doubt that the rhythms of history and the compression of events—economic and political, including rearrangements in bilateral and international relations—are accelerating.

In examining the role of Europe as a factor in Greco-Turkish relations in the post-war period, I firmly believe that the determinant factor is structural. I do not propose this approach in spite of the crisis but because of it. Crisis periods are times for collective introspection, for re-evaluating essentials. I will go back to the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth to examine structural elements determining the essentials of the Greek collective mind-
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set that have now, with varying degrees of intensity, been resurgent for nearly two centuries.

The terms ‘Europe’ and ‘Turkey’ refer to constructs, not certain assumed pre-existing ontological realities. In the formation of the Greek Self-Image both Europe and Turkey have played pivotal roles, perceived positively or negatively—or, in the case of Europe, positively and negatively in alternation, depending upon the particular position of each European country. My contribution will be to try to elucidate the dominant modes of thinking in the Greek discourse about the past or, rather, the pasts in the formation of self-image. My analysis has elements from both politico-cultural theory and the history of ideas and/or attitudes.

Three clarifications are necessary:

1. By using the terms ‘myth’ and ‘mythological foundation’ I do not mean that the edifice of the modern Greek state is built solely or chiefly upon mythological foundations; rather, that myth has proven to be one of the most enduring elements in its construction.

2. By ‘modern Greek state’ I am simply referring to the Greek state. Since antiquity is still understood in the Greek cultural context, however, as self-evidently ancient ‘Greece’, especially when linked to the world of myths, we can allow the qualifying adjective in. Historians, of course, know full well that there is no such thing as mediaeval ‘Greece’ as a nation-state but rather the Roman Empire of the East, and that ancient ‘Greece’ never existed as a state but rather as sub-territorial entities—that is, city-states—or à la rigueur as a cultural entity, especially in the Hellenistic age, as a hyper-territorial imperial cultural galaxy of reference (despite the Olympian Gods, a powerful common element which, however, varied in synthesis and specific weight in its individual manifestations and practices).

3. In accordance with the above paragraph, continuity in the Greek state is precluded simply because no such state existed in all historical periods. Nonetheless, there is continuity within the discontinuity of the Greek language for certain population groups, along with a possible shared experience over the very long term of the geographical space—mountains, seas, rivers, and climate. These geographical characteristics affected the behaviour of every inhabitant of the ‘atrium of the Aegean’ (irrespective of ethnic or religious provenance) at least until the industrial transformation and ecological disturbances of the post-war years. Consequently, when we consider perceptions about continuity, we mean perceptions of absolute, unmediated continuity, and not the clearly identifiable traces that one would expect to find, but which cannot retrospectively (and anachronistically) be termed ‘national’ in the modern sense of the term. This same continuity is disrupted in the official narrative, since whole eras such as the Ottoman are deliberately omitted.
‘EUROPE’, ‘TURKEY’ AND GREEK SELF-IDENTITY

‘Greece’ and ‘Turkey’ through the European looking glass

As a first step in the forthcoming argument it is possible to isolate the Ottoman past for analytical disciplinary purposes from earlier and later historical periods, but doing so does not help us understand how Greece’s Ottoman past is articulated (in fact, rejected from) within the overall Hellenization of the past, and the essential role played by Europe in this process.

I will be necessarily sketchy in describing the conclusions reached by specialized historians and scholars from various social disciplines over the past three decades. Understanding how the assimilated or annexed pasts have been Hellenized is essential for understanding (or having the illusion of understanding) the mythological foundations of modern Greece. Stereotypes and preconceptions of Greece’s Ottoman past were created and shaped within a European framework. This can be illustrated by two voices from the Enlightenment: Voltaire, the most prominent scholar of the European Enlightenment, and Adamantios Korais, the uncontested figure of the Greek Enlightenment, both ardent proponents of tolerance.

In more than one of his writings Voltaire condemns the damage inflicted upon the heritage of ancient Greece, his strong feelings directed expressly against the Turks; moreover the bipolar dissociation of Antiquity from the Ottomans is clear and consistent in the Philhellenic movement as well, all over Europe.

Voltaire wrote in 1756 in his *Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations*:

Athens. This city, that vanquished Xerxes, contains sixteen to seventeen inhabitants, trembling in front of 1,200 janissaries, who hold in their hands nothing more than a white stick [Athènes. Cette ville, qui vainquit Xerxès, contient seize à dix-sept mille habitants, tremblants devant douze cents janissaires qui tiennent qu’un seul bâton blanc à la main] (Voltaire, 1962: 377).

And elsewhere:

The fatherland of the Miltiades, the Leonidas, the Alexanders, the Sophocles and of the Platos, was transformed rapidly into barbaric [by the Ottoman Turks]. The Greek language since then was corrupted (Voltaire, 1962: 376).

And again:

I will always be inimical [elsewhere ‘will always hate’] and aggressive against those who have devastated, impoverished and brutalized the whole of Greece. You cannot honestly demand from me to sympathize with the destroyers of the fatherland of Homer, Sophocles and Demosthenes… (Voltaire, 1962: 376).

Almost eighty years later Korais (1748–1833) took much the same stance using much the same wording initially, in his prologues to his edited Ancient Greek texts and in his *Autobiography* first published in 1833 in Paris. Of course, by then the deepest resentment for Korais is provoked by the geno-
cidal massacre in 1822 of Chios, his native fatherland, not because of resurrection which did not occur but solely for the plundering of this rich island: ‘The hatred against the Turk nourished in my soul since childhood became, when I had tasted the freedom of a state of law and order, an obsessive aversion’ (Korais, 1870: 15). Also, ‘Turk and wild beast were to my thinking synonyms, and they remain so … Turk and wild beast were to my thinking synonyms, and they remain so for my whole life’ (Korais, 1870: 15). This sentiment was still reverberating up to approximately a decade ago when an erratic Greek foreign minister publicly declared that ‘Turks are a nation of cannibals’ [laos anthropofagon-λαόςανθροποφάγων].

Nevertheless, both Voltaire and Korais reveal much more complicated modes of thinking, as in other writings where tolerance of the ‘other’ including ‘the Turk’ and/or ‘the Muslim’ is very much in the centre.5

All one needs to do is follow the transformation of cultural paradigms in the thought of Greek Enlightenment thinkers, which from this point on are characterized by hatred of the Turk. I am thinking in particular of the evolution of Korais’ thinking as shown in his letters from Amsterdam to Stamatis Petrou. A re-reading of Korais shows the following central and interconnected factors as they appear clearly in Mémoire sur l’état actuel de la civilisation dans la Grèce (Korais, 1803).6 From this selected delving into Korais’ texts, the following lines of thought are recurrent:

1. Love for one’s country is closely associated with love for culture, education, the sciences, the arts, Europe and Greek antiquity. For Korais his full-time involvement with the study of the ancients is not an escape from the present but additional weaponry against Turkish despotic tyranny (in this respect see Dimaras, 1980: 335).

2. Hatred of ‘The Turk’ is associated with rejection of Ottoman oriental despotism—the wording in French is ‘barbarie’, ‘joug ottoman’ (Ottoman yoke), ‘not susceptible to learning’—within an overall rejection of all dynastic empires after the collapse of Athenian democracy, including the Macedonian, the Roman, the Byzantine, and finally, the pejoratively Turkified Ottoman Empire (with varying nuances for ‘national’, ‘local’, and ‘foreign’ despotism).

3. Therefore, the Greek revolution needed to be a revolution in culture, language, and education (‘build schools and universities’). Extensive translations of European literature were needed to foment revolution through awakening the spirit of the ancient forefathers, and this could only be achieved by revolution against illiteracy and the Turks as the culmination of 2,000 years of despotism. Only in Europe, Korais writes, can we comprehend the immense value of our glorious ancestors. ‘Read the Ancients’ is a second commandment.
4. Similarly, only in Europe can we recognize the ‘despicable Turk’. Korais’ encapsulation of the dominant polarity in European thinking and transmission of it to the contemporary Greek intelligentsia illustrate my central point. One pole is the brilliant classical Greek antiquity—not all antiquities—contrasted with the dark pole of contemporary ‘Turks’.

Greek Enlightenment scholars living in Paris, Pisa, Padua, Vienna and Amsterdam—romioi or graikoi in their self-image but Ottoman subjects, rejected ‘the Turk’ in all his attributes (not only the Ottoman Empire as a ‘despotic state formation’ and a way of governing) as a necessary factor in their identification with Europe and, simultaneously, with Greek antiquity (in the enlarged definition of classical antiquity). It was during this period and in this same European environment that Greek scholars were imbued with the newly emerging paradigm—democracy, political philosophy, science, progress—which they imported into Greece. In the process they modified the paradigm to include European idealizations of Greek antiquity—that is, the glorification of their/our own ancestors with the concomitant self-glorification of us/them (the Greeks) as the descendants of ancient Greeks.7

Greece and neighbouring Turkey: the production of friends and foes in retrospect

The Greek self-image is not defined solely upon constructs of absolute continuity since antiquity, but also in terms of Greek Otherness, differing mainly from ‘the Turk’, but also at times from the ‘Bulgarian’ and, more recently in the 1990s, from the ‘statelet of Skopje’ as the Republic of Macedonia was pejoratively called.8 In this section a step further is taken in the argumentation by examining the enduring acceptance of what can be summarized as ‘Greeks and Turks always have been, and always will be, enemies.’ The above maxim, immune to doubt, has exerted extensive political influence at various stages in modern Greek history. By extension, this maxim divides the entire world politically and culturally, diachronically and retrospectively, into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’—Philhellenes and Antihellenes who may be Turcophiles as well—and/or, within Greece, into ‘patriots’ and fifth-columnist ‘sons of Turks’ (Tourkosporoi), a term used to describe any politician, intellectual, or citizen who dares to differ from the ‘nationally correct’ canon. As a logical consequence the emphasis to date was upon constructing and narrating the past and present of Greco–Turkish relations by focusing on the disasters inflicted by the one upon the other. But reality is always more complex. There was not one catastrophe, ‘ours’, but many catastrophes (plural).9 Let us refer to a selected chain of a few examples covering the historical span of nearly two centuries deriving from this fallacy of a priori-ism. ‘Ethnically correct’ think-
ing was canonized from the first Greek constitution in the mid-1840s as *ethnikophrosyni* which, ever since, has been a major factor in determining laws and in the long debate about who is Greek and who is not (the troubled history of citizenship).

The bipolar theme of good and bad patriots continues to reverberate. This is evident in the libellous reactions by leading purist scholars to the openness towards the Ottoman ‘other’ in the three volume mosaic *Konstantinopolis* by Skarlatos Vyzantios in the 1850s and 1860s. It is also evident in a long satire targeting the Greek sense of pseudo-pride and Turcophobia, in the climate of the end of the nineteenth century, published in booklet form by Manis (a pseudonym) with the title *Pseudopolemēs* [phony war] of 1897. Bipolarity is reflected again in the literature on Asia Minor: it is a ‘just cause’ for campaigners but there is also the ‘unjust’ abandonment by the major European powers leading to the Catastrophe. Later derivatives of the deeply rooted axiom are Metaxas’ ‘Third Hellenic Civilization’ (1936–40), the Colonels’ (1967–74) ‘Greece of Greek Christians’, and the climate within which major issues in Greco-Turkish relations are handled (the Cyprus issue, Imia, the Öcalan affair, the reactions to the Annan plan). It is reflected up to the beginning of 2011 in some of the reactions in Greece to visits made by the PM and other leading politicians to Turkey. It is finally reproduced by the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party, which up to very recently (the summer of 2012) considered atrocious the fact that a left-liberal historian was elected member of Parliament. This idea of an unbridgeable political and cultural gulf, as cultivated from national time immemorial by the Greek educational system, the media and politicians, remains unsubstantiated in any serious, systematic way, but has come to be linked with dangerous views about the ‘clash of civilizations’.

The unwavering maxim that ‘Greeks and Turks are enemies’ is embedded in nationalistic stock phrases taken as absolute certainties. We know who our friends are and who our enemies are beyond any doubt. The next stock phrase, the ‘rebellious nature of the Greek’, a stereotype in every sense of the word, is complementary. Both phrases are taken as a conceptual framework for understanding centuries of Ottoman rule.

A second step, based on the ever-growing body of secondary literature, must be taken to counter these aphoristic bipolarities. The two maxims of ‘perennial enmity’ and ‘rebellious nature’ should be tested against all sorts of documentation from every available source. Another factor, the deafening silence of the sources, should also be taken into account, for the ninety-nine per cent overwhelmingly agrarian population left no decodable testimony behind. Our conclusions must necessarily be drawn from three different areas:

1. Surviving written documents, of which over eighty per cent up to the early nineteenth century were religious or theological in nature (for example see EIE/KNE, 2000; Iliou, 1997, 2005; Konortas, 1998; Apostolopou-
los, 1995: 33, 1989) and imbued with an ideology that could best be described as ‘Patriarcho-Ottomanist’.13

2. Texts from the level of oral tradition (onto which every nationalist element was grafted during the Romantic stage) (for example Politis, 1993, 2000, 1981, 1984).

3. Beyond the corpus of written and oral testimonies, disciplined case studies relating to particular places or areas (not the para-literature of past glories which generally—though not always—flourished at local level) for example 1984; Sakellariou, 1978; Zachariadou, 2004; Liata 1987; Zei, 2001; Matha-Dematha 199214).

The choice presented is between two prominently visible models of governance; there is no third possible choice, it is either Latin rule in its various forms—Frankish, Venetian, Genoese, etc.—or Ottoman dominance. Most studies can be decoded and positioned on the basis of three criteria:

1. The relative autonomy of the communities and, in any case, the varying and flexible policies of government.

2. The degree of religious freedom—the relative tolerance of the Ottoman model as compared to the restrictions imposed usually, though not always, by the Catholics.15

3. The relative burden of taxation. This last may well be the most important criterion, for the practices of Latin rule seem to have been usually, though not always, systematically more burdensome than the more flexible Ottoman approach (itself accentuated in periods of crisis).

What does a rational examination of the arguments in this official narrative reveal? When dealing with the ‘barbaric nature of the Turks’ it concentrates on Ottoman atrocities (such as those in Chios or the Peloponnese). Greek school textbooks, in contrast, give no significance to the slaughter of rebellious Melos by imperial Athens in 415 BC and make no mention whatsoever of the brutal slaughter of the citizens of Salonica in 390 AD by the Byzantine Emperor Theodosius. Let me take two more examples linked with the ‘rebellious nature of the Greek nation’. Over and beyond its difficult reductionism, the supposed resistance of the Greek nation when it did not even exist as such—resistance that we relive periodically on specific occasions, even more so now on the brink of bankruptcy—is subject to many qualifications; it is invoked as a stock phrase, but is used as though it were associated exclusively with the Ottoman period and exclusively with Greek subjects. Uprisings that occurred during earlier periods (under Byzantium) are passed over in silence. Within this very long time span, then, the uprisings during the Ottoman period are narrowly nationalized, although during the same period there also were several uprisings by Slavophone populations and/or by Turkish-speaking Muslims in Anatolia and combined Greek-speaking Muslim and
Christian populations in Crete and Cyprus. The beheading of patriarchs and other clergymen is presented as a specific feature of Ottoman power and not as a practice espoused by the previous holy empire, Byzantium. In addition, such beheadings are presented as barbarous acts (which they were) inflicted solely upon Christian leaders (and retroactively invested with anti-Greek sentiments). They are not listed alongside the customary Ottoman practice of beheading Muslim viziers and grand viziers and sons, brothers, and fathers of sultans. There is no getting round it. However religiously tolerant the Ottoman regime may have been towards recognized faiths,\textsuperscript{16} it was also despotic and tyrannical towards more or less all its subjects, but these practices are stressed or suppressed in accordance with the degree of ethnocentric arbitrariness and subjectivity they are assigned in retrospect.

All this mythology weighs heavily, for in the Greek nationalist ideology, from all the complexities, contradictory perceptions, convergences, and interactions of the shared millennia, the only phrase that remains—in a linear and meaningless fashion—is the imaginary ‘400 years of Turkish rule’. As Elisavet Zachariadou has rightly noted in a recent unpublished paper, it was neither 400 years long (it ranged from 250 to 1,000 years depending on locality) nor racially Turkish—it was Ottoman, with different ethnic groups dominating various professional and economic sectors and regions, not to speak of the complexities introduced by the recurrent Latin domination in specific areas and periods (in the same way that Byzantium was not a strictly Greek formation but was Hellenized in retrospect).

I would like to bring this issue to a close by echoing Alkis Angelou in saying that, instead of seeking the formation of modern Greek identity before the eighteenth century (indeed, even before the first half of the eighteenth century) in resistance to the Turk/Ottoman and rejection of him, it is better to pursue more fruitful lines of inquiry such as the cross-fertilization between and amalgamation of the Greek/Orthodox and Turkish/Muslim cultures in the Ottoman context. The shared historical experience over the very long term, reaching as far back as 1,000 years, weighs heavily not merely as one element among many, but as the main defining element in parallel with others drawn from lived history like language and religion (all remaining subject to Ottoman commands within the \textit{millet} system\textsuperscript{17}) had a homogenizing effect, in varying degrees, between communities, as well as remaining, in a sense, worlds apart. The wording (in the mid nineteenth century) of the great scholar and lexicographer Skarlatos Vyzantios in his three-volume history is much closer to the Ottoman realities than any subsequent Manichean theorizing: ‘However hard we may try, we cannot deny that after four centuries of Turks mixing with Greeks and Greeks with Turks, the majority, both of us have become Turcified and Grecisized, and that this fact is not in itself reprehensible’ (Vyzantios, 1862: γ’,l: the quote was first noted by Ange-
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lou, 2001). If the German in the inter-war period had a good deal more in common with the contemporary Frenchman or Englishman than he did with the mediaeval German and/or Visigoth (in relation to national character), then it holds equally true that the contemporary Greek has a lot more in common with the contemporary European and the contemporary Turk than he does with his ancient forebears, be they Athenians or Minoans: in contrast to the nonsensical ravings one hears from certain—not archaeological, but nevertheless established—academics about the absolute, diachronic continuity in the character of the Greeks.

Nonetheless, despite persuasive argumentation, systematic documentation, and rational deconstruction of Greek national mythology over the past three decades, this same mythology seems to be taken for granted—not any more by the flourishing serious historiography, but in mainstream Modern Greek discourse. Collective prejudices die hard, for they continue to function as absolute certainties (witness school textbooks and national celebrations, the mass media, politics, sermons from the pulpit). The motif of rejecting the Turk kept recurring throughout nineteenth-century Greece (with a few interruptions) and continues until today (transferred against the Macedonian in the early 1990s). Mindsets of this sort are dangerous because all they do is fuel intolerance at critical moments of political decision-making.

The simultaneous emergence of notions of the superiority of the Greeks and the inferiority of minority communities was part and parcel of Greek self-identity and the ideology of ethnikophrosyni excluding minorities. Minorities were considered ‘foreign’ to the Greek race, potentially subversive in conjunction with neighbouring hostile states against the Greek nation. It can be argued, mainly on the basis of the substantive literature and evidence emerging after the mid-1990s, that the cost of mobilizing the demographically dominant Greek population during Greece’s successive expansions of its national boundaries was the accumulation of more new social/ethnic groups needing to be excluded and to have the memory of their existence erased. This process of nationalization-Hellenization was common in the process of nation-building. We perceive the silence of the Other from his absence in official historiographies, school textbooks, and, until very recently, university curricula (Pemazoglou, 2002). Communities with different religions and/or languages (Turkish-Muslim, Slavo-Macedonian, Jewish)—and today, of course, the new immigrant minorities, chiefly Albanian—are absent from Greek collective knowledge (Mackridge, 2009): ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’.

Within this same mindset, and quite contradictorily, in the name of an abstract Greek identity the nationalist ideology mobilizes people ‘of the same nation’, ‘of the same religion,’ or ‘who speak the same language’ to protect their ‘fellow nationals’ (οµογενείς) beyond Greece’s borders, usually in neighbouring states (turning Vlachs in Albania—by the so-called ‘Vlachometro’—
and Russian-Pontians from the Black Sea states into Greeks) while at the same time marginalizing, excluding, and eliminating the Others inside Greece. Historically, in Greece and elsewhere, national values have been used to contain working-class mobilizations, exploiting the vertical penetration of nationalist ideas into all social classes. In the first post-war decades the labels ‘EAMO-Slavs’ and ‘EAMO-Bulgarians’ were attached pejoratively to the Communists—the ideological opposition to the dominant Right.22

However, in the two past decades European institutions (the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission of Human Rights) have brought major positive change to the self-centred approach of Greek national identity.

**European origins of the Greek rejection of the Turk**

A further step in the development of the proposed argumentation was to examine the European origins of national bipolarities, since there is little internal evidence of Greco-Turkish, specifically ethnic bipolarities within the Ottoman context, at least up to the mid eighteenth century. We know from the body of political theory—the theory of nationalism, in particular—that the birth of nations was, and is, violent to varying degrees. The process automatically generates a bipolar system of friends and foes (domestic and external) by which a friend can be transformed into an enemy and vice versa by a change in international conditions or balance of power.

If we want to bypass *a priori* idealized assumptions of a perennial enmity between Greeks and Turks, we have to recognize that an identification of epic proportions with classical antiquity, coming via Europe, was and still is at work, with ludicrous side-effects.23 This identification with classical antiquity, although superficial, is powerful.24 Antiquity worship accompanied by an equally monumental rejection of the Ottoman past was redemptive at first but tragic in its outcome. These two stereotypical mental processes have been constantly at work, side by side, in forming Modern Greek identity since the Enlightenment. The two processes—linking the positive identification (with ancient Greece and Europe) and rejecting Ottoman Turkey—were the *sine qua non* of the entire Greek cultural ideology.

Since we have enough documentary evidence showing that the roots of the bipolar brothers/enemies (be they perceived enemy Turks or, later, minorities of a different faith and/or language) were not restricted to peoples living under Ottoman rule, we should look to Europe, to an exogenous matrix, for the origins of the modern Greek rejection of the Turk in particular and the Other in general. If we go further in this line of thinking we reach a number of conclusions.

First, I will take the risk of stating—always with the danger, if not the certainty, of obliterating all the differences and nuances involved in such sweep-
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ing generalizations—that the history of the formation of European attitudes from the Renaissance up to the Enlightenment, which continued well into nineteenth-century Romanticism and the early twentieth century, is permeated by highly negative representations of ‘the Turk’ and Islam that necessarily entail intolerance. If we want to avoid the usual one-sided Eurocentric assessments, with all due consideration for variations from region to region and from one historical period to another, we have to recognize that for centuries parts of Catholic Europe were bastions of intolerance whereas the Ottoman Empire was, in a sense, the domain of religious tolerance: when the Sephardic Jews were expelled from Spain, Portugal, and, a century later, Italy, Ottoman Turkey was where they found refuge. We have to get accustomed to the idea that it is not only Europe teaching Turkey and the world: Turkey, as the main (not the only) heir of the Ottoman Empire, has something to teach Europe.

Where does all the above lead us? I believe that if we take all these factors into consideration we are smoothly led to a logical sequel of thought. It is possible that not only the construction of the ‘imagined Greek self-identity’ but, equally, the parallel, equivalent, and antithetical reconstruction of ‘the infidel Turk’ may be very much dependent upon transpositions of negative Eurocentric and Catholic-centric constructions. It is, after all, the period during which what we have come in recent decades to conceptualize as the discourses of Eurocentrism, Orientalism and Hellenism were formed. These discourses had to pass through all the readjustments culled from lived collective experiences. Greek identification with Europe and, even more, with Greek antiquity cannot be perceived separately but only in conjunction with constructs of Turkish ‘otherness’. They must be opposing poles of a particular conceptual package perceived as two opposing systems of values and beliefs, both politically and culturally (Pesmazoglou, 1994).

In most fields of European academic literature—geographical, historiographical, socio-political—and in the daily journalistic and political discourse a negative, indeed often dismissive, European perception of the Turk is a common denominator. The negative perception, however, varies considerably for there are, of course, many ‘Europes’ of many hues, some of them complementary, others contradictory. Victorian Britain, for example, had one view of Turkey—described by Elli Skopetea—and Germany quite another, for the two states had conflicting economic and political interests. Perceptions also vary according to the place and time of viewing and the politico-ideological and philosophical-theological opinions then current (Renaissance, Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Secularization). The variety of these perceptions is not properly treated by the stereotypical presence of a single narrative presenting the history as if it were of two entirely different and hermetically sealed and impermeable cultures. For Christianity, it is as though Islam exists to its south, stretching from one end of the Mediterranean to the other as an abstract
coordinate, initially Arab and subsequently Ottoman. Europe’s great fear of the Ottomans and of Islam (the Fall of Constantinople and the two sieges of Vienna) was a basic interpretative key for historians as different in their provenance and goals as Braudel and Duroselle in explaining the great flight to the New World.

Construction of the difference between Greeks and Turks was, in its absoluteness, a consequence of Greek contact with Europeans in many varied forms. The unprecedented communication by Greeks with other peoples sparked capitalist commercialization, especially navigation, and later industrialization. The initial development of Greek national consciousness arose among—and, for a long period, was held almost exclusively by—merchants and scholars who had dealings with, or lived in, foreign lands. It would be unthinkable otherwise. Historically this mental process materialized within a declining Ottoman Empire in the middle of a war with Russia and getting increasingly insecure and abrupt in its conduct.

To summarize: there is not, and factually there cannot be, any documentary evidence or oral evidence (through demotic songs) for an indigenous rejection by Greeks of ‘the Turks’ as perennial enemies before the mid eighteenth century. The origins, then, of the modern Greek rejection of ‘the Turk’ and the racist exclusion of the minority Other must lie in the stereotypical Eurocentric constructs of the Other within Greek borders and the Turk beyond them as extreme Otherness on the fringes of Europe (and Greece). Identification with ‘Antiquity’ and rejection of the adjacent Other (the Turk) form two complementary processes within the same intellectual climate. They are perceived in political and cultural terms as two contrasting systems of maxims and beliefs.

The above argument seems essential if we are to overcome polarities that operate particularly effectively in our time of reinvigorated perceptions of ‘the Islamic threat’. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the successive Western military interventions, theories about clashes of civilizations and cultures have again become very much à la mode. Rereading the earlier period forcefully establishes that in the European Enlightenment we can, of course, trace all the material for painting the old continent with bright colours, but we can also detect certain solid threads leading to racism and aggressive nationalism that made Europe the ‘dark continent’ a century later.

**Viewing Greek pasts**

In determining the factors behind the Greek-Turk bipolarity and examining the European origin of this nationally determined mindset, it is possible to go a step further in our reasoning and place the mode of thinking about the Ottoman past in a wider context of previous periods. I maintain that the suc-
cessful mobilization of classical antiquity seriously affected the way not only the Ottoman past and ‘the Turk’, but all previous periods of the history of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans were perceived after the emergence of post-national modes of thinking. This contextualization also has been decisively conditioned by European waves of thought. Classical Greece, classical Athens, is a tale with a name: Greek Nation, a tale about ‘the essence of National Identity’, about ‘the nature of Hellenism’, that is, the tale of the ‘upsurge of National Consciousness’.

In classical antiquity—approximately 150 years (480–323 BC) or, for others, one hundred, fifty or strictly thirty years (Pericles’ Golden Century)—there was an unprecedented and uncontested explosion of creativity in most fields of knowledge (philosophy, science, art, theatre). Several waves can be identified of what Rafael depicted in his ‘The School of Athens’ fresco: the School of the Hellenes, symbolized by the nearly 500 year existence of the Library of Alexandria (180 BC—297 AD); the School of Augustan Rome (27 BC—14 AD), which established the basic educational curriculum in Europe for 1,000 years; Athens as the school of the Arab renaissance during the centuries of the Arabic translations of classical texts; the European Renaissance; the Athens School of European Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment continuing to our time, perhaps with Winkelman and his canons of Aesthetics and as symbolic figures Goethe, Kant, Nietzsche on through Humboldt and Von Neumann up to Jaegger and his three volume Paideia in the inter-war period, then on to Harold Bloom and Saul Bellow in the 1990s among many others. The verdict is crystal-clear. Classical Athens is recognized as providing splashes of light for Europe’s history of ideas and collective mentalities. European mentalities were mobilized by invoking classical antiquity for recurrent support for the Greeks, first for the Revolution, second for founding the state, then for its consolidation, and thereafter in times of crisis, as recently proclaimed by Cohn Bendit (member of the European Parliament leader of the Green Party) stating that (2001) ‘the retrospective European and Western debt to Greece is incalculable; it far surpasses Greece’s economic debt and adapting it’.

Eurocentric constructs of the brightness of classical antiquity automatically generated external negative by-products in viewing other civilizations. Shadows laid down in various degrees of intensity covered periods before and after classical antiquity, culminating in the darkest blackness of the Ottoman period (completely Turkified in the same sense that Byzantium is totally Hellenized in Greece), with all possible repercussions in such things as public financing of archaeological excavations and the establishment of museums.

On the basis of conclusions reached by various scholars specializing in various periods I will sketch some preliminary remarks on how the classical period obliterated all others, just to contextualize the polarized contrast made
between that period and the Ottoman period (see Hodder, 1986; Chamila-
kis, 2007). The Neolithic period has been condemned to perennial indiffer-
ence (Kotsakis, 2008; Voutsaki, 2003). Cycladic Art was first considered as
meaningless junk of no interest to the international smuggling market. Since
the 1930s, however, because it was discovered by the ‘Prophets of Modern-
ity’—Pablo Picasso, Amedeo Modigliani, Constantine Brancusi, Henry
Moore—it has gradually been incorporated into the official national dis-
course as the precursor of the classical, although for the Modernists it was
exactly the opposite: the Cycladic was considered Primitive art that could be
of use against the classical tradition (Plantzo, 2006). The Mycenaean and
Minoan periods were incorporated and after the decipherment of Linear B—
considered by Chadwick as a proto-Hellenic language swiftly Hellenized by
Grecocentric approaches, not by the community of classicists. This moved the
‘cradle’ of European civilization south to Mycenae and Crete (Ziolkowski,
2008; Gere, 2009). The archaic, the pre-classical (Osborne, 1996) and the Hel-
lenistic post-classical (Brown, 1989) periods have all been relatively under-val-
ued in favour of the classical (exceptionally annexing certain writers from
Homer to Plutarch).

Finally, the Macedonian period, initially ‘barbaric’ in official ideology in
accordance with European modes of thinking, since G. Droysen, and in
Greece mainly because of Bulgarian territorial claims, was incorporated into
the official national discourse by the end of the nineteenth century. Since the
early 1990s this incorporation has been made with a resounding splash
because of the Slav Macedonians laying claim to the name (see for example
Skoulariki, 2005).26 The Roman period—by a simplistic paraphrasing of Hor-
ace’s dictum ‘Et Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artis intulit agrestic Latio’
summarized in the schoolbook motto: ‘they conquered us by the force of
arms; we conquered them by the force of intellect’—is seen as the second
wave of barbarism, worse than the previous one (Papaggelis, 2005). The Byz-
antine era is the third wave of initially oriental barbarism, re-anointed by the
end of the nineteenth century for reasons similar to those for Macedonia; it
then becomes idealized as Christianized Hellenization (Cameron, 2006).
Hybrid currents or personalities are retrospectively nationalized to the full:
for example, the ancient art of Faiyum becomes fully Hellenized through the
definite influence of Hellenic colours but the influence of Roman forms and
Egyptian burial traditions is ignored; El Greco becomes the Greek par excel-
lence because of existing Byzantine influences overshadowing Venetian and
Spanish influences (Chatzinikolaou, 2008).

With ‘the Classical’ (‘The Glory that was Greece’) being made a fetish,
shadows and darkness fell and continue to fall upon contemporary (Persian)
and previous Eastern civilizations (Phoenician, Egyptian).27 Ultimately, Greek
panegyrics about Greece’s classical past damage our understanding of this
same classical past. It goes hand-in-hand with the lack of serious, systematic classical studies in Greece. European research, journals, and publications all take precedence. This short diversion into the ways of conceptualizing other past eras was to show the extent and the depth of Hellenic refractions linked with European tendencies and put the rejection of ‘the Turk’ in context.

Instead of seeking racial, ethnic, and linguistic purity (*homeiogeneia*), we should have as guidelines of our research such concepts as ‘crossroads’, ‘cross-fertilization’, ‘links’, ‘influences’, ‘contacts’, as well as compound nouns for areas of civilization such as ‘Greco-Persian’, ‘Greco-Indian’, ‘Byzantino-Ottoman’, ‘Turco-Greek’, ‘Judaeo-Christiano-Islamic’, ‘Arabo-Ottoman’.

**Inconclusive concluding remarks**

The modes under which the ‘national’ is articulated as a historic past are neither natural nor obvious. Instead, the articulation stems from a series of conscious political decisions at the micro, macro, and giga levels (in the extended Foucaultian sense of the term). The ideological framework in which these political decisions are taken in each period is shaped by particular historical contexts and specific socio-political relations of power that can be taken as givens. What strikes the reader of modern Greek History is that despite the ups and downs of Greco-Turkish political relations, despite common participation in Western and International institutions (NATO, Association agreements with the EEC, and so on), despite instant upsurges of feelings at the popular level (earthquake diplomacy, reciprocal translations of literary works and a high ratings Turkish serial) it does not take much for ‘all that seems solid to melt into thin air’. Deeper currents are at work and their roots—often sentimental—have not been dealt with. Disciplined studies could provide a number of reliable conclusions about the hard core of collective mental constructs of identity. Crises and crossroads such as moments of rapprochement, and the turning points in the history of the two nations, could well be exceptionally rewarding subjects of research. In such critical periods national/state policies stemming from conscious (and often instantaneous) decisions stand out clearly, and they often remain (usually because of inertia) fixed for long periods of time.

This is the case also for the current Greek crisis—not only in its economic dimension, but in its political and moral dimensions as well. The tyranny of national history, it seems, is hard to shake off. For a century after the establishment of the Kingdom of Greece it served mainly as a deceptive medication (φαρμακεία), but in recent decades it has primarily been a poison (φαρμάκι). On the basis of the above, to what extent can the Greek state be considered to have been perpetually contradictory? The contradiction lies precisely in the contrast between a rational process of state modernization—Europeaniza-
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tion—and the mytho-demonological, therefore irrational, foundations of state policies. In general, the search for Greek identity has left its mark on the mindset, centripetally and creatively in some respects, but divisively, steriley, and frequently disastrously in others. The point is to examine the counter-policies that could effectively deal homeopathically, so to speak, with the problems posed by intense self-centred preconceptions, and analyze the modernizing impact of Europe.

A question remains, not exactly to be answered but to be faced: What is to be done? No ready-made recipes are available. But I could give some indications towards basic notions that ought to permeate policy directions. First and foremost is educational policy: the need to correct curricula and textbook ideology of self-glorification and hatred and belittlement of the ‘other’. Cultural policy, instead of being mobilized to continually legitimize diachronic Greekness as is the regular practice of institutions such as the Hellenic Foundation for Culture, the Foundation of the Greater Hellenic World and the World Council of Hellenes, could be redirected towards the search for mutual influences of civilizations. More specifically, we know how tightly linguistic policy has been bound up with perceptions of the nation: with terminology like ‘intrusion’, ‘invasion’, ‘infection’ and ‘adulteration’ (of the Greek language and, by extension, of Greek education), ‘cutting off’ or ‘amputation from our roots’ or the one word ‘de-Hellenized’ (culturally and politically as well as linguistically). A policy countering the quest for purity and the expulsion of ‘tainted’ vocabulary can replace the body of laws, resolutions, circulars and committees. The EU factor, emphasizing the multi-lingual approach at the European institutional level and the shoring up of minority languages, has encouraged a change in the overall approach. The media is another sphere that rallies and divides at one and the same time. Instead of promoting ethnically bipolar images, the emphasis could be on understanding frontier civilizations. Foreign and defence policy (chiefly in relation to Greco-Turkish relations) seems to be conditioned by the underlying nationalist mytho-demonology. A modernizing change away from parochial internal rallying that succeeds only in reproducing and heightening the dichotomy between friends and enemies would move away from emotional, false policies. This necessarily means a change in propagandistic attitudes during military service.

