ARMY DOCTRINE PUBLICATION
VOLUME 2
COMMAND

APRIL 1995

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From Field Service Regulations,  
Part II - ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 1909:

1. The successful issue of military operations depends primarily upon combination and unity of effort directed with energy and determination towards a definite object ...

2. A system of organization must be suitable to the character and armament of the forces and to the nature of the proposed operations. Convenience of command, facilities for transmission of orders, for combined action, and for maintenance are of the first importance; mobility must be assured and the system must be sufficiently elastic to meet all the varying conditions which may arise, and which it is impossible to foresee ...

3. So diverse are the conditions in which the British Army may be called to take the field that it is impossible to design for it a system of organization applicable, without modification, to every campaign. But, although the strength and composition of the forces in the field must vary according to the enemy to be encountered, and the nature of the prospective theatre of operations, yet the general principles which govern their organization remain practically the same whether operations are conducted under civilized or uncivilized conditions, and whether a small force or a large one is employed. It is only the application of principles in detail which vary, and once the principles themselves are clearly understood, it is comparatively simple to adjust such details to any given case.

4. The essence of all efficient organization lies in due sub-division of labour and decentralization of responsibility among subordinates, each individual being given duties which he can perform adequately ...

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The end of the Cold War and the dramatic changes in our security environment since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radical reappraisal of our Army Doctrine. We began the process with the publication of Volume 1 - Operations. In that publication we attempted to explain the British Army's revised approach to warfighting in future conflicts. We set out to provide a guide to the conduct of operations, and set down a basis for the Commander as to how he might think about operational problems without prescribing solutions.

If we are to execute our operational doctrine with its premium on achieving high tempo and destroying the cohesion of an adversary in order to succeed on the battlefield, then we shall need an approach to command that matches our approach to warfighting. This approach will have to use the same language and concepts, whilst recognising both the need for timely decision making and firm leadership, as well as the other enduring tenets that form the foundations of command and its execution. Volume 2 - Command sets out to provide just that.

Although 'Command' has been written for the whole Army, it is designed to be particularly relevant and valuable for the Commander and his staff, and all who aspire to those positions. It needs to be read and understood by them if we are to give lie to the words of General Patton:

'It is sad to remember that when anyone has fairly mastered the art of command, the necessity for that art usually expires - either through a termination of the war or through the advanced age of the commander.'

This publication does not provide a template for command. But it does aim to lay out clearly the principles and techniques that will underpin successful command in war. For that alone it is worthy of study by all aspiring commanders.

March 1995
Inspector General Doctrine and Training
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to explain the environment and nature of command, to relate command to leadership and management, and to set out by means of a command model the scope and application of ADP Command.

ENVIRONMENT OF COMMAND

0101. The nature of conflict is complex. At its simplest, conflict is an adversarial activity involving a clash of wills between the participants. On operations, a commander exercises command of his force in conditions of uncertainty, risk, violence, fear and danger. Friction, that 'force that makes the apparently easy so difficult', adds further to the chaos and confusion of conflict. A commander should not only accept the inevitability of confusion and disorder, but should seek to generate it in the minds of his opponents. He should attempt to create only sufficient order out of the chaos of war to enable him to carry out his own operations. Much of the scope for his success will depend on his experience, flexibility, will and determination. But no military activity takes place in a vacuum. Much as he will try, the commander cannot master all conditions and events affecting his command.

0102. The environment of command in a campaign, major operation, battle or engagement is inextricably linked to the environment of operations in a particular theatre and the strategic context of any campaign or other military activity. For example, the employment or threatened use of weapons of mass destruction will add to the ever-present physical and mental stresses of command and may raise difficult moral issues. Therefore a military force is unlikely to succeed unless its commander understands the environment of his command - in which the activities of his own force and of his adversary play but a part. In the complex conditions of contemporary conflict, commanders are increasingly likely to have to contend with a wide range of

external factors, including political and legal constraints, and media interest. This applies to any military involvement in all forms of conflict, whether undertaken on a national or multinational basis.

**NATURE OF COMMAND**

0103. **Command** is the authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.² The need for command arises from, and varies with, the size and complexity of the force. The larger and more sophisticated a force becomes, the greater the difficulties in preserving its cohesion and fighting power. Thus the importance of the function 'Command' is related to the level of responsibility of an individual commander.

0104. Command has a legal and constitutional status, codified in Queen's Regulations.³ It is vested in a commander by a higher authority that gives him direction (often encapsulated in a mission) and assigns forces to him to accomplish that mission. The exercise of command includes the process by which a commander makes decisions and impresses his will on, and transmits his intentions to his subordinates. It therefore encompasses the authority, responsibility and duty to act; to deploy, for example, his assigned forces to fulfil their missions. Military command at all levels is the art of decision-making, motivating and directing all ranks into action to accomplish missions. It requires a vision of the desired result, an understanding of concepts, missions, priorities and the allocation of resources, an ability to assess people and risks, and involves a continual process of re-evaluating the situation. A commander requires, above all, to decide on a course of action and to lead his command. Thus leadership and decision-making are his primary responsibilities. Command also involves accountability and control.

0105. **Authority, Responsibility and Accountability.** Authority involves the right and freedom to use the 'power of command', and ultimately, to enforce obedience. Whilst a commander can devolve specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated

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2. NATO definition. AAP-6.

3. Queen's Regulations (QRs) state that, at the highest level, "The government and command of each of the fighting Services is vested in Her Majesty The Queen, who has charged the Secretary of State with general responsibility for the defence of the Realm and established a Defence Council having command and administration over Her armed forces" (J1.001); and, in turn, Commanders in Chiefs who "in conjunction with their other duties are operationally responsible to the Defence Council for the command of all British Army personnel in their area" (2.002).
responsibility, a commander retains overall responsibility for his command. Responsibility is thus a fundamental concept of command, which has been described in the following terms:

Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. 4

Accountability is a corollary to both responsibility and authority; it involves a liability and obligation to answer to a superior for the proper use of delegated responsibility, authority and resources. Thus, he who delegates responsibility should grant sufficient authority to a subordinate for him to carry out his task; the subordinate, meanwhile, remains accountable to his superior for its execution.

0106. **Control.** Control is the process through which a commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him. 5 To achieve this, he and his staff employ a common doctrine for command and use standardized procedures for control (including staffwork) in conjunction with the equipment, communication and information systems available. Command and control are thus inextricably linked with commanders and staffs requiring a knowledge and understanding of both and the roles of each other if they are to perform their duties effectively. Command and control, however, are not 'equal partners' as control is merely one aspect of command. In this publication the term command is therefore used to encompass both command and control, except when the control aspect of command needs to be highlighted. 6

**COMMAND, LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT**

0107. The terms **command**, **leadership** and **management** are closely related. Command at the highest levels involves ultimate responsibility for a
force or organization and, to be effective, requires a wide range of qualities and skills. Command at lower levels is closely linked with a direct style of leadership. Much has been written about military leadership, and, particularly, leadership at unit level in war. Whilst the art of command at higher levels remains based on the timeless qualities of leadership, it encompasses a wider range of attributes which are discussed in Chapter 2.

0108. Management is primarily about the allocation and control of resources (human, material and financial) to achieve objectives. In the military environment, management is defined as: 'The use of a range of techniques to enhance the planning, organization and execution of operations, logistics, administration and procurement.' Essentially, both management and command contain elements of leadership, decision-making and control (in the sense of to verify, check and regulate); it is the mix of these elements that makes for the difference between management and command, and explains why the nature of command changes with level.

0109. Whilst command must be exercised in the differing conditions of peace, conflict other than war and war, it is only fully tested under the extraordinary stresses of conflict and war. It is these circumstances that differentiate between command and management: effective command is essential if military forces are to be led and employed successfully.

0110. In principle, command (in particular, identifying what needs to be done and why) embraces both management activities (allocating the means (resources) to achieve it) and leadership (getting subordinates to achieve it). On operations, however, some management functions are subsumed by control. Whilst management may not necessarily smack of command, resource allocation, budgetary responsibilities and associated management techniques have become critical considerations in an increasing number of military activities. Therefore the study of management techniques, although outside the scope of this publication, is required by all those who aspire to higher command and senior positions on the staff. Command on operations involves the interaction of leadership, decision-making and control, as shown in the Command Model at Figure 1.1.

7. One of the most useful and readable books on the subject is the RMA Sandhurst anthology Serve to Lead.


Figure 1.1 indicates the relationship between the aspects of command (leadership, decision-making and control), the three basic components of command (the conceptual, the moral and the physical), which, together with a command support organization, form a command system.

In the model, the aspects of command are shown as overlapping to indicate their interaction; decision-making takes place in both leadership and control, leadership relying more on human factors, and control on material ones. The components of command also relate to, and impact on, each other. The moral component places a high premium on the physical component, including organizations and technical means, promoting the human role in communication (for example, voice recognition in radio). The conceptual component is based on doctrine, including procedures. In turn, doctrine must take account of technology and human factors. The three components of command are supported by a command support organization which exists to pass and process information and provide advice, as well as to cater for the physical needs of the commander and his staff.
SCOPE OF ADP COMMAND

0111. The Command Model provides the underlying framework for this publication. The conceptual component of command requires a sound philosophy of command, based on the establishment of a common doctrine. The second, the moral or human component, centres on the ability to get soldiers to fight, hence the requirement for leadership and other qualities of command. These two components provide the Foundations of Command which are discussed in Chapter 2. The third, the physical component, relates to the technical means of command and the ability to exercise command. It is based on the application of a number of command imperatives, which are related to the Principles of War and the Functions in Combat\(^\text{10}\), and the use of a decision-making process. The Exercise of Command is examined in Chapter 3.

0112. An efficient decision-making process, together with flexible control, communications and information-handling organizations are essential prerequisites of a responsive command system. That system, linked to imaginative and inspired leadership, provides the basis for the successful exercise of command. The British Army command system is examined in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 considers the Organization for Command, relating it to the Army’s doctrine for operations described in ADP-1 VolumeOperations, whilst Chapter 5, Organization of Command Support, describes the organization of the staff, communication and information systems and of headquarters.

0113. It is unlikely that the British Army will take part in a national military campaign without the participation of another Armed Service. In the current and likely environment of command on operations, it is increasingly probable that the Army will be required to fight any future campaign or major operation, or be involved in Operations Other Than War, alongside the forces of other nations, and probably within a coalition. Thus an understanding of command of joint and multinational\(^\text{11}\) operations, the subject of Chapter 6, is an essential part of command. The application of command in Operations Other Than War rests on common principles for all types of conflict. However, a modified approach, and a shift of emphasis, may be required. Chapter 7

\(^\text{10}\) Described in ADP 1 Vol 1 Operations, Chapter 5.

\(^\text{11}\) The term “multinational”, rather than “combined”, is used in this publication reflecting its wider nature, usage and application. “Multinational” is also used to avoid confusion with the term “combined arms”. ADP Vol 1 Operations, which used “combined”, will be amended in due course. For completeness’ sake, the NATO definition of “combined” is retained in the Glossary.
outlines the essential differences between command in war and in Operations Other Than War.

0114. No system of command can function efficiently without common procedures for Command and Staff Decision-Making (Chapter 8) and the formulation of Directives and Orders (Chapter 9). Whereas the preceding Chapters 1-7 are largely descriptive, Chapters 8 and 9 are prescriptive. Their Army-wide adoption is mandatory in order to ensure common command and staff procedures within the Army and to present a standardized approach to the other two Armed Services and to allied forces.

0115. A ready reference list of the principal command terms described in this publication and in ADP Volume 1 Operations is at the Glossary. The Select Bibliography contains a list of the principal sources used in the writing of Command, which readers may find useful as a guide for further study.

APPLICATION OF ADP COMMAND

0116. In common with its sister volumes ADP Volume 1 Operations and ADP Volume 3 Logistics, ADP Volume 2 Command is based on the principles given in the British Military Doctrine (BMD). It also reflects joint and combined doctrine. Its focus is command in war. However, the philosophy of command, and most of the techniques of command, including the military decision-making process, apply equally well to military activities in peace and in conflict other than war.

0117. National direction on higher command at the grand strategic and military strategic levels of conflict is given in BMD and JSP1. Multinational doctrine is covered in AJP-1. Although ADP Volume 2 Command deals with the principles and techniques spanning every level of conflict, it concentrates on command at the operational and tactical levels. Details of specific command and control organizations at the tactical level are contained in Army Field Manuals such as Formation Tactics. Thus the content of this publication will need to be interpreted appropriately for each level.

0118. Although the scope of ADP Volume 2 Command is wide, it is essential that the underlying philosophy and doctrine for command - including the basic principles and techniques of decision-making - are taught and understood at the start of a junior commander's training. From this foundation, integrated

12. Including JSP 1 and AJP-1 (see details in Chapter 6).
command and staff training needs to be progressively developed during the course of an officer's career. The study and practice of command including associated staffwork and decision-making techniques, remains an essential component of command and staff training, both in training establishments and in the Field Army.
CHAPTER 2

THE FOUNDATIONS OF COMMAND

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to outline the historical development of the British approach to command and to set out its doctrinal basis (Mission Command); to describe the role of the commander and the qualities required by commanders, including those in battle and in positions of high command.

APPROACH TO COMMAND

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

0201. Whilst British military history is replete with examples of heroic leadership, the record of effective command has not always been as consistent. The cause of failure in the past has sometimes been ascribed to poor equipment (such as inadequate armour for much of World War Two) but this argument should not be used to obscure unpalatable truths about inadequacies of command. Weakness in command does not necessarily reflect personal failings; often the cause may be doctrinal, organizational or as a result of inadequacies in training.¹ Thus an army is likely

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ANNEX:
A. The British Style of Command

to be only as good as its higher commanders whose job it is to ensure that the doctrine, organization and equipment are appropriate and in harmony.

0202. British Army command and staff procedures have tended in the past towards detail and tight control. The reasons for this are not simply explained, but the rapid expansion of the Army in two world wars and subsequent conditions of post-war counter-insurgency campaigns have left their mark. The Army appeared well suited to a centralized style of higher command, but at the same time saw the need for a more flexible, decentralized approach to command at lower levels, promoting initiative in junior commanders. This apparent contradiction between the requirement for detailed, methodical planning, and the recognition of the need for more flexibility, has been at the heart of much of the doctrinal debate over command in the British Army since 1945.

0203. Although the concept of decentralized command was introduced formally in 1987, its practice is much older. Military history shows that certain British commanders recognised its importance. For example, what is now recognised as 'mission command' was put into practice by generals such as Wolfe in Canada during the Seven Years War, Wellington in the Peninsular War, and by Field Marshal Slim in the Second World War. Yet the tight command and control required in the counter-insurgency campaigns and the detailed planning approach to the General Defence Plan (by all NATO armies) during the Cold War did little to engender decentralized command. However, there were exceptions to this approach. In recognition that centralized command methods were unlikely to withstand the effects of battlefield nuclear engagements, 'directive control' procedures were adopted during the early 1960s. More enduring exceptions proved to be the activities of British special forces, who fought their own - mostly secret - campaigns, minor battles and engagements throughout much of the post-war period. For the bulk of the professional army, however, the 'Master Plan Approach', by which the Higher Commander details much of the planning, and keeps a very close grip on the execution of the plan, remained a running theme, despite tacit acceptance of the need for decentralized command.

0204. The historical development of the British style of command from the Boer War to the Cold War is described in more detail at Annex A.

DOCTRINE FOR OPERATIONS

0205. British Army doctrine remains based on the Principles of War and on the concept of Manoeuvre Warfare described in BMD and developed in ADP Volume 1 Operations. This doctrine emphasises the achievement of a position of advantage through the application of manoeuvre rather than attrition. It seeks to attack the enemy's cohesion, usually avoiding trials of strength and striking in preference points of weakness. It plays as much upon the enemy's will to fight as upon his material ability to do so. To be successful, this approach requires a flexible and positive attitude of mind by commanders, which seeks opportunities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities whilst maximising own strengths.

0206. Although firepower (which destroys, neutralises and suppresses) plays an important part in attacking the enemy's cohesion, British doctrine stresses a number of additional means: surprise, tempo (the rhythm or rate of activity on operations in relation to the enemy) and simultaneity (the ability to overload the enemy commander by attacking or threatening him from a number of directions at once). This approach to operations requires a distinctive style of command, the success of which is largely determined by the ability of a commander to make timely and informed decisions (often based on his position in relation to events) and the responsiveness of his command (a product of equipment, organization and training).

0207. A manoeuvrist approach to command is applicable to all forms of operation. The tenets of Manoeuvre Warfare are just as appropriate to the special conditions, usually unique to each separate situation, characteristic of Operations Other Than War, even if the pace of such operations will normally be slower. However, there are likely to be more limitations on a commander's freedom of action in such operations.

0208. Whatever the future environment of conflict, one thing is certain: the pressures on commanders are unlikely to decrease. Commanders therefore continue to require mental and physical resilience, the ability to lead effectively and to inspire trust and confidence in the face of adversity. The successful prosecution of Manoeuvre Warfare also demands commanders who can think quickly and with originality, and who are prepared to study the

3. See ADP Vol 1 Para 0222-0224 for a fuller discussion of firepower, tempo and simultaneity.
mind and doctrine of an opponent - with the aim of attacking the enemy's will. Command thus requires both mental stamina and dexterity; only those who are physically and intellectually fit can compete. The ability of a commander to meet these requirements will affect the fighting power of his command.\(^4\) This results from the commander's direct influence on the three components of the fighting power of his command: conceptual (doctrine), moral (the ability to get soldiers to fight), and physical (combat power).

0209. Whilst the individual commander has a duty to promote the moral component of the fighting power of his formation or unit by good leadership, his personal contribution to the conceptual component must conform to an Army's doctrine if it is not to be counter-productive. A common and authoritative doctrine maximises the cohesion - and thus collective fighting power - of a force. As stated in ADPVolume 1 Operations, commanders who are in each others' minds and who share a common approach to the conduct of operations are more likely to act in concert.\(^5\)

\textbf{MISSION COMMAND}

0210. The Army's philosophy of command is described in BMD and has three enduring tenets: timely decision-making, the importance of understanding a superior commander's intention, and, by applying this to one's own actions, a clear responsibility to fulfil that intention. The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act (or, in certain circumstances, to decide not to act) within the framework of the commander's intentions. Together, this requires a style of command which promotes decentralized command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. Mission Command meets this requirement and is thus a central pillar of the Army's doctrine. It has the following key elements:

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his subordinates understand his \textit{intentions}, their own \textit{missions} and the \textit{context} of those missions.
\item[b.] Subordinates are told \textit{what effect} they are to achieve and \textit{the reason why} it needs to be achieved.
\end{itemize}

\(^4\) "Fighting Power defines the Army's ability to conduct operations" (ADP Vol 1, Para 0110). In addition to the conceptual, moral and physical components of fighting power, which a commander can influence, environmental conditions, over which he has little or no influence, have an impact on the effective combat power that can be brought to bear (see Chapters 6 and 8).

\(^5\) ADP Vol 1, Para 0219.
c. Subordinates are allocated the appropriate resources to carry out their missions.

d. A commander uses a minimum of control measures so as not to limit unnecessarily the freedom of action of his subordinates.

e. Subordinates then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions.

0211. Mission Command is designed to promote a robust system of command and to achieve unity of effort at all levels; it is dependent on decentralization. Historically, this approach has proved to be the most appropriate to contend with the demands, uncertainties, and frictions of command in war. It requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command, and timely and effective decision-making, together with initiative (a quality of a commander) at all levels: the keys to 'getting inside' the enemy's decision-action cycle.

0212. The successful employment of Mission Command on operations rests on its principles being fully understood, fostered and frequently practised in training. Its application, however, cannot be stereotyped. A commander's style of command must also reflect the situation, including the capability and understanding of his subordinate commanders. Mission Command provides a common base-line: it applies not only to operations but also to much of the regulation of the Army's affairs in peacetime. It is to be used at all levels of command. Mission Command must also remain a dynamic component of doctrine and not become dogma; as new technology becomes available, its principles and application should be re-addressed as necessary.

UNITY OF EFFORT

0213. Mission Command requires a style of command that devolves decision-making without losing the unity of effort and which can only come from a clear lead and sense of purpose being given by the higher commander. Unity of effort is a tenet of both Mission Command and the British doctrine for operations. It provides a focus for separate but coordinated actions by subordinates. The failure to achieve unity of effort will, at its best, lead to confusion and missed opportunities; at its worst, the effects can be catastrophic.
Much of the 8th Army's inability to concentrate force effectively at the Battle of Gazala in June 1942, for example, was rooted in a lack of unity of effort (and discipline) at all levels. As General Sir David Fraser noted:

'[The British] were plagued by feebleness, by lack of instant authority in the high command. Intentions were too often obscure. On the British side orders at army, corps or divisional level were too often treated as bases for discussion, matters for visit, argument, expostulation even. The result was a system of command too conversational and chatty, rather than instant and incisive.'

0214. Main Effort. Unity of effort is enhanced through the selection and maintenance of the aim and concentration of force, the latter achieved by the designation of a Main Effort. It is mandatory for subordinates to support the commander's Main Effort, in order to focus their actions on the commander's aim (expressed as the Commander's Intent), maintain that aim and yet give them flexibility in achieving it.

0215. Understanding Intentions. Unity of effort is further enhanced by subordinates understanding not only the intentions of their immediate superiors, but also those of two levels up. This achieves consistency in the aim at three levels of command and promotes mutual understanding. It also provides the basis of decentralization of decision-making in fluid operations; subordinates aware of the 'big picture' are far more likely to continue acting purposefully in the light of an unexpected situation. The examination of superiors' intentions is achieved through the technique of Mission Analysis (explained in detail at Chapter 8).

DECENTRALIZATION

0216. There is nothing new in decentralization - it has marked the practice of many successful commanders in British military history. Montgomery wrote, for example, in the context of higher command: '[The C-in-C] must decentralize...he must trust his subordinates, and his staff, and must leave them alone to get on with their own jobs.' But the principle of decentralization


7. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0237. Main Effort is explained in detail in Annex C to Chapter 8.

8. High Command in War, 21st Army Group publication, June 1945, p. 23.
applies not only in a headquarters or within the higher echelons of command. It must apply to all levels. As FM Slim noted of the 14th Army:

'Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander's intention. In time they developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors. ...[This] requires in the higher command a corresponding flexibility of mind, confidence in subordinates, and the power to make its intentions clear through the force.'

0217. In some circumstances a commander may have to impose a centralized style of command in order to concentrate force and to synchronize combat support. Decentralized command, however, allows subordinates to use their initiative within their delegated freedom of action and provides them with a greater sense of involvement and commitment. Decision levels should therefore be set as low as possible. This sets the conditions for appropriate decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of battle. It also reduces the need for all but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command and ensures that decisions are taken by the local commander with the most up-to-date information. The more fluid the circumstances, the lower the decision level should be set.

TRUST

0218. Trust is one of the corner-stones of leadership and command; like respect, it must be earned. There are few short-cuts to gaining the trust of others, but it is based on a number of qualities including professional competence, personal example and integrity. Trust, often so slowly gained, can be lost quickly, particularly under the extreme conditions of war. Once established, and if sustained, trust brings its own rewards for commanders and subordinates alike: it is a vital constituent of the maintenance of morale, and so ultimately, of victory.

0218. Trust is a prerequisite of command at all levels. Soldiers must not only feel that they can trust their immediate superiors, but must also have confidence in the ability of commanders higher up the chain of command, right to the top. Field Marshal Montgomery, as Commander in Chief of the

21st Army Group in 1944-45, enjoyed the trust of his troops - and consequent loyalty and respect - throughout his command. Trust in Montgomery was based on his victory at El Alamein in 1942 and subsequent successes in North Africa and in Italy. It was sustained in North West Europe despite the delays in Normandy and the disappointment of Arnhem. Montgomery’s biographer described this achievement in the following terms:

'Monty’s appeal across the chasm between leader and those led rested in great measure on the trust he inspired: a trust that he had the ordinary soldier’s well-being at heart, that he would not risk life unnecessarily but would wage war with a studied attention to casualties and the cost of victory.'

For Mission Command to function effectively, a superior needs to have trust not only of, but also in his subordinates. Thus trust must be seen to function both ways. The basis of this two-way trust is mutual understanding.

**MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING**

0220. Like trust, **mutual understanding** requires time to become established. With experience, commanders should be in a position to understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates. Professional knowledge and study will give subordinates, in turn, an insight into command at levels higher than their own. Thus a good commander ensures that he understands his subordinates and that they understand him. Only then can they together conduct operations in a cohesive and effective manner. Mutual understanding is also based on sharing a common perception of military problems. Here a common doctrine and philosophy of command bonds commanders and subordinates together by providing a unifying framework of understanding. This does not imply any requirement to come to identical solutions, as Mission Command stresses that an understanding of what effect has to be achieved is more important than concurrence over how it is to be achieved.

0221. A common approach to command, based on a professional understanding of doctrine, drills and procedures, including the **language of command**, assists mutual understanding and is a fundamental tool of Mission Command. Commanders’ intentions must be quite clear to subordinates if they are to understand what they are to achieve. On operations, there will seldom be time for questions or debate over the

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meanings of tactical terms or command expressions. The most infamous unclear order in British military history illustrates this point:

‘Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.’

Thus for those who aspire to command or hold key operational staff jobs in the Army, there is no substitute for professional competence, including fluency in the language of command.

**TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING**

0222. **Mission Command requires timely and effective decisions at all levels.** Much of the art of command consists of a timely recognition of the circumstances and moment demanding a new decision. This is dependent on good **judgement** and **initiative**. The British approach to operations requires that a commander must aim to reach a timely decision in relation to an opponent’s own decision-action process. Implicit in this is the ability to know if a decision is required at that level of decision-making, and if it is, **when** it must be taken. The requirement is thus to make the appropriate decision at the right time. In some circumstances it will be wise for a commander to delay making a decision if he has insufficient information or when he is dependent on other decisions yet to be made. However, fleeting opportunities should be grasped. Thus many tactical decisions, in particular, will have to be made on the basis of incomplete information. **He who always waits for the latest available or ‘complete’ information, is unlikely to act decisively or in good time.**

0223. **Responsibility for Decision-Making.** The ability to take difficult decisions marks a strong commander. Those who are unsure of themselves may seek to have the decision referred up the chain of command, or may turn to their advisers for help. As Major General J.F.C. Fuller observed:

‘How many generals say to their staffs: ‘Give me all the facts and information and then leave me alone for half an hour, and I will give you my decision.’ In place they seek a decision from their staffs, and frequently the older they are the more they seek it, because they so...

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often feel that the latest arrival from the Staff College must know more than they do - sometimes they are not wrong.12

Fuller underlined the point that decision-making on key issues is the province of the commander, whilst routine decision-making should be delegated to the staff. This is not to say, however, that senior members of the staff or principal subordinates should not participate in the decision-making process. A wise commander will heed sound advice, but the final responsibility for decision-making at his level is his alone. He must balance the expert, sometimes conflicting, opinion he receives from advisers and subordinates and decide, so committing his command to a course of action.

0224. Planning. Having made a decision, the commander remains responsible for the direction of future planning (see Chapter 3).

THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER

CREATING THE COMMAND CLIMATE

0225. Whether in peacetime or on operations, a commander, by force of his personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour, has a considerable influence on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff and subordinate commanders. Thus it is a commander's responsibility to create and maintain an effective 'climate' within his command. Although Montgomery has been severely criticised for his authoritarian manner and attitudes to certain individuals, he was clear enough on the requirement to create the 'right atmosphere':

'Inspiration and guidance must come from above and must permeate throughout the force. Once this is done there is never any difficulty, since all concerned will go ahead on the lines laid down; the whole force will thus acquire balance and cohesion, and the results on the day of battle will be very apparent.'13

0226. Successful Mission Command depends on a climate of command which encourages subordinate commanders at all levels to think independently and to take the initiative. Subordinates will also expect to know the 'reason


13. FM Montgomery, High Command in War, 21st Army Group, June 1945, p. 21.
why’. A wise commander will recognise this; he will explain his intentions to his subordinates and so foster a sense of involvement in decision-making and shared commitment.

COMMAND PRIOR TO OPERATIONS

0227. Prior to the commencement of operations, a commander directs, trains and prepares his command, and ensures that sufficient resources are available. He should also concern himself with the professional development of individuals to fit them for positions of increased responsibility on operations. As Mission Command requires an understanding of operations two levels up, it follows that the training of future commanders must reflect this requirement. In addition, a dedicated component of all officers’ training should prepare individuals to assume command one level up. This requires that they should also be capable of holding their own in military debate two levels up from that.14 The training of subordinates is a key responsibility of all commanders in peacetime and a core function which, if neglected, under-resourced, or delegated without close supervision, will undermine the operational effectiveness and fighting power of the Army.

0228. Fostering an Understanding of War. Within its wider context, professional development also includes evoking an interest in the conduct of war through the critical study of past campaigns and battles in order to learn relevant lessons for the future. In this respect, commanders should give a lead in educating subordinates through battlefield tours, staff rides15 and study days which can stimulate considerable professional interest, evoke an understanding for the realities of war and widen military perspectives in peacetime. Often the basis of such studies is historical research. However, as Michael Howard advised in his lecture ‘The Use and Abuse of Military History’ (1961), caution needs to be applied in drawing lessons from the past. Study must be undertaken in width, depth and in context if it is ‘to improve the officer’s competence in his profession’.16

0229. Resourcing for Operations. The commander must focus attention on identifying the resources required for operations, managing their condition and ensuring that they are available. Whether these resources are material


15. A staff ride consists of a systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each.

stocks, equipment or manpower, their readiness requires confirmation. This is achieved by promoting good personnel administration and equipment husbandry measures.\textsuperscript{17} Details are contained in ADP Volume 3 \textit{Logistics}.

\textbf{COMMAND ON OPERATIONS}

0230. \textbf{Approach}. On operations, a commander must lead his command at a time of fear and uncertainty to defeat his enemy quickly and at minimum cost to his own forces, whilst maintaining the morale and material well-being of his troops. The complexities of Operations Other Than War and of war will rarely call for the measured unfolding of a carefully rehearsed plan. Command requires the determined application of the Principles of War interpreted through current doctrine. To be successful, a commander must be capable above all of \textit{selecting} and then \textit{maintaining his aim} resolutely whilst displaying \textit{flexibility} in his approach to achieving it.

0231. \textbf{Command Function in Relation to Level of Command}. A commander's function varies with his level of command and of responsibility. At the highest level, senior commanders exercise 'High Command' through subordinate commanders.\textsuperscript{18} Thus their leadership of troops is mainly \textit{indirect}. At the lowest level of command, junior commanders are primarily involved in leading men \textit{directly} in combat. Between these two levels, middle-ranking, subordinate field commanders, translate the intentions of those in high command, and command their formations and units. In addition to leading men, such commanders - with increasing rank - have increasing responsibilities for the organization, training and allocation of resources within their commands. Although the levels of conflict are not tied to particular levels of command, the term 'High Command' is normally associated with the military strategic and operational levels. Command at the tactical level is termed 'Battle Command'.

\textsuperscript{17} The responsibilities of commanders are described in Queens Regulations (QRs) (1975), Chapter 3 (Duties of Commanders) and Chapter 5 (Unit Command, Control and Administration). QRs Para 3.001 state: 'Common to all levels of command from independent sub unit upwards it is the responsibility of the commander for:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [a.] The command, training, security, discipline, education, health, morale and general efficiency of the troops under command.
  \item [b.] The efficient administration of his command...
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{18} Whilst QRs Chapter 2, 'Command Within the Army', distinguishes between 'Higher Command' (formation level and above) and 'Lower Command' (unit level and below), the commonly accepted and long established term 'High Command' is retained in this doctrine publication (c.f. \textit{High Command}, W.O. Code 9738, 1961).
HIGH COMMAND

0232. Commanders at High Command are concerned with the planning and execution of campaigns and major joint and multinational operations, to meet grand strategic objectives. A commander’s competence at these levels will depend to a large extent on his understanding and application of Operational Art. This, in turn, rests on his ability to understand the environment in which operations are to take place, and his knowledge and understanding of his opponent’s capabilities and vulnerabilities. It also demands skill in force planning, the management of resources and the application of technology to achieve operational goals.

0233. Proficiency in High Command demands close co-operation with (and respect for) other services and the forces of other nations. It further requires the ability to deal with those political, legal, financial and media pressures, which are normally associated with the military strategic and operational levels of conflict (see Chapter 6). Thus the higher commander needs to have a wide perspective of the application of military force and to understand its strategic and operational context and the risks involved in its use. Ultimately, his likelihood of achieving success will depend on his professional experience and judgement, and his ability to take the appropriate decisions in the full knowledge that the cost of failure could be catastrophic for his command, and, ultimately, for his nation.

BATTLE COMMAND

0234. When military force has to be applied, the achievement of strategic and operational goals largely depends on tactical success. Thus, at the tactical level, a commander is concerned with winning battles and engagements in accordance with the plan of campaign or major operation. Whilst luck may have some part to play, a commander’s tactical success is normally based on more certain military requirements such as good leadership, based on the ability to motivate his command and professional competence at all levels. Battle Command demands a sound knowledge and understanding of tactical doctrine, the ability of a commander to translate his superior’s intentions into effective action at his level and expertise in the

19. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0304.

20. Defined in ADP Vol 1 Para 0301 as ‘the skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration and conduct of campaigns and major operations’.
techniques required to succeed in battle. In short, the tactical commander’s focus must lie on the skilful defeat of the enemy by timely decision-making, superior use of arms and competence in synchronizing combined arms on the battlefield.

**COMMAND IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

0235. In Operations Other Than War the distinction between High Command and Battle Command is far less clear-cut. Commanders at the lower tactical levels may be confronted with legal, political and media pressures normally associated with High Command. More typically, unit or formation commanders accustomed to training and operating at the tactical level may have an operational level component in the exercise of their command. Command in Operations Other Than War is covered in more detail at Chapter 7.

**ASSESSMENT OF SUBORDINATES**

0236. Once appointed, a higher commander must study the personalities and characteristics of his subordinate formation commanders. Some need a tighter rein: others work best when given their heads. Some will be content with a general directive; others, less confident with Mission Command, will prefer more detail. Some will tire easily and require encouragement and moral support; others, perhaps uninspiring in peace, will find their feet and flourish on operations. Matching talent to tasks is thus an important function of command. The higher commander must, therefore, continue to judge men in peace and on operations, so that the right commanders can be appointed in the right place for the right time. The assessment of individuals and handling them to best effect applies to a commander’s staff as well as to his subordinate commanders. The recognition of subordinates’ strengths and limits is vital to the effective exercise of command. As Jomini remarked:

> He [Napoleon] fell from the height of greatness because he forgot that the mind and strength of men have their limits, and the more enormous the masses that are set in motion, the more subordinate does individual genius become to the inflexible laws of nature, and the less is the control which it exercises over events.\(^{21}\)

0237. Inevitably some commanders (and members of the staff) will fail, and in their own interests and those of their commands, will have to be removed.

The chain of command must assist in this necessary process, however unpleasant for those involved. As Field Marshal Slim advised, for example, an army commander should remove a divisional commander (in other words, removal should be done two levels down). When treating failure at lower levels, however, there is often scope for giving officers and men a second chance. As General Sir John Hackett observed: 'An opportunity to re-establish himself in his own esteem, when he has forfeited it, is something for which a man will give you a great deal in return.'

Successful commanders who have unexpectedly failed may be simply worn out; after rest and recuperation they can be returned to operations and prove themselves again. It is a matter for the higher commander to decide whether they should be returned to their old commands, or given new ones.

One of the most important duties of a commander is to report on his subordinates and to identify future potential candidates for senior appointments in command and on the staff. To allow the objective assessment of the command qualities of subordinates, individuals should be placed in circumstances where they must make decisions and live with the consequences. They must also know that their superiors have sufficient confidence in them to permit honest mistakes. Training should give an opportunity for judgements to be made on individual qualities (listed below). In particular, any assessment of subordinates should confirm whether they exhibit the necessary balance of professionalism, intelligence and practicality required to carry the added breadth and weight of responsibilities that go with promotion.

QUALITIES OF COMMANDERS

There is no unique formula for describing the 'right combination' of qualities required of commanders. Clausewitz, for example, described two 'indispensable' qualities of command:

- Leadership
- Professional Knowledge
- Vision and Intellect
- Judgement and Initiative
- Courage and Resolve
- Self Confidence
- The Ability to Communicate
- Integrity and Example

22. Field Marshal The Viscount Slim, Lecture to the Staff College, 2 Nov 67.

'First, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some
glimmerings of the inner light which leads to the truth; and second, the
courage to follow this faint light wherever it may go.'\textsuperscript{24}

Field Marshal Montgomery, however, described command as 'the capacity
and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character
which inspires confidence'.\textsuperscript{25} Both descriptions are accurate. Command thus
requires a combination of conceptual and human qualities, together with a
number of inter-personal skills including the ability to communicate.

0241. \textbf{A successful commander requires a measured balance of
cerebral, moral and physical qualities, those of intellect, character and
temperament.} This applies equally at both High and Battle Command.
Whatever the level, the foundation of successful command is good \textit{leadership},
complemented by a number of key attributes such as \textit{professional
knowledge}, and underpinned by \textit{integrity} and \textit{example}. In general, the
higher the level of command, the wider the scope of qualities required.
Additionally, the emphasis in, and between, the required qualities changes.
For example, those at higher levels are likely to require greater \textit{moral} than
\textit{physical courage} and will have increasing demands placed on their \textit{intellect}.
Organizational and management skills including \textit{vision} and the \textit{ability to
communicate} will complement those of \textit{leadership, judgement, initiative
and self-confidence}. That said, the qualities do not lend themselves to being
added together to produce the characteristics of an 'ideal' commander; a
commander with poor leadership ability, for example, despite strengths in
other qualities, is very unlikely to be a good commander.

\section*{LEADERSHIP}

0242. \textbf{A commander must be a leader.} Military leadership is the projection
of personality and character to get soldiers to do what is required of them.
Field Marshal Slim described the attribute as 'that mixture of example,
persuasion and compulsion which makes men do what you want them to
do.'\textsuperscript{26} There is no ideal pattern of leadership or simple prescription for it;
different commanders will motivate subordinates in different ways. Leadership

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Clausewitz, Carl von. \textit{On War}. p. 102.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Field Marshal Sir William Slim. 'Courage and Other Broadcasts, Marks of Greatness. The
\end{itemize}
is essentially creative. It is the commander who determines the objective and, whilst assisted by his staff, conceives the plan and provides the drive, motivation and energy to attain it. Yet, as BMD stresses, 'no military leader will succeed if he does not know the organization, however large or small, that he is privileged to command'. Thus as far as conditions allow, the commander should see and be seen by his troops and not let his staff get between him and his men.

0243. **Morale.** An interest in, and a deep knowledge and understanding of, humanity will help a commander assess the characteristics, aptitudes, shortcomings and state of training of his formations and units. Above all, the commander must give his command an identity, promote its self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort, and give it achievable aims, thus ensuring success. Along with discipline, comradeship and self-respect, leadership is a fundamental component of morale. 'High morale', wrote Montgomery, 'is a quality which is good in itself and is latent in all men. It maintains human dignity. It enables fear and fatigue to be overcome'. 27 Slim, meanwhile, was of the view:

'Morale is a state of mind. It is that intangible force which will move a whole group of men to give their last ounce to achieve something, without counting the cost to themselves; that makes them feel they are part of something greater than themselves.' 28

0244. **Generalship.** Generalship is the highest form of military leadership, and marks an officer suited for operational command at the highest levels. In terms of contemporary warfare, generalship involves not only professional knowledge and proficiency, intellect, and judgement to a higher degree than required at lower levels of command, but also the ability to deal competently with a number of other requirements associated with High Command. These include an understanding of the political dimension of his command, ability to handle the media, and the additional responsibilities that go with joint and multinational command (see Chapter 6). Therefore a wide range of command qualities and skills is required. As Richard Holmes has observed, however, '...save in the case of a few brilliant exceptions, generalship is not acquired by osmosis, but by a mixture of formal training and the practical exercise of


command."^29 Yet such is the complexity of the task that there is no ideal example of generalship - as Frederick the Great observed: 'A perfect general, like Plato's republic, is a figment of the imagination.'^30

PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

0245. **A commander must be a master of his profession.** His subordinates will have no confidence in him unless he is. He must be professionally proficient ('knowing his business') at whatever level he is commanding and have insight into the wider nature of his profession. This is largely dependent on professional knowledge. In addition to formal education and training, a commander's knowledge is determined by experience and by personal study of his own profession. With increasing rank, much of this professional study falls on the individual officer as self development. The lesser the degree of relevant operational experience at the level he is commanding (or about to command), the greater is the imperative to study. This calls for research, thought and reflection on the theory and practice of war, an understanding of doctrine and its flexible application to meet new circumstances.

0246. **Technical Knowledge.** Whilst a commander cannot hope to be an expert in all the technicalities of contemporary warfare, he must have sufficient knowledge to be able to judge the soundness of the technical advice given to him. Therefore he must know the capabilities and limitations of his weapons, communications, information and surveillance systems. To be a good administrator a commander also requires a sound knowledge of logistics and personnel matters.

0247. **Knowing Your Enemy.** Whereas, in the past, the principal threat was known and well-documented, and study and training could be directed towards it, the location and scope of future conflict is far less certain. Warning times for future conflicts involving British forces and those of allies may prove short. Thus there may only be limited time for the study of the enemy and the operational environment of a new area or theatre of operations. Commanders must therefore anticipate sensibly, and study more broadly in peacetime the characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of likely enemies, or, in the case of Operations Other Than War, of belligerent parties.

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VISION AND INTELLECT

0248. A commander will neither understand a complex situation in a campaign, major operation or battle, nor be able to decide what to do (requiring vision), without intellect. Apart from intelligence, intellect embraces clarity of thought (including the ability to seek and identify the essentials), originality (based on imagination), and judgement and initiative (described below).

0249. The most successful higher commanders in history have displayed a 'genius' for war, transcending that associated with intellect alone. Echoing Clausewitz, Fuller observed: 'Like the great artist the general should possess genius, and if he does not, then no effort should be spared to develop his natural abilities in place of suppressing them.' Napoleon, however, who often appeared to have luck on his side, remarked:

'If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and have foreseen what may occur. It is not genius which reveals to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and meditation.'

Napoleon's view thus reinforces the role of study in the education of commanders. Whilst genius is an innate quality, some of the intellectual requirements of higher commanders can be developed in training. In particular, clarity of thought and judgement, including powers of decision-making, can be enhanced through specific training systems, including computer-assisted wargaming and exercises.

0250. Vision. A fundamental objective of warfighting is to bring armed force to bear effectively in order to defeat the enemy. To accomplish this, commanders need to set the conditions they wish to establish at the end of a campaign, major operation or battle; they must work out in advance the desired End-State. Only once this is done can a plan be developed; no

31. Maj Gen Fuller, J.F.C. Generalship, p. 87. Clausewitz noted: 'Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievement, their possessor is called a 'genius'. ' (On War, p. 100.)


33. The End-State is defined as in ADP Vol 1 Para 0324b as 'that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign either to terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.'
coherent plan of campaign can be written without a clear vision of how it should be concluded. The same approach applies in Operations Other Than War. The ability to anticipate enables a commander to take positive steps to achieve his vision. In peacetime this is likely to be preparing his command for a range of operational tasks. On operations, it will be achieving a mission or a campaign objective. In order to do this, a commander shapes his organization and gives it purpose by setting attainable goals. Communicating the vision throughout the span of command before a battle or campaign is as vital as the vision itself. Its establishes the framework by which command at lower levels is developed, practised and sustained. How a higher commander communicates his vision to his force will depend upon his own style; he may address large audiences, visit his subordinates and units, issue directives or combine these methods.

0251. **Originality.** Originality, one of the hallmarks of intellect, is arguably a key element of command and is at a particular premium at high command. Major General J.F.C. Fuller wrote:

>'Originality, not conventionality, is one of the main pillars of generalship. To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him morally. To be always thinking ahead and to be peeping round corners. To spy out the soul of one's adversary, and to act in a manner which will astonish and bewilder him, this is generalship.'

Thus, the ability to innovate, rather than adopt others' methods, singles out the original commander as one well equipped for adopting a manoeuvrist approach to operations. However, whilst few successful commanders have been unoriginal, the more successful 'original' commanders have placed considerable emphasis in explaining their ideas to their subordinates in order to foster mutual understanding.

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36. Cynics might suggest that Montgomery was an unoriginal commander, but this would belittle his achievement based on an original approach to many aspects of command - 'teaching the generals', as no other contemporary did - to name only one. See Annex A to this Chapter for further details and Annex A to ADP Vol 1.
At the lowest levels, judgement is a matter of common-sense, tempered by military experience. As responsibility increases, greater judgement is required of commanders, which is largely a function of knowledge and intellect. To succeed, a commander must be able to read each major development in a tactical or operational situation and interpret it correctly in the light of the intelligence available, to deduce its significance and to arrive at a timely decision. However, a commander seldom has a complete picture of the situation, as many of the factors affecting a commander’s choice of a course of action are not susceptible to precise calculation. To weigh up the imponderables in a confusing situation, a commander needs a clear brain and must exercise sound judgement to distinguish the essentials from a mass of detail, and to identify practical solutions. This requires powers of decision-making.

Powers of Decision-Making. The ability to decide (decisiveness) is central to the exercise of command. It requires a balance between analysis and intuition. In the pursuit of timely decision-making required by Mission Command, a commander should have confidence in his own judgement. He should maintain his chosen course of action until persuaded that there is a sufficiently significant change in the situation to require a new decision - at times, it will be a conscious decision to decide not to make a decision. A commander then requires the moral courage to adopt a new course of action and the mental flexibility to act purposefully when the opportunity of unexpected success presents itself. Conversely, a commander must avoid the stubborn pursuit of an unsuccessful course to disaster. As Clausewitz observed “strength of character can degenerate into obstinacy ...it comes from reluctance to admit one is wrong” 37; thus the borderline between resolve and obstinacy is a fine one. In times of crisis, a commander must remain calm and continue to make decisions appropriate to his level of command. His calmness prevents panic and his resolution compels action. When under stress, the temptation to meddle in lower levels of command at the expense of the proper level - contrary to the decentralized ethos of Mission Command - should be resisted unless it is vital for the survival of that command. This rule, however, is easier to state than to follow in the heat of battle. The unfortunate Marshal of France Bazeine, for example, who tended personally to the siting of individual gun batteries rather than committing his reserves

during the battle of Gravelotte-St Privat during the Franco-Prussian War, was neither the first nor the last commander to become thoroughly distracted and so lose a battle.  

0254. **The Role of Intuition.** A commander may have to make a decision in the absence of all desirable information because, in his judgement, there is an imperative to initiate action quickly. The requirement to make intuitive decisions also occurs when there is insufficient time to weigh up *analytically* all the advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action. Intuition is not wholly synonymous with instinct, as it is not solely a 'gut feeling'. Intuition is rather a *recognitive* quality, based on military judgement, which in turn rests on an informed understanding of the situation based on professional knowledge and experience. Clausewitz described intuition (in terms of the French phrase *coup d’oeil*) as '...the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss or would perceive only after long study and reflection.'

At the tactical level, intuitive decisions require a confident and sure 'feel' for the battlefield (including an eye for ground and a close perception of the enemy's morale and likely course of action). Intuition plays an equally valuable part at the operational level. When a commander is receiving too much information and advice (suffering 'information overload'), there is a danger of 'paralysis by analysis'. In such circumstances, an intuitive decision may prove appropriate. As John Masters reflected:

'...The higher [the commander] stands the more he needs, too, another quality which cannot be taught by any quick means but is either there, by a stroke of genetic chance, or more usually, is deposited cell by cell on the subconscious during long years of study and practice. It is this quality which tells a commander, instantly and without cerebration, whether a plan is inherently sound or unsound.'

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38. See Howard, Michael. *The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71*, (London: Methuen, 1981), p. 173: 'There can be little doubt that (Bazeine) was morally if not physically exhausted; that the weight of responsibility had paralysed him, annihilating all power of action and independence of will'.

39. Clausewitz, *On War*, p.102. Clausewitz discusses this in the general context of 'Military Genius' (Chapter 3 of Book One) and in the specific context of a commander having to make decisions in the 'realm of chance' or in 'the relentless struggle with the unforeseen'.

40. The German term for this quality is *Fingerspitzengefühl*, for which there is no adequate translation into military English. It is literally translated as 'finger-tip feeling', but the expression in tactical German implies a confident and (rare) sureness of touch - or sixth sense - that characterises gifted or 'natural' commanders such as Alexander the Great, Caesar and both Napoleon and Wellington. Of more recent commanders, the quality was well exemplified in Rommel, the 'Desert Fox', who had an uncanny ability to be in the right place at the right time and to understand intuitively the wider operational level significance of tactical events happening around him and then to act decisively upon them.
It is this that enables him to receive the advice of specialists and experts, and reach the proper decision though the specialists conflict; and, on other occasions, to overrule them even when they speak with one voice.\textsuperscript{41}

Additionally, intuitive judgements, rather than those based on detailed analysis, may assist the higher commander in assessing the likely action or reaction of his opponent. By whatever method the commander achieves such an insight into the enemy, it represents an important step towards imposing his will on the enemy and so to dominate him.

0256. \textbf{Initiative}. Initiative is about recognising and grasping opportunities, together with the ability to solve problems in an original manner. This requires flexibility of thought and action. For a climate of initiative to flourish, a commander must be given the freedom to use his initiative and he must, in turn, encourage his own subordinates to use theirs. Although initiative cannot be taught, it can be developed and fostered through a combination of trust and mutual understanding and by training. This process must be begun in peacetime, as one military historian has observed: Running an army demands the copious exercise of initiative: it is fruitless to expect officers to employ Mission Command in war unless they have learned to make their own hard decisions, in command and on the staff, in peace.\textsuperscript{42} Commanders should be encouraged to take the initiative without fearing the consequences of failure. This requires a training and operational culture which promotes an attitude of calculated \textit{risk-taking in order to win} rather than to prevent defeat, which may often appear as the 'safer option'.

0257. \textbf{Flexibility}. Acting flexibly on personal initiative - based on a local assessment of a changed or unexpected situation - should be expected and thus encouraged on training, even if it means varying from the original orders. The key proviso is that any action by a subordinate should still fall within the general thrust and spirit of his superior's intentions. A subordinate should also report to his superior, and by implication, to other interested parties (such as flanking formations) any significant changes to the original plan without delay. This procedure promotes unity of effort and balances the requirement for local initiative with the need to keep others informed, so that they, in turn, can make any necessary adjustments to their own plans. Once the right

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\textsuperscript{42} Holmes, Richard in \textit{Nuclear Warriors Soldiers, Combat and Glasnost}, p. 285, uses \textit{Auftragstaktik} in place of Mission Command.
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conditions for the exercise of initiative have been established, commanders should be capable of acting purposefully, within their delegated freedom of action, in the absence of further orders.

**COURAGE AND RESOLVE**

0258. A commander must be resolute, a quality which relates directly to the first Principle of War - *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. Resolve helps a commander to remain undaunted by set-back, casualties and hardship; it gives him the personal drive and will to see the campaign, major operation or battle through to success. He must have the courage, **risk-taking ability** (boldness), **robustness** and **determination** to pursue that course of action which he knows to be right.

0259. **Courage**. Courage is a quality required by all leaders, regardless of rank or responsibility. **Physical courage** is one of the greatest moral virtues and characterises all good leaders. But for higher commanders, it is not sufficient on its own; the demands of warfare also call on their **moral courage** to take an unpopular decision and to stick by it in the face of adversity. Command at higher levels is not about taking expedient short-term solutions to tactical problems. It requires a commander to take the longer-term operational level view in the interests of his campaign objectives, commensurate with the need to motivate and sustain his force. As Richard Simpkin wrote:

> 'At the operational level the commander needs the moral courage to keep his judgement unclouded when forced to accept short term set-backs for the sake of long term aims, or to follow a course which he knows will cause heavy casualties among men who trust and respect him. Above all he needs moral courage to make big decisions and stick to them.'


0260. **Risk-Taking**. The willingness to take calculated risks, is an inherent aspect of resolve but requires military judgement. Although the inherent element of chance in war cannot be eliminated, the risks may be reduced by foresight and careful planning. However, a manoeuvrist approach to operations requires commanders who seek the initiative and take risks. Risk-taking
means making decisions where the outcome is uncertain and, in this respect, almost every military decision has an element of risk. This requires determination. It is for a commander to determine the balance - whether the risk is worth taking. A good commander acts boldly, grasps fleeting opportunities and, by so doing, appears to have luck on his side.44

0261. **Robustness.** Physical and mental fitness is a pre-requisite of command. Rarely can a sick, weak or exhausted man remain alert and make sound decisions under the stressful conditions of war. As Montgomery advised: 'Keep fit and fresh, physically and mentally. You will never win battles if you become mentally tired, or get run down in health.' This is not to say that old commanders cannot be successful - witness Moltke the Elder aged 70 in the Franco-Prussian War - but they must remain young and active in mind. Higher commanders must also possess sufficient mental and physical stamina to endure the strains of a protracted campaign, particularly in Operations Other Than War. In order to keep fresh and to maintain the required high levels of physical and mental fitness, commanders at all levels have a duty not only to themselves but also to their commands to obtain sufficient rest and to take leave, as appropriate.46 This lesson is not new, for Slim advised: 'Generals would do well to remember that, even in war, 'the wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure.' Generals who are terribly busy all day and half the night... wear out not only their subordinates but themselves.'47

**SELF-CONFIDENCE**

0262. Self confidence is linked to resolve and to professional knowledge reflecting in a justifiable confidence in one's own ability. A commander must maintain and project confidence in himself and his plans, even when he may harbour inner doubts as to the likelihood of success. There is a fine divide between promoting a sense of self confidence and appearing too self-

44. See Wavell in *Generals and Generalship*, p.7, who also notes: 'The general who allows himself to be bound and hampered by regulations is unlikely to win a battle.'

45. Montgomery, *High Command In War*, p. 44.

46. For details on the effects of sleep deprivation, see Table 4.1, p. 4-15. Further evidence on the impact of stress and sleep deprivation on decision-making at senior levels is contained in Directorate of Science (Land) report *Sleep, Stress and Decision-Making, Report of a study into Op GRANBY* (October 1994).

47. Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, p. 213.
opinionated. Self confidence based on the firm rock of professional knowledge and expertise brings its own assurance and humility; the hollow confidence based on presentational qualities alone is easily punctured.

0263. Commanders also need to have sufficient self confidence to listen constructively to the views of the staff and subordinate commanders without fear of losing their own authority. This form of dialogue acknowledges that a commander does not have all the answers and is receptive to good ideas. It also demonstrates confidence in subordinates and engenders a wider level of commitment. Above all, it promotes trust, mutual understanding and respect. A good commander does not, however, rely on others for the creative and imaginative qualities he himself should possess; rather he has the skill to use others’ ideas in pursuit of his own objectives to support the interests of his command.

THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE

0264. The ability to communicate effectively is an important aspect of command. However brilliant a commander’s powers of analysis and decision-making, they are of no use if he cannot express his intentions clearly in order that others can act. In peacetime, the temptation is to rely too much on written methods of communication which can be refined over time. Modern information technology and communications systems facilitate this approach, but written papers, briefs and directives may not necessarily have the same initial impact as oral orders, consultations and briefings. However, ‘hard copy’ continues to have an indispensable place in the exercise of command, including administration, to ensure clarity and consistency of approach. Thus, both oral and written powers of communication are vital to any commander.

0265. On operations, a commander must be able to think on his feet - without prepared scripts or notes - and be confident and competent enough to brief well and give succinct orders to his subordinates. Only in this way can he impose his will on his subordinates with his articulate command of the situation and by his personal example of clarity of thought and military expression. A commander must also be capable of briefing the press in a convincing manner.

INTEGRITY AND EXAMPLE

0266. The setting of high standards of conduct, based on professional ethics and personal mores, is a requirement of all commanders. Values such as moral courage, honesty, and loyalty are indispensable in any
organization. In a close community such as the military, however, observance of such values, based on **self-discipline, personal and professional integrity**, and adherence to both military and civilian law, plays a crucial role in the maintenance of military discipline and morale. Commanders thus have an important role in setting and maintaining the ethical climate of their commands, which must be robust enough to withstand the varied pressures and temptations of both peacetime soldiering and life on operations. It is the responsibility and military duty of all commanders to maintain a sense of values in their commands for the collective benefit (and hence operational effectiveness) of that command. This requirement, however, must be balanced against the need to safeguard individual rights.

0267. Integrity is a quality of command particularly vulnerable to public scrutiny. Although media interest tends to rise with higher rank, commanders at all levels must set an example. There can be no exceptions to this rule. However, any ethical line and code of discipline set by the higher command is unlikely to receive much credibility unless it is seen to apply to all ranks and to all sections of the military community.

0268. Self-control, which is, to paraphrase Clausewitz, the 'gift of keeping calm even under the greatest of stress' is an important component of setting the right example. It not only adds dignity to command but will aid its preservation. As General Robert E Lee put it, 'I cannot trust a man to control others who cannot control himself'.
INTRODUCTION

1. In the *Times History of the Boer War*, L.S. Amery wrote of Sir Redvers Buller, the British commander in the early days of the Boer War, and most notably during 'Black Week' of initial defeats, that 'Buller was an archetypal British senior officer - a bungler'\(^1\). This assumption, warranted or not, that British Commanders would make a mess of things in the first phase of any war, but 'that the man will emerge' is a very important theme in British military writing. It is summed up in such phrases that British generals lose all their battles except the last; to quote Admiral Lord Chatfield, who was Minister for Co-ordination of Defence in Neville Chamberlain's government as we went to war in 1939: 'it was traditional British policy never to be ready and to be rather proud of it'.\(^2\)

2. The theme that British Commanders are never ready for the war they are about to undertake is pervasive. And if they are not ready then it is a bit much to expect anybody else to be ready either. Anthony Eden once warned his listeners who might have military ambitions that, 'I would strongly advise them against holding a high military command in the first two years of any war in the British Army'. It was far 'Better to wait until the stuff begins to come along. Which, I am afraid, in the last two experiences (by which he meant the Two World Wars) was after the third year or later.'\(^3\)

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3. In addressing this theme, it is not suggested that there is a particular 'British style of command' which would be applicable under all circumstances. But there are certain features of British generalship which keep recurring and have done so throughout our history. If there is one word that sums up the British command style, it is improvisation. A universal expectation prevails, almost operating like a law of nature, that a Wellington or a Montgomery, will turn up and, to use the title of Field Marshal Slim's *Memoirs* (who should certainly be included in such a group), turn 'defeat into victory'. Therefore very high standards of improvisation are expected of British commanders, as 'things fall apart' and they are expected to patch them up again. In later life the Duke of Wellington made a very revealing remark: He said of the French marshals that he faced in the Peninsular War:

>'They planned their campaigns just as you might make a splendid piece of harness. It looks very well; and answers very well, until it gets broken; and then you are done for. Now I made my campaigns of rope. If anything went wrong, I tied a knot; and went on."  

4. This attitude established a firm foundation reinforced by the lustre of an illustrious reputation on which the pragmatic, a priori tradition was based throughout the nineteenth century.

5. It is also important to remember that all generals were once captains. All commanders are the product of their environment and the armies that produce them; and all have inherited a social and intellectual baggage, as it were, which guides their thoughts and actions. Though it may be tempting to study a list of qualities that will guarantee success in high command in war (and studying these in isolation from all other factors), this is easier said than done. Napoleon urged all young officers to learn and re-learn the campaigns of 'the great captains' (including the ancients, Alexander the Great and Caesar). In his opinion, this was the only way to succeed in war. But the British experience has shown that circumstances can conspire to swamp the commander, however much he has attempted to nurture those qualities in himself which seem to indicate success in war. Not all the generals who were defeated in the first stage of British wars were as inept tactically as Sir Redvers Buller (who was nonetheless adored by his troops: public opinion and popularity can be very fickle, and is not always a sound guide to a general's ability).

6. An attempt will be made here to try and delineate those features of British military history, and of the Army, which have conspired to demand very high standards of improvisation.

a. The role of the British Army in any future war has not always been thoroughly clarified throughout the twentieth century. After 1918, for example, it was difficult to pin down British political leaders and get them to specify what the Army was actually for. If this all-important specification was ignored, it left the military conundrums of strategy and operations hanging in the air; and clearly the procurement of weapons and the laying down of training programmes was a very hazardous process indeed. This is not to suggest, however, that improvisation is inappropriate, or that such factors are currently irrelevant.

b. Secondly, British strategy has been Janus-faced - and this remained the case until the later 1980s - between possible or real commitments to the European Continent and the defence of, or retreat from Empire. The regimental system as it evolved during the nineteenth century was very largely a response to the need to police the Empire, with paired battalions, one serving in the Dominions or Colonies, the other sending out replacements from home. This was a system set up by the Cardwell Reforms of 1873. It is no coincidence that Field Marshals Alexander and Auchinleck made their reputations on the North West Frontier; but their responses to fighting European armies would clearly be conditioned by their experience in military operations in the Empire.

c. So much of the inconsistencies and lack of continuity in British military policy were not resolved because, in contrast to the German Army, the British Army lacked a formal, professional General Staff, whose members (removed from the Regimental system) enjoyed the benefit of a command and staff course, both before and after 1939-45, of two years' duration (although since 1989 a Command and Staff Course has been instituted at Camberley). Thus training and doctrine 'on the cheap' is a recurring theme in British military history and contributed to the poor quality of the available British generals, after an initial expansion of the British Army, in 1915 and 1940-42. The CIGS, Alan Brooke, complained in 1941 that:

'It is lamentable how poor we are as regards Army and Corps Commanders; we ought to remove several, but heaven knows when we shall find anything very much better.'

5. Alanbrooke, MS Diary 5/4 Alanbrooke Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. Quoted by kind permission of the Trustees.
This may explain also some of the operational failures of British
generalship and weaknesses in inter-service and inter-arm co-operation.
There was no 'brain' in the inter-war Army remotely comparable to that
found in von Seeckt's Reichswehr, for example. Therefore, we may
deduce that much of the malaise that affected the British command in
both World Wars resulted from inadequate training (doctrine alone will
not train).

d. So much of British military culture, and military thought has been
conditioned by 'Small Wars' - the title of a book by C E Callwell published
in 1899, and still in print. This has led to a neglect of the question of scale
- not just in terms of the size of the number of troops available for any
operation, but of the scale of concept determining their deployment.

e. Finally, although other features could certainly be added to this list,
the British Army has long had a reputation for being anti-intellectual;
whatever the merit of this charge, the Army has certainly resisted (and
still does resist) attempts to develop systematic, doctrinally based
methods for preparing for war - at any rate, at the higher levels and this
has included failing to evolve a 'philosophy' of command. In the same
way that we have no written Constitution, ridicule the grand designs of
our European neighbours and rely on a pragmatic, step by step study of
a problem, as each case emerges, so our military commanders have
sought to approach the problems of higher command on an ad hoc basis
- treating each problem on its own terms and informed by the spirit of
common sense.

7. Often the Duke of Wellington sums up the classic British attitude. On the
eve of Waterloo in June 1815, the Earl of Uxbridge (the commander of the
cavalry and the titular Second-in-Command) had the temerity to ask what 'the
plans' were. Wellington replied very shortly: 'Well, Bonaparte has not given
me any ideas of his projects: and as my plans will depend on this, how can
you expect me to tell you what mine are?' And with an extraordinary moral
grandeur not always shared by some of his twentieth century successors, he
said: 'There is one thing certain, Uxbridge, that is, that whatever happens,
you and I will do our duty'. How splendidly British; this attitude elevates
pragmatism virtually to the level of religious mysticism.

8. But there have been two results of this in the twentieth century which
have not always been so admirable. Doctrinal discussion has been forced

6. Longford, Wellington, p. 442
on us in wartime, which has sometimes been less than helpful and produced considerable muddle. Secondly, there has been an excessive reliance on what have come to be called, 'buzz words' - catch phrases, the fashionable tags or 'cries', which are repeated endlessly and thoughtlessly without real understanding. There are two striking examples from the Two World Wars. The first was that 'artillery conquers, infantry occupies' in 1914-18. This led to a massive over-reliance on increasingly long artillery bombardments, which were to some extent counter-productive, not least in sacrificing surprise. Secondly, in 1941-42 British armour developed an obsession with seeking out 'the decisive tank battle', based on the fashionable belief that tank battles resembled fleet actions at sea. Yet these catch-phrases were not systematically analyzed or discussed.

9. Now, to turn to the actual practice of generalship in the twentieth century conducted within this framework, it is as well to remember four things:

a. That from 1815-1939, with the exception of 1915-18 the British Army was a colonial force, in organization, numbers and outlook. Therefore, the enormous increase of the British Army in the Two World Wars led to an influx of officers and men who were not well trained. Therefore the scale and variety of military operations which could be carried out by such troops was more restricted in scope compared with the armies of countries who enjoyed a more enduring tradition of large, conscript armies.

b. That we began both World Wars with negligible land forces - spread in small packets all over the world.

c. Under these conditions it was almost inevitable that Britain should lose battles, and some campaigns - but what she could not afford to do was lose the war. In both conflicts this was (just) achieved.

d. Yet even in periods of prolonged peacetime no sustained and convincing British command 'philosophy' emerged. This is perhaps one of the most striking features of the period of the Cold War, say 1947-89. Throughout these years the British Army, for the first time in its history, maintained a commitment to the defence of continental Europe, which was something far more entangling than the armies of occupation that followed 1815 and 1918. Simultaneously, the British Army waged numerous colonial and 'low intensity' operations during its 'retreat from Empire'. But no command synthesis emerged. This was in part because, in conducting its post-colonial campaigns, the Army fell back on its old 'small wars' traditions; and indeed each of these campaigns,
scattered all over the world, did seem to justify a step-by-step, pragmatic approach, because each case was individual and bore little relationship with another, save that the British Army was involved. As for the British Army of the Rhine, this was convulsed throughout the 1960s and 1970s by frequent, frenetic and frantic bouts of reorganization and restructuring, which seem to repeat one another and be reversed for the opposite reasons every few years. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that no coherent view of the practice of command evolved. 7

10. But it must be said that some perennial features of the British command system did not improve the chance of British generals to secure early victories. British commanders in the Second World War continually battled against certain aspects of the British system of war that kept rearing their ugly heads:

   a. The lack of unity of command is a striking feature, plus a tendency to command by committee in which the three Service Commanders in Chief - air, land and sea were co-equal, with the Army CinC being able to 'advise' the other two. The position of a Supreme Commander in 1941-45 was forced on the British by the Americans.

   b. It was only during the Second World War that anything remotely resembling a proper chief of staff system, in which the COS was free to act in the name of his commander, was developed. But this development was largely personality-driven and was advocated by Montgomery in 21st Army Group: it was not a 'root and branch' reform. Although we need not assume that a Chief of Staff system is a prerequisite for military success, it is an important factor that should not be disregarded.

   c. Area, geographical commands, such as Middle East, India or South East Asia, rather than formation commands, have prevailed. In these the CinCs have important political duties. Another layer of command, such as, for example, Allied Forces South East Asia, was introduced in Burma in 1944 which had only one fighting formation, the Fourteenth Army. Clearly the operational commanders wished to confer with the CinC or Supreme Commander rather than an intermediate level of command.

11. Although British generalship in the First World War has been the subject of severe criticism over the years, it was the product of a particular system, and was not just the fruit of the peculiar idiosyncrasies and shortcomings of those particular individuals who happened to be commanding at the time. It was the universal belief throughout the nineteenth century that it was the prime duty of a general to set the strategy for their armies and distribute his forces in accordance with his plan; but once the general engagement commenced tactical arrangements were entirely the business of his subordinate commanders. The most revered model in this regard was General Robert E Lee, who throughout 1862 virtually single-handedly saved the Confederacy from imminent defeat, by using such a system (which he had learnt from Lt Gen Winfield Scott during his campaign in Mexico, 1847-8). But it relied heavily on an intuitive understanding with 'Stonewall' Jackson, and was seen to rather lesser effect during the Gettysburg Campaign of 1863 after Jackson's death. Thereafter Lee increasingly abandoned it and took upon himself the task of directing the tactics by which the outcome of his battles ultimately hung. Through the medium of the writings of Col G F R Henderson and his many imitators, the campaigns of Lee and Jackson were studied intensely.  

12. Yet the conditions of 1914-18 were rather different from those of 1861-65. In the first instance, Haig was too aloof and solitary to enjoy any relationship with another commander remotely similar to that of Lee with Jackson. Haig was a remote character who inspired fear; unlike Lee, he liked to be surrounded by sycophants; he did not appreciate the efforts of those who had the temerity to disagree with him. This led to a rather rigid system of command, accentuated by Haig's notion that 'The chief duty of the higher command is to prepare for battle, not to execute on the battlefield. After having clearly indicated to subordinate leaders their respective missions we must leave the execution to them'. The result of this 'laissez faire' view of command was that Haig in a very vital sense did not command his armies, but he did control them. An example of his dominance occurred in 1918 when the new Commander of Fifth Army, General Birdwood was persuaded by the other Army Commanders (perhaps because he was their junior) to suggest some modifications to a pamphlet, Division in Defence. 'But when Birdie began, Haig bit him: 'I won't have anyone criticising my orders'. Birdie collapsed and the others said nothing,' recalled an eye witness.

13. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong in the Commander in Chief dominating his command and stamping his will on his commanders. It was rumoured that Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Snow (GOC VII Corps) was more frightened of Haig than he was of the Germans. Yet the structural novelty of the relationship of Haig and GHQ led to a number of difficulties. The huge expansion of the BEF from six to 66 divisions and the shortage of trained staff officers had led to a reduction in the number of visits officers from GHQ paid to the front. Yet these visits were not replaced by any formal system of liaison officers, so that GHQ was out of touch with what was actually happening at the front, and a gap undoubtedly emerged between the planners and those who carried out the operations.

14. The lack of clear direction that often resulted led to confusion over policy and the pursuit of over-ambitious objectives during the Somme and Third Ypres Campaigns in 1916-17. In both these instances, Haig had his way over the adoption of unlimited objectives even though the commander on the spot had doubts. Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army, was an exponent of the 'bite and hold' policy of mounting a series of limited attacks. Yet Haig maintained in December 1917 in a letter to his wife, that 'Of course the Army commander must fight his own battle - I can give him all the troops available and general instructions....' Yet on two notable occasions this largely improvised system of command, in which many staff officers lacked essential experience, seemed to offer the Army Commander the worst of both worlds. Haig interfered too much but commanded too little.9

15. Recent studies have identified the Corps level as a significant source of weakness in the command structure of the BEF. But it might be that the root of the organizational problem lay in the failure to evolve an army group structure. Haig commanded five armies in November 1918, one entity of 66 divisions. This was a much larger force than that commanded at the army group level in the West in 1944-45. It was too unwieldy and required modification. In this case, it is interesting to compare Allenby's performance in Palestine in 1917-18 with that of Haig. Allenby commanded a much smaller force - comparable to a single Army on the Western Front. He attempted and succeeded at performing as his own intelligence officer. Haig, more remote, seemed more out of touch; he was much less open-minded than Allenby and consistently accepted the grotesquely exaggerated forecasts of his chief of intelligence, John Charteris, who saw as his main task the confirmation of Haig's prejudices.10 But there can be no doubt that Allenby had the easier

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In 1918, however, Haig had learnt sufficiently from the experience of 1916-17 to make himself more accessible, and during the Summer Offensive of 1918 he travelled about the front in a special train so that he could be more easily consulted about the tactical and operational dilemmas confronting individual Army commanders.

**THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

16. Nonetheless, the main lesson that was derived by younger British officers of the First World War generation, was that the style and conduct of GHQ on the Western Front in 1914-18 should be avoided in any future war. Commanders must command and be seen to command, and not be shut up in comfort miles from the front. Detailed study reveals this to be an unfair caricature. But the structure of the British command system remained bureaucratic and cumbersome. For example, in 1940 the Commander-in-Chief Middle East was a theatre commander, not an army group commander. The British command structure both at home and in the Empire was built around geographical areas, not formations, in which the CinC often had important political and administrative duties; these areas were frequently huge, but the troops deployed in them (especially in peacetime) small in number. Consequently, a further area command was often inserted between the CinC and the fighting formations. In the Western Desert in 1940, Lt Gen Sir Richard O'Connor of the Western Desert Force (WDF, later XIII Corps) had to deal with British Troops in Egypt (BTE, commanded by Lt Gen Sir Henry Maitland-Wilson), before being given access to the CinC, even though O'Connor commanded a mere two divisions in the field.

17. This muddying of the chain of command led to a less than dynamic system in war, and explains some of the seemingly odd decisions arrived at by the CinC, Wavell, during the vexed year of 1940-41. For example, O'Connor was bitterly disappointed when Wavell decided to withdraw 4th Indian Division on the night of 10-11 December 1940, after the dazzling success of Operation COMPASS. Yet this decision should not be judged by an operational standard of comparison, because Wavell had so many other pressing priorities in his vast command. On this occasion, the strategic gains resulting from the conquest of Italian East Africa and the opening of the Red Sea, could not be neglected. Likewise, Wavell's decision in March 1941 to bring operations in Cyrenaica to a premature end before they had realised their tremendous promise, and the occupation of Tripoli completed, in favour of intervening in Greece, was probably inevitable given the higher demands of grand strategy. Too much was being asked of tired and over-stretched forces. Wavell was certainly over-sanguine. Yet he was too pragmatic to try
and obstinately resist political intrusion because he understood that his task was just as much political, strategic and administrative, as it was operational.

18. There is one other aspect of the command system that deserves attention. It forced Wavell to take too many decisions at too many different and competing levels. Because his various forces were so small, he ultimately became sucked into discussion about tactical deployments, despite the fact that in the Spring of 1941 he was directing five campaigns simultaneously. Wavell failed (and was inclined to blame himself) to reconnoitre the terrain personally before the defensive line at El Agheila, and this led to faulty defensive dispositions and an erroneous estimate of the strength needed to hold the Western flank. Wavell believed that Rommel could not possibly launch an attack before May 1941. But even accepting the small size of the forces available, it was not Wavell’s prime duty to attend to tactics, and Philip Neame failed to exert a tough enough grip over his forces.  

19. Throughout the Desert War (1940-43) British higher headquarters were too bureaucratic, too tied to geographic areas and not sufficiently flexible to cope with a rapid war of manoeuvre. In Operation BATTLEAXE, Beresford-Peirse’s HQ was 60 miles from the front, Cunningham was 80 miles behind the lines in Operation CRUSADER, and Ritchie was 60 miles from the point of decision at the height of the Battle of Gazala. All of these campaigns smack of ‘small wars’ and improvisation. The improvised columns that were frequently organised during these years - ‘Western Desert Force’, ‘W’ Force’, ‘East Africa Force’, ‘Creforce’, ‘Habforce’, to name but a few, are central to the British ‘way’ of warfare in this period. Their formation contributed to the dispersal and loss of experienced staff officers (like those of XIII Corps) and added to Wavell’s problems in controlling his disparate and understrength units.

20. Experiments with smaller, manoeuvre forces, like the ‘brigade groups’ (ad hoc forces that are not to be confused with today’s battle groups), were brought to an end by the appointment of Lt Gen B L Montgomery as GOC Eighth Army in 1942. Montgomery was determined to exercise command through the existing structures, of divisions and corps, and not meddle with these during wartime. While at Eighth Army, and on the larger canvas of 21st Army Group, Montgomery developed a style of command which owed much to the administrative excellence of GHQ in 1914-18, but sought to eradicate its operational errors. Montgomery attempted to eliminate risk from the

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planning process by exhaustive study and thought. This produced the 'Master Plan'. Montgomery sought to save soldiers' lives by the maximum use of firepower and materiel. There were two reasons for this. First, the British Army was facing a manpower crisis. 21st Army Group, in effect, had 90,000 riflemen and Montgomery could not afford to lose them at a greater rate than 300 per day. Secondly, Montgomery recognised that the morale of his troops was essentially fragile. He therefore adopted the methods of the politician to an extraordinary degree, by making striking speeches and appearances, and courting publicity. His main aim was to secure the trust of his soldiers and build up confidence on the basis of a record of consistent success. Hence the cautious approach to operational planning.

21. Montgomery relied heavily on his Chief of Staff - probably more so than any other British commander of his generation. Not only were the majority of administrative matters delegated to him, but he had full authority to act in the name of the CinC, and represented him at conferences. Montgomery had the good sense to realise that the bane of the great majority of British generals' lives was detail. He attempted to free himself from this by relying heavily on his COS, Maj Gen 'Freddie' de Guingand. What he needed above all was time - for quiet thought and contemplation, and not be bothered and worn down by unimportant administrative matters. Thus his headquarters was essentially split into two departments - HQ (Main) which could be further sub-divided, and his forward ('Tac') HQ, from which he could direct the battle personally. In terms of operational flexibility, this system had much to recommend it, but it had the unfortunate side-effect of isolating Montgomery from the higher conduct of the war, surrounded as he was by comparatively junior staff officers and adoring ADCs. This was the reversal of Haig's experience, as he tended to be isolated from the fighting echelons.

22. But Montgomery's delegation of important functions to the staff should not be misconstrued as evidence that he was in their thrall. Nothing could be further from the truth. He did not believe that planning teams should confer without direction from their commander, and he refused to send a 21st Army Group team to Versailles to work out a plan for the spring of 1945, as requested by SHAEF (in accordance with US practice). 'I have made it clear to SHAEF', Montgomery wrote in no uncertain terms, 'that I will not on any account be drawn away from first principles; that it is for commanders to make plans and give decisions, and staffs then to work out the details of those plans; on no account will I have a plan forced on me by a planning staff; when the Supreme Commander has made his plan and issued his orders, the detailed planning for my part of that plan will be done at my HQ and nowhere else'.\(^{13}\) This approach was fundamental to the British style of command by

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the end of the Second World War. Indeed this attitude illustrates the growing importance of operational directives by the end of the war.

23. Yet there were conditions where Montgomery's style was clearly inapplicable. It is no coincidence that Montgomery's greatest failing was as a coalition commander. This is as much a question of intuition and personal strengths and weaknesses as it is of institutional or doctrinal focus. Yet as the British Army throughout this period lacked any clear doctrinal focus and had frequently been unprepared for the kinds of command tasks that it undertook, some knowledge of historical experience and the kinds of expedient adopted, is important. Alexander had to command over 20 different nationalities in his army group. His style of command was altogether more casual and relaxed than the 'grip' demonstrated by Montgomery. Alexander preferred to make suggestions rather than give clear cut orders. Harold Macmillan, the Resident Minister in the Mediterranean thought them 'most effective'. 'These are put forward with modesty and simplicity. But they are always so clear and lucid that they carry conviction'.14 At Salerno in September 1943, when Alexander visited the beleaguered beachhead, he considered that Lt Gen Ernest J Dawley was incapable of showing the necessary drive and resolution needed to save his troops. Alexander said quietly to Lt Gen Mark Clark, the commander of Fifth Army, 'I do not want to interfere in your business, but I have some ten years’ experience in this game of sizing up commanders. I can tell you definitely that you have a broken reed on your hands and I suggest you replace him immediately' - advice that Clark took.15 Under such circumstances 'gripping the show', which Alan Brooke, the CIGS, called for frequently in his diary, would have stirred up more problems than it resolved.

CONCLUSION

24. In conclusion, 'the British Style of Command' can be reduced to four sub-categories, all of which were the product of improvisation (which is without doubt an essential virtue in many cases):

   a. **'Chateau generalship'**: the creation of an enormous administrative and managerial infrastructure capable of organising an army of mass involvement. This was a major achievement but had severe operational shortcomings. There was an excessive reliance on rigid tactics,

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overwhelming firepower and adherence to a controlled advance based on moving to a series of 'phase lines'. Ground became an overwhelming preoccupation. Surprise and flexibility were not high priorities, and the isolated somewhat narrow and inflexible command system reflected this approach.

b. **Generalship of Empire** - this was a direct outgrowth of imperial commitments. Under commanders such as Allenby, Wavell (who had studied Allenby's methods) and Slim, these commanders emphasised surprise, flexibility and manoeuvre. Yet these campaigns were often hamstrung by political imperatives, over-stretched forces, and the overall command system was essentially bureaucratic and rather cumbersome.

c. **The 'tidy' generalship of Montgomery.** A clear connection exists between this method and that of Haig and GHQ 1916-18 with the qualification that Montgomery sought to rectify the weaknesses of the command system that were evident to him as a Brigade Major in 1916-17. This resulted in a more personal style of command.

d. **Coalition warfare** - as exemplified by Alexander in Italy. This approach was less the result of a clear cut, well thought out, doctrinal approach to the problems of coalition warfare, than a reflection of the personal attributes of the CinC.

25. It is clear also that this lack of an unambiguous doctrinal focus on command continued into the post-war years. It was exacerbated by the continuing tension between a continental commitment to the NATO Central Region and the demands of the 'retreat from Empire'. These two commitments demanded quite different styles of leadership and command and little effort was undertaken to fuse them into an integrated system of command. It is also worth remembering that, as Britain eventually emerged on the winning side in both World Wars, that no wide-ranging system of reform was advocated after 1918 or 1945 like that suggested by the Esher Committee following the initial disasters in the Boer War. Pragmatism had appeared to work. It relied heavily on the personal predilections of individual commanders. All such men in the first half of the twentieth century had enjoyed considerable experience of war at various levels. That reservoir of experience no longer exists.
CHAPTER 3
THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe the Exercise of Command in relation to the Foundations of Command described in Chapter 2. It translates the commander's functions in the exercise of command into a list of 'command imperatives' and introduces the decision-making process.

COMMANDER'S FUNCTIONS

0301. As indicated in Chapter 1, the exercise of command is primarily concerned with **leadership**, **decision-making** and **control**. The role of the commander can be expressed in terms of these functions, which, together with a number of complementary activities, enable him to exercise command. The emphasis between the functions involved varies with the situation, the level and span of command.

0302. A commander can only sustain his exercise of command if he has a robust planning and decision-making capability. This rests on **information** and **time** to make decisions, a **control** means to co-ordinate and monitor the actions of subordinates, and **communications**. From these requirements, together with the Principles of Mission Command, **Command Imperatives** have been derived (Figure 3.1). They apply to all levels of command, and serve as a check list to ensure that a commander and his command are organized and trained for operations.
THE COMMAND IMPERATIVES

TEAMWORK

0303. Teamwork is a product of sound leadership and of a positive command climate which promote co-operation at, and between, all levels of command. Together with leadership, covered in Chapter 2, teamwork motivates and inspires staffs and subordinates; generates the cohesion, trust and mutual understanding required by Mission Command; induces enthusiasm for the cause and task at hand; and thereby provides a solid basis for the maintenance of morale at all levels.

COMMON DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

0304. Common Doctrine. A commander has a duty to employ a common doctrine in the execution of command. This ensures that the commander, his staff and his subordinates work together in an efficient manner to a common purpose. Only in this way can unity of effort be secured and maintained. However, the employment of a common doctrine for operations must not lead to stereotyped planning for, and standard responses to, every situation. Mission Command encourages initiative at all levels within a common framework of military thought. The use of a common doctrine applies to principles, practices and procedures which must be adopted in a flexible manner to meet changing circumstances.¹

¹. Principles are given in BMD and in the ADP series; practices in AFMs; procedures in SOPs.
0305. **Training.** The ultimate object of all training is to ensure military success. Training provides the means to practise, develop and validate - within constraints - the practical application of a common doctrine. Equally importantly, it provides the basis for schooling commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control respectively. Training should be stimulating, rewarding and inspire subordinates to achieve greater heights. A valuable by-product of good training is the fostering of teamwork and the generation of the force’s confidence in commanders, organizations and in doctrine, a necessary pre-requisite of achieving high morale before troops are committed to operations. Training should be divided into two parallel and complementary activities: decision-making and drills.

a. **Decision-Making.** Commanders should be educated and practised in the making of appropriate and timely decisions, and with their staffs, in the development of resulting plans. These plans are then executed using drills and procedures. Such training must extend to the education of commanders - and equally their subordinates - in combined arms operations. The greater the proficiency in timely planning and decision-making, the greater the organizational agility of a force - so adding to the tempo of operations.²

b. **Drills.** The slick execution of plans requires the flexible use of drills and procedures. Training in the practice of drills and procedures must be appropriate to the weapon system, sub unit, unit or formation concerned. It includes those drills associated with the administration of the man and his equipment both in barracks and the field. Once proficiency in special-to-Arm skills is reached, the emphasis in unit and formation level training must turn to the practice of combined arms tactical drills. The more practices that can be reduced to drills, the quicker those drills can be executed, and the quicker forces can transition from one drill to another. This contributes further to the development and maintenance of tempo. However, drills and procedures must be adapted to meet the demands of the situation; their employment must be allied to the requirement to give pertinent and timely orders.²

0306. **Commander’s Responsibilities.** The value of realistic and challenging training in developing and maintaining professional standards cannot be over-stated. Commanders at all levels have a responsibility to train

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² Details of battlegroup and sub-unit drills are given in TD Note 29 (1 Mar 94), which will be incorporated into AFM *Battlegroup Tactics* in due course.
their forces and organizations in anticipation of operations. A commander must establish drills within his own command and validate subordinates in their drills and procedures. A commander, apart from professional study on his own, cannot easily and fully train himself in planning and decision-making as he must conduct his business in accordance with Mission Command in the context of his superior's plan and that two levels up. He should, however, train his subordinates in planning and decision-making, and be able to validate that training. Where no clearly defined commitment or role exists in peacetime, the commander must place his training emphasis on maintaining a broad capability of military proficiency applicable to his command and its ability to deploy at short notice. **On committal to operations, the commander must identify and prioritize his key training objectives and be able to implement the appropriate training to ensure that his command is operationally fit for role.**

**CONTROL**

0307. The relationship of control to command is described at Para 0106. At lower levels, commanders may be able to undertake the functions of planning and making decisions, directing forces and controlling, in isolation. At unit or formation level, however, the demands on commanders are normally too great for them to work effectively without assistance; hence they require staffs. The staff's primary function is to provide command support, to relieve commanders of much of the detailed planning and subsequent control, allowing the latter to concentrate on their primary functions: those of leadership, decision-making and the planning of future operations. The function of the staff is covered in greater detail in Chapter 5.

**DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITY**

0308. **Decentralization of decision-making requires delegation of specific responsibilities in the exercise of command.** It underlies much of the practical application of command, from granting financial responsibility to designated budget holders in peacetime, to creating the conditions for freedom of action by subordinate commanders on the battlefield at the tactical level. A responsible commander only delegates action to a subordinate commander once he has set the necessary conditions to allow that action to be carried out. Assessing what responsibilities to delegate is therefore an essential part of a commander’s planning and decision-making. Whilst delegation of responsibility characterises decentralized command, it does not necessarily imply any slackening in the requirement to control. Control in the form of reporting performance and progress to a higher commander remains an important component of any command organization. The quality
of a superior’s decision-making depends on this form of feed-back from a subordinate.

0309. Commanders must possess sufficient judgement to know not only what to delegate but also to whom. Prior knowledge of a subordinate’s strengths and weaknesses will often provide the basis for that judgement. Thus when some subordinates are offered more freedom than others, it does not imply inconsistency of command.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AND SUSTAINABILITY

0310. *Allocation of Resources*. The corollary of delegation of responsibility is *allocation of resources*. In principle, a commander who delegates responsibility for action to a subordinate is required to furnish that subordinate with sufficient resources to carry out the action concerned. This requirement under-pins much of budgetary planning in peacetime. However, such a tidy relationship between responsibility and resources is unlikely to survive in the complex and uncertain conditions of operations. In these circumstances, whilst responsibility can be delegated relatively easily, the allocation of adequate resources is much more dependent on military judgement and can never allow fully for the actions of the enemy. The requirement to allocate sufficient resources implies a concomitant responsibility to sustain men and equipment and to prevent wastage. This is consistent with the Principles of War. Economy of effort in one activity allows the concentration of force in another. Consequently, commanders must allocate priorities in almost any field of military activity and identify their Main Effort.