The power of the state to structure and rally the nation and its ideology generally comes hand-in-hand with the policy of repressing minorities and excluding immigrants (see for example Christopoulos, 2008; Tsitselikis and Christopoulos, 1997; Featherstone, Papadimitriou et al., 2011; Society for the Study of Neohellenic Culture and General Education, 2004). Only recently, largely because of the various institutional manifestations of Europe, has the Greek judiciary’s approach to issues of human and minority rights (historic groups and new immigrants) and religious freedoms been modified. Within
this European environment the institutional system as a whole has been systematically studied, revealing a dense nexus of laws and ministerial decisions arbitrarily deciding inclusion and exclusion. Here, too, the underlying Greek national mythology has rallied the nation psycho-socially by flattering the Greeks’ sense of superiority with its anti-foreign, chiefly anti-Albanian rhetoric. A radical law on the acquisition of citizenship was passed in 2010, which is a breakthrough.31

All the above policy areas have to be dealt with if Greece is to turn its back upon the logic that serving the nation-state as a supreme good justifies all means.

Through its many institutional manifestations, Europe has decisively modified Greece’s approach to what ‘legal’ means where human and minority rights and religious freedoms are concerned. Europe has affected Turkish law and practice even more clearly.32 Of course, Europe’s inability to deepen its own integration politically is evident in crucial areas. The lack of political will to coordinate steps in dealing with the current economic crisis in the Eurozone, the intensifying social inequalities, the strengthening of xenophobic political opinions combined with the similar anti-Islamic phobia no longer allow Europe to function as an incentive for major transformations in Turkey.

I have tried to outline how, at first, a Eurocentric mindset decisively influenced Greek perceptions of Self and the ‘Other’, whether the ‘Other’ was a neighbour such as Turkey or a minority—a historic or a new immigrant minority—within Greece’s borders. In addition, this Eurocentric mindset has profoundly distorted perceptions of historical periods in the past and their relevance. The shining classical Golden Age has thrown all other periods and influences into varying degrees of shade and darkness, affecting how we deal with classical antiquity itself and how we understand the phases that led to it. Instead of persuasion through reasoning, a mechanism has been put in place for generating conviction through the emotive manipulation of memory and forgetting, a mechanism whose constant aim is to flatter the collective subconscious. By analyzing meanings attached to various conceptualizations of Europe and classical Greek antiquity, again through Europe, the legitimization of modern Greece was assured.

In the period after World War II Europe meant economic development (through the EEC). Later on, after Turkey, provoked by the Greek coup against Makarios, invaded Cyprus in 1974, Greek integration into Europe meant a decisive shield against Turkish aggression (or what was perceived as such). Finally, with the Helsinki agreement there was a whole paradigm shift related to the Greco-European-Turkish nexus. During the period of the Simitis government, with George Papandreou as minister of foreign affairs, the importance of endorsing Turkey’s adhesion to the EU became a strategic factor for easing continuing tensions in the area. The endorsement was strategic also
because an eventual reduction in defence costs (the highest among OECD countries as percentage of GDP) could drastically improve Greece’s finances, allowing funds to be spent more productively on education, health and culture. A prerequisite for all the above, in my view, is the in-depth transformation of preconceptions and bipolar constructs in viewing the Ottoman past and the Turkish present. This chapter has focused on understanding the die-hard mental rigidities in a period of economic depression, if not crisis, for the European Union and Greece, but also of record GNP growth for Turkey.

Skarlatos Vyzantios, a major but undervalued nineteenth century scholar, stated:

We rejoice to see Turkey becoming all the more Europeanized and rejecting her ancient tendencies as irreconcilable with the demands of modern ideas and modern civilization. But we consider it equally desirable that she does not discard all her virtues with her vices (κακώς κείµενα), as is usually the case when modernizing tendencies supersede rational discourse and the judgment of legislators. (Vyzantios, 1851–1869, vol. 3: 293)

Modis’ Pseftopolemos which was written half a century later in 1897, but could just as well have been applied to later circumstances of Greek crisis inexorably involving Europe, seems to me an apt final note:

And the Romios’ [Greeks’] neck, which has such a[n amazing] reputation
And as you very well know cannot endure a [foreign] yoke/
Accepted even [International Financial] Control without much grumbling
And in bargaining with the foreign inspectors we had a hard time (Manis, 1994: 79)
THE RELEVANCE OF ‘EUROPE’ TO GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

Spyros Economides

Introduction

Since the ‘metapolitefsi’, ‘Europe’ has played a key role in Greece’s foreign policy. This relevance of ‘Europe’ to Greek foreign policy since World War II, and especially since the mid-1970s, is expressed in both normative and rationalist contexts. In its normative context, ‘Europe’ has shaped as well as legitimized significant aspects of Greek foreign policy. In its rationalist context, ‘Europe’ has safeguarded Greek interests as well as providing increased capabilities. In both contexts, and perhaps spreading into the realm of constructivist thought, ‘Europe’ is important for Greeks, and their foreign policy, in terms of identity.

First, to explain the role and impact of the ‘European’ factor on Greek foreign policy one has to distinguish which ‘Europe’ we are referring to: the ‘Europe’ of values, norms, culture, and identity, or the ‘Europe’ of the EU institutions, rules, foreign policy-making mechanisms and processes, and strategic interests. Of course, one cannot and should not artificially divorce one from the other. But this distinction is key as we have to be clear which Europe we are addressing. Secondly, ‘Europe’s’ impact on Greek foreign policy can only be assessed through some empirical reference to Greek foreign policy itself. What are its key interests? Is it successful in achieving goals?
Lastly, ‘Europe’s’ impact on Greek foreign policy can only be assessed by looking at the relationship between Greece and Europe in the foreign policy sphere. Do the interests of Greece and ‘Europe’ coincide? Are systemic factors more important than intra-European relations? How much do other actors, such as the United States, matter?

This chapter seeks to identify how and when ‘Europe’ has been relevant to Greek foreign policy since the end of World War II. It will argue that it is not necessarily ‘being European’ that is fundamental for Greece in the formulation and pursuit of its foreign policy. What is important is belonging to an institutionalized ‘Europe’ which legitimizes and safeguards interests and gives meaning to foreign policy.

From the US to Europe. For much of the initial post-World War II period, the ‘European factor’ in Greek foreign policy was negligible and clearly of secondary importance to a dominant US. The nature of US involvement in the Greek Civil War set Greece firmly on the path to belonging to the anti-communist ‘Western Bloc’ which soon emerged with the onset of the Cold War (Hatzivassiliou, 2006). Institutionally, this translated primarily into Greek membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (1952), which would become the primary political forum for the development of ‘Western’ defence and foreign policies in the Cold War context (Economides, 1995). Whilst there gradually emerged a set of European ‘voices’ within NATO, over the first two decades of its existence they were never homogeneous or robust enough to challenge US predominance. Nor did the rather static Cold War strategic balance, at least in the European theatre, allow much room for manoeuvre for European states which were neither willing nor able to radically influence US strategic thinking. The reliance on US defence and extended deterrence, as well as a focus both on managing imperial decline (for France and the UK) and reconstructing Europe, or constructing a new Europe, meant that foreign policy had always to be conducted with one eye on US interests and influence. For Greece, this was even more the case. Beyond NATO, Greece did join ‘European’ institutions. In 1948 it became a member of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), and in 1951 of the European Payments Union (EPU). But the OEEC, and a subsidiary EPU, were only European institutions inasmuch as they comprised a European membership brought together to plan for Europe’s post-war reconstruction and economic development. The European Recovery Programme was possible only because of the US, and as US relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) rapidly deteriorated, so the recovery programme became increasingly influenced by the emerging Cold War discord. While the Programme still aimed to resuscitate Europe economically and socially, the perceived external threat of the USSR shifted the emphasis from constructing Europe to reconstructing a Europe.
strong enough to withstand the threat of communism in the East-West strategic context. In Greek terms, this solidified Greece’s ‘Westernness’ in systemic terms, but did nothing to elevate the relevance of institutional Europe to Greek foreign policy.

Perhaps membership of the Council of Europe (CoE), in 1949, could be seen as a truly European influence on Greece and its foreign policy. But to all intents and purposes the CoE never developed into a key structure of a united Europe—at least not as long as Europe was divided—and remained a noble cause of limited influence; as Konrad Adenauer said, ‘an expression of the European conscience’ (http://www.coe.int). More important, the Association Agreement between Greece and the European Economic Community (EEC), concluded in 1961, could be portrayed as a significant step up in the relevance of Europe to Greece. Indeed, in social and economic terms this is undeniable: Greek associate status brought with it the benefits of adaptation as well as material advantage and preferential treatment. But in the context of foreign policy, which is the scope of this chapter, the Association Agreement made no substantial difference. It merely solidified the understanding that Greece belonged to the ‘West’, a ‘West’ dominated by the US in foreign policy and strategic terms, in which the nascent EEC had no competencies and virtually no role in foreign policy terms.

Therefore, for almost three decades after the end of World War II the European factor in Greek foreign policy was negligible and deeply submerged under US predominance. The systemic requirements of the Cold War, added to the priority of post-war European reconstruction, left little room for a ‘European’ foreign policy influence: those truly European institutions that were developing had no mechanisms to make, and no capabilities to carry out, anything amounting to foreign policy (or to influence the foreign policies of members and associates).

Of course, individual European states may have had a relevance and impact on Greek foreign policy. For example, the UK was a significant actor in the case of Cyprus, an issue of much substance and priority in Greek foreign policy. But these instances are rare, and on the whole amount to nothing nearing a notion of ‘European’ relevance and influence on Greek foreign policy in this period.

In effect the next manifestation of the Cyprus problem, in 1974, best exemplified both the predominance of US influence on Greek foreign policy (and the virtual absence of a ‘European factor’) and the beginning of a turn to Europe by Greece in politico-economic as well as foreign policy terms. The junta years in Greece led to increasing scepticism about the role and influence of the US in Greek politics. For the US, the Colonels’ junta was in many respects an acceptable evil when viewed in Cold War terms: as long as foreign and defence policy stayed in line with the broader global anti-com-
Communist strategy, internal undemocratic institutions would be tolerated in the short term. This attitude, of course, gave rise to increasing anti-Americanism within Greece. And when the Turkish invasion of Cyprus took place in 1974, the US was seen to be complicit, if not partisan.

The ensuing end of the dictatorship in Greece, and the metapolitefsi, brought with it a growing interest in counterbalancing the influence of the US both in Greece’s domestic politics and in its foreign policy. This was not an overt form of anti-Americanism (even if that was prevalent in the leftist circles), but a more rational management of interests and expectations on the part of Karamanlis. On his return to Greece, he quickly put into place a programme of pursuit of EEC accession. This pursuit, and the reasons for it, have been heavily analyzed and documented. But what is usually missing from this analysis is the foreign policy component. Karamanlis was keen to create an alternative pole of influence to that of the US. He was committed to NATO and ‘the West’, but sought different venues for safeguarding Greek interests which would perhaps be beyond total US dominance. The US’s strategic interests provided the broad context for Greek foreign policy and its position in the international system, but did not always provide the necessary protection of narrower Greek interests (which arguably had been sacrificed in the broader Cold War context with respect to Cyprus). In short, with Greek-Turkish relations in mind in the aftermath of Cyprus 1974, and with a need to counter the post-junta anti-American sentiment in Greece, Karamanlis needed a European pole as a complement to the US.

The EEC could provide this. It was not a threat to the US, but was becoming an increasingly significant actor on the international stage through its economic influence and trading power. France had removed itself from the NATO military command in 1966 and other European NATO and EEC members wished to see greater Euro-influence over strategy and American policy-making. In sum, the European Community would maintain Greece’s Western credentials in general, not threatening its underlying strategic relationship with the US, but providing a complementary pole of security with regard to specific, narrow national interests. Hence I would argue that the Karamanlis decision to pursue early EEC accession was driven not insignificantly by the desire to safeguard Greek national interests in foreign policy through a European framework.

This framework was primarily a European institutional framework provided by the EEC. But there was a secondary framework, that of a broader notion of Europe which traversed the Iron Curtain. Karamanlis embarked on a set of bilateral relationships with neighbouring communist states—Bulgaria for example—and attempted generally to engage with the Eastern Bloc, something which Greece had not done since the onset of the Cold War. This was not done to spite the US, but rather in the spirit of serving Greek interests...
within the ‘European framework’, which was also becoming more apparent through the ‘Helsinki process’. In short, by the time of EEC accession in 1981, Greece’s main foreign policy interests, especially in the Aegean with Turkey and over Cyprus, were now conducted through numerous conduits. The US, and NATO, were still key actors in maintaining the Aegean balance. But now there was the added weight, behind Greek positions, of the premier European institution, providing Greece with an important advantage over Turkey.

The transformation of Europe’s role as primary guarantor of Greek foreign policy interests would only be completed after the creation of the EU, and especially the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and more recently a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) initiated by France and the UK in the St Malo Agreement of 1998 and codified in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. Within this transformation one also has to discuss the role of Europeanization in measuring the impact and relevance of the European factor in Greek foreign policy. But this discussion will follow later.

The 1980s were a rather strange decade in terms of this shift away from the US to ‘Europe’. PASOK, and Andreas Papandreou, introduced a completely different tone to Greek foreign policy. While the interests, and issues, remained static, the PASOK government in a sense speeded up the process of divesting Greece of American influence. One cannot forget the incessant tirades over the US military bases, or the constant anti-American and anti-NATO rhetoric.

In one respect this was in accordance with the grass-roots demands of the PASOK electorate: Greece’s first socialist government had to respect the voice of a Greek Left which could not respect the US for its involvement in the Greek Civil War or forgive Washington for its role in the onset of the dictatorship in 1967. In another respect, it chimed with a party leadership ideology which was increasingly attracted to a ‘third way’ not only in domestic politics but also in foreign policy: the view that escaping the clutches of US/‘Western’ dominance without falling under the influence of the USSR was feasible. While not necessarily preaching non-alignment, PASOK governments in the 1980s pursued policies, such as the ‘Initiative of the Six’, which were in fact non-aligned.

While much of this anti-US/‘anti-West’ stance was rhetorical, it did result in formal decisions and actions that distanced Greece from its NATO allies and European partners. The most anti-US of these was the increased support not for Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, but for the demand of the removal of the US military presence. In short, there was a strident rhetorical lurch away from the US, backed up with policy decisions which both alienated and annoyed successive US administrations.
For the purposes of this chapter we have to consider how much this move away from US influence was followed by a strengthening of Greece’s European orientation. The indications here are that PASOK’s foreign policy was, at least rhetorically, equally anti-European in the institutional sense. The clamour to leave NATO was joined with loud calls to abandon EEC membership as well. PASOK governments did nothing to harm the immense transfer of funds and subsidies from the EEC to Greece, but in the foreign policy sphere, Greece took positions which really diverged from the policies of its EEC partners, and took actions which disrupted the unanimity of European Political Co-operation (EPC). The most commonly cited examples relate to the imposition of martial law in Poland (1981), the Argentinian invasion of the Falklands (1982), and the shooting down of the commercial airliner KAL 007 by the Soviet air force (1983). In each of these instances, attempts to reach unanimity in the context of the EPC, the process by which the Community formulated and carried out its foreign policy, were undermined by Greece. These were real and not rhetorical ‘anti-European’ decisions. They did not only address a domestic audience in Greece, they scuppered EEC member states’ attempts to forge consensus, reach unanimous positions and take action, in what were seen as important international crises affecting the interests of the Community and its members. They were anti-European in both the institutional sense and the ideational sense. In the first case, they were veto positions taken in the context of recognized processes and mechanisms of European decision-making: they weakened the EEC’s ability to act internationally. In the second case, they were sharp attacks on European values and norms which underpinned the attempt to forge a unanimous view: they challenged not only the mechanisms of decision-making but the very ideas these mechanisms were meant to serve.

That these veto positions were taken on issues not considered of vital national interest to Greece was a double-edged sword. On the one hand it could be argued that it was easy for the Papandreou government to act in such an obstructionist manner on issues not deemed of key national importance; essentially, that this was a form of ‘grandstanding’ of no consequence in real terms for immediate Greek interests. On the other hand, the fact that Greece was willing to challenge the will of its EEC partners on issues not vital to its interests could be taken as an indication that ideologically, and in terms of the European foreign policy, Greece was going down a different path from the rest of Western Europe, and this really was a significant divergence in policies and interests.

Either way, the consequences of such actions (among others), and the rhetoric of anti-Europeanism and anti-Westernism, ushered in a new era in the relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy. While there had been a steady move away from the dominance of US influence and into the ‘European
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orbit’ from the mid-1970s onwards, culminating in EEC accession in 1981, the Papandreou era seemed to seek an end to European influence as well. On one level, this was achieved through either obstructionist policies mentioned above or independent actions in sensitive fields such as the Arab-Israeli conflict. On another level, it was achieved through rhetoric. Overall, though, it seemed that the relevance of Europe to Greece was on the wane.

In terms of the relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy, the creation and evolution of the CFSP and later the CSDP are highly significant for at least two reasons. First, it further shifted the locus and focus of Greek foreign policy from the US to the EU: while the US and NATO remained highly relevant in Greek foreign policy terms, the EU (‘Europe’) became the predominant pole. Secondly, the EU now provided a challenge to Greek foreign policy in the sense that it was making both institutional and normative demands on its member states. Participation in the CFSP was necessary in procedural terms and vital national interests could still be safeguarded through the veto provision. But there was an increasing emphasis on states having to behave in certain ways that met the normative and value-based criteria upon which the EU and its foreign policy would be based (as enshrined in the Copenhagen Criteria for future accession in 1993). In short, the EU would defend the interests of its member states through institutional provisions—and the need for unanimous decisions in foreign policy—but member states would also be required to behave in ways upholding the principles and values of the EU and its members.

What this section has attempted to trace is the transformation of Europe’s relevance to Greece and its foreign policy. It is argued that for a variety of domestic and systemic reasons, from the mid-1970s onwards Europe became an increasingly more attractive and important pole for Greece in the pursuit of its foreign policy interests. While the US had dominated the foreign policy scene, as it had done the domestic scene, since the late 1940s, the metapolitefsi marked a departure from US pre-eminence on both scenes, as Karamanlis sought to protect national interests through the medium of Europe. Indeed, as Europe became increasingly institutionalized through the EEC and subsequently the EU, and its desire and ability to conduct foreign policy grew within procedures embedded in this growing institutionalization, it became increasingly relevant in Greek terms. The Papandreou decade in the 1980s may have been a hiatus in this growing relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy, but that hiatus would quickly come to an end in the early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslavia.

What the next sections will do is examine which Europe it is that became increasingly relevant. It will also involve the use of empirical examples from Greek foreign policy positions and interests to highlight the increasing relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy. Events in that foreign policy since
1990 have been dramatic and have really brought home the closeness in the relationship between Greece and Europe, for better or for worse.

Which Europe?

_Institutional Europe._ It has been argued that the decision to pursue EEC accession in the 1970s was primarily driven by the security dimension (Valinakis, 1994). Karamanlis saw in the European Community the provision of a security guarantee safer and more reliable than that of the US. As part of the European project, Greece’s interests would be better served and safeguarded by European partners which, unlike the US, would put the interests of their European partners above the interests of maintenance of some kind of systemic balance. And while it has been questioned whether the EU has been more successful than the US in safeguarding Greek national interests (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003), there is no doubt that it has replaced the US as Greece’s main ‘security provider’. Hence two areas need to be explored. In this section we will look at ‘which Europe’ is viewed as the security provider for Greece: the Europe of institutionalized foreign, security and defence policy, or the Europe of values and norms. In the next section we will test some of the hypotheses emerging from this section by looking at the evidence from the reality of Greek foreign policy, especially in the post-1992 context.

The relevance of Europe to contemporary Greek foreign policy is that it fulfils the same role that the ‘West’ did during the Cold War. In fact it is a rearticulation of the ‘West’ of the Cold War years, providing certainty and legitimacy for Greece in political, socio-economic, and foreign policy/security terms. Just as Greece belonged to the ‘West’, so it belongs to Europe which has replaced ‘the West’ as the strategic context for Greek foreign policy. More specifically, since 1981, it is the institutionalized form of Europe that has replaced ‘the West’ as the context and safeguard for Greek foreign and security policy: in technical terms, the EU is the main ‘security provider’.

This is a very rationalist approach both to what Greece wants from Europe and to what the latter provides, in the field of foreign policy. In this rationalist approach Greece sees in the EU a set of partners and procedures, with which and in which Greece is of equal status, that can serve Greek national interests and enhance its capabilities. Just as ‘the West’ provided instrumental guarantees for Greece’s survival and the pursuit of its national interests, so does the EU. Essentially, one could argue that it is about the primacy of EU power and not principle, just as in the Cold War era it was about belonging to the West for national security reasons and not ideological ones. There is of course a sense of legitimization here: Greek interests and foreign policy provisions are legitimized by membership of the ‘European club’ because that club has the ability to influence. This is a crude approximation of the old
realist adage of ‘might is right’, and since the EU is an acknowledged, significant international actor, it bestows certain privileges and capabilities on its members.

Let us look at a quick example in the foreign policy domain. Greece has had a trying relationship with its neighbour, FYR Macedonia, since the latter emerged as an independent state from the remnants of the former Yugoslavia. The dispute is well known and need not be recalled at length here. The main issue of dispute revolves around the name of the country, and the concomitant cultural and historical implications that arise from this. There has been a long-standing attempt, through UN-sponsored international mediation, to resolve the name dispute and normalize relations between the two states. There is one significant imbalance in the relationship between Greece and FYR Macedonia: the former is a member of the EU, which the latter wishes to join. Greece effectively holds a veto over FYR Macedonia’s hopes of accession to the EU.

It does not matter, at this stage, that the EU in general has strong reservations on whether the state is ready for accession, meets all the relevant criteria and can satisfy the demands of membership (which include resolving the dispute with Greece). Greece is seen as the veto player, potentially denying the right of EU membership to a state which is a candidate for membership and which, for many, will only be able to resolve its internal ethnic rivalries—which result in political instability and economic underperformance—and perhaps even its international disputes through early accession to the EU. Whether Greece is right or not, it has the power of EU membership on its side, and that is a most powerful tool in the context of foreign policy and enlargement. There is, of course, a precedent to this; the same situation evolved with FYR Macedonia’s potential membership of NATO, which was rejected by the North Atlantic Council at a meeting in Bucharest in April 2008. Greece had threatened to veto this application but it never got to a vote as many of Greece’s NATO allies saw fit to side with it and put FYR Macedonia’s membership on hold pending the resolution of the name dispute. As in the case of the EU, this was a clear indication that simple membership of the organization conferred an inestimable advantage and ability of influence on Greece. It is an example of the legitimization of a foreign policy position derived from membership of a most powerful and influential organization, the EU—especially in the context of enlargement which is seen as its most potent foreign policy tool.

In this sense the relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy is highly instrumental and based heavily on the institutional workings of the EU. Decisions in foreign and security policy need to be taken unanimously (for the most part), and as a result all member states have immense influence over the foreign policy of the Union. Accordingly a state like Greece can promote and
safeguard its interests by using or threatening to use the procedures available to it in the CFSP and other policy-making aspects of the EU.

In turn, simply being a member of the EU confers influence on Greece, as it is more likely that members will side with it against outsiders or prospective members. Sometimes in the past, especially on the ‘Macedonian issue’, this has not been the case: in the early 1990s Greece’s partners lost patience with its positions on the ‘name issue’, which were deemed irrational and unwarranted. But even in that climate of animosity, membership of the EU granted Greece privileges of influence and security which it would not otherwise have had. Thus institutional Europe in the ‘Macedonian issue’ has been of extreme value to Greece in promoting and protecting what is seen as a ‘domaine réservé’ in CFSP terms or an ‘ethniko thema’ in Greek terms.

Therefore, institutional Europe confers ability to use procedures, mechanisms, and influence to achieve foreign policy objectives. It is a rationalist understanding of what membership of the EU can provide in the domain of foreign policy, and it provokes instrumentalist attitudes towards the uses of the CFSP. In other words, this very specific notion of Europe can be co-opted or employed as a multiplier of Greek influence and capabilities.

Indeed this conceptual lens can also explain the relationship between Greece and the EU, in recent years, with respect to the other two major issues on Greece’s foreign policy agenda, Turkey and Cyprus. Again, here is not the place to rehearse the historical and thematic details of the Greek-Turkish and Cypriot disputes. Suffice it to say that since the late-1990s, Greece has made good use of its EU membership to influence Europe’s relations with Turkey and Cyprus in the best interests of Greece. In the case of Turkey, Greece seemingly made a policy volte face, proposing in 1999 that it would support Turkish entry into the EU. This went against all conventional understanding of Greek policy towards Turkey, which was based on unshifting opposition to Turkish accession. But the rapprochement that occurred between Greece and Turkey in the late 1990s, attributable among other things to the ‘earthquake diplomacy’ of 1999 and the close personal relationship between foreign ministers Papandreou and Cem, led to a changing perception of the role that the EU could play in shaping Turkish policy on the Aegean and other issues dividing it from Greece. By proposing early Turkish accession to the EU, on the condition that all bilateral issues with Greece must be resolved pre-accession, Greece was using the power of the EU to enable change in Turkish attitudes and produce change in the issues dividing the two countries: an exercise in soft power, perhaps, but still showing a very instrumentalist understanding of the EU’s ability to influence prospective members.

With respect to Cyprus, Greece pursued a vigorous and enthusiastic policy of promoting early membership of the EU. Here again, the idea was to employ the prospect of EU membership as an inducement to reach a nego-
tiated solution to the problems plaguing the divided island: membership would entail an agreed settlement. Once the process of Cypriot accession had proceeded substantially, it became increasingly obvious that a solution would be extremely hard to achieve, but in the meantime Cyprus had met all other accession criteria and Greece threatened to veto the whole process of ‘Big Bang’ enlargement involving nine other states, if Cyprus’ accession was held up. Consequently, Cyprus became a member of the EU, the island remains divided, and Greece achieved its primary objective. The incentive of EU membership did not prove strong enough in the field of conflict resolution in Cyprus. But the use of EU membership, and the requirement of unanimity for accession of new states, by Greece resulted in the accession of Cyprus, which put it in an advantageous position with respect to Turkey and the Turkish community in northern Cyprus. For Greece, this was a foreign policy success to the extent that Cyprus was now an equal, sovereign member of the EU, affording it greater autonomy and influence vis-à-vis Turkey, and it potentially freed Greece from the constant tutelage it had to provide Cyprus in foreign policy terms. For the EU, it added a seriously disruptive problem to its internal and external agendas.

So this section has strongly suggested that the relevance of Europe to contemporary Greek foreign policy should be viewed in the narrow institutional context. Using the examples of the three major issues dominating Greek foreign policy, I have proposed that, through this lens, Europe matters only inasmuch as it can be used as an instrument to promote Greek interests. This rationalist approach ignores the potential influence of ‘European values’ or ‘identity’ on Greek positions and concentrates on the multiplier effect that the EU can have on Greek power.

Normative Europe. There is an alternative view to the one outlined above, which suggests that the biggest influence Europe has had in foreign policy terms has been in the normative sphere. In the first instance, and especially since the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the EU has attempted to develop a distinctive foreign policy identity broadly based on experiences internal to the EU. Integration overcame the divisive politics of the pre-1945 European order, and consequently the values espoused by ‘integrationists’ have formed the essential foundations for a foreign policy identity. As this identity developed, the EU was initially characterized as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene, 1972) and subsequently as a ‘normative’ power (Manners, 2002), or an ‘ethical’ power (Aggestam, 2008). Its foreign policy was based on the essential values of the protection and promotion of peace, human rights, democracy, and economic development. Its growing ambition in the 1980s and 1990s was to create a regional environment stable and secure enough to prevent threats to Europe’s integrationist achievements, and to entice states to change their behaviour through diplomatic entreaties and economic inducements. The
institutionalization of the EU’s foreign policy, especially through the ‘pillar’ arrangement in Maastricht and the emergence of the CFSP, was partly driven by the need to give shape to the aforementioned identity but also to provide it with instruments. And these instruments were primarily derived from the EU’s economic power, and the perception that economic instruments would prove powerful enough to achieve foreign policy goals in their own right. It seemed that the EU’s foreign policy identity was now complete, its civilian power based on both ambitions and capabilities.

This Europe had a different relevance for Greece. While it too is a legitimizing actor, just as the ‘West’ was for Greece during the Cold War years, the source of legitimacy is not merely systemic. The EU, especially in its foreign policy-making dimension, is not merely a set of institutionalized mechanisms and procedures, backed up by a set of instruments, that can be utilized by member states in the pursuit of its national interests. The EU, in this interpretation, is driven on by a normative understanding of its international role, in which rules and values are the defining factors of ends and means. In this sense, EU foreign policy—and that of its member states—is not merely about ‘rational calculation’ but about ‘convergence of values’ leading to a ‘collective identity’ able to serve as a base for a single foreign policy based on a ‘European identity and values which, married to specific European interests, erode the parochial and narrow national interests of member states (Hill, 1988, 37).

The relevance of Europe is one in which convergence, and a specific understanding of a common past that has been overcome in very specific ways, have led initially to the emergence of a shared value-system that acts as the foundation of foreign policy, and subsequently the construction of a common identity defining all foreign policy goals. This is a Europe of European rather than national interests, and a Europe that shapes the foreign policy agenda of its member states. In turn, membership of the EU, and for our purposes the CFSP, bestow influence and legitimacy on member states not only because of the multiplier effect of ‘EU power’, but because of the power of common goals based on shared norms and values: it is about what is right as well as who has the might. This differs substantially from the rationalist, instrumentalist view outlined above, and derives its conceptual approach from a normative starting point that may ultimately blend into a constructivist understanding of interest formation.

Through this conceptual lens, Greece’s foreign policy goals, and certainly the style and tone of its foreign policy, have been heavily affected by EU membership. Joining the Community in 1981 made Greece a ‘European state’ again, following the years of dictatorship and political instability. Consequently, while it acquired rights and powers as a member of ‘institutional Europe’, it also acquired duties and rules of behaviour that it had to follow as a member of this European community of nation-states. In foreign policy
terms, this proved initially to be highly problematic during the 1980s and a very serious difficulty in the early 1990s, as outlined above.

But arguably ‘normative Europe’, and, at the extreme, the Europe of an emergent common identity, have had identifiable and significant influences on how and why Greece pursues its foreign policy interests (and even shapes those interests). Let us briefly consider the three ‘ethnika themata’ employed in the rationalist argument and see how they fare when considered through this conceptual lens. In all three cases, FYR Macedonia, Turkey and Cyprus, a strong argument has been made for a rationalist explanation of the role of the EU in Greek foreign policy. In all three cases, it could be argued that we have seen a substantial shift in the substance and style of Greece’s foreign policy: a shift that cannot be justified only through the rationalist prism. Alternative explanations emphasize that, in the longer term, membership of the EU has shaped Greece’s international behaviour. Greece has sought to serve its interests not only through the mechanisms of EU foreign policy, or through use of its instruments, but by behaving differently and according to criteria which have evolved from beyond the narrower Greek political and national landscape.

In the case of FYR Macedonia, a different diplomatic style partnered with a less confrontational policy was, to a large extent, responsible for the process of ‘rehabilitation’ Greece underwent with its European partners from the mid-1990s, and in policy terms for the signing of the ‘Interim Agreement’ with FYR Macedonia in 1995. This agreement put the relationship between the two states on a different footing in political and legal terms and set out clear targets for resolving the dispute. While the dispute continues, now it is Greece’s neighbour, rather than Greece, that is seen not to be meeting European standards, and hence the EU partners are siding with Athens. Indeed, the incentive of potential EU membership is a strong one, but it has been suspended because many EU states do not believe that FYR Macedonia is ready for membership, and not only because of its outstanding dispute with Greece. For Greece this is now a European issue.

In the relationship with Turkey, we have seen that since 1999 the tone and nature of Greek foreign policy have seemed to change. The differences separating the two sides remain, tensions often escalate, but a series of measures have been put in place, including confidence building measures, increased commercial and cultural interaction and, perhaps most important, continuous dialogue, which have signified a shift in this aspect of Greek foreign policy. Again, the lure of EU membership has proved a strong catalyst for the aspiring member, with knock-on effects for Greece. But Greece’s support for Turkish accession as a way towards resolving all bilateral disputes marked a significant change in Greek attitudes, and a positive way of addressing the relationship through a European lens. The problems still persist, and Turkey is
yet to join the EU, but through no fault of Greece. Turkey too is now a European issue within which the Greek-Turkish disputes are subsumed. In the case of Cyprus, the situation is even more clear-cut: it is now a member of the EU and certainly its unresolved issues are by nature European. It is less clear in this case how the normative dimension fits in its explanatory function, but it is indicative that it was hoped that through its ‘soft power’ and policy of enlargement, the EU could provide a strong enough incentive for dispute resolution. In any event, Cyprus is now by nature a ‘European issue’.

The normative dimension can only partly explain developments in Greek foreign policy in the European context. Normative power Europe is influential but has to be married with the rationalist explanations of interest-based policies to be convincing; and there is absolutely no conceptual or analytical reason why norms and interests cannot be married together as an explanatory tool in the context of Europe’s relevance to Greek foreign policy. Where these alternative explanations do fall short, in my view, is in the domain of ‘identity construction’—the idea that as a ‘European identity’ emerges it will increasingly become the basis for the construction of a European foreign policy (just as the national interest has always been seen as the basis for state foreign policy). Different states have different interests which then transform the policy of the Union. There are values which are shared by all members and contribute to the formulation of European foreign policy, but they often shape how states attempt to achieve goals rather than what those goals actually are. But is there a credible ‘European identity’ upon which all foreign policy can be based?

Europeanization. Much of the recent academic debate on the relevance of Europe to Greek foreign policy has been analyzed through the concept of Europeanization. This is a much used and much maligned term for the impact of the EU on its members (and other states). Building on an immense literature on the domestic impact of the EU, the Europeanization of national foreign policy literature is a growth industry in its own right. Some of this recent literature is highly theoretical, dealing with the conceptual and methodological agendas of Europeanization in the field of foreign policy (Moumoutzis, 2011). Much of it deals with Europeanization in the context of member state and EU foreign policy (Wong and Hill, 2011). More specifically, in the context of Europeanization of national foreign policy, there is an extensive literature on the case of Greece (Economides, 2005; Ioakimidis, 2000; Kavakas, 2000; Tsardanidis and Stavridis, 2005, 2011).