0311. *Sustainability*. Sustainability is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objective.\(^3\) Sustainability influences the tempo and duration of operations through the delivery of combat service support (CSS). The scarcity of CSS resources and the lead-time required for most logistic activity determines that control of resources is retained at a high level. This, combined with the time required to create and adjust the logistic framework to support an operation, requires commanders not only to state their logistic requirements early in the development of their plans, but also to take into account any limitations on CSS.

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\(^3\) AAP-6.
0312. **Commander's Responsibilities.** Commanders have logistic staff and advisers to plan and execute CSS on their behalf. However, the commander has key a role to play in the formulation of CSS concepts and plans. In particular, commanders should:

a. Recognize the need for logistic planners to anticipate future requirements and involve them at the start of any estimate or planning process, including reconnaissance.

b. Ensure logistic staff, formations and units are informed of their intentions, concepts of operations, Main Effort and CSS priorities. This includes stating CSS requirements in warning orders to allow early logistic preparation, regrouping and redeployment.

c. Balance their plans with CSS realities. This will often entail calculated risk-taking, which may be off-set by tactical or operational advantages.

**TIMELY DECISION AND ACTION**

0313. **Theory.** In order to exercise command effectively, a commander must make timely **decisions** and take the appropriate **action.** This is a fundamental principle of both Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission Command. If a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, the former possesses a significant advantage. By the time the 'slower' commander decides and acts, the 'faster' can do something different, rendering his opponent's actions inappropriate. A USAF officer, Colonel Boyd, undertook extensive research into adversarial 'decision-action' cycles. The results of Boyd's research have been summarised as follows:

'Conflict can be seen as time-competitive observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) cycles. Each party to a conflict begins by observing. He observes himself, his physical surroundings and his enemy. On the basis of his observation, he orients, that is to say, he makes a mental image or 'snapshot' of his situation. On the basis of this orientation, he makes a decision. He puts the decision into effect, i.e., he acts. Then, because he assumes his action has changed the situation, he observes again, and starts the process anew.'

0314. **Practice.** In order to decide on a course of action, make a plan, and put it into operation, a commander requires timely and accurate information, together with a control means and robust communications to bear that information and to pass his orders to his subordinates. The quality of a commander's decision-making and planning capability is also affected by a number of other influences, including individual differences and environmental factors. Individual differences include personality, intelligence, experience and cognitive style (including intuition). Environmental factors include the conflict setting, workload and, in turn, stress level, and the way information is processed and presented. The relation of the observation-orientation-decision-action cycle to information and communications is shown at Figure 3.2. The need for timely, accurate and relevant information may demand information flows that do not necessarily follow the chain of command. A number of levels of command may require vital information simultaneously, rather than sequentially; for example: a NBC strike warning.

![Figure 3.2 - The Decision-Action Cycle](image)

0315. **Information.** A commander requires processed information, especially in the particular form of intelligence, in order to assess the situation, to make the appropriate decisions and to plan. Therefore directing the intelligence process is a key command function. The sequence of activities whereby information is assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to the commander and his staff is known as the intelligence cycle. The cycle consists of four stages: Direction, Collection, Processing, and Dissemination, which needs to be synchronized with the decision-action cycle. A commander needs to prioritize both his information and intelligence requirements:
a. **Commander’s Information Requirements (CIR).** A summary of CIR is at Annex A. In the direction stage, a commander must focus his and his staff’s attention on his, the commander’s, critical information requirements (CCIR), including the intelligence he needs in order to make his decision and plan. The requirement for relevant information must therefore be carefully directed (‘command-driven’). Otherwise, irrelevant details will conceal the critical essentials, leading to unnecessary work, slowing down the command system and leading, ultimately, to decision-making that is neither timely nor appropriate.

b. **Intelligence.** In the collection and processing stages, the quest for information as opposed to intelligence, if it becomes too time-consuming, may become an unreasonable burden on subordinate formations and units. At its worst, it corrupts the trust required in Mission Command as a subordinate bothered over every trifle will rarely take the initiative. Lack of intelligence should not preclude action, although it may limit the context in which plans can be developed. In a similar way to identifying his CCIR, a commander will also identify his priority intelligence requirements (PIR). In the absence of sufficient intelligence, forces must be committed to fight for information, even if dedicated resources are not available for this purpose.5

0316. **Communications.** A commander is dependent on communications, both human and technical, in order to gain, process and pass information, including the dissemination of intelligence. Communications provide the principal method by which command and control can be decentralized and executed. Modern communications involve a wide spectrum of means: from the traditional physical passage of written documents by courier, through telecommunications including telephone, combat net radio and satellite voice links, to the automatic electronic exchange of data on wide area networks. The effectiveness of a particular system (or combination of systems) will often depend on the theatre of operations involved, the transmission means available and the local operational or tactical situation. Careful planning and management of human and technical communications assets will increase the capability of commanders and staffs to pass critical information and decisions at the right time, thus helping to maintain the tempo of operations.

0317. **Decision-Making and Planning Capability.** In order to decide on a course of action and then to initiate action, a commander requires a decision-

5. Principles for intelligence management are given in ADP Vol 1 Para 0425-0433.
making and planning capability. This capability rests in turn on first assessing the situation and determining the actions required (which encompasses the estimate), leading to a succinct decision in which the commander's intent is quite clear. This intent, together with the setting of missions and allocation of resources to subordinate commanders, and the detailing of any constraints that may be required, provides the basis of the commander's operational plan, which is described in Chapter 8. The subsequent coordination of forces is a control function, which complements the command process. Decision-making and planning, however, must be undertaken in a manner appropriate to the level concerned, allowing subordinate organizations to conduct their own decision-making and planning.

THE DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING PROCESS

ELEMENTS OF DECISION-MAKING

0318. Decision-making is at the heart of the exercise of command, and to a lesser extent, of control. It is an essential command skill that must be mastered, along with visualizing and assessing the situation, problem-solving and planning. To assist the commander and his staff in decision-making and planning a number of command tools are available, which are considered later in this chapter. The elements of the decision-making process, which affect both command and command support, are described below before the organizations for command and command support are described in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The detailed techniques of the decision-making process, including the estimate, are considered in Chapters 6 and 8.

0319. The elements of the decision-making process apply to any level of command. Any military decision-making process depends first on logical analysis (normally the product of both the commander and his staff) and, secondly, on the commander's military judgement. Whilst the commander may consult his staff throughout the process, he remains responsible for making the final decision. The key is to make timely and relevant decisions, appropriate to the level of command. The full decision-making process is shown at Figure 3.3. The four stages in that process (direction, consultation, consideration and execution) are described below sequentially, but there is a degree of overlap between the first three stages.
0320. **Direction.** During the Direction stage the commander makes an initial analysis of what is required by him. He can do this either by reference to his **mission** and superior commander's intent or, less formally, to the **situation** in which he finds himself. Whatever the circumstances, this stage is termed **Mission Analysis** within an estimate process. Mission Analysis enables a subordinate to capitalise on an evolving situation in a way that his superior would intend, and to act purposefully on changes of which his superior is not aware. The norm is that a subordinate is given a mission. Whenever, for good reason he is not, he must be prepared to deduce one himself following the principles of Mission Command. By the completion of the Direction stage, the time by which a decision must be made is determined (the decision point), along with priorities for staff work, including the setting of critical intelligence requirements. Other time-critical activities may also need to be initiated.

0321. **Consultation.** In this second stage, consultation occurs if **time permits.** When time is short, the consultation and consideration stages are merged. Consultation should take place as follows:

a. **Upwards.** The commander should talk to his superior if he is any doubt as to what he has to do (the mission), the reason for that mission (set in either the mission or the superior's intent) or as to the means with which he is expected to accomplish his mission (task organization). The subordinate commander also has a duty to report to his superior any serious limitations of manpower or materiel which may prevent him from carrying out his mission successfully. Thus bids for additional resources or requests for clarification of details in orders may in certain circumstances be appropriate and do not by themselves indicate any lack of confidence in the higher command. A subordinate
must also keep his superior informed of his intentions; this can be done after the decision stage.

b. **Sideways.** Sideways consultation takes place both externally with neighbouring formations and internally. A commander may consult with his advisers in his own headquarters - usually his chief of staff and deputy chief of staff (or equivalents) at a minimum - but this may not be necessary until the consideration stage. The commander should also liaise with neighbouring commanders in accordance with the principles and procedures for establishing liaison - described in Chapter 5.

c. **Downwards.** Consultation downwards is one of the principal means by which the commander can obtain an impression of what is feasible. In this process, he must also beware that his own resolve is not weakened on account of the fears or concerns of subordinates who may not be able to see the 'big picture'. As a general rule, a commander should go forward - as the situation allows - to consult with subordinates where he can obtain a feel for the situation and make his own judgements. The better the climate of mutual trust which exists between superior and subordinate, the greater the degree of consultation that can take place without any loss of authority.

0322. **Consideration.** Before the commander reaches his decision it will be necessary, at all but the lowest tactical levels, for the commander to consider the work of his staff as a result of his direction. He must apply his own judgement to the staff work both during the conduct of the consideration stage in refining a number of possible options (courses of action), and at the end of the consideration stage (the Decision).

0323. **Decision.** The commander next makes the Decision - which represents a course of action to be adopted and includes an expression of his intent and broad concept of operations.\(^6\)

0324. **Execution.** Although he has made his decision, the decision-making process is not completed until the commander (or chief of staff on his behalf) is satisfied that the decision has been translated into orders and disseminated. The commander will rely at this stage on positive feedback from his subordinates. Under the principles of Mission Command, feedback is particularly important at the outset of a campaign or major operation when the

\(^6\) Details of the Decision format are contained in Chapter 8.
outcome of a plan is uncertain. In such conditions the commander will need to satisfy himself that he is being fully comprehended by his subordinates, the more so if he has adopted an original course of action.  

0325. **Review.** Subsequently, the commander will also wish to assure himself that the action contained in his orders has been executed and adjusted as necessary in the light of events. Whilst the staff carries the burden at this stage in monitoring the situation, a control function, it remains very much the commander’s business to review the situation against his mission and superior commander’s intent. He will continue to seek the initiative as the campaign, major operation or battle unfolds, keeping his focus on the enemy, exploiting his mistakes and grasping opportunities. On completion of a campaign, major operation or battle, a commander is responsible for recording the salient facts and assessing successes and failures in order to determine and distribute the appropriate lessons to be learned for the future. On operations and training this *after-action review* process must become sufficiently dynamic and open to allow individuals to profit from a knowledge and understanding of their own and others’ mistakes.

**TOOLS OF DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING**

0326. **Brain-Storming.** Brainstorming is a creative thinking technique whose basis is the encouragement of members of a team or group to exchange their ideas in an open and informal manner. The brainstorming session begins with the team leader describing to the participating members the problem under analysis and encouraging them to be as imaginative and creative as possible in formulating their ideas. Many of the resulting ideas will prove of little value. Some will prove to be superficial, others too imaginative to be workable. However, those that remain are often very helpful. Brainstorming, as a mind-clearing exercise, is often useful prior to the start of more formal decision-making processes, such as the estimate. Brainstorming can also be used as a command tool to train the staff to look at problems from different angles, to seek original solutions by questioning conventional wisdom and to recognize the potential gains and costs associated with them.

0327. **The Estimate.** The principal tool in the command and staff decision-making is the estimate. Following his *mission analysis*, the commander,  

7. For example, Nelson developed his ideas with his ships’ captains before both the Battle of the Nile and of Trafalgar, leading to set drills and concepts of manoeuvre. In both cases, the ‘band of brothers’ knew their commander’s intentions for the forthcoming battle. Nelson’s orders before Trafalgar concluded with ‘in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy’.  

supported by his staff, evaluates all relevant factors, where consultation may take place, leading to an assessment of tasks and consideration of a number of courses of action. The estimate process proper is concluded by the commander's decision. Following his decision, detailed planning is completed by the staff which leads to a directive or operation order. At any stage in the planning process and throughout the execution of operations, the mission or plan can be reviewed using mission analysis. Details of the estimate process are given in Chapters 6-8.

0328. **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB).** The IPB process complements the estimate. Its purpose is to help commanders to identify critical decision points, from which their staffs can first deduce the information needed to support those decisions, and secondly, recommend how best to focus reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (RISTA) assets. In contrast to a written intelligence estimate,\(^8\) IPB uses a graphical approach to present information, making it easier for the staff to update, and for commanders and staff to assimilate and to identify the essential decision points. IPB is a dynamic process in that data can be added or adjusted at any time before or during combat. Details of how IPB is related to the estimate process are given in Chapter 8.\(^9\)

0329. **Briefings.** Within the Consultation stage, a number of briefings can be held to assist the commander, his staff and subordinate commanders in the development of their plans. Whatever the objectives of a briefing, they should never develop into a conference; the commander must never permit decision by committee. Briefings should not be confused with orders; whilst briefings are often employed as a means to decision-making, orders are a means of transmitting decisions to subordinates. The principal types of briefing held at formation level are:

a. **The Information Briefing.** An information briefing can be held regularly outside the decision-making process or at any stage during the stages of this process where information needs to be exchanged. A commander's decision is not normally expected at an information briefing but, as a result of the information presented, one could be made.

b. **The Decision Briefing.** A decision briefing is an irregular staff briefing to the commander, normally conducted at the end of the

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8. JSP 120(3) - Army Intelligence.

9. See Chapter 8, Figure 8-2. A description of the full IPB process is given in TD Note 26.
Consideration stage, in order to present the commander with the results of staffwork initiated during the Direction stage. A decision is expected at the conclusion of this briefing. Alternatively, to determine *not to make a decision yet* is a legitimate outcome. Depending on the level of command and the situation, the staff may propose courses of action to the commander within his overall mission and intent. The decision briefing is not a conference - members of the staff present the salient points of their staff work to the commander. Any discussion is the prerogative of the commander.

c. **The Back-Brief.** The Back-Brief is an opportunity for subordinate commanders to brief their superior commander and fellow commanders on their own plans. Thus it follows the superior commander's decision and orders. Where circumstances permit, this is done collectively to enable a number of subordinates to meet in the presence of the commander and to discuss forthcoming operations. The object is thus not to seek approval but to increase mutual knowledge in, and understanding of, each others’ plans. Often Back-Briefs can be developed by war-gaming possible scenarios. Whilst a Back-Brief must not be allowed to degenerate into a conference, it provides a useful forum for commanders and principal subordinates to discuss future operations in a less formal atmosphere than that of an orders group.

0330. **Use of Operational Analysis (OA).** OA is the application of scientific methods to assist in the military decision-making process; it must not be regarded as a substitute for that process. OA can be used as part of a deliberate planning process prior to operations or whilst they are in progress. It is particularly useful when applied to problems which lend themselves to mathematical measurement. Important applications cover the determination of the correlation of forces (OA techniques allow for an assessment of qualitative differences) and the evaluation of plans. Historically, OA has also been used with success to recommend tactical or operational techniques for exploiting enemy vulnerabilities or protecting our own, particularly in circumstances where an opponent has no previously recognized doctrine. OA also has an important role in the production and validation of data used in wargaming and planning, including tactical yardsticks.

0331. **Wargaming.** Wargaming is an interactive simulation of combat. It can range from informal discussions round a map to the use of sophisticated computer programmes. Computer modelling is especially useful in quantifying the problems of time and space and illustrating the interaction between air and ground weapon systems. As with all simulations, however, the results
of wargaming are predictive and are not a guarantee that a particular outcome will occur. Prior to operations, wargaming can be used to train commanders and staffs and to allow aspects of particular operations to be rehearsed. On operations, wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualise the ebb and flow of a campaign, major operation or battle. By wargaming, commanders and staffs attempt to foresee the dynamics of action, reaction and possible counteraction of battle. In conjunction with OA, wargaming can be employed to determine enemy courses of action and to identify, and quantify objectively, possible responses. Given friendly force strengths and dispositions, enemy capabilities and deduced possible courses of action in a set area of operations, proposed own courses of action can be tested. In this way, wargaming can assist in the commander's decision-making and in the development of subsequent plans (see Para 0818).

FUTURE PROSPECTS

0332. **Advanced Information Technology.** Current research into communication and information systems (CIS) indicate that there is considerable potential to harness advanced information technology in the execution of command. The principal objective is to improve both the timeliness and accuracy in the collection, processing, analysis and dissemination of information over existing, largely manual, methods. Duplication of effort and errors in the re-transmission of information up and down the chain of command can be minimized by the creation of a relevant common picture of the battlefield, which is automatically updated. However, there are limitations in future technology, apart from cost, which indicate the need for caution in its introduction. These include the dangers of information overload and addiction to automation, over-reliance on 'perfect communications' and a resulting gap appearing between the 'graphical' and the 'real' battlefield. Thus commanders and staffs employing advanced information technology must be so trained and equipped that they able to revert quickly to manual methods (see Para 0531).

0333. **Command Decision-Making Aids (CDMA).** Command and staff decision-making and planning can also be supported by a number of

10. See Para 0826.
11. This is increasingly being termed 'digitization'.
12. This technology already exists for maritime and air forces.
computer-supported command tools. These include 'unit movement' and 'force analysers' and 'course of action' decision-making aids.\textsuperscript{13} However, whilst valuable staff time may be saved by such tools, the commander must still make his decision based on his military judgement, where his experience and intuition, as opposed to computer analysis, will continue to play a key part.

\textsuperscript{13} MOD LSOR 8 based research.
1. Constraints may include Rules of Engagement, Resources, and Time and Space.
2. In Operations Other Than War, the information requirements here are of the Belligerent Parties involved.
CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION FOR COMMAND

The purpose of Chapter 4 is to set out principles for the organization of command, relating those principles to the Foundations of Command and the Exercise of Command (described in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively), and the Operational Framework of Deep, Close and Rear Operations described in Chapter 5 of ADP Volume 1 Operations.

PRINCIPLES

GENERAL

0401. For command to be organized efficiently, and thus achieve its objectives effectively, it is important to understand what an organization is and how it functions. At its simplest, an organization is defined as 'two or more people working together in a co-ordinated manner so as to achieve group results'. Thus an organization should have a clear role. In addition, all organizations have a human aspect; they therefore require some degree of discipline within a defined structure.

0402. There are five organizing principles which apply to command:

a. **Unity of Command.** A commander should be accountable to only one superior. This ensures clarity and unity of effort, promotes timely and effective decision-making, and avoids potential conflict in orders and instructions. Unity of command is effected through a clear chain of command, whereby command at each level is focused on one commander. This principle applies at all levels and in joint operations. In multinational operations, however, absolute unity of command may not be achievable, as considered in Chapter 6.
b. **Co-operation.** Co-operation, a Principle of War described in BMD, complements unity of command. It entails the co-ordination of individual and group activities to achieve an optimum combined effect for the common good. Co-operation is based on teamwork, trust and mutual understanding, and is developed through training. Three elements contribute to co-operation: a common aim (reflecting unity of effort), mutual goodwill, and a clear division of responsibilities. Responsibility for actions, however, cannot be greater (nor should it be less) than that which is implied by the amount of authority that has been delegated to a commander. Military co-operation is formalised through clearly defined states of command.

c. **Balanced Structure.** There is a limit to the number of subordinates (and thus subordinate organizations) a superior can command effectively. The optimum number will depend primarily on the complexity and tasks of the particular organization. In practice, a balanced and capable overall structure is achieved by adjustment of the span of command, which determines the 'width' and number of levels of an organization.

d. **Common and Responsive Procedures.** Command procedures must be simple, efficient and flexible in order to be responsive, and so assist the development and maintenance of the tempo of decision-making within a command. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) save time and effort. Procedures for the running of headquarters are considered in Chapter 5. They also extend to decision-making techniques and the formulation and dissemination of directives and orders, which are detailed in Chapters 8 and 9.

e. **Dynamic Organization.** The organization for command must be dynamic. Changed situations and new technology will demand adjustment of structures and procedures. For example, the structure of a force and its headquarters deployed on peace-support operations may differ considerably from that for regional conflict. Therefore a responsive and continuous monitoring and review mechanism is required in the organization for command. However, 'change for change's sake' must be avoided.

**CHAIN OF COMMAND**

0403. **Principles.** The Army's command framework, both in peace and war, is based on the chain of command, the structure by which command is exercised through a series of superior and subordinate commanders. Through
this chain all operational directives, orders and instructions are passed. For a chain of command to be effective, it must be flexible. It needs technical resources (command support, including communication and information systems) to link each level, and recognised common procedures. Where these are not standardized or guaranteed, liaison is essential (see Chapter 5). The most important prerequisite of an effective chain of command is that each commander knows where he fits into the chain, from whom he derives his command and whom he commands. The consequences of a confused chain of command have been illustrated by General Sir David Fraser in his account of the situation of 1st Armoured Division in France in May 1940:

‘The chain of command to this unfortunate division was confused and inefficient. At different times (the divisional commander) received orders direct from the War Office in London, from GHQ BEF, from General Georges commanding the army groups engaged in the battle wheresoever, from General Altmayer, commanding the left wing of the French Seventh Army - the left-hand French Army on the general line of the Somme - from General Frere, commanding Seventh Army, as well as from General Weygand, Supreme Commander, himself.’

0404. **Exceptions.** In all but exceptional circumstances, observance of a clear chain of command will be the most efficient, reinforcing the decentralist principles of Mission Command. However, information must still flow and all should strive to this end:

a. There will be times when the imperative of timely decision and action is best met by information reaching different levels of command simultaneously rather than sequentially (see Figure 4.1). An example of this was Montgomery's use of the 'J Service', a radio intercept service, which monitored lower formation command nets and complemented the work of the better-known 'Phantom' liaison unit.

b. If communications are lost between a superior and a subordinate command, the onus is on the superior to re-establish communications with the subordinate. However, common sense dictates that both levels do their best to communicate with one another again whilst the subordinate continues to act purposefully in accordance with his superior's intent. In re-establishing communications, other points of command may have to become involved.

1. General Sir Fraser, David. *And We Shall Shock Them*. p.73.
0405. **Technical Control.** In addition to the formal chain of command, there is an element of technical control in the Army which reflects functional areas of interest. This exists at almost every level. For example, the officer commanding the brigade signal squadron, whilst under the command of his brigade commander, may receive technical direction (frequency allocation and cryptographic instructions) from the divisional signal regimental commanding officer. Within their functional areas, CSS commanders may exercise technical control over subordinates; they do so, however, on behalf of the combined arms commander and to support his intent. On no account should technical control be allowed to eclipse or confuse the primacy of the combined arms commander; it must be restricted to specific and delegated areas of interest or responsibility. If it is not restricted, there is a danger that trust in command will be broken and the morale and efficiency of formations or units will suffer accordingly.

**STATES OF COMMAND**

0406. An important factor in stabilising the chain of command is establishing the **states of command** (listed in the Glossary) of subordinate formations and units. In particular, establishing clear Command and Control (C2) relationships is a fundamental requirement in all operations, and especially so in joint and multinational ones. In establishing command relationships, a commander delegates authority to subordinates commensurate with their responsibilities. A commander can determine whether and how he can employ subordinate formations or units by using the following criteria:

a. For any purpose (*can he give them a mission*)?

b. If the mission (the purpose of their employment) is not within his gift, can he give them tasks within the given mission (*can he direct its execution*)?

c. Can he break up the formation or unit or must he retain its integrity?

d. Are there any caveats on their use (for example, *for hostilities only or for a specified duration or place*)?\(^4\)

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2. The responsibilities of functional commanders are explained in ADP Vol 3 Logistics.

3. NATO states of command are detailed in the Glossary.

4. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0421, and the Glossary.
0407. A summary of the application of NATO C2 states is at Annex A. Care should be taken in the choice of these states as they may be interpreted differently by other Services and allies. The criteria listed in Para 0406 assist this choice but in case of doubt it may prove prudent to consult the superior commander as to any restrictions he envisages on the employment of subordinate formations and units.

0408. The use of C2 states in joint and multinational operations is explained further in Chapter 6.

0409. Application to Mission Command. Once the chain of command and the states of command within it have been defined they should be accepted until formally changed. Commanders must respect the unity of command and be aware of the possibly damaging consequences of ignoring an established structure. This applies both up and down the chain. However, it is important that states of command and the chain of command are not interpreted too narrowly when special circumstances apply. On operations, a commander on the spot may have to use his initiative and break both the chain and states of command to ensure timely and effective action in accordance with his superior’s intent. For example, a considerable part of the German success in thwarting the British armoured attack during Operation GOODWOOD in Normandy on 18 July 1944 is credited to a local German commander, Major Hans von Luck. He commandeered a battery of Luftwaffe 88mm anti-aircraft guns and directed that they should be used in the anti-tank role. In response to von Luck’s orders, the Luftwaffe battery commander resisted being placed under command: ‘Major, my concern is enemy planes, fighting tanks is your job. I’m Luftwaffe’, to which von Luck drew his pistol and replied ‘Either you’re a dead man or you can earn yourself a medal.’

**SPAN OF COMMAND**

0410. The span of command is the number of subordinate organizations given to one commander to command directly (see Figure 4.1). It is determined by the overall size and spatial deployment of the forces that a commander has to direct. It takes into account who has to be directed but not how they are to be directed. Narrowing spans of command may well add levels of command with potential undesirable effects on timely decision and action. The use of technology, particularly modern communications and

information handling techniques, may make it possible to widen spans of command. But as command is essentially a human function, purely technological considerations should not be the only criteria in determining the span.

0411. Regardless of the technical ability to communicate with every formation or unit within a span of command, studies have shown that a ratio of more than four or five subordinate points of command to one headquarters is the maximum that a commander can manage effectively. Further, the more varied the points of command are, the less that can be handled simultaneously. Experience indicates that the commander risks becoming overloaded, with a debilitating effect on decision-making, if more than three are active at any one time. Thus, in order to reduce his points of command, a commander may well have to delegate command either within the context of the operational framework (described below), or by function.

Figure 4.1 - The Chain and Span of Command, and Information Flows

STRUCTURE

0412. **Operational Integrity.** In principle, forces should be grouped together with the capability for independent action. The cohesion, and thus effectiveness, of a command for employment on operations rests on integrating

its component parts to optimise its overall capability and on reducing its inertia. In practice, this means forces should be organized to contain, or draw on, the elements necessary to fulfil the Functions in Combat. For example, a balanced force should contain combat Arms with common mobility and adequate levels of protection, assisted by combat support units to support manoeuvre and to give indirect firepower, together with service support units to provide sustainment. Supporting elements require sufficient - but not necessarily common - levels of mobility and protection. Commanders of all types of forces need the means to command (including access to intelligence and compatible communications) and, if not integral to their commands, the ability to request timely fire, engineer and logistic support.

0413. **Re-grouping.** There are penalties in terms of loss of cohesion and tempo in frequent re-grouping. The extent of the penalty will depend on the level of command and the nature of the organization being re-grouped. Where possible, standard groupings and organizations should be employed on operations. If this is not feasible on initial deployment to a theatre, and ad hoc organizations are formed, the penalties involved should be clearly recognized. Bringing together units and personalities unknown to each other loses valuable time and effort in establishing working relations and procedures, so requiring additional training. Where an ad-hoc organization or unit is created in a theatre of operations to cover a specific capability gap, its command relationship to other units or formations must be addressed and made known. Once committed on operations, troops and resources are allocated and grouped (typically once the necessary force ratios have been determined) to achieve missions; subsequent re-grouping, which costs time and effort, and loss of tempo, should be minimised. For example, switching fire support (itself necessary to give substance to Main Effort) is quicker than re-grouping engineers. Logistic constraints may preclude quick re-grouping. Therefore, commensurate with the need to concentrate force, missions should be tailored as far as practical to existing groupings.

0414. **Forces For Special Tasks.** In certain circumstances, the principle of employing standard groupings will have to be broken when forces for 'special tasks' are placed together under a specified commander. Forces for special tasks should be built around existing points of command (formation or unit headquarters) as far as possible, as they have the necessary command

7. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0220.
8. Ibid., Para 0503-0516.
facilities. An example of where this principle was not observed can be seen in Lord Gort’s appointment in May 1940 of his Chief of Intelligence to command an ad-hoc force without proper command support.9 However, if the situation demands it, such forces may have to be improvised. At the tactical level, ‘battle grouping’ can take place round any combat, combat support or combat service support unit. When applied flexibly, this principle can offer economies of effort in combat forces allowing concentration of force elsewhere.

COMMAND IN RELATION TO DOCTRINE FOR OPERATIONS10

THEATRE FRAMEWORK

0415. The framework of operations in a theatre will largely be determined by the nation contributing the largest forces in the case of an ‘ad hoc’ coalition, by adaptation of alliance doctrine in fully integrated operations, or by a combination of these approaches. In most cases, the theatre of operations is sub-divided into a number of areas of operations which complements the division of a theatre into Combat and Communications Zones.11 In Operations Other Than War, these terms may no longer be appropriate.

0416. Within NATO, a specific framework of rear operations reflecting combat service support organizations applies. The current ARRC concept, for example, sees the area behind national divisional boundaries being divided into a Forward Support Area (FSA) and a Rear Support Area (RSA). Whilst the former is under the command of ARRC REAR HQ, the latter area may be the responsibility of a superior level of command (such as a theatre HQ). In this case, the ARRC Rear Support Command acts as a focus for the co-ordination of combat service support within the RSA.12

OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

0417. The framework of deep, close and rear operations is a means of visualising operations and aids synchronization. The terms deep, close and


10. Details of the doctrine for operations in relation to command are contained in Chapters 4 and 5 of ADP Vol 1.

11. See the Glossary; the term area of operations is explained further in ADP Vol 1, Para 0542.

12. Details are contained in AFM Vol. 1 Part 6 CSS and in ADP Vol 3 Logistics.
rear are used to describe how these three operations relate to each other - primarily by function (what they are to achieve) and secondly by geography (where they are to achieve it). Use of the framework helps the commander relate friendly forces to one another, and to the enemy, in terms of time, space, resources and purpose. The simultaneous prosecution of deep, close and rear operations contributes to the defeat of the enemy.

APPLICATION TO COMMAND

0418. In principle, the organization of command on operations should reflect operational framework of deep, close and rear. A commander applies the framework of operations to:

a. Provide a basis for the decentralization of command.

b. Promote the necessary synchronization of operations in time and space to achieve decisive action, and to designate the Main Effort.

c. Describe where his personal priorities should be set (commander’s focus).

0419. Decentralization. In nominating points of command within his span of command for deep, close and rear operations, a commander decentralizes decision-making and delegates responsibility. A superior commander applies the framework of operations in establishing his command organization by activity and space. The superior commander must match his organization of command with his intent and concept of operations. His options for decentralization will depend on the situation and the control and communications resources available. Each subordinate commander should have responsibility for the control of operations within his delegated area of operations. Areas of operations at different levels of command, however, may overlap. For example, the deep operation of a superior level of command will normally correspond to the close operation of a subordinate, and vice versa. Areas of interest and influence, however, can overlap at the same level of command. This arises from a common requirement to focus on the enemy, who will not respect own forces’ boundaries. Figure 4.2 shows an example in which the superior commander has four principal points of command within his area of operations, corresponding to his two subordinate commanders for close operations, and commanders of deep and rear operations.

13. ADP Vol 1, Para 0533.
0420. **Synchronization.** Synchronization is the focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time and place. Having decentralized his command, the superior commander must remain able to synchronize the activities of his subordinates in order to seek simultaneity and to preserve unity of effort across his force. Synchronization involves the orchestration of operations primarily by activity and time, and secondarily by space. Deep and rear operations tend to be continuous activities whilst close operations are likely to be of shorter, yet intense, duration. A commander's most powerful tool in synchronizing operations is the designation of Main Effort. The shifting of Main Effort, however, must depend on the situation. **Therefore the prediction of any shifts of Main Effort too far in advance must be resisted.**

0421. **Commander's Focus.** The focus of a commander's personal attention will shift from *future plans* to *current operations* as required. If his plan requires or circumstances are such that he focuses on current operations, he should normally concentrate on whichever of deep, close or rear operations represents his Main Effort. His priority for future plans, however, is likely to be whichever of deep or rear operations sets the conditions for decisive close operations. In battle, the conduct of deep operations is typically the commander's key concern for much of his time, provided he can delegate command of discrete close and rear operations to subordinate commanders. When decisive action is expected in close operations, the commander would normally focus on these, synchronizing the activities of his subordinate commanders. He needs, meanwhile, to maintain a careful watch on the
progress of deep and rear operations, which may affect the outcome of both current and subsequent close operations, and to adjust his priorities as required.

COMMAND OF DEEP OPERATIONS

0422. Deep operations expand the battlefield in time and space, making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and thus diminish the coherence and tempo of his actions, creating favourable conditions for close operations. Although the purpose of deep operations is often to find and fix the enemy, increasingly, the range and lethality of modern weapon systems, tied to accurate and responsive acquisition and communication systems, allow deep operations to contribute directly to striking the enemy. Deep operations focus selectively on key enemy vulnerabilities. In his design for operations, the commander will normally devote RISTA effort, firepower and manoeuvre resources to deep operations in order to provide the necessary conditions for close operations.

0423. The scope of deep operations extends to a wide variety of tasks such as RISTA, raids or attacks into the enemy's rear areas, or flank protection. The means to prosecute these range from ground manoeuvre forces, or aviation units and formations, to aircraft or special forces. Command of discrete deep operations must be left to the appropriate force commander.

0424. A formation commander will normally delegate control of deep operations to a subordinate (Commander Deep Operations). This subordinate commander should either command in his own right, or, at a minimum, have the facility to control the means required to prosecute deep operations. These include appropriate RISTA and strike assets (reconnaissance, artillery, aviation and EW units), supported by air.

COMMAND OF CLOSE OPERATIONS

0425. By function, the usual objective of close operations is to strike the enemy; close operations may also be used to fix the enemy to give freedom of action elsewhere. Finding is involved at any time. Command of close operations is normally best conducted by subordinate formation or unit commanders who have the mission and resources to strike the enemy. Close operations are conducted typically in immediate contact with the enemy. A local subordinate commander is well placed to direct the conduct of close

14. This description reflects the function of the commander concerned; the actual appointment title may vary. This principle holds true for commanders of close and rear operations.
operations as he can formulate, and subsequently adjust, the detailed execution of plans to meet local circumstances, which will change after first contact with the enemy.

0426. The superior commander can reduce his active points of command by sequencing his actions, ensuring that subordinates tasked with close operations are not all simultaneously committed. However, whilst this may reduce the load on the command organization, there are considerable benefits in achieving simultaneity of both deep and multiple close operations. Thus the organization of command must be sufficiently robust and flexible to maintain effective command over a number of concurrently active points of command.

COMMAND OF REAR OPERATIONS

0427. Rear operations under-pin both deep and close operations. Their purpose is to ensure freedom of action of the force by sustaining combat operations (whether exploiting success or recovering from combat) and retaining the freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. The division of responsibility for the overall protection of the force will be determined by the superior commander. Command of rear operations is not synonymous with logistic command.

0428. Combat service support activities are complemented by activities such as establishing and securing lines of communication, and protecting uncommitted forces. Units, installations or other locations within the rear operations commander's area of operations may become targets of enemy deep operations. In these circumstances, rear operations will include local deep and close operations to find, fix and strike the enemy to eliminate the threat. Thus the command organization of rear operations needs to include the capability to gather intelligence, and to plan and mount close operations, in addition to its primary role of sustaining the force. To avoid potential clashes of interest or priorities, unity of rear command is essential. Thus a Commander Rear Operations must be appointed at every appropriate level with clear command relationships to all forces located within his designated area of operations.

0429. Within a theatre of operations, rear operations take place both in the Communications Zone and in the Combat Zone. Where such operations overlap, command arrangements must be confirmed to preserve unity of effort. This applies equally to logistic operations and security matters, including the protection of base areas and lines of communication.
INTEGRATION OF COMMAND

0430. The integration of command of deep, close and rear operations to achieve decisive action rests on applying the principles of decentralization and synchronization, together with the designation of Main Effort. Figure 4.3 shows an example of operations set at Corps level.

CONTROL OF OPERATIONS

0431. Control measures are required to co-ordinate and deconflict operations.\(^{15}\) A commander should understand whether the method of control during a major operation or battle is procedural or positive as this will affect the freedom of action of his subordinates. Control can include elements of both. **Procedural measures** are those previously agreed and promulgated, including boundaries, fire control lines, designated engagement areas, restricted fire areas and limits of exploitation. They are of particular significance in joint air/land operations. **Positive measures** rely on positive identification and clearance to act, which puts greater emphasis on communications, and can reduce the tempo of operations.

0432. **Use of Control Measures.** The balance between procedural and positive control measures in a theatre of operations will depend on:

   a. The type of operation and the operational environment (including terrain).

   b. The available technology, including position-finding and identification equipment.

   c. Any agreed, existing, national, or joint and multinational procedures and rules of engagement.

0433. **Promulgation of Control Measures.** The promulgation of control measures (typically listed under Co-ordinating Instructions) is described in Chapter 9.

\(^{15}\) Details of control measures are contained in ADP Vol 1 Para 0537 - 0544.
The **corps deep operation** 1 to fix the enemy depth division - the corps commander’s current Main Effort - is at the same time a close operation for the aviation brigade concerned. Meanwhile, the deployment of a corps reconnaissance force regiment to secure the right, open, flank is also a corps deep operation 2. Its purpose is not only to monitor enemy activity on that flank, but also to screen the attack, a planning option of the corps reserve division to manoeuvre and strike the enemy depth division. The situation in the area of operations of the left-hand defending division is stable. The operation of the right-hand defending division is a **corps close operation**, as it is primarily an operation which, from the corps perspective, is designed to strike the enemy and to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power. This division mounts a counter-attack, involving close operations (one brigade) to fix 6 and (two brigades) to strike 6 the enemy, whilst its deep operation 7, cued by the divisional reconnaissance regiment, protects its flanks and fixes elements of the attacking enemy division. **Corps rear operations**, intended to ensure freedom of action of the force, include a close operation 8 to counter an enemy deep operation, and so protect uncommitted manoeuvre forces, logistic units and the lines of communication of the corps. Thus, the corps commander has four **active** points of command: the aviation brigade commander, the corps reconnaissance force commander (who both could be subordinated to a Commander Deep Operations16), one out of the two divisional commanders involved in corps close operations, and his designated Commander Rear Operations.

Air operations are an integral part of the Corps framework of operations. For example, BAI could be used to assist Corps deep operations, while CAS could support the aviation brigade’s and the divisional close operations, and Corps rear operations.

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0434. The experience of the First World War, described in Annex A to Chapter 2, illustrated the fundamental dilemma facing any commander: where best to position himself on the battlefield or theatre of operations. Then a commander could either go forward to lead and motivate part of his force or keep to the rear in an attempt to co-ordinate the actions of his span of command and to remain in contact with his superior HQ. The introduction of reliable radio communications in the Second World War gave both tactical and operational commanders more flexibility of choice as to where to position themselves and to remain in touch with other mobile points of command.

0435. At the lowest levels of command it is likely that the commander will be in direct contact with those that he commands. At platoon and company levels, for example, a commander will normally be able to see his soldiers and thus give direct orders. At each successive level, commanding at a distance will increase. In an experienced unit or formation, the commander may be able to command in this way for most of the time, entrusting his subordinates. However, personal contact or intervention at the Main Effort will often become imperative. Similarly, when a commander loses his 'feel' for the situation, he may well need to deploy forward to re-establish a clear perception of events and must therefore possess the means to do so. Sir David Fraser, writing of Rommel as a divisional commander in 1940, noted:

'[Rommel] believed...in commanding from the front. The opportunities of battle present themselves fleetingly, and can only be seen by eye and seized by the mind of one at the critical point. But to command a large and complex formation of all arms while simultaneously placing oneself at such a critical point or points requires a well-thought-out technique.'

0436. The commander must consider his position in relation to the forces he commands and his mission. The decision as to where he positions himself can have important consequences, not only for the command organization, but also for the conduct of operations. The basic factors influencing that decision are developed from the Command Imperatives (see Para 0302) and are common for both the operational and tactical levels. They are:

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17. The British tendency in World War One to centralize all but junior command from the rear is explained in van Creveld's, Martin. *Command in War*, pp. 160-168. However, battalion and brigade commanders and staffs were very much at the 'front' as research into casualty lists indicates.

a. Access to **information** on which to make timely decisions, including the ability of the commander to judge the condition and morale of his forces.

b. **Communications** to points of command. Within technical limitations, communications systems must be adapted to the needs of the commander, and not vice versa.

c. Planning and **decision-making capability**.

d. **Security**, including physical protection.

0437. **Battle Command.** The commander must consider his position in relation to the forces he commands and his mission. At the lower tactical levels, the commander must lead by personal example, have access to information and physically communicate with those he must direct. Typically, the commander will command one major close operation at a time, with the immediacy of the situation requiring him to be well forward. While there may be occasions where personal intervention at a precise point will override all other factors, the commander should also consider how this will affect his communications with other points of command and how it will impact on his command, were he to prejudice his safety unwisely and be killed or wounded. If the commander needs to go forward and command in person, then structures and equipment must be organized accordingly to support him.¹⁹

0438. **High Command.** At higher levels of command, including the operational level, the commander’s decision about where to base himself is less straightforward. The commander will have a wider range of responsibilities (including liaison with the host nation and the commanders of national contingents in multinational operations) and his position will be influenced by a more complex operational framework. In joint operations, for example, (discussed further in Chapter 6) both air and land component headquarters should be located together, notwithstanding the capabilities of modern communications. One of Montgomery’s first acts on arrival in the Western Desert in August 1942 was to unite the Eighth Army headquarters with that of the Desert Air Force. Montgomery describes this himself with characteristic frankness:

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'When I took command, Army H.Q. was right forward, and Air H.Q. Western Desert was right back near the landing-grounds. The Army was fighting its battle and the R.A.F. its battle... Army H.Q. and Air H.Q. and the two staffs seem gradually to have drifted apart. I decided to remedy this at once and moved Army H.Q. back to Air H.Q., and brought the A.O.C. and his senior staff officers into my Mess. This was a good move, and from that moment we never looked back.'

0439. **Summary.** The position which a commander chooses for himself has an important effect on his ability to assess progress, interact with staff and subordinate commanders, and to influence events. Forward command assists commanders in making timely decisions and so grasp fleeting opportunities. However, if a commander is too close to the action, he risks becoming embroiled in a side-show that obscures his overall vision, and undermines his judgement and the efforts of his subordinates. Thus a commander needs to strike a careful balance between forward command and commanding further back. Therefore the most suitable position of the commander is that point where he can best influence the progress of the campaign, major operation or battle by making timely decisions appropriate to his level of command.

**DEPUTIZING OF COMMAND**

0440. British Army field commanders of 'fighting' formations have traditionally not been supported by deputy commanders. The concept of deputies in the form of seconds in command, however, is not alien to the Army; they exist from section to battalion level. In addition, deputy commanders are appointed to brigades in Northern Ireland, the ARRC has a Deputy Commander and a Deputy C-in-C is established at Land Command level. In principle, the requirement for deputy commanders at formation level depends on the circumstances, including the timescale and nature of operations. Deputizing of command, however, is not necessarily synonymous with appointing deputy commanders.

20. Extract from Montgomery's diary notes entitled 'Review of the Situation in Eighth Army from 12 August to 23 October 1942', quoted by Brooks, Stephen. (Ed.) Montgomery and the Eighth Army, (The Army Records Society, 1991), p. 22-23. Original: Imperial War Museum, Montgomery Papers BLM 27/1. Montgomery's action caused a decisive improvement in air/land co-operation which greatly contributed to the ultimate success of the campaign from El Alamein to Tunis. It also resulted in less interference by the Army commander and his staff in the detailed affairs of subordinates - a problem that had bedevilled earlier command organization.