For our purposes, this literature is important because it provides an alternative explanation for the impact of the EU on Greek foreign policy from the rationalist/normative framework used above. It was argued above that much of Greek foreign policy in the European context is rationalist in nature, employing the influence and multiplier power of the EU to achieve national foreign policy goals. In the Europeanization framework this process is
acknowledged, but more importantly, it is modified and cast in the context of ‘uploading’ national foreign policy goals onto the European agenda. This form of policy transfer, arguably, changes the nature of the goals from being narrow ‘national goals’ to being broader ‘European goals’. It is not merely a case of the ‘multiplier effect’, but of ‘Europeanizing’ the goals and making them common goals for the EU and its members.

In the more normative framework outlined above, the influence flows in the reverse direction and focuses on how the EU influences national foreign policy formulation and execution, through both the transfer of European norms and standards of behaviour and participation in the constant repetitive bargaining processes of the CFSP and other parts of EU foreign policy-making. In this understanding of Europeanization, the key ideas are those of convergence and ‘downloading’: the transfer is one from the EU to the member state and is one of the convergence of values and views among the member states. Within this particular framework the notions of adaptation and socialization are also central. The formation and implementation of national foreign policy are shaped both structurally and in content through long-term participation in the EU institutions (which represent very specific values and behaviour). There is a third dimension to the Europeanization debate which focuses, in a constructivist vein, on identity formation as the basis of foreign policy formulation: goals derive from a sense of shared ‘Europeanness’ which is not institutionally based or driven.

What makes Europeanization so enticing an idea is that it attempts to capture the impact of the EU on member states within the sphere of one theory or concept. But that theory faces strong doubts in terms of conceptual difficulties (such as causality) and, in the case of foreign policy, in terms of the line between domestic and foreign or international levels of policy-making (in the field of EU foreign policy, states still play a central role, which ‘fudges’ the issue of what constitutes the EU policy-making level at the centre of Europeanization). Therefore, what we are left with is a concept that is at best ‘a middle-range theory within the range of approaches used to explain the foreign policies of European states’ (Wong and Hill, 2011: 232).

Conclusion

This chapter has tried to show that Europe has indeed been extremely relevant to Greek foreign policy, especially since the mid-1970s. By tracing the shift from the US to the European pole of influence, we can see how institutionalized Europe became increasingly important to Greece. It was a Europe which, as a security provider, could seemingly best promote and safeguard Greek interests. And as this Europe became increasingly institutionalized and transformed from EC to EU, and created a deeper foreign policy-making
process through the CFSP, it became even more important for Greece. Inevitably this raises the question of how important being ‘European’ is in foreign policy terms. Just as belonging to the West in Cold War terms brought with it certain value-based criteria for judging foreign policy, so too being European assumes values and norms as the basis for policy formulation.

This too has had an impact on Greek foreign policy, especially in terms of the ‘ethniki themata’, and especially in terms of style as well as substance. But while it is an attractive proposition, it is very difficult to prove the normative impact on foreign policy evolution. Indeed, this is also the problem—proving causality—in the academic debates on Europeanization of foreign policy, of which there is a now substantial literature focusing on Greece.

Hence the focus of this chapter has been ‘Which Europe’: the rational Europe of institutions, instruments and influence; or the normative Europe, of values, rules and standards of behaviour. The two are not readily separable; both have been relevant to Greece’s foreign policy in the last forty years. But, through time, it is easier to discern a pattern of wanting to safeguard interests through membership of institutionalized Europe than to promote interests through a normative Europe. Whether and how this makes Greek foreign policy ‘European’ remains open for debate.
Three decades since its 1981 accession to the European Community/European Union (EC/EU), Greece as an EU member state has graduated from the ‘reluctant partner’ of the 1980s to becoming a more or less committed European participant in all EU institutions, including the core project of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Such a development not only summarizes the country’s socioeconomic and political transformation, but also testifies to the EU’s crucial contribution in bringing about this transformation. It is proof of Greece’s integration into the European economy that the country’s most severe political economy crisis unleashed in 2009–10 had to become an inextricable part of the ongoing existential turmoil of the Eurozone, by far the most dramatic since the inception of the EMU project.

Along with Spain and Portugal, Greece was one of the three post-1974 ‘new democracies’ of southern Europe, and a market economy that was substantially liberalized after accession. The EC/EU underwrote Greece’s transition to a stable, mature and consolidated democracy, by providing a normative and institutional blueprint, and by extending financial resources that cemented societal welfare and confidence in the Third Republic. Europeanization led Greece all the way from an over-protected to a far more liberalized, internationalized economy, integrated into the single European market. Moreover,
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in a country that has carried a long and deep tradition of cultural dualism (Diamandouros, 2000) Europeanization has unleashed far-reaching attitudinal and cultural shifts in Greek society, cementing the central presence and influence of a strong Western-leaning, pro-European, politically liberal and reformist ideological pole.

Three decades of participation in the European Union have defined both the Greek state and an evolving conceptualization of ‘Europe’ in Greek society. Underlying a seemingly linear process of Greece’s integration, a vibrant domestic public debate over the EU has evolved, both actively framing public stances and profoundly affected by the country’s ongoing Europeanization. This chapter discusses (a) the transformation of the Greek state and economy under the EU, and its limits; (b) the political economy of reform; (c) the implications of the 2010 economic crisis for Greece’s European vocation.

The Europeanization of the Greek political economy

Over thirty years of EU and one decade of EMU membership offer the opportunity for at least a tentative account. It is virtually impossible to separate the impact of the EU from the crucial mediating role of the national socioeconomic and politico-institutional system, as it is to distinguish the forces of European integration from those of globalization. But there is probably little reason to do so anyway: as much as Greece is part of the European integration process, so is the EU an inseparable element of Greek developments of the last thirty years. Far from being a patently exogenous force, ‘Europe’ has been internalized and endogenized by the domestic socioeconomic and politico-institutional system. The EU has generated not just legally binding frameworks and institutional adjustment, but also lasting normative influence that has defined the terms of ‘Europe’s’ domestic reception, public choices and collective action in Greek society.

The EU has exercised diverse functions with regard to the Greek political economy. It has acted as the external constraint, forcing compliance with the *acquis communautaire*, the single market programme and subsequently the EMU nominal convergence criteria, for a country whose declared objective was complete accession to all EU core functions and institutions (Featherstone, 2004). In its operation as an external constraint the EU often became a political facilitator of painful domestic economic adjustment, allowing the national government to invoke the EU as a scapegoat for unpopular policies.

Much of the EU’s transformative impact has unfolded by way of policy linkages, representing a version of indirectly imposed adjustment via an external disciplining mechanism. In this process, mutually interdependent policy reforms acquire a self-enforcing quality. Policy action in one field necessitates parallel or subsequent reforms in interdependent fields, one set of policies
leading to another. For example, the Maastricht programme imposed public deficit reduction towards the objective of debt sustainability. Before that, the liberalization of interest rates in the second half of the 1980s (implementing the single market programme) had hardened the government’s soft budget constraint, raising the cost of government financing. Financial liberalization denied the Greek government the ability to influence real interest rates, increasing the cost of servicing the large public debt. This maximized the government’s need to generate primary budget surpluses (net of interest payments) by increasing public revenue. As a result, Greek governments in the 1990s resorted to extensive privatization, which however required a developed capital market in order to succeed. This reinforced the process of financial liberalization, which enhanced the disciplining impact of globalized financial markets on the government’s macroeconomic policy.

Through hard and soft harmonization and convergence, Greece’s EU membership spearheaded domestic institutional and administrative modernization (Dimitrakopoulos and Passas, 2004). Though with a significant time lag, EC structural and cohesion funds gradually generated institutional adjustments, social learning and administrative adaptation, among other ways by energizing social capital in the Greek periphery (Paraskevopoulos, 2001; Andreou, 2006). The decentralization of power from a traditionally hydrocephalic national capital of Athens to the periphery from the 1980s to the 2000s (municipalities, prefectures and regions) was both motivated and funded by the European Union (Chadjipadelis and Hlepas, 2009). European legislation, structural programmes and their implementation expedited the modernization of a politico-administrative system traditionally characterized by a low degree of legitimacy and institutionalization, excessive formalism combined with the persistence of informal practices, and subjection to political patronage (Sotiropoulos, 1993; Pappas and Assimakopoulou, 2011). EU-imposed mechanisms of monitoring and control helped the civil service somehow to strengthen its position vis-à-vis politicians, the transfer of EU standards enhanced meritocracy, while the management of EU structural programmes raised the level of professionalism and efficiency of Greek administrative authorities (Spanou, 1998).

The emergence of independent regulatory authorities, the domestic transposition (via emulation) of standard operating practices and institutions (Ladi, 2005), the diffusion of social rights (for consumers, women, handicapped, minorities) and the awakening of civil society (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos, 2005), the institutionalization of social dialogue (Tsarouhas, 2008)—all these have been aspects of the multi-faceted Europeanization of the Greek political economy and society, where the impact of a ‘model EU’ has extended beyond hard policy compliance. The EU has operated as a yardstick against which the performance of the Greek political economy is measured, provid-
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ing convergence blueprint and reform direction, since 2000 under the framework of the open method of coordination. Replete with benchmarks and indicators, this is also a self-awareness enhancing process for the Greek state.

The EU has been associated with a crucial paradigmatic function. We refer here to a normative framework of values, norms, policy paradigms, best practices, and behavioural standards that induce adjustment by way of emulation and inspiration rather than by imposing direct sanctions and obligations. This version corresponds to the core of what the constructivist stream of the literature identifies as Europeanization (Radaelli, 2003: 30 ff). This is about emulating West European practices, ‘catching up with Europe’, not only in material but also in behavioural and cultural terms. Demonstrations of the paradigmatic function have included elite learning through the Europeanization of policy milieus, and, most notably, the graduation of PASOK, over the 1990s, into a mainstream European social democratic party (Moschonas and Papanagnou, 2008).

Moreover, the financial assistance function of the EU towards a net recipient member state has entailed a crucial political economy dimension. From the 1980s, it could be claimed that Europe underwrote democracy in Greece by extending the material resources (agricultural support and structural funds) that enhanced development and modernization, raised the levels of general societal welfare, and provided the vital perceived link between democracy and prosperity which is essential for sustaining political and democratic stability. Although a significant portion of EC funds provided for structural modernization in the 1980s ended up being used as targeted income rather than investment subsidies, and consolidating traditional party clienteles, they did play a crucial part in rendering anti-democratic nostalgia (especially in the rural periphery) a thing of the past. By the same token, net EU inflows over three decades helped cement pro-EU sentiment in a Greek society and body politic traditionally torn by cultural ambivalence towards the West.

The limits of economic transformation

Despite the undeniable scope and depth of domestic transformation under the impact of EU membership, the Greek state and political economy have also provided extensive instances of adjustment failure, epiphenomenal change, reversion, divergence or sheer resistance to reform. Let us look at certain aspects and figures, to illustrate the point.

After the 1980s Greece apparently caught up with, but in fact diverged from, the EC economic policy standard. Greek government spending rose from 30 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1980 (compared with an average 43 per cent of the GDP of the twelve initial members of the Euro-area, EA12) to 49 per cent in 1990 (above the 48 per cent EA12 aver-
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However, such upward convergence of public spending was not followed by a proportionate increase in public revenue, as the tax base remained narrow and tax evasion continued to reign. Greece’s fiscal predicament since the 1980s has been primarily a problem of revenue and less so one of expenditure. The latter has not been significantly higher than the EU average, but its composition has hampered economic growth: very heavy on military spending, relatively low overall on investment compared with consumption spending, with social spending heavily skewed in favour of pensions. As a result, Greece ended up diverging from the EU in terms of a rapidly growing public deficit and an untameable public debt. The macroeconomic adjustment effort of the 1990s to meet the EMU objective reduced Greek government spending to 44 per cent of GDP, compared with 48 per cent in EA12. However, after EMU accession, Greece partly relaxed the fiscal consolidation effort, as the ‘hard’ EMU nominal convergence constraint gave way to a ‘softer’, politically negotiable Stability and Growth Pact (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008). The budget primary surpluses (excluding interest payments on the debt) were short-lived, generated only at the end of the 1990s and sustained for just half of the 2000s. Combined with the high cost of the 2004 Olympic Games and the loss of fiscal control after 2007, the new context sent public spending up to 52 per cent of GDP by 2009, the public deficit to a record 15.4 per cent of GDP, and the country into the arms of its creditors.

To be sure, neither progress nor deterioration is linear. They are rather the cumulative outcome of successes and failures, of stop-go cycles, of the alternation of expansionary (usually electoral) sprees with repeated parentheses of disciplined stabilization programmes.

Much of the public spending rise of the last thirty years resulted from the expansion of public employment and the public sector wage bill, driven by the forces of party clientelism. Higher public spending was also associated with increasing social expenditure, whose levels converged to the EU15 standard. Social transfers in Greece rose from 8 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 21 per cent in 2009. This was certainly an indication of convergence with the EU. However, both the composition and the effectiveness of social spending suggested significant divergence. Despite similar levels of social protection spending in Greece, its comparative effectiveness in curbing poverty was among the lowest in the EU (Matsaganis 2006). The disparity between nominal spending levels and delivered quality outcomes can be said to extend to other social policy areas, such as higher education. In both health and secondary education, the significant levels of public funding have not managed to avert parallel private spending, whose levels are among the highest in EU terms. Most importantly, in contrast to the EU welfare state of advanced social services, the Greek welfare state is predominantly about pensions, whose cost since the 1980s increased rapidly, culminating in one of the country’s most acute fiscal and
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structural problems (Tinios, 2010). The blocking power of the trade unions (predominantly of workers in the wider public sector), which (until 2010) repeatedly averted pension reform and managed to thwart an ambitious reform attempt in 2001, can be pinpointed as a cause of reform failure.

In other areas, too, structural continuities remained unaffected by the broader trend of Europeanization, and domestic institutions failed to catch up with systemic change. For example, Greece continued to be an EU laggard with regard to employment structure. Greece has one of the highest rates of self-employment as share of total employment, which also explains why Greeks are European champions in terms of average annual hours worked per employed person (self-employed people, such as small shop owners, tend to work more hours). A nexus of other features is associated with this. First, there is high tax evasion and one of the highest percentages of shadow economy in Europe. Secondly, the high percentage of self-employed is associated with a low percentage of private sector employees, and thus an over-representation of wider government sector employees as percentage of total wage earners. If one looks at the composition of the leadership of the General Confederation of Greek Labour (GSEE) over the last few decades, the private sector (with the exception of banks, many of which used to be state-controlled before being privatized) is very heavily under-represented, and the export-oriented or tradable sectors are virtually absent. Powerful trade unions over-representative of the sheltered, protected sector of the economy have bargained with governments (especially but not solely PASOK governments) into building up a highly protective employment regulation structure skewed to their interests.

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2004), Greece (until July 2010) was among the strictest OECD countries in terms of employment legislation. A highly protective and rigid labour market was instituted over the last three decades, protecting insiders at the expense of outsiders, and failing to catch up with momentous societal changes such as the massive entry of women into the employment market. As an example of institutional rigidity, part-time employment in Greece in 2009 corresponded to 6 per cent of total employment, compared with 19 per cent for the EU and 20 per cent for the Eurozone. Correlated with the over-regulation of the ‘official’ employment sector is the sheer regulatory anarchy and lack of any social protection of employees that prevail in the very extensive informal sector, altogether amounting to a polarized duality of the labour market. No wonder Greece also possesses one of the highest rates of female unemployment, youth unemployment and long-term unemployment in the EU15 and the Eurozone, even though the male unemployment rate is not above the EU average (Fotoniata and Moutos, 2010).

All this means that there are limits to EU-driven convergence; under the nominal convergence that led Greece into the euro there lay glaring struc-
tural disparities, and the imported stability and credit-driven euphoria under the euro may have acted as a palliative to structural adjustment pressures, buying policy-makers precious political time, allowing them to postpone otherwise, urgent and painful adjustment. The Lisbon process in the 2000s has enhanced awareness of these structural divergences, but (lacking any hard policy instruments) has done little to fix them. It took nothing less than the seismic crisis of 2010 and the ensuing conditionality to engineer legislative reforms that are tackling long-standing distortions and changing the structure of the Greek welfare state.

There are two important macroeconomic indicators that reflect economic policy and adjustment failure, and evolve in a linear rather than cyclical manner: public debt and net foreign indebtedness. The public debt/GDP ratio rose above 100 per cent in the early 1990s, did not decline significantly, and in 2009 shot up to unsustainable levels. Greek governments after the 1980s bloated government expenditure without supporting it by an equivalent rise in tax revenue, and in the 1990s failed to adjust to the reality of market interest rates compared with the previous regime of financial interventionism that allowed cheap public deficit financing by taxing the domestic banking system. Subsequently, in the high-growth 2000s until 2008, governments did not take advantage of the low interest rates to de-escalate the public debt/GDP ratio and implement a drastic fiscal consolidation. The euro-denomination of public debt of Eurozone countries eliminated the exchange rate premium and the inflation premium, allowing governments to borrow at moderate interest costs, as long as their debt was not perceived as subject to default risk. The interest rate decline inside the Eurozone (the Greek government until 2007 could borrow with a spread of ten or thirty basis points, that is, 0.3 per cent, above the German bund), combined with enhanced opportunities of public debt management and financial accounting provided by financial engineering, altogether ended up softening the budget constraint and relaxing the adjustment effort.

The second adverse development is the gradual widening of the current account deficit and accumulation of foreign debt. This points to deeper structural forces at play, and testifies not just to government fiscal failure but to an overall poor record of integration of Greece in the European and global economy. To explain the background, until 1973 Greek current account deficits were limited to an average around 2 per cent of GDP. From the 1950s to the first half of the 1970s, Greek trade deficits were offset by surpluses on the income and transfers accounts, mainly resulting from remittances from Greek seamen and emigrants. From the 1980s onwards, the gradual liberalization of trade led to a deterioration of the trade account, and the growing return of emigrants had an adverse impact on the income account. These negative effects were offset by large current and capital inflows from the EC/EU
(equal, on average, to about 3 per cent of Greek GDP), which kept the current account deficit contained at more or less modest levels. These Community funds supported the high GDP growth rates of 1994–2008, which allowed Greece to converge with EU average per capita income levels, recovering the lost ground of the 1980s. EU inflows declined in the 2000s, in accordance with the new EU-25/27 budgetary framework priorities. The Third Community Support Framework Fund ended in 2006. From a total average equivalent of 4.2 per cent of GDP in 1990–99, the net current and capital transfers from the EU in 2000–08 declined to an average 2.4 per cent of GDP. Also reflecting a sharp deterioration of the trade balance, the current account deficit grew rapidly after 2004, skyrocketing to a record 14.5 per cent of GDP in 2008. Thus the Greek economy found itself unprepared to confront the post-enlargement reality of deepening liberalization and declining EU inflows.

The gradual widening of the current account deficit and the accumulation of foreign debt have been the outcome of the large and steady decline in Greece’s national savings rate between 1974 and 2009, a decline only partly associated with the rise in government borrowing. Though parallel to the trend observed in many other EU15 countries, in the case of Greece (as well as Portugal) this decline has been far more pronounced. The current account deficits incurred from the late 1990s to the late 2000s were responsible for increasing the country’s negative net foreign asset position as proportion of GDP from 3 per cent in 1997 to 86 per cent by end of 2009 (IMF, 2010a; Moutos and Tsitsikas, 2010). The rise in net foreign indebtedness from 3 per cent to 86 per cent far exceeds the parallel rise in the public debt/GDP ratio during the same period, from 102 per cent in 1997 to 127 per cent in 2009 (Katsimi and Moutos, 2010).

These developments are symptomatic of the Greek economy’s insufficient capacity to compete at a European and international level, of declining competitiveness and real exchange rate appreciation, of rising unit labour costs and a consistently higher level of inflation compared to the Eurozone partners, and probably also of an immoderate exploitation of the credit boom of the low-interest rate decade under the euro. The opening of the economy to trade and financial flows as a result of financial liberalization, given insufficient structural adjustments, resulted in a rapid credit growth which bloated imports and consumption and led to an overexpansion of the sheltered, non-tradable sectors at the expense of the export-oriented ones. An unreformed, swollen, low-productivity wider public sector passed on its higher costs to the rest of the economy, including the tradable sector, undermining its performance.

Thus, along with the legacy of chronic public deficits that increased the country’s public debt levels to unsustainable proportions, widening current account deficits during the euro period raised net foreign indebtedness, rendering the economy vulnerable to the external shock incurred in 2009–10.
Hence, Greece’s 2010 economic crisis contained a twin failure: a fiscal crisis and a crisis of economic competitiveness. While the sovereign debt crisis displayed a failure of government and the public sector, the external private debt represented a failure of the market and private sector, being related to the steep decline in the private sector’s gross saving rate. The latter trend is broadly associated with the north-south asymmetry inside the EMU. By 2009 Greece, Portugal and Spain had one of the worst net foreign asset positions among all advanced countries (IMF, 2010b: 9). Financial liberalization triggered inflows in the lower-income peripheral countries, and cheap credit reduced the need for domestic saving.

Thus peaked a long-term trend in Greece, whose roots can be traced back even to the early metapolitefsi period. With democratization and the rise to middle-income status, a semi-developed economy structure, and membership of the advanced European club, Greece graduated from a nation of savers to a nation of spenders and borrowers, from a country of emigration to one of immigration, from a young society to an ageing society, from an economy hungry for capital to an economy awash with liquidity and capital glut. By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, conditions were already ripe for what sociologists would view as increased affluence and political democracy undermining societal willingness to defer consumption, leading to declining rates of capital accumulation, slower rates of economic growth, and higher inflation (Goldthorpe, 1978). After a seven-year authoritarian suppression, sociopolitical demands had re-emerged intensely invigorated; after the legacy of populism in the 1980s they never subsided (Voulgaris, 2008). The cumulative outcome of these circumstances amounted to a transfer of systemic power from state to societal interest group and party politics. The economic implications were clear: the Greek economy was opening up to the realization of the modern-day Greek dream of rising to the living standards of ‘Europe’, if possible to the same welfare and income levels, even if productivity performance and structures were lagging behind.

During the decade under the euro, the external constraint softened and complacency tended to prevail. The alarm system was switched off. In the drachma period, when major imbalances occurred (by way of a widening public or current account deficit) the external pressures on the drachma would release the automatic adjustment process, for fear of a major balance of payments crisis. As an indication, a current account deficit of just 3.25 per cent of GDP in 1985 alarmed the authorities and necessitated urgent adoption of the 1985–87 stabilization programme that included a 15 per cent devaluation of the drachma. Under the euro, such external balance or currency crises have been averted, but the upshot was that, without corrective interventions, they would turn into accumulating imbalances that are politically harder for any government to deal with. Owing to money illusion, real
income adjustment through currency devaluation is politically more palatable than nominal wage cuts are, even if the former leads to a greater erosion of real purchasing power. All are easier than far-reaching structural adjustments to expand productive capacity and enhance the competitiveness of the economy, which require policy determination, continuity and coordination, and a high level of public administrative capacity. This is even more so in the face of powerful trade unions predominantly representing the sheltered wider public sector, never directly confronted by external market competition.

During the 2000s, most major necessary structural reforms were either postponed or heavily watered down; initially the Simitis government sought to maintain the maximum possible socio-political consensus in view of the preparation of the 2004 Olympics. Some have identified the Simitis government's retreat from pension reform in 2001 as the end of the brief 'modernization period' that had delivered significant societal benefits since 1996 (Stournaras, 2011). Then the Karamanlis government that followed was obsessively trying to avoid the threatening spectrum of a 'centre-right wing parenthesis' and squandered precious political time shirking difficult reforms. In a process culminating in the disastrous 2007–09 years, the cost of the public sector was bloated, unit labour costs increased, imports, the state and the sheltered sectors (constructions, media, banking, telecoms, etc.) further expanded at the expense of export-oriented ones, and competitiveness collapsed.

Thus Europeanization brought about significant convergence to a certain extent, but left deeper structures largely unaffected. The tension between complete external openness and lagging competitiveness, between limited productive capabilities and increased consumption needs, was satisfied through growing public and private borrowing (the latter given a new boost after the late 1990s), and was reflected in high public and current account deficits. Their culmination under an extremely adverse international economic environment following the 2008 global crisis evolved into the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, which led the country to the EU/IMF financial rescue mechanism.

External constraints, paradigm shifts, and the political economy of reform

The limits of socioeconomic transformation are political limits to reform. As ample literature has demonstrated, Greece's economic problem has been largely one of political economy, incomplete adjustment and inadequate reforms (Pagoulatos, 2003a; Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2006; Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008; Tinios, 2010; Kalyvas et al., 2012). Macroeconomic ills such as chronic fiscal deficits reflect the excessive politicization of economic policy-making, the low integrity and capacity of the state (as witnessed in widespread corruption and tax evasion), and the heavy cumulative impact of numerous micro-economic reform failures. Various policy domains (from
health, education and pensions to public enterprises and national defence) are captured by special interests and powerful clienteles, acquiescent to their rent-seeking pursuits. The undeniable success stories (EMU accession, the Ombudsman, the Higher Council for the Selection of Personnel [ASEP], the Citizens Advice Centre [KEP], and others) have compared poorly with major policy areas that remained chronically lagging, in urgent need of far-reaching reform.

Explanatory factors for reform inertia or failure have typically included problems arising from the government apparatus, such as weak political determination and the prevalence of political cost considerations, inadequate planning and formulation of reforms, intra-governmental dissent and opposition by other cabinet members or senior officials, government discontinuity, bureaucratic fragmentation and legal-constitutional and bureaucratic impediments, and pervasive policy implementation problems. They have also included resistances arising from society and the party system, such as powerful status quo private interests or unions blocking reform, internal party opposition, party-political polarization, and failure to convince the public or mobilize a pro-reform coalition (see contributions in Kalyvas et al., 2012).

Until the 2010 Memorandum, Greece was regularly listed by institutions such as Eurostat and the OECD as a policy laggard, as one of the OECD countries in major need of reform in a large number of key areas such as public administration, social, health and pensions policy, employment, environmental sustainability, market competition, education, research & development. Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2008) have examined three pivotal cases of micro-economic policy reform attempts (pension reform, labour market reform and the privatization of Olympic Airways). They have argued that EU-level commitments provide a reform resource, whose outcome however varies according to both the type of EU pressure and the configuration of domestic conditions. Thus the extent of domestic adaptation will depend on the degree of ‘policy misfit’ and the availability and strength of a pro-reform domestic coalition.

The inability of governments to build up a wider reformist socio-political coalition to overcome the forceful resistance of pro-status quo interests often underlay patchy results and policy failure. Well-known structural constraints embedded in the Greek system (intragovernmental feudalism, noncommittal public bureaucracy, market weakness, anti-liberal attitudes in society) have had their own negative role to play (Pagoulatos, 2001). Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2008) blame reform failure on structural adversity, attributing Greece’s lack of ‘reform capacity’ to what they define as a paradox of governance: a government formally powerful at the top, but administratively and institutionally weak in its policy-making and implementation apparatus. Pagoulatos (2012) has noted the importance of major crises in redefining the conditions and content of political survival or success, bolstering government
determination, rendering electoral popularity a less overarching consideration than it normally is. Such urgent crises, of global market proportions, also recast internal balances within the government apparatus, leading to a relative primacy of policy over politics. 

As we know, within less than a year, in 2010, Greece shifted from reform stagnation to a reform programme of unprecedented intensity, density and breadth, from widening the tax base to public sector, pension system, and market reform. Some of the implemented policies (like the statutory rise in the retirement age) would have been considered unthinkable only a year before. Notably, contrary to ‘silent’ reforms of the past, such as financial liberalization (Pagoulatos, 2003b) or reforms concerning a limited number of stakeholders, such as privatization (Pagoulatos, 2005), the 2010 adjustment programme involved policy areas that are socially sensitive, prominent in the public debate, with direct effects on the income and welfare of the wide population, and exposed to political conflict, such as wages, pensions, taxes, employment and services regulation.

The loan conditionality negotiated with the Troika of Greece’s creditors (European Commission, ECB, IMF), formulated into a Memorandum of Understanding subsequently enacted into law, operated as the obvious crucial external constraint. Exogenously-driven reform has been the paradigm category of successful reform—successful not necessarily in terms of its outcomes but in terms of managing to be adopted and implemented. The more direct and forceful the external constraint, the clearer and more visible the adjustment programme, the higher the chances of enactment of reform. The external constraint overlaps with a vibrant literature on Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). In the pre-EMU accession phase, the power of exclusion exerted intense pressure on aspirant members to redress fiscal imbalances and bring about fiscal consolidation (Featherstone, 2004). Looking at reforms, one reaches the conclusion that they happened when they were driven by a serious, ineluctable external constraint (whether that was the conditionality attached to the EC balance of payments support loans of 1985 and 1991, the single market programme deadlines or the EMU roadmap), which could also take the form of self-binding (as with the 2004 Olympic Games). The ‘hard conditionality’ on the road to EMU accession was succeeded, inside the EMU, by a softer and more politicized conditionality under the Stability and Growth Pact, unable to resort to equally powerful instruments of coercion (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008; Heipertz and Verdun, 2010). Thus Greece took advantage of a favourable political environment to repeatedly breach the EMU fiscal rules, until its fiscal standing was no longer sustainable.

Large-scale reforms often correspond to broader paradigm shifts, which provide both the conceptual framework and the legitimizing discourse. Using
macroscopic terms, we could conceptualize the reform problématique as an oscillation between two competing policy paradigms, or in terms of ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ problems: institutions and policies are adopted in order to resolve ‘first generation’ problems and frictions associated with a specific hierarchy of priorities, but having been adopted, they create their own set of ‘second generation’ problems and failures, whose salience leads to a new, different prioritization of policy objectives. After 1974 the economy was managed under the overbearing political priority of democratic consolidation. In post-authoritarian Greece and Southern Europe, public and social expenditure was significantly increased and nationalizations were implemented. The same priority, though even more intensified, drove the economic policies of the 1981 PASOK government, the pursuit of consolidating the socialist rise to power, by cementing a social plurality of new beneficiaries, the ‘non-privileged’ of the past—a category so broadly and vaguely defined that it could encompass nearly everyone. A national health system was created, average nominal wages were raised by over 30 per cent, pensions and early retirement were extended to various groups regardless of contributions, the public sector opened its arms. These were the kind of reforms prioritized in that particular historical juncture characterized by the imperative of democratization, a primacy of politics over policy (Maravall, 1993), and a socialist programme of catching up with Europe in terms of social spending. They were facilitated by the limited importance of the external economic constraint (it was still a relatively closed economy) and a rather low level of public debt. But these reforms, amounting to pronounced state expansion, bred a new generation of problems and failures, associated with their economic and fiscal costs.

Hence a ‘second generation’ reform agenda became necessary, this time motivated by the reverse prioritization: the primacy of policy over politics, the need to transform the state in order to respond to the pressing economic constraints emanating from European market integration and from the fiscal front. The fiscal constraint became inexorable after the government (following single market liberalization and the Maastricht agenda) lost its ability to finance its deficits by taxing the domestic banking system. If the ‘first generation’ of reforms expanded the state at the expense of the market to serve political objectives as part of a broader ideological agenda of democratization, the ‘second generation’ reforms sought to roll back the state, to release the market from its tentacles in order to serve a different set of overarching political objectives under the rubric of Europeanization, modernization, and integration into a globalizing political economy. In broader terms, this corresponded to Hirschman’s (1982) ‘shifting involvements’ between state and market, the public and the private sector, the pendulum moving from one end to the other. Or, as Hirschman (1970) again would put it, for the unhappy many, the public goods (past policies and institutions) had become ‘public...
evils’. Products of the ‘first generation’ of reforms (a wide and overstaffed public sector, an unsound pension system, a rigidly regulated economy, extensive state ownership, a politicized public administration, and powerful unions in the wider public sector) were now the targets of the ‘second generation’ reforms, and the principal obstacles to its implementation as well.

The 2010 reform programme unfolded against the backdrop of important macro-structural trends that had overall nurtured the mature need and demand for reform. Over the last 20–25 years, the Greek economy and society underwent a far-reaching process of EU-led modernization. In most cases, top–down, elite-driven reform dragged along a reluctant society, bringing about a hesitant pace of societal change: opening the market and society to the European market, intensifying exposure to the norms of globalization, redefining boundaries between church and state, instituting better guarantees of civil rights protection, shifting policy vis-à-vis Turkey post-1999—all these were instances of EU-driven modernization. In other cases, socioeconomic change preceded reluctant institutional and policy reform, which led to institutional friction, outdated institutional structures incapable of meeting contemporary needs: the institutional rigidity in the overregulated part of the dual labour market (while the other, unregulated, part functioned in total breach of labour rights) defies changing workplace conditions and the accelerating entry of the young and women, both of which require greater flexibility—combined with social security. Or the outdated corporatist framework governing higher education and its exclusive state provision—constitutionally prescribed—seriously prevent the quality of university education that would sufficiently respond to modern needs. Or the parochially structured pre-2010 pension system, by failing to accommodate changing demographic, societal and financial developments, turned into a ticking time bomb threatening to explode in a few years’ time. In all such cases, rigid institutions failed to catch up with rapidly changing economies and societies.

One notable implication of these structural developments involved the progressive Tartarization of the Greek economy and ‘financialization’ of the productive base. Since especially the late 1990s, the financial sector expanded rapidly, creating thousands of new jobs, spreading as well as destroying wealth, but also disseminating new attitudes and values associated with consumerism, a cultural proclivity towards the Anglo–American part of the world, a culture of ‘quick and smart’ money, and a view of globalized financial markets as pacesetters of the economy (Pagoulatos, 2003a: chapter 7). These trends facilitated broader understanding and dissemination of the news regarding Greece’s financial and public borrowing crisis, thus also probably increasing public receptiveness to the applied policy remedies.

An implication of the structural Europeanization process in Greece involved the growing (ideological, political, mental) shift of Greek society towards
Europe. Over the 1990s and 2000s, a pro-European ideology or political culture became hegemonic in Greek society. This was not an unconditional hegemony, for the Europeanist ideology was always forced to cohabit with (and frequently appease through various concessions) a traditionalist, nationalistic, anti-Western, instinctively Euro-sceptic ideology. Western-leaning, reform-minded elites have vitally relied on the EU as the single most important strategic and ideological ally, ‘enlisting Europe’ in the purpose of promoting the country’s socio-political and institutional modernization (Pagoulatos and Yataganas, 2010). Dynamic elite and middle-class strata have consistently operated as a constant influential advocacy coalition in support of EU-led reforms in Greek society. These strata overwhelmingly abandoned the New Democracy (ND) party in the 2009 elections, and closed ranks in support of the Papandreou government’s efforts to avert the collapse of the Greek economy in 2010. The ND decision to vote against the Memorandum in May 2010 and against the Social Insurance reform bill in July 2010 alienated those pro-European elite and middle-class strata. Overall, as a result of the ideological and cultural Europeanization that had unfolded during the previous decades, Greek society was readier than at any time in the past to perceive the 2010 fiscal crisis in the context of a European and Eurozone problem, and that mitigated reactions to the externally imposed conditionality of the Memorandum.

On the other hand, the populist reaction merged with nationalistic reflexes, originating from the left and right extremes of the political spectrum, censuring the Memorandum as a violent encroachment upon the country’s national sovereignty, hyperbolically denouncing the ‘neo-colonialist’ Troika and the country’s coming under a new foreign ‘occupation’. Yet the polemic argument against the ‘surrender’ of national sovereignty is disingenuous, by presenting the end-result of a combination of past choices as the cause of antecedent circumstances, whereas it is actually their effect. By failing to effectively curtail its public debt/GDP ratio while it still had the chance to do so, Greece brought itself to a condition of extreme dependency on its lenders and the whim of global money markets. The forced adjustment that ensued was merely an inevitable demonstration of the transfer of power from the heavily indebted borrower to its creditors that had occurred throughout the preceding period.

Concluding remarks: the implications of the economic crisis

The 2010 crisis and the subsequent adjustment effort under the Memorandum programme entail the extremely difficult task of attempting to confront simultaneously a twin crisis of competitiveness with a crisis of public deficit and debt. Given the unavailability of crucial policy instruments under the euro, internal devaluation (drastic deficit decrease, nominal wage and price
reductions) backed by structural reforms becomes the key strategy for restoring external competitiveness and fiscal balance. However, a harsh fiscal consolidation aggravates recession, and the contraction of economic output worsens the public debt/GDP ratio as debt deflation takes its toll. Locked inside such a debt trap, the Greek economy cannot exit without a central EU solution by way of alleviation of the public debt burden and/or its servicing cost.

It is certainly too early to gauge the implications of the ongoing crisis for the image of the EU in Greek society, but at first sight they appear to be significant. For one thing, the scope and depth of the economic crisis challenge the entire political-economy status quo of the last 30 years, of which the EU has been an inextricable part. Being predominantly a public deficit/public debt crisis, the Greek crisis was not a failure of EMU design as such (as could be said of the crises in Ireland and Spain) but a failure of domestic economic governance and political implementation, and the European responsibility was mainly a case of weak oversight and lack of timely sanctions rather than wrong policy blueprint (cf. Featherstone, 2011). Yet the anti-systemic sentiment directed against the two-party political system could evolve into an anti-status-quo, anti-EU sentiment, especially if the tangible financial benefits of the past are now less manifest than they used to be.

Greece is part of the current account imbalances problem inside the Eurozone, with huge deficits in the south mirroring large surpluses in the north. While it can well be argued that a part of the responsibility for these imbalances lies with national governments abandoning the adjustment process, the big question is now whether the scale of adjustment to be made (in terms of both government balance and restoring competitiveness) will be politically feasible. Whatever resolution to the current Eurozone crisis prevails (and it is probably bound to be true to the time-honoured EU tradition of muddling through), it is almost certain to involve protracted macroeconomic consolidation for Greece greater than the one which prevailed following or even prior to EMU accession. In the past, the EU was always identified with a novel sense of rules, external competition, and discipline, but the rigours of the single market were softened by (win-win) generous net financial inflows, and the tight straightjacket of the Maastricht criteria was perceived as a transitional antechamber to the euro promised land. Now that the inflows are being reduced and the euro promised land has proven not to be the utopia anticipated, the political attractiveness of the entire EU project to Greek public opinion could be significantly affected. For one thing, the halcyon days are over, and the obvious benefits of participation in the EU single market and single currency institutions down the road may not be as uncontroverted as they used to be (Pagoulatos, 2010). The EU could end up receiving the blame for what is predominantly a failure of the Greek political economy to engineer successful and sustainable adjustment.
As enthusiasm for the euro project has given place to sombre concern about its prospects, the foremost stabilizing factor militating in support of the euro remains the disastrous implications of euro-disintegration. At the same time, and for the time being, the domestic arguments in support of an exit of Greece from the Eurozone remain marginalized, as the devastating costs of such an option, by most accounts, hugely outweigh any potential benefits. It seems that Greece could for some time remain locked in a suboptimal equilibrium, where the pain and length of adjustment will be deeply felt, intensifying discontent, without however justifying exit. With an admitted degree of simplification, one would be tempted to conclude that after a socialist decade of the 1980s that created much of the country’s fiscal and structural problems; a decade of adjustment in the 1990s that brought Greece closer to the EU and into the EMU but failed to effectively confront the public debt problem or implement the necessary structural reforms; and a decade of complacency in the 2000s, when euphoric inertia prevailed and structural weaknesses culminated in an extreme crisis, now a decade of painful uphill adjustment and socio-political dissent lies ahead.
Contesting Greek exceptionalism within the European crisis

Long before 2008 there was a growing atmosphere of malaise with respect to the European project, and even its most ardent supporters were hard pushed to claim that the project had caught the imagination of the European public. Indeed it was difficult to claim that such a thing as a European public, or a specifically European public space, had come into being. This disappointing development can be traced in part to the dominant approach to integration adopted by European elites. From the start, the Monnet method of integration had put economics before politics. The idea was that integration would be driven by a process of creating a common economic space by removing in successive stages various barriers to the flow of goods, people, finance and services. As integration proceeded, the need for more political integration would become apparent and the appropriate institutions would materialize like the cherry on the cake. The emphasis on negative integration, the removal of obstacles to economic exchanges between Europeans, sidelined attempts at positive integration, the creation of European-wide institutions to rival those that exist in other monetary unions.

The first consequence of this approach was the democratic deficit at the core of the new Europe. The form of governance that evolved seemed specif-
ically geared to insulating European economic and financial elites from democratic pressures from below. A further consequence was that there were few institutions with which Europeans could identify. Support for the European project tended to become increasingly instrumental, based on the perceived national interest of each member state. In this Greece was no exception. As Greece’s integration proceeded there was a shift in public attitudes, with an increasing majority believing that a national development strategy was more feasible within the European Union (EU) than outside. Europe was seen as a necessary external constraint to further necessary modernizing reforms or as a source of funds to further various social projects. While these were often presented as substitutes, it will be argued below that they were in fact complementary. But in any case Greeks, like their fellow Europeans, were little concerned with the quality of EU institutions and with developing European-wide policies.

Instrumental support requires results, and even before 2008 these were very mixed at best. Thus the dynamic spurt to growth promised as a result of the Single European Act and, subsequently, monetary union never materialized, while the goals of the Lisbon process with respect to employment participation and unemployment had to be re-launched well before the target year of 2010. In short, negative integration, more often than not a euphemism for institutionalizing the neo-liberal project, failed to create either a dynamic economy or a European-wide public space. The latter proved especially debilitating after 2008, with the dominant elites effectively isolated from the type of new thinking that could have allowed a more effective response to the crisis.

Since the Greek fiscal crisis exploded in the spring of 2010, there have been calls from influential quarters for a radical rethink of the financial and economic architecture of the EU. Thus Paul Krugman, Wolfgang Munchau and Martin Wolf have all suggested that, without some move to fiscal federalism and the increased solidarity between nation states that this would entail, the future of the euro is in doubt. The various rescue packages, the proposed institutions for managing severe fiscal imbalances, as well as the new supervisory mechanism intended to act as an early warning system to prevent new episodes, fail to get to the heart of the problem. For these analysts the current economic woes did not originate in the fiscal profligacy of the state. Neither Ireland nor Spain before 2008 evidenced any tendency for debt and deficit to increase, nor was the level of these deficits remarkable relative to EU averages. The economic crisis developed from within the private sector as a result of complex interactions between over-borrowing, housing and commercial real estate bubbles, and, ultimately, bank insolvency. If you add to this the current account imbalances that have developed since the inauguration of the euro between the north, mainly Germany, and the PI(I)GS (Portugal, Ireland,
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(Italy), Greece, Spain), it is easy to see why there is growing concern over the EU response.

However the same analysts are also convinced that the Greek case stands as an exception. Greece’s problem was precisely a fiscal crisis resulting from government profligacy, creative statistics, and populist politics. Here the EU response in terms of austerity, expenditure cuts and so on is appropriate. This case for exceptionalism is also shared by influential policy makers, intellectuals, important strands of the media, and powerful financial and industrial interests within Greece. It represents in some ways the dominant ideology, or discourse, accepted by the two main parties, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND): their squabbles over which party is responsible for the fiscal crisis serve to the bolster the particular set of ideas that they hold in common. Greece has been living for too long beyond its means, with consumption levels way out of sync with production possibilities. An over-powerful state has been in cahoots with powerful sectional interests, through the mediation of party-led clientelistic politics. Powerful redistribution coalitions have marginalized those (potential) production coalitions that could increase the size of the pie. Within the dominant discourse, the crisis represents an opportunity to carry out those reforms that should have been implemented long ago—to recalibrate the economy and the polity in order to marginalize the former groups and enhance the latter.

What this dominant viewpoint refused to consider was the possibility that the crisis reflects the general direction of European economic policies and the political choices made since the 1980s. The Left in Greece had long argued that this direction would sooner or later reach its limits, and that it was, in any case, highly inappropriate for promoting sustainable convergence in a peripheral economy such as Greece. It is a common belief of every strand of leftist political economy theory that capitalism proceeds unevenly between national economies. In this light, a strategy of negative integration could only enhance this endemic characteristic of capitalism. To be sure, there were important differences within the Greek Left on the viability of any European-wide economic and political project. But the inadequacies and contradictions of the existing approach, at the national and supra-national levels, were a common refrain of the whole of the Greek Left. The very fact that the crisis affected the whole European economy is evidence that such views should be taken seriously.

This chapter contests the exceptionality of the Greek case. Our analysis has implications beyond challenging the inappropriateness of the policies currently being implemented in Greece. Any understanding of the crisis must start with some assessment of the neo-liberal economic project (see Harvey, 2007). Neo-liberalism, given the shift to market power entailed by its project and the inequalities that have opened up as a consequence, has had to address
the issue of legitimization. One response has been with the use of the financial system. It is no coincidence that the financial crisis began with toxic loans given to the some of the poorest sections of US society (Konings and Panitch, 2008). Bolstering consumption through loans, housing bubbles and unsustainable private sector debt has also been a key feature in economies as diverse as the UK, Spain and Ireland. This use of finance turned out to be unsustainable. Hence this is not just a crisis of financial regulation and macroeconomic imbalances, but one that has deep roots in the production prototypes and social inequalities that have gained prominence since the 1980s.

Greece has also implemented key aspects of the neo-liberal project since the mid-90s. While it is always possible to argue that not enough was done—and neo-liberals are of course inclined to argue that their approach did not fail, it was just not promoted with the necessary vigour—this goes against the evidence of the number of privatizations, the measures to deregulate labour markets, the reduction of corporate profits taxation, and so on. The response to the issue of legitimization was different in the Greek case, less with the use of finance and more through the workings of the clientelistic state. The latter has contributed (not exclusively, as we shall see) to unsustainable deficits. But the line of causation goes in a very different direction from that suggested by the dominant view. The Greek economy is not weak because of clientelistic activities; rather, such activities were a necessary complement to the chosen model which could not provide enough jobs, steady wage increases, and taxable incomes to support welfare services.

The dominant view is evidence of ‘cognitive locking’ (see Blyth, 2002), a process whereby established ideas do not allow new thinking to new problems. As Blyth (2002) has argued, the two major crises of capitalism in the twentieth century led to a serious rethink at the level of ideas, and eventually to different social coalitions and substantially new policy and institutional initiatives. By 1945 the ideas of classical economics had been widely discredited, and we had the beginning of the era of Keynesian social democratic hegemony. Similarly, after the crisis of the early 1970s, neoliberals were able to gain hegemony both through their interpretation of the crisis (overstrong unions, overregulation of markets, welfare state dependency and so on) and the appeal of their proposed solutions to important sections of the working class that had been the bulwark of the previous regime. It is difficult to believe that the present crisis can be resolved without some similar process.

Two aspects of current thinking in particular need to be reassessed. The first has to do with the stability of the market economy. Neo-liberalism holds that the market economy is basically a stable entity that can respond with its own resources to any shock. Furthermore these shocks are primarily exogenous, more often than not originating from the operation of governments. The penchant for independent central banks and other regulatory authorities, lim-
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its on fiscal deficits, and so on needs to be seen in this light. In neo-liberal theory there is a certain role for the state to cater for market failures such as training and infrastructure, but the main dynamism comes from the private sector and entrepreneurship. The crisis of 2008 has posed severe questions for this outlook. Capitalism seems prone to endogenous shocks, in part because the dynamism of the private sector is as likely to lead to regional and social inequalities, speculative housing bubbles and financial crises as it is to promote the needs of the real economy.

The second aspect has to do with the acceptability of market outcomes. As Hirsch has argued: ‘Renunciation of political weaponry is an unattractive option, above all for groups that look to political weapons to alter the economic and political status quo in their favour. (In the words of an old Labour Party slogan: “The rich man has his money, the poor man has his politics”)’ (Hirsch, 1978: 269). Moreover, subsequent experience has amply justified Maier and Lindberg’s prediction that ‘[e]fforts to depoliticize the market tend to be spurious. They usually entail a one-sided buttressing of profits and managerial prerogatives’ (Maier and Lindberg’s, 1985: 597–8).

To anyone listening to some adherents of the dominant view, it seems somehow natural that dominated classes restrict themselves to reading The Theory of Moral Sentiments or The Great Transformation, and learn the lessons of social solidarity, public spiritedness and cooperation, while the dominant classes remain free to be inspired by The Wealth of Nations and The Road to Serfdom. The ethical defence of the market is on many accounts weak (Sen, 1989), as even Hayek acknowledged, and that leaves an instrumental defence on the grounds of results. But the latter is what is now in question.

The dominant discourse in Greece, it will be argued, has not come to grips with the problematic nature of either of the two preceding assumptions. The successful working of a neo-liberal economy, within the existing economic and financial EU architecture, is taken as given. Therefore the issue of legitimation of the system as a whole is either not addressed, or addressed in a wholly unsatisfactory manner. We begin with an account of the dominant discourse in Greece concerning the crisis. We then address how this account misinterprets important facets of the economic, social and political crisis, and end with some elements that would characterize any alternative account.

Second wave modernization

The nature of the problem. The dominant viewpoint in Greece can be seen as a development of those modernization ideas that crystallized around the governments of Kostas Simitis after 1996 (for a critique of first wave modernization, see Tsakalotos, 2005; Sevastakis, 2004). The latter were by no means restricted to supporters of PASOK, finding large appeal not only within ND
but also on the Left, while also tending to create cleavages within most parties. Modernizers attempted, using a set of dualities, not only to define their own worldview but to construct that of the opposition. Thus in Diamandouros’ (2000) account, those forces stacked up against reforming Greek institutions have attached themselves to a culture that has had a particular take on economics, society, and international affairs. This ‘underdog’ culture, whose origins lie in the nineteenth century, has tended to be inward-looking, suspicious of foreigners, statist, anti-market, and pro-redistribution. It has been able to offer powerful resistance to the ‘reform’ culture, thereby delaying or distorting modernization. However, Diamandouros predicted in the 1990s that the outward-looking and pro-market reform culture would gain ground, helped by the process of globalization (for a critique see Tsakalotos, 2008): a prediction borne out by, for instance, PASOK’s gradual shift towards a pro-European stance. However, the continuing harm done by certain traditional Greek attitudes and moral dispositions has more recently played a powerful ideological function through the widespread contention that in some sense all Greeks are responsible for the crisis.

But the dominant view does not depend primarily on such a cultural-anthropological analysis. According to Kostas Simitis (‘The Cost of Clientelistic Politics’, *Kathimerini*, 2 May 2010), the real obstacle to reform, and to creating the necessary consensus for such reform, lies in the clientelistic state (Balabanidis 2010). The villain of the peace consists of an osmosis of party-state-sectionalist interests, with trade unionists often playing a particularly pernicious role (Voulgaris, 2010a). As Amable (2010: 3–4) has argued, neo-liberalism is best understood not in terms of an attack on the state, but as a tendency to delegitimize all those forms of collective action that promote redistribution and provide protection from competition. Voulgaris (2010b) includes both PASOK and the Left in his critique of those parties of redistribution and consumption with little interest in the culture and needs of production, competitiveness, and innovation (see also Pagoulatos, 2010). Such an axis was enough to block reforms, thus laying the foundations for a fiscal crisis. The major losers in this arrangement are the ‘outsiders’, those with insufficient bargaining power to extract concessions, subsidies, tax exemptions and other goodies from the state (see Thomadakis, 2010). Ignored by the ‘old’ Left and the trade union movement (dominated by relatively privileged public sector workers), they are victims of the inequities of the pension system, as well as the varying experiences of men and women, older and younger workers, and public and private sector workers (Matsaganis, 2010). This has led to well-paid public sector workers and poorly paid ones in the private sector, and overregulation in the former sector as opposed to the jungle of the latter (see Pagoulatos, 2010).

It is not difficult to see here the echoes of public choice theory that came to prominence in the 1970s, pointing to an input politics where groups had
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no reason to restrain their claims on the state, and an output politics where politicians and bureaucrats had every interest to give in.7 1970s phrases such as ‘democratic overload’ and the ‘fiscal crisis of the state’ are not used but their presence is unmistakable (for an account that has rent-seeking activity at the centre of reform-blocking in Greece see Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2006).

The nature of the solution

Few items of the neo-liberal settlement have been subjected to reassessment on the basis of any lessons that might have been drawn from the 2008 crisis.8 Deregulation, privatization, flexible labour markets, and a smaller but more efficient state9 remain centre stage. There is recognition of the fact that Greece needs to climb up the ladder of the international division of labour, and some appreciation that a model based on the exploitation of cheap labour may be reaching its limits. But in the post-Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) period, where the emphasis is on a radical reduction of state expenditure, the major response is expected to come from the private sector,10 under the current euphemism of entrepreneurship. Such entrepreneurship may need networking, help from European structural funds (the National Strategic Reference Framework, ESPA) and other assistance from a ‘supervisory’ state,11 but the basic direction is unmistakably in terms of removing fetters imposed on an inherently dynamic, risk-taking, and innovative private sector (see Pelagidis, 2010).

There is also much attention paid to increasing transparency and removing red tape in order to enhance growth and competitiveness and provide the stable framework that private capital (to cut the number of euphemisms for a moment) needs. But transparency also has a crucial role in sorting out the fiscal crisis by making clear who gains what and who pays what. What is needed is a welfare state that can respond to the obvious inequalities of the clientelistic state, for the benefit of the least well off and those operating under the most precarious conditions (see Voulgaris, 2010b; Pagoulatos, 2010).

What forces are to carry out the necessary reforms this time around? Given the poor opinion that most of those holding the dominant view have of Greek society, a democratic majority, let alone an active participating one, is unlikely to be a major ingredient of change.12 In such circumstances, external imposition is to be seen as a blessing in disguise (Featherstone, 2010)—the universal approval of the European project amongst modernizers must be considered in this light, with the democratic deficit as an indispensable component of what is required. There is also much reference to progressive elites that can further the necessary progressive reform agenda (Pelagidis and Mitsopoulos, 2006). Others speak in terms of leadership or courageous reformers (Voulgaris, 2010b; Featherstone, 2010). The elitist nature of the project can
Europe in modern Greek history

Scarcely be in doubt. What Greece has suffered from in the past is a ‘grand narrative’ of reform, supported by reform-minded elites, technocrats and politicians. Rallying of such a coalition is what is needed, it becomes clear, to respond not only to the economic crisis, but to the crisis of society and the political system as well.

Seeing the world the right way up

An alternative reading of the economic crisis. To begin with, it is simply false that the neo-liberal project in Greece has been successfully blocked. From the 1990s onwards the direction of economic policy is unmistakable: privatizations, deregulation, reductions in taxes on profits, and more flexible labour markets have been central to the policy agenda of all governments. Large-scale capital has gained much from these changes in sectors such as banking, construction, food-processing, and pharmaceuticals, with many firms having an impressive export and overseas investment orientation. However the overall strategy has also relied on an alliance with the middle classes and small-medium size enterprises (see Editorial, 2010), with the latter gaining access to finance, cheap labour through immigration and labour market flexibility, and a blind eye to their non-payment of taxes. On this foundation, Greece exhibited high growth rates from the mid-1990s to just before the outbreak of the crisis, and this enabled the continued financing of important aspects of the strategy. Similarly, international economic conditions also ensured a plentiful supply of capital inflows, mainly through shipping and tourism.

How was this achieved despite the existence of the clientelistic state, discussed above? For some the answer lies in the existence of external priorities which tended to focus the mind: first the process of joining the euro, and secondly the need to organize the Olympic Games (see Featherstone, 2010). But the influence of both these external constraints is deeply ambiguous.

Before 2000 many economists, and the Greek Left in its entirety, argued that Greece would find entry into monetary union difficult. Although the Maastricht criteria rested on the need for nominal convergence, economic theory suggested that survival rested on real convergence. Right-wing American economists such as Martin Feldstein, or liberal ones like Paul Krugman, argued that without the supporting mechanisms that exist in other monetary unions, such as the stabilization and equalization functions that accompany a large federal budget, the euro would face serious problems. European economists, the Commission, but also prominent Greek economists would give a number of often ingenious arguments to show why the EU was different.

Subsequent developments did not confirm such sanguine assessments. The problem of Greek competitiveness is not primarily home-grown as the dominant discourse claims. It is extremely difficult for peripheral economies to
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compete without some form of fiscal federalism, and while Germany continues to insist on its right to have permanent current account surpluses and ignore the influence of its own macroeconomic and wages policy on European demand (Lapavitsas et al., 2010; Tsakalotos, 2010). The permanent current account deficits of the PIIGS represent the other side of the same coin. Cumulative current account deficits in Greece have led to a huge increase in net foreign debt, and a major aspect of the crisis is that so much of the debt is in foreign hands.15 Appendix A provides a fuller account of this story.

The Olympic Games, if anything, provide an even more improbable illustration of the beneficial, mind-focusing, and clientelistic side-stepping effects of external constraints. The staging of the Games was an option that continued the failed tradition of an industrial policy focused on large-scale infrastructural projects (Tsakalotos, 1998). While it was sold on the grounds of promoting infrastructure and upgrading telecommunications and other services, few of the supposed benefits materialized. There was ample room for lack of transparency and corruption. If ever there was a project for the nexus of party, state and sectionalist interests, then this was surely it.

We need another reading of Greece’s partial success story up to 2008 and the subsequent crisis. What is at issue is whether a liberalized financial system and large-scale infrastructural works, primarily geared to upgrading Greece’s road networks, construction and the Olympic Games, add up to a sustainable development policy. In this respect it is important to point out that economic policies stemming from the Commission continued to narrow the options for EU member states (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2006), not only with the insistence on tight macroeconomic policies, but also in limiting industrial policy. Furthermore financial liberalization, which often took the form of promoting the market-based Anglo-Saxon model system over a German or Japanese model, was more geared to commercial lending rather than the needs of the real economy (Gibson and Tsakalotos, 2003).16

The chosen economic model is directly related to the fiscal crisis, but not as usually envisaged. For a start, any account that does not include at least some of the following items must be considered partial: the attempt by modernizing governments to reduce taxes on capital;17 socialization of the debts of private sector firms; extravagant military expenditure;18 costs associated with the organization of the Olympic Games;19 and the support given to the banking sector after the crisis.20 In modernizing accounts, under-theorized to put it no stronger, bankers, builders, military suppliers and a host of other groups are rarely addressed as sectional interests.

But what about those sectional interests that are at the centre of the modernizing critique? Did they not contribute to unsustainable deficits and debt? Public sector employment (Figure 1)21 did rise. However, as Figures 2 and 3 show, Greece’s deficit problem is more a result of a crisis in revenue than of
Figure 1: Compensation of employees (%GDP)


Figure 2: Total expenditure (%GDP)

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Figure 3: Total revenue (%GDP)


high expenditure; this reflects, among other factors, a lax attitude to collecting taxes (as is evident from low tax revenue compared with other EU countries in spite of similar tax rates, Figure 3), evasion of social insurance contributions, and ‘legal’ tax evasion (the term has been introduced by Stathakis, 2010) by Greece’s over 900,000 private firms. But most of these items can be seen as integral parts of the development strategy promoted, rather than as representing a residue of some previous political economy. Public sector employment and the shortfall in revenue can be seen as a means of compensating for low social transfers (Figure 4), of responding to the issue of inequality inherent in all market economies, an attempt to tie the interests of capitalists to those of the middle class and sections of the working class. There is little recognition in the dominant discourse that it is the market itself that is a major source of disruption, inequalities, and discrimination.

Such tendencies have been in evidence in Greece since 2000. Evidence that profits have risen at the expense of wages comes not only from evidence of a rising profit share, but also from an increase since 1990 in the rate of return on capital. As is clear from Figures 5 and 6, the rise was particularly strong under the second Simitis government. At the same time, while the real value of the minimum wage has been rising since the mid-1990s, it still lies below that of the early 1980s, and it fell relative to average wages in the economy, from around 51 per cent of gross average wages in the early 1990s to under 42 per cent in 2005 (Figure 7). This again provides evidence of the gains of growth being unequally shared.
Direct evidence on poverty and inequality in Greece also provides little comfort. Using data from household surveys since 1995 (the European Household Panel Survey followed by the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), the risk of being poor in Greece has ranged from 20 to 22 per cent with no discernible trend (the risk for the EU-15 lay between 15 per cent and 17 per cent). The same stagnant picture is evident from an examination of measures of inequality. The ratio of the income of the richest 20 per cent of the population to that of the poorest 20 per cent moved between 5.7 and 6.6 (compared with levels of between 4.5 and 6.1 for the EU). A similar picture of inequality in Greece being high by European standards with no...
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Figure 6: Adjusted wage and profit shares, 1974–2011

Source: Author’s own calculations from AMECO database and National Statistical Service of Greece. The 2001–12 figures are based on estimates from Eurostat.

Note: Wage shares are calculated using the compensation of employees (adjusted for the self-employed by imputing a wage using average wages across the economy for the self-employed) as a percentage of gross value added. Profit shares are gross operating profits (minus the imputed wages of the self-employed) as a percentage of gross value added.

Evidence of a downward trend is also given by other measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient (Bank of Greece, 2006: 123, Box IV.2).

For modernizers, high growth in the Greek and the world economy, by providing funds for redistributory politics, alleviated the pressure to enforce the necessary reforms (Pelagidis, 2010). But such an account assumes that without such redistributory policies, the system could have gained widespread legitimization. The line of causation in the modernizing accounts is faulty. It was not the presence of clientelistic politics that derailed the Greek economy from its path, and ensured the fiscal crisis of the state. Rather it was the weakness of the neo-liberal project in a peripheral economy that necessitated measures to broaden its appeal and promote alliances with groups with little to gain from such a project. Certainly these measures proved to be unsustainable. But other approaches to the problem elsewhere have also proven to be unsustainable. This chapter argues that clientelistic solutions in Greece provide a functional equivalent to using the financial system to shore up support for neo-liberal strategies, a solution tried elsewhere. This argument is supported more fully in Appendix B.
At issue is the ability of a more liberal economy, for a country like Greece, to provide its legitimization by results: not necessarily for the whole society (for which capitalist society has ever even aspired to that?), but enough to incorporate, let us say—as was commonly argued in the 1980s—two-thirds of society. In the dominant discourse, as we have seen, inequality is primarily the result of outsiders being exploited by insiders. The implied corollary to this is that the outsiders have an objective interest in supporting reform-minded elites that wish to restrain the accumulated benefits of the insiders for the greater good. There are a number of serious limitations to such a conception. In the first place it seems hardly deniable that outsiders seem to be a permanent feature of the more liberal economies, and not just of states like Greece which have failed to develop further along liberal lines.23 Neo-liberalism began, lest we forget, in the US and the UK with a frontal attack on insider trade unions. Subsequent moves to lower taxation, and to more directed welfare to those most in need, have led to precious few benefits for the outsiders: as the middle and privileged sections of society extract less from public and social services, their commitment to them falls off rapidly.

An alternative reading of the political crisis. The issues to do with inequality, precarious employment, and poverty are integrally related to the political crisis that is also in evidence in Greece. The decline of support for the two ruling parties, rising abstention rates in elections, and the alienation from the polit-
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ical process evidenced in opinion polls are indicative of this crisis. For the dominant discourse the fault lies in a lack of a modernizing narrative and the inability of modernizing elites so far to push forward a restructuring of economic and political institutions.

But first and foremost, the crisis is one of political representation. With the convergence on a neo-liberal programme after the 1980s, centre-left parties were increasingly reluctant to mobilize their own social base on the basis of economic programmes that differed in any essential from those of the centre-right. This convergence is of course one aspect usually associated with the rise of the cartel party (Katz and Mair, 2009), a multidimensional process involving parties moving closer not only to each other but to the state, and employing the resources of the state for their continued reproduction. The locus of decision making, and available resources, move away from the party base towards the party in public office. A looser organization, for instance blurring the distinctions between party members and supporters, helps to outflank party members with greater links to the social base. This distancing from society has often meant for the parties of the centre-left a refusal to represent the working class as a unified entity (Belandis, 2011).

Here too it is difficult to make the case for Greek exceptionalism (for a discussion of those accounts that employ the notion of the cartel party with respect to the Greek crisis see Balabanidis, 2010). Many of the features of the cartel party aptly describe the trajectory of PASOK and ND, with respect both to internal organization and, crucially, to the use of state resources. In the post-MoU world it is the viability of this mode of governance that is at stake as the cuts in state expenditure severely reduce the resources available for the cartel parties. Moreover, the move from the mass party to the cartel party was premised on the decline in the intensity of class and other cleavages, and the expectation that large sections of society would face a common experience (Katz and Mair, 2009). Austerity measures severely challenge such sanguine expectations. For although the initial austerity measures were aimed at public sector workers, this radically changed in the autumn of 2010 when it became clear that private sector workers were not to be excluded. If one includes cuts to the welfare state, then the prospect of liberal elites allying with outsiders, and their ability to divide sections of the working class, become increasingly problematic.

We return to the assumption of the acceptability of market outcomes, and the willingness of the losers from the market to voluntarily give up their political weaponry. It is instructive in this respect to recall that Simitis (1989: 71–88) began staking out his modernizing ground in the late 1980s with a highly suspicious attitude to organized interests, explicitly criticizing their supposed beneficial consequences claimed in both pluralist and corporatist accounts. Indeed, for Simitis, a central obstacle to modernization in Greece
was precisely the Greek public’s penchant for not supporting reforms opposed by powerful organized interests—the usefulness of such groups is to be measured by the extent of their support for modernizing reforms, ones which, we should add, they play no role in determining. In the new realities of crisis, centre-left parties have given little thought to the question of how to respond to those groups that have little stake in society.

Exit options

Greece is not exceptional and has shared many of the dilemmas faced by other economies suffering from the current crisis. Contradictions and weaknesses within the neo-liberal economy have necessitated the promotion of strategies to expand the basis of support for the overall project. The fact that various economies relied on different strategies is less important than the common problematic faced and the seeming non-viability of the solutions chosen. Certainly the straightjacket of the EU economic financial architecture has accentuated the problems of peripheral economies, but this is a fate that Greece shares with others. Nor is Greece exceptional with respect to the crisis of politics, any differences being more of degree than of kind. The non-representation of popular interests has been a hallmark of the neo-liberal era.

Nor is there much prospect for alleviation of the problems of legitimization and representation any time in the near future. It is not at all clear that the major contributing factors to the crisis have been addressed in the period after 2008. There is considerable scepticism, even in quarters with impeccably orthodox credentials (Rajan, 2010), about whether major problems, such as the regulation of the financial system or the existence of global macroeconomic imbalances, have been addressed adequately. In Greece all the arguments concerning the ineffectiveness of fiscal austerity in conditions of generalized recession have been borne out. Attempts at internal deflation, given the unavailability of devaluation, have deepened the recession and led to more austerity measures as predictions for the control of deficits prove to be wide of the mark. Needless to say the social consequences are dire in terms of unemployment, low wages and poverty (see Tsakalotos, 2010). As Gray (2010) argues, an equality of insecurity hardly seems a firm basis for building support for a new economic, social and political settlement.

What tentative thoughts can we offer about possible paths out of this quagmire? In the dominant discourse citizens seemingly face either a hierarchical, corrupt and inefficient state or a world of negative freedom where the more innovative and dynamic sectors of society are liberated to innovate and promote the common good. This seems to bear little relation to developments over the last twenty years. In the more liberal economies, on the one hand, we have witnessed a significant degree of centralization, with tighter control by
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the state of intermediate organizations such as schools, hospitals, and local authorities. On the other hand, the private sector power of certain individuals and interests, most prominently financial and media interests, over citizens has increased dramatically (see Amable (2010), s. 4–5). Italy presents the paradigm case: the combination of personalized democracy and negative freedom tends to undermine ‘fatally the attempt to assert collective interests. It denies the possibility for a given community to establish, in the name of a collective good, a sense of limit and a necessary framework in which the search for self-realisation can take place. It encourages instead the creation in civil society of over-powerful individuals unwilling to submit to a much weakened general rule of law’ (Ginsborg, 2003). Marquand’s (2004) conclusion about a similar phenomenon in the UK should give Greece’s modernizers some pause for thought. Modernization under New Labour led to a return to the politics of connection, favouritism and patronage, blurring the distinction between legal, ‘dodgy but not quite illegal’, and illegal transactions.

Gray (2010) considers that the more likely exit strategy is one of national retrenchment—the use of the national state to provide some security to its citizens. This is likely to be an exit strategy under the hegemony of the Right. Groups suffering from insecurity may not be able to organize easily, and frequently have recourse to blaming others even less fortunate than themselves. Nationalism, cultural politics, and the rise of the radical Right are in part the result of the centre-left’s disinclination to organize its own base on an economic agenda of jobs, wages and security. Taking economics out of the political battlefield has left the Right to organize the social base of the Left on a cultural agenda that has led to a shift of the whole political spectrum rightwards.26

Are there any grounds to think that there could be an exit in a more progressive direction? We can conclude by pointing to three general lessons drawn from the analysis given here. Not surprisingly, given our rejection of Greek exceptionalism, all three are relevant elsewhere.

The first has to do with the role of supra-national solutions. In the Greek debate, the dominant discourse has argued that it represents the outward-looking pro-European option. In actual fact what is on offer is a national strategy within the EU. Modernizers are willing to offer some criticism of existing EU policies and institutions, but a shift in these is not seen as an indispensable element of the solutions offered. The roots of such neglect go far back into the roots of Left politics in Greece, but I suspect that similar considerations have played out elsewhere. In the post-1974 period, the Left was concerned with the restructuring of the national economy. PASOK and the KKE thought that this could be done best outside the European Economic Community (EEC), while the Communist Party of Greece-Interior (KKE-Interior), representing a Eurocommunist tendency, argued that a national strategy inside the European
Community was more viable. What was lacking in this conflict, which has subsequently re-emerged in different guises a number of times, was a strategy based in part on supra-national solutions. But the present conjuncture suggests that such a strategy is crucial for a leftward exit from the crisis. It seems difficult to see how the regulation of financial markets and the control of multinationals can be achieved at the national level.

The second lesson has to do with the consumption and production prototypes promoted by neo-liberalism (Tsakalotos, 2004). Financial liberalization, to take just one example, did not lead to finance going where it was ‘most needed’, but to fuelling of speculation in housing, stock and derivatives markets. The ecological crisis has meanwhile put in doubt the viability of the current quest for maximizing the production of commodities at the expense of investing in our relationships to each other and nature. Similar conclusions are being drawn from the research on happiness, suggesting that modern societies need a radical rethinking about both the means and the ends of current policies.

The final lesson has to do with popular mobilization. Within the dominant discourse populism is usually described in a pejorative way. But there are two things wrong with such a stance. First, modernizers have no ear for the concerns that underlie populist rhetoric—concerns about the need for a sense of belonging, for security, for some collective self-realization. The neglect of such concerns has meant that anti-populism has often led to a disdain for the popular, further fuelling the appeal of the far Right amongst some of the losers of the market. Secondly, there is good reason to doubt whether any degree of equality can be achieved without considerable popular mobilization. But the centre-left has eschewed popular mobilization throughout the last twenty years or so (for the experience of the Olive Tree in Italy see Ginsborg, 2003: 26–7). Is it conceivable that a project to regulate finance and to provide some protection for those groups exposed to the market and globalization, let alone challenge the dominant production and consumption models of latter day capitalism, could be achieved without a massive mobilization of popular forces? Is there any alternative to such mobilization that is not at best the rule of technocrats and experts, and at worst deeply hierarchical and authoritarian?