0441. **Requirements.** There is a requirement for deputizing when one or more of the following conditions apply:

a. When there is a need to provide short-term relief for the commander (for example, when he rests or when he is absent from his place of command either on or off duty).

b. When succession in the chain of command must be provided (for example, in the event that the original commander is killed or wounded in action, or for whatever reason, relieved of command).

c. When there is a need to reduce the burden on a commander by delegating responsibilities.

d. At the operational level, when deputy commanders of multinational or joint forces are required in order to promote the cohesion of such forces.

0442. **Reliefs.** In the absence of established deputy commanders, senior Arms Advisers or principal general staff officers, such as chiefs of staff, can provide reliefs for commanders for short periods. The appointment of informal deputies within a formation headquarters is up to the local commander to determine, dependent on the seniority, training, ability, experience and other tasks of the individuals concerned. The importance of providing reliefs for commanders is illustrated by the debilitating effects of sleep deprivation on performance, including decision-making ability, illustrated in Table 4.1. These effects often appear after one night of total sleep loss, and are present in most individuals after two nights without sleep. Some individuals are more susceptible to sleep deprivation than others; commanders have a duty to impose adequate sleep routines on themselves and on their subordinates.

0443. **Succession.** Seconds in command provide succession at the lower tactical levels and are normally available to assume command at little or no notice if the original commander is no longer available to exercise command. On operations at formation level, procedures for alternate command rest on nominating a subordinate commander to assume command. The potential practical difficulties of adopting this procedure should be recognized when setting up the organization of command for a particular campaign or major operation. A subordinate not only has to move to join the superior

22. The function of Arms Advisers is described at Para 0516.
Attention
Lapses of attention increase in frequency and duration; information is often not registered.
Decisions and calculations must be cross-checked.

Initiative
The ability to initiate work decreases: tasks imposed by others are less likely to be affected.

Insight
Insight is reduced; performance and abilities are over-estimated.

Motivation
Motivation is reduced. A ‘mental lift’ or high morale can counter this.

Memory
Short-term memory is impaired. Increased reliance must be placed on written means of communication.

General
Fatigue, irritability, feelings of persecution, inability to concentrate, and periods of misinterpretation and disorientation. SLEEP: In every 24 hours, 4 hours sleep is likely to maintain adequate performance over several weeks.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Counter-Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attention</td>
<td>Lapses of attention increase in frequency and duration; information is often not registered.</td>
<td>Decisions and calculations must be cross-checked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>The ability to initiate work decreases: tasks imposed by others are less likely to be affected.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insight</td>
<td>Insight is reduced; performance and abilities are over-estimated.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Motivation is reduced.</td>
<td>A ‘mental lift’ or high morale can counter this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>Short-term memory is impaired.</td>
<td>Increased reliance must be placed on written means of communication.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>Fatigue, irritability, feelings of persecution, inability to concentrate, and periods of misinterpretation and disorientation.</td>
<td>SLEEP: In every 24 hours, 4 hours sleep is likely to maintain adequate performance over several weeks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 - Mental Factors and Sleep Loss

headquarters (if it still exists) - which will take time - but also must acquaint himself fully with the situation at that level of command before he is in a position to assume command effectively. This will be achieved more quickly if he is fully conversant with his predecessor’s intent.

0444. Delegation. Delegating command responsibilities allows the senior commander to concentrate on particular areas or concerns, leaving a nominated assistant or deputy to concentrate on others. For example, deputy commanders may have specific, delegated powers of budgetary and financial responsibility in peacetime. On operations, if the commander were to fall in action or be otherwise incapacitated, the nominated deputy commander could be available to take his place. Alternatively, those who deputize for the commander in peacetime may not necessarily deploy with a formation to a theatre of operations, for example, and may be retained at the home base to look after the residual responsibilities of deploying commanders and to train reinforcing units.

0445. Deputies of Multinational or Joint Forces. Deputy commanders of multinational forces are appointed in the main to help strengthen the

23. Adapted from The Effects of Sleep Loss: A Commander's Guide (Army Code 71378) following consultation with DRA Centre for Human Sciences, Farnborough
collective command of an alliance or to bond coalition forces together, giving a visible expression of national stake and representation in the higher command. Examples include DSACEUR and Deputy Commander of the ARRC. In national joint operations, single service deputy commanders are typically employed at both Joint HQ (JHQ) or Joint Force HQ (JFHQ) levels, as explained in more detail at Chapter 6.
## THE APPLICATION OF STATES OF COMMAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AUTHORITY</th>
<th>OPCOM</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>TACOM</th>
<th>TACON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GRANTED TO A COMD</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATED TO A COMD</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGN MISSION</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGN TASKS</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECT FORCES</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASSIGN FORCES</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REASSIGN OPCOM</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETAIN OPCON</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATE OPCON</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES WITH APPROVAL(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGN TACOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DELEGATE TACON</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RETAIN TACON</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOY FORCES</td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGN SPECIFIC TASKS</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGN SEPARATE EMPLOYMENT OF COMPONENTS OF UNITS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGISTICS SUPPORT/COMMAND</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOGISTICS CONTROL</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAY-TO-DAY DIRECTION</td>
<td>NO(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPERIOR TO TACOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### AUTHORITIES:

2. MNC and MSC Agreements Concerning C² of Forces in the Vicinity of MNC Boundaries, 25 May 93.
3. AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 92.

### GUIDE TO USERS:

a. "YES" and number in brackets indicates the reference that specifically allows authority.

b. "NO" with number in brackets indicates the reference that specifically prohibits authority.

c. Blank means references do not mention authority: some nations infer prohibition; others infer authority is allowed.

d. US national definitions vary from what is shown.
CHAPTER 5

ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND SUPPORT

The purpose of Chapter 5 is to describe the organization of Command Support in relation to the Exercise of Command and the Organization for Command described in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively.

REQUIREMENTS

0501. A commander needs support if he is to exercise command effectively. At every level of command above the lowest tactical level, there are four basic support requirements:

a. Personnel who assist the commander in the exercise of command and control on his behalf (the staff, arms advisers and liaison officers).

b. Robust communication and information systems.

c. A secure working or base for the commander and his staff (a headquarters) which includes an administrative and security organization to protect, sustain and move the commander and his staff.

d. Standard procedures, including those for decision-making, which focus command and staff effort within and between headquarters.

0502. Scope. This chapter deals with the first three requirements for command support. Joint or multinational aspects of command support are
covered in Chapter 6. The fourth requirement, for standard procedures and techniques in decision-making and in the composition and dissemination of directives and orders, is covered in Chapters 8 and 9 respectively.

0503. **Design of a Command Support Organization.** When designing a command support organization, the elements should be seen as forming a cohesive whole so that resources are not wasted on duplication. There is a temptation to let the size of the staff (and hence the headquarters) grow. If un-checked, it will expand to unmanageable (and dangerous) proportions, risking its own survivability. Major General J.F.C. Fuller’s cautionary words still apply:

> ‘The staff becomes an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus squirming ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner. Unless pruned with an axe it will grow like a fakir’s mango tree, and the more it grows the more it overshadows the general. It creates work, it creates offices, and, above all, it creates the rear spirit.’

The design process must also take full account of the threats to a command system: those posed by the enemy, including Command and Control Warfare (C2W)\(^2\), environmental conditions and 'self-inflicted' threats, illustrated in Figure 5.1.

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**Figure 5.1 - Threats to a Command System**

2. C2W is described at Annex C to Chapter 6.
THE STAFF

FUNCTION

0504. In contemporary warfare, a commander is incapable of exercising command alone except in the simplest and smallest of organizations, such as those found at the lowest tactical level. Therefore, at most levels a staff exists to assist and support the commander. The staff has no authority by itself; it derives authority from the commander and exercises it in his name. Thus all its activities are undertaken on behalf of a commander.

0505. **Duties of the Staff.** Regardless of the level of command, the staff has two main roles:

a. **Assisting the Commander.** The staff has the duty to advise, assist and caution the commander in his decision-making. In assisting the commander, the staff focuses on the two primary functions of control: co-ordinating and monitoring. Under the function of co-ordinating, the staff supports the commander by gathering, processing, analysing and presenting information in a manner that helps the commander to select a particular course of action. The staff is then responsible for planning and the preparation and dissemination of control measures, normally promulgated in the form of orders. In the second and overlapping function of monitoring, the staff provides part of the dynamic feedback mechanism essential for subsequent timely decision-making.

b. **Helping Formations and Units.** The staff also exists to help subordinate formations and units. Their ability to live, train and fight depends to a large extent on the actions of the staff of their superior headquarters. Montgomery wrote: ‘...the staff must be the servants of the troops, and that a good staff officer must serve his commander and the troops but must himself be anonymous.’\(^3\) In the eyes of both superior and subordinate commanders and staffs, the hallmark of a proficient headquarters is its staff’s capacity to work in a timely, efficient, and co-operative manner. Staff must not ’sit’ on information. It is the responsibility of the staff to ensure that all relevant information is passed to subordinate and flanking formations and units.

0506. **Role of the Staff in Decision-Making.** The commander is not the sole decision-maker. In practice, he focuses the efforts of his staff by giving

guidance and making the key decisions from which a framework of action is
developed. By devolving decisions and setting priorities, the commander can
concentrate on his own business of making the essential decisions applicable
to his level of command. In lowering the level of routine internal decision-
making, the commander allows his staff to act within his overall intentions and
to take decisions within their own areas of responsibility. This is consistent
with, and an integral part of, Mission Command.

THE STAFF OFFICER

0507. The staff officer assists his commander by:

a. Understanding his commander's future requirements and offering
informed advice when called for, or if an important factor has been
overlooked.

b. Providing the commander with information to assist him in
reaching decisions, whilst making his own decisions within his
delegated areas of responsibility, thus protecting the commander
from irrelevant detail.

c. Developing and implementing the commander's plan by issuing
and monitoring the execution of directives and orders on his behalf.

0508. Qualities of a Staff Officer. Many of the qualities required by
commanders (described in Chapter 2) apply to staff officers.\(^4\) This is
particularly so for senior staff officers in both national and multinational
appointments who may have considerable delegated powers of command or
management authority and responsibility. Staff officers also work with
subordinates and support personnel (such as clerks and signallers) and thus
will be required to lead others. In addition to the fundamental quality of
leadership, shared by all officers, the following personal qualities grouped
under character, intellect and industry typify a good staff officer:

a. **Character.** A staff officer must be loyal, tactful, trustworthy and
supportive of his commander yet at the same time retain an
independence of thought and judgement. He must accept responsibility
willingly and stand by his decisions; he must advise, consult and co-
operate with others, and be prepared to represent other's decisions

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\(^4\) A former Chief of the German General Staff advised: 'In forming a Staff for war the
qualifications required include not only a great professional knowledge and acquaintance with
service routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion' (General
and to sacrifice self or vested interests. A wise staff officer will also cultivate a pleasant disposition; as SD in the Field (1962) advised 'Good manners and a sense of humour will often help a staff officer to achieve results which could not be otherwise obtained'.

b. **Intellect.** No staff officer will succeed unless he is professionally competent. This involves research and subsequent mastery of his area of responsibility or field of interest. He must be knowledgeable, imaginative, capable of anticipating, acting and reacting in a flexible manner, thinking and working under pressure, and of communicating accurately, both verbally and on paper, with emphasis on clear, succinct, powers of expression. Above all, he must be capable of taking a broader view of his responsibilities and not allow himself to become too compartmentalized in his outlook.

c. **Industry.** The object of most staffwork is to relieve the commander of routine and detailed work. Therefore, despite the requirements for originality and creativity, the reality of much staffwork is solid hard work, where a methodical, systematic approach and eye for detail are also necessary. If a staff officer is responsible for a team, he must be able to delegate responsibility to his subordinates, co-ordinate their work, and present a solution based on team effort succinctly, accurately and on time.

0509. **Implications for Self Development.** All staff officers should take an interest in the activities of their superiors and of other branches of the staff and so widen their professional horizons. This not only prepares individuals for more senior positions in command or on the staff but also allows them, if the need arises, to take over from other members of the staff, adding an element of flexibility to a headquarters. A commander should foster this ethos within his staff and develop it through training.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE STAFF**

0510. **Origins of the British Staff System.** The British Army does not possess a unified general staff system in the continental sense. It makes no formal distinction - either by dress, qualifications or title - between members of the staff and those serving at regimental duty and makes little distinction between members of the staff and those of a 'general staff'. As working with

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5. One of the best guides on the creation and development of the British General Staff before World War One is Gooch. John. *The Plans of War The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900-1916.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974. After the First World War, the distinguishing red gorgets worn by all ranks of the General Staff were (Continued on 5-6)
Allies assumes greater significance, it is important to understand that the British Army has developed its own staff system.

0511. **Comparison of Staff Systems.** In the early 1980s, the British Army partially adopted the NATO staff system for use in formations and organizations outside the Ministry of Defence.\(^6\) In outline, the G [General Staff] Branch was absorbed into G2 and G3, the A [Adjutant General's] Branch into G1 and the Q [Quarter Master General's] Branch into G4. However, important differences in nomenclature, organization and in staff branches' responsibilities between the continental general staff system and the British staff still apply (see Table 5.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Staff Division</th>
<th>Principal Functions (NATO System)</th>
<th>Principal Functions (British Army System)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>G1</strong></td>
<td>Personnel manning and organization; welfare; public relations.</td>
<td>Personnel manning and welfare and medical services.</td>
<td>a. Personnel organization and public relations are dealt with by G3 in the British System. b. At formation level, G1 is responsible for MS matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G2</strong></td>
<td>Intelligence and Security</td>
<td>As NATO.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G3</strong></td>
<td>Current Operations and Movement (Ops); Forward Planning (Plans); Co-ordination of combat support</td>
<td>As NATO, but includes Organizations and Deployments (O &amp; D), Public Information (P Info.) NBC, targeting policy; C2W including OPSEC, deception and PYSOPS.</td>
<td>G3 is responsible for co-ordination of all staffwork, less MS matters. G3 O &amp; D reflects incorporation of “Staff Duties” into G3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G4</strong></td>
<td>Logistics; Co-ordination of combat service support</td>
<td>Logistic Support and Equipment Support functions of CSS.</td>
<td>In NATO the provision of medical services is a G4 function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G5</strong></td>
<td>Civil - Military Relations</td>
<td>As NATO.</td>
<td>Formerly shared by G, A and Q branches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G6</strong>(^7)</td>
<td>Communication and Information Systems.</td>
<td>Function extends to include advice on the control of electromagnetic.</td>
<td>Currently G6 duties are largely carried out by G3 (Comms). Mirrors J6 function (see Annex B to Chapter 6).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.1 - Comparison of Staff Systems**

abolished for lieutenant colonels and below. With few exceptions, they remain worn by colonels and above, although many, strictly speaking, are not members of the general staff in the continental (or US) sense.

6. QRs Chapter 4 explains the duties of the staff in general terms only.

7. G6 is established in the German, Netherlands and United States armies, among others. There is also a G6 branch in HQ MND (C).

0512. **Comparison with the Joint Staff System.** The G1-G6 (land force) staff structure is not wholly compatible with the J1-J9 (joint) staff system, described at Annex B to Chapter 6, which is used at echelons above corps level in NATO.⁹ In British joint operations, J1-J9 is used at both the Joint Headquarters (JHQ) and Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) levels.

0513. **Employment.** In common with most armies, British staff officers are employed above unit level in three main ways:

a. **As General Staff Officers.** General Staff officers may be members of joint staffs, either in the Ministry of Defence Central Staffs, or at joint or multinational headquarters, and other establishments, or of single service staffs. The majority of those employed within the Army are members of general staff branches in headquarters. General Staff officers are appointed without regard to cap-badge, although some posts may be annotated as more suitable for officers with particular training, arm or service experience. General Staff officers complete formal command and staff training which may also include a period of technical training in order to fit officers for weapons staff appointments.¹⁰ Officers who have not received such formal training but work in General Staff positions may become staff-qualified (sq).

b. **As Specialists.** Specialist staff officers normally deal with single arm or service matters in combat support, command support or combat service support branches. Officers are normally appointed to specialist staff posts with regard to cap-badge and arm or service experience.

c. **As Personal Staff.** Personal staff officers have such roles as military assistants (MA) and aides-de-camp (ADC). A MA is a commander’s personal staff officer whose work will largely depend on the individual commander. An ADC is particularly concerned with the personal and social requirements of his commander. At formation level, a MA or ADC is also a combatant officer who must work closely with officers from all branches of the staff and with those of superior and subordinate headquarters.

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⁹. For example, the joint equivalent of G5 (Civil-Military relations) is J9 (Civil and Political Affairs).

¹⁰. Command and staff training will be conducted on a joint basis from 1997.
SPECIFIC RESPONSIBILITIES

0514. **Principal General Staff Officers.** The commander requires a number of key advisers to relieve him of the burden of control, and to provide timely and un-filtered advice in support of his decision-making. At formation level and above, this group will normally include the heads of the general staff branches, together with the Arms Advisers and, possibly, Heads of Service. The work of the staff is co-ordinated by the **Chief of Staff**, the commander's principal general staff officer at Corps level and above. In contrast to most NATO armies, however, the British Army has two principal general staff officers at divisional and brigade levels.11 The Chief of Staff (COS) co-ordinates the G2, G3 and G6 functions, and the **Deputy Chief of Staff** (DCOS) co-ordinates G1/G4 and normally G5 functions.

0515. **Role of the COS.** Although the COS at formation level is not the commander's deputy, alongside the DCOS and others of equal rank he is primus inter pares; he must be capable of acting on behalf of his commander, including decision-making in his absence, and co-ordinating the work of all staff branches. **In this respect, the development of a close working relationship, based on mutual understanding and trust, between a commander and his COS is vital.**

0516. **Arms Advisers.** A commander frequently has the services of an adviser from one or more of the main combat support Arms (artillery, engineer and communications). Arms Advisers are either part of the staff or are attached to the HQ of the formation or unit being supported. They may have the dual function of advising the commander on matters affecting their own arm and of commanding their own troops. They usually accompany the commander on his reconnaissance and should be involved in the planning stage of an operation. To enable them to carry out their work efficiently they, and their staffs, must be kept fully informed by the formation staff. Arms Advisers have the right of direct access to the commander at all times; their staff to the COS. Arms Advisers also have the right of access to their functional superior at the next higher headquarters. However, such contact should be confined to special-to-Arm matters so as not to circumvent the chain of command.

0517. **Heads of Services.** In a similar way to Arms Advisers, formation commanders down to divisional level receive advice from their Heads of

11. The origins are historical: the COS assumed the function of the Colonel 'GS' at divisional level and brigade major at brigade level, whilst the DCOS assumed the role of the Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (DAA & QMG or 'DQ') at both levels. The title COS was reserved for use at Army or Army Group level.
Services who are also commanders of combat service support arms in their own right. At divisional level, these include Commander Medical, Commander Logistic Support and Commander Equipment Support. There are also service representatives at brigade headquarters. Heads of Services, although having the right of access to the formation commander as in the case of Arms Advisers, normally work through the formation DCOS. The role of Heads of Services and of the logistic staff is explained in more detail in ADP-3.

RELATED SHIPS INVOLVING THE STAFF

0518. **Between the Commander and his Staff.** Although a commander sets the pace and is the principal decision-maker, the staff has a vital role in informing him, developing his decisions and making subsidiary ones. The relationship between a commander and his staff should be characterised by a climate of loyalty, respect and individual initiative rather than one that is sycophantic and unquestioning; the independence of thought and timely action implicit in Mission Command is vital.

0519. **Between The Staff and Other Levels of Command.** The relationship between the staff and both subordinate and superior commanders and their staffs is important. It must be based upon mutual respect and developed through a conscientious, determined and helpful approach to the solving of problems; anything less will undermine confidence in the exercise of command at all levels. Friendly personal relationships between all members of a headquarters and with the staff of superior and subordinate headquarters are thus essential.

0520. **Staff Integration and Teamwork.** The creation of an effective and closely knit 'staff team' during peacetime both within and between headquarters and units is essential. A staff cannot work efficiently without complete cooperation between all branches and services. There must be no secrets between branches, and no abrogation of responsibilities. The COS and other principal general staff officers have a key role in fostering this atmosphere. However, this environment can be frustrated by frequent changes in personalities and infrequent opportunities to exercise under operational circumstances. Groupings and work practices are unlikely to remain static. Many of the British Army's past and present operations have been characterised by the forming of ad-hoc headquarters, formations and units and the integration of additional personnel from coalition partners and the Reserves. Therefore forming a well-integrated staff team must be built on operational deployment. Team-building is a command skill which requires practice.
0521. **Access to the Commander.** While it is important, at all levels, that a commander strives to maintain a two-way contact with all members of his staff, this becomes increasingly impractical at each successive level of command. At battle group level, all members of the commander’s staff will have frequent contact with him in peace and on operations. At higher levels, commanders may choose to allow a wide range of staff officers to have direct access to them in peace. During operations, however, this may become less feasible and a commander may elect to limit the amount of access. The personal relationships created in peace and so essential to the maintenance of trust can be fostered by involving a large number of staff officers in information briefings, thereby acknowledging their contribution as well as allowing them to hear the commander’s deliberations. Decision briefings, however, may often have to be restricted to a smaller group who contribute to the commander’s decision-making process (see Chapter 8).

### LIAISON

#### PRINCIPLES

0522. Liaison is defined as that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.\(^\text{12}\) Liaison may be a continuous but informal process, normally achieved through consultations between the respective commanders or their staffs either by face to face contact or electronically. Liaison is a standing requirement, especially in multinational operations and must not become an after-thought on deployment. Liaison must be reciprocal when:

a. A force is placed under the command or control of an headquarters of a different nationality.

b. Brigade size and higher formations of different nationalities are adjacent.

0523. When liaison is not reciprocal, responsibility for its establishment is governed by the following principles:

a. From left to right.

b. From rear to front for units of the same echelon.

\(^\text{12}\) JSP 110/STANAG 2101.
c. From higher to lower echelon.

d. From supporting to supported unit.

e. From the incoming force to the outgoing force during the relief of combat troops.

**ORGANIZATION**

0524. **The selection of liaison officers is critically important.** The contribution of one high-grade and well-motivated liaison officer to the cooperation and mutual understanding between headquarters can be out of all proportion to the individual's rank and appointment. As they represent their commander, liaison officers should know him, understand his plans and be able to express his views cogently to the commander and headquarters to which they are attached. It is the responsibility of the despatching headquarters to select, train and exercise their liaison officers and then brief them on the current situation before their deployment. The receiving headquarters must provide access to commanders, briefings and any information relevant to their liaison duties. Liaison detachments must provide 24-hour cover and maintain the necessary communications.

0525. There will be occasions when the exchange of liaison officers or liaison detachments will be insufficient to ensure adequate understanding and co-operation between formations. This is most likely to be the case in joint or multinational operations. Integration of staff into each others' headquarters provides a solution (see Chapter 6). In addition, a commander can employ personal liaison officers to provide an independent source of timely accurate information.13

0526. When electronic communication is either impossible, unreliable or not interoperable, it is imperative that formations or units which are operating closely together exchange Liaison Officers (LOs). This may be done for a specific purpose and a limited period of time, such as providing a liaison officer at a reserve demolition to report when their units are clear. Liaison may have to be conducted over a more protracted period when, for example, the activities of a number of formations or units have to be tightly co-ordinated;

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this is especially important if they are from different nations or if they have not
trained together for the activity they have to undertake. In this case liaison
officers should be exchanged between headquarters, and, if they need to be
effective for a significant period, they may have to be built up into a liaison
detachment.

COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS)

THE NATURE OF CIS

0527. Communication and information systems, which bear and share
information, are so inter-related that they are best treated together. They are
means to one end: the effective functioning of command. They exist to serve
a commander and his staff, forming an indispensable 'nervous system'
linking points of command.

0528. Modern CIS offer great potential benefits to commanders and staff
who understand the strengths and limitations of that CIS. The sharing of
information on an 'all-informed' basis supports mutual understanding and
promotes unity of effort as required by Mission Command. Communications
may contribute to decisive action and to military success. This was
demonstrated by the skilful German employment of radio in co-ordinating the
Panzertruppe in 1940. When used expeditiously, CIS can give a commander
a decisive edge over his opponent in reducing decision-action cycles and
improving co-operation between combined arms. Exploiting CIS is therefore
a pre-requisite for the effective exercise of command.

0529. The ready accessibility to information which CIS provide, however,
may lead to ever greater demands for information, particularly from higher
levels of command. This, in turn, may begin to undermine a decentralized
style of command. Additionally, CIS structures, and the staff which controls
them, tend to expand to meet technical rather than operational aspirations.
Un-checked, CIS and its management can become bureaucratic and
unresponsive.¹⁴ The overall result includes the stifling of initiative at lower
levels and slowing of decision-making. Technically advanced CIS can also
give a false sense of security and are vulnerable to C2W, as the Germans
found to their cost when their Enigma machines were 'cracked'.¹⁵

¹⁴. Take, for example, the US CIS structure in Vietnam described by van Creveld, op cit., p.
239.

¹⁵. Enigma systems protected strategic and operational traffic. The British attack on Enigma
was successful only after a great deal of effort, which itself had to be kept secret (and remained
so for 35 years). This operation, now known by its classification of 'Ultra', made a major
contribution to Allied success. Of the many books written on the subject, see Lewin, Ronald.
REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS

0530. **Capacity.** Sufficient capacity is required to cope with the quantity of information necessary for a force to operate effectively and to ensure its timely passage. Some information will be required by many users in which case it is more efficient to transmit the information once over a system which allows users to be 'all-informed'. Other information may need to be selectively disseminated by 'one-to-one' systems or by means of a restricted net. Such systems should be managed according to the commander's priorities to prevent the wastage of resources.

0531. **Survivability.** CIS must be reliable, robust, resilient and at least as survivable as the supported force. A major threat to CIS is the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and transient radiation effect on electronics (TREE) resulting from a nuclear detonation. Both can result in prolonged interruption of communication links and the destruction of vulnerable parts of a system. Selective destruction by conventional means can also paralyze CIS. Alternate means of communication provide a measure of resilience. CIS must be organized and deployed to ensure that their performance under stress reduces gradually and not catastrophically. Command procedures must be capable of adaptation to cope with CIS degradation or failure. Additionally, commanders should understand that their uncommitted reserve is only properly balanced if it has appropriate CIS.

0532. **Security.** The level of security required will depend on the nature of the information to be protected and the threat of interception and exploitation of communications traffic. Communications security will usually be provided by electronic on-line encryption devices. At lower levels of command, reduced levels of security may have to be afforded by the use of manual codes, which result in a much slower information flow. The security of information systems is achieved by a combination of control of physical access to terminals, by software, and by control of disks. Countering the threats to an information system can be expensive and complicated.

0533. **Range, Mobility and Deployment.** The characteristics of CIS should not unduly constrain the supported force. CIS characteristics are largely determined by:

16. EMP can be generated by conventional means.
a. **Range.** A communication system, as a whole, should have the range to link all points of command. Communications must also be maintained with elements of the force, such as RISTA, deep attack and special forces that may be employed beyond the force's immediate area of operations.

b. **Mobility.** The mobility of a communication system is governed by the mobility of its individual components. Whilst these must be capable of moving at least at the same rate as the element of the force they support, some elements of the system, especially those whose function is to provide range and connectivity to the rest of the force, may need to move much more quickly. The mobility and range of a communication system are therefore closely related and are important factors in the system’s ability to support manoeuvre. This requirement places increasing emphasis on the need for a range of technical capabilities including non-terrestrial (satellite) means to link fragmented systems, even at the tactical level.

c. **Deployment.** Apart from cost constraints limiting the number of systems available, the ability to deploy communications systems is governed by size, weight and power considerations. Strategic mobility is an important consideration, and CIS equipment must be matched to each formation's role.

0534. **Constraints.**

a. **Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum.** There is a finite part of the electromagnetic spectrum which can be used for communications and which has been internationally allocated for military use. In a multinational and joint context, frequency management for friendly forces is difficult even in a benign environment. Efficient use of the available and allocated spectrum is therefore critical to the deployment of a coherent CIS structure.

b. **Interoperability.** In joint and multinational operations, particularly at the operational level, individual CIS must be compatible. Military systems will also need to work with civil systems, particularly in Operations Other Than War.

**PLANNING OF CIS**

0535. **General.** The nature of the communications requirement becomes evident as soon as the command structure for a campaign develops. The
requirement is further defined as each commander identifies his information needs. The communications structure supporting a force also has to allow for the exchange of information with other Services and allied formations. It is therefore vital that command relationships are clearly defined from the outset.

0536. **Responsibility for Provision of Communications.** The responsibility for the provision of communications is from superior to subordinate, and between equivalent levels of command, from left to right. This does not excuse subordinates from careful siting of communications assets to assist their superiors. Where flanking formations or units are of different nations, the requirement for communication matches that for liaison and should therefore be reciprocal.

0537. **Planning Factors.** Various additional factors may necessitate changes to the CIS plan throughout the campaign. These include:

a. **Evolving Command Structure and Re-subordination.** During the campaign the command structure may change. The communications structure must reflect this to ensure that command can be continuous. As formations and units are re-subordinated, their information flow requirements will change. Close co-ordination between the losing and gaining HQ will be necessary to ensure that communications are maintained.

b. **Movement.** Any movement planned for a significant proportion of the force or over any significant distance will change the area over which communications is required. For example, in a passage of lines operation, it may be necessary to extend communications cover into or beyond the in-place force’s area of operations before the main body of the moving force moves.

c. **Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** The use of C2W by either friendly forces or the enemy will affect the use of command support systems. Close co-ordination between the G3, G2, G6 and EW Co-ordination Cell (EWCC) staff is necessary to reduce the effect of own C2W activities on command support, including the impact of imposing a restrictive EMCON state for deception or OPSEC. The principle that C2W protects friendly force CIS whilst attacking the enemy’s should always be an important part of the planning process. Further details of C2W are given at Annex C to Chapter 6.
0538. **Application of Information Technology (IT).** The aim of introducing IT is to save time and reduce staff activity, not to make the life of an existing staff more comfortable. Therefore, in planning the introduction of IT, the key is to sort out what activities need human judgement, where that judgement must guide technology, and where technology can reduce or eliminate human activity. However, great care should be taken to ensure that there are alternative systems available, should the primary system fail. The current division of IT systems generates penalties in the double-handling of information as it is transferred from one system to another with a consequent risk of error and slowing the information flow. For the future, the objective is for one-time entry of data at the appropriate level and a seamless flow of information to the commander and staff, in barracks or deployed. The information should then be manipulated on machines with a common 'feel' for the user.

HEADQUARTERS

PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION

0539. The word headquarters is often used as a generic term for the grouping of the staff, its associated CIS and a structure which provides a working environment. In this sense, the 'headquarters' supports the commander by presenting him with relevant information, by providing him with the means of control and the communications through which orders are passed and information is exchanged. Principles for the design of formation headquarters from Corps level downwards are described in terms of organization and function.

0540. **Requirements.** Headquarters at all levels must be responsive and able to survive. Whilst the detailed organization of headquarters must reflect the level and nature of the command and the type of the campaign or operation which is to be conducted, a number of common requirements determine the organization. They are:

a. **Deployment.** A field headquarters must be structured so that it can be deployed easily to, or within, a theatre of operations. This ease of deployment is in turn dependent on the size of the headquarters and the mobility of its component parts, including CIS.

b. **Continuity of Command.** When operational, a headquarters must be able to sustain the exercise of command. This requirement is met primarily by maintaining external communications. Continuity of command further depends on the manning of headquarters to maintain 24-hour cover, the provision of alternate or step-up facilities
(see Annex A) to allow headquarters and staff to move, and the ***survivability*** of headquarters and CIS in the face of ground and air threats. Thus a degree of ***redundancy*** must be built into and between headquarters and CIS.

c.  **Fusion of Command and Staff Effort.** Within a headquarters, command and staff effort must be fully co-ordinated, or 'fused'. The internal layout, manning structure, CIS infrastructure and staff procedures will largely determine this.

0541.  **Functions and Design of Headquarters.** The functions of different types of headquarters vary with the level of command and detailed roles will vary accordingly. Operational level headquarters are likely to be joint and multinational as considered in Chapters 6. Annex A contains a summary of the principal types of headquarters in use at the tactical level, together with associated design criteria which are common to all field headquarters. Detailed organizations of headquarters, however, are subject to change. Descriptions of current formation headquarters are contained in the *Staff Officer's Handbook*.

**OPERATION OF HEADQUARTERS**

0542.  All the staff cells within a headquarters are concerned with the two functions of co-ordinating and monitoring in support of the commander's intention and mission. While all cells should have clearly defined responsibilities, few, if any, will be able to operate effectively in isolation. Co-ordination between them will be important. The interaction between staff cells must be identified early in the process of structuring the headquarters, and arrangements should be made to ensure that they are equipped and manned to work, not only with other cells within the headquarters but also with similar functional cells in other headquarters.

0543.  The principal staff officer (typically the COS or DCOS, depending on the level and function of headquarters) provides the *human focus* for activity within a headquarters. Regular briefings (for both himself and his commander) aid the flow of information and hence the integration of staff effort. There will also be a need for a physical focus within headquarters; a place to which all staff cells have access, where they are required to display current information needed by other staff cells and from which they can draw all or most of the current and accurate information they require. Ideally this should be centred on the map on which the current battle is being fought, although access to future plans must not be restricted to a degree that prevents staff cells from
making a timely and, in some cases, concurrent contribution to their formulation.\textsuperscript{17}

0544. Once battle has been joined, co-ordination upwards, sideways and downwards by physical means may become difficult. Greater reliance will have to be placed on electronic means which, where possible, should be of an all-informed nature - using combat net radio or the trunk communication conference call or sole user facility; the subsequent distribution of written or graphical orders will be especially important as staffs and commanders become progressively more tired.

0545. \textbf{Summary.} The keys to the efficiency, responsiveness and the survival of tactical level headquarters are restricting their size and maintaining well rehearsed drills for movement, concealment, defence and working routine. If allowed to grow too big, or to become too dependent on complicated CIS or staff procedures, the effectiveness and survivability of headquarters will be impaired.

\textsuperscript{17} In some HQ it may be appropriate to establish a bird-table, with a common operations and briefing map, located at the centre of the key staff cells, although this may have implications for physical security and mobility.
FUNCTIONS, DESIGN AND SITING OF HEADQUARTERS

FUNCTIONS

1. The functions of headquarters are described in Table 5A.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of HQ</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAIN (Bde/Div/Corps)</td>
<td>Principal location of the commander for the command of deep and close operations. HQ at which deep and close operations are planned and commanded and rear operations are monitored.</td>
<td>a. Overall command of deep, close and rear operations is exercised by the commander wherever he may be located.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORWARD (Any level)</td>
<td>A small and very mobile headquarters with appropriate protection, designed to allow a commander to command forward. It may also be deployed early into a theatre or area of operations as a base for planning or be used by the commander in specific operations of limited duration.</td>
<td>A commander's ability to command from a FORWARD HQ is limited in scope and time. The level of command support is less than that available at a MAIN HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAR (Div/Corps)</td>
<td>Principal location for the designated commander of rear operations, including combat service support activities. HQ at which rear operations are planned and commanded and deep and close operations are monitored. In the ARRC, responsibilities are split between the ARRC REAR and HQ Rear Sp Comd (RSC).</td>
<td>a. The Rear Operations Commander is supported by G1, G4 and G5 staff together with CSS commanders. Elements of G2/G3 and combat support staff may also be present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTERNATE (any level)</td>
<td>In the ideal case, a duplicate HQ for either MAIN or REAR.</td>
<td>In practice, resource constraints may rule out the full duplication of manpower, vehicles and equipment, leading to the use of STEP-UP HQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEP-UP (any level)</td>
<td>A headquarters which may replicate only key functions of a MAIN or REAR HQ.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5A.1 - Functions of Headquarters

1. Details of specific CSS HQ are included in ADP-3 Logistics and AFM Vol 1 Part 6 CSS.
2. **Tactical Headquarters**. All field headquarters require to be tactical. If a headquarters has become too large and unwieldy, then its structure should be pruned. If a commander needs to go forward to visit subordinates, he should either fly or move in a 'Rover Group', depending on the threat. If he needs to command forward, he should consider moving his own headquarters sufficiently forward to a suitable location or joining a subordinate's headquarters. Alternatively, a commander may elect to command from a Forward HQ which, at formation level, may consist of the command vehicles of the commander and those of his principal Arms Advisers.

3. **Alternate Headquarters**. Alternate headquarters provide continuity of command when a headquarters either needs to be moved or is put out of action. There are a number of ways to achieve this, but the price of added flexibility is additional resources. Headquarters can be duplicated in entirety to allow control to be passed, for example, from one headquarters to another prior to the first moving.

4. **Step-Up Headquarters**. If fewer vehicles, manpower and CIS are available, a STEP UP headquarters may replicate only key functions and be capable of holding control for only limited periods whilst men and vehicles are transferred from the previous MAIN headquarters.

**DESIGN**

5. **Size**. The size of headquarters affects its deployability and survivability. In broad terms, a larger headquarters may provide greater endurance but often at the expense of security and mobility, while a smaller headquarters may limit support to the commander. Added redundancy in the numbers or size of headquarters gives greater flexibility but at the cost of greater resource investment in terms of manpower, vehicles and CIS equipment, and reduced deployability. The key is to strike the right balance thus producing a responsive and agile organization. Active measures must be taken to identify those elements that are absolutely necessary and banish those that are not.

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2. The term 'TAC HQ' is largely historical, and reflects the fact in the Second World War part of an army or army group headquarters was split off to conduct 'tactical operations'. Corps and divisional headquarters became too large to move easily in an adverse air situation and the tendency grew to detach part of them, mainly to achieve dispersion and for ease of movement, and call them 'tactical headquarters'. (See Montgomery. FM. Memoirs and Higher Formation Training 1951. WO Code No 6990, pp. 27-29.)

3. To quote a former US Army divisional commander: 'Good intentions fall victim to a variety of contrary pressures such as comfort, visitors' accommodations, a desire for briefing facilities and the conviction of staff officers that prestige is inversely proportional to the distance from the flagpole' Major General Prillaman. Richard L. Command and Control in the 2d Armored Division, Military Review, Jul 82.
6. **'Hardness'.** Hardness refers to the degree of physical and electronic protection a headquarters has. Hardening extends beyond providing armoured staff vehicles, as protection may involve a combination of active and passive measures. Small size and hardness together contribute towards survivability, as will frequent movement. In many cases geographical dispersion of command facilities will help to diffuse a headquarters' signatures (visual, thermal, radar and electronic).

7. **Modularity.** A modular headquarters structure offers flexibility in deployment and employment. It allows elements to be deployed as required by the type of operation. In theatre, elements of a headquarters can be ‘bolted-on’ as required to other elements of the same headquarters or to other headquarters. Modern CIS may allow a large headquarters to be split into a number of smaller elements. However, the advantages of separation (in terms of physical and electronic protection) must be balanced against the disadvantages of loss of personal contact and team planning, thus risking fusion of effort.

8. **Manning Structure.** At brigade level and above there is a need for an organizational division into current operations and future plans; only in this way can a smooth transition between major operations and battles be achieved and the continuous nature of warfare be recognised. The division between current operations and future plans, although imperative for G3, is also required in most situations for G2 and G4 and the arms and services.

9. **Administration.** The following administrative requirements must be met: the physiological needs of the headquarters personnel - shelter, rest, food and water; the provision of internal communications, light and power; and collective and individual mobility appropriate to the formation. Whether these administrative needs can be met in the field will also depend on the siting of headquarters.

**SITING**

10. **General.** Reliable communications, together with the administration and security of the commander, his staff and the other supporting elements are vital to the continuity and effectiveness of command. Headquarters, and the CIS that support them, are indispensable in the exercise of command; they are therefore high value targets for enemy C2W. Thus the siting of headquarters is as critical as their design.

11. **Tactical Level HQ.** Taking into account the requirement for Forward Command described in Chapter 4, the principal considerations affecting the siting of tactical headquarters are:
Communications. Not only must the site offer good communications to subordinate and other headquarters, it should also if possible be screened from enemy EW devices. Access to civil communication and information systems may also be important.

Concealment. Woods or built-up areas offer the best cover form view; the use of barns, large sheds or factory complexes, however, helps counter thermal imagery (TI) surveillance and provides some basic protection against chemical attack.

Security. Headquarters must provide a secure working environment for the commander and his staff. Security is achieved through physical and electronic concealment and protection, and NBC defence measures. There may also be a need to assign forces for the physical security of the headquarters and its associated communications.

Accessibility. The site should be easily accessible but not liable to accidental discovery by roving enemy land or aerial reconnaissance. Therefore the use of 'tac-signing', a useful peacetime expedient, should be controlled carefully on operations.

Operational Level HQ. In principle, the siting of operational level headquarters follows the same considerations as tactical headquarters but additional factors apply. Communications to the host nation and to the home base are essential, as they are to other services and force components. Infrastructure requirements and access to ports or fixed wing airfields may also determine siting.
Allied Command in the First World War:
Left to right: Joffre, Poincare, King George V, Foch and Haig

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby: Soldier and Statesman
Higher Commanders (FM Montgomery and FM Slim)

FM Slim and the 14th Army - Leadership is the basis of all command
The Second World War - Allied Commanders:
  Patton, Bradley, Montgomery

The Gulf War - Multinational Command
  Lt Gen Sir Peter de la Billière and General Schwarzkopf
The Commander and the Media:
FM Slim being interviewed by the BBC

Major General Sir Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery's Chief of Staff
Forward Command:
General Guderian, Commander XIX Panzer Corps. France 1940

Falklands War land commanders:
Major General Jeremy Moore and Brigadier Julian Thompson
CHAPTER 6
COMMAND OF JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

The purpose of Chapter 6 is to describe principles for the planning and command of joint and multinational operations, relating these to the Foundations and Exercise of Command (described in Chapters 2 and 3). This chapter should be read in conjunction with Chapters 5 and 6 of ADP-1 Operations and associated national (JSP 1) and NATO (AJP-1) publications.

NATURE OF JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

0601. Wars, campaigns or major operations, including Operations Other Than War, will invariably be joint; they are also very likely to be multinational. Thus an understanding of the nature of joint and multinational operations, their demands on individuals and implications for the organization of command and command support, is essential to all commanders.

JOINT OPERATIONS

0602. Any large-scale land operation will always be conducted on a joint basis with air or maritime forces. In Operations Other Than War the term 'joint' extends to include other agencies, such as the police and humanitarian organizations. Thus joint operations embrace a wide range of military activities in peace, conflict other than war, and war, and so form an enduring feature of command.

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- Multinational Operations

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ESTIMATE
- Enemy
- The Operational Environment
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- Other Factors

ANNEXES:
A. National Command Arrangements
B. Joint Staff Structure
C. Command and Control Warfare (C2W)
0603. Joint operations include amphibious, airborne, airmobile, counter-air, land/air, maritime air, and SF operations. Successful command of joint operations is based on joint-Service understanding and co-operation, detailed planning, clear command relationships, good communications at all levels and, above all, flexible execution. History has shown that the continuous development and refinement of joint doctrine and realistic joint training, together with a common determination to succeed and to support each other, are essential if joint operations are to be executed with any prospect of success. Joint expertise is the product of many years' inter-service understanding, training and co-operation. Once lost, it is not easily regained.

0604. **Transition from Joint to Multinational Operations.** Although the joint command structure is intrinsically national, it must retain the capability to change into a multinational structure at short notice. What may start as a small-scale joint operation may quickly become a major multinational one, involving a number of nations. In turn, commanders' responsibilities and command relationships may require adjustment. This will call for flexibility, co-operation and efficient liaison arrangements, and above all, a pragmatic approach.

**MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

0605. Other than in pursuance of solely national objectives, British armed forces will invariably be deployed within the framework of an alliance established by treaty, or as part of an ad hoc coalition. Multinational campaigns and major operations will normally be mounted in accordance with alliance obligations. In the case of an ad hoc coalition, military action is likely to have been legitimised by international mandate, usually in the form of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

0606. An understanding of the nature of alliances and coalitions is required by all commanders and staffs involved in multinational operations. In multinational operations, national contingents will probably have direct links to national headquarters and governments. This may complicate the

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1. Details of these joint operations, including C2 arrangements, are given in Part II to Joint Service Publication 1 (JSP 1) (Fifth Edition), *United Kingdom Doctrine for Combined and Joint Operations*.

2. British joint doctrine is described in JSP 1. It is intended that this document, when published in final form, will be identified as a UK Supplement to Allied Joint Publication (AJP-1) ‘Allied Joint Operations Doctrine’. ADP Vol 1, meanwhile, sets out the Army's approach to joint operations.
exercise of command. National restrictions may affect the employment of forces in the campaign. The scope of such restrictions will be related to the level of commitment of the national government concerned, which will depend on the nature of the alliance or coalition force involved. A number of important differences between formed alliances and ad hoc coalitions bear on the exercise of command of multinational operations.

0607. **Alliances.** A successful political-military alliance typically arises from an easily identifiable strategic threat and consequent, long-term requirement for collective security. Such alliances are characterised by mutual cooperation between, and respect for, individual member sovereign states (allies). Balanced structures for political affairs, defence planning, training and conducting operations are developed. Military contributions to the alliance tend to reflect the member states’ respective political resolve and economic capabilities. However, if the perceived threat to an alliance is no longer one which demands a collective approach to security, consensus within an alliance as to its role may not necessarily be guaranteed. In this way the distinction between an alliance and a coalition can become blurred.

0608. **Coalitions.** Coalitions differ from alliances in their duration, nature and purpose. The individual members, termed coalition partners, often disparate in political orientation and culture, ‘have temporarily merged their capabilities and submerged their differences in the interest of a common goal.’ Examples of this included the grouping of Allies in the Second World War and of the members of the US-led Coalition in the Gulf War. A coalition will only remain in being as long as sufficient mutual interest exists in a common military enterprise. Military contributions to such coalitions are based on short-term political and economic considerations. Command and control structures are inevitably more ad-hoc in nature than in an established alliance. As John Terraine has noted, however, ‘the ultimate strength of a coalition is not measured by the number of its members, but by the strength of its strongest member’. Command and control arrangements of coalition forces will also tend to follow the practice of its strongest member, and therefore reflect that member’s military experience, organizational strengths and weaknesses.


4. Terraine, John. ‘Lessons of Coalition War: 1914 and 1939’, RUSI Journal (Summer 1989), p. 62. Conversely, the strength of an alliance may be that of the weakest member, if unanimous collective decisions are required.
0609. **National Influence.** There is usually an element of choice in deciding the level of participation in multinational operations. Depending on the circumstances, there are differing degrees of national interest at stake and upon this depends the strength and nature of the contribution to the alliance or coalition concerned. This, in turn, will influence the weight of the national voice in decision-making within the alliance or coalition. In any future large-scale multinational campaign, however, it is unlikely that the United Kingdom will act as the lead nation and be in a position to dictate terms. Participation in multinational operations is therefore likely to be as a junior partner. This demands a knowledge and understanding of the capabilities and intentions of allies. Participation in the decision-making process at the highest levels of command, and so scope to influence the planning and execution of campaigns or major operations, will often depend on the size of the military contribution to an alliance or coalition. The BEF in 1914, for example, was committed without much British involvement in the French plan of campaign, and little say in its subsequent direction.  

0610. **UN Operations.** Command of UN operations may often pose the greatest challenge to a commander. As a senior UN official remarked, 'UN commanders need to be comfortable with the fluid, the ambiguous and the unpredictable.' The forces of nations involved in a UN operation may not have any tradition or recent practice of working together. There may be neither a common doctrine for, nor approach to, such operations and the national employment restrictions placed by the contributing governments may severely hamper the freedom of action of the UN commander.

0611. **Role of the Commander.** Whatever the nature of the operation or composition of a multinational force, the commander should be aware of national sensitivities and vital interests. This calls for political acumen, together with patience, tact and mutual understanding based on knowledge of other nations' languages, history and culture. There is no place for prejudice of any sort. In particular, the commander must also understand the relative capabilities and weaknesses of the forces under his multinational command which will affect the total fighting power of the force. The practical guidance of World War Two remains valid:

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5. For a detailed discussion of the problems of multinational command in two world wars, see Graham, Dominick and Bidwell, Shelford. *Coalitions, Politicians and Generals.* London, Brassey’s, 1993; tensions between allied commanders and politicians of World War One are described in Chapter 4, 'A Coalition Bedevilled'.

6. Kofi Annan, lecture to the Staff College, 23 Sep 94.

'It has been shown that when staffs are composed of more than one nationality, or when troops of one nation are fighting under a formation commander of another nationality, difficulties are likely to arise unless higher commanders and staffs possess a knowledge, not only of the organization and staff methods of their allies, but also of the organization and general principles of the tactical employment of allied subordinate formations.'

0612. It is up to the commander to generate and sustain confidence in, and within, the force, to weld all the national contingents together into a strong and co-ordinated team and, by his personal example, to continue to motivate it. This will provide the required foundation of common purpose, unity of effort and co-operation. The commander’s task is made even more demanding in the face of disappointment or set-back. In such circumstances cracks may begin to appear amongst coalition partners and between national contingents; the multinational commander will then have to call on his reserves of determination, resolve and imagination and take all necessary steps to re-build the morale of the force and confidence in the coalition. To achieve this, the commander’s object will be to achieve military success as quickly and as economically as possible.

ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND

PRINCIPLES OF JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL COMMAND

0613. Unity of Command. At the grand strategic level, the direction of military operations in the pursuit of national, or multinational, policy objectives is normally the result of collective decisions made by sovereign governments or in alliance councils. The basis of such decisions must be common purpose. At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict, a fundamental tenet of operations is unity of command. At


10. Unity of Command is a US Principle of War (FM 100-5, p. 2-5), which includes Unity of Effort: ‘For every objective, seek unity of command and unity of effort’.
whatever level, unity of command provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations. AJP-1 states:

"Unity of command is indispensable for the efficient and economical operational employment of forces and resources. Unity of command is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and co-ordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander."

0614. **Continuity of Command.** Unity of command is further enhanced by continuity of command for the duration of a campaign or major operation. In principle, 'he who plans should execute'; however, circumstances may not permit this.

0615. **Decentralization.** Delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander's intentions are enshrined in the principle of Decentralization within Mission Command. Although the emphasis given to a decentralized command style in the doctrine and practice of other Services and nations may differ, joint or multinational commanders, and their staffs, should employ the principle of delegation for two main reasons:

a. Joint or multinational commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint or multinational operational matters, taking account of single service or national issues only as necessary.

b. Through delegation, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise and to exploit favourable opportunities. This decentralization encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making.

0616. **Co-operation and Mutual Understanding.** Without the common will and necessary trust to plan and execute a joint or multinational campaign or major operation, there can be little chance of success. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation of co-operation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution of joint and multinational operations. This must stem from the highest levels. Mutual understanding also rests on a common application of joint and multinational

11. AJP-1, Para 0304.
The necessary familiarity with the procedures of other Services and nations, and confidence in each other, is best achieved through joint and multinational training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; joint and multinational training should be undertaken wherever possible, but it is particularly important, should time be available, prior to any major operation. The greater the degree of standardization (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for fruitful co-operation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success.

0617. Integration of Command. Integration of forces and command structures ensures that the capabilities of the component Services of single nations, or those of several nations, can be brought to bear decisively to achieve the joint or multinational commander's operational objectives. Component commands into which national components are integrated will normally be either functional (Maritime, Land, Air, Logistics and Special Forces (SF)) or service (Army, Navy, Air Force) in nature. Integration between commands is strengthened by a clear chain of command. If separate single service or national component headquarters are required, they should be established to complement rather than to obscure or impede the joint or multinational chain of command. In all operations, comprehensive and efficient liaison structures are essential to effective integration of C2.

TERMINOLOGY

0618. The current UK terminology for the command of national Joint Operations is based on the assumption that such operations will be conducted outside the integrated military structure of NATO. The command of joint operations in Northern Ireland does not come into this category and is not

12. NATO doctrine exists at both the operational and tactical levels: AJP-1 provides a doctrine that outlines the principal factors affecting the planning, execution, and support of Allied joint operations. For the purposes of AJP-1, the term Allied Joint Operation is defined as 'an operation, carried out by military forces of two or more nations, in which elements of more than one service participate'. It is primarily concerned with the planning and execution of joint campaigns and major operations. Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-35 (B) provides land force tactical doctrine for the planning and execution of battles and engagements.

13. Defined as 'The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.' (AAP-6).

14. Hence the term 'Out of Area' (OOA). See JSP 1 Chapter 1.
discussed further in this chapter. In multinational operations, some differences exist between NATO and US terminology. The principal joint and multinational C2 terms which apply at the military strategic and operational levels of conflict are listed in Table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Conflict</th>
<th>UK National Joint Operations</th>
<th>NATO Operations</th>
<th>US-led Multinational Operations¹⁵</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Strategic</td>
<td>The Chief of Defence (CDS) appoints a joint commander (the <strong>Jt Comd</strong>) to mount an operation and to exercise command of the forces assigned to the operation. The Jt Comd directs joint operations from the Joint Headquarters (<strong>JHQ</strong>)</td>
<td>The appropriate Allied military strategic command authority is normally a Major NATO Commander (MNC) or a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC).¹⁷</td>
<td>The National Command Authority (NCA) [the President and the Secretary of Defense], advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issues orders to commanders of unified and specified commands and existing Joint Task Forces.¹⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>CDS, with advice from the joint commander is responsible for nominating a one, two or three star joint force commander (<strong>JFC</strong>) to command a joint force in theatre. He exercises his command from a joint force headquarters (<strong>JFHQ</strong>)</td>
<td>The Allied command authority appoints a Commander of an Allied Joint Force (<strong>COMAJF</strong>)</td>
<td>Command at the operational level is exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands (for example, C-in-C CENTCOM), subordinate unified commands and Joint Task Forces.¹⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 - Principal C2 Terms in Joint and Multinational Operations

**JOINT COMMAND**

0619. Details of joint command of operations conducted on a national basis are given at Annex A, which covers the division of responsibilities between MOD, JHQ and the JFHQ. Full details are contained in JSP 1.

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¹⁵. US terminology taken from FM 100-5, Chapters 4 (Joint Operations) and 5 (Combined Operations).

¹⁶. From 1995, a permanent JHQ (PJHQ). See Annex A.

¹⁷. AJP-1 Para 0310.

¹⁸. FM 100-5, p. 4-1.

¹⁹. Types of commands are explained in FM 100-5, p. 4-2.
MULTINATIONAL COMMAND

0620. **Challenges of Multinationality.** Whatever the organization of multinational command, multinationality poses a number of key challenges whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness and hence success on multinational operations. These include the formation of an effective command system, an intelligence system which can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, and a logistic system which acknowledges the need for national support but also caters for multinational needs. Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command arrangements, and the speed and quality of decision-making may become adversely affected. Such detrimental effects must be counter-acted vigorously through the adoption of common doctrine and procedures and realistic training, which must extend to headquarters and assigned forces. Multinational command requires an attitude of mind that is international in perspective. It is enhanced through knowledge, trust, mutual understanding and respect, the seeds of which are sown by posting high calibre commanders and staff officers to multinational formations in peacetime. This extends to exchanging officers as staff officers or LOs to other national and multinational headquarters.

0621. **NATO.** Within the integrated military structure of NATO there are three basic models for the command and organisation of forces with varying degrees of multinationality: **fully integrated, bi-national and framework nation.** In peacetime, contributing forces to multinational formations are termed either 'command' (and usually placed OPCOM of a NATO or national HQ), 'assigned' (usually denoting that an operational headquarters has a responsibility as a co-ordinating authority), or 'earmarked'.

20. **NATO Command Forces** are forces in being which nations in peacetime have placed under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander. **Assigned Forces** are forces in being which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at the declaration of a specific stage, state or measure in the NATO Precautionary System or as prescribed in special agreements. **Earmarked Forces** are forces which nations agree to place under the operational command or operational control of a NATO commander at some future time.
a. **Fully Integrated.** Fully integrated forces are based on a 'proportional shares' multinational basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters. One example is the Multinational Division (Centre) with an integrated headquarters and four brigades (or equivalents) from four different countries. Commanders of such multinational formations are usually appointed on a rotational basis.

b. **Bi-national.** Bi-national formations such as the German/Netherlands and United States/German bi-national corps are formed on an 'equal shares' basis with fully integrated headquarters.

c. **Framework Nation.** Forces based on a Framework Nation, such as the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), are commanded by a general officer of that nation, which also provides the communications framework and leads on doctrinal matters. A significant proportion of the staff will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the 'best ideas' of the contributing nations.

### 0622. **Other Multinational Command Structures**

a. **Ad Hoc Coalition.** In ad hoc coalitions, the strongest partner may nominate a single Coalition Joint Task Force Commander, who should provide unity of command. However, political imperatives may dictate some form of collective command structure within the theatre of operations.\(^\text{21}\)

b. **UN Structure.** There is no standardized C2 structure for UN multinational operations (see Chapter 7).

### MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

0623. It is preferable to use an existing headquarters for command of a multinational operation. The specific tailoring of this headquarters should be kept to a minimum and should use existing procedures to ensure stability and simplicity, particularly during the early, often critical, stages of an operation - including mounting and initial deployment within theatre. The multinational headquarters is likely to be based on an existing, integrated, multinational headquarters.

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\(^{21}\) As in the 1991 Gulf War. However, General Schwarzkopf exercised *de facto* sole command.
arrangement or will make use of a framework nation. Differing training levels, difficulties in language and not least cultural differences may impede the efficiency of the headquarters. However, both political and military benefits may accrue from nations being treated as equal partners and receiving, planning and implementing missions together.

STAFF

0624. Organization of Joint and Multinational Staff. The organization of joint (or as appropriate, multinational staff) into nine staff divisions is shown in Annex B.

0625. Role of the Chief of Staff. In a joint or multinational headquarters, the role of the chief of staff is vital. Although the commander will set much of the tone and pace of the headquarters, the chief of staff’s responsibilities will be heavy. He will have to deal with the inevitable challenges and strains of a multi-Service or multinational environment and ensure that the work of the headquarters is completed efficiently. In a framework headquarters, the commander and his chief of staff should be of the same nationality. Whilst this principle may become less valid over time, it is nonetheless essential that the chief of staff, in the absence of his commander, should act and take decisions on the same lines as the commander. This is more likely if they have had the same professional background and training.

0626. Integration of Multinational Staff. In multinational or coalition operations, particularly where the groupings are ad-hoc or partners are not accustomed to working with each other, it may be desirable to integrate staff into an operational level headquarters, while also exchanging LOs or Liaison Detachments at the tactical levels of command. This follows NATO practice in headquarters established in peace (such as the ARRC) and its value was further confirmed by the success of the command arrangements during the Gulf Conflict of 1990-91. To quote General de la Billière, Commander British Forces Middle East during this conflict:

'It was important to me .... that British officers should be integrated within the American planning staff in order that they could represent a British view and influence both the overall plan and the use of British forces within that plan. I discussed this with General Schwarzkopf at an early stage and he readily agreed. As a result, I was able to place officers in key appointments on his staff.'

0627. **National Representation and Working Relationships.** To improve the efficiency of a multinational headquarters, certain principles should be understood. First, officers are not delegates from their own countries, but are part of a team working for the commander. Secondly, national interests should be handled by liaison teams, appointed to the headquarters by the contributing nations concerned, which work between the headquarters and the national defence authorities or support commands. Thirdly, whilst the official language of the headquarters will generally be that of the commander, all members of the staff should strive to improve their knowledge in the language and culture of other nations. This last measure will do much for mutual understanding and co-operation.

**PLANNING OF JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS**

0628. **Initial Approach.** Before joint or multinational operations are considered in any detail, a **geostrategic analysis** of the situation should be carried out. This should consider - both in the national and international context - the historical, political and economic causes of the conflict, and take into account the competing demands for resources and the political, economic, legal and moral constraints which may apply in conflict resolution. It should also consider the characteristics of the theatre of operations (the operational environment). This geostrategic analysis provides the basis of military strategic direction to those responsible for campaign planning, and is developed as the campaign plan is evolved through the estimate process.

0629. **Planning Principles.** Principles for the planning of joint and multinational operations are set out in JSP 1 and AJP-1 respectively. At the operational level and above, every plan must be a joint plan from its inception to its execution. A joint force should have a single aim, and the joint operations must be planned as a coherent whole. This principle applies equally to multinational operations. All planning and associated decision-making must be sufficiently **flexible** to take into account the **political aim** and the **military tasks** involved, which may have to be adjusted as planning is underway. Planning must be based on sound and timely **intelligence** and give due accord to **OPSEC** and to **deception**. **Rules of Engagement** (ROE) for an operation must be agreed at the highest political and military levels before any part of the operation takes place (see Para 0644). **Logistic support**, including strategic movement planning, combat service support and administration, must be jointly planned to give the greatest flexibility and economy of effort. Wherever practicable, this approach should be extended to multinational operations. All military action must remain consistent with the political aims of the operation. Therefore **close liaison with civil and allied authorities** during all stages of a campaign or major operation is essential.
0630. **Campaign Planning.** Principles of campaign planning are detailed in Chapter 3 of ADP Volume 1 and in Chapter 4 of AJP-1. Responsibilities for joint planning are covered at Annex A. The basis of all operational planning is the decision-making process, which rests on receipt of clear **military strategic direction** and the subsequent completion of an **estimate of the situation**. Once the commander has made his **decision** for the conduct of the campaign, he states **what** he intends to achieve in his **statement of intent**, and **how** he intends to achieve it in his **concept of operations**. It is then complemented by planning leading to the preparation and dissemination of directives, orders and instructions; at the operational level the principal medium for transmitting the operational commander's intent and concept of operations is his **campaign directive**. Guidance on the content of a campaign directive is given at Annex A to Chapter 9.

**THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL ESTIMATE**

0631. The relationship of the estimate process at the operational level to the **concepts of operational design** (which require to be identified during the

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**Figure 6.1 - Campaign Planning and the Operational Level Estimate**

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23. See also JSP 1 Para 0259-0262.

24. The Statement of Intent should include the commander's vision of how he intends to achieve the desired End-State of the campaign or major operation. This should be related to unlocking the enemy's Centre of Gravity. See Chapter 9, and ADP Vol 1, Chapter 4 for further details.

25. Described in ADP Vol 1 Para 0324.
estimate before a campaign plan is written) is shown at Figure 6.1. The principal factors of an operational level estimate are considered below. These factors, however, apply in principle at all levels and to all types of operation, although a different emphasis in their evaluation and interpretation may be required. Further details of the estimate process are given in Chapter 8.

THE ENEMY

0632. **The Threat.** Whatever the scope or intensity of a campaign, the object of the enemy’s military strategy will be to thwart operations by friendly forces. In campaign terms, the enemy will seek to identify and neutralise, if not defeat, the centre of gravity of his opponent. The strategic centre of gravity of developed nations’ forces may not necessarily be military, and may be the national will in the home base. Thus, the threat is wider than that applied by purely military means. The enemy’s options range from deliberate operations aimed at disrupting the deployment and build-up of forces to causing unacceptable levels of casualties and collateral damage to neutral parties when decisive operations are underway. Throughout, an enemy may attempt to conduct Command and Control Warfare (C2W) against friendly forces.

0633. **Enemy PSYOPS.** The enemy may mount deliberate PSYOPS to subvert the local population, its government and forces in theatre. A sophisticated enemy will extend his PSYOPS to the home-base and through a number of channels, including the international media, attempt to undermine individual national governments’ resolve and thus fracture the alliance or coalition.

0634. **Implications.** Enemy offensive measures, including C2W, add to the friction of the command process, slowing down and degrading the quality of decision-making to such an extent that the tempo and effectiveness of friendly force operations can be significantly reduced. Thus, protective C2W measures must be included in the planning of operations at both the operational and tactical levels. More importantly, a comprehensive offensive and defensive C2W plan must be made which reflects the requirement to achieve control of the electromagnetic spectrum. Further details of C2W are given in Annex C to this chapter and in Chapter 9 of Allied Joint Publication (AJP-1). The evaluation of C2W in the decision-making process is completed under the heading **Surprise** and **Security** in the estimate (see Para 0641).
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

0635. The operational environment, including geographical and demographic conditions, affects the scope, intensity and duration of operations.\textsuperscript{26}

0636. \textit{Geographic and Topographical Factors.} The terrain, climate and prevailing weather in a theatre of operations may significantly affect the command of forces. The morale of the troops engaged, and the performance of ground and airborne sensors, weapons, communications links and the ability to move, may all be adversely affected by environmental conditions. Well commanded and motivated forces can conduct audacious and unexpected operations in difficult terrain to achieve surprise. Motivation in the face of environmental challenges such as difficult terrain and harsh climatic conditions is based on robust leadership, sound equipment and hard and realistic training.

0637. \textit{Demographic Factors.} Consideration of the local population must take into account ethnic, religious and cultural factors. Operations are likely to take place in or over-populated areas where account has to be taken of non-belligerents caught up in hostilities. Collateral damage must be minimised. Whereas the local population might not be openly hostile, loyalties can change fast, particularly in conflict other than war when local sensitivities to the presence of external forces can be stirred up and exploited by the opposition. If fairly and humanely treated, the local population can provide a useful source of information - and hence intelligence (HUMINT) - on both the ground and the belligerent parties involved, thus providing a beneficial influence.

FRIENDLY FORCES

0638. \textit{Coalition and Alliance Interests.} The way in which a campaign is conducted will be influenced by national political imperatives which will determine the choice and deployment of forces of particular nations for particular tasks. Although this may appear an unreasonable constraint on the operational commander's plans, there will have to be some measure of compromise between military requirements and political necessity.\textsuperscript{27} Coalition


\textsuperscript{27} Saddam Hussein's use of SCUD missile attacks against both Saudi Arabia and Israel during the 1991 Gulf War illustrate this point. Although the SCUD attacks did little material damage, their political and military effects were significant, including the diversion of Allied air and Special Forces effort to counter the threat. The effect on the morale of the affected local populations was palpable.
and alliance interests may require some adjustment to command organizations as the campaign unfolds to cope with the unexpected.

0639. **Economic and Resource Constraints.** National budgetary pressures and associated constraints on manpower, materiel and logistic support may limit a commander's options for the prosecution of a campaign right from the start. Because of economic constraints, and the long-lead time necessary to obtain reinforcements and supplies, the commander's flexibility may be further reduced as the campaign develops. The imperative of conducting operations in such a way as to minimise casualties and materiel attrition is a 'planning constant' which is likely to affect all future operations. Additional resource limitations and shortages, particularly of high-value modern telecommunications and intelligence gathering equipment may affect the quality of planning and subsequent conduct of operations.

0640. **Forces.** National contingents in an alliance or coalition will reflect differing customs, traditions and methods of their parent armed forces, although many differences in their approach to operations may be only matters of nuance. Levels of logistic support may vary considerably.

**OTHER FACTORS**

0641. **Surprise and Security.** The factor Surprise and Security embraces Deception, OPSEC and Protection measures. Details are contained at Para 0819.

0642. **Time and Space.** Time and space considerations, including readiness to deploy, deployment times and movement, and preparation within a theatre of operations, affecting both enemy and friendly forces, must be addressed for all phases of a campaign or major operation.

0643. **The Media.** The use of modern technology allows both national and international media instantaneous coverage of a theatre, rendering total regulation of the media impracticable. The media can pre-empt political decision-making and drive policy by influencing opinion-formers in the contributing nations: this influence may spread to deployed forces. The influence may also extend to the local population, government and to the enemy's forces. The media may attempt to highlight and exploit differences between allies' purposes and capabilities to provide news interest, thus endangering unity of effort by default rather than design. A pro-active and co-operative multinational public information campaign is required to counter act this. Media pressures arising from the 'acceptability' of casualties on any side of that conflict may also influence the decision to terminate military activity in
a conflict. A commander must understand the needs of the media, the implications of their activities on the prosecution of his mission and ensure that he establishes a sound working relationship with members of the press corps. A commander must, therefore, construct a public information policy within his campaign plan and command, and strive to maintain a positive relationship with all elements of the media.28 Representatives of the media will expect to have access to, and be briefed by, the commander. Inevitably conflicts of interest and problems will arise. Commanders need, therefore, the support of able Public Information officers.

0644. Legal Constraints. The law of armed conflict is part of international law, codified for the most part in the Hague Rules, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocols.29 The law provides for the protection and humane treatment of both combatants and non-combatants. It regulates the rights and duties of the belligerents if an armed conflict occurs whatever the cause of that conflict. It protects the basic rights of civilians, prisoners of war (PWs) and the wounded and sick. The basic principles to be observed by commanders and their forces include those of civilian immunity from attacks, the need to direct military attacks at military objectives and the need to take precautions in attack to reduce as much as possible incidental losses among the civilian population and damage to civilian property. Commanders at all levels should be aware that the obligations and duties imposed by the Law of Armed Conflict have implications for the conduct of operations and, depending on the situation, give rise to additional tasks of a humanitarian nature. Competent legal advice must be sought in the case of any doubt as to the responsibilities involved.

0645. ROE. The conduct of military operations is circumscribed by the provisions of international and national law. Within this legal framework the MOD, in consultation with Ministers, sets out parameters within which UK forces can operate. ROE are the means by which the MOD reflects political direction and provides guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied and are designed to ensure that such application of force is carefully controlled.30 The rules are set against a given Political Policy Indicator (PPI) by which the Government seeks to de-escalate any conflict, wishes to

28. Factors to be considered in the formulation of a public information plan are listed in ADP Vol 1, Para 0444.

29. JSP 383 is being re-drafted. See also JSP 1, Para 0118-0124 for further details of the Law of Armed Conflict.

30. JSP 1, Para 0125-0126.
maintain the status quo, or is prepared to accept escalation in furtherance of its political aims. The PPI should be addressed by the operational level commander in his mission analysis, and specific ROE must be evaluated subsequently in the main body of the estimate. ROE, however, must remain dynamic. If local commanders judge ROE no longer appropriate in their evaluation of the situation they should request such changes as they require to allow them the freedom to complete their missions. Such requests will not always prevail, but commanders have a duty to make their superiors aware of the military effect of political constraints. ROE always include the right of self-defence.
1. **Political Direction and Interests.** Military operations are closely monitored and authorised at Governmental level by the Cabinet. The Cabinet delegates policy-making to two Ministerial sub-committees depending on the area of operations. For NATO operations, the Emergency Measures Committee (EMC) provides political direction; for operations outside the NATO area, the Committee on Overseas Policy and Defence (OPD) leads. These policy committees are advised by three military committees: the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Operations Executive (consisting of the Assistant Chiefs) and the Current Operations Group (chaired by Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) [DCDS (C)]). The work of these military committees is influenced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Other Government Departments (OGD) whose representatives attend as required.

2. **MOD.** In the MOD, joint command is primarily concerned with the grand strategic and military strategic levels of conflict. Advice is given by CDS to the Secretary of State for Defence and to other ministers at the grand strategic level which concerns the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives. CDS is the principal military adviser to the Government. He has right of direct access to the Prime Minister, and he attends meetings of the Cabinet and its sub-committees as required. He thus acts as the interface between the grand strategic and military strategic levels. CDS chairs the senior military committee within the MOD, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee. It is advised by the Defence Operations Executive (DOE), chaired by DCDS (C), who works at the military strategic level which concerns the application of military resources to achieve the military aspects of grand strategic objectives. Crisis management meetings held by the MOD Current Operations Group (COG) assess military options and enable the commencement of planning at all levels. Once the COG has recommended a joint military option, and, on receipt of the necessary political clearances, CDS nominates a Jt Comd and issues his Directive to him.

3. **JHQ.** When an operation is declared 'joint' by CDS he assigns forces to the Jt Comd through the Cs-in-C. The main factors guiding the choice of Jt Comd are: the nature of the operations, the method of force deployment and recovery, and the early involvement of single-Service assets.1 The Jt

Comd, who operates from the national permanent JHQ (PJHQ) at Northwood, is the military strategic commander responsible for operations in, and in support of, a theatre. He is responsible for the deployment of the assigned joint forces to the theatre of operations, sustaining them throughout the operation, monitoring their progress and recovering them once the operation is concluded. The JHQ thus acts as the focus for all necessary support to the campaign from the home base, and relieves the JFHQ of direct political inquiry and contact. Before a JFHQ is deployed, the JFC and his staff work alongside the Jt Comd and his staff and initiate outline campaign planning and conduct initial reconnaissance. Thus, at this stage, JHQ planning staff may work at the military strategic and operational levels of conflict. Strategic air operations, for example, may be directed at JHQ or at a higher level. The decision may also be taken not to delegate OPCON of SF to JFHQ and thereby retain SF for operations at the military strategic level.  

4. **JFHQ.** At JFHQ, the JFC is concerned primarily with the **operational** level of conflict. He is responsible for the planning and execution of his campaign plan to achieve military strategic objectives. Depending on the scale of the operation, the JFC could be a one, two or three star officer. The basic planning criteria and procedures for establishing a national JFHQ are based on the appointment of a 2-star JFC in command of an in-theatre force consisting of a significant contribution from at least two of the three Services. Should command of any of the single Service components be at 2-star level (for example, Comd 3 (UK) Division), then the JFC will normally be a 3-star officer. The selection of a component commander is directly related to the size and complexity of the forces and assets he will command. The command structure to support the JFC is based on the following conditions:

a. Where applicable, maritime, land and air component commanders will normally be nominated as the JFC’s immediate subordinates and the JFC will exercise command through them. A Special Forces (SF) component commander may also be appointed to command those SF assigned to operate in theatre at the operational level. A component commander is responsible to the JFC for all aspects of his component’s part in the campaign, and may operate at either the operational or tactical levels of conflict (see Figure 6A.1). In addition to the component commanders, a **functional commander** can be given responsibility for **force logistics**, and may be appointed to command the forces of all Services in a Rear Support Area. Although the focus of operations in this area will be logistics, an important part of this commander’s responsibility

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2. See Para 0706-0709 of JSP 1, which explain command arrangements for SF. Fuller details of SF doctrine are contained in Chapter 7 of JSP 1 and in JSP Special Forces Operations.
is the physical security of all forces and installations within the Rear Support Area, including air and sea points of disembarkation.

b. As a rule, the JFC should not be dual-hatted as a component commander. There may, however, be exceptions to this rule when an operation is heavily biased towards a particular maritime, land or air environment with only secondary involvement of one or both of the other Services.

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**Figure 6A.1 - Theatre Command Structure**

5. **Command States.** In the context of joint command, command states have been applied inflexibly in the past. Command states are not linked to the levels of conflict. In national operations, it has sometimes been misconstrued that a commander can only delegate a lower command and control status to his subordinates. When progressing down the chain of command from the Jt Comd to the tactical level component commander, the command and control states become progressively more restrictive.³ This limits subordinates' freedom of action and consequently their initiative. A commander should be aware of this. He can delegate to his subordinates, within clearly defined limits, some or all of the powers of command and control normally held by him, without prejudice to his own authority. Commanders should be aware, however, that there is less flexibility in the use of command states in multinational operations.

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³ In that the Jt Comd exercises OPCOM, whilst the JFC OPCON of forces. To leave the tactical component commander only exercising TACON of forces is clearly inadequate. (c.f. C2 arrangements in the Gulf War).
DIRECTION OF OPERATIONS

6. **Political Approval.** Much of the scope for success of joint and combined operations rests on swift and appropriate initial military advice to gain timely political approval. The focus of this preparatory work is at MOD level of national governments and at MOD/HQ NATO for NATO operations. It rests on gathering intelligence, assessment of options and monitoring of the situation and then forwarding military advice to national policy makers (Ministers) or, in NATO, to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or Defence Planning Committee. However, regardless of the NAC’s decisions, national governments still have to agree and approve military action.

7. **Initiation of Military Action.** If political approval is given for an operation, CDS will issue his Directive to a nominated Jt Comd for non-NATO operations, who may be one of the UK Cs-in-C. CDS will also nominate with advice from the Jt Comd, as required, a JFC. Single Service subordinate commanders for the operation will be appointed by the Cs-in-C providing those components. The CDS Directive will assign forces to the operation and state the mission. For NATO operations, CDS will issue the appropriate transfer of authority for assigned forces to a NATO commander.

8. **Warning Time.** Forces are maintained at a readiness state. They are placed at an appropriate notice to move (NTM) when a specific task is given. In order to achieve a smooth transition to active operations, maximum use should be made of the warning time available to allow these units to prepare. This is contingent on timely political approval to reduce the NTM time. Once this is given, MOD issues a warning order (through the JHQ to Cs-in-C) to the headquarters and units concerned.

9. **Political Direction and Clearance.** CDS’s Directive states the political imperatives and constraints. Throughout the planning and conduct of joint operations, commanders must remain aware of these constraints and the likely time required to obtain further political clearances. At the military strategic and operational levels, national political direction and interest is likely to have a considerable impact on the planning and conduct of operations. To avoid undue pressure on the in-theatre higher commander, the competent military strategic authority (normally at JHQ) should deal with political questions. However, the politicians’ demand for regular and accurate information from the theatre will remain and must be met.

4. Exceptions are those placed at a NTM as part of UK national standby forces such as the LPBG and Spearhead Battalion.
10. **Planning Responsibilities.** Planning responsibilities for national joint operations or the British contribution to multinational operations are split as follows:

a. **JHQ.** On receipt of CDS's Directive the Jt Comd will initiate military strategic planning; he will be assisted by the nominated JFC and his staff. The Jt Comd will first brief his plan to the Chiefs of Staff before issuing his Mission Directive to the JFC. Thereafter, the following are established: the JFC's outline plan and concept of operations, the composition and order of deployment of the Joint Force (JF), readiness states for assigned forces and reserves. Meanwhile, preparatory action such as reconnaissance, logistic build-up and movement of forces to ports and airfields will have been initiated, together with the establishment or activation of a Forward Mounting Base (FMB).

b. **JFHQ.** Promulgation of the JFC's concept of operations leads to the preparation and issue of directives and orders to subordinate forces, formations and units. If the campaign plan is to be conducted in phases, separate directives and operation orders may be produced for each phase. (An example format of a campaign plan/directive is at Annex A to Chapter 9.) The JFHQ will deploy into the theatre of operations as soon as practicable and complete its planning there.
# Joint Staff Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Division/Cell Designation</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>J1</td>
<td>Personnel and Administration</td>
<td>Personnel management&lt;br&gt;Manpower administration&lt;br&gt;Medical&lt;br&gt;Provost and discipline&lt;br&gt;Prisoners of war (PW)&lt;br&gt;Casualty procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Intelligence and Security</td>
<td>Collection, collation, assessment and dissemination of intelligence&lt;br&gt;Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>J3 (N)</td>
<td>Naval Operations</td>
<td>Maritime operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>J3 (L)</td>
<td>Land Operations</td>
<td>Land and airborne operations&lt;br&gt;Land force organization and design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>J3 (A)</td>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td>Offensive and defensive operations, Air Transport and Support Helicopter operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>J3 (SF)</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>J3 (Ops Sp)</td>
<td>Operations Support&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Coordination of Command and Control Warfare&lt;br&gt;Targeting policy&lt;br&gt;EW Coordination Cell&lt;br&gt;PSYOPS&lt;br&gt;Deception&lt;br&gt;OPSEC</td>
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<td>J3 (Coord)</td>
<td>Operations Coordination</td>
<td>Coordination of all staff cells&lt;br&gt;ROE&lt;br&gt;Met&lt;br&gt;NBC Defence</td>
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<td>Public Information</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>J4</td>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Combat Service Support&lt;br&gt;Force Movement&lt;br&gt;Host Nation Support&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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1. Based on proposed PJHQ structure, JSP 1 (Fifth Edition), not yet endorsed.
2. In NATO, Medical is a G4/J4 function.
3. Note link to G6.
4. Note link to G5.
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<td>J6</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Communications, Information systems management, Cryptography, Electromagnetic Spectrum control</td>
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<td>J7</td>
<td>Doctrine and Training</td>
<td>Doctrine management, Exercise planning</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>J8</td>
<td>Resources and Finance</td>
<td>Civil secretariat, Civilian personnel administration, Finance and budget planning</td>
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<td>J9</td>
<td>Civil and Political Affairs</td>
<td>Political liaison, Support to Political Adviser, Legal Affairs</td>
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COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W)

GENERAL

1. Command systems are fundamentally dependent upon their component parts of personnel, equipment and procedures. Each provide vulnerable points which can be attacked or, conversely, which must be protected. By countering enemy command systems, the enemy’s ability to make and promulgate timely and appropriate decisions is destroyed whilst, at the same time, our own command and control process is preserved. C2W, therefore, serves to increase the ‘friction’ sustained by the enemy through both mental and physical attack by slowing his tempo and reducing the availability of information to him. This is accomplished by attacking the enemy’s will, increasing the enemy commander’s sense of stress, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and chaos that will undermine his will and capability to fight, and degrading his ability to make and disseminate decisions. His cohesion will thus be destroyed in general and specific parts of his force in detail.

2. C2W is defined as “the integrated use of all military capabilities including physical destruction, electronic warfare (EW), deception, psychological operations (PSYOPS) and operations security (OPSEC), supported by all source intelligence and communications and information systems (CIS), to deny information to, exploit, influence, degrade, confuse or destroy enemy C2 capabilities and to protect friendly C2, intelligence and CIS against such actions”.

3. In more simple terms, the objectives of C2W are the use of all military means to defeat the enemy’s C2 command system, while preserving our own. Thus, the purpose of C2W is to open, maintain or widen the gap in command system effectiveness in favour of friendly forces, and thereby make a contribution to operational effectiveness.

APPLICATION OF C2W

4. Levels of Application. The application of C2W is a command function. It can be applied at each level of command (strategic, operational and tactical) and at all levels in the spectrum of conflict. To be an effective instrument of warfare, overall command of C2W must be retained at the level to which the C2W plan applies; there is little scope for delegating downwards.
However, tactical C2W assets can be employed to support strategic, operational and tactical C2W plans.

a. **Strategic C2W.** Strategic C2W is primarily concerned with gaining the command advantage at the National level; for example, the protection of friendly government and alliance command centres and the disruption of an enemy’s command centres.

b. **Operational C2W.** Operational C2W involves such tactics as attacking major military command centres, civil communications networks and sensor networks and undermining popular support through PSYOPS.

c. **Tactical C2W.** Tactical C2W could involve, at the lowest level, an anti-tank platoon aiming to identify and destroy command AFVs in an enemy armoured advance. Tactical C2W could also include disrupting an enemy division's command net.

d. **Information Warfare.** Information warfare is the application of principles similar to C2W at the politico-strategic level. Information warfare is conducted by all national means, not just military means, in order to influence the availability and use of information by the enemy. The targets of information warfare may include political, financial, commercial and public media organisations as well as the military.

5. **Operational Framework.** C2W is an all pervading element of command, applicable to deep, close and rear operations:

a. **Deep Operations.** C2W is most effective in deep operations when aimed at formation commanders and their command structures and communications means, where the results of its prosecution can have most effect in constraining the enemy’s freedom of action and influencing his design for battle.

b. **Close Operations.** Close operations will involve the more routine, but nonetheless important, execution of C2W through:

   (1) **OPSEC** - through provision of our security and penetration of the enemy’s.

   (2) Participation in deception plans.
(3) PSYOPS - through the maintenance of our morale and undermining of the enemy’s morale through successful close operations.

(4) The application of EW.

(5) Destruction of the enemy by striking him at close quarters.

c. **Rear Operations.** Rear operations will be primarily concerned with the protection of command systems, preventing the enemy from practising his C2W upon us thereby preserving our own capability and thus our ability to conduct operations.

6. **Command System Nodes.** Command systems consist of personnel, equipment and procedures, and the point at which they come together defines a node. A critical node is an element, position or communications entity whose disruption immediately degrades the ability of a force to command, control, or effectively conduct combat operations. A vulnerable node is one which is susceptible to attack. To be considered vulnerable, the node must be open to degradation, there has to be some weakness that can be exploited, and it must be accessible. Nodes can also be linked and are synergistic. Command protection and C2W planning must, therefore, consider the critical, vulnerable and dependent nodes.

**C2W DIVISIONS**

7. C2W can be divided into two parts:

a. **Offensive C2W.** Offensive C2W is used to deny enemy commanders effective command of their forces through destruction, disruption, exploitation, deception, influence or denial of all or part of their command system, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. Offensive C2W is a particularly effective, and often the most economical, way of reducing an adversary’s combat effectiveness. It is applicable at all levels of command. The primary objectives of C2W directed against an enemy’s combat potential are to:

   (1) Slow down the enemy’s tempo in relation to our own.

   (2) Disrupt his activities.

   (3) Degrade the enemy commander’s command cycle.

   (4) Disrupt his ability to generate and sustain combat power.
b. **Defensive C2W.** Defensive C2W is used to deny, negate, diminish or turn to friendly advantage, enemy efforts to destroy, disrupt, exploit, deceive and/or deny information to friendly command systems, including its supporting communications, information and intelligence activities. Safeguarding friendly command systems is a fundamental consideration, as failure to do so is likely to result in loss of freedom of action and initiative, mis-direction of effort, or failure of the operation. The primary objectives of Defensive C2W are, therefore, to:

1. Reduce the vulnerability of command support assets, procedures and installations to attack.

2. Reduce the effects of enemy deception actions against friendly command systems.

3. Nullify the effects of enemy EW actions against friendly command systems.

4. Deny the enemy the ability to exploit friendly command systems.

5. Ensure that the enemy’s PSYOPS are ineffective.

**C2W ACTIONS**

8. There are five core C2W actions:

a. **Deception.** Deception is likely to be the C2W activity which gives the highest return on effort and resources expended.

b. **OPSEC.** OPSEC reduces or denies the enemy information concerning our operations. It is a pre-planned and protective method for keeping an operation secure, and, as well as personnel and physical security, may involve many other measures. It can also be used in an offensive sense by complementing operational deception plans and allowing the enemy access to information which helps to confirm his perceptions of our intentions or by influencing the timing and sequencing of operations in order to make the enemy’s response inappropriate. It should incorporate the use of HUMINT and IMINT assets along with any other means of penetrating enemy command systems in order to pinpoint his vulnerabilities for exploitation by further intelligence resources or for destruction or disruption.
c. **PSYOPS.** The purpose of PSYOPS is to "influence attitudes and behaviour thereby enhancing the achievement of one's own political and military objectives. Specifically, PSYOPS seeks to undermine an enemy's will to fight, strengthen the support of the loyal and gain the support of the uncommitted" (ADP-1 Operations). They are applicable at all levels of conflict though they will be aimed at different target audiences within each level. PSYOPS within C2W are directed at both the Command and Control functions of the enemy's capabilities. Against commanders, PSYOPS seek either to induce a specific course of action, probably in support of an ongoing, larger deception plan, or to deter against a specific course of action. Against control staffs and subordinate commanders and troops, PYSOPS seeks to undermine their natural trust and reliance upon their commanders, to question the worthiness of their mission and their ability to win. PSYOPS can also be used to direct other C2W activities, such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed.

d. **EW.** EW can degrade the performance of an enemy's electronic and weapon systems, warn of enemy action, provide self-protection, locate and identify emitters and reduce fratricide. EW is discussed in more detail in Appendix 1 to Annex A to Chapter 2 of AFM Formation Tactics.

e. **Physical Destruction.** Destruction of an enemy's command nodes will be effective only for a relatively short period; given time and resources they will recover. It is important, therefore, to use destruction as a C2W tool before an operation to deny the enemy time to reconstitute. To degrade an enemy commander's capabilities effectively, C2W should focus on his HQ and their associated CIS facilities. Destruction can be achieved through the use of such means as manoeuvre forces (including attack helicopters), indirect fire, SF and air. Use can also be made of non lethal means such as ECM. Protection of our own command systems against destruction by the enemy is also an important consideration and will require both electronic and physical means to protect vulnerable points and links.