Appendix A: External Imbalances in EMU

Figure A1 shows current account positions as a percentage of GDP in 1999, 2007 and 2008. It illustrates that since the formation of the euro area there has been a tendency to divergence, with Greece, Portugal, Spain and Malta experiencing growing deficits and Germany and the Netherlands significant, persistent and growing surpluses.
Germany has a long tradition of not generating demand domestically. Rather it has had a policy of repressing wages (Lapavitsas et al., 2010) and reliance on external demand to generate strong export performance. The credit dependence which Germany has proudly avoided at home has effectively been exported abroad (Rajan, 2010), with German banks playing a leading role. German surpluses were lent to the PI(I)GS which generated demand, leading to higher inflation, real appreciation and current account deficits. Post-crisis, it is the deficit countries, rather than those with surpluses, that feel the pressure—since they are the ones that rely on external financing to continue to keep demand above income (or growth above potential).

As can be seen from Table A1, first column, the German current account surplus as a percentage of GDP has been increasing. This is reflected in the German trade account (second column). The third column shows the net trade in goods (not services) between Germany and the PI(I)GS. The net trade in goods between Germany and the PI(I)GS amounted to some 2.24 per cent of GDP in 2007, accounting for 27.5 per cent of Germany’s trade account surplus. This is clear evidence that Germany has been benefiting from the demand generated by the PI(I)GS. In general, Germany depends quite heavily on demand generated within the rest of the European Union. In 2007, when the trade account surplus was 8.15 per cent of GDP, some 4.44 per cent of GDP (that is, 63.4 per cent of the trade account surplus) originated in Germany’s surplus arising from its export of goods to other EU countries over its imports from EU countries. So if Greece and the other

![Figure A1: Euro Area countries: current account as % of GDP](source: IMF International Financial Statistics.)
PI(I)GS had not been growing during this period, Germany’s growth (which is largely export based) would not have been as healthy.

The present stance of euro area (as expressed in the Eurogroup or the Commission through their handling of the current sovereign debt crisis in the euro area) is that the deficits of the PI(I)GS are primarily a problem for them—reflecting their lack of competitiveness, their tendency to consume more than they produce, and their inability to generate higher rates of potential growth as would be warranted by real convergence; they therefore need to adjust. The account here suggests that this is, at best, a one-sided simplification.

### Appendix B: Financial Market Deregulation

The role of deregulation of financial markets should not be underestimated in providing support for neo-liberal reforms. Increasing financial market sophistication has allowed at least some households to borrow, thus providing significant support for their consumption aspirations even if the income gains required to support these aspirations in the long run have not been forthcoming. As a consequence many countries have witnessed a decline in household savings rates and a rise in debt (figures B1–B2).

There is a sharp contrast between the Anglo-Saxon economies of the US and the UK, which experienced falling household savings rates (at least until

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### Table A1: The Importance of the PI(I)GS in German Trade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German current account (per cent GDP)</th>
<th>German trade account (per cent GDP)</th>
<th>German trade with PI(I)GS (per cent of German GDP)</th>
<th>Percentage of German trade account surplus originating in trade with PI(I)GS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-1.26</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>16.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-1.70</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>25.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>4.62</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>16.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>17.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>20.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>22.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>25.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.92</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>27.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6.69</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>24.82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTESTING GREEK EXCEPTIONALISM

the onset of the crisis) and sharp rises in the household debt burden, and countries like Germany and France and, for the period for which figures are available, the euro area as a whole. One factor in this difference is that the US and the UK can easily attract funds through international markets located in London or New York which can be on-lent domestically, facilitating large build-ups in debt levels and enabling the consumption aspirations of the newly-emerging middle class to be realized. Germany and France, which have traditionally had more institutionally-based and domestically-oriented financial systems, have not been able to support the consumption desires of a new middle class to the same extent. This perhaps explains the earlier appearance of the crisis of social democracy in these two countries.

Financial deregulation in Greece increased the opportunities for borrowing (either for house purchase or for consumption) and, as Figure B1 shows, household savings ratios fell sharply in Greece (although part of the sharp decline in 1999–2000 is likely to be due to the move to ESA95 national accounts). Bank credit to households exhibited rates in excess of 30 per cent per annum until the crisis. This led to a build-up of household debt which reached just over 50 per cent of GDP by March 2010 (still below the euro

Figure B1: Household gross savings rate

Source: AMECO database.
Results of household surveys conducted by the Bank of Greece (in 2002, 2005 and 2007) suggest that only about 50 per cent of households in Greece have some kind of debt obligation (including loans from friends or other family members). Moreover, Symigiannis and Tzamourani (2007) show that the probability of having debt is strongly positively related to income. This suggests that, while financial liberalization in Greece has helped to support the emergence of a new middle class, a significant proportion of PASOK’s social base has remained unaffected—they do not have access to loans. It has not been possible, therefore, to satisfy their aspirations by the accumulation of debt as witnessed in the Anglo-Saxon economies.

Figure B2: Household liabilities/disposable income (%)

Source: OECD, Economic Outlook.
EUROPEAN INFLUENCES IN GREECE’S MIGRATION POLICIES
BETWEEN ‘HARD’ IMPACT AND ‘SOFT’ INFLUENCE

Anna Triandafyllidou

Greece: in Europe but not of Europe

Although politically Greece has been firmly anchored in Western Europe in the post-World War II period, the cultural positioning of Greece remains ambivalent, modern Greekness being in Europe but not of Europe. During the 1990s, the confrontation between Greece and its fellow partners in the EU on the Macedonian question was but one example of misunderstandings between Greece and its fellow member states.

The twenty-first century has brought new developments and new challenges for Greece and its national self-understanding. The eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 has made Greece geographically and culturally less peripheral, as other central eastern and southeastern European countries which share with Greece a common historical legacy under the Ottoman empire and a predominantly Christian Orthodox population have joined the EU (Triandafyllidou and Spohn, 2003). The position of Greece, however, has remained, to a certain extent, unique as it is the only southeastern country that belonged to the ‘Western’ sphere of influence and not the Soviet bloc during the post-war years.
EUROPE IN MODERN GREEK HISTORY

Greece is a country that culturally and historically belongs to both the East and the West. Dominant discourses on Greek national identity reflect clearly this ambivalence between being ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ (Roudometof, 1999; Tsoukalas, 1993). References to the ‘East’ in the Greek national narrative reflect a notion of ‘eastern danger’ (Heraklides, 1995) that is generally projected to modern Turkey, reflecting both past experiences of subjugation to the Ottoman Empire and current tense relations with Ankara. References to the West and Europe are also ambivalent. Modern Greece carries the ‘honourable burden’ of being the heir of ancient Greece, identified by modern European intellectual and political elites as the cradle of European modernity. This glorious past is both a source of national pride and inspiration and a heavy symbolic burden to the extent that modern Greeks cannot stand up to the level of cultural, political or scientific excellence of their ancestors. Greeks have found themselves trapped between Hellenism (the Western prototype of classical Greece) and Romiosyne (the historical experiences of Greece in the last five centuries under the Ottoman Empire) (Tsoukalas, 2002; Tziovas, 1994).

This chapter discusses whether and in what ways EU policies have influenced the development of Greek immigration and anti-discrimination policies. The chapter distinguishes between the ‘hard’ policy impact of EU directives and regulations and their transposition into national law, on the one hand, and the ‘soft’ influence of policy discourses and general symbolic references to the EU, Europe, the ‘Europeanness’ of Greece or its relations with other EU member states, on the other. I contend that although it may seem at first glance that hard impact is more important than soft influence, this may not actually be the case when we look not only at policy measures adopted but also at how they have been implemented. Hard impact—effective policy changes, the introduction of new laws and even of new institutional bodies—may be mitigated by problems in implementation and by the inertia of state administration and civil society organizations. By contrast soft discursive influences in policy areas that are even outside the EU’s competence domains may be important in shaping national policies and in supporting their legitimation in the national political arena.

The chapter examines three different types of policies with a view to highlighting the above argument: immigration policy in general (immigration control and migrant integration), anti-discrimination policy (covering migrants and minorities) and citizenship policy (with special reference to citizenship acquisition and naturalization). In the former two cases I look at the relevant EU directives and how they have led to specific national laws, and assess the success of these laws in achieving their goals (of managing migration/promoting migrant integration, and promoting equality/fighting discrimination). In the latter case I examine how references to the EU and the
'Europeanness' of Greece are used to legitimize citizenship law reform. Although citizenship is a policy area of exclusive national competence and generally responding to national considerations, the recent Greek citizenship law reform was debated in Parliament with frequent references to migration control on the one hand and the position of Greece vis-à-vis the EU, as a 'responsible' and 'efficient' member state, on the other.

The chapter is organized into four main sections. Section 2 below discusses how Greek national immigration policy has been shaped by national and EU-related factors, assessing the concrete impact of the EU *acquis* on migration—notably the requirement to transpose and implement EU directives. The third section discusses the development of Greek anti-discrimination policy, a policy that has been a concrete outcome of the EU 2000 anti-discrimination directives. The fourth section looks at the ‘soft’ discursive influences, in particular at the ways in which Europe and the EU are used by MPs and civil society actors to support or criticize the very recent (March 2010) citizenship law reform. In the concluding section, I shall highlight both the specific features of the Greek case and the possible general relevance of the findings.

**Greek immigration policy: between national and European influences**

Greece has become an immigration country during the last twenty years, and currently about 1.35 million of its eleven million population is of foreign origin or foreign-born. Of those, 0.6 million are legal immigrants (holding a residence permit or in the process of renewing their documents) and an estimated 0.3 million are irregular migrants (Maroukis, 2008). Another 340,000, approximately, are co-ethnic migrants who are of Greek descent, from the former Soviet Union (150,000, according to the 2000 special census, have now naturalized and hence statistically disappeared) and from Albania (195,000 on 31 December 2010). About 45,000 people have naturalized during the period 2007–09, of whom the vast majority are Albanian citizens of Greek ethnic origin. Immigrants thus account for more than 10 per cent of the total resident population and 12 to 14 per cent of the total labour force. Children of foreign parents account for about 10 per cent of the school population, as there were approximately 120,000 pupils of foreign nationality enrolled in Greeks schools (public and private) in school year 2008–09 out of a total of 1,308,000 pupils (http://www.ipode.gr).

These data suggest that migration has acquired an important place in the Greek society and economy which is not, however, reflected in the state policy towards migrants. During the 1990s and to a certain extent to this day, Greek migration policy has been characterized by the ‘fear’ of migration and an overall negative view of migration as an unwanted evil or burden to Greece’s society and economy. It has thus developed in a re-active rather than pro-active way.
Initially these fears were related to questions of territorial integrity and national unity, and were fuelled by the fact that the vast majority of immigrants in Greece came from neighbouring countries in the Balkans (notably Albania and Bulgaria, which is now an EU member state). Collective memories of nation-formation wars in the Balkans (in particular the national war of independence in the nineteenth century, and the Balkan wars of the early twentieth century that led to the incorporation of the northern regions of Macedonia and Thrace to the modern Greek state) were projected to the present day to become geopolitical factors that should affect migration or minority policies (see for example Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 2009; Anagnostou, 2005).

In other words, many of the concerns that have prevented more long-term planning of migration policies and immigrant socio-political incorporation policies during the 1990s had to do with fears of emergence of ethnic parties, and concerns that immigrants are citizens of neighbouring countries and hence that their countries might raise territorial claims against Greece and ask for the redrawing of borders in the future. These concerns were largely shared among the leadership of both the ND (New Democracy) and PASOK (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement), although there was significant variation of opinion in each party: there were fervent xenophobic nationalists in both parties, as there were more moderate ones, privileging a civic and territorial view of the nation and a concomitant openness to migration and migrant integration.

It is these regional and foreign policy concerns, alongside a lack of any experience in immigration and a generally closed attitude towards foreigners and immigrants, that explain the delay with which Greece enacted its first regularization programme (in 1998) and adopted its first comprehensive immigration law (2001). These regional concerns also explain the Greek state’s delay in creating a special status to accommodate the ethnic Greek Albanian immigrant population (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002) without granting them Greek citizenship as was done with Pontic Greeks (co-ethnics ‘returning’ from the former Soviet Republics).

During the 1990s Greece paid more attention to external controls, although the Greek-Albanian land border was largely permeable during a good part of the decade. Until 1998 and the setting up of the Greek border guard forces—as well as the intensification of the coastguard patrols near Corfu—many Albanians were smuggled on foot through the mountains or by speedboat from the Albanian coast to Corfu or the Greek coast south of the Greek-Albanian border. Actually, Greece’s immigration policy in the period 1991–98 mainly consisted of internal controls, targeting mostly Albanian immigrants. There were massive stop-and-arrest operations at public places where migrants were known to gather either to wait for jobs or for recre-
BETWEEN ‘HARD’ IMPACT AND ‘SOFT’ INFLUENCE

The documents of foreign-looking persons were checked and those not in order (in reality, the vast majority among them) were arrested and expelled. They were put onto buses and sent overnight to Albania, sometimes without even being given the possibility to notify their families.

Table 1: Expulsions according to nationality (in thousands), 1991–1995.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albanian</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>277.0</td>
<td>221.0</td>
<td>216.5</td>
<td>241.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>282.0</td>
<td>239.0</td>
<td>225.0</td>
<td>250.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This policy of arrest-and-expel was supported by the EU, which at least partly subsidized it, as a means of controlling irregular migration into Europe. In fact, Greece and the EU spent a considerable amount of money, without bringing about the desirable effect of actually holding migration in check. These measures, apart from being inhuman and ineffective, also reinforced a common view of migration as a crime and of all migrants as criminals (see also Pavlou 2001, Panousis, 2007). They were abandoned, to a large extent, after the mid-1990s as the Greek government realized that a massive regularization programme was probably the only realistic measure for dealing with the several hundreds of thousands of irregular migrants who already resided and worked in the country by then.

Indeed, as the war in the former Yugoslavia ended and the political situation in the Balkans became more stable, Greek political elites realized that migration was there to stay and the factors and concerns driving Greek migration policy (and political elites’ interests for that matter) changed. In 2001, before the 1998 regularization programme had come to a close, the PASOK government led by Costas Simitis issued Law 2910/2001 entitled ‘Entry and Sojourn of Foreigners in the Greek Territory, Naturalisation and other Measures’. The Socialist government argued that the bill was inaugurating a new era in migration management in Greece.

The then interior minister Vasso Papandreou, in a short statement on television on the occasion of the voting of the Law in Parliament, noted that migrants were welcomed as long as they had (regular) jobs. However, migrants were welcomed only so long as they had work. If they became unemployed or
the labour market no longer needed them, they were expected to leave. This was the justification put forward by the minister for the short duration of the permits, which required frequent renewals and hence frequent checks that the migrant still had a regular job (necessary for renewal of a permit), and the absence of long-term integration prospects for the immigrant population.

Law 2910/2001 was voted as a means to combat irregular migration, cater to the needs of the Greek labour market, and generally protect Greek society from an unregulated situation of massive undocumented migration. It was also presented as responding to Greece’s international and mainly EU obligations, and recognized the international character of the migration phenomenon. As Mavrodi (2005) shows, however, the Law actually paid little attention to EU migration legislation and was, rather, concentrated on a short-sighted regulation of migration through restrictive legal migration channels and a large regularization programme. Migrants were seen by socialists and conservatives alike as a needed, albeit temporary and dispensable, labour force.

This view of migration in purely instrumental terms should come as no surprise since none of the Greek parties had any votes to gain by campaigning in favour of or against immigrants. Immigrants, after all, were not voters, and since the public view was negative (Triandafyllidou and Mikrakis, 1995), why should the government be concerned with adopting a long-term plan for immigration?

A new immigration law (Law 3386/2005) was introduced four years later in 2005 by the then ND government. This was probably the first law in which we note a clear EU influence on Greek immigration policy. Indeed the bill was mainly geared towards incorporating the EU Directives 2003/86 (on the right to family reunification) and 2003/109 (on the status of long-term residents) into the national legal order and simplifying some procedures for issuing or renewing residence permits. The 2005 Law did not alter substantially the logic of the Greek migration policy. This law has been in force since 1 January 2006 but was modified in February 2007 by Law 3536/2007, mainly on aspects of secondary importance.

Both acts (3386/2005 and 3536/2007) have included new regularization programmes. Law 3386/2005 introduced a regularization programme for undocumented migrants who had entered Greece before 31 December 2004. Law 3536/2007 introduced a new, smaller regularization programme enabling those who had not been able to renew their permits, according to Law 3386, in time and those who were not able to collect the necessary insurance stamps. Thus the aim of these two programmes (the second one ended on 30 September 2007) has been to incorporate into legal status certain specific categories of immigrants who had lived in Greece for several years but who, for various reasons, had not been able to regularize their residence and employment in the country.
Act 3386 regulates matters of entry, stay and social integration of third country nationals in Greece (refugees and asylum seekers are excluded from its application). The new law abolishes the existence of separate work and residence permits and introduces—in line with EU requirements—a residence permit for different purposes. The application fee of 150 euros for issuing a residence permit with a one-year duration remains, but the fee rises to 300 euros and 450 euros for permits with two and three years’ duration correspondingly. As a result of protests by immigrant organizations and other institutions this provision was amended so that dependent family members did not have to pay the fee.

Law 3386 determines the right to family reunification and the procedure for it by incorporating the relevant EU directive into the Greek legal order. It waives the application fee for the residence permits of dependent persons within a family (spouse and children). It also incorporates the EU directive for the status of long-term residents. A basic knowledge of the Greek language and Greek history and culture are among the conditions for acquiring this status. The original Presidential Decree that determined the details for certification of Greek language knowledge was particularly restrictive and was heavily criticized by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and immigrant associations. Finally, a new ministerial decree was issued in November 2007 that simplified the procedure of proving one’s fluency in Greek and one’s knowledge of Greek history and culture.

Finally, the law introduces an Action Plan for the social integration of immigrants, based on respect for their fundamental rights and with the purpose of their successful integration into Greek society, emphasizing the following sectors: certified knowledge of the Greek language, following introductory courses on the history, culture and way of life of Greek society, integration into the Greek labour market, and active social participation (Article 66, paragraph 4). This programme has largely remained on paper as the Ministry of Finance has not made available the necessary resources. Moreover, a Social Integration Directorate was created as a response to the establishment of the European Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals in the summer of 2007; the funds made available by the European Union (EU) for this purpose, however, started being used only in 2009, under pressure from the EU. The reasons for the inertia of previous years were, apparently, the lack of national funds for the 25 per cent co-funding required and, in particular, the fact that migrant integration measures were not a priority for the conservative government then in power.

Overall this law reiterates the restrictive migration management logic of the previous one, requiring frequent renewals of residence permits, tying those permits to jobs, and even hampering migrant business development by requiring that independent professionals should invest at least 60,000 euros to
obtain a permit for this purpose. The main reason for adopting the new law was actually the incorporation of new EU legislation into national law, rather than a political will to overhaul the migration management system.

The 2005 law bears a clear imprint of EU migration legislation as nearly half of all the articles included refer to the transposition of EU directives, notably the family reunification and long-term resident status directives. Overall the EU has shaped a more open and integration-oriented approach in Greece as it has been the main source of information, policies, and practices for developing the national migration policy, and more recently it has been the main framework within which migration laws have to be developed. Moreover, the EU acquis provides the framework for human rights protection in relation to both asylum seeking and irregular migration control policies (Pro Asyl 2007; Statewatch, 2009).

On the whole, Greece seems to have been stuck for a long time with its national interests’ concerns and an overarching view that migration is an unwanted burden for the country despite developments in other European countries and at the EU level (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002; Triandafyllidou, 2005). It is only after the 2005 law that we see an impact of EU legislation on national policy. Fieldwork conducted in 2008–09 (Triandafyllidou, 2009) with the Ministry of Interior also suggests that the emphasis on a National Migration Plan and on the development of a national integration framework programme in 2008–09 was due to a happy combination of factors: pressure to comply with EU policies, the fact that migration had come of age in Greece after more than fifteen years of experience as a host country, the mobilization of migrants themselves, and the sometimes fortunate coincidence of skilled and open-minded bureaucrats holding key positions in the ministry. However, that programme was never implemented, because of lack of national funds as well as lack of political will.

The arrival of PASOK in power in October 2009 marked a change in perspective on migration management and migrant integration, despite the ongoing acute economic crisis that Greece is going through. There is a renewed interest in promoting migrant integration and the EU long-term resident status has been given a new impetus in this new approach. Thus Law 3879/2010 facilitated acquisition of the EU long-term resident status, by allowing immigrants to prove their knowledge of Greek language and history through a relevant test or through various types of certificates rather than by attending an obligatory state-sponsored course with very few available places. Having EU long-term resident status has also become a prerequisite for applying for citizenship (for more details see below). In addition, during the last year and a half, and despite the dire financial situation of the country, the Ministry of Interior has implemented several initiatives co-funded by the European Fund for Integration of Third Country Nationals (2010–11). The
government has also voted a new law (Law 3907/2011) reforming the asylum system and improving in important ways the management of irregular migration at the borders and within the country. This change in policy direction has been the result of both the change in government and ‘soft’ EU influence regarding the need to respect the human rights of asylum seekers and irregular migrants and to create an efficient asylum system in the country (see also Triandafyllidou, 2011).

In conclusion, during the 1990s Greek immigration policy—notably a combination of internal and external control measures—developed mainly in relation to national considerations of political instability in the Balkans and fears that this might affect Greece not least by way of settlement of numerous Albanian citizens in its territory. This policy was indirectly supported by the EU as it responded to concerns about Greece becoming an entry gate for irregular migrants who would move on to other EU countries. During this first decade, however, the influence of EU migration policies on those of Greece was rather small. The effective development of a comprehensive (even if inefficient) migration management and migrant integration policy in the early 2000s was again shaped more by national than by European concerns. It was from the mid-2000s that a clear imprint of EU migration policies was evident on Greek arrangements with the transposition of EU directives into Greek Law. These transpositions have actually shaped, to a large extent, important migration measures in Greece, for example on issues of family reunification and migrant integration (EU long-term resident status). At the same time, however, the importance of such ‘hard impacts’ on Greek policy has been reduced by their only partial implementation. The stringent requirements for Greek language knowledge have basically rendered void the EU long-term resident status. The lack of national matching funds has hindered the implementation of measures funded by the European Integration Fund.

It was mainly the indirect influence of EU developments—notably the creation of an Integration Directorate within the Ministry of Interior (so that the European Integration funds and the related provisions could be more effectively managed by this ministry) and the overall European discourse concerning respect for irregular migrants’ and asylum seekers’ human rights (mainly propagated by NGOs from other countries such as ‘ProAsyl’ and ‘Statwatch’)—that prepared the ground for the development of integration measures (the European Integration Fund started being used from 2009) and for reform of the asylum law and the related management of irregular migration. Indeed the voting of Law 3907/2011 in February 2011, reforming the Greek asylum system, was the result of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ European influences: ‘hard’ as regards the requirement to transpose the EU directive on minimum common standards for returning unlawfully residing aliens, and ‘soft’ as regards Greece’s obligation to respect the fundamental rights of asy-
lum seekers and irregular migrants while also providing for an effective asylum system.

**Greek anti-discrimination policy and the role of the EU**

Alongside Greek immigration policy it is useful to consider the role of the EU in the development of anti-discrimination measures in the country. The two European directives, the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC of 29/06/2000) and the Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC of 27/11/2000), adopted in 2000 on the basis of Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, set in place a framework for the development of specific and comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation and policies in all member states. These directives define the principles that offer every individual in the EU a common, minimum level of legal protection against discrimination. They have been fighting discrimination based on sex and on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religious or other beliefs, disability, age and sexual orientation, particularly in the workplace, over the past three decades.

Greece, like all EU member states, had to transpose these directives into national law by 2003/04. At the end of 2004 Greece had still not done so. After infringement proceedings before the European Court of Justice, Greece complied. In 2008 it was one of the seventeen EU Member States that had fully transposed the two directives into national legislation. In a single act, Law 3304 (published in the Government Gazette A’16/27.01.2005), the two directives were more or less directly reproduced in Greek legislation. It is important to underline here that prior to this law there had been no anti-discrimination legislation in force in Greece (Ktistakis, 2007: 5). It is thus clear that anti-discrimination policies came onto the Greek agenda in a top-down manner, through the EU level following the adoption of the EC directives on Anti-Discrimination and Equality.

Law 3304/2005 set up a general, regulatory framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, religion, belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect the principle of equal treatment. Both direct and indirect discrimination are defined in the legislation. Provisions are applicable to all public and private actors as regards access to employment and employment in general.

The law grants a number of exceptions to the applicability of the principle of equal treatment, based on the nature of particular occupational activities, or the context in which these are carried out, provided that the objective is legitimate, genuine and proportionate. In the event that an individual considers he or she has been discriminated against, then they need to present the court or the competent authority with the facts on which they consider there
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has been direct or indirect discrimination. The burden of proof lies with the respondent to indicate that in civil law cases there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment.

As Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2009) convincingly argue, the Greek legislative framework concerning anti-discrimination measures, though responding to the EU requirements technically, did not create the conditions for effective protection from discrimination. The reasons (outlined by Gropas and Triandafyllidou, 2009) are manifold. I shall here mainly summarize their findings to show how the ‘hard’ impact of EU policy can be rendered void by problems with the national institutional and administrative framework.

The general framework laid out by this law is formally correct, even if it is slightly more restrictive than what was foreseen by the relevant EU directives. The main problem is that it does not fully respond to the spirit of the Council Directive. The need for improved legislation was underlined by the European Commission in early 2008 (MEMO/08/68, 31 January 2008).

The shortcomings of Greek anti-discrimination policy concern mainly the bodies responsible for implementing the policy in Greece. These are: the Economic and Social Committee (Οικονομική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή—ESC) (proposing measures to the government and the social partners aimed at promoting the principle of equal treatment and combating discrimination); the Greek Ombudsman (Συνήγορος του Πολίτη) (designated authority for cases where public authorities have infringed the principle of equal treatment); and, for cases where individuals and private actors have infringed the principle of equal treatment, the Equal Treatment Committee (Επιτροπή Ίσης Μεταχείρισης), which falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice. The Labour Inspectorate (Σώμα Επιθεώρησης Εργασίας) is also responsible for infringements in the workplace. It performs inspections aimed at ensuring the implementation of legislation and has the authority to institute criminal proceedings or impose fines against employers.

With the exception of the Greek Ombudsman, none of the above bodies effectively fulfils its tasks as regards promoting equality and fighting discrimination. The Equal Treatment Committee remains under-resourced and therefore unable to meet its responsibilities adequately. Moreover, it is questionable whether the Equal Treatment Committee can act as an independent actor given its institutional affiliation with the Ministry of Justice. The Labour Inspectorate is not able to carry out its role adequately because lower and middle rank employees have not been made aware of the Inspectorate’s new, specialized responsibilities on issues of discrimination in the workplace and the new legislative framework.

The traditional weakness of Greek civil society adds another dimension to the inaction of institutional actors. With some noteworthy exceptions of course, Greek civil society has not exerted pressure to public and private
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authorities to respect, implement and adhere to the new legislative framework. Nor has it taken initiatives in bringing cases of discrimination forward and seeking remedies and thereby provoking change and progress from the bottom up.

Thus in the case of anti-discrimination policy, while the hard EU impact on Greek legislation has been noteworthy, the implementation of anti-discrimination measures has been hampered by the under-resourcing of the responsible bodies and the lack of political will to promote equality.

Citizenship reform and the soft influence of the EU

The most important development of the last few years concerning migrants and minorities has been the Greek citizenship reform in March 2010. While citizenship law is in all respects a national matter and not an area that pertains to EU policy or even EU influence, references to Europe and the EU were common in the relative public debates.

Integration through naturalization has not been an easy option, since Greek nationality has been based predominantly on the *jus sanguinis* principle and until March 2010 the naturalization procedure was long, costly and with a very uncertain outcome even for applicants who satisfied the requirements. Law 2130/1993 and its revision in 2001 (Law 2910/2001) stated that immigrants who wish to become Greek citizens have to have been residents in Greece for ten of the last twelve years. Citizenship test requirements, similar to those of other European countries, were based on proficient knowledge of Greek history, language and culture. The procedure was cumbersome and expensive and lacked transparency.8

In November 2006, a joint decision by the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs facilitated the naturalization procedure for ethnic Greek Albanians, waiving the fee and the discretionary character of the judgment. That decision was passed largely without much debate as it fitted with the predominant conception of the Greek nation: Greeks are those of Greek genealogy, not those who live in Greece.

When PASOK came to power in October 2009 it quickly proceeded to change the citizenship law, in keeping with its electoral promises, in order to facilitate naturalization for non-Greek-origin immigrants. Thus, in March 2010 the Greek Parliament voted a new law (Law 3838/2010) on citizenship and naturalization which introduced provisions for the second generation of migrants, notably children born in Greece of foreign parents or children born abroad of foreign parents but who have completed at least six years of schooling in Greece and live in Greece. In either case, these children can naturalize with a simple declaration by their parents when they are born or when they complete their sixth year of attending a Greek school. The new law has also
lowered the requirement for naturalization for first generation migrants, from ten to seven years of residence, provided the foreigner has already received the EU long-term resident status, which can be acquired after five years of legal residence. Last but not least, the new citizenship law introduces local political rights for foreign residents living in Greece for five years or more.

Law 3838/2010 made a breakthrough by Greek standards, introducing a substantial element of *jus soli* in the concept of Greek citizenship. It therefore stirred a hot debate among its supporters and its critics, in Parliament, on the government website where bills were posted for public consultation, and, of course, in the newspapers. In this section I would like to offer a brief critical analysis of the parliamentary debates in March 2010 and of civil society actors’ views (based on qualitative research interviews conducted in the autumn of 2010) around the new citizenship law, with a view to highlighting how national and European interests and concerns are combined by members of the Greek Parliament of either of the major parties to support their arguments, and hence how European soft influences have been important in this debate.9

*The nation: between ethnic descent and civic community.* The main theme that ran through the parliamentary debates on the new citizenship Law in March 2010 was actually the juxtaposition of two competing views of national identity—one that sees the nation as a community of descent and the other that considers the nation as a civic community. In this juxtaposition, the role of references to history and us/them categorizations are crucial semantic tools to put forward the competing arguments of the political parties.

The majority spokesman Ioannis Diamantidis, for instance, referred to Rigas Feraios, one of the early leaders of the Greek national independence movement and a prominent figure in early Greek Enlightenment, to reinforce a view of the nation as a civic community, as a community of values, introducing the idea that this was the very genuine and initial conception of the nation by the heroes of the national independence struggle:

In inviting you to vote in favour of this bill I will refer to Rigas Feraios who in 1779 [said] every [man] who is born and lives in this kingdom [the kingdom of Greece] who is 21 years of age or older, is a citizen. Every foreigner who is 21 years of age and has lived in this kingdom at least for one year and lives off his work is a citizen. (…) He who speaks the common or the Greek language and helps Greece, is a citizen. And any stranger that the government considers that he is a valuable citizen, a valuable resident of this homeland, he is a citizen (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 11 March 2010).

The ND party spokesperson Athanasios Nakos, in contrast, distinguished between ‘foreigners’—that is, migrants who live in Greece but who are not of Greek descent—and the ‘real Greeks’ who are of Greek descent:

We [with this bill] are being unfair to those who really want who really have made Greece their homeland. We are putting into the same grade, the co-ethnics for
instance, with those for whom being Greek is just one feature, not even a defining one, which they can acquire with a quick and simple administrative procedure. In this way we are being unfair though to the co-ethnics who want to take part in our political life (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 11 March 2010).

The dichotomy between ‘us’—Greek citizens—and ‘them’—foreigners—was compounded by the economic crisis. Nakos, arguing against the citizenship reform proposal, said it would attract more migrant workers to the country at a time of increasing unemployment and economic hardship and made no distinction between long-term migrants and new/potential arrivals. Indeed, this view was taken further by an MP of the extreme right wing party LAOS, Adonis Georgiadis, who argued: ‘With this bill you are putting on the same level the refugees from Pontos and Minor Asia with the Pakistanis and the Afghans. This is what you are doing. (...) we consider that this article offends those of us who are of Minor Asia or Pontic descent’ (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 10 March 2011).

The spokesperson of the left-wing party SYRIZA, Nikolaos Tsoukalis, by contrast referred to national history and particularly to the country’s refugee history to point out that those who were against facilitating naturalization were people who ‘would have sent back the Greek refugees from Minor Asia in 1929, 1928 and 1927’ (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 10 March 2011). He argued in favour of a nation based on a community of voluntary association and civic values: ‘The strength of each community lies in the will of the people to integrate and work together’ (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 10 March 2011).

This topic is clearly revealing of the unsolved tensions of Greece’s identity in its relationship with Europe. References to national history and categorizations of ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ can be used either way to construct different views of ‘Greekness’.

There was evidently a left-right rift. PASOK and other left-wing parties expressed positions in favour of a civic conception of Greek identity and citizenship and referred to national heroes and the national history to emphasize that this was the original and genuine conception of the nation. This position was espoused by all the interviewees that may be considered as belonging to the centre-left, that is, representatives of centre-left and extreme left-wing student associations (Interviews 5 and 6) and the representative of the teachers’ association (Interview 1). By contrast, ND and the extreme right-wing party LAOS, as well as the right-oriented interviewees, emphasized an ethnic view of the nation and used references of national history to define categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Interestingly, the representative of a migrant association interviewed (Interview 2) justified the reservations of the right-wing discourse by arguing that Greece was a second homeland but one that could in no way compare to the
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first, the real homeland, a migrant’s country of origin. By contrast, the young
interviewee from a second generation migrant NGO considered the whole
dilemma about redefining ‘Greekness’ as something constructed by the media
but not shared by the citizens. He pointed out (Interview 7) that he had never
felt his Greekness being questioned because of the mere fact that his parents
were foreigners.

The notion of a contemporary Greek identity was however problematized
in an interesting manner by one of our interviewees, a teacher trade union
activist:

Left wing forces and movements, not necessarily the state, have to fight for the forma-
tion of a modern Greek identity, perhaps not modern Greek because this as an expres-
sion seems to refer to nationalism, but to a modern identity in Greek society that will
be able to integrate both a modern version of popular culture and the part [brought in] by immigrants (Interview 9).

The nation as culture. Education was at the core of the parliamentary debates
on citizenship reform, as it was seen as part and parcel of the civic and terri-
torial conceptions of citizenship. Through education, migrant children can
become Greeks, and as one of our migrant interviewees noted (Interview 2)
they learn to love the country, they learn Greek history and the national cel-
ibration days through education. Similarly, during the course of the debate,
PASOK’s spokesman Ioannis Diamantidis argued: ‘With this bill, we address
the families of legally employed foreigners, the children who are receiving the
Greek education [paideia], those who have loved our country and who have
been now attached to it, those who were born here’ (http://www.hellen-
icparliament.gr, 11 March 2010).