**C2W PLANNING PROCESS**

9. **Organization.** C2W planning is currently a G3 responsibility. In developing the C2W plan, however, the Operations staff will require input from, and
must coordinate with, G2, G6, EW, artillery, air and aviation staffs.¹

10. **Offensive C2W Planning Process.** To accomplish offensive C2W objectives, the staff should use the following process:

   a. **Identify how offensive C2W will support the commander’s intent** - C2W operations should be selective; the objective is to strike at the enemy’s command system to support the commander’s operational intentions.

   b. **Identify the command nodes** - this requires an examination of the functions of the enemy’s command system. The G2 staff may need to develop models of the enemy’s command system by function eg air defence. Assistance in this task may well be required from the higher formation.

   c. **Analyze the nodes for criticality and vulnerability** - the nodes must be analyzed to identify those, whose degradation will cause a severe impact on the enemy command system. After determining the criticality of the node, its vulnerability to C2W action must be determined. The ideal target is a critical, vulnerable, accessible node that serves several command functional systems.

   d. **Prioritize the nodes** - this is a G3 function supported by G2. The G3 needs to look at the priorities in terms of the resources required to take action against it and the effect that such action will have in supporting the commander’s concept of operations.

   e. **Determine the desired effect and how each of the five C2W actions will contribute to the overall objective** - there is a requirement to determine what effect is required on the node, which part of the enemy’s command system should be attacked, how long the effect is to continue, and where the effect should occur in relation to the position of friendly forces. The next step is to determine which one, or combination, of C2W actions will best support the commander’s overall plan.

¹ At the present time, G3 acts as the overall coordinating and directing staff branch, allowing the artillery commander to oversee those assets which contribute to the deep battle and the comms staff to plan and coordinate the communications and EW aspects. This system does not, however, give any focus to the synchronization required for the cohesion of the various elements of C2W. The solution lies in the development of the G6 branch which coordinates all activity in relation to C2W.
f. Assign systems to attack each of the nodes - the most appropriate system should be selected to achieve the desired effect. This requires a good understanding of the capabilities of all force components in terms of weapon system capabilities, EW, deception, PSYOPS and OPSEC.

g. Determine the effectiveness of the operation - the effectiveness of the C2W measures need to be determined in order to exploit success and to refine future C2W operations plans.

11. Defensive C2W Planning Process. There are three actions that should be taken when developing a Defensive C2W plan:

a. Identify friendly critical command nodes - this should be done through a consideration of the commander’s mission and concept of operations. The specific tasks to be accomplished in support of the concept of operations should then be considered in relation to the friendly command nodes which will be essential to their accomplishment.

b. Analyze the nodes - the vulnerability of the nodes should be analyzed. This will provide a list of priorities in terms of nodes requiring protection.

c. Recommend options - When analysis reveals that a critical command node is highly susceptible to enemy C2W, options should be recommended to protect it in order to satisfy the commander’s requirements.

COMMAND OF C2W

12. Control of C2W strategy must be conducted at the operational level since synergy will only be possible through full integration of all component parts of the C2W plan at that level. The enemy’s command systems must be attacked throughout the depth and width of his area at the same time thereby overloading his ability to absorb punishment and reducing his overall cohesion. The key decisions for the operational commander are:

a. The degree of denial of the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to the enemy.

b. The level of protection allocated to friendly use of the spectrum and the conditions and limitations imposed upon that use.
13. These decisions will be governed by the extent to which both rely upon their use of the EM Spectrum for both the acquisition of information and for command.

SUMMARY

14. Commanders at the tactical level will need to be aware of the overall C2W strategy in order that their own C2W operations are integrated and coordinated with those of the higher formation. Above all, when planning and conducting operations, C2W should be seen as the re-affirmation of the hard won knowledge that a command system, its destruction or survival, is very often the key to success or failure in battle.
CHAPTER 7

COMMAND OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

The purpose of Chapter 7 is to describe the principles of command of Operations Other Than War, relating these to the Foundations and Exercise of Command explained in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. This chapter should be read in conjunction with Chapter 7 of ADP Volume 1 Operations.

SCOPE

0701. In British doctrine, Operations Other Than War embrace Peacekeeping, Wider Peacekeeping, Peace Enforcement, Counter Insurgency (COIN) and Limited Intervention. These operations, which are defined in ADP Volume 1, are invariably joint and are very likely to be multinational.¹ They may be conducted with or without the mandate of an international organization. The operations fall into two broad categories: those in which the UK is a party to the conflict, either through choice or necessity; and those in which the UK is an impartial third party.

0702. Principles for the command of operations of the first category (Peace Enforcement, Counter-Insurgency (COIN) and Limited Intervention) are covered in the main body of this chapter. Command of Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping operations is covered in Annex A, reflecting the approach taken in ADP Volume 1.

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¹ ADP Vol 1, pp. 7-2 to 7-9.
NATURE OF OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

0703. Operations Other Than War are distinguished by a number of characteristics which bear on the application of a manoeuvrist approach to operations; command style, the exercise of command and on the organizations for command and command support, including staff responsibilities.

0704. An enduring feature of Operations Other Than War is the importance of the political dimension. Military commanders are unlikely to have primacy of command, as military activity may form only one component of an integrated campaign plan in which economic, political humanitarian, or legal achievements can be as important as strictly military success. Political considerations may influence decision-making down to the tactical level and constrain the freedom of action of military commanders at all levels. The successful prosecution of Operations Other Than War requires consultation with political advisers and joint action with other agencies. This rests on close co-operation and liaison with other uniformed services, with national or local government agencies involved with the economic and political aspects of a campaign, and, depending on the type of operation, with a variety of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). All operations are conducted within a tight framework of legitimacy and legality, and are likely to be the subject of attention of third parties, including international human rights groups.

0705. Initially, the aims of a campaign may be unclear, with objectives which unfold following events; what is begun as a limited intervention operation, for example, may develop into a protracted campaign.2 Commanders must therefore be aware from the start of operations that speedy solutions in Operations Other Than War are difficult to achieve, and must plan accordingly for the longer-term. Meanwhile, the support of the local population will be vital to the force engaged, especially in COIN. This reinforces the need for a pro-active public relations and public information campaign and gives emphasis to economic and humanitarian programmes. It may also extend to the employment of the military in civil-aid programmes. Enemy forces, however, may well seek to exploit local sensitivities to the presence of external forces and so broaden the conflict. Thus commanders neglect the importance of winning the 'hearts and minds' of the local population at their peril. The application of force will be restricted to the minimum necessary to achieve the mission at hand; minimum force must remain appropriate, proportionate,

2. The intrinsic difficulty is in establishing the End-State. With the possible exception of Limited Intervention and Peace Enforcement, Operations Other Than War are characterised by a lengthy period of operations. Operations in Malaya, for example, lasted fourteen years; UNFICYP has run well over twenty years, and the most recent 'troubles' in Northern Ireland over twenty-five years.
demonstrably reasonable and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended.

0706. Operations Other Than War are characterised by heavy Media attention. This is partly a feature of modern communications and partly a reflection of the nature and pace of operations where individual incidents assume great significance. For commanders, dealing with the Media is a constant theme.

THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE

MANOEUVRE WARFARE

0707. The approach to operations described in ADP Volume 1 and reflected in Chapter 2 of this volume is not a way of thinking which can be adopted for warfighting and dropped for Operations Other Than War. For example, manoeuvre techniques have been used by insurgent forces with considerable success. Typically, their operations are targeted against their opponents' political will (often a perceived weakness) as much as against military strength. In turn, the actions of security forces must complement political initiatives to attack the will and shatter the cohesion of the belligerent or insurgent parties involved.\(^3\) Indirect attack by pre-emption, dislocation and disruption (or a combination of these methods) is more likely to be successful than destruction, particularly if the political costs (high casualties involved on either side and associated collateral damage) outweigh the military benefits. Thus, rather than relying on firepower (which in its pure sense is likely to be constrained\(^4\)), surprise (often achieved through exploiting technology), \textit{simultaneity} and \textit{tempo} can be applied to shatter the enemy's moral and physical cohesion. Simultaneity is achieved through the use of a mix of security force agencies in COIN, and by grouping for independent action in both COIN and Intervention. Security forces achieve surprise and tempo by acting in an agile and unpredictable manner, changing, at their own initiative, the pace of operations to catch insurgents or \textit{belligerents} off-guard, including the rapid transition from covert to overt action.

0708. The enemy's will or the belligerents' opposition, however, is unlikely to be broken by military measures alone; the political dimension in resolving a conflict cannot be neglected. Therefore the scope of the core functions find, fix and strike within the operational framework of deep, close and rear

\(^3\) Attacking the will is described in more detail in ADP Vol 1 Para 0732.

\(^4\) In Operations Other Than War such as COIN, striking to eliminate a discrete element of the enemy's combat power can also be achieved through the legally legitimate 'firepower' of evidence-gathering, arrest and legal action.
operations can be widened in Operations Other Than War to embrace activities by non-uniformed Services. In COIN Operations, the intelligence services and elements of the Army, overt and covert, find the insurgent by information gathering and the production of intelligence. The uniformed military services, the police and emergency services, and the spending departments of government - combined with an active public information campaign, 'fix' the insurgent; special forces, and both the military and the police, 'strike' him - but so too does the legal system. Covert and overt deep operations will constrain the enemy's freedom of action, distract and fix him. Close operations will be both overt and covert and will aim to eliminate specific elements of the enemy by military, political, legal or media pressures. Rear operations protect own bases, sustain close and deep operations, and contribute to the freedom of action of security forces. In this way, deep, close and rear military operations and other activities, such as political, economic and public information measures, are synchronized.

0709. Manoeuvre Theory is therefore valid in Operations Other Than War, but if it is to be successfully applied, it must be manifested through a style of command that permits flexible decision-making and co-operation at all levels - political considerations accepted. Mission Command, described in Chapter 2, is that style.

MISSION COMMAND

0710. Application. Because political considerations permeate down to the lowest tactical level in Operations Other Than War, constraining the freedom of action of military commanders, it has sometimes been argued in the past that Mission Command does not apply. But this is to misunderstand the basis of Mission Command. To provide unity of effort, relationships with other Services and organizations will need to be spelled out and standard operating procedures observed, particularly when joint action with other Services, agencies or departments is involved. Relationships with these, the media and the public must be defined to minimize the scope for friction. The success of any joint action, however, will rest on trust and mutual understanding at all levels.

0711. Approach. A decentralized approach can also apply in Operations Other Than War, reinforcing timely decision-making and freedom of action at lower levels, allowing higher levels of command more time to devote to their specific responsibilities. In remote areas, or for example, when rapid on-the-spot decisions are required, junior commanders will have no option but to use their initiative. This is to be encouraged. In the often politically-charged atmosphere and complex conditions of conflict other than war,
However, it is important that subordinates' actions remain within the framework of the superior commander's intent and contribute to the achievement of the desired campaign aim or End-State. One isolated, thoughtless action can prejudice months of patient work, potentially alienate the local population and so benefit the enemy's or belligerents' cause. Therefore local commanders must understand not only their tasks and their immediate purpose, but also recognize the overall effect or 'atmosphere' that is to be achieved in the course of a campaign. In turn, they must communicate the rationale for military action and explain what is to be achieved throughout their commands. In this way, junior commanders and their soldiers, while not necessarily knowing the details of how the campaign plan has been constructed, will gain an insight into what is expected of them, what constraints apply and why.

0712. **Implications for Training.** While there are risks in devolving levels of decision-making to lower levels in Operations Other Than War, there are also considerable benefits. As in warfighting, subordinates well-versed in the principles and practice of Mission Command are more likely to respond purposefully when confronted with the unexpected. Mission Command provides the foundation for timely, intelligent and appropriate action which supports the higher commander's intent whilst operating under a wide range of constraints. It places heavy demands on the training of commanders at all levels and requires a disciplined yet creative approach to operations. Relevant and realistic training should focus not simply on the military skills required, but also include education on the political, economic and cultural causes of the conflict.

**CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND DIRECTION**

0713. The subject of campaign planning is described in detail in Chapters 4 and 7 of ADP Volume 1. While it is not necessary to restate that material, three areas are amplified here for the command of Operations Other Than War: **Strategic Guidance, Statement of Commander's Intent and the Operational Commander's Estimate.**

0714. **Military Strategic Guidance.** As in warfighting, an operational commander should expect clear military strategic guidance as the basis for his campaign planning. At the very least, given the political influences, this must be a statement of the desired End-State of the campaign, including what constitutes success. However, the commander must realise that changing political imperatives may lead to amended guidance, and that a clear End-State may not necessarily be forthcoming.
Statement of Intent. On receipt of strategic guidance, the operational level commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a campaign will analyze it through mission analysis to formulate his outline Statement of Intent. This reflects his vision of achieving the desired End-State.

Operational Commander’s Estimate. The commander must use the full estimate process to re-examine the strategic guidance, refine his Statement of Intent and initiate his Campaign Directive, including Concept of Operations. Having been given the desired End-State, he will seek to identify his opponent’s Centre of Gravity and the path to unlocking it, through a series of Decisive Points. The decisive points may not necessarily be purely military in nature. The path to the enemy's Centre of Gravity may typically require the development of a number of Lines of Operation (or inter-related sequence of military and non-military activities). This approach rests on close co-operation from the initial planning stage onwards with other Services and agencies involved.

Detailed Conduct of the Estimate. In Operations Other Than War, the estimate process described in Chapter 3 of ADP Volume 1 Operations and in Chapter 6 of this volume requires some modification of approach:

a. Mission Analysis. Although potentially more wide-ranging than in warfighting operations, the process of Mission Analysis is no different in principle and no less important in Operations Other Than War. It will be necessary, however, usually in the light of political developments, to revisit Question 4 of mission analysis (has the situation changed?) frequently. This review process will apply both at the tactical and operational levels, as explained in Chapter 8.

b. Evaluation of Factors. Decision-making in Operations Other Than War rests on an adaptation of the approach taken in warfighting operations. In addition to the evaluation of the factors Enemy, Friendly Forces, Surprise and Security and Time, (described in more detail in Chapter 8), greater emphasis must be given to consideration of the

5. Described in ADP Vol 1, Para 0730.

6. The Centre of Gravity is defined as ‘that aspect of the enemy’s overall capability which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to the enemy’s inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations’ (ADP Vol 1, Para 0324c; see also Para 0328-0334).

7. Decisive Points are ‘those events, the successful outcome of which is a pre-condition to the successful elimination of the enemy’s centre of gravity (ADP Vol 1, Para 0324d; see also Para 0335-0337).

8. See Chapter 8, Para 0811-0812 for a detailed description of mission analysis.
Operational Environment, including local population, and to Information in its widest sense. Therefore 'Hearts and Minds', including Public Relations and Public Information, must be regarded as critical factors. In addition, the media, legal and ROE should be evaluated. Table 7-1 shows the consideration of critical factors in relation to the normal estimate process described in Chapter 8.

c. **Consideration of Courses of Action.** The commander will examine a number of courses of action, considering their relative advantages and disadvantages and taking into account the principles for the conduct of the particular operation.

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<th>Estate Factor</th>
<th>Particular Considerations For Operations Other Than War</th>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Nature of the belligerent parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>Demography; political factors; local/historical/special conditions and socio-economic conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and Infrastructure; Local Population, including ‘Hearts and Minds’</td>
<td>Topography; climate and weather; physical electronic communication links. Attitudes to Friendly Forces; Legal affairs: legitimacy and legality; ROE. Media: Internal PR/P Info; External PR/P Info. Civil-Aid and community relations measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Forces</td>
<td>Impact of other Services, Government and Non-Goverment Agencies. Multinational/Coalition considerations; force planning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise and Security</td>
<td>Security applies to Friendly Forces and to local population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time for various elements of the campaign to take effect.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Table 7.1 - The Estimate and Critical Factors in Operations Other Than War**

d. **Decision.** The commander completes his consideration of the courses of action with his decision confirming a course of action. He expresses this in his concept of operations. It must be understood, however, that shifts of political direction during what will usually be a long campaign will be reflected in the continuous revision of military objectives and priorities and therefore the commander's decision will be subject to review in the course of the campaign.
0719. **The Exercise of Command.** As in Warfighting, the commander in Operations Other Than War is responsible for the *military* direction of the campaign. He is primarily concerned with the exercise of command through the decision-making process, the dissemination of directives and orders and their subsequent execution. Assisted by his staff, he is also responsible for co-ordination with other military and non-military agencies. He remains responsible for the motivation of his command throughout the duration of the campaign. He must also delegate authority to subordinates. Given the potentially long time-frame of Operations OtherThanWar, he will achieve this in several ways:

a. **Missions/Tasks to Subordinates.** In the context of Operations Other Than War, each subordinate formation must be allocated individual missions in the Campaign Directive. These will accord with the commander’s Statement of Intent but will be worded to take account of the particular contribution and circumstances of the formation in question.

b. **Grouping for Independent Action.** Grouping is much more than just task organization. At the operational level, it will be a reflection of the commander’s priorities in relation to his *Main Effort*, and in relation to the overall direction of all elements of a campaign. At the tactical level, military and non-military forces should be so grouped to facilitate concerted and co-ordinated action.

c. **Delineation of Main Effort.** Main Effort in military terms is defined as an activity or series of activities which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission. This Main Effort becomes the focus of the activities of subordinates and in Operations OtherThanWar encompasses the direction of a variety of non-military assets. **Whilst the military Main Effort may not be the same as political Main Effort, the two must be complementary.** For example, the political Main Effort may lie in an activity such as improving the infrastructure of the country, while the military Main Effort could be expressed in terms of targeting a particular element of a belligerent faction. Since, however, both are aimed at the same End-State, the restoration of normality, there is no divergence of interest. A commander may therefore express his military Main Effort as an activity (for example, the arrest of wanted insurgents) or as an area of activity. It can be given substance using all the conventional methods: narrowing of boundaries, grouping, combat support and

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9. See explanation of Main Effort at Annex B to Chapter 8.
CSS allocation, planning options for reserves. To these can be added aspects like intelligence and covert agencies, active P Info, PSYOPS and economic activity. Forming and shifting Main Effort in these operations is considerably assisted by technology, which is an area of Friendly Forces’ strength and potential Enemy weakness.

d. **Co-ordination Measures.** Co-ordination measures with other Services, governmental and non-governmental agencies, vital to the success of Operations Other Than War, must be set out.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND**

**THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND**

0720. **Intervention.** In Intervention operations, the Services have well-developed joint structures and procedures for the organization of command, both at the operational and tactical levels. These operate in accordance with the principles described in Chapter 4 of this volume and in JSP 1.

0721. **COIN.** In COIN Operations, where coordination with the Police and other agencies takes place primarily at the operational level but also at the tactical level, unity of effort is achieved through a system of Action Committees, which bring together all aspects of the campaign. This committee system has been applied in most of the post World War Two COIN campaigns, most notably Malaya and Kenya, and operates from the Northern Ireland Office to company level in Northern Ireland.

0722. **Peace Enforcement.** Peace Enforcement operations, typically, will be conducted on a multinational basis. Ideally, existing alliance command structures and procedures should be employed. However, an ad hoc command organization may have to be used, particularly in the early stages of an operation.

**ROLE AND QUALITIES OF THE COMMANDER**

0723. Given the complex nature of the conflict with which he may be confronted, the role of the commander on Operations Other Than War may differ in some respects from that in Warfighting. During peace, the responsibility of commanders for training and professional development, especially in terms of fostering the awareness of subordinates of non-military aspects of Operations Other Than War is vital. The complex conditions of such operations will seldom permit the measured unfolding of a carefully rehearsed campaign plan. A commander must on the one hand maintain the
**determination** to achieve his aim, but on the other, have the **mental agility** and **imagination** to adapt to changing circumstances. He requires, as in warfighting, **robustness** not only in the face of military set-back, but also when frustrated by the actions of **third parties** over which he may have little influence, let alone control.

0724. The requirements of the commander’s role emphasise the importance of certain qualities in a commander during **Operations Other Than War**, but negate none of those described in Chapter 2. The higher commander must have a wide perspective of the conflict. This embraces the political situation and a range of cultural factors - religion, history, ethnography - which will be unique to each operation, and which are the essential elements of the root causes of that conflict. Without such a comprehension of the conflict and understanding for the position of its participants, any campaign plan is likely to be fundamentally flawed. This requirement lays particular stress on the qualities of **professional knowledge** and intellect.

0725. As in warfighting operations, a commander must have the ability to make decisions in a timely and accurate manner, having taken into account potentially complex **ROE** and having balanced the risks and benefits of a number of courses of action. This will call for fine **judgement**. No two campaigns or operations will be alike; moreover political influences mean that operations themselves will evolve rapidly. Operations may involve both the violent and non-violent application of military force, support to, and co-ordination with, the other agencies involved in the campaign. This indicates the need for the qualities of **flexibility** and **originality**; for these operations, especially when dealing with cunning opponents or determined belligerents, leave no scope for the application of 'templated' solutions or for inertia.

0726. The **ability to communicate** is vital because of the range of forces involved\(^{10}\), and because of the importance of the news media. Commanders at all levels must possess sufficient **self-confidence** to brief under pressure. The ability to communicate is closely tied to the values of **courage**, **honesty** and **integrity**, which others, including those outside the military, perceive the commander to exemplify.

0727. Just as **Operations Other Than War** require particular qualities for the commander, so they require him to recognise in his subordinates a wider range of qualities, including understanding and ability to handle the media. He must recognize too, that there are many representatives or officials from

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\(^{10}\) The ability to speak foreign languages may add to a commander's suitability for command of multinational operations, especially in Operations Other Than War.
other Services and agencies over whom he will have limited control, and in some cases, can only influence, but for whose actions he will be responsible. This is a major difference between the role of the commander in War and in Operations Other Than War. Thus success in Operations Other Than War may often require an indirect approach to leadership, reflecting the requirement to motivate soldiers and civilians alike through professional example and competence, good-will and co-operation. This may call for some compromise in command style.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND SUPPORT

STAFF

0728. The need for a commander to exercise control applies as much in Operations Other Than War as in War. Where assigned forces include NGOs as well as military forces of other nations and Services, adequate control measures must be seen as vital to the execution of a campaign. This control will be exercised through the Staff, as explained in Chapter 5. The needs of Operations Other Than War will, however, require the expansion of some branches and the renaming of others. It may also require the inclusion of non-military specialists who can advise on the history and culture of the belligerent and neutral parties involved.

0729. Staff Branches and Functions.

a. **G2 (Intelligence).** Operations Other Than War may require a considerable expansion of the G2 Branch, and its integration, for example, with Police Special Branch and covert agencies, and the adoption of a longer-term view towards the conduct of operations. This is particularly the case in COIN where it may be necessary, for example, to penetrate an insurgent organization.

b. **G3 (PR/P Info).** As described in ADP Volume 1¹¹, public relations and public information are important in the conduct of any campaign. A dedicated PR/P Info staff must exist to assist the commander and to foster, through expert management and assistance, the link between the forces and the media. This staff should exist at all levels.

¹¹. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0444.
c. **G3 (PSYOPS)**. The value of PSYOPS in Operations Other Than War was clearly illustrated in the US operations in Grenada, Panama and Haiti. The NATO definition of PSYOPS\(^\text{12}\) could be interpreted to include PR as a subsidiary task, but if the link between the forces and the media is to be credible, PSYOPS and PR must remain separate, although the need to co-ordinate the two remains. While PR will be directed at the home audience, PSYOPS will be directed at enemy forces, and the indigenous population in the theatre of operations. Coordination of message and means is critical and is best undertaken by the PSYOPS staff at the operational level. The characteristics and requirements of Operations Other Than War make this coordination a vital staff function; it is illustrated in Figure 7 - 2.

d. **G5 Civil-Military Relations**. Like G2, G5 is a branch which may require expansion and will need long-term objectives. It represents the overt military input into the process of gaining or reinforcing the 'Hearts and Minds' of the unconvinced population, and, as such, must maintain links with the PR and PSYOPS Staffs as well as with the spending departments of government.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.2 - Relationship Between PSYOPS and Public Relations Staff**

0731. Integration of Staffs. In Operations Other Than War, the integration of political and economic advisers and representatives of other uniformed Services, such as the police, into military staffs is essential. 'Joint Committees',

12. AAP-6: 'Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives.'
comprising military commanders and representatives of all interested parties, should be formed at a number of levels to co-ordinate action in the prosecution of a campaign plan.

0732. **Liaison.** If mutual understanding, unity of effort and action between the diverse elements of any force engaged in Operations Other Than War are to be maintained, then the term 'liaison' must be interpreted widely. The value of liaison is undeniable, especially where inter-communication is technically difficult and where there is a need for long-term continuity.

**COMMAND SUPPORT SYSTEMS**

0733. **Communications.** In Operations Other Than War, force-wide communications are required to link the Services and other organizations, such as NGOs. This can prove problematical, as difficulties of Police-Army communications in post war COIN campaigns have demonstrated. During Intervention operations, it will also be necessary to communicate out of theatre. Off-the-shelf buys of commercial equipment, or the use of framework communications, are both possible solutions.

0734. **Information Systems.** The application of CIS in providing accurate and timely dissemination of information is vital, especially in COIN. It will take time to develop databases but this will reflect the likely longer time-frame of a COIN operation.
COMMAND IN PEACEKEEPING AND WIDER PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping are described in Annex A to Chapter 7 of ADP Volume 1 Operations. The purpose of this Annex is to highlight those areas where, because of the different notions of success in these operations, a modified approach to command is required.

2. **Defining Success.** Wider Peacekeeping conflicts will require resolution by conciliation rather than termination by force. Thus, as in peacekeeping, military operations will be designed principally to create the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Military action cannot, therefore, be viewed as an end within itself, but will rather complement diplomatic, economic and humanitarian endeavours which together will pursue political objectives. Success will be measured by the rate at which the sum total of those activities progress towards the achievement of the UN Mandate.

CHARACTERISTICS OF OPERATIONS

3. **The Importance of Consent.** British doctrine for Wider Peacekeeping identifies consent as the key determinant for the conduct of operations. The presence of consent, however patchy, distinguishes peacekeeping (including Wider Peacekeeping) from the high risk and resource-intensive activity of Peace Enforcement. Consent is supported by the key peacekeeping principles of impartiality, legitimacy, minimum force, credibility and transparency. Actions that may prejudice consent and push a peacekeeping operation into one of peace enforcement should not be undertaken lightly. In practice, Wider Peacekeeping operations are likely to represent a continual struggle to preserve and sustain whatever consensual framework might exist. The vital requirement for impartiality is often difficult to achieve and maintain in such operations; it rests on the adoption of an even-handed approach. Military techniques that have the greatest utility are likely to be those that promote and develop consent. The need to preserve consent does not foreclose the use of force. However, the use of force is only acceptable as long as peacekeepers preserve their overall non-combatant status and do not become party to the conflict.

4. **The Political Dimension.** Peacekeeping operations often take place in an environment where even the most minor measures and actions may
have immediate strategic consequences. These operations are usually conducted in the full glare of world-wide media attention. Thus political influence is likely to reach down to the tactical level and commanders will be expected to make decisions that may have immediate strategic and political implications.

5. **Joint and Multinational Operations.** Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping operations will invariably be multinational and usually joint, and will involve a mixture of civil and police agencies and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose activities must all be fully integrated into a coherent campaign plan.

6. **Legitimacy and Legality.** Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping will be conducted within a tight framework of legitimacy and legality which will derive from the UN Mandate, and which for a commander, will determine the mission, the operational plan, the resources allocated and the Rules of Engagement.

**THE APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE**

7. British doctrine recognises a clear distinction between peacekeeping (including Wider Peacekeeping) and peace enforcement. In peace enforcement the force makes a clear and conscious decision in effect to become a party to the conflict. Thus while a warfighting approach is appropriate in peace enforcement operations, the contrary principles and techniques designed to support and sustain consent are applied to peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping operations. Military battlefield skills, however, remain applicable in the whole range of peace support operations. Elements of manoeuvre warfare theory, such as mission command, tempo and simultaneity have certain applications within peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping also has a psychological dimension, in that the focus of a campaign should normally be directed at the popular will of all parties to fight or make peace.

**CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND EXECUTION**

8. **The Levels of Command.** Military decision-making in UN peacekeeping operations will take place at 3 levels: the strategic, the operational and the tactical. Strategic guidance on the overall objectives, resources and the limitations of the military campaign is the responsibility of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in theatre, who in turn takes his guidance from the Secretary General and the UN Security Council. The Special Representative delegates the conduct of military operations to the Force
Commander, who further delegates the conduct of operations to sector, area or individual national contingent commanders.

9. **Directives and Missions.** A directive at the operational level in Peacekeeping or Wider Peacekeeping should make it clear what the desired End-State of the campaign is and the strategic goals that will realise the End-State. It must assign missions to subordinates and allocate resources to achieve the mission. It must give the commander’s intent and establish a concept of operations expressed in terms of Lines of Activity (or operation) which should be directed and sequenced through a series of decisive points to the Centre of Gravity. In Peacekeeping or Wider Peacekeeping, the Centre of Gravity may be defined as ‘that aspect or aspects of the conflict which, if neutralised or resolved, will bring about the conditions for the successful achievement of the Mandate’. An example of related Lines of Activity is:

   a. Direction and Organization - promote unity of purpose and increase operational efficiency.

   b. Information Initiative.

   c. Develop and Promote Consent.

   d. Achieve Freedom of Movement.

   e. Support Humanitarian Assistance.

10. **Information Initiative.** In Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping a force may be vulnerable to direct attack by the belligerent parties to the dispute. However, a peacekeeping operation is often open to potentially dangerous and destabilising attacks. For example, through political or media manipulation a force can appear to become a party to the dispute, or portrayed as weak, inept and lacking in credibility. The purpose of a public information initiative is to replace doubt, rumour and uncertainty with clear and truthful information which is made available to all. Dealing with truth builds trust, and secures the moral high ground. The consequences of the activities of the parties to the dispute must be reported openly and truthfully to the population who are affected by the dispute and to the world at large.

11. **The Use of Force.** Implicit in campaign planning and execution will be political considerations, which will inevitably result in constraints on the use of force. Force will be restricted to the minimum necessary to achieve the mandate and to protect the personnel involved in the operation. Any
proactive use of force must be within the overall consensual framework in order to prevent drift towards peace enforcement. The level of force permitted must be within the law (the mandate, and existing national and international law), and must be governed by ROE which are understood across a multinational force and by the belligerent parties to the conflict.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND

THE ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND

12. In Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping, the organization of command may tend to become complex, especially where the span of interests and nationalities is wide. In a UN sanctioned operation, the military strategic level of command will normally be exercised by a lead or framework nation, alliance or regional organization, acting in consultation with the UN Security Council. Command authority is thereafter, in all peacekeeping operations, maintained as far as possible using recognised states of command. National contributors may place their troops either under operational command or under operational control of the force. Intermediate Sector Commanders may exercise tactical control of all troops task-organised to them. Full command of national contingents is rarely ceded to the force commander. This has important implications for force commanders who must clarify those operations and activities which a particular national contingent will refuse to participate in.

COMMAND SUPPORT

13. **Headquarters.** The need for a commander to exercise control applies as much in peacekeeping as in war. Indeed, where assigned forces include NGOs as well as military forces of other nations and services, adequate control measures are vital to the execution of the campaign. This control will be exercised through the HQ and staff. The requirements of Peacekeeping and Wider Peacekeeping may again require the expansion of some staff branches and the renaming of others.

14. **Multinational HQ.** In the past, operations run by the UN have relied on multinational HQs and staffs assembled for a particular operation. Such HQs have been large and unwieldy, with much duplication of G1/G4 effort in particular, and a slow decision-making process. Wider Peacekeeping operations may in the future use a framework structure provided by one nation or alliance. This offers the advantages of a unified structure with common doctrine and procedures.
15. **G2 Military Information.** In Peacekeeping Operations, a force will not gather intelligence as there is no 'enemy' and the fundamental requirements of impartiality and transparency do not sit well with intelligence gathering. However, 'military information' (intelligence by a more usual and acceptable name) will remain crucially important, if only to make the commander more aware of the activities of those belligerents who interfere with the achievement of the mission. The staff must be able to gain access to this information either from national resources or the resources of the force, ranging from satellites to visual observation. But while the staff may use military collection methods, it must be aware that the needs of other agencies and the requirement to maintain impartial status may alter collection requirements and priorities.

16. **G3 Liaison.** The value of liaison is emphasised in Peacekeeping because of the requirements of conflict mediation, the limitations on military information collection and the multiplicity of agencies involved. This is especially important when communication is technically difficult.¹ In volatile conflicts and disputes special forces have considerable value.

17. **G3 P Info.** Management of all forms of information is necessary. It is important that high grade officers are employed to implement a responsive and coherent information strategy, to establish the positive and constructive aspects of the operation in all eyes. Activities will include the pro-active use of 'community information' (PSYOPS). However, the media both at local and international levels insist on their independence.

18. **G4 Logistics.** One of the most important support functions in a peacekeeping operation is logistics - equipping and sustaining the force. G4 staffs must be involved in the planning of a peacekeeping operation from the outset to ensure success.

19. **G5 Civil-Military Affairs.** Establishing smooth relations with the host nation (or belligerent factions) and gaining internal logistic support for peacekeeping operations will raise complex challenges for peacekeepers. G5 staffs may therefore require augmentation.

20. **The Force Commander’s Personal Staff.** The Force Commander will normally require an enhanced personal staff which must include a political adviser, a legal adviser and a public affairs officer as well as liaison officers from the parties to the conflict.

¹. A useful example is the exchange of LOs between UNPROFOR and UNHCR in the former Yugoslavia. Widespread and overt deployment of liaison teams to all parties involved in the dispute is a vital means of information gathering and an essential part of an information initiative.
CHAPTER 8

COMMAND AND STAFF DECISION-MAKING

The purpose of Chapter 8 is to describe the direction, consideration and decision stages of the decision-making cycle introduced in Chapter 3. It contains the methods by which the commander - assisted by his staff - reaches decisions, includes details of the formal estimate process and outlines compressed decision-making techniques which are applicable when there is insufficient time or staff capacity to conduct a formal estimate.

REQUIREMENT

0801. The requirement for a fast and flexible decision-making process was described in Chapter 3. The focal point for that activity is the estimate where the situation, mission, and any other relevant information (considered under factors) is evaluated prior to the commander deciding on the plan for initial action or further conduct of a campaign, major operation, battle or engagement. Although much of the decision-making process in the exercise of command can be delegated, the commander alone remains ultimately responsible for determining how his formation or unit is to operate.

TERMINOLOGY

0802. As the decision-making process involves activity by both the commander and the staff, it could be described more accurately as a command and staff estimate, but, for reasons of brevity, it is termed the estimate in this doctrine publication.¹ There are two types of estimate:

1. In accordance with NATO doctrine, the British Army has adopted the term 'estimate' which has replaced the 'appreciation' at the tactical and operational levels. The appreciation, described in JSP 101, is still used by the other Services and in the Ministry of Defence.
a. The **formal estimate** is used when there is sufficient time to complete a thorough assessment of the situation. Although it suits well the planning of deliberate operations, it can be used at any time in a campaign, major operation, or battle provided there is sufficient command and staff capacity and time to complete it.²

b. The **combat estimate** is used primarily at the tactical level for decision-making in battles and engagements when time is short. It is an abbreviated form of the formal estimate. At the lower tactical levels, it is usually completed in mental or note form by the commander alone.³

0803. **Application.** The formal estimate process can be employed in the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command and across the spectrum of conflict, including Operations Other Than War and military activities in peace. Further details of the application of the estimate process at the operational level can be found in ADP-1, Chapter 6 of this volume and in Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 1.

**RESPONSIBILITIES**

0804. **The Commander.** In the British Army the command and staff estimate process has been traditionally 'command-led', rather than 'staff-driven'. This has particularly been the case at the tactical level and within headquarters manned under predominantly national staff arrangements. In joint or combined headquarters at the higher tactical or operational levels within NATO, a greater degree of responsibility has been accorded to the staff. As the commander is responsible for the direction of the decision-making cycle, it follows that he must be fully involved in the estimate at its initial stage, and as he makes the decision, he must be involved in its latter stage. The extent to which the commander is involved in the detailed evaluation of the factors in between will depend on a number of considerations, including:

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2. TD Note 8 differentiated between the 'formal appreciation' - whereby all options are kept open until the decision - and the estimate where options can be rejected before the decision. This distinction is largely artificial. The estimate adopted at formation level during operations is usually an abbreviated formal estimate.

3. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0404-0406 and Annex 4A to AJP-1.
a. The prevailing situation (in particular, the time available to make a decision).

b. The state of training and experience of the staff.

c. The level of decision-making required.

d. The potential complexity of the required decision.

e. The style and personality of the commander himself, as the way he makes or arrives at a decision remains largely his business, commensurate with the need to utilise the general or specialist skills and experience of his staff to best advantage.

0805. **The Staff.** The staff is responsible for completing the bulk of the estimate under the direction of the commander, or his principal general staff officer. The staff at lower tactical levels is concerned with detailed evaluation of information and the conduct of staff checks on behalf of the commander. At the higher tactical levels and at the operational level (particularly in joint and combined operations), the staff will often be required to develop options, or possible courses of action, for the commander to compare and decide on. However, whilst members of the staff may present the commander with courses of action, they do not make the decision.

THE FORMAL ESTIMATE

**GENERAL**

0806. The **purpose of the estimate is to make a decision for a course of action, appropriate to the level of command, from a body of information or picture of a campaign, major operation, battle or engagement.** As the situation changes, the mission and relevant factors are re-evaluated in a logical manner. In this sense, the estimate can be looked on as a continuous cycle which can be returned to when needed. The formal estimate within the command and staff decision-making and planning process is explained below and is shown graphically at Annex A; a tabulated layout, for use principally at formation level, is shown at Annex B. Whilst this publication concentrates on the principles concerned and sets out the sequence of factors to be considered to ensure uniformity, the detailed manner in which an estimate is conducted should be determined by the local commander and staff.
0807. Consistent with the principles of Mission Command, a subordinate commander is directed by his superior as to what effect he is to achieve. At the operational level, the superior commander’s intentions are expressed in a **Statement of the Commander’s Intent**⁴ (*what needs to be achieved in terms of the desired end-state for a campaign or major operation*), which is normally refined in a **Concept of Operations** (*how the level of command will achieve the desired end-state*). At the tactical level, the superior commander’s concept of operations should include both his intent and his design for operations. At all levels, stating the commander’s intent allows subordinates to exercise initiative, but in a way which will be in accordance with the commander’s aim. The estimate process, of which mission analysis is only a part, helps the subordinate commander at any level then decide how he will achieve the desired effect.

0808. The estimate has the following four stages, shown at Figure 8-1:

a. **Stage 1 - Mission Analysis.** Mission Analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing from a superior’s orders the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. It places in context what effect is to be achieved in the overall design for operations. A commander establishes what constraints apply, and determines, as the campaign, major operation, battle or engagement progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a dynamic process which 'triggers', and then regulates, the remainder of the estimate. It is continued thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed.

b. **Stage 2 - Evaluation of Factors.** The factors which affect the tasks are then considered. The following are mandatory: **Enemy, Environment** (including Ground and Weather), **Friendly Forces** (including Combat Service Support), **Surprise** and **Security**, and **Time**. Any further relevant factors are then considered. In Operations Other Than War, for example, political factors may be particularly important. Deductions will begin to reinforce some tasks; others may be eliminated because they are not vital to the mission. A list of tasks which should be completed in order to fulfil the mission will emerge.

c. **Stage 3 - Consideration of Courses of Action (COA).** The next stage is to identify broad COA based on the identified tasks. For each of the COA, the advantages and disadvantages in relation to the mission are considered in order to establish the combat power required and risks involved. The Commander’s Decision then follows.

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⁴ Explained in ADP Vol 1, Para 0407.
Figure 8.1 - The Estimate Process

d. **Stage 4 - The Commander’s Decision.** The Decision must be the logical result of the Estimate. With it the commander decides on (or develops) one of the possible COA, having taken into account the advantages and disadvantages of each COA in comparison with the likely COA of the enemy. The Decision constitutes the basic directive for the completion of the planning and for all future actions. As such it represents the outline concept of operations and must include the commander’s intent (his design for battle).

0809. **Development and Review of the Plan.** Once the Decision has been made, the plan is developed and directives or orders are produced (see Chapter 9). Subsequently, the situation is monitored. New information, as it becomes available, is used to re-evaluate the situation and, in turn, the tasks. If the situation changes radically, the commander must return to the Estimate, starting at the Mission Analysis stage, to test whether his mission, Decision - or developed plan - are still valid. However, whilst this re-examination of the estimate may occur at any stage of the decision-making process, commanders must beware of over-loading either themselves or their staffs as a result of every unforeseen, or minor change in the situation.

0810. **Time in Hand.** The commander must ensure that he and his staff complete the planning and issue directives or orders appropriate to the level of command in sufficient time to allow subordinate commanders to do the
same, including the time taken for the dissemination of orders. This imperative for timely battle procedure applies down to the lowest level of command to ensure that soldiers have proper orders before being committed (or re-committed) to action. Thus a running check on the situation and the time in hand to make decisions, to complete planning and to issue orders must be maintained at every level of command. The one third: two thirds rule, whereby one level of command takes only one third of the time remaining before committal for decision-making and the issue of orders, is a good rule of thumb. However, this guide must not be applied inflexibly: often decisions will need to be made as quickly as possible. In most circumstances it is advisable to conduct a preliminary analysis on the time in hand before the estimate process (including mission analysis) is initiated. Following this initial time analysis, time deadlines - taking into account the time required to plan, reproduce and distribute orders - should be issued to the staff.

**MISSION ANALYSIS**

0811. The Estimate starts with the commander’s Mission Analysis. From the orders he receives, a commander must understand the context and purpose of his own mission statement. Specifically, the commander will determine:

<table>
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<th>MISSION ANALYSIS</th>
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<td>Q1. Superior Commanders' Intent.</td>
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**Q1. His Superiors' Intent.** *(Noting my immediate superior's role in his own commander's plan, what is my immediate superior commander's Intent and how must my action directly support it?)* The purpose here is to establish what effect a commander has to achieve in his superior's concept of operations. This requires an understanding of the superior's End-State and Main Effort (see Annex C). A commander is required to understand his superiors' Intent at two levels above in order to place his own actions into full context.

**Q2. Specified and Implied Tasks.** *(What must I do to accomplish my mission?)* Specified tasks are those stated in the directives or orders received by the subordinate from his superior commander. Implied tasks are other activities that must be carried out in order to achieve the mission, including the requirement to support the superior commander's Main Effort. A logical check of the operation should reveal the implied tasks. A comparison of the specified and implied tasks with the superior commander's intent should lead to an initial
deduction of the critical activity required of the formation or unit, and likely Main Effort.

Q3. **Constraints.** Under Mission Command, a subordinate can assume freedom of action unless he is otherwise constrained. Specific constraints may include those of time, space and resources, including combat service support, in the way a commander executes his mission. *(What limitations are there on my freedom of action? What can I not do? When do I need to decide (his decision point))*). At all levels, further limiting factors including political restrictions (such as ROE) which prohibit the commander from undertaking specific actions may apply.\(^5\)

Q4. **Changed Situation.** A commander needs to determine whether the situation has changed sufficiently to warrant a review of the estimate. Using Mission Analysis, the commander reassesses the progress of his operation against his Mission as the situation develops, applying Question 4 on a continuous basis. The commander can ask at any time *Has the situation changed - and do I need to take another decision?* As well as *No - no change*, there are three possible responses:

- **Yes** - the situation has changed but my plan is still valid.
- **Yes** - the situation has changed: my original mission is still feasible but I need to amend my plan.
- **Yes** - the situation has changed and my original mission is no longer valid. In this case, the commander should consult his superior but if for whatever reason he cannot, he will act on his own initiative to support his superior commander’s Main Effort, in keeping with that commander’s original intent. He will also keep in mind the commander’s intent two levels of command up.

In the case of the second and third responses, the commander and his staff then review the Estimate, updating information as required, and confirm the Mission and Decision.

0812. **Mission Analysis thus allows a commander - without waiting for further orders - to exercise personal initiative and exploit a situation in a way which his superior would intend.** The product of Mission Analysis

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5. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0404b.
is both a common start point for further consideration of the situation by both
the commander and his staff and a means by which the commander
reassesses the progress of an operation against his mission (see Para
0834). He must judge by a process of continual review whether the situation
has changed (either to the advantage or disadvantage of Friendly Forces) to
a degree which requires him to take further decisions. Through constantly
returning to ‘Question 4’, Mission Analysis is thus both an active and a
reactive process.

0813. **Commander's Direction and Review.** On completion of his Mission
Analysis, the commander gives direction on the completion of the Estimate
(Commander’s Planning Guidance and the Plan for the Staffwork) and may
also seek any necessary clarification required. He reviews his mission
throughout the estimate process and subsequent execution.

a. **Commander’s Planning Guidance.** Normally the command-
er’s first priorities will be to identify his critical information require-
ments - to give focus to staff effort - and determine what has to be
decided - and by when. The commander will also guide DCOS and
his staff on likely logistic priorities. This allows the G1/G4 staff to
initiate the service support estimate that runs concurrently with the
G2/G3 estimate. At this stage, the commander may have identified
key tasks which must be completed, and constraints which may
appear to exclude some courses of action. He can then concentrate
his and his staff’s effort on those options which appear more feasible.
There are advantages in producing broad options at this stage,
particularly when time is short. But there is also an inherent danger
in 'situation the appreciation' before the factors are evaluated suffi-
ciently in the main part of the estimate. Where the situation is
complicated, a prudent commander will examine a wide range of
courses of action. When time is short, the situation simple, or the
options limited, the commander may need to exercise judgement in
restricting what he and his staff consider. Thus the degree to which
a commander narrows his options will depend on the time available
for the decision, the complexity of the situation, the information
available and what has happened already. It will also vary with the
experience and level of training of the commander and his staff.

b. **Plan for the Staffwork.** The commander, or more typically his
principal general staff officer, will conclude the Commander’s Plan-
ing Guidance with direction to the staff on the completion of the
Estimate, including deadlines for contributions to the estimate, whether
written or verbal (in the case of a Decision Brief to the commander).
All members of the staff have a duty to comply with this plan for the staffwork in order that the commander can make his Decision on time. As described in Chapter 5, this staffwork is an interactive process involving both the commander and his staff, and between members of different staff branches or armed services, working towards a common end.

c. **Clarification.** In some circumstances it may be appropriate to clarify any questions concerning the mission with the Superior Commander before the rest of the estimate is undertaken. However, neither valuable time nor staff effort should be expended at this stage in confirming points of minor detail.

d. **Initial Warning Order.** In order to initiate timely battle procedure, an initial warning order should be issued at this stage. A full warning order, however, cannot be issued until after the commander's Decision (see Para 0831).

e. **Running Review.** On completion of his Mission Analysis, the commander has reviewed his mission in the context of his superior's intent, and should be in no doubt as to what effect he has to achieve. It remains his responsibility to review the manner in which the remainder of the estimate is carried out in relation to the mission and prevailing situation, and to make his Decision on time.

**EVALUATION OF FACTORS**

0814. **General.** Just as Mission Analysis considers tasks and constraints, so should the Evaluation of Factors lead to the deduction of tasks and constraints. Tasks come principally from Enemy, Environment, Friendly Forces and Surprise and Security. Constraints are derived largely from consideration of Security and Time. There may be other additional factors relevant to a particular campaign or operation which must be considered appropriate to the level of command. They may produce further tasks and constraints. Whilst the following factors are listed sequentially, they are *not necessarily evaluated in this order* for two reasons: first, in certain environmental conditions there may be merit in considering the Environment before evaluating the Enemy; secondly, whilst G2 staff are evaluating the Enemy, G3 and G4 staff are evaluating Friendly Forces, including combat service support, in parallel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendly Forces (including CSS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
0815. **Enemy.** In evaluating the Enemy, the commander and his G2 staff seek to form a clear impression of his capabilities and intentions. This allows an examination of the capabilities of own forces to be made with a view to exploiting the perceived vulnerabilities of the enemy and possible weaknesses in his assessed courses of action. Whilst the commander may have a possible own course of action in mind, he and his G2 staff should *focus here on the enemy’s will, vulnerabilities and probable intentions*, within the context of the enemy’s likely plan for a campaign or major operation. As described in Chapter 6, at the operational level and the higher tactical levels, the enemy’s **centre of gravity** needs to be assessed and identified - from which a number of **decisive points** on the path to the elimination of the centre of gravity are determined. At the tactical level, if time is short or intelligence is limited, the 'most likely' and the 'worst-case' enemy courses of action should be examined.

0816. **Environment.** Environmental factors embrace topography and demography: terrain, weather, and local population, including religion and culture, and the likely interest and influence of the media, the latter factors assuming particular importance in Operations Other Than War. **Terrain** and **weather** (including **visibility**) are grouped together under '**Ground**'. Ground is considered in detail by **Terrain Analysis** which can range in scope from map study to the use of advanced IT, (normally held by formation engineer or G3 Geographic staffs) which allows the terrain to be considered from both the enemy and own viewpoints. Further details on how terrain and weather are evaluated together under the factor 'Ground' at the tactical level are given in AFM **Formation Tactics**.\(^6\) Consideration of both Enemy and Friendly Forces to the Environment is closely linked. For example, it will often be appropriate to consider the **Enemy**, the **Ground** element of Environment and **Friendly Forces** together, particularly at the tactical level. **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)** is a command and staff tool which allows this to be done in an integrated manner.\(^7\) The integration of IPB into the estimate is shown at Figure 8.2.

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7. IPB is described at Annex A to Chapter 3 to AFM *Formation Tactics* and in TD Note 26.
G2 staff, assisted by the engineer staff, examine Enemy and Ground/Weather under the following steps, although others may be considered for Operations Other Than War.

a. **Step 1 - Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE).** When time permits, a full evaluation of the Environment (battlefield area) should be made. If not already done so, the battlefield area is defined in Mission Analysis. The basis of successful BAE is the production of a terrain and meteorological database which is kept continuously updated from the time planning for operations commences. This process runs in parallel to the estimate and the database is 'interrogated' as required when Enemy and Ground/Weather are considered. The primary purpose of BAE is to identify Enemy and Own Mobility Corridors and Avenues of Approach. It includes both air, sea/river and ground approaches as necessary. When considering the terrain in the area of operations (together with the likely area of operations of the enemy, which can be different), corridors and avenues for possible use by own forces must be identified.
b. **Step 2 - Threat Evaluation.** The purpose of Threat Evaluation is to identify the enemy's overall capability, based on his doctrine. There is no unique formula for this, as the approach adopted will depend on the nature of the enemy. Where appropriate, the production of a Doctrinal Overlay, based on intelligence of the enemy’s air and maritime capability, land organization and capability reflecting his equipment, combat service support and perceived deployment is a useful method for achieving this. It is based on knowledge of his doctrine, and is kept updated during the course of a campaign as a result of his practice on operations. This process remains equally valid in Operations Other Than War, where the enemy may not have developed a formal doctrine. Here he will typically have developed over time a modus operandi which can be used in Threat Evaluation.

c. **Step 3 - Threat Integration.** Based on an assessment of enemy aims and intentions in relation to his known dispositions and doctrine and combined with the BAE, it is possible to predict likely enemy courses of action or reaction to friendly forces. If applicable, an attempt should be made to ‘get into’ the enemy commander’s mind. At the operational level, the key is not only to identify the enemy’s centre of gravity but also his perception of friendly forces’ centre of gravity, and likely decisive points in his campaign plan. This should lead to a deduction of his likely courses of action. At the tactical level, his likely courses of action are identified in the context of his deduced campaign plan. His assessed courses of action, which should reflect his fighting power on particular terrain and for specific types of operation, may be shown graphically on a Situation Overlay. This overlay is a representation of the perceived way the enemy will fight. From this, an Event Overlay is produced which considers specific enemy events in time and space. It provides the basis for the Intelligence Collection Plan.

d. **Step 4 - Production of the Decision Support Overlay.** The final step in the IPB process is conducted during the development of the plan. (See Para 0833b.)

0817. **Friendly Forces.** An examination of own troops will determine the capability of employing particular formations or units for tasks identified so far in the estimate process. In addition, an evaluation of friendly forces, including those of flanking formations, may not only lead to constraints but, more importantly, offer opportunities for seizing the initiative, including offensive action. The evaluation of Friendly Forces should include consideration of:

a. **Air and Maritime Situation.** Options for ground manoeuvre are bound to be influenced by the prevailing air situation in terms of air superiority and availability of air support to land operations. In terms of campaign planning, and particularly in intervention operations, it may often be necessary to predicate land operations on the basis of successful air operations. At both the operational and tactical levels, if air superiority or local parity cannot be achieved, the implications for ground forces, including surface-based air defence, must also be thoroughly examined under the Factor Surprise and Security. In amphibious operations, or when naval assets are in support or providing combat service support, the maritime situation should be evaluated.

b. **Flanking, Forward or Depth Formations.** When keeping the 'big picture' in mind, the status and intentions of friendly forces plays an important part in the estimate. This is particularly important when
transitional phases such as forward or rearward passage of lines or link-up operations are envisaged. As the headquarters of neighbouring forces may be involved in parallel planning, close liaison whilst the estimate process is being conducted will prove mutually beneficial. Specifically, liaison with flanking formations is essential during the planning process and thereafter to ensure transparency of boundaries (including surveillance, obstacle and fire plans), co-ordination of joint reaction to enemy operations in the boundary area and maintenance of shared routes.

c. **Own Forces' Capability.** Before COA can be developed, the status and hence capability of own troops - particularly in multinational formations - must be accurately determined, if not already known. This will form part of the commander's Critical Information Requirements and will normally entail confirmation of:

1. **Organization and Equipment.** This involves expressing strengths as combat power, taking into account any associated limitations in the use of formations/units for particular tasks.

2. **Dispositions and Availability.** (By time and space).

3. **Restrictions on Employment.** Restrictions include, for example, any limitations imposed by the command states of the forces involved.

d. **Combat Service Support (CSS).** Under Friendly Forces, CSS must always be considered. CSS constraints almost invariably modify or exclude tasks. The consideration of CSS includes not only the assessment of current and future formation or unit sustainability, but also of the overall CSS plan to sustain a campaign, major operation or battle. This may include support to deployment, establishment of logistic bases and the outload of stocks to these bases and the balance of stocks held at various levels. Some combat tasks may be sustainable, others only at risk, yet others may be unsustainable and should therefore be eliminated. Sustainability is assessed under the headings: **Distance, Demand and Duration.** Concurrent with the G2/G3 part of the estimate, a service support estimate is carried out by DCOS and the G1/G4 staff. This estimate will identify logistic

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8. See Para 0315a and Annex A to Chapter 3.
constraints on the commander's freedom of action and produce a service support plan to support the operation. Further details of the CSS contribution to the estimate are contained in AFM Vol. 1 Part 6 CSS. In order to achieve economies of time and effort, it is vital that both operational and logistic planners work in tandem at this stage of the Estimate.

e. **Fighting Power.** The *fighting power*, or suitability of own troops for employment for particular operations against the enemy and in particular types of terrain, must be assessed. Whilst this is based on objective equipment considerations, the commander's more subjective judgement on the state of training, readiness and motivation of subordinate formations or units should be applied. In the case of a protracted campaign, the *state of morale*, may become a critical factor. Thus whereas combat power can be quantified, fighting power is better expressed in qualitative terms, reflecting the suitability for employment in a particular environment of operations.

0818. **Relative Strengths.** The assessment of Friendly Forces is concluded with a comparison of enemy and own strengths, weaknesses and capabilities termed Relative Strengths, determined on the availability of fighting power by time and space for employment. Relative Strengths is based on force ratios of combat power, modified as necessary by the assessed *fighting power* of both enemy and own troops. In comparing Relative Strengths, the *weaknesses* of the enemy (including how his moral and physical cohesion can be attacked) are examined with a view to identifying COA and the force levels required for particular tasks. In considering Relative Strengths, *planning yardsticks* for movement and force ratios for particular types of engagement, based on operational analysis (OA) research, are employed. OA data which is compiled for a particular theatre of operations should be updated during the course of a campaign. Training data is included in the SOHB.

0819. **Surprise and Security.** Surprise concerns gaining or wresting the initiative from the enemy. Security involves maintaining the initiative and enhancing freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. The value of surprise is of paramount importance and so warrants critical examination at this stage of the Estimate. The goal should be gaining 'absolute' surprise in order to disrupt or paralyse the enemy commander's will.
and decision-making ability. If this cannot be achieved, the lesser but often more practicable objective of 'operational' surprise - whereby the enemy determines too late what is likely to happen and is therefore powerless to react (by you acting faster than his decision-action cycle) - can often prove effective. In order to effect surprise and security, it is mandatory that deception of the enemy, OPSEC and protection of own troops are considered.

a. **Deception.** Deception is defined in AFM Vol. 5 Part 5 *Deception in War* as 'those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests'. Deception forms an important component of Surprise and Security. To be effective, deception should be integrated from the highest level downwards, and will usually require the committal of significant forces or resources to convince the enemy. Thus it is tempting to dismiss its value at an early stage in planning. Yet, skilfully applied, deception can provide considerable benefits. Because of scarce resources, however, it is essential to target accurately the level of command which needs to be deceived, linked to the perceived enemy expectation of own actions. The staff should determine what indicators are required, and establish what reconnaissance assets the enemy has to discover the indicators.¹⁰ These considerations provide the basis of the deception plan.

b. **OPSEC and Protection.** *(How do I protect my plans and forces, how do I stop the enemy exploiting my key vulnerabilities, how do I conceal my intentions from him?)* OPSEC (which seeks to deny operational information to the enemy) and Protection produce both additional tasks and constraints. They must be considered as a coherent whole within the context of the operational level Command and Control Warfare (C2W) plan (see Annex C to Chapter 6), if one is not to negate the other. **At the operational level, the protection of the own forces' centre of gravity must be assessed.** Key vulnerabilities, which the enemy will attempt to exploit, should be examined at all levels.

0820. **Time.** Time, often linked to *Space*, will constrain the courses of action. The commander or his staff must assess the timing of each task identified so far. Timing includes both the sequence of tasks and the duration of each, as far as this can be realistically assessed before contact with the

¹⁰ Further details are contained in AFM Vol V Part 5 *Deception in War.*
enemy. In this context, the use of **yardsticks** for time and space is an important command and staff tool.

0821. **Consideration of Any Other Relevant Factors.** As stressed in Chapter 6, other relevant factors at the operational level will invariably include ROE and external influences such as legal constraints, the media and civil-military relations. These factors may impinge on the mandatory factors (principally Enemy, Environment and Friendly Forces). Although no additional combat tasks may be deduced, these factors can have a significant effect on the conduct of a campaign, major operation, battle or engagement and should be included as necessary.

0822. **Summary of Possible Tasks.** At this stage, the Estimate will have identified a list of tasks necessary to the Mission, which are possible and sustainable. The straightforward approach is then to list all the tasks and to quantify the total combat power required. However, often the requirement will exceed the troops available, leading to the deduction that tasks should be sequenced. In contrast, a more manoeuvrist COA might obviate the need either to undertake some of the tasks, or to commit a significant component of available forces to them. Thus only a preliminary assessment of the combat power required for each task should be undertaken prior to the consideration of COA. This will produce a summary of possible ‘troops to task’. **Tasks can only be related to one another in developed COA and therefore the detailed allocation of troops or assets to tasks must follow the Commander's Decision, not precede it.**

**CONSIDERATION OF COA**

0823. **Formulation of COA.** A COA should reconcile the troops available with the troops required from the identification of tasks so far, and include an outline concept of operations with a clear indication of Main Effort. In developing COA, it is quite proper to adjust the balance of troops to various tasks to economise effort in one activity in order to concentrate force in another. Whether a number of COA can be developed and compared, rests on the extent to which the options have been narrowed down during the estimate process. At lower tactical levels, there may be only one workable COA and the only decision left to the Commander is to allocate combat power to the identified tasks. For each COA, the weight of combat power given to each task needs to be ascribed; if sufficient force appears available to complete all the tasks concurrently (and so achieving simultaneity) rather than some being conducted sequentially, then there may be implications for the concentration of force (to achieve the appropriate correlation of forces) and the establishment of a true Main Effort. Common elements of a number
of separate COA should be identified and considered as early as possible as this will save effort all round prior to the Commander’s Decision. Thus only the contrasting aspects of COA need to be compared. Each COA, however, should include consideration of what the likely enemy reaction to it will be.

0824. **Focus on the Enemy.** At the higher tactical levels, and most certainly at the operational level, the Higher Commander must always strive to identify a number of alternative COA which focus on the enemy’s centre of gravity or his key vulnerabilities. This approach can also be followed at lower levels. COA should focus on shattering the enemy’s moral and physical cohesion, which can often result from achieving surprise. Where there is a balance to strike between adopting a more predictable or secure approach and selecting a less obvious COA, ultimate success may rest on adopting the COA least expected by the enemy, entailing calculated risk-taking, one of the tests of command ability at any level.

0825. **Comparison of COA.** The advantages and disadvantages of COA are considered in relation to the mission and likely enemy COA, taking into account his likely reactions to own courses. COA should be re-checked against Questions 1 and 2 of Mission Analysis in order to confirm whether they meet the Superior Commander’s Intent (Question 1) and achieve the critical activity (*what overall effect must I achieve* derived from the specified and implied tasks in Question 2). If they do not, then such COA should be discounted. At the tactical level, the practicality of COA can then be checked and compared using the **Functions in Combat** or the principles for the operation of war involved. This method may also be used at the operational level, but a wider range of factors is likely to be involved. Whatever the methods used, the commander must exercise his military judgement in comparing the advantages and disadvantages of COA.

0826. **Wargaming.** If there is time, wargaming of possible COA must be completed to determine likely responses to the actions of the enemy and own forces. Wargaming should include the possible consequences of operations in flanking forces’ areas. Computer assisted wargaming may prove increasingly important in the future when field headquarters are equipped and manned to conduct it. Where computer assistance in the form of Decision Support Systems is not available, wargaming should still be completed.

0827. **Synchronization Matrix.** The recommended method for the planning and co-ordination of battlefield activity in time and space is the development of a Synchronization Matrix. It provides a graphical planning tool to assist the commander and his staff analysing own COA (including deep, close and rear operations and supporting Functions in Combat) both
in time and space in relation to the enemy's most likely COA. The chart includestime, the enemy COA and own COA, and the standard Functions in Combat developed as required. Once operations are underway, however, the Synchronization Matrix should not be rigidly applied in a fluid situation; otherwise favourable opportunities to take the initiative will be lost. An example Synchronization Matrix, developed from an approved COA, is at Annex D.

0828. **Mission Statements.** Outline mission statements for each subordinate can be included at this stage of considering various COA as a check to ensure that proposed tasks are within the capability of each subordinate. Confirmed mission statements, however, can only be formulated once the commander has made his Decision, since his selection of a COA may affect the basis on which the likely missions were drafted.

**COMMANDER’S DECISION**

0829. In NATO doctrine, the Commander’s Decision is described as follows:

>'As the final step in the estimate process the commander considers the courses of action open to him to accomplish his mission. He selects his COA and expresses it as his decision. From the decision he develops his concept of operations which must include his intent. The commander's decision should embody his will for the conduct of the operation.'

Thus the Commander’s Decision has two elements: first, the selection of a COA - which can be a modification of a proposed COA - and, secondly, the expression of an outline concept for that action. The expression of the decision or subsequent confirmation of it as a concept of operations is not a staff function as the commander himself must be able to identify with it himself and motivate subordinates with his Decision.

0830. The commander's Decision should state:

a. The formation or unit involved (who?).

b. His **Intent** (why?).

11. ATP-35(B).

12. A higher commander, however, should be aware of the possible risks involved in modifying a fully considered COA. It may necessitate a number of staff checks to confirm its validity.
c. A broad outline of intended operations, *(what, where and when?)*, and **Main Effort**.

0831. Wherever possible, the Decision should be passed quickly to subordinates to initiate concurrent activity. Thus an **Initiating Directive** at the operational level or a **Warning Order** at the tactical level sent on completion of the Mission Analysis stage of the Estimate may be supplemented by the commander's Decision. Once the Decision has been made it is not to be altered lightly. Given the fluctuating circumstances of war, however, inflexible adherence to a decision as the situation changes may lead to errors, including missed opportunities. *The art of command consists of a timely recognition of the circumstances and moment demanding a new decision.*

0832. **Briefing the Decision.** In certain situations, including during training, it may be appropriate to brief the decision to subordinate or superior headquarters, to members of the staff, or to neighbouring formations/units or to liaison officers. For sake of brevity, the decision can be broken down into and justified in its component parts. (For example, the formation is attacking because..., the Main Effort is here because...). This **decision with justification** procedure *provides no alternative for either a formal or a combat estimate*; it is merely a convenient briefing tool.

**DEVELOPMENT AND REVIEW OF THE PLAN**

0833. **Development of the Plan.** The development of the plan involves further staffwork including:

a. **Preparation of Orders.** Once the commander has made his Decision, the staff has the responsibility to complete the plan under his direction, or that of his principal general staff officer. The **Concept of Operations** is based on the Commander's Decision. It includes his Intent, his scheme of manoeuvre (an outline of the **deep**, **close** and **rear** operations) and a statement of Main Effort required to achieve the mission. In most circumstances it will be appropriate for the commander to produce his own Concept of Operations.13 Mission statements for subordinates are then developed and would normally be completed or checked by the commander himself. Once the

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13. At the operational level, a commander would express his intentions in a Statement of Intent; a Concept of Operations would follow normally after detailed staff work. At the tactical level, the commander's Intent, which is included in his Decision is re-stated, or expanded as necessary, in the Concept of Operations. Further details of the composition of the Concept of Operations are included in Annex B to Chapter 9.
mission statements are confirmed, the task organisation can be
checked to ensure that subordinates have been allocated sufficient
resources to complete their missions.

b. **Threat Integration.** Threat Integration is carried out in the IPB
process in parallel with the development of the plan. It is a continuous
process whose end product is a **Decision Support Overlay** contain-
ing critical areas or events (including targeting) which may require
decisions by the commander (his Decision Points) and trigger the
mission analysis stage of a new decision cycle. The Decision Support
Overlay is related to the decision time-line of the Synchronization
Matrix. As the operation plan is developed so is the service support
plan. DCOS and the G1/G4 staff complete the service support
estimate and produce the service support plan. As the main operation
plan is reviewed and updated, the service support plan is amended to
reflect changes.

c. **Targeting.** The targeting process is closely linked to the devel-
opment of the plan and threat integration in particular. The acquisition
of targets, tracking and their subsequent attack is a process which
requires detailed co-ordination. Targeting is defined as 'the process
of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them,
taking into account operational requirements and capabilities.' It is
therefore a combined command and staff function which enables
enemy targets to be identified, evaluated and then attacked. At the
operational and higher tactical levels, targeting is joint air/land re-
ponsibility. The targeting process at the tactical level is described in
more detail at Annex B to Chapter 3 of AFM *Formation Tactics*.

0834. **Review of the Plan.** Once a Decision has been made, the situation
must be monitored carefully while orders are being prepared or disseminated
and throughout the execution of an operation in order to confirm the validity
of the Mission. Whilst much of this control activity is a staff function, the
commander’s own review of his Mission Analysis must play its part. If the
commander is forward, directing close operations or visiting subordinate
formations, his principal general staff officers and Arms and Service com-
manders must be in 'his mind' and be both trained to and allowed to act
positively if the situation demands it. Thus a continuous review of the plan
takes place at all levels and staff and subordinates are encouraged to act for
themselves without waiting for detailed instructions or orders. This required
delegation of executive authority reflects the application of a Mission Com-
mand philosophy within a command and staff team.
0835. **Contingency Planning.** Contingency planning is the process by which options (including alternative or further developed COA) are built into a plan to anticipate opportunities or reverses. The process gives the commander the flexibility to retain the initiative. In reviewing the plan, campaign or operation wargaming techniques can be applied to Mission Analysis 'Question 4 - What if' scenarios. Thus wargaming plays a critical part in contingency planning, especially in the prediction of likely enemy reactions to friendly forces initiative and the exploitation of opportunity. Contingency planning can be undertaken at any level but there is a limit to what can be achieved. **It is impossible to cater for every perceived eventuality; no amount of wargaming or contingency planning can replace the priceless ability of a commander to act quickly, appropriately, decisively and resolutely in a totally unexpected situation.** In such circumstances the estimate process, tempered by intuition and military judgement, will still play a crucial role in decision-making. Wargaming and contingency planning should be continued after the commander has made his decision, as more information becomes available. In particular, previously discarded or entirely new COA, for both the enemy and own troops, can be wargamed and developed as time permits, to consider possible 'branches and sequels' to the existing plan.

**FIGHTING**

0836. Once operations are underway, the commander and his staff at the operational and tactical levels are concerned primarily with fighting, and providing the required logistic support to sustain operations. This will often require a split of effort between decision-making for current and future operations. For example, mission analysis may be conducted to review the situation and mission in the light of current operations and to initiate the planning of a new operation. Therefore the decision-making and planning process for one operation may overlap with that for the next. Thus, at formation level, it is necessary to maintain a discrete future plans staff.

0837. If the situation is fluid and time is short, the commander must be prepared, particularly at the tactical level, to command his formation without recourse to a formal estimate and detailed planning. In such circumstances, compressed decision-making techniques are required, including the use of the Combat Estimate. After coming to his Decision, a commander should direct subordinates brought up and trained under the ethos of Mission Command with brief oral or radio orders.

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14. See ADP Vol 1, Para 0344 for further details.
THE COMBAT ESTIMATE

0838. **General.** At the tactical level, particularly when time is short and information is incomplete, compressed decision-making techniques are required to complement the Formal Estimate process. An abbreviated form of the Formal Estimate, usually completed in mental or note form, is termed the Combat Estimate. The Combat Estimate can be completed by map study (including IPB if appropriate), by observation on the ground, or, typically, by a combination of both methods.

0839. **Format.** In all cases, **Mission Analysis** is mandatory in the Combat Estimate; in most circumstances, the rest of the estimate will concentrate on the **Enemy** and the Ground element of Environment, **Friendly Forces**, together with **Surprise and Security**. Time (and Space) are checked as required, with additional factors being added if necessary - as will often be the case in Operations Other Than War. A tabulated format for the Combat Estimate is shown in the Tactical Aide Memoire (TAM), and AFM *Battlegroup Tactics*.15

0840. **Conduct.**

a. **Approach.** Whereas the Formal Estimate is normally completed by a command and staff team, the Combat Estimate is usually completed by one individual at formation level and below: the commander. He will invariably complete his mission analysis, but may choose to delegate some parts of the Combat Estimate (such as Enemy and Ground) to another officer. The principles for the completion of the Combat Estimate and the sequence of factors to be evaluated are essentially the same as for the Formal Estimate, but the detailed manner in which the Combat Estimate is carried out will be determined by the local commander taking into account the prevailing tactical conditions, including the time available to make his decision.

b. **Focus on the Enemy.** In completing the Combat Estimate, it is important to concentrate on the Enemy's vulnerabilities and intentions and Own Forces' ability to exploit them. This is consistent with an approach to operations at all levels of command which emphasises that fleeting opportunities to take the initiative should be grasped. Thus, active consideration of the situation in order to seek a COA which surprises and deceives the Enemy, is fundamental in any Combat Estimate.

15. AFM Battlegroup Tactics is due to be published in early 1996.
c. **Role of Intuition.** As explained at Para 0254, intuition has an important role in decision-making. In many circumstances the experienced commander will be able to apply his knowledge of the situation and eye for the ground to compress his combat estimate, making a series of *intuitive judgements* which lead to a quick and appropriate decision. This approach is to be encouraged - and developed on training - in order to effect timely decision-making. The basis of this ability, however, remains a complete understanding of, and practice in, the more analytical approach to the estimate process.

d. **Planning Yardsticks.** Knowledge of planning yardsticks (such as for deployment and movement) and a sure feel for their application in battle will speed the completion of the combat estimate. Examples of planning yardsticks can be found in the SOHB.
The Decision Making and Planning Process

CONTINUOUS BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION (BAE)

PREP STD INFO REGS

REFINE BAE DEFINE THREAT EVALUATION (TE)

INFO TO COMD AS REQUIRED

INTEGRATION OF BAE TE AND CIR TO PRODUCE THREAT INTEGRATION (TI)

DIRECTION - RECEIPT OF HIGHER COMD'S Os OR CHANGE IN SIT

REQ ADDL INFO

PRELIMINARY DECISION TIME ANALYSIS

CONSULTATION

SUPERIOR, FLANK AND SUBORDINATE HQs

CONSIDERATION (COMD & STAFF)

EVALUATION OF FACTORS

STATE PLANNING GUIDANCE, INCL CRIT INFO REQUIREMENTS (CIR)

STAFF ADVICE

FURTHER STAFF CHECKS

DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION

WARGAMING COA

DEVELOP SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX (Annex C)

MISSION ANALYSIS

(1) COMD'S DIRECTION

STATE PLANNING GUIDANCE, INCL CRIT INFO REQUIREMENTS (CIR)

ISSUE WNG O

IDENTIFY KEY LOGISTIC PRIS AND CRITICAL TASKS

INITIATE SVC SP ESTIMATE

ISSUE SVC SP WNG O

COMD'S DECISION

SELECT COA: EXPRESS AS CONCEPT OF OPS:

COMD'S INTENT,

SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE,

INCL MAIN EFFORT

WARGAMING COA

DEVELOP SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX (Annex C)

COMD'S DECISION

SELECT COA: EXPRESS AS CONCEPT OF OPS:

COMD'S INTENT,

SCHEME OF MANOEUVRE,

INCL MAIN EFFORT

CONFIRM SVC SP PRIS AND TASKS

COMPLETE SVC SP ESTIMATE

DEVELOP SVC SP PLAN

CONTINUE STAFF DEVELOPMENT OF SVC SP ESTIMATE

ISSUE SVC SP O

Notes:

(1) This may include a brief consultation with Comd Gp.

(2) Additional Wng Os or Frag Os may be issued throughout the process.

(3) G2/G3 and Arms input. This overlay will contribute to targeting and focusing of RISTA.
## THE ESTIMATE FORMAT

**MISSION**  The task(s) given to you, and the purpose, against which all factors are considered.

### STEP 1 - MISSION ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QUESTION/FACTOR</th>
<th>CONSIDERATION/DEDUCTION</th>
<th>TASKS/CONSTRAINTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| (Why?) 1. a. Intention of Superior Commanders  
(1) Two levels up  
(2) One level up | How must my action directly support my immediate superior, taking into account his Intent, and the intent two levels up? | |
| | | |
| b. My Role in his Plan | | |
| (What?) 2. Tasks.  
a. Specified | What task(s) must I complete to fulfil my Mission? | |
| | | |
| b. Implied | | |
a. Time (incl fixed timings). | What limitations are there on my freedom of action? | |
| b. Space. | By when do I need to decide? | |
| c. Resources. | | |
| 4. Changes to Tactical Situation  
a. Mission no change. | Has the situation changed since orders were received or the estimate completed?  
- Nothing changed.  
- Minor change.  
- Significant change.  
- Major change. | -No change - Mission Confirmed.  
-Same Mission, same Plan.  
-Same Mission, new Plan.  
-Possibly new Mission and new Plan. Refer to Superior Commander, or if not possible, act in support of his Main Effort, taking into account his Intent. |
| b. Changed mission. | | |
| 5. Commander's Direction  
a. Critical Information Requirements (to focus staff effort). | What has to be decided? Who is to check what, if I am not going to complete this estimate totally myself?  
How long will it take to complete the estimate and prepare my | (For example, combat power required and axis of attack)  
Issue Warning Order! |
| b. Planning Guidance (Down). | | |
| c. Clarification (Up). | | |
### 6. Environment, En and Friendly Forces.

**a. Ground**

   (1) **Battlefield Area Evaluation**

   (a) **Terrain**
   (Terrain Overlay)

   i. Gen.

   ii. Vital Ground/Key Terrain.

   iii. Bdry.

   iv. Left.

   v. Centre

   vi. Right

   (b) **Approaches.**
   MC/AA Overlay (incl impact of expected weather)

   i. Own

   (1) Going/Routes

   (2) Obs.

   (3) Dominating Ground

   (4) Distance

   (5) En Perception

   ii. En

   (1) Going/Routes

   (2) Obs.

   (3) Dominating Ground

   (4) Distance

**c. Weather**

   i. STA Implications (incl day/night)

   ii. Air/Avn implications

Col a can be graphic, col b & c must be written (note form)
(a)                                                                 (b)                                                                 (c)

b. En.

(1) **Threat Evaluation.**
(Doctrinal Overlays)

(a) Org
(b) Eqpt
(c) CSS
(d) Tac Doctrine

(2) **Threat Integration.**

(a) Aims and Intentions.
(b) Disposns.
(c) Strs and Weaknesses.
   (inc C of G)
(d) En Courses of Action (COA).  Sit Overlays/Event Overlay

c. **Friendly Forces.**

(1) **Air.**

(2) **Maritime.**

(3) **Flanking, Fwd or Depth Fmns.**

(4) **Own Forces Capability.**

(a) Org and Eqpt.
(b) Disposns and Aval.
(c) Restrictions on Employment.
(d) Strs and Weaknesses.

(5) **CSS.** (pris)

(a) Distance.
(b) Demand.
(c) Duration.

(6) **Relative Strs.**

(a) Cbt Power.
7. Surprise and Sy.
   a. Surprise.
   b. Deception.
   c. OPSEC and Protection.

8. Time and Space.
   a. Fixed timings.
   b. En timings.
   c. Own timings.
   d. Time and Space Constraints.

9. Other Relevant Factors.
   (P Info, HNS, ROE etc).

10. Summary of Possible Tasks.
    (in order of importance)

    | Task         | Tps Required | Remarks |
    |--------------|--------------|---------|
    | (a)          | (b)          | (c)     |
    | Essential Tasks. |            |         |
    | Optional Tasks.  |            |         |
### STEP 3 - CONSIDERATION OF COURSES OF ACTION (COA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. What is common to all COA?</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. <strong>COA I.</strong> Concept incl ME and schematic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Advantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13. <strong>COA II.</strong> Concept incl ME and schematic.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Advantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. <strong>COA III.</strong> Concept incl ME and schematic.</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Advantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <strong>Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15. <strong>Assessment of Courses of Action.</strong> (Can be assessed against Functions in Combat) (Planning tools Wargaming, and the DST should be used here, if time permits.)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### STEP 4 - COMMANDER’S DECISION

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Selection of COA.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. State outline Concept of Ops, (incl Intent (What?), Where? When? and How?) and ME.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ISSUE FULL WARNING ORDER

### STEP 5 - DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17. <strong>Planning Tools.</strong></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Production of Decision Support Template (DST).</td>
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<td>b. Production of Synchronisation Matrix.</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Wargaming.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. <strong>Task Org.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>19. <strong>MISSION.</strong></td>
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<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>20. EXECUTION</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Concept of Ops.</strong> Comd's intent, scheme of manoeuvre (deep, close, rear ops) and ME.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <strong>1 Armd Bde.</strong></td>
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<td>c. <strong>2 Armd Bde.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. <strong>3 Armd Bde.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>e. <strong>Offensive Sp Msn Statement.</strong></td>
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<td>f. <strong>Pris for Cbt Sp.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Arty.</td>
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<td>(2) Engr.</td>
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<td>(3) Air.</td>
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<td>(4) Avn.</td>
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<td>g. <strong>Coord Instrs.</strong> (not exclusive).</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) <strong>Timings.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) <strong>Recce Pris.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) <strong>Deception.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) <strong>OPSEC.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>21. SERVICE SUPPORT.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. <strong>Log Sp.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. <strong>ES.</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. <strong>Med Sp.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>22. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MAIN EFFORT

DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION

1. Main Effort is defined as 'a concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.' It is a concept or 'tool' to provide a focus for the activity which a commander considers crucial to the success of his mission.

ESTABLISHING THE MAIN EFFORT

2. The decision on where to establish the Main Effort will depend on the higher commander's Intent, the commander's mission analysis, the relative strengths and the intelligence available. The commander has six main ways, which may often be combined, to give substance to his MAIN EFFORT:

a. Narrowing of boundaries to concentrate force-economy of effort elsewhere.

b. Grouping extra combat power on the Main Effort.

c. Allocation of priority for Combat Support.

d. Allocation of priority for Combat Service Support.

e. Use of second echelon forces and reserves.

f. Sequencing of deep, close and rear operations.

3. A commander declares his Main Effort so that in a fluid and dynamic situation everyone can understand his Intent, and his subordinates may take quick and independent action to support that Intent, thus focussing effort, and contributing to success. It is therefore mandatory for subordinates to support the commander's Main Effort. It is stated in the commander's concept of operations and should not be shifted except when necessary to the success of a mission.

1. ATP-35(B): The word 'area' is used in a broader sense to include activity, for example the defeat of a particular enemy group.

2. The Main Effort is likely to shift when the answer to Question 4 of Mission Analysis (has the situation changed?) is 'yes'.
4. Once a Main Effort is established at one level of command, Main Efforts should be established at subordinate levels as well as for combat support and combat service support. For example, a battle group not on the Brigade Main Effort will nevertheless have its own Main Effort.

5. A commander can only establish one Main Effort within his framework of Deep, Close and Rear Operations. An Example would be:

"If the commander seeks to bring about a decision through 7 Armd Bde’s part in the attack, then this activity could constitute his Main Effort, and for ease of comprehension only, that formation is annotated as being 'on the Main Effort'. This would be established by a combination of the methods detailed in para 2. Thus the divisional concept of operations could read: '7 Armd Bde - on Main Effort - and 4 Armd Bde are to attack into ObjTIGER in order to defeat the enemy...' For clarity, the attack symbol for the formation on the Main Effort is differentiated graphically using the double-headed arrow."

**SHIFTING MAIN EFFORT**

6. Shifting Main Effort causes potential difficulty. Shift too often and its effect is reduced; even if subordinates can keep track of what is the designated Main Effort, repeated shifting will have the effect of dissipating combat power instead of achieving concentration. On the other hand, when the situation changes, the commander must be prepared to shift his Main Effort in response to the changing fortunes of battle, including reinforcing unexpected success. A commander must avoid the temptation of 'time-tabling' shifts of Main Effort but could indicate within his Concept of Operations the circumstances under which his Main Effort would shift. In operations where ultimate success depends on the completion of a sequence of actions it may be appropriate to designate a Main Effort for the initial phases only.

7. The fastest way to shift Main Effort is by shifting fire or fire potential. The methods a land commander has are, starting with the fastest, the use of artillery, aviation, offensive EW, and air, followed by the manoeuvre of ground forces including the committal of echelons and reserves.

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3. The explicit statement of Main Effort may be unnecessary or inappropriate at the lowest tactical level but the concept must be universally understood.
8. The commander can only establish one Main Effort at any time to fulfil his intent. It is the focus for planning and is reflected in the priority for allocation of resources. In certain situations, however, combat support and CSS priorities may not necessarily reflect directly the commander’s current Main Effort. For example, whereas a divisional commander’s Main Effort - and his priority for artillery, aviation and air support - might involve an attack by a brigade to strike of an enemy’s open flank, the Main Effort of his divisional engineers commander might lie in a related blocking operation in order to fix the enemy for the attack. The logistic commanders Main Effort meanwhile, could lie in another activity. Thus, at brigade level, the Main Effort may involve seizing an objective whilst the CSS Main Effort could be to replenish a battle group that has just completed a previous action.

APPLICATION

9. The application of Main Effort at the tactical level for offensive, defensive and delaying operations is described in more detail at Chapter 3 to AFM Formation Tactics.

SUMMARY

10. The concept of Main Effort is consistent with British Doctrine, including the Principles of War Maintenance of the Aim, Concentration of Force/Economy of Effort and Flexibility, and the principles of Mission Command. It is also part of NATO Doctrine. The use of the concept Main Effort must therefore be understood and applied in an appropriate way at all levels of command, not least to ensure coherence and consistency throughout operations. For once the commander has established his Main Effort in support of that crucial activity which is essential to the success of his mission, and has ensured that it is known by his subordinates, it is mandatory that they in turn do their utmost to support that Main Effort. It allows subordinates to take decisions at the lowest possible level and without consultation, particularly when the situation changes, while providing a focus for their efforts, and so provides Unity of Effort across a force.
CONCEPT OF OPS:
Div Comd's intent is for fast attack to defeat en in obj BAILEY, secure PL GIN and so set conditions for ARRC attack before en res fms can react decisively.
On completion of prelim op by 4x to secure PL SODA, 7x and 20x attack to seize obj BAILEY in close co-ordination with div deep ops to isolate and attack en in objs GRANT, BAILEY and STEWART and protect open flanks
Initial ME 4x to secure obj GRANT.

TIME (Estimated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>-12</th>
<th>-10</th>
<th>-8</th>
<th>-6</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>+2</th>
<th>+4</th>
<th>+6</th>
<th>+8</th>
<th>+10</th>
<th>+12</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENEMY ACTION</td>
<td>Deep Ops</td>
<td>Fire in Zone</td>
<td>Defend Main. Plan</td>
<td>CB Fire</td>
<td>Fight in Sy Zone</td>
<td>Defend Main. Plan</td>
<td>CB Fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWN DECISION PTD</td>
<td>PRELIM OP</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEEP OPS</td>
<td>Air and Arty</td>
<td>Watch Flanks</td>
<td>Air and Arty</td>
<td>Air and Arty</td>
<td>Air and Arty</td>
<td>Attack GRANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 BDE OPS</td>
<td>Ass. Area APPLE</td>
<td>Cross LD</td>
<td>Secure Obj GRANT</td>
<td>70 + 20 Bdes</td>
<td>Launch Avn Attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 BDE OPS</td>
<td>Ass. Area APPLE</td>
<td>Move on 1 + 2</td>
<td>Cross LD</td>
<td>Secure Obj BAILEY</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 BDE OPS</td>
<td>Ass. Area APPLE</td>
<td>Move on 3 + 4</td>
<td>Cross LD</td>
<td>Secure Obj BAILEY</td>
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<tr>
<td>REAR OPS</td>
<td>Ass. Area APPLE</td>
<td>Art. Attack</td>
<td>Bde Prep Attack</td>
<td>Take on sy of GRANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIRE SP</td>
<td>Prep Fwd Post + Ammo</td>
<td>Art. Attack GRANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Bdes</td>
<td>Sp &amp; Attack</td>
<td>Attack fire RAG SEAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR DEFENCE</td>
<td>Protect Ass. Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Bdes</td>
<td>Move with Bde</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSS</td>
<td>Route Sy</td>
<td>Clear Routes 1 - 4</td>
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<td>7 + 20 Bdes</td>
<td>Maint on ARRC MSR Passage of Lines</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMD</td>
<td>FWD HQ</td>
<td>MAN to GRANT</td>
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<td>MAIN to FWD HQ</td>
<td>MAN to MAIN HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>REMARKS</td>
<td>Sp to ARRC op</td>
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CHAPTER 9
DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS

The purpose of Chapter 9 is to describe the principles for the composition of directives and orders and their dissemination, relating these to the principles of Mission Command described in Chapter 2, and the decision-making process described in Chapters 3 and 8.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

REQUIREMENT

0901. The final stage in the command process is direction leading to execution. Directives and orders provide the principal means by which the intentions of a commander are conveyed to his subordinates and so form a critical link in the chain of command. Directives and orders are thus indispensable tools of command, without which no organised armed force can function effectively.