This argument was repeated time and again by the majority and left-wing
party representatives during the parliamentary debate: ‘The Albanian child
who has studied in school and who in 6–7 years speaks excellent Greek, bet-
ter than his mother, better than me, no we are not going to let him go. We will
make him Greek, as we will make Greeks all those children who wish them
and their parents to be Greeks. (…) otherwise our Greece is fading both eco-
nomically and socially’ (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 10 March 2011).

The conservative and extreme right-wing parties however refuted this
argument, declaring that although culture and education are important, they
cannot supersede ethnic descent, or nationality in the sense of ethnic origin
(rather than of territorial or civic belonging):

Emotional arguments are the worse (…) The children are sitting next to one another
at school. So nationality… and of course they fall in love, they quarrel, they learn. Who
questions all this? Is this the issue at stake? The issue is: is nationality important? Or
not? Tell us dear colleagues: Is nationality not important, for citizenship, for living
together, for social cohesion, for identity, is it not important ultimately for the com-
**Law, order and rights: being a European country.** Spokespersons of both the majority party PASOK and the left-wing SYRIZA supported the new bill, referring to a ‘modern state of law’ and arguing that the previous law was ‘out of date’ and inadequate for a country that belongs to Europe. This argument brought together a number of elements: a modern state, good governance, clear and transparent rules, equality of rights for all, and European standards.

Thus, being ‘modern’ and belonging to ‘Europe’ became bound up with respecting equality, providing universal access to the welfare state, respecting the law but also fighting irregular migration and thus playing Greece’s due part and honouring the country’s obligations towards the European Union. The following excerpt from the speech of the socialist party spokesperson is an eloquent example of this argument:

It is not possible that we want simply and only cheap, third-word labour force, ignoring the consequences on our welfare state, on our health services, and on the rights of Greek workers, ignoring also the human rights, the European practice, and our obligations as a modern organized polity. Securing the rights of legal migrant workers means also securing the rights of Greek workers and of societal cohesion (http://www.hellenicparliament.gr, 10 March 2011).

Indeed, being European was presented essentially as being fair, democratic and transparent but also as being firm, law-abiding and efficient.

This analysis of parliamentary debates and of fourteen qualitative interviews with civil society actors confirms the existence of the rift between Romiosyne and Hellenism, but seems to escape the often expressed notion of Greek exceptionalism, and rather subscribes to the general debate in Europe about accommodating diversity within national conceptions of citizenship by reference to territory and civic values. References to the glorious Hellenic past that should excuse all shortcomings of the present are put aside by the left-wing forces that support citizenship law reform. Right-wing forces refer to national history and tradition but also to instrumental considerations about unemployment and the economic crisis to obstruct an expansion of the definition of citizenship. ‘Europe’ enters the debate in defence of the civic conception of the nation, as ideas of equality of rights, respect for diversity, civic citizenship, and extension of local political rights to non-citizens are all ideas and policies that exist in other EU countries.

Analysis of the parliamentary and civic society debate on the citizenship law reform reveals that in an area of exclusive national competence lying at the heart of national sovereignty, notably citizenship law, European ‘soft’ influences—through references to what other EU countries do, the European human rights tradition, the need to show that Greece is a modern, well-governed and efficient state—can also be important in supporting national policy developments, even if there is no concrete EU policy that should affect the national framework.
Concluding remarks

This chapter assessed the hard and soft impact of EU policies and related policy discourses on Greek migration and minority policy. In particular the chapter examined the development of migration management and migrant integration policy during the past twenty years, the recent emergence of an anti-discrimination policy framework (as of 2004) and the most recent developments in citizenship law reform (in 2010). The chapter shows how ‘hard’ impacts, notably the transposition of EU directives into national law, have sometimes been of limited importance because of deficiencies in the implementation framework (lack of national funds, lack of appropriate bodies for implementation, lack of political will, imposition of stringent conditions that rendered the spirit of a law ineffective). By contrast, sometimes ‘soft’ influences such as the European discourse on human rights and the question of asylum, or the idea of good and effective governance, can be equally effective in promoting and legitimizing legislative changes, such as the new asylum law (3907/2011) or the new citizenship law (3838/2010), in the national political arena.

The findings of this study should be seen as complementary to earlier research (for instance, Anagnostou 2005) which shows how developments in national policy on minorities have been defended in Parliament with full reference to national considerations even if the ground had been prepared by ‘soft’ European influences concerning minority protection and human rights. Indeed, national and European hard and soft policy influences form a complex framework and there is a need to analyze carefully the role of each. However, we may consider that while national concerns remain dominant in Greek policy and political discourses, the need to transpose EU legislation and the gradual development of relevant discourses of human rights, equality and good governance play an important long-term part in shaping not only the policies but also the related discourses in a less nationalist orientation, more respectful of diversity.

Annex I: List of Interviews

1) Dimitra Petrou, teacher of Secondary Education at the 3rd High School of Ag. Dimitrios, Athens, 28.06.2010.
2) Jo Valencia, president of the NGO Kasapi, Union of Filipino Migrant Workers in Greece, 05.07.2010.
3) Priest Antonios Kalligeris, head of Youth Department of Archdiocese of Athens, 01.07.2010.

5) Dimitris Grapsas, student, member of NAR-EAAK, of the Youth for Communist Liberation, and secretary of Student Youth (2006–07), 10.07.2010.

6) Nikos Malliaris, student, member of the student group ‘Libertarian Intervention’ of the Faculty of Humanities, Athens, 28.06.2010.

7) Nikos Odoubitan, member of the NGO ‘Asante’ (Second Generation Migrants from Africa in Greece), 14.07.2010.

8) Chrisanthos Lazarides, journalist, secretary of NGO ‘Network 21, Movement for Patriotic Revival’ and currently adviser to the leader of the centre-right party New Democracy, 16.07.2010.

9) Panagiotis Sotiris, anthropologist, president of the Union of Teachers in Private Secondary Education Tutorial Schools (2005–7), currently lecturer at the Aegean University, 05.07.2010.


12) Thanos Veremis, professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and head of the National Education Council (ESYP), 27.07.2010.


Scene 1

It is Saturday afternoon at the Community Centres created by the Project on the Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children. Thirteen-year-old children of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace are involved in a creative educational activity, taking place in one of the Community Centres. Such an activity operates on the basis of small group work, aiming at utilizing experiential learning, and promoting psychosocial development. The group offers the opportunity for exchange of ideas and feelings not always easy to accommodate. The young people are involved jointly in a common task that brings out differences, highlights the value of each member of the group as a distinct individual, and encourages the exploration of those skills that are necessary for a collective endeavour. When the groups are mixed (boys and girls belonging to both the minority and the majority), the task is even more challenging.

As part of the task, the young people are writing down the rules they perceive as necessary for smooth operation of their group: (a) we should not
tease each other, (b) we should decide jointly, (c) one should listen to what the other person has to say, (d) we should help each other, (e) we should respect our ‘double’ (δίπλός). This last regulation represents a very revealing Freudian slip of the tongue.

In Greek the words ‘δίπλος’ (diplos) and ‘διπλανός’ (diplanos) sound similar but they mean two completely different things: the first signifies ‘double’ and the second ‘fellow man’ or ‘neighbour’. The children, whose Greek is poor, obviously ‘made a mistake’. They meant to say ‘respect for our fellow man’, ‘for our neighbour’. Instead their suppressed desire was to employ the word ‘diplos’, unconsciously invoking respect for ‘their double’ which they feel is not being accepted and is an object of continuous negotiation.1

Scene 2

The above self-portrait of a ten-year-old boy was produced in the context of educational activities in another Community Centre. The face has no mouth, the arms have no hands nor fingers, the body is floating in the air, while at
the bottom of the paper he has scribbled, with many spelling mistakes, ‘There
was someone in the past who did not know his name’, and at the top he has
added the words ‘like a fool’. The freedom of expression that characterizes the
atmosphere at the Centres has allowed the young boy to reveal the trauma
minority identity has experienced. The obvious association is the proverb
‘children and fools do not lie’. The idea that the name is the primordial trace
of humankind and civilization and marking one’s identity is being questioned.
The idea that, in the history of humankind and civilization, one’s name repre-
senting the symbolic and institutional recognition of kinship, ties and con-
tinuity, is missing in the eyes of the young boy. It is through the symbolic
mediation of the name that biological existence is transformed into social
existence, and one’s identity is inscribed in the symbolic order through rec-
ognition by the other and by the use of social practices. It is the name that
renders one part of a whole and it is the name that gives one a place in suc-
cession. One does not exist without a name. Without a name, identity is dis-
qualified, and the sense of cohesion in the present and continuity in the
future is lost.

Political conflicts inevitably impinge upon identity. Damage to identity is
a narcissistic injury bringing about painful feelings of shame and humiliation.
When shame is evoked and not acknowledged, it may lead to an unending
spiral of shame, anger and aggression. In order to prevent or undo this ‘loss
of face’ experienced subjectively as death of the self, people will sacrifice
everything to prevent annulment and destruction of their individual or group
identity (Gilligan, 1997).

The above scenes place us at the heart of identity politics in Western
Thrace, the theme of the present chapter. People of the Muslim minority, the
largest minority in the country and the only one officially given minority sta-
tus, were recognized as citizens in May 1920 when Western Thrace became
part of the Greek state. According to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the
Convention and Protocol on the Exchange of Populations (30 January 1923),
the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace, as well as the Greeks in Istanbul,
were exempted from the compulsory exchange of populations. Most of the
Muslim minority population in Thrace has a Turkish ethnic identity, bearing
the stigma of the ‘life-long enemy’ of Greece. Pesmazoglou in the present vol-
ume traces adeptly the origins of Greek stereotypes about the ‘Turk’ linked
tightly with the formation of Modern Greek identity. The ‘unwavering axiom
that Greeks and Turks are perennial enemies’, as stated by Pesmazoglou in this
volume, accounts for a historically induced antagonism, creating a divided
society in Thrace.

Modern Greek society has been, for historical and socioeconomic reasons,
relatively homogeneous. The wars between Greece and the Ottoman Empire
at first, and then Turkey, and the neighbouring Balkan countries, from the
nineteenth century into the 1920s were followed by a forced exchange of
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populations in the 1920s and 30s. This moved much of the Turkish and Slav minority population beyond the Greek frontiers. Subsequently, between 1941 and 1944, the Nazis exterminated almost the entire Jewish population of Northern Greece. Similarly, the Chams (Muslim Albanian-speaking populations), and in 1949 the Slavo-Macedonians, were subject to persecution. Thus, after the end of the Civil War in 1949 and until the 1990s, when immigrants started to flow into Greece in big numbers, the Greek nationalists could easily establish the myth that Greece was a homogeneous and mono-cultural society with the exception of the Muslim minority, which was the ‘other’ par excellence.

The arrival of large bodies of immigrants, reaching, according to wide agreement, at least 10 per cent of the Greek population, placed multiculturalism on the public agenda, stimulated growing debates on difference and identities, and fuelled racist and nationalist discourses and practices. This is not an exclusively Greek phenomenon. Post-colonial multicultural, multiracial and multi-ethnic Europe presents challenges to societies that imagined themselves as homogeneous. Racism, intolerance, anti-Semitism and xenophobia persist, at both personal and institutional levels, in more or less virulent forms, in every single country of Europe (Ginsburg and Sondhi, 2000). It is estimated that there are up to 75 million national, regional and immigrant minorities, refugees and asylum seekers residing in the member states of the Council of Europe, amounting to about 10 per cent of the total population.4 Fekete and Webber (in Ginsburg and Sondhi, 2000) indicate how, without exception, in every European state minorities continue to suffer from prejudice, discrimination and violence.

While historically Western Thrace has always included several cultural communities, the contemporary cultural and political climate is quite different from that prevailing in the pre-modern institution of the Ottoman millet system.5 Present-day multicultural Thrace has emerged against the background of the culturally homogenizing nation-state and a very different view of social unity. Thanks to the dynamics of the modern economy, the minority cannot lead isolated lives and is caught up in a complex pattern of interaction with the majority. And thanks to democratic ideas, the minority has the right in law (even if not always an effective right in real terms) to participate in the cultural life of the wider society. The reconciliation of unity and cultural diversity is particularly salient in the field of education. Education in the millet system was not meant to fuse the different elements of the Ottoman Empire as in a modern nation-state; on the contrary, it was a mechanism to keep the millets apart. The big challenge in Thrace is to transform minority education into a mechanism that helps develop a common sense of belonging, while at the same time discourses regarding diversity, bilingualism and multiculturalism between majority and minority will not be set solely by the majority.
THE VICISSITUDES OF IDENTITY IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY

In the large-scale educational initiative targeting the Muslim minority children—the Project for the Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children, known by its Greek acronym as PEM, designed and implemented since 1997—negotiation of identities inside and outside the classroom was one of the most salient dimensions. In this chapter I choose to elaborate on three aspects of identity politics: (a) naming and categorization of the minority, (b) negotiation of identities in the context of the ‘Project on the Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children’, and (c) accommodation of cultural conflicts in Western Thrace.

What is in a name in Western Thrace

I do not intend to go into details of the legal identity of the Muslim minority of Western Thrace, a product of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and part of the wider League of Nations pattern to protect minorities from the changes in borders and states produced by World War I. What I am interested in, for the purposes of the present chapter, is to show how in the complex interplay of national, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identities of the minority groups constituting the Thracian minority, self-naming and others’ naming and categorization have held an important place as much in majority-minority relations as in Greek-Turkish relations.

Understanding the identity construction of a minority requires an understanding of the intricate interplay between the real and symbolic groups it belongs to. Individuals and groups adopt identity strategies, at both the personal and the collective level, by means of which they assert their existence, their social visibility, and their integration in the wider community, while at the same time valuing and establishing their own internal coherence. The case of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace is a very good example of such identity construction arising from constant dynamic negotiation between minority and majority.

The understanding of how and why identities (of self or group) are negotiated entails a double perspective: that of psychodynamic processes, and that of their embeddedness in a larger socioeconomic, historic and political context. This chapter will attempt to articulate the psychosocial principles by which individuals and groups self-name, self-characterize, and claim social spaces and social prerogatives with the historical and political context within which such descriptions and categorizations acquire meaning.

Negotiation of identities as an intrapsychic process refers to psychological mechanisms within individuals. Primitive emotions surface, especially those associated with the first experiences of groups, and have to be worked through. Unconscious psychological mechanisms, such as splitting, introjection, identification, projection and projective identification, are set in motion.
and show how the external world of other people and the initial world of self can flow into each other (Klein 1946; Bion 1961). ‘Us’ groups project unwanted aspects of ourselves into ‘them’ groups. As a consequence the ‘them’ group comes to be experienced as embodying the negative aspects that have been projected onto and into them, and through this mechanism ‘them’ comes to be devalued and denigrated. This is not a static operation, it is a continuous process in the making.

While it is fascinating to search for intrapsychic processes of the categorizing and the categorized individual or group, if we do not contextualize subject positions we run the risk of attributing dominance or subordination to human nature, and thus inevitably justify it. As formulated by Elias (1994) the function of a difference is to make a differentiation between the ‘haves’ and ‘must-not-haves’. Thus identity is more than an inner psychological state, an individual self-definition; it is a form of life daily lived in the world of nation-states (Billig, 1995).

As a result of the millet system whereby ethnicity or origin had little significance, the Treaty of Lausanne describes the exempted population in religious rather than ethnic terms. It consequently lumped together diverse ethnic groups that had only their Muslim faith in common. Thus, while religious identity is recognized by the Greek state, ethnic status is not acknowledged. In the power game of minority politics, the largest and strongest group is that of Turkish ethnic identity. Smaller groups within this larger one are frequently omitted in the category shuffle, creating ‘injustices of recognition’. The Turkish language is taught in minority schools as the maternal language both to Turkophones and to Muslim Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims) and Muslim Roma, several of whom speak Turkish, while others speak Romani.

Interestingly enough, no reliable official statistics exist for either the exact size of the minority or its ethnic composition. The last figures published by the Greek Statistical Service, concerning language and religion, date back to the 1951 census. All subsequent information regarding population statistics of the minority is considered classified material. This lack of official data is indicative of the attitude of both the Greek state and the minority, the first wishing to present smaller numbers, and the second larger ones. Thus, different sources provide different undocumented estimates that vary widely from 90,000 to 130,000 (Dragonas, 2004).

In naming the minority, the Greek state employs a double standard: when the objective is to underemphasize the Turkish ethnic identity of the minority, its religious status is invoked; but when the intention is to weaken its unity, then its multiple ethnic composition is cited. When a minority Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) is claiming directly or indirectly the national character of a group of the minority, it faces a strong reaction by the Greek authorities and the majority public opinion, both referring to ‘Greek Muslims
of Turkish decent' (*Tourkogenis*). With respect to Turkey’s policy towards the ethnic composition of the minority, the more Greece insists on a single Muslim minority, the more Turkey claims a single Turkish one (Akgönül, 1999).

Concerning the Pomaks, there is a nationalist rhetoric emanating from various ethnocentric sources, attempting to appropriate their origin. The Greek state has been very ambivalent towards this group, which has been simultaneously subjected to appropriation and exclusion. The self or group identification of the Pomaks has hardly been taken into consideration (Trubeta, 2001; Demetriou, 2004). Whenever local agents, and to a lesser extent the central government, decide to embrace the Pomaks, the Turkish position in the identity politics of the minority is threatened. As far as the Pomaks themselves, and to a lesser extent the Roma, are concerned, caught between various political fronts and opposing ideologies competing for their allegiance, they choose to remain silent. Their political consciousness remains to a great extent locked up within the wider Greek-Turkish conflict.

While the dominant minority group is disinclined to acknowledge the Pomak or Roma identity of the other two smaller minority groups, their permanent grievance is the unwillingness of the Greek state to acknowledge their own ethnic Turkish identity. Minority grievances concerning the right to found associations with national appellation in their title (a right rejected by the Greek Supreme Court) have been taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Tsitselikis, 2008). Recently the Court ruled that the title of the Turkish Union of Xanthi does not constitute a danger to public order. The implementation of the ECHR’s decision by the Greek authorities is still pending. The issue has become of crucial importance, mostly symbolic, because of the minority’s hope to gain national recognition as Turkish.

As Bhabha (1983: 24–5) says of the colonial subject, colonizer and colonized are constructed within colonial discourse; the dominant is strategically placed within the discourse for the dominated subject. How one chooses to address the minority, or what a minority member calls him/herself, plays an active part in the discourse of identity politics and is fraught with overtones. Depending on the ideological position of the speaker, the minority may be called ‘Muslim’, irrespective of whether its members are religious or not; ‘Tourkogenis’ (of Turkish descent), meaning that it consists simply of Greek Muslims who at some point in their history came from Turkey; ‘minoritarians’ as opposed to the majority; ‘Turkish, Pomak or Romani speaking’, in order to shift the emphasis from ethnic to linguistic identity; or ‘Minority Turks’, underlining their minority status in the Greek society while distinguishing them from Turkish citizens by pointing to their Greek citizenship.

All this shows clearly the Greek state’s reluctance to accommodate otherness and the mobilization of a multifaceted spectrum of political, legal and ideological arguments. A key factor that I choose to explain such identity politics
is that the ideological construction of ‘otherness’ justifies and perpetuates domination. The process of subjectification, the ambivalence at work in the representation of ‘otherness’, and the dimension of the dominant-subordinate relation all stem from the fantasy of a pure, undifferentiated origin frequently documented in the modern Greek national imaginary (Frangoudaki and Dragonas, 1997; Gourgouris, 1996; Dragonas, 2005). The mode of representation of ‘otherness’ is based on a mechanism whereby difference is simultaneously recognized and denied (Bhabba, 1983). While the Turkish ethnic identity of the minority is denied, when one brings up the similarities between majority and minority population groups the difference is immediately amplified and the Turkish identity is angrily evoked. Bhabba demonstrates how this mechanism of simultaneous recognition and denial of difference works with both dominant and subordinate groups, such that both are caught in an imaginary conflict relation that precludes recognition of difference.

The resistance to finding out that the ‘other’ is the same springs from the reluctance to admit that the same is ‘other’ (Johnson, 1986). If the average majority person, the average Greek, could recognize that one of the minority, the Turk, is just like him, he would have to recognize that he is just like the Turk. This recognition is very powerful because it forces the similarity between self and ‘other’. And if the same, however fleetingly, is ‘other’, then the differences that have been constructed to justify dominant supremacy are unmasked.

Going back to the drawings we started from, it is not clear how the young boy whose identity is being disqualified will react. The face of his drawing has no mouth, hence he has no voice to claim a life with dignity. His arms are truncated, hence he has no hands to fight with and defend himself. Fanon (1952) talks about the broken up body of the colonized subject trapped in an imaginary constructed by the colonizer. Fanon concentrates on strategies to resist oppression that do not involve compromise or flight, while most analysts writing on aggression and violence agree that a major source, if not the major source, of hostile or violent acts is damage to one’s sense of identity (Bracher, 1998).

As regards violent acts, while the Balkans is a ‘powder-keg’ region where ethnic conflicts have often led to violence, interestingly there has been very little overt physical violence in Western Thrace (Yiagcioglu, 2004). Minority members in their history of almost ninety years have in the main employed non-violent protest methods against the restrictive and discriminatory, often harsh and oppressive, measures they were subjected to. In their struggle to have their demands accepted by the government, they have engaged in actions such as mass petitions, sit-ins, school boycotts, mosque boycotts, marches and demonstrations, burning of school textbooks. They have also used the courts extensively, including the European Court of Human Rights. Yet they have been especially careful to avoid the use of violence, and neither the govern-
ment nor the majority has responded, as a rule, to the minority’s struggle by overt violence.

The beginning of the 1990s marked a turning point for the minority in Thrace. Majority-minority relations were seriously deteriorating by the late 1980s and tensions escalated, threatening to become violent, to the point that government agencies seemed no longer able to control the situation or to provide order and enforce the law. This was the time when important changes regarding minority rights took place in the international and the national scene. On the one hand international organizations mobilized efforts to develop standards for minority protection while, on the other, the intensification of Europeanization processes in Greece set in motion a liberalization of the government’s policy towards the minority. In 1990 the American Helsinki Watch issued a report bringing to light serious concerns regarding the discriminatory treatment of the Muslim minority in Thrace, followed, in 1991, by the State Department’s Human Rights Report to the American Congress which revealed for the first time at an international level the systematic violations of rights. The Greek government found itself in a very uncomfortable position, even more so as Greece adopted resolutions passed by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) (now renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE) and the CoE in Vienna in 1989 and in Copenhagen in 1990 respectively, which extended individual principles of human rights to the protection of minorities as groups. Although international organizations did not exert direct pressure, the Greek government was led, willingly or not, to reconsider its minority policy with a view to redeeming its anti-minority reputation in Europe and toning down inter-communal tensions in Thrace (Heraklides, 1997; Anagnostou, 2005).

The new policy was guided by the principle of ‘legal equality’ and ‘equal citizenship’, and measures leading to the improvement of the minority’s condition were taken. Policies for economic revitalization were introduced, liberalization measures were adopted—such as a more tolerant attitude toward the minority’s access to the Turkish mass media—and the ‘restricted zone’ along the Greek-Bulgarian border was opened up. Important measures for reform of the education of minority children were taken, education being a thorny issue of increasing importance for the minority. The most significant measure was that of positive discrimination allowing a 0.5 per cent minority quota to enter the Greek universities sitting for special exams. Some opposition from both majority and minority hard-liners notwithstanding, the measure set major developments in motion. The Project for Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children (PEM), launched in 1997, was to change the scene drastically.9
The Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children (PEM)

Education is the *sine qua non* condition for fighting social exclusion in Thrace. Social exclusion has been a debilitating social process that has created a progressive loss of autonomy, a loss of a sense of worth. It has had profound consequences for people’s ability to make decisions about the course of their own lives, or about the course of events for which they are responsible. Thus individual opinions are rarely, if ever, voiced. Bodies such as the Consultative Committee (Συμβουλευτική Επιτροπή) or the Association of University Graduates (Σύλλογος Επιστήμονων Δυτικής Θράκης), composed of élite members of the minority, control both discourse and course of action according to a strict party line.

PEM has aimed at the social inclusion of minority children by confronting massive under-achievement and reducing the high drop-out levels from compulsory nine-year schooling. The minority’s educational level is very low. A huge percentage of minority members have only had six years of elementary education. In the year 2000 the drop-out rates from the nine-year compulsory education reached 65 per cent, while the national drop-out mean was 7 per cent; and in 2003 only 2.6 per cent of men and 0.2 per cent of women had university degrees (Askouni, 2006). Minority schools are segregated, and on the basis of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and Greco-Turkish Protocols (1951, 1968) have bilingual curricula. The Turkish language and mathematics, physics, chemistry and physical education (supposed to be ideologically neutral) are taught in Turkish, and religion (the Qur’an) is taught in Arabic, by teachers who belong to the minority; Greek language, history, geography, environmental studies and civic education are taught in Greek, by teachers who are members of the majority. Even though minority primary schools are bilingual they are obsolete institutions, in the sense that none of the issues of the current *problématique* of bilingual education seems to interest educational policy makers on either side.

PEM has been a comprehensive intervention inside and outside the classroom, including teaching Greek as a second language, development of educational materials, extensive teacher training, creative activities with the young, and work with the community. PEM was strongly challenged by a constructionist epistemology which argues strongly for greater democracy in negotiating what counts in educational practice, local embedding of curricula, breaking of disciplinary boundaries, and outreaching the community, thus relating educational practice to societal issues and shifting to relationships as opposed to individuals (Gergen 2009). What makes this intervention noteworthy is (a) the duration of such a concerted effort, (b) the broad spectrum it has covered, ranging from classroom materials to the involvement of the community, (c) the twofold approach of top down and bottom up processes, and (d) its interdisciplinary nature. Underlying PEM’s core is the accommo-
dation of demands emanating from a deep and defiant diversity; the empowerment of educators, students and community in order to challenge the operation of coercive power structures; and the encouragement of an open-minded dialogue between the majority and the minority.

PEM is an educational project, yet deeply political. Education is by definition a politically relevant category, being an integral part of equal citizenship as well as a cultural institution, since parents and cultural communities have a vital interest in it. All educational structures are rooted in sociopolitical contexts traditionally disempowering subordinated groups in many different ways. Since the minority in Thrace has been a subordinated group, its education is no exception. Wagner (1991) discusses two distinct forms of what he calls ‘subordinated group illiteracy’: ‘illiteracy of oppression’ and ‘illiteracy of resistance’. Both types of illiteracy derive from basic problems of access to appropriate schooling. ‘Illiteracy of oppression’ is brought about by the majority society. It is a direct consequence of the process of integration/assimilation operating in state education and in the entire society. It results in the slow destruction of identity and cultivates mechanisms of resistance in the minority community. ‘Illiteracy of resistance’, although caused by oppression, is to some extent instituted by the minority group itself. By wishing to safeguard its language and culture, and fearing assimilation, the minority turns against itself and rejects the form of education imposed by the majority group. At the extreme, says Wagner, the minority group would prefer to remain illiterate, rather than risk losing its language and culture.

Wagner’s analysis reflects in the most accurate way the stunted process of minority education in Thrace. At the onset of PEM, in 1997, 95 per cent of the parents were choosing to send their children to the segregated minority schools. The quality of these schools was (and to a great extent still is) very poor; a large number of students completing primary education were illiterate in Greek and functionally illiterate in Turkish. The drop-out rate, compared with the national mean, is exceedingly high (Askouni, 2006). These figures illustrate both ‘illiteracy of resistance’ in that the minority choose the poor quality school, resisting the education offered by the institutions of the majority, and ‘illiteracy of oppression’ in that minority children are failing in huge numbers. Yet the effects of the intervention carried out by PEM, the positive discrimination measure for university entrance examinations, and the overall social changes show impressive improvement in the above statistics. In twenty years attendance at compulsory school more than quadrupled, while upper secondary school attendance has multiplied by 1,000 per cent. The drop-out rate has gone down by half and the 5 per cent of minority children attending the state primary school has increased to 32.5 per cent (Askouni, 2011). As impressive the above changing figures may be, the leaders of the minority fearing assimilation cling to the minority school, wishing to safe-
guard their linguistic and cultural identity. Minority children still lag behind and low educational levels are typical of hugely disproportionate numbers of minority children, by comparison with majority ones. The drop-out rate of minority children is still five times higher than the national mean.

On the intrapsychic level, another way of dealing with threats to identity is the idealization of the in-group, the resort to closing up as a means of enhancing feelings of false security. Collective faith is thus intensified. The ideal ‘we’ mobilizes collective action that surpasses individual weakness and averts destruction. ‘United we stand’, individual energy and enthusiasm get marshalled, agreement and mutual accord are cultivated. Kernberg (1998) refers to identifications with state power, political groups, church, all offering narcissistic satisfaction intensifying an insecure identity. Yet when the group stops being idealized, things become shaky and the promised comfort is not there any more.

In the case of the Thracian minority, I suggest that there are changes concerning the idealization of group solidity. The local elections in November 2010 showed that the members of the minority are no longer very keen to follow blindly the line spelled out by the representatives of Turkey, playing, as the kin-state, an overwhelming role. A freer civil society is gradually being born. In following my argument, the in-group is becoming less idealized, and is not offering the security it used to offer. Yet this is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be an optimistic development, by which passive subjects are turning into self-defined ones.

If we were to go back to the first scene, described at the beginning of the chapter, whereby the adolescents were setting rules for the operation of their group, and focus on the respect invoked for the ‘double’ of their identity, we would find it squeezed between two opposing forces: one is the explicit or implicit intention of the majority group to assimilate the minority, the other is the conscious and/or unconscious fear of identity loss expressed by the minority. It is this fear that propels the minority to resist morphogenetic changes. Identities are valued or devalued because of their bearers’ place in the prevailing structure of power, and their revaluation entails corresponding changes in the latter, says Parekh (2000).

Jim Cummins’ entire work focuses on issues of identity and power intersecting, both in classroom instruction and in school organization (Cummins 1996, 1997, 2004). He describes in a most convincing way the ‘slow destruction of identity’ brought about by remaining trapped in oppressive school and social situations. He underlines the ambivalence and insecurity about identity that marginalized groups often experience. Power relations and educational achievement are tightly connected. The causes of underachievement are buried, says Cummins, in the complexities of dominant-subordinated group relationships. In order to reverse school failure, we must approach this relationship
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in dynamic rather than static terms. Identities are not stable. They are an interac-
tional accomplishment, and the challenge facing education is to turn rela-
tions of power from coercive to collaborative. In the context of the latter,
power is created and shared within the interpersonal space where minds and
identities meet.

To meet this end, PEM brought to fore important identity issues; claimed
a position of knowledge embedded within communal relationships; professed
a move from authoritative monologic to dialogic practices of meaning mak-
ing in the educational setting; and aimed to raise the understanding of the
historical, social and political conditions within which education of the
minority takes place.

Negotiation of identities in multicultural Thrace

Although contemporary multicultural societies are not unique—since many
pre-modern societies also included several cultural communities—their his-
torical context, cultural background and patterns of interaction between their
constitutive communities are (Parekh, 2000). In almost all pre-modern soci-
eties, cultural communities were left free to follow their customs and prac-
tices, while the modern state has required cultural and social homogenization
as its necessary basis.

In contemporary multicultural societies there are, as ideal types, two top-
down government approaches to the management of diversity: the ethnic
minorities approach and the citizens’ rights one. In the ethnic minorities
approach, represented by theorists such as Kymlika (1995), the right to be dif-
ferent supersedes the right of equality. Targeted programmes to meet the spe-
cial needs and claims of ethnic minority groups are provided. In order for
minority members to be treated fairly, the state should accommodate diver-
sity by giving effective control to minority groups over certain political and
cultural affairs through special rights of representation and self-government.
It is the institutionalization of collective rights that can provide guarantees
against majority oppression. The Australian, Canadian and British societies
have deliberated extensively on multiculturalism and the rights of their
respective ethnic minorities. In contrast, the citizens’ rights model, represented
by theorists such as Dworkin (1986) and Rawls (1993), is premised on equal-
ity of all individuals before law. Ethnic identities are not recognized within
the public sphere. In this model, one’s cultural, ethnic, religious or racial iden-
tities are private matters. The role of the state is to ensure that every citizen is
treated as an equal member of society with the same rights and responsibili-
ties. The aim is to ensure that all citizens’ rights are protected; that members
of minority groups do not suffer from discrimination and are not subject to
the tyranny of the majority. France is a typical example of a country that
adheres to such a model: all French citizens are supposed to enjoy the same rights and obligations.

The Treaty of Lausanne introduced two opposing directions: with the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, it provided the mechanism of homogenization of the nation-states involved, while with the exemption of two ethnic minorities and the protection of their cultural identity and their civil liberties, it secured diversity. What was the intention of the Treaty for management of this diversity in terms of the two models discussed above? While the purity of either approach is often not retained in practice, the accommodation of the Muslim minority’s diversity definitely does not fall into the citizens’ rights model. It also does not fall under the ethnic minorities approach, since respect for the cultural peculiarities of the Muslim minority is not the product of the Greek state’s active policy. Yet the protection of the minority’s cultural identity is not a remnant of the traditional status of minorities in the Ottoman Empire either. There, the legal and social mechanisms contributed towards keeping the different millets apart and not integrating them, while the British policy-makers who took part in the Lausanne Treaty promoting minority protection did not do this to perpetuate their separate status, but to integrate them within their host countries in order to secure international stability (Aarbakke, 2000). By allowing them to retain their cultural identity and ensuring their civil liberties they intended to facilitate their assimilation into their host countries.

Nearly ninety years after the Treaty of Lausanne disadvantages on the grounds of identity are still being suffered. From the 1990s onwards, while minority rights never stopped being a responsibility of host states, international standards were developed by the Council of Europe and the OSCE for the protection of members of minority groups in Europe. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM), drafted in 1995, was such an effort for protection. Greece signed the Convention in 1997 but has not yet ratified it, and continues to apply the standards determined by the narrow interpretation in the Treaty of Lausanne. A document produced by Directorate General (DG) A2 of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs justifies the reservations about ratification of the Convention by claiming, among other things, that it would provide a concrete framework premising further the cultural rights of the minority.11 The European Court for Human Rights has been the recourse for members of the minority and has served as an effective means of counteracting state opposition to particular types of claims. Interestingly, notes Psychogiopoulou (2010), while Strasbourg litigation against the Greek state has managed in several cases to secure a change in judicial approach that is congruent with the European Convention on Human Rights, judgments originating in applications by individuals that attest ethnic minority belonging have not markedly affected domestic judi-
cial practice. In other words, despite the gradually growing concern with bringing law and practices into line with the international and European norms regarding minorities, the Greek state is reluctant to reorient minority policy through direct reference to European minority protection texts, and there is not much evidence of reframing of national identity in a multicultural direction.

In the field of education, the Treaty of Lausanne (Articles 40 and 41) granted the minority the right to ‘establish, manage and control at their own expense ... any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise its own religion freely therein’. It also granted the state the right to introduce teaching, alongside the minority language, of the official one, and demanded an equitable share of public funds for adequate facilities for instruction. In the years following the Treaty of Lausanne, minority education underwent changes from an unstructured framework and less interference by the state to a standardized programme and operation under the close eye of the state authorities.

In her relatively recent dissertation on ‘Identity, Justice and Stability: A Defence of Democratic Justice for the Muslim Minority of Western Thrace in Greece’ Mantouvalou (2009) examines whether the recognition of minority language and identity guarantees fair treatment of the minority. She examines the equal recognition approach of Patten (2003) and the language consolidation approach of Levy (2000). She shows that although the liberal multicultural approach of equal recognition creates some parity between the different languages in Thrace, it does not ensure equality of respect for individual identities and equal opportunities for minority members. The disadvantage the minority faces is treated primarily as cultural, and the structural aspects of exclusion fail to be taken into consideration. The result is marginalization in the name of cultural diversity. This is what led Cummins, when he visited Thrace in the context of PEM, to note: ‘Ironically, the Muslim children in Thrace have received a bilingual education for the past seventy years, illustrating the fact that the language of instruction itself is only surface-structure. Coercive power relations can be expressed as effectively through two languages as through one’ (Cummins, 2004: 10).

Levy, on the other hand, following the language consolidation approach, argues that in order for individuals to be treated as equals, the state should not publicly recognize particular identities or cultures. Language consolidation is in line with the equal citizens’ approach and rejects the model of the bilingual minority school. According to this position, the removal of the institutional framework that led to marginalization of the minority for decades would translate into equality of opportunities for minority members and equal respect for their identity. The language consolidation approach, says Mantouvalou, disadvantages members of historically discriminated groups,
because it does not correct the institutional biases that exist in allegedly neutral settings and the structural aspects of the discriminations they suffer; it just makes them invisible.

The democratic pluralist model is the third way between ethnic minorities approach and that of the citizens’ rights. It is not a top-down approach. Pluralism refers to more fluid and open-ended processes of negotiation and contestation rather than fixed representation and recognition of specific categories (Bellamy, 1999). Decision-making is grounded in the ideal of equal participation of all affected members in common institutions. When members of minority groups exercise this right they should not be separated from the majority, but effectively integrated in the decision-making process. Multicultural policies that separate the minority from the majority in the decision-making process may bring neither justice nor stability in a state. Within a space of collaborative meaning-making, multiple traditions and various potentials can be appreciated best (Gergen, 2009). Applying democratic pluralism to language use, Mantouvalou resorts to the principle of democratic familiarization used by Valadez (2001). Familiarization is grounded in the democratic principle of equal participation. It requires the state to give a fair hearing to members of minority groups in order to reduce internal and external forms of domination they are subjected to. Giving voice to members of the minority can increase understanding and empathy between the majority and the minority populations, and remove the structural obstacles minority members face when they participate in the mainstream society.

The application of the democratic pluralist model in minority education in Thrace diverges from the segregated minority school model. One has to respect an international treaty, as well as the will of the members of the minority to sustain this type of school that they believe meets their needs. However, PEM has held the firm belief that a segregated school, no matter how much better it may get academically, will not accommodate rigid dichotomies, will not promote dialogue between cultures, and thus will not encourage collaborative relations of power. The democratic pluralist model will be fulfilled by improving the quality of education offered to minority students at the state school.

An example of good practice towards democratic pluralism was the pilot introduction of the Turkish language as an optional course in secondary education in 2005. This provision must be extended to all state schools in Thrace and to all educational levels. There are other such examples within PEM. The creative activities between majority and minority youths offered the opportunity for negotiation of conflict, common goal setting, compromise and resolution of difficult issues of coexistence. Youngsters proved much wiser than their elders. The development of a Turkish textbook jointly by members of the Muslim minority in Thrace and members of the Rum minority in Istan-
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bul, residing in Greece, was another opportunity for shared deliberation. It was the very first time that a joint product was developed in the realm of education. The staffing of the Community Centres was also something new in Thracian society. For the first time, young people from both the majority and the minority either administering the Centres, offering counselling services or working as youth workers found themselves striving for a common goal. In all these efforts new values and new rules had to be developed. A new space was required to create the requisite containment of emotional and intellectual tensions, to manage individual and group differences, divisions and conflict, and to foster productive organizational dynamics. The entire PEM venture was geared towards the reconciliation of unity and diversity, cultivating inclusion without being assimilationist, promoting a common sense of belonging while respecting legitimate cultural differences, respecting plural identities without diminishing shared citizenship.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the way the identity of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace is negotiated. The stimulus for this analysis was the drawing and the words of minority children involved in creative activities in the context of the ‘Project on the Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children’ (PEM). The youngsters who laid down rules for their group by resorting to the language of the unconscious, with a Freudian slip of the tongue asked for respect of their double identity—an identity of equal value to the dominant one. The young boy’s drawing revealed that he is moulded, inculcated and penetrated by threat to his identity. The threat has left him without a name, the signifier of identity, and without power to claim one.

The vicissitudes of identity were understood at the intrapsychic, interpersonal, socio-historical and political levels. The complex interplay of national, ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural identities of the groups comprising the Muslim minority was brought to fore. The members of the minority have been caught between the ebb and flow of Greek and Turkish relations and conflicting interests; on the one hand their Turkishness has been nurtured on the basis of their kin status, and on the other their control, their exclusion from the mainstream of society or alternatively their assimilation have been orchestrated by the Greek authorities. The politics of domination in Western Thrace have led to longstanding control, other naming and categorization in service of political interests superimposed on the minority.

Despite the changes of the last twenty years in Greece’s reorientation of minority policy, there is plenty of room for deepening democratic institutions and there seems to be some way to go before minority issues are treated in the light of European texts of minority protection such as the FCPNM.
The top-down approaches in accommodating cultural diversity either give control to minority members over certain political and cultural matters that directly affect them or ignore ethnic identities in the public sphere while ensuring citizens’ rights and premising equality of all individuals before the law. The first approach may protect specific collective rights for a minority but runs the risk of segregation, of building boundaries between the majority and the minority and paying lip service to inequalities of power within the minority itself. The second model has a moral standing and offers a powerful tool in Western society, yet it may leave unnoticeable structural aspects of exclusion, enduring injustice and social constraints difficult for the oppressed to overcome, so that it is difficult also for them to be empowered. Neither approach guarantees that coercive power structures in Western Thrace get challenged and that the rights of children to a culturally sensitive and equitable education are secured.

The model of democratic pluralism is the only one that can challenge the disempowerment that the minority in Thrace has experienced, creating a space of collaborative meaning-making. This model treats identities as a dynamic and shifting nexus of multiple subject positions and provides space where identity options can be negotiated and renegotiated. It stresses the centrality of dialogic interaction between cultures, between the oppressed and the oppressor, towards cooperation and common goal setting. Commitment to dialogue implies a willingness of competing parties to accept certain modes of deliberation, certain norms and democratic procedures, and a desire and intention to arrive at a consensus.

The aim of PEM was to fight social exclusion that has had profound consequences, preventing minority people from making decisions about the course of their own lives or the course of events for which they are responsible. Exclusionary and assimilationist educational policies, implemented for a very long time, have rendered subordinated minority members invisible and inaudible. Learning Greek is a necessary condition for minority members to be treated formally as equals within the state. Yet marginalization cannot be remedied only by acquiring the language of the majority. PEM devoted a lot of resources to improving the teaching of Greek but also introduced measures to reverse educational inequality, and provided opportunities towards identity negotiation and collaborative relations of power.
CULTURAL MISMATCHES

GREEK CONCEPTS OF TIME, PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND AUTHORITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPE

Renée Hirschon

Part I

The framework

This anthropological examination of notions of time, personal identity, and authority is located on the micro-scale, but the analysis is also situated in a wider overall framework, that of the macro-scale factors that have affected conditions in Greece in many radical and disruptive ways, particularly since its incorporation into the European Union (EU) in 1981. My assessment of the changes in Greek social life and organization have led me to recognize that common assumptions regarding the state of ‘modernity’ are not applicable to the Greek reality. The result is a mismatch between Greece and some of its European partners regarding appropriate conduct in many dimensions of life, highlighted by an acute phase in the current economic crisis. What is revealed is incomprehension in many areas, and an overall lack of cultural knowledge or sensitivity on all sides. The aim of this chapter, the essential brief of the anthropological perspective, is to ‘make sense of’ some cultural misunderstandings. In doing so, I will bring together several threads that help us understand and interpret the current situation in which Greece views its European partners, and is viewed by them.
The economic crisis is being addressed by politicians, political scientists, economists, political economists, and to a lesser extent sociologists and historians, but has largely been ignored by anthropologists, despite its usefulness as a discipline providing a wider frame of reference than those other specialist disciplines. Anthropology can make a valuable contribution because of its comprehensive and holistic scope, and it has interpretive and explanatory value in identifying the factors that underlie and produce observable conduct and patterns of interaction. As a discipline it is not normative (possibly a weakness, as the tendency to extreme cultural relativism indicates) but it does provide the insights which may inform ways of inducing change. I wish to draw attention to the sharp difference in historical experience which marks Greece off from the core members of the EU. Although Greece became a nation-state early in the nineteenth century (1830), before the unification of Italy and Germany, originally its state building came out of a long-established position as a subject people in the Ottoman Empire. This has had long-term repercussions for the incorporation of Greece into the EU. I maintain that this is reflected in its political culture and economic conduct, as well as social patterns.

One of the prevailing themes of the recent period in Greek political life is the idea of modernity and modernization, eksynchronismos being a key slogan under both Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and Nea Demokratia/New Democracy (ND) governments in the past three decades. The failures of most of the policy measures have been revealed and now Greece is being required by European central financial institutions and the IMF (the Troika) to undertake structural reform and to shed deeply-entrenched patterns of economic and social conduct. Phrases used to identify the problems are taking on the sound of well-known cliché: ‘the high rate of tax evasion’, ‘falsified accounting’, ‘clientelist politics’, ‘fraud’, the ‘rentier mentality’. Derogatory opinions widely used in the European media characterize Greeks as ‘undisciplined’, ‘unreliable’, ‘rude’, ‘lazy’. Such views are held especially by the northern European countries such as the Benelux countries, Germany and Denmark. I suggest that such characterizations should be scrutinized in order to facilitate mutual co-operation. The cultural differences embedded in different religious and ideological traditions are, in my view, a critical dimension to be considered in order to understand economic conduct, for without it, confrontational political stances arise and the capacity to effect change is bound to be ridden with difficulties, if not failure. For such consideration, a frame of analysis wider than that covered by any one specialist discipline is required.

At the outset, the overall historical context should be a point of reference. Modernity is itself a historical period associated with the rise of capitalism, industrialization and secularization, and can itself be periodized. Briefly summarized, it is a condition involving the increased specialization of labour, increased movement of goods, capital and people, expansion beyond the local
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area, and overall standardization to promote economic integration. Marked by the emphasis on rationalization, it is associated with the decline of religion through the Enlightenment, and with it, the rise of experimental and observational science. The nation-state became the prevalent form of political organization with a preference for the ‘separation of powers’ in government.²

When these criteria are applied to the Greek state, one is immediately struck by the ways in which it does not conform to many of these characteristics. The questions often posed by non-Greeks, even long-time residents of the country, and now by the economic advisers who are setting the agenda for Greece’s recovery reflect this dissonance in terms of modernity. Put crudely, these tend to be expressed thus: ‘Why do they not keep to deadlines? Why do they always run late/are unpunctual? Why can’t they plan ahead/stick to plans? Why do they have violent reactions to external and internal political constraints?’ ‘Why do they break the rules?’

It is my aim to suggest some of the factors in Greece’s history and culture that may throw light on these aspects of conduct, and give examples of the cultural misapprehensions affecting the present economic and social crisis. By way of a pre-emptive summary, the answers to the questions can be found in:

(1) A different set of attitudes to time and to time perception, which can overall be crudely characterized as ‘pre-modern’, but which is undergoing observable change;

(2) A different set of notions regarding personal identity, symbolized in the celebrations of name days and birthdays, and having deep implications for the concepts of time associated with them (cyclical as opposed to linear);

(3) Attitudes to authority and to rules which are bound up with the historical experience of the Ottoman period, and more recent twentieth-century historical events (Nazi occupation, civil war, military rule), and with central cultural values regarding personal autonomy and obligation.

Part II

Time attitudes and modernity

In this section I set out indications that Greek time attitudes have ‘pre-modern’ characteristics. This element is inextricably bound up with Greece’s history, and it is important to note the different trajectory of Greece into the modern period. Many commentaries today acknowledge that elements of the current crisis have been present for decades (such as clientelist politics), but their longer-term historical roots have not been examined. Without making a case for Greek ‘exceptionality’, analysis should not ignore the specifics of the historical experience. In this case, the salient factor is that Greece did not
undergo the Enlightenment\textsuperscript{3} or the processes associated with the eighteenth-century industrial revolution.

This can be illustrated, in my view, by Greek attitudes to time. Indeed, approaches to time are by no means universal, as is demonstrated in abundant anthropological studies of non-Western peoples where time concepts are notably different, and may even be lacking in any recognizable way.\textsuperscript{4} E.T. Hall’s seminal work (1959), an early comprehensive approach to the anthropology of time, arose out of his international experience and his consultant role in development projects on American ‘native’ reservations. Using examples from the native American Navajo and Sioux peoples, Hall shows how notions such as that of ‘time’ itself or the idea of being ‘late’ or of ‘waiting’ do not exist. Development projects on reservations which required a specific plan of action were hindered by such cultural discrepancies and practitioners had to devise ways of inculcating a more precise and linear notion of time, for example by installing classroom clocks. Another feature for many indigenous peoples (but not confined to such traditional societies alone) is that planning for the future is poorly developed and may even be seen as not a relevant approach. This limitation in the concept of future planning is a characteristic aspect of ‘pre-modern’ time attitudes. Hall states that in such societies ‘what matters is the present’ while, by way of contrast, ‘… Americans are oriented almost entirely towards the future’ (ibid: 7). Likewise, Giddens noted that modern society comprises ‘… a complex of institutions which…lives in the future, rather than the past’ (1998: 94).

Hall’s work also uses examples of the conflicting expectations of business associates from Germany and the United States compared with those from southern European countries, where time management approaches are very different. He uses as an example failed initiatives discussed in the early 1950s between an American delegation and Greek representatives. Problems arose out of their different expectations in matters of procedure related to time, to decision-making, and to authority (ibid: xv). It is patently obvious that the various ways in which time is employed by people from different societies, as well as their different cultural expectations, may lead to misunderstandings and conflict. This element is also present in the recent contentious interactions within the EU, where the divergent expectations between Greece and many of its northern European partners have become clearly evident.

I suggest that what I call a ‘pre-modern’ approach (or a ‘non-Western’ one) to issues of time-management continues to prevail in Greece, because Greece did not follow the path of industrialization of the developed countries of the EU. Specifically regarding time, these features include an elastic and imprecise approach, an attitude of negotiability and flexibility, a mode based on a sense of seasonality and natural processes; in brief, it is a cyclical modality, not linear, and it runs counter to modern Western European notions of appropriate time conduct (see Thompson, 1967).
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Specifically, a notable and well-known feature is that of punctuality—or rather its absence. Until very recently, the quality of punctuality was not particularly valued in itself, nor was lack of punctuality seen as an insult to others, or as a failing. Since there is a culturally low expectation of maintaining schedules, keeping someone waiting is not perceived, overall, as impolite. In university circles, clichés such as ‘the academic quarter hour’ are used as an excuse for lateness, and people are usually prepared to adjust appointment times in a flexible way. A punctual man is said to be ‘an Englishman’ (*Egglezos stin ora tou*).\(^5\) Foreign residents who have spent years in Greece continue to register frustration at the ineffectiveness of time schedules. They learn to accommodate on a personal level, for example, by specifying the time of an invitation to dinner much earlier than the intended time, knowing that the guests will predictably arrive late!

An associated feature is the way in which fixed deadlines are pushed to the limits. Complaints about running late on a project are countered by the common response that the important thing is to get a job done, and it matters less *when* it gets done. In 2004, preparations for the Olympic Games were behind schedule right up to the last few weeks, provoking international comment and anxiety, but the triumphant completion of the Olympic Stadium shortly before the opening was the vindication of Greeks’ assurances that they can complete things when the necessary end is required (see also example in Hirschon, 2008). This feature is characterized in the historical literature as ‘task-orientation’, notably prevalent in traditional and peasant societies, and even in 1950s rural Britain (Thompson, 1967: 60), and it is clear that this is the most practised approach in Greece. Indeed it may be seen to operate in the current economic crisis when the necessary proposals for structural reform are not submitted in full, or even on time.

The mismatch of time attitudes is evident here. Getting things done to a rigid time schedule is an essential dimension in a high productivity industrial economy where synchronization of labour and of the production process is essential, where regularity as well as standardized and accurate ways of measuring time are required for the development of large-scale machine powered industry. In an economy dominated by micro- and small-scale business enterprises, however, a different perception of time can prevail, one in which irregularity and imprecision can be accommodated, where there is greater flexibility in production and distribution schedules. It is surely significant that even today Greek industry is dominated by micro- and small-scale enterprises. Micro-enterprises comprise 96.4 per cent of Greek industrial firms, and 44 per cent of industrial employment. The corresponding figures are 85 per cent and 18.8 per cent for the UK, 72.7 per cent and 11.7 per cent for Germany, and 89.1 per cent and 36.1 per cent for Italy (OECD 2010). Micro-enterprises therefore count for a much larger proportion of industrial employment than in the UK and Germany, but are closer to those of Italy.\(^6\)
Another feature of the difference between Greek time practices and those prevalent in Western Europe is the weak ability for (or lack of) forward planning. Here I can provide some illustrative examples: at the British School in Athens, invitations for events, public lectures and seminars, and to the annual Garden Party, are sent out not well in advance but with a maximum of two weeks’ notice ‘People will tend to forget if they are notified too soon’ is the explanation. At an Oxford college recently an informal party for Greek postgraduate students was discussed, and it was decided to hold it on following Friday evening ten days away. The Greek student organizer delayed sending out the email, leaving it until the Thursday before the appointed day. She explained that last minute notices are more effective because people do not plan ahead!

How are we to understand the patterns that are evident here? Some conceptual tools are available in the vast body of literature in historical studies on changing attitudes to time in Western societies. This research has established that industrialization in Western Europe, particularly in England, entailed a fundamental re-formation of attitudes to time and to work routines. These were necessary preconditions for the development of large-scale industrial enterprises, and took place over a long period, indeed over several centuries. This trajectory from the thirteenth century onwards depended on the advances in technology, as more sophisticated time-keeping devices were developed, recording time with increasing precision and sophistication through mechanical time keepers (public clocks, private watches) (see especially, Thompson, 1967; Cipolla, 2003; Mumford, 1934). From the eighteenth century, as rural dwellers moved to towns and were employed in large factories, the need to synchronize production and distribution for machine-powered industries became imperative. In the vast literature on modernity and its characteristics which involved major socio-economic and political transformation, attitudes to time are among the criteria, perhaps even the precondition for this state (see for example Giddens’ copious works on the topic).

For our purposes, further useful insights come from Linder’s (1970) study in which he describes the difference between three categories of time orientation. In time surplus societies life moves at a slow pace, and there are no formal time schedules. Low productivity and low consumption characterize such societies, usually those of the ‘underdeveloped’ world. A low productivity economy (tribal, peasant, feudal), one dominated by agricultural production and small-scale family and artisan enterprises, does not require synchronization for production or distribution. Similar to these are time affluent societies where things are accomplished at one’s own pace, where there is no premium on ‘saving’ time and no concept of ‘wasting time’. Characteristically, there is little capacity for forward planning. Events are arranged at the last minute, there is greater spontaneity of action and programmes are frequently disrupted (see below).
In developed economies, however, time scarcity prevails. Primary values in such societies are efficiency, punctuality, regularity. Concern with timetables and schedules, and with forward planning, predominate. Notions of time are based on linearity and entail precision in time reckoning.

I suggest that the dissonance in expectations of appropriate conduct arises between Greeks and western Europeans in part because of the different frameworks related to concepts of time and to its management.

Part III

‘Individuals’ and ‘persons’

My intention in this section is to show how notions of time are changing on the most intimate micro-scale and quite dramatically in contemporary Greek society, with regard to personal identity. I contend that this change is intimately associated with influences that have come about in the context of European integration. The role of religion in defining identity is a critical feature of Greek social life, and the importance of religion as the modality for national identity can be seen to have its template in the Ottoman millet system of classification, as I have argued elsewhere (Hirschon, 2009, see also Aarbakke, 2003). The congruence of religion and national identity affects secularists and the liberal elite as well as believers (see examples in Ware, 1983, Hirschon, 2009: 7), and is manifest in the ways in which personal identity is celebrated. Within this religious and cultural setting, our attention turns to concepts of the person and the human being.

Anthropologists working in so-called ‘exotic’ societies have been concerned with analyzing concepts of personhood and the individual. But Greece’s cultural familiarity has apparently hindered a deeper interrogation, allowing us to rest on unexamined premises and the assumption of shared cultural postulates. It is easy to take for granted what appears to be the common ground of a broad Western tradition in which Greece is situated, even if somewhat uncomfortably (as pointed out by Herzfeld, 1987). A noticeable gap is that foreign anthropologists of Greece as well as native Greek anthropologists have not concerned themselves with critical analysis, especially regarding ideological aspects of Greek society, as is routinely done for more obviously ‘exotic’ societies. In the case of Greece, I have demonstrated ways in which central values having explanatory significance—those of personal autonomy and the desire to avoid obligation—affect social conduct, values which can be seen to underlie other social phenomena such as gift-giving and verbal play, as well as the lack of punctuality (Hirschon, 2008).

How, then, does this relate to ideas of personal identity, particularly to the notions surrounding the Individual? It is often and glibly said that ‘Greeks are individualists’. This is something of a cliché, one which I would argue is not
an accurate characterization, though it may seem evident from the volatile quality and character of chance encounters and informal social relations in Greece, which are essentially confrontational and eristic. The turbulent quality of social life, expressed so readily in interpersonal conflicts, kavgades, which stimulate and actually provide entertainment as well as necessary outlets for endemic frustration, can give a misleading impression of untrammelled individualism from a ‘Western European’ point of view.

A more subtle interpretation requires that the notion of ‘individualism’ should be examined in its cultural specificity and variability. In this analysis I wish to bring out the contrast between the terms ‘individual’ and ‘person’ in the context of Greek society, and my interpretation rests on drawing a sharp contrast (of a Weberian ideal-type) between these two oppositional, though not mutually exclusive, constructs of the human subject (see below). They represent two different philosophical and theological traditions: in broad terms, what has developed in a Western philosophical tradition is the concept of the ‘individual’ as a self-contained, independent agent, while ideas associated with the concept of the ‘person’, a socially-embedded being, have developed in twentieth century Orthodox theology. For the purposes of argument, as an ideal type distinction, this polarity can be represented schematically:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Being as Individual</th>
<th>Human Being as Person</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atomo</td>
<td>Prosofo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unit, indivisible</td>
<td>face to face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-contained</td>
<td>involved, in relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>separation</td>
<td>communion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>competitor</td>
<td>co-worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possessing</td>
<td>keeping sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I, me, mine</td>
<td>We, us, our, thou</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They are depicted as two antithetical categories when drawn up in opposition to one another, as above. However, in a wider interpretative framework, writings on the subject indicate that the two categories are conceptually opposed but interpenetrate one another and are hierarchically structured so that the one subsumes the other: the individual is the core of the person, it is a state of primary self-awareness, but it is subsumed within the more embracing notion of the person, the full expression of interaction. The connection between the two concepts is a dynamic and situational one, where the fully developed person exists in relationship to others as a fully integrated individual, and where the realization of full personhood can only come about through the achievement of full individuality.
The significance of this analytical distinction can only be understood, again, in the overall context of Greek life, especially in the intimate realm of the domestic, of the family, and in the network of kinship relations. My argument rests on the interconnection between philosophical principles and their expression in social life. Here, the specific character of Greek social and personal identity is my focus. No Greek exists (in the old paradigm) outside the kinship nexus which confers identity upon him or her. I would argue strongly that even now, for most Greeks, the articulation of self and family is very different from that which is current in the post-industrial West. In the turbulence of the current crisis (perhaps a reinforcing factor), the family remains the focus and point of orientation where the efforts and endeavours, the aspirations and ambitions, and the loyalty of each of its members are invested: the fundamental social bonds continue to be those involving the kinship group.

Although cases of independent living have certainly increased, my early recorded observation in the 1970s in Kokkinia in Piraeus, that there was no expectation of the progression from dependent child in a family of origin to an independent adult individual living separately from the family, is still largely true (Hirschon, 1998: 107–9). There was and is no expected period of bachelorhood, of unmarried independent existence ‘on one’s own’. When it does occur, for example during higher education, it is seen as a measure of expediency. I would suggest that this feature is one of great significance: the absence of a phase of unmarried independent adulthood is a key expression as well as a reflection of the nature of personal identity in Greek society, which is essentially socially embedded. ‘Individuals’ here have family obligations as a primary point of reference and they are always contained within the context of family life. This feature stands in contrast with the characteristic pattern in the industrialized (Anglo-Saxon) West (see below).

My intuitive perception of this as a critical distinction and culturally specific feature was verified through a comparative perspective. Sharp contrasts are presented in a revealing examination of various facets of individualism in America (Bellah et al., 1985). The authors, well-regarded sociologists, emphasize that ‘leaving home’ is a key element in the constellation of notions surrounding the individual (Bellah et al., 1985: 56ff), and they state that where ‘…a culture …emphasises autonomy and self-reliance… the primary problems of childhood are …separation and individuation—indeed, childhood is chiefly preparation for the all-important event of leaving home’ (Bellah et al., 1985: 56–7). Bellah et al. show how this pattern developed in the nineteenth century and is contained in the concept of self-reliance, one that is so clearly elaborated by Emerson and is a foundation of the New World society of the USA. Two features characterize this ideology and its social context: the notion of the individual’s detachment from society, and the clear separation of public and private spheres. In the USA these features are critical and central. In short,
notions regarding the human subject in the American tradition centre on values of independence and autonomy, values which constitute the human subject in a very different way from the Greek case.10

Anthropological inquiry can be stimulated by small but highly revelatory incidents. One of these occurred several years ago when I was shopping at an Athenian greengrocer’s shop in the Plaka. A man was sitting at the till, head in hands, when I went up to weigh a bag of fruit. Ignoring me, he addressed the women at the till: ‘Wife’, he said, ‘Tomorrow you must light a black candle for me’ (Yineka, avrio na mou anapsis mavro keri). This striking image caught my attention, so I enquired why he was distressed. ‘Tomorrow it’s my fiftieth birthday,’ he explained. ‘What can I do? We’ve got old’ (Ti na kano? Yerasame).

In sympathy, I asked if he didn’t have a name day. He affirmed that his name was Andreas (celebrated in November). ‘So why not celebrate your name day—after all, it’s the custom?’ I suggested. At once his wife replied, ‘Oh! It’s more correct to celebrate your birthday. After all it’s your own—it’s your unique personal festival’ (pio sosto einai … I monadiki sou prosopiki yiorti). Then she added the incontestable justification, ‘Anyway, that’s what they do abroad, in Europe’ (Telos panton, etsi kanoun sto exoteriko, stin Evropi).

This incident highlights the influence of the European presence in the manifold transformations of Greek society over the past twenty years. The point of reference and justification of the changing nature of personal celebrations focuses on Europe (though American influences are also manifest and are often invoked to explain changes in Greek social practices). My argument is that from the later 1970s and 1980s, personal identity has been subjected to a transformation which is revealed through the nature of celebrations. Formerly, the celebration of name days was in general the predominant social feature: people celebrated annually on the feast day of their patron saint. The celebration conformed to a particular pattern, a highly formalized visit in which simple conventional exchanges took place. Significantly, the house was open to all comers, and participation was communal and expected. Some variation by region and by social class existed but the general pattern was recognizable. Seldom in the past were birthdays marked in any way. Indeed, in rural areas they were often not known or ignored.

The striking feature is that birthdays are more widely and increasingly celebrated. Many people of all ages observe their birthdays nowadays, and certainly children are being brought up with the celebration of birthdays being a main feature of their annual experience. The significance of this change is revealed in the greengrocer incident: birthdays are celebrations of the unique and individual by contrast with the collective and communal nature of festivities associated with name days. I maintain that this reveals a fundamental shift in the conceptual paradigm of the human subject, and that it is also intimately implicated in different perceptions of time, the shift being from a cyclical to a linear perception of time.
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Nowadays, personal celebrations often take both forms, but the manner in which name days are celebrated has also undergone suggestive changes. The celebrations have become selective, highly elaborate, and are tinged with competitive overtones. In short, I have observed three things: there is (1) an increasing preference for celebrating birthdays, (2) a decline in name day celebrations, and (3) a marked difference in the way the latter are observed. The implications for time perceptions, I believe, are profound, having many ramifications. What is evident now is the counter-positioning of an older flexible way of time reckoning having a seasonal and cyclical character (pre-modern), as conceptually opposed to a linear and non-repeatable perception of time (modern), which was troubling our greengrocer on his 50th birthday.

In the practice of celebrating the name day as a personal festivity, a twofold significance exists: it is the spiritual identity as well as the social existence of the named person that is being celebrated. The name day has as its reference point the sacred realm, that of eternity, a dimension of timelessness where rebirth and salvation are the reality.

The essential characteristic of name day celebrations is that they are/were public knowledge, therefore not optional, and communal—the house was open to all—and that standard gifts were brought (a bottle of alcohol, pastes, chocolates); and, notably, the offerings to guests (kerasma) were standardized, requiring little preparation (liqueur, chocolates, pastes). It is important to note that the older pattern of name day celebrations was in communal style, inclusive and incorporative. The name day celebration had the effect of uniting the neighbourhood, the community, on a basis wider than that of everyday interaction. Allowing access to the home, normally the private sphere, name day celebrations generated a sense of the local community, as well as uniting in sentiment all those sharing a name with their patron saint or holy figure.

Name days are also cross-temporal, creating, as it were, a vertical dimension. The name day unites deceased family members across generations because the prevalent naming pattern in Greece is one of repetition in alternate generations through the separate lines of father and mother. The same name crosses the generations, preserving the memory of those who have died. It acts, therefore, as a perpetual commemoration, as *anamnesis*. Significantly for the present analysis, the name day celebration exists in a particular time dimension: that of liturgical or ritual time, in the eternal world, that of infinity. Name days follow a cyclical pattern and are repeated each year without a sense of progression. Notably, the anniversary of a saint’s death is not the focus, even when the year of martyrdom is known. Thus, with its reference to the sacred world, the name day exists within a ritual conception of time; it is liturgical time where the notion of coincident dimensions prevails over a linear, progressive model of time that belongs to the secular world.
Birthdays and changing time perceptions

With the legal reforms of 1983 introducing civil registration, a new awareness of the birthday as a marker of personal identity was established. By law, a child must be registered immediately after birth, and the hospital provides the forms on discharge. The registration at the lyxarcheion (registry office) must be done by parents, and once a name is entered, it cannot be changed even if a later and different baptismal name is conferred. It is possible for no name to be entered, so that the registration simply records the child as male or female.

Increasingly from the 1980s, birthday parties are held for children’s school friends in the Athenian middle class. These follow a style familiar in the West, with a cake, candles, a printed table cloth, napkins, songs and presents. Popular magazines run articles on ways of holding birthday parties, and some parents express anxiety about ‘getting it right’, which means doing it correctly ‘as it is done abroad’. This imported practice consciously adopted is a marker, in my view, of a fundamental change in the paradigm of personal identity. The practice of celebrating one’s birthday is the celebration of physical/biological birth; it is the marker in finite time of one’s material existence in the social world. Seen through a Durkheimian lens, the name day celebration associates us with the sacred realm, while the birthday is an expression of the ‘profane’ or ‘mundane’.

To sum up the effects and significance of the celebration of birthdays: they are not public knowledge but are private and selective, since they require invitations, and are therefore not communal, collective or inclusive. Birthdays celebrate the individual’s birth as a unique event, and mark one’s chronological age and thus the finite passage of life. Birthdays relate to biological existence and celebrate the mortality of the human condition, but not, as name days do, one’s membership in an eternal and timeless community.

It is clear, therefore, that the increasing recognition of and emphasis on birthdays are associated with a secularization project and entail a re-visioning of time. The ‘pre-modern’ mode of cyclical and ritual time embodied in the celebration of name days now coexists with an increasing awareness of linear time, a progression that is irreversible and non-repeatable.

Besides the legal impositions of recording precise birthdates, the reformulation of time perception and the imposition of the ‘modern’ time framework are also being effected through other forces. I suggest that one of these is the new Athens metro system, where highly accurate time schedules are maintained. The oncoming trains are announced with interval times marked in minutes, and recorded visually on the illuminated notices. I am sure that daily exposure to the metro time schedules is acting as a powerful technological influence which promotes consciousness of the precise measurement of time, an interesting parallel with the effect of synchronization of railway timetables in Victorian England (see note 7 above).
Clearly, Greece has been undergoing significant transformations, and I suggest that one of these is related to changing attitudes to time. This is a period when different notions of time are being used. Tension and stress can result when formerly well-recognized patterns are no longer applicable and people have to choose, or predict, what the response should be or will be—in other words, on which time scale they are operating. The tension caused by co-existent but contradictory expectations was expressed succinctly to me: ‘I feel agyos (stress) all the time,’ DK (a busy professional) said, ‘because I know about the need for time schedules and deadlines, and feel pressured to maintain them. Personally I prefer to spend time as it presents itself, so I’ll fit in chatting to an unexpected visitor, such as you, even though I have a tight deadline on my work.’

The delightful spontaneity built into everyday Greek life, even in the busiest enterprises in the capital city, is one side of the coin, the other being problematic effects such as inefficiency, and unpunctuality. Two clashing modes of time orientation are operating here, that of the pre-modern or ‘time affluent’ society and that of the post-industrial ‘time scarcity’ society of the developed world.

Part IV

A ‘culture of resistance’ and problems with authority

The phrase ‘culture of resistance’ is inspired by James Scott’s (1985) compelling analysis of what he calls ‘everyday forms of resistance’ in his detailed study of a Malaysian peasant community. Scott’s examination of power differentials, of exploitation and class conflict in this part of the world, formerly subject to Dutch and British colonial domination, centres on techniques and strategies employed by locals to deal with the authorities. He characterizes some of the ‘everyday forms of resistance’ as ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander…’ (Scott, 1985: 29). He also notes a performative dimension which includes ‘false’ or ‘calculated’ deference (Scott, 1985: 278, 285).

I find this a useful concept to apply to various problems now highlighted in Greece’s current economic crisis. This requires incorporating the historical dimension into the analysis of present patterns of conduct, which is not normally within the scope of political science or economic viewpoints. I argue that it is worth looking at the parallels for this kind of conduct in other post-imperial, post-colonial regions, since the structure of power differentials might reasonably be assumed to provoke similar responses in subject peoples, those who are under domination by outsiders.12

An interesting possibility for interpretation lies in the power inequalities of the past throughout this region, and I suggest that Ottoman domination has
left a heritage with similar concomitants. For the Balkans and the Middle East, regions which were long under the imperial regime, with a constant siphoning of taxes and varying periods of oppression, similar patterns of conduct are evident. Although Scott does not mention the longer-term consequences, the concealment of commercial and agricultural production would be an understandable reaction to what locals would see as unfair or oppressive taxes. In this way, tax evasion and fraudulent accounting might become a legitimate activity. I suggest, therefore, that some of these forms of ‘everyday resistance’ are detectable in the political and economic culture of the region and should be understood as having historical roots. Their continuance is explained by the cultural patterns which are established through time and form part of the socialization process from one generation to another.

In the Greek case, for example, what I have elsewhere called verbal ‘non-accountability’ can be understood as part of a ‘survival strategy’ that developed in a previous period. In an early analysis (Hirschon, 1992) I concentrated on the linguistic forms (promises, threats, fantasies, lies) through which children at an early age are instilled with a sceptical attitude to adults’ verbal utterances. The different weight of statements of intention (promises, threats) in a Greek language community can be interpreted in terms of a cultural ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1977), which is propagated through socialization, the way in which children learn what is culturally acceptable conduct. Lack of punctuality is also part of this syndrome, I suggest, since it is in essence the exercise of non-accountability and can be seen as a reluctance to conform with the expectations of others, a form of resistance or exercise of personal autonomy (Hirschon, 2008: 201–4).

Representatives of the ‘Troika’ dealing with the Greek economic crisis, as well as foreign diplomats, deplore the way EU directives are not followed. Typically, these are published, transmitted to ministries, and then ignored. ‘Why do they not observe the rules?’ these officials complain. This is one aspect of the phenomenon, and closely related to it is the reluctance to concede to authority. Similar problems, I am told, are encountered in the application of EU integration measures required for EU accession in the Balkan states: the slow application of reform measures is a continuing matter of concern (Max Watson, Oxford, personal communication). I suggest that the underlying reasons for these patterns of conduct lie in cultural factors moulded by historical forces.

We have already queried the stereotype that ‘Greeks are individualists’, arguing that this characterization should be examined more carefully. Certainly many Westerners who know Greece have the impression of a people who do not recognize the constraints consistent with membership in the social body/polity. In the current crisis, increasing public protest and social unrest sometimes take a violent form. These incidents are a shocking and
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extreme expression related to the signs of collapse of the Greek economy, a deadlock in the political system, and ineffective policing measures. It is debatable whether they can also be seen as an extension of the long-established confrontational spirit of Greek social relations. A telling phrase crystallizes this feature in the well-known rhetorical rejoinder ‘...kai pios eisai esy? And who are you?’, a challenge to any other person regarding their relative status and authority when the social context is fluid. Significantly, it is countered by the rejoinder ‘ksereis poios eimai ego?’, ‘Do you know who I am?’ Amounting to an assertion of a higher status, this phrase expresses the deeply competitive spirit and the contestation of hierarchy associated with concern for personal autonomy, for not being beholden to anyone else.

Many clear illustrations of the entrenched character of ‘disobedience’ underlying the breaking of rules can be quoted. One was the incident, some years ago, when I appealed to a policeman to stop people smoking in the non-smoking area of a provincial airport. His reply, coming from an officer of the law himself, revealed the essence of the problem: ‘Madam,’ he replied haughtily, ‘in this country the law is not strictly upheld’ (o nomos dhen tireitai afstira). Further recent examples are the protest movement ‘I don’t pay’, Dhen plirono, against toll charges on national highways, which goes unpunished, as do contraventions of the EU directives regarding non-smoking in public areas and the local authorities inability—or unwillingness—to control traffic and parking offences. These are among numerous examples of the problems regarding lawful and compliant conduct in everyday life. Although it might be necessary to distinguish between rule-breaking as a cultural norm and lack of respect for authority, the line is very fine and the net result is a society in which it seems that ‘anything goes’.

Many commentators on Greece are perplexed by this phenomenon. Certainly, there is a complex historical background to be considered and it constitutes the overall context for interpreting themes in this analysis. However, only brief reference can be made to the main issues. Regarding problems with authority, some aspects might result from the periods of oppressive authoritarian rule in the twentieth century (military coups and dictatorships). The most recent spell of authoritarian rule, under the military junta from 1967 to 1974, left traces on a generation who had allied themselves with resistance to its imposition in various ways. The association between the unjust nature of power-holding under such a regime and those who enforce the law, the military and the police, has become an entrenched problem with far-reaching and unfortunate consequences. The effects of that period on those called the ‘generation of the Polytechnic’ (the student-led uprising which was instrumental in bringing about the end of the dictatorship), who became a generation of over-indulgent parents (by their own admission), are cited by some as a primary factor. A built-in reaction against the authorities as well as an
unwillingness among the police to take effective action against law-breaking could be attributed to the experience of that period. Associated with the ‘metapolitefsi’, the post-dictatorship period, is what I have heard being called a ‘culture of entitlement’, an ethos of compensation for the poverty and material deprivations of the post-World War II period together with the instability and political oppression of that time. Other factors, such as populist political policies and the reckless economic borrowing and spending dating from the 1980s, have all contributed to the predicament in which Greece now finds itself.

Part V

Summary

The issues considered here are only some of those that contribute to the extreme crisis which focuses on Greece but is affecting the EU, particularly the Eurozone, in major ways. The situation is one of great complexity and requires careful analysis. In this chapter, I have dealt with only three features constituting what I perceive to be some ‘cultural mismatches’ between Greece and its northern/western European partners. These are the culturally specific aspects of Greek notions of time and of personal identity, and attitudes to authority. My analysis highlights the importance of considering historical factors, in both longer- and shorter-term views, which affect a people’s response to modernization and to adjustment in a supranational entity.

Given our knowledge about the development of the modern industrial period in western Europe, I have suggested that Greece’s history and cultural background have not been commensurable with that of the rest of Europe. The Ottoman period, as well as the political upheavals at times through the twentieth century, have, in my view, played a major role in differentiating Greece’s responses to Europe, but these differentiating factors are generally not well known or recognized in the European view of Greece. This leads to areas of cultural misapprehension on both sides which, I suggest, could be alleviated through sensitivity to the expectations of appropriate conduct by others.

One of these themes, in particular, is that attitudes to time in Greece, though undergoing change, are still characteristically those of a ‘pre-modern’ period. Until recently, these attitudes have not been responsive to modernization since the need for precision, forward planning and synchronization has been minimal. Precise timetabling has not been a necessity since the structure of the Greek economy itself did not demand a change. Indeed, economists noted how small-scale industrial units in Greece adapted well to the initial incorporation into the EU, better than the large-scale enterprises which could not deal with the more efficient industries of the core members of the EU (Kevin Featherstone, LSE, personal communication).
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Nowadays, the effects of changing patterns of celebrating name days and birthdays reflect a major shift in the paradigm of personal identity. Individualism of a Western kind is being introduced, expressed in the nature of birthday celebrations. This ontological change, which also involves growing secularization promoted by legal reforms in the 1983 Civil Code, is accompanied by technological factors, which together promote a re-visioning of time from a cyclical, flexible and non-progressive one to that of linear, irreversible time that is precisely apportioned.

The third theme is deeply implicated in Greece’s history, both recent and in the *longue durée*. Attitudes to authority and to rule-bound conduct, which are highly contested areas, are rooted in cultural notions regarding personal autonomy. The oppressive experience of being a subject people in a medieval empire, as well as being under foreign occupation during World War II, evokes strong emotions regarding the right of ‘outsiders’ to decide Greece’s way ahead. Notably, the phrase ‘foreign occupation’ has been used with regard to the role of the Troika in the present crisis. The notion of a ‘culture of resistance’ having historical roots is, I suggest, a useful way to understand many of the developments in the economic and political spheres over the past decades.

The present analysis is offered as a way of comprehending culturally specific patterns; it is primarily an interpretive endeavour and not a normative one, nor is it based on any essentialist foundations. The concept of culture itself demands careful treatment and should not be seen as a static reference point. On the contrary, cultural patterns should not be seen as immutable, they are intrinsically dynamic, for they are subject to change and agency. As the current developments unfold, with profound implications for the future of the European vision, it will become clear that knowledge of local culture and history is a central consideration in the negotiations of a political and economic nature between nations. It would be well to achieve a greater understanding of these factors as the increasing pace and scale of global cooperation make this an imperative.

*Update: Since the initial submission of this chapter research by anthropologists on the Greek crisis has burgeoned. Scholars such as Giorgios Aggelopoulos, Dimitrios Dalakoglou, Dimitrios Gkintidis, Daniel Knight, Dimitrios Theodossopoulos, among others, have undertaken intensive fieldwork in various localities, both urban and rural.*
NOTES

1. INTRODUCTION

1. I am very grateful for comments made on an earlier draft by Michael Llewellyn-Smith; Georgios Pagoulatos; Spyros Economides, and Dimitris Papadimitriou. Any errors remain mine alone.

2. I am grateful to Thalia Dragonas for her comment on this point.

3. ‘Εθνικός’ was the term used at the time to describe ‘those foreign to both the Byzantine people and Byzantine state’, ‘ξένος’ denoted people foreign to the local population because they were from abroad (Ahrweiler, 1998: 2).

4. See the data reported in Triantafyllidou and Maroukis (2011), and National Statistical Service of Greece, Census 2001 (for more information, see http://www.statistics.gr).

2. GREECE AND EUROPE: PROGRESS AND CIVILIZATION, 1890s–1920s

1. Metaxas (1975) is typical:

In any case I am still convinced that Germany will be victorious in the great struggle. In these present trials, the great virtues of the German race will appear: Entsagung and Ergebung, their perseverance and religion. Now those imponderables which cannot be calculated in numbers will play their role. You will see. And they must triumph, because otherwise humanity will decline (Metaxas 1975: 360; entry of 1 September 1914, letter to his wife).

See also Joachim (2000: 184–5). George Mavrogordatos has pointed out to me that Metaxas’s cultural preferences went much wider than Germany, including France, but were limited by his not speaking English. Under the impact of the Great War the German strand in his thinking, nurtured by his military training in Berlin, was reinforced.

2. For Greek examples, see the works of Zizimos Lorenzatos, and the weekly articles of Christos Yannaras in Sunday’s Kathimerini.
4. ‘EUROPE’, ‘TURKEY’ AND GREEK SELF-IDENTITY: ANTINOMIC MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS


2. The final text has benefited from the comments by participants in the HO/LSE & British School Conference, January 2011, as well as of specific sections by close readings by the historians Richard Clogg, Dimitris Kyrtatas and Elisabeth Zachariadou and for editorial comments from John Chapple.

3. By referring to the Ottoman past we should not obliterate the Latin pasts—contemporary to it—of parts of the mainland and islands (Frangokratia—Venetians, Genoese, Franks, Catalans).

4. This is not an exclusively Greek national perception. Generalized collective character attributes, even in recent decades, are painted with vivid colours, as reflected in a memorandum leak from a seminar held at Chequers with the presence of Margaret Thatcher as PM and Timothy Garton Ash and Norman Stone from Oxford among the participants. The seminar’s main question was whether the Germans were dangerous. What was the German national character, from A to Z? Did the German past signpost the future? Aggressiveness as part of German character and all that… The leak with the offending list of alleged German national character traits was published in *The Independent on Sunday* on 15 July 1990 and the commentaries followed for weeks with many commentators, among them the two above mentioned academics. See e.g. Norman Stone (1990).

5. In the case of Voltaire, see as a counterpoint *Candide* with the good and virtuous Muslim, and *Histoire de Charles XII, roi de Suède*, more specifically the fifth chapter where the king demands asylum at the Ottoman Sublime Porte.

6. It was read in 1803 at the Société des Observateurs de l’Homme.

7. G. Souris’ verses are of relevance here:

   *And showing him the antiquities and the lots of [marble] stones
   Every now and then to tell him:
   Quelle gloire, mon cher Ethem’
   Que je t’aimes, je t’aimes, je t’aimes
   […]και τα’αρχαία δείγμαντάς του και τις πέτρες τις πολλές,
   Κάθε τόσο να του λες:
   ‘Κελ γκλοάρ, μον σερ Ετέμ!’
   Κε έε τα’εμ, ζε τα’εμ, ζε τα’εμ (Souris, 1987).*

   ‘Ethem’ refers to Ethem Paşa, the general in command of the Turkish army in the *drôle de guerre* of 1897 (he later became Ottoman minister of war).

8. Or, more elegantly, ‘the little worm that’s Skopje’. In the 1990s, everyone in Thessaloniki (schools, universities, churches, factories, public and private enterprises, ministries)—except for a segment of the Left—joined the struggle for ‘Macedonia solely Greek’ (see Michalopoulou et al., 1998; Skoulariki, 2005).

9. For Turkey the major Greek Catastrophe was the War of Liberation from the Greek army of occupation. What in Greece is viewed as the liberation of native Greeks
from Ottoman rule in Turkey is considered treasonous, violent conquest of Turkish land. That the obligatory ‘exchange of populations’ as it was called, what today would be described as mutual ethnic cleansing, was in fact a practice generally accepted and used by the major European powers is overlooked. That this massive enforced movement of populations (1912–22) based on ethnic criteria in the Balkans was used as a model fifteen years later by the Nazi regime and then again by the Allies in the immediate post-war period (1945–49) of massive movements (forced voluntarism) is also overlooked. The same practice was tolerated if not enhanced initially by the West in Yugoslavia. The European Union in concert with the US legitimated practices that have no relation whatsoever with the principles and values associated with the nucleus of political liberalism (regardless of its Left or Right orientation).


‘Τι μέγας ενθουσιασμός, τι χτύποι και τι βρόντοι!
Κι όλοι κοιτάζαν χάσκοντα το κλασικό μας γένος,
Λυσσούσαν για τον πόλεμο και γέροι μ’ένα δόντι
Και μάχας ονειρεύεται κ’η τρυφερά παρθένος[…]

‘What great enthusiasm, what bangs and thunders!
And all gazed gaping at our classical nation,
They had all gone mad for the War and even single-toothed old men
Dreaming of battles and the tender virgin’


12. The PM was George Papandreou, going to Ankara in January 2011; among the politicians was Dora Bakoyianni, a former minister of foreign affairs, and at the time leader of the newly formed Dimokratiki Symmachia (Democratic Alliance) party, who spoke to a selected Turkish audience in Istanbul. She was attacked as ‘Turcophile’ and her lecture as an ‘anti-Greek delirium’ because she referred to a millennium of confrontations being supplanted by a period of peaceful and creative collaboration. Quoted in T. Skylakakis, ‘Populism and Greco-Turkish relations’, Kathimerini daily newspaper, 21 December 2010.

13. The interesting thing is that it was only in Athanassios Parios (1798), a most important representative of the Patriarcho-Ottomanist ideology and the anti-Enlightenment movement among the ecclesiastical and monastic circles, that ‘certain subtle ideological hues’ were identified in the Roman [Greek] Community as deriving from the French Revolution.

14. However, taking the communities as a dominant factor, there are serious counterindications with regard to the stance adopted by the populace. This different view dominates the bibliographical survey of the subject by Anastasia Papadia-Lala (2004). Of course, one cannot arrive at solid, general conclusions, since there are considerable variations; in the period of Venetian rule there was goodwill towards
the Venetians and widespread hostility towards the Turks in the later period; the picture varied in different provinces (anti-Turkish sentiment in the Ionian islands, anti-Venetian feeling in Salonica, Nafpaktos and Aegina [many of whose people sought refuge in the Ottoman empire], anti-Frankish sentiment in the Pelopon- nese); and there were significant differences between urban and rural populations (Crete/Cyprus) and among different social groups or classes.

15. As is the case with Latin rule in the Ionian islands and Crete during the Venetian period.

16. Religious toleration that was in no way extended to heterodox Muslims (there were periodic massacres of the Alevi).

17. The millet system was the Ottoman way of organizing the communities on the basis of religion.

18. An exception, in the direction of only tentatively questioning some flagrant stereotypes while reproducing certain others, is the historical documentary ‘1821’ being shown in early 2011 on Greek television with a team of professors and journalists.


20. This piece of the mosaic could not have taken shape without what I see as the decisive impact over the last decade of a coherent series of studies and publications emanating from a dynamic group of researchers centred on the Minority Groups Research Centre (KEMO); work that has now led to more formal university collaboration. The researchers involved include Lambros Baltsiotis, Dimitris Christopoulos, Leonidas Empeirikos, Alexandra Ioannidou, Eleni Karantzola, Tasos Kostopoulos, Dora Lafazani, and Kostas Tsitselikis.

21. Vlachometro is the term coined to depict the measurement of Greek self-consciousness when deciding if a Vlach is to be given Greek citizenship or not (Tsitselikis and Christopoulos, 2003).

22. Just as the fans of a particular Thessaloniki football club are called ‘Bulgarians’, creating a fuss when this well-known fact was cited as an example of pejorative use in the Dictionary of the Greek Language, 1998. This led Georgios Babiniotis, editor and director of the dictionary, to withdraw the first edition and publish a second one without the inclusion of the specific example.

23. One recent example: the official reactions in March 2010 to the cover of the German popular magazine Focus illustrating Aphrodite of Milos with the missing hand restored and begging. Political leaders, including the speaker of Parliament, considered it an insult to the Greeks, demanding through official notifications to the German ambassador an apology from the government of Germany!

24. As Elli Skopetea has insightfully noted ‘the high-toned worship of—and obsession with—antiquity was accompanied by little actual knowledge about it’ (1988: 204).

25. Only exceptionally were Sparta and Thebes taken as models.

26. Let me add that in a shallow nationwide TV ‘beauty contest’ in 2009 of all great Greeks through history, Alexander the Great was acclaimed by electronic ballot the Greatest of all Hellenes—if ever we can seriously compare in the same scale
personalities ranging from Homer and Plato to Kolokotronis (central figure of the Revolution in 1821), Velouchiotis (leader of the anti-Nazi resistance) and Dalaras (the present-day singer)!(the same TV show considered the Roman Emperor Constantine as ‘Greek’, and not one of the established journalists and professors reacted against his inclusion in the list of the contenders). Reactions are vivid if not violent when ancient Greek homosexuality is referred to by either Harvard scholars in academic conferences held in universities or Hollywood film directors when Oliver Stone’s film was released in Athens cinemas.

27. Bernal’s Black Athena, not contesting the classical Greek heritage but minimizing it by emphasizing the Middle Eastern and African roots that influenced it, although motivated in terms of political correctness within US Academia, provoked an interesting debate among classical scholars; but in Greece, with certain exceptions, it turned into a fierce rejection not on academic but on strictly political identity grounds.

28. Resulting from the two major twin earthquakes in Istanbul and Athens within a fortnight (17 August and September 1999).

29. There has been a relatively rich bibliography on Education and the Nation but with no serious implications for educational policy. Among them I have to highlight the path-breaking work by Christina Coulouri (1988) and her leading editing role in a series of publications on comparative educational curricula in South Eastern Europe, published during the decade of the 2000s by the Centre of Democracy in Thessaloniki. Also, Frangoudaki Anna and Thaleia Dragonas (1997), and Efi Avdela (1998).

30. The work that systematically pinpoints Greek’s debt to the other languages and civilizations, initially of the Eastern Mediterranean, as a prerequisite for tracing Greece’s influence on Europe is Tasos Christidis (2007).

31. The law received a temporary setback from the Council of State, linked with the length of the period needed for the acquisition of citizenship. It is pending the final decision of the Council’s plenum.

32. In the 2011 issue of the New York Review of Books Orhan Pamuk (2011) writes that there was not a word about democracy and human rights in his school textbooks when he was growing up, that ‘genocide’ was an unknown term and its historical contextualization with the massacres of the Armenians did not exist. Decisive steps forward have been taken to a great extent as a condition for Turkey’s accession to the EU during the Erdogan period.


2. The government’s pension cost from 12 per cent of GDP in 2007 was projected to 19.5 per cent in 2035 (compared to a projected rise of less than 2 per cent for the EU27, taking it to 12 per cent of GDP in 2035).
3. That is, total annual EU inflows (structural funds, cohesion fund and the Common Agricultural Policy, CAP) minus national contributions to the EU (European Commission, various years).
4. The current account deficits after 2004 added almost fifty percentage points to Greece’s negative net foreign asset position, which stood at about 90 per cent of GDP at the end of 2009.
5. Keynes argued long ago that there is a crucial distinction between external and internal depreciation. While it is conceivable to orchestrate a price and wage cut that mimics an external depreciation, the process is difficult in a comparatively large economy with a large variety of diverging interests. The workers who will first be called on to accept a reduction in their nominal wages will not happily acquiesce in it, until they are sure that all other workers will also accept a reduction in their wages. Moreover, the workers as a group cannot be certain that their sacrifice will be met with a corresponding fall in the cost of living, since producers may not pass on to prices their reduction in wage costs. The political skill required for implementing substantial decreases in thousands of wages and millions of prices is considerable (EEAG, 2011).
6. Such, for example, has been the discourse of the two left-wing opposition parties (Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA, and the Communist Party of Greece, KKE), and prominent public opinion leaders such as the composer Mikis Theodorakis and others.

7. CONTESTING GREEK EXCEPTIONALISM WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CRISIS

1. In the writing of the chapter I have benefited a great deal from discussions with Heather Gibson, Haris Golemis, Spiros Lapatsioras and Nikos Theocharakis. I would also like to thank the participants at the Hellenic Observatory and British School in Athens conference, and especially Kevin Featherstone and Dimitris Sotiropoulos.
2. The title of the article by Nikos Houndis (2010), a leftist MP, in Άνγη is indicative of the overall approach: ‘Crisis of the Greek economy: crisis of the European neoliberal model’.
3. In an interview published in Το Βίμα (3 April 2010), Giannis Dragasakis, one of the Left’s most prestigious economists and politicians, argued that ‘The crisis has taken by surprise the whole European architecture; it was neither foreseen, nor easily confronted once it materialized.’
4. An early account of the reversal of the post-war trend towards greater equality can be found in Harrison and Bluestone (1988). More recent accounts detailing the phenomenon can be found in Green et al. (1994) and Piketty and Saez (2003).
5. Sevastakis points to the success of Ramfos’ (2010) book as evidence of the continu-
ing prevalence of a cultural critique concerning the nature of Greek attitudes and dispositions.

6. Balabanidis offers an excellent introduction to the whole spectrum of Greek approaches, both academic and political, to the current crisis.

7. Voulgaris (April 2010a) argues, for instance that no group in society was strong enough to resist wasteful public sector expenditure—the self-employed, private-sector workers, future generations, the financial and export-producing sectors were either unable to do so or uninterested.

8. Predictably the least amount of rethinking is to be observed amongst the economists of the modernizing camp, their proposals being exactly the same as they would have been any time over the previous twenty years or so: see Meghir et al. (2010) and Azariadis et al. (2010).

9. There is still some talk of a new balance between state and market, public and private sectors (Voulgaris, 2010b).

10. Yannis Stournaras, a central figure in the run up to Greece’s entry into the common currency, had in the early 1990s expressed concern about the loss of state policies (Stournaras, 1992: 121–3). Some twenty years later, as chief economist of the industrialists’ think tank Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research (IOBE), he was more likely to be calling for more liberalization as an industrial policy in itself (Stournaras, 2010a&b).

11. Reminiscent of Third Way thinking (for a critique, see Tsakalotos, 2001).

12. Although, to be fair, few within the dominant tradition would feel comfortable with the almost cavalier attitude to democracy, public opinion, and the Greek constitution exhibited by Azariadis et al. (2010).


14. One such argument was that EU business cycles corresponded remarkably, and therefore the single monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the limits imposed on the autonomy of fiscal policies of member states were relatively unproblematic (Christodoulakis et al., 1995). This was an unconvincing argument at the time (see Dickerson et al., 1998) and has subsequently proved even more wide of the mark.

15. External debt was 78 per cent of long-term public debt in 2009 (IMF, 2010).

16. For a more general critique of financial liberalization, see Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994), where it is argued that fully liberalized financial markets do not provide the best framework for the promotion real convergence.

17. Corporate tax rates in Greece fell from 40 per cent in 1995 to 24 per cent in 2010. It is also indicative that when the actual tax rate on capital was 25 per cent in 2007, the implicit tax rate was only 15.9 per cent (European Commission and Eurostat, 2010).

18. The latest figures for OECD countries (2007) on public expenditure on law, order and defence show Greece in fifth place behind Israel, the US and Korea (OECD, 2010). The OECD emphasizes that Greece’s position is a result of its spending on defence, rather than law and order.
19. Newspaper reports suggest figures of 9–12 billion euros, more than 5 per cent of GDP and twice the initial cost estimate.

20. Three support packages for the banking sector have been passed through Parliament. The first in 2008 amounted to 28 billion euros, the second 15 billion euros (May 2010) and the third 25 billion euros (August 2010). These support packages create potential liabilities for the state.

21. Insofar as the number of employees is reflected in payment of employees in the public sector which, of course, conflates prices (wages) and quantities. The results of the census of public sector employees in July 2010 suggest that they number about 770,000.

22. There is a question, of course, concerning the effectiveness of this expenditure.

23. Apart from the huge increases in inequality, recent attention has concentrated on the issue of precarious employment; see Standing (2010).

24. That is, the MoU signed by the Greek government, on the one hand, and the IMF-EC-ECB, on the other, in May 2010.

25. The 2010 report of the research institute of the GSEE offers an excellent account of the social consequences.

26. For the US experience see Frank (2004). For a critique of Greek, and European, social democracy on similar grounds, see Tsakalotos (2008).

8. EUROPEAN INFLUENCES IN GREECE’S MIGRATION POLICIES: BETWEEN ‘HARD’ IMPACT AND ‘SOFT’ INFLUENCE

1. That is the question of recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent Republic, the name that this last would take, as well as its nationalist claims to what the Greeks deemed as ‘their’ national heritage (Triandafyllidou et al. 1997; Roudometof 1996).

2. This section is based on Triandafyllidou (2009). The arguments presented here are however revised and updated.

3. Before 2007 it was practically impossible to naturalize and naturalizations were in two-digit numbers each year. The situation changed after a joint declaration of the then minister of interior and minister of foreign affairs (of the Conservative party) in November 2006 inviting ethnic Greeks from Albania to naturalize. The


5. These insights are based on research interviews of the author with Ministry of Interior employees at different posts on 16 February 2009 and again on 10 January 2011 in the context of different migration research projects.

6. The fifteen ‘older’ EU member states had to transpose the Racial Equality Directive into national law by 19 July 2003 and the ‘newer’ ones by 1 May 2004, while the Employment Equality Directive had to be transposed by 2 December 2003 in the former and 1 of May in the latter group of member states.

7. At the legal level, contrary to what was suggested by the European legislation, Greece has put some restrictions on initiatives that NGOs can take on behalf of affected individuals. The latter need to give their consent in writing that an NGO may sue a given employer in a discrimination case on their behalf. Moreover, for
NGOs to bring a case to court, they have to include in their statutes as part of their mission the fight against discrimination or the protection of the rights of a given group that is then found to be discriminated against.

8. A high fee was paid by the applicant (1,500 euros) and the decision was discretionary; authorities were not required to reply within a specified period of time and did not need to justify a negative decision to the applicant. If an applicant was rejected, he or she could apply again after one year.

9. The analysis presented in this section is based on the parliamentary proceedings on 10 March and 11 March 2010 (see www.parliament.gr) when the citizenship bill was debated in Parliament, as well as the reflections of fourteen interviewees coming from different parts of civil society including student associations, political parties, the Greek Church, the press and migrant associations. A list of the interviews conducted is given in the annex to this chapter. The empirical research for this part of the study was conducted under the auspices of the EU-funded programme (FP7, Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities), Identities and Modernities in Europe (contract no: SSH-CT-2009–215949); for more see: www.eliamep.gr/en/ime-identities-and-modernities-in-europe/. See also Gropas, R.H. Kouki and A. Triandafyllidou (2010).

9. THE VICISSITUDES OF IDENTITY IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY: THE CASE OF THE MUSLIM MINORITY IN WESTERN THRACE

1. Slips of the tongue come not from the ‘contact effects of sound’ but from thoughts that lie outside the intended speech that determine the occurrence of the slip and provide an adequate explanation of the mistake: Freud (1982: 94).

2. Scheff (1994) in his theory of ethnic nationalism describes the relation between shame dynamics and power struggles.

3. It is not my intention in this chapter to go into the rapidly growing topic of national, linguistic and religious minority protection and the concerns expressed by European Human Rights organizations such as the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (CESR), the Council of Europe (CoE) and European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) over the Greek authorities’ reluctance to recognize the existence of any other minority except the ‘Muslim’ one. There have been several reports in the past twenty years regarding recognition of minorities in Greece, stressing that the protection of minorities is essential to stability, democratic security and peace. Interested readers can read Rozakis, 1996; Tsitselikis and Christopoulous 1997; Kostopoulos, 2000; Dimitras, 2007.

4. According to the International Organization of Migration in 2005 there were approximately 64.1 million migrants in Europe (Council of Europe, General Assembly 2010). As regards the size of minority populations, obtaining accurate statistics is very difficult because (a) states have varied approaches with regard to the definition of a national minority, ranging from a very restrictive approach to a more inclusive one, and (b) many states do not disaggregate data on ethnic grounds for a variety of historical and political reasons while others do not have reliable up-to-date census figures (see http://www.coe.int/minorities). In the member states of
the Council of Europe there are 10–12 million Roma (for estimates see http://

5. Millets were the religious communities organized around the principal religious
authorities, for example the Greek Orthodox and Armenian churches and the
Jewish bodies in the Ottoman Empire, which constituted a vital element in the
Ottoman administration. They were rather autonomous in their internal affairs
and regulated a good part of the lives of their members including the judicial
affairs pertaining to issues of civil society.

6. The Project on the Reform of the Education of Muslim Minority Children was
directed by professors Thalia Dragonas and Anna Frangoudaki under the Greek
Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs, Operational Programme in Educa-
‘Education of Muslim Children’, financed 25 per cent (initially) and 20 per cent
(subsequently) by the Greek Ministry and 75 per cent by the European Social
Fund.

7. Once more turning to Pesmazoglou in the present volume, the reader can see
how this ‘us and them’, ‘friends and foes’, ‘patriots and traitors’ dichotomy has
plagued the socio-cultural and political Greek life and has created a rupture sys-
tematically nourished by the educational system, the media and political discourse.
Tsitselikis (2008) claims from his legal viewpoint that the unwillingness to accom-
modate otherness is rooted in reluctance to accept fundamental premises that con-
stitute modern European states, such as rule of law, prohibition of discrimination,
tolerance for minority groups; deficits do not occur only in Greece but in a num-
ber of co-partners in the construction of the legal and political European systems
protecting human rights. He uses Estonia, France and Turkey as some examples of
national legal orders where the minority questions seem to be interpreted under
a strict national ideological orientation that dictates policies and drafts relevant
legal rules derogating from human rights standards.

8. It is beyond the scope of the present article to analyze why the minority opted
for the specific strategies employed to affirm its identity, ‘occupy a place’ in Thrace
and cope with the oppressions it was subjected to. Interested readers should read

9. Council of Europe, General Assembly (2009). Mustafa Mustafa, an ex-MP of Syn-
aspismos (the moderate left party), publicly described the project as a landmark in
the education of the minority that has changed radically what existed before
(University of Athens, 26 Nov. 2010).

10. The educational intervention consisted of

(a) New schoolbooks and teaching materials: forty new textbooks were designed
at primary level covering Greek as a second language, history, geography, the
environment and civic education. Supplementary materials were produced,
such as an electronic method for teaching Greek as a second language; a
6,000-entry children’s Greek–Turkish dictionary; interactive educational appli-
cations both conventional and electronic; and songs. All the materials respect
the children’s ethnic identity and are interactive, playful, colourful and ‘user-
friendly’. At secondary level, new materials were developed for use in con-
junction with existing ones covering Greek as a second language, literature, history, mathematics, physics and geography. The main thrust of the materials is active learning and the encouragement of critical thinking.

(b) An extended teaching programme: more teaching hours were added to the standard secondary level programme. Trained teachers have offered afternoon classes to more than 1,000 students per year.

(c) Teacher training: for an average of 120 hours per year, both primary and secondary teachers were trained in bilingualism, didactic and pedagogic skills, use of the new materials, social and gender inequalities, classroom dynamics, identities, discriminations and negotiation of differences. Extensive teacher training materials were also developed.

(d) Research and work with the community: a number of surveys and qualitative studies were carried out on students’, teachers’ and parents’ profiles; language use and language assessment; drop-out rates; parents’ attitudes towards education; representations of ethnic identity. Eight Community Centres were set up, equally staffed by minority and majority personnel, operating a lending library; offering afternoon classes and summer courses, Greek classes for parents, Turkish classes for Greek teachers, counselling for parents and teachers; organizing creative activities whereby youngsters could run their own projects. Two Mobile Units travelled daily to remote areas offering classes and creative educational activities. One thousand, two hundred children per year profited from the activities at the Community Centres. Regular meetings were held with the teacher unions, minority leaders, local administration and government officials. Open workshops and conferences involved the entire community. For a detailed description of PEM’s activities see http://www.museduc.gr, and Dragonas and Frangoudaki (2008).


10. CULTURAL MISMATCHES: GREEK CONCEPTS OF TIME, PERSONAL IDENTITY, AND AUTHORITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPE

1. It is worth noting that these countries are part of a Protestant religious tradition where strict moral standards and rule abiding conduct prevail, at least as explicit values even if not in absolute practice, following Weber’s characterization of the rise of capitalism (2010).

2. This is not to deny that modernity has various expressions in different countries. The concept should not imply any convergence idea of ‘Westernization’, given that a broader global perspective must be maintained.

3. Attempts to introduce Enlightenment attitudes by the Western-educated Greek elite were ultimately not successful; see Kitromilides’ detailed and subtle analyses 1989, 1996.

4. Many ethnographies provide examples of culturally specific ways of reckoning time, see e.g. Evans-Pritchard (1940) on the Nuer in the Sudan; Barnes (1974) on the Kedang in Indonesia; Thornton (1980) on the Iraqw of East Africa; for Greek villages, see du Boulay (1995, 2009) and Hart (1992).
5. Sociological generalizations describe cultural patterns and general expectations, and do not account for individual variation. Just as there are some consistently unpunctual British, Germans or Americans, so there are punctual Greeks, indeed in increasing numbers. An additional caveat is the evidence of a growing sensitivity to accurate time keeping in Athenian circles, and I am aware of the changing context in which this analysis is situated.

6. It has been noted that Italian industry also has family-run businesses but they reach out to export markets and can become very big, e.g. Benetton. I am grateful to Massimo Antonini, University of Oxford, for providing evidence and for discussion on this topic.

7. The growing importance of the railways as the main method of mass and goods transport necessitated a countrywide time standard in Britain in order to synchronize small local differences in time-keeping so that rail services could be co-ordinated (Landes, 2000).

8. They have been challenged to address this topic because of the great variety of ways in which the human subject is conceptualized indigenously. Persons in other societies may perceive the world around them in ways very different from our own. Marcel Mauss (1985) was one of the first who drew out this distinction explicitly (see Carrithers, 1985). For example, among the Kanaks, a Melanesian island group, the social world of persons is defined by relationships which include animals and plant life, since these share with humans the quality of being alive, having a common life substance. Many examples illustrate the different ways in which the human subject is constructed, and there is a vast bibliography on the rich variety of these conceptualizations.

9. See, for example, the writings of Sakharov (2002), Ware (1986), Yannaras (1984), Zizioulas (1985). For a considered evaluation of these trends in contemporary Orthodox theology see Stamatopoulos (2003).

10. The individualism of American society can and should be further differentiated into ‘different modes’, e.g. utilitarian or expressive kinds (Bellah et al., 1985). Further insights into the notion of the human subject come from the history of philosophy and changes in ideology in the Western European tradition, indicating that they are by no means ‘uniform or monolithic’ (Morris, 1991: 4).

11. However, in the Orthodox approach, the material and mundane dimensions are not opposed to the sacred. The material world is imbued by the Divine world, interpenetrated and transfigured in a process of continual communication with that world, though this significance may not be in any way conscious for the actors.

12. Reference should be made to post-colonial studies in history and anthropology; see, for example, Comaroff (1985).


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