0902. The function of directives and orders must always be considered within the context of the exercise of command. Directives and orders are used in the command of military operations. They also serve a wide variety of other purposes including the initiation or direction of training and of logistic preparations. They must be acted on expeditiously. The production and subsequent dissemination of directives and orders should not be allowed to become an end in itself. The test of any directive or order is whether the commander (or the staff on behalf of a commander) has translated his intentions into a form which can be easily understood, and acted on, by subordinates or members of his staff. This reinforces the need for common doctrine and training.
TERMINOLOGY

0903. **Directives, Orders and Plans.** The terms directive, order and plan may appear to be close in meaning but have distinct definitions in military use:

a. A **directive** is defined as either 'a military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered', or 'any communication which initiates or governs action, conduct, or procedure'. A directive is employed at the higher levels of command to initiate activity and to give both general and specific guidance to subordinate commanders. It may include missions to subordinates but need not necessarily do so.

b. An **order** is defined as 'a communication, written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate'. Orders are used in all spheres of military activity and at all levels of command. They include sufficiently detailed direction to subordinates (in the form of missions and/or tasks) so that they can achieve specific activities, such as the deployment and employment of troops.1

c. A **plan** is usually used instead of 'orders' during the early preparations for operations. Plans carry no executive authority in isolation. They are often developed and issued for contingency planning purposes only.

0904. **Instructions.** An **instruction** is used to regulate military activity. Standing Instructions are issued typically to set out organisational responsibilities and to govern routine administrative procedures and actions.2 Periodic instructions cater for any specific actions required of a non-routine nature. In general, formal instructions carry authority equivalent to that of directives or orders. While instructions may complement directives or orders, they are not discussed further in this publication.

APPLICATION

0905. The considerations which affect the choice whether to use a directive or an order depend to a large extent on the level of command and the stage of a particular campaign, major operation, battle or engagement. In general,

---

1. For example, orders governing the day-to-day life of a unit or formation are published at frequent intervals in **routine orders**. This chapter, however, concentrates on **operational directives** and orders.

2. Such as Army General and Administrative Instructions (AGAIs) and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs).
Directives are used at the military strategic and operational levels and may apply for a longer duration than orders. A commander may also choose to issue a directive in preference to orders when he wishes to devolve greater latitude in execution to his subordinates. Orders can be used at all levels of command.

0906. **Approach.** The composition of directives and orders demands the adherence to certain rules to aid comprehension and to promote uniformity of procedure. However, within these constraints it is important that commanders are free to bring their plans to life - the production of directives and orders should be regarded as a creative act. As the circumstances of peace, conflict other than war and war evolve, an originality and a freshness in approach, tempered by practical constraints, is required. **Further, as no situation demanding military action is likely to repeat itself, a template-solution to the content of directives and orders for such action is unlikely to be successful, and is incompatible with the principles of Mission Command.** Where the execution of standard drills is required in orders, the drills should be referred to as such for ease of understanding.

0907. **The Imperative of Timeliness.** Commanders and staffs must be aware of the appropriate decision point to allow the timely preparation and dissemination of directives and orders. The time required for dissemination is easily underestimated. Late directives or orders risk becoming inappropriate before they can be carried out; ultimately their execution may prove impossible. A number of means for dissemination may be required in order to guarantee timeliness. However, there are times when orders will be issued at very short notice, for which circumstance commanders and staffs should be prepared in training.

0908. **Composition.** Directives and orders should be:

- **Concise.** Directives and orders should be concise, aiming to convey no more than is necessary for a subordinate to act and to achieve his mission. Thus they should contain nothing that a subordinate can and should arrange for himself. A commander should not attempt to prescribe to a subordinate at a distance anything that he, with a fuller knowledge of the local conditions, should be better able to decide on the spot. Otherwise he runs the risk of cramping his subordinate's initiative. Although the amount of detail required in directives or orders will depend on the situation, those that are too detailed will invariably take longer to produce, disseminate and assimilate; the essential sense may become obscured.
b. **Clear.** There should be no scope for ambiguity in the interpretation of directives and orders. Above all, the intentions of the commander must be quite clear. On operations where only national formations are involved, directives and orders should be written in operational staff duties format.\(^3\) In multinational operations, however, consideration should be given to using non operational (and thus non-abbreviated) staff duties. Obscure national or single-service military vernacular is to be avoided. **In all cases, clarity must take precedence over conciseness and slavish adherence to convention.\(^4\)**

c. **Accurate.** Care must be taken to validate all information such as timings, grid references and other critical details such as ROE. Therefore, if time permits, all written directives and orders should be double-checked before dissemination.

**DIRECTIVES**

**PURPOSE**

0909. **Link to Campaign Planning.** The formulation and dissemination of operational directives is an essential feature of war and campaign planning. At the military strategic and operational levels of war, directives provide the principal means by which higher commanders pass on their intentions for the conduct of the campaign to subordinates, including maritime, land, air, SF and Rear Area component commanders. Subordinate commanders then base their own planning on such directives. It must be recognised that the operational environment - on which planning assumptions were based - may change significantly during a campaign. For example, after General MacArthur's successful landings at Inchon in Korea in 1951 and subsequent swift advance into Northern Korea, the entry of the Chinese Red Army led to a significant change in the operational situation and caused a two year stalemate before the cessation of hostilities. Further directives may have to be developed for the continuation and conclusion of the campaign on favourable terms. This also applies to logistic planning. Although a Sustainability Statement will have been issued to define the level of sustainability to be achieved during the campaign, the statement will be regularly reviewed in the light of current and future operations.

\(^3\) Operational staff duties are set out in JSP 101.

\(^4\) Staff Duties in the Field's (1962) direction still holds: 'The criteria to be applied to the use of all points of minor staff duties are 'Do they make the document more intelligible? Do they save time?' If so their use is justified. Pedantic insistence on functionless trivialities merely create difficulties where none really exist.'
0910. **Content.** The detailed content of directives will vary according to the prevailing circumstances. In the case of campaign directives, for example, direction on the conduct of the campaign is likely to evolve during the planning and preparation stages and therefore more than one directive may be required (for example, an Initiating Directive may be followed by a more detailed Campaign Plan). In accordance with Mission Command, directives should contain sufficient information (including the allocation of resources) and guidance to allow subordinates to plan effectively, whilst only specifying the minimum of control and coordination measures necessary to ensure unity of purpose and effort across a force. Only in this way can the activities of subordinate commanders be focused, without undue constraints on their initiative. As a general rule, directives should include as a minimum:

a. The Situation, including the higher commander's intent and any planning assumptions.

b. The Mission.

c. The Commander's Intent and his Concept of Operations.

d. The allocation of resources to subordinates.

e. Any limitations on subordinates' freedom of action, including ROE and command and control arrangements.

If missions to subordinates can be stated, they should be included in a directive. Whilst this may not be possible at the planning and deployment stage of a campaign or major operation, the earliest guidance on probable missions (or follow-on missions once operations are underway) is essential to logistic planning and preparations.

**TYPES AND USE**

0911. Table 9.1 lists the main types of directive normally associated with the operational level of command. Further details of operational level directives are given in ADP Volume 1. However, the issue of directives is not restricted to the operational level. Higher tactical commanders may also issue directives as a prelude to operation orders. This is particularly applicable when a commander sets out planning options to his subordinates or wishes

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5. See ADP Vol 1, Chapter 4, Campaigning.
to provide a common basis for further planning at a number of levels. Both operational and tactical level commanders may issue associated training and logistic directives in peace, in periods of tension and crisis, prior to deployment and whilst on operations.

### Table 9.1 - Directives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directive</th>
<th>Typical Initiator</th>
<th>Typical Restraint</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Strategic Directive**    | The Military Strategic Authority - for most UK operations this would be the Chief of Defence Staff, who, in conjunction with the appointed Joint Commander (Jt Comd), together exercise the military strategic function | The Operational Commander - who may become the in theatre Joint Force Commander (JFC). | a. Contains military strategic goals, the desired end-state of the campaign, allocates forces and should include any political constraints or resource limitations.  
  b. The Strategic Directive will be normally supplemented by a Sustainability Statement (see Annex B to Chapter 1 of AFM Vol 1 Part 6, CSS). |
  b. Special Forces and Higher Tactical Commanders. | a. Sets the scene and framework for planning, states the main effort, allocates resources, indicates freedoms and constraints and may give guidance on special training, likely C2 arrangements (including states of command) and ORBAT.  
  b. It should also contain a Statement of Commander's Intent for the forthcoming campaign if not previously issued. |
| **Campaign Directive**     | The Operational Commander.                                                      | As for the Initiating Campaign Directive.                                         | Contains a confirmed Statement of Intent and a Concept of Joint Operations, assigns missions or broad options to subordinates.                                                                                       |
| **Planning Directives**    | Operational and Tactical Commanders                                             | Subordinate Formation and Unit Commanders; could also include Functional Commanders. | Operational or tactical planning directives can be used by a commander to set out how he sees the forthcoming major operation or battle being fought. It may provide greater detail, including planning assumptions, than a concept of operations found in a specific Campaign Directive or Operation Order. |
| **Training and Logistic Directives** | Operational and Tactical Commanders                                             | As for planning directives                                                        | A commander may give direction on training or logistics in separate documents or combine it into a planning directive. Training and logistic requirements in a theatre of operations may require refinement once the commander's intent and concept of operations are confirmed. |

**FORMAT AND FORMULATION**

0912. **Format.** The nature and variety of directives is such that their format is not standardised throughout NATO. The content and layout of campaign
directives, for example, will vary according to theatre, campaign objectives and force structure. One possible example of an outline format of a campaign directive is at Annex A. The production of directives requires both originality and creativity in content and often in format.

0913. **Formulation.** The commander and his staff normally share the task of formulating directives. Whereas much of the detailed drafting of directives can be delegated - particularly at the higher levels of command - the operational commander himself should have a close hand in the formulation of key elements such as *Statements of Commander's Intent* and *Concepts of Joint Operations*. As FM Slim advised ‘...I have had published under my name a good many operational orders and a good many directives... but there is one paragraph in the order that I have always written myself... the intention paragraph’.

ORDERS

PURPOSE

0914. **Orders** are the formal and primary means by which a commander communicates his intentions to, and imposes his will on, his subordinates. They provide a unified basis for action. Once issued, orders are never to be the basis of discussion. However, if a subordinate is unclear as to his superior's intentions, clarification may be necessary. In the confusion, stress and uncertainties of war, only orders give certainty in purpose and resolve to subordinates on the battlefield. In this way, they provide a firm reference point and foundation for effective action. Thus orders are crucial to the exercise of command. Once a decision has been made, the production and subsequent dissemination of orders, of whatever type, must take top priority in the functioning of a command system.

0915. **Link Between Operation Plans and Orders.** Different types of orders (including warning orders) may refer to Operation Plans that are likely to be adopted. In all cases, a clear distinction between a plan issued for information and an order which is issued for execution needs to be maintained. An Operation Plan may be put into effect at a described time, or following receipt of a specific order or codeword which converts the plan into an Operation Order. In most cases, a brief 'Adopt (or execute) Plan CHARLIE with immediate effect' will suffice.

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6. AJP-1, Para 0411.

7. Lecture to the Staff College, 2 Nov 67.

8. For example, OPLAN and FRAGPLAN.
0916. **Orders.** Orders are of two main types: **Operation Orders** and **Administrative/Service Support Orders.** Both types may be preceded by **Warning Orders.** **Fragmentary Orders** usually follow other orders, but may precede them in particular circumstances when there is insufficient time to issue a full operation order. **Movement Orders** can be issued as annexes to either Operation or Service Support Orders, or may be issued as separate documents in their own right. **Overlay Orders** are a form of order in which graphics replace text as far as possible. To ease comprehension, graphical and tabular methods of presentation are used in most types of order. Table 9.2 lists the principal features of orders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Warning Orders (Wng Os)**         | To enable subordinate commanders to initiate the preparation for a new operation. | Format is not fixed. See SOHB for an example, including the incorporation of graphical techniques. | a. The amount of detail depends on the time and communication means available and the information required to initiate essential action.  
   b. The wording of a Wng O must show clearly those parts which are executive, and other parts which constitute only a warning, such as probable tasks. |
| **Operation Orders (Op Os)**        | To give subordinate commanders the essential information and direction required to plan and execute an operation. | **Standard format:**  
  1. SITUATION.  
  2. MISSION.  
  3. EXECUTION.  
  4. SERVICE SUPPORT.  
  5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.  
   a. Should only include such detail required for subordinate commanders to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination.  
   b. May be written, oral or graphical, or a combination of these forms.  
   c. Further details are at Annex B.  
   d. A variation of an Op O is a movement order, which may either be an annex of an Op O or a stand-alone document. | |
| **Administrative or Service Support Orders (Svc Sp Os)** | May often supplement an Op O by giving the commander’s concept for CSS operations, in which case it:  
   - Informs subordinate formations/units of the CSS concept.  
   - Allots missions to CSS units. | **Standard format:**  
  1. SITUATION.  
  2. MISSION.  
  3. GENERAL.  
  4. MATERIEL & SERVICES.  
  5. MEDICAL.  
  6. PERSONNEL  
  7. CIVIL-MILITARY  
  8. MISCELLANEOUS.  
  9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.  
   a. A Svc Sp O may be issued separately from, but in conjunction with, an Op O; it then takes the place of the Service Support Annex of the Op O. In these circumstances a separate Svc Sp O is referred to under the heading of SERVICE SUPPORT of the Op O.  
   b. When it is known that a Svc Sp O will not be published at the same time as Op O, the Op O (or Wng O) should contain any vital CSS matters that subordinate commanders need to know immediately.  
   c. A Svc Sp O will normally be preceded by a Svc Sp Wng O and amended by a Svc Sp Frag O. | |
| **Overlay Orders**                  | See Op O.                                                               | See SOHB.                                                    | Used as an alternative to an Op O at the tactical level - can be adapted for use in other types of order. |

**Table 9.2 - Orders**
0917. Operation Orders should be composed to enable subordinates to understand the situation, their commander’s mission and intentions, and their own mission. This provides unity of effort and gives cohesion to a force. As Mission Command stresses that superior commanders only state what is required of subordinates, rather than how to achieve it, the temptation to give too much direction and to cater for every eventuality and hence plan too far ahead, must be strenuously resisted. Operation Orders must include a summary of the prevailing situation from the perspective of the initiating level of command and the following:

a. The **superior commander’s intent**.

b. The commander’s own **mission**.

c. His concept of operations, which includes his **intent**, **scheme of manoeuvre** and **main effort**.

d. A **mission statement** to each subordinate which includes a **task** and its **purpose**. Where a number of tasks are required, they should be linked by a unifying purpose (see Annex B).

e. The **allocation of sufficient resources** to subordinates to enable them to fulfil their missions.

f. Details of essential command, control and coordination measures.

0918. Mission Command type orders stress not merely the actions required of a subordinate but also an understanding of their context and purpose, without unduly restricting his freedom to achieve his mission.\(^9\) This provides a framework of direction within which subordinate commanders have the appropriate freedom to act. Whilst clear direction is essential to the success of the mission, a careful balance must be struck between such direction and over-control. Control measures will invariably need to be applied in order to

\(^9\) In contrast, orders within a centralized command system stress detail of grouping and coordination at the expense of information of the ‘bigger picture’. For example, Staff Duties in the Field (1962) stressed, presumably for reasons of OPSEC, that ‘the higher commander’s intentions should not be given unless it is essential to the understanding of orders. Only information about higher and flanking formations which directly affects the action of subordinate commanders should be given.’ (Para 619). This restrictive view is incompatible with Mission Command.
maintain unity of effort and achieve concentration of force, or to prevent possible fratricide. However they must be kept to a minimum so as not to constrain unnecessarily the freedom of action of subordinates.

0919. Commanders should endeavour to promote a state of mind which encourages control by exception. A subordinate who takes action first within his commander’s intent and reports later will often achieve far more than one who delays action to confirm to his superior that he knows what to do.

**FURTHER GUIDANCE**

0920. Detailed advice on the formulation of orders and associated detailed annexes is given in the SOHB. Whilst firmly based on STANAG 2014, the SOHB gives the recommended practice for the British Army, which may differ in minor detail from the STANAG to take recent doctrinal developments into account. Detailed guidance on the content of a tactical level Operation Order, including direction on the drafting of concepts of operations and missions, is given at Annex B, which should be followed in the interests of commonality across the Army. For Operations Other Than War, some adaptation of this format may be required.

**DISSEMINATION OF DIRECTIVES AND ORDERS**

**FACTORS**

0921. *Time Available.* The fundamental factor affecting the dissemination of both directives and orders is the time available between the commander’s *decision* (and planning) and subordinate’s *action*. Before operations commence, there is usually sufficient time to conduct face-to-face oral orders and briefings. During fast-moving operations, radio or telephone orders are more appropriate.

0922. *Content.* The decision to deliver the content of directives and orders verbally (such as in the case of oral orders), or to send them in written, graphical or electronic form, or a combination of these methods, is important. Where critical aspects of directives and orders are conceptual, such as commander’s intent, they are often best expressed by use of the spoken word amplified, where appropriate, by the written word and graphics. The conceptual elements will often require close understanding and therefore the
undivided attention of the recipients. Some factual information, such as ROE or task organizations, for example, will be needed to support this understanding.

0923. **Multiple Means of Communication and Redundancy.** Orders can be transmitted by multiple means of communication to provide redundancy in dissemination. Verbal orders (either face-to-face or at a distance) can be preceded or followed by other types of order. Written orders sent by facsimile, for example, can be duplicated in the form of electronic mail; the written part of an operation order can be sent by one or more methods whilst some types of graphics may be delivered by courier or liaison officer. To avoid possible confusion in the stress of operations, duplicate orders should be clearly annotated as such.

0924. **Need for Confirmation.** Directives and orders should be acknowledged on receipt. The need for confirmation - which implies understanding of orders - will depend on the situation. Following the issue of orders before a major operation, mutual understanding can be confirmed through subsequent Back-Briefs from subordinates to commanders. In battle, there is usually no requirement for confirmatory, non-verbal, methods of dissemination at unit level. At formation level, however, confirmatory orders are increasingly required. In protracted operations, when fatigue begins to impair mental performance and comprehension of verbal orders, confirmatory written orders may be required at all but the lowest tactical level.

0925. **Degree of Mutual Understanding.** The degree of mutual understanding may also determine the degree of detail required and hence the size of documents. Whilst the requirement for detail will depend primarily on the situation, it will also rest on levels of mutual understanding of doctrine and competence, based on force composition and training standards.

0926. **Security.** The need to maintain operations security (OPSEC) may also act as a limiting factor which affects the dissemination of directives and orders. The risk involved will rest on the nature of the enemy threat, proximity to the battle and the time-span affected by the directives and orders concerned. Thus security considerations may also influence the content of directives and orders. The advantages, in OPSEC terms, of reducing information on Friendly Forces must be balanced against the disadvantages of reducing the framework of understanding.

**MEANS OF DISSEMINATION**

0927. **Oral Orders.** The manner in which oral orders are given will reflect a commander's personal style. A formal Orders Group will require a degree
of stage-management. In most cases, the audience should be as wide as possible, commensurate with space and security. Attendance will normally include manoeuvre and functional commanders and principal staff officers, together with liaison officers.

0928. **Use of Telecommunications.** The need to impart intentions makes it desirable to give oral orders before an operation starts, but as a corollary, it should negate the need for subsequent orders groups involving further extensive orders. Subordinates who are empowered to act purposefully within their commander’s intent should require the minimum of further direction as the operation unfolds. In these circumstances, short verbal orders should suffice. If they are to be timely, it will be appropriate to transmit them by spoken word. If personal contact is not possible, other ‘voice’ means (including combat net radio and trunk), are to be preferred.

0929. **Planning Yardsticks.** Planning yardsticks for the dissemination of orders by non-verbal means (including facsimile and electronic mail) should be produced locally, as the time required will depend largely on the equipment available. In practice, the time taken to complete and transmit orders will vary considerably.

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10. In future, such data may be included in the SOHB once standardized CIS is issued to the Field Army.
OUTLINE FORMAT OF A CAMPAIGN DIRECTIVE/PLAN

1. **Situation.**

   a. **Military Strategic Guidance.**

      (1) Grand strategic situation (brief political survey) and related military strategic alliance/coalition Goals.

      (2) The desired End-State (that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms).

      (3) Political, financial and legal limitations on the use of force, including UN resolutions, if appropriate.

      (4) Definition of Theatre/Area of Operations.

   b. **Enemy Forces.**

      (1) Assessed military strategic intent.

      (2) Deployment and current posture of air, land and sea forces.

      (3) Assessed operational intent (including outline of the enemy commander's likely [future] campaign plan, related to Friendly Forces’ Centre of Gravity).

   c. **Friendly Forces.**

      (1) Deployment and current posture of In-Theatre forces.

      (2) Availability (by type) of assigned alliance/coalition air, land and sea forces planned for committal.

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1. This should be given by the competent Military Strategic Authority; for most UK joint operations this would be the Chief of Defence Staff in conjunction with the appointed Joint Commander, who together exercise the military strategic function. In NATO, the appropriate Allied command authority is normally a Major NATO Commander (MNC) or a Major Subordinate Commander (MSC). (AJP-1, Para 0310.)
(3) Details of any joint or multinational operations whose outcome may affect the Theatre of Operations and campaign.

d. **Assumptions.**

(1) Alliance/coalition political direction and will.

(2) Enemy intentions and likely reaction to Friendly Forces' committal.

(3) Likely reaction of any third parties.

(4) Deployment and reinforcement of Friendly Forces.

2. **Mission.** If a specific mission is not given to the operational level Joint Force Commander, it should by derived as a result of Mission Analysis. It should include the military dimension of the desired End-State of the Campaign.

3. **Execution.**

a. **Statement of Joint Commander's Intent.** (The Statement of Intent could have been given previously in an Initiating Directive, but it must in all cases by re-stated here, to take account of any changes of intent in response to an evolving situation). The Statement of Intent should include the following elements:

(1) **Identification of the Enemy's Centre of Gravity** (at both the Military Strategic and Operational levels, if different) in relation to the Desired End-State of the Campaign.

(2) Assessed keys to unlock the Enemy's Centre of Gravity, expressed as a number of **Decisive Points** on a Line(s) of Operation.³

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2. In alliance or coalition operations, the equivalent of the Joint Force Commander is termed the Commander of an Allied Joint Force (COMAJF), AJP-1, Para 0206.

3. In Operations Other Than War, the term Lines of Operations could be replaced by a number of related 'Lines of Activity', such as Political, Economic and Military, as explained in Chapter 7.
b. **Concept of Joint Operations.** The Concept of Joint Operations expresses how the Statement of Intent is to be realised, usually in terms of a number of over-lapping campaign phases. The description of the phases should concentrate on what effect they are designed to have on the enemy in pursuit of the overall Campaign Plan, rather than detailing over-specific schemes of manoeuvre which should remain the province of Component Commanders.

c. **Mission/Planning Guidance to the Maritime Component Commander.**

d. **Mission/Planning Guidance to the Land Component Commander.**

e. **Mission/Planning Guidance to the Air Component Commander.**

f. **Mission/Planning Guidance to other Subordinate Commanders.**

These can include:

(1) Those with specific responsibilities and right of access to the Joint Operational Commander, such as the Special Forces Commander, Chief Political Advisor, PSYOPS Co-ordinator and Commander External Relations (if this appointment is applicable for the commander responsible for relations with the media and relations with the host nation).

(2) Subordinate Joint (or Multinational) Commanders with specific delegated geographical areas of responsibility within a Theatre of Joint Operations, such as a Rear Operations or Force Logistics Commander.

g. **Coordinating Instructions.** Coordinating Instructions can be developed using the Functions in Combat. They will also include:

(1) Key planning dates/timings for the Campaign, normally expressed in terms of:

(a) **G-Day,** the day on which an order (normally national) is given to deploy a unit.

(b) **D-Day,** the day on which an operation commences or is due to commence. This may be the commencement of hostilities or any other operation.
(2) ROE and any anti-fratricide measures (particularly air-surface).

(3) Media/public relations plan/measures.

4. **Service Support/Logistics.** The content of this paragraph will normally be based on the advice of the principal logistics commander to, or the staff of, the Joint Force Commander (or equivalent). It will vary in format and content in each case - the following list is a rough guide only:

   a. Assumptions.
   b. Sustainability Statement.
   c. Deployment: sea and air point(s) of embarkation and disembarkation.
   d. Logistic ORBAT.
   e. Construction and operation of logistic 'pipelines'.
   f. Personnel, supply, movement, maintenance and medical plan.
   g. Host nation support plan and foreign military assistance.
   h. Plans for reinforcement and reconstitution.
   i. PW and detainee plan.
   j. Humanitarian relief plan, including evacuees and refugees.
   k. Joint responsibilities.
   l. Multinational responsibilities.
   m. Logistic CIS.

5. **Command and Signal.** This paragraph should include, at a minimum, details of joint-multinational:

   a. Command structure and HQ.
   b. CIS.

**ANNEXES:** As required, but should include summaries of Enemy and Friendly Forces' capabilities and intentions; command structures and the like.
**GENERAL**

1. An Operation Order should include only such detail as is necessary for the commanders of subordinate formations/units to act purposefully, to issue their own orders and to ensure coordination. Mission Command-oriented orders concentrate on imparting an understanding of the context of the operation and what needs to be done, rather than how it is to be achieved in detail.

2. Operation Orders may be written, oral or graphical (using an overlay), or a combination of these forms. The standard STANAG five paragraph format (shown in the box), applies to all types of Operation Orders and, modified as appropriate, to Operation Plans and Directives. In oral orders, particularly, Paragraphs 1-5 can be prefaced by 'Preliminaries' which typically includes a description of the Ground.

3. **Minor Staff Duties.** Orders Paragraph 1 should always contain Sub-Paragraphs a., b., and c. There is no restriction as to the number of sub-paragraphs in Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, which are laid out to suit the requirements of the operation at hand. Details of the minor staff duties and conventions for the completion of an Operation Order are contained in the

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**STANDARD ORDERS FORMAT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preliminaries, such as Ground.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Organization (typically an annex).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SITUATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Enemy Forces.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Friendly Forces (including Air).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Attachments &amp; Detachments.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MISSION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXECUTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Concept of Operations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Missions/ Tasks.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Coordinating Instructions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SERVICE SUPPORT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COMMAND AND SIGNAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Staff Officer's Hand Book (SOHB). Details of Fragmentary Orders (Frag Os) are contained in the SOHB.

**SITUATION**

4. The Situation Paragraph gives subordinate commanders a common understanding of the current and projected situation and thus provides the operational context - including the higher commanders' intent - of the orders that follow in Orders Paragraphs 2-5. Before an operation commences, the commander determines the necessary level of detail required, taking into account the principles for dissemination of orders. Once operations are underway, Paragraph 1 of subsequent orders may be restricted to 'Changes To' the original Operation Order. Annexes may be used to supplement the information given in Sub-Paragraphs 1a, 1b and 1c. Alternatively, much of the detail of Sub-Paragraph 1a can be contained in an INTSUM.

5. **Enemy Forces.** The Enemy Forces sub-paragraph establishes a common insight into the enemy's organization, capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. The detail that is included in this sub-paragraph should draw heavily on the deductions derived from the consideration of the enemy and environment (ground and weather) in the estimate process. The assessment of the enemy's intentions should look outside the formation or unit's area of operations and should include a prediction of his future actions and their possible effect on own operations. In Operations Other Than War, 'enemy forces' may embrace a number of belligerent factions, some of which cannot be defined with precision.

6. **Friendly Forces.** The primary purpose of the Friendly Forces sub-paragraph is to set the context for the commander's mission. At the least, this should include the intent of the commander two levels up in order to establish the concept within which the immediate superior commander is operating. The mission and concept of operations (including the Intent and Main Effort) of the commander's immediate superior should then be given in the detail necessary to explain the purpose and underlying intention of the commander's mission, expressed in the terms of the effect he is expected to achieve on the enemy. This allows the commander's subordinates to think and understand

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1. The authority in NATO is STANAG 2014.

2. Described at Para 0920-0925.
two levels up. The path for the extraction of orders is shown at Figure 9B.1. In addition, the current dispositions and intended actions of neighbouring formations, including those to the front and in depth, which may impinge on subordinates' areas of interest and operations, should be described. The general air situation (for example: supremacy, superiority, local parity, or inferiority) must be included, together with an outline of maritime support and the Friendly air campaign, if appropriate. Details of air support to land operations (in terms of sorties) are included under ‘Air’ in Co-ordinating Instructions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CORPS</th>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>BRIGADE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. SITUATION</td>
<td>1. SITUATION</td>
<td>1. SITUATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. ENEMY</td>
<td>a. ENEMY</td>
<td>a. ENEMY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. FRIENDLY FORCES</td>
<td>b. FRIENDLY FORCES</td>
<td>b. FRIENDLY FORCES</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. MISSION</td>
<td>2. MISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. EXECUTION</td>
<td>3. EXECUTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. CONCEPT OF OPS</td>
<td>a. CONCEPT OF OPS</td>
<td>a. CONCEPT OF OPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. MSNS/TASKS</td>
<td>b. MSNS/TASKS</td>
<td>b. MSNS/TASKS</td>
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</table>

Figure 9B.1 - The Extraction of Orders

7. **Attachments and Detachments.** Where a Task Organization is not included separately, which is the norm, the Attachments and Detachments sub-paragraph is used to describe the composition and state of command of the commander’s formation or unit. In joint and multinational operations it may be necessary to describe capabilities which are not normally integral to the formation or unit. CSS dependency is normally considered in the Service Support paragraph or in a separate Service Support Order.

8. **Commander’s Evaluation.** Under STANAG 2014, the Situation paragraph can include an optional Sub-Paragraph 1d giving the commander’s evaluation of the situation. This is not normally required as a commander would usually choose to impart his evaluation verbally.

**MISSION**

9. The mission stated by the commander in his orders is that given to him from his superior. Having subjected his mission to analysis, he may have
derived further, implied tasks, in addition to those specified in the mission. Although implied tasks are not listed in Paragraph 2 of an Operation Order, they should become apparent in subordinates' mission statements or in other parts of the Operation Order.

10. In certain circumstances, however, and these are normally only applicable at formation level upwards, a commander may derive his own mission in the interests of clarity and understanding. This situation may apply when the commander has not received a clear and succinct mission from his superior, or when his mission analysis reveals a critical task which is crucial to the success of his mission, and which, in his judgement, must be emphasised. In these cases, the commander may derive his own mission. Wherever possible, however, this mission should be confirmed with his superior before being used as a basis of orders to subordinates.

EXECUTION

11. The Execution paragraph specifies the conduct of a formation or unit's operations in sufficient detail to allow subordinates to act within a framework of Mission Command. The degree of detail required will depend on the situation and will reflect the commander's judgement of a number of factors including the complexity of the operation, his subordinates' understanding and the state of training, morale and fatigue within his command. Whilst the format of this paragraph can be modified to suit particular requirements, the Concept of Operations (Orders Sub-Paragraph 3a), which is related directly to the commander's Decision made on conclusion of the estimate process, and Missions/Tasks to subordinates (Orders Sub-Paragraph 3b onwards) are mandatory. Coordinating Instructions are listed in the last Sub-Paragraph in Paragraph 3. The key to subordinates understanding an operation order is the clarity of the Concept of Operations and their Missions.

12. Concept of Operations. Under Mission Command, the Concept of Operations represents the most important element of orders after the Mission. In it, the commander expresses his vision of purpose (why), his method (how he intends to conduct his selected course of action in order to accomplish his mission) and whom in general terms he assigns to perform it. To do this successfully, the commander must strike a careful balance between planning too far ahead in detail and providing subordinates with a vision of how the operation should develop. Specifically, within the Concept of Operations, the commander must:
a. State the **formation/unit** concerned and his Intent (what overall effect he intends to achieve), which should normally be focused on the enemy.³

b. Include a succinct summary of his scheme of manoeuvre: *what, where, when* and *how* his command will achieve its purpose in relation to the enemy, in order that subordinates understand *what role* they have to play in the operation and *what effect* they are to achieve.

c. State his **Main Effort** (see Annex B to Chapter 8).

In addition, the commander may include **key timings** (for example, ‘On Orders’ or references to H-Hr), the intended **area of operations**, priorities for fire and other combat support⁴, and an outline of any **supporting plans** he deems critical to his Concept of Operations (such as reserve options or deception). A concept of operations for defensive operations at divisional level might be:

**Comd's Intent is that 3 (UK) Div defeats leading en regts using full depth of Div area and preventing any pen of Line EAGLE, thereby causing en to conc on Corps Obj PANTHER for destruction by 4 (US) AD. Div will fight battle initially with deep ops between Lines JAY and OWL to channel en towards OWL. Div holds hard shoulder on left with 1 Mech Bde to deny en access to BLOCKLEY HILLS; conducts mob def in centre and right with 19 Mech Bde and avn to draw en into Obj LANCE; blocks meanwhile on EAGLE with 5 AB Bde and 19 Mech Bde to prevent en pen so setting conditions for Div counter attack by 21 (GE) Pz Bde into en left flank vicinity Obj LANCE. ME 1 Mech Bde to hold BLOCKLEY HILLS.⁵**

13. **Phases.** A commander’s Concept of Operations should include no reference to phases until he has described his plan as a single overall operation. At the operational level, phases are often required to give substance to the sequencing of joint or multinational operations in a campaign plan (for example, when operational pauses are required). At the tactical level, however, phases can impose unwanted breaks in the tempo and

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³ STANAG 2014 states that Commander's Intent should be included in an un-numbered sub-paragraph before the Concept of Operations; UK usage is to include the intent within the Concept of Operations sub-paragraph.

⁴ In US usage, fire support (from artillery, air and aviation) is described in terms of ‘fires’.

⁵ The example is intended to illustrate the format and vocabulary of a concept of operations, not the tactics.
continuity of an operation, contrary to the aims of British war fighting doctrine. Thus phases should be used with care. If, however, they are required in certain situations to synchronize the actions of the whole formation/unit they then represent a legitimate control measure which allows force (including combat and combat service support) to be concentrated at the correct time and place. The test for phasing is: ‘does the phase concern the whole formation/unit?’ In many cases, when phases would only involve some subordinates, the designation of Main Effort (and shifting of it) and the synchronization of deep, close and rear operations will have the same effect without imposing the breaks imposed by phasing (see Annex B to Chapter 8).

14. Missions to Subordinates. In an Operation Order, a commander must assign a mission to the commanders of each of his subordinate manoeuvre formations or units. The mission is defined as ‘a clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.’ There are three broad types of mission statement: single task, multiple task (both types including the purpose); and a list of tasks with the purpose contained in the concept of operations, usually used for reserves.

a. Single Task Mission. A superior commander should strive to give a minimum of tasks to each subordinate. Therefore the simplest type of mission, and that usually most applicable at lower levels of command, contains only one task. However, this type of mission can also be used at higher levels as shown in 1 (UK) Armd Div's initial mission from VII (US) Corps during the Gulf War:

‘To attack through ID (M) [1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)] to defeat en tac res in order to protect the right flank of VII (US) Corps.’

b. Multiple Task Mission. Where a number of tasks is required, the tasks must be linked by a singular, unifying purpose which is related to the higher commander's Intent. For example, a brigade mission, related to the concept of operations given at Para 12, is:

19 Mech Bde is to defend between Line OWL and Line EAGLE to:

6. In this context, armoured reconnaissance and aviation formations/units and units grouped together for offensive support tasks should be treated as manoeuvre formations/units in their own right and given missions.

7. AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms.

8. 1 Armd Div OPO 4/91 of 180800CFEB91 - OP DESERT SABRE.
- Draw en into Obj LANCE.
- Prevent en pen of Line EAGLE.

*In order to set conditions for Div C attack.*

The unifying purpose ensures that the recipient does not have any conflict of priorities which would make him divide his force between tasks with different purposes. Only those tasks vital to the completion of his mission should be given to a subordinate; others can be included in Co-ordinating Instructions. The unifying purpose of the mission should have been identified from the estimate. If a commander is still unable to determine a unifying purpose for a subordinate, he should revisit his estimate. The clearest place to state purpose is in the mission statement to each subordinate (Sub-Paragraph 3b onwards).

c. **Use of Tasks.** In a more complex mission involving a number of tasks, it may be better for clarity and brevity to give the unifying purposes of subordinates' missions in the Concept of Operations (Sub-Paragraph 3a). For example, this is often the most convenient way to give a mission to reserves. In each case, the purpose of each mission must be quite clear and unambiguous to its recipient. The commander then gives out tasks to subordinates in Sub-Paragraph 3b onwards. This method is less likely to be used at the lower tactical levels.

15. **Missions for Reserves.** Missions for reserves may sometimes cause difficulty. A commander should seek to distinguish between true reserves (retained for the unforeseen) and echelon forces (those already committed or held ready for committal as part of the plan). The distinction which should be clear from the commander’s estimate is illustrated below:

a. A formation or unit held wholly in reserve to exploit unexpected success or unforeseen setback will be given planning tasks (options) rather than a mission, for example: 'Be prepared to...conduct A, B and C.' The unifying purpose of the reserve will be implicit in the Concept of Operations. Before it is committed, such a reserve should be given a specific mission.

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9. Commanders of multinational formations should note, however, that the distinction between ‘true reserves’ and ‘second echelon forces’ made by the British Army is not necessarily followed by armies of other NATO nations.
b. Formations or units held in echelon whose committal is vital to the success of their commander's mission should receive a mission. For example:

'On completion of 20 Armd Bde's break-in, attack [on orders] the remaining enemy up to Line CRIMSON in order to complete the defeat of 21st Mech Div.'

It follows that formations or units held in echelon should not lightly be given a reserve role because, if they are used in a reactive fashion, the commander risks losing the initiative. A commander who combines these two roles in a single formation or unit must accept the risk of compromising his mission.

In formulating missions, maximum use should be made of defined doctrinal terms to afford consistency in approach and to avoid misunderstanding. This particularly applies in joint or multinational operations. For example, when appropriate, the mission of combat formations and units should include the verb 'to attack, defend or delay' so as to reflect the relevant operation of war. The purpose within a mission should be quite clear and consistent with the Concept of Operations. When the mission is enemy-oriented, for example, purposes such as 'to defeat' or 'to destroy' are often appropriate; when the mission is terrain or own forces-oriented, the purpose can be expressed in terms of 'to protect...' or 'to secure...'. Where transitional phases are involved, the terms 'to relieve' or 'to link up' can be used either in the formulation of the task or the purpose. In all cases, however, the final choice of wording must depend on the context of the mission and the need for clarity. Thus the general term 'to defend' may need to be qualified, for example, by more specific wording such as 'to prevent enemy penetration of ...'; 'to prevent enemy capture of ...'; or 'to defeat the enemy in Area A...'. Missions to combat support and combat service support units will often use wording such as 'to support' or to 'sustain'.

16. **Missions and Priorities to Combat Support Formations/Units.** Wherever possible, missions should be given to commanders of combat support formations/units. However, it may prove inappropriate to give missions to combat support commanders when their role will be to continue to support the entire formation or unit throughout the operation.\(^\text{10}\) In these circumstances the unifying purpose is to provide the required support. Thus

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\(^{10}\) A commander may also be restrained in giving missions by the command state of the combat support unit involved.
it will normally be necessary to establish priorities - qualified as necessary by time, resources and space - for combat support formations/units. The setting of priorities is not only for the benefit of the combat support commanders' own planning, but also allows commanders of manoeuvre formations/units to gauge the level of combat support they will receive and, as the situation develops and the Main Effort is shifted, to determine what combat support is likely to be available to them.

17. **Co-ordinating Instructions.** The purpose of Co-ordinating Instructions is to set out control measures which are necessary for the execution of the mission. Mission Command requires that a minimum of control measures should be applied. Therefore maximum use of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and drills should be made in a determined effort to reduce the amount of detail included under Co-ordinating Instructions. Co-ordinating instructions must include timings and should include Rules of Engagement (ROE), battlefield identification friend/foe instructions if not contained in unit or formation SOPs, and other specific instructions for fratricide prevention, when applicable. Co-ordinating instructions can be related to the Functions in Combat\textsuperscript{11} as follows:

a. Within **Manoeuvre**, deconfliction is achieved by the management of real estate, establishment of liaison\textsuperscript{12} (detailed in the Command and Signal paragraph), setting of barrier-free zones, movement control and the allocation of areas of operations (defined in terms of boundaries). Objectives that are force-oriented will often be identified with tasks within a mission; it will therefore be repetitious to list them in Co-ordinating Instructions. Where they are terrain-oriented, they are best depicted graphically. A restrictive by-passing policy will similarly be inappropriate to a force-oriented mission and, furthermore, it can unduly limit a subordinate's initiative.

b. Within **Firepower**, deconfliction is likely to be imposed in terms of linear procedural measures such as FSCL, RIPL, NFL, RFL (details are contained in Section VIII of SOHB). The monitoring of demolitions is subject to unique and strict control measures.

c. Within **Intelligence**, priorities for reconnaissance and targeting are listed.

\textsuperscript{11} See ADP Vol 1, Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{12} See Chapter 5 of this volume.
d. Within **Protection**, it is necessary to deconflict air and air defence, achieved through airspace control procedures. The ability to use the electro-magnetic spectrum may require deconfliction measures to be imposed on emitters and offensive systems. These (and STAP) are detailed concurrently in the Command and Signal paragraph.

If appropriate, additional co-ordinating instructions may be required for the media, host nation support, prisoners of war and NBC measures.

**SERVICE SUPPORT**

18. The purpose of the Service Support paragraph is to provide subordinate commanders with sufficient detail of the service support plan to permit further planning. As a minimum, the paragraph will normally contain brief details of the service support concept, details of the commander's service support priorities and the allocation of key resources. If lengthy, and particularly at the beginning of a major operation, it will be normal for a separate Service Support Order to be issued in support of the main Operation Order. The Service Support Order, in addition to informing subordinate commanders of the service support concept, also directs service support formations/units to provide the support. Further details of Service Support Orders are given in AFM Vol. 1 Part 6 CSS and in the SOHB.

**COMMAND AND SIGNAL**

19. The purpose of the Command and Signal paragraph is to explain how the exercise of command is to be maintained. The key consideration is the measures required to make one's own command system robust, and, where appropriate, to frustrate the enemy's attempts to disrupt it. To ensure robustness, the locations of headquarters are listed, an alternate commander is nominated and liaison arrangements are specified. To frustrate the enemy, EMCON and counter surveillance measures will be listed and this paragraph is an appropriate place in which to specify OPSEC measures - if not included under the Protection sub-paragraph of Coordinating Instructions. A CEI will normally be issued separately.

13. The counter command warfare function (C2W) is considered in ADP Vol 1, Chapter 5 and in detail at Annex C to Chapter 6 of this volume.
ANNEXES

20. The main purpose of using annexes is to keep the main text of an order short. It also allows addressees to be given additional copies of certain information, for example movement tables. Annexes provide amplifying information or direction which is not appropriate in the main order, or information which amplifies a specific Function in Combat (or type of combat support/combat service support/command support), not pertinent to all addressees of an order.

21. Further guidance on the content and layout of annexes is given in STANAG 2014 and the SOHB.

USE OF GRAPHICS

22. The use of graphics, both within the main text of an operation order and in annexes, is encouraged to aid comprehension. Where employed, however, care must be taken that the required tactical notation is used accurately. The SOHB includes examples of how graphics are incorporated into orders.
Adv to contact
Seek to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy. (AAP-6)

Air Interdiction (AI)
AI is conducted to destroy, disrupt, neutralise or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. Detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (AAP-6)

Alliance
The result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. (FM 100-5)

Area Defence
Area defence focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy into a framework of static and mutually supporting positions from which he can largely be destroyed by fire. The emphasis is on retention of terrain or its denial to the enemy for a specified time. (AFM Formation Tactics)

Area of Influence
A physical volume of space that expands, contracts and moves according to a formation or unit’s current ability to acquire or engage the enemy. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Area of Interest
That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (AAP-6)

Area of Operations (AO)
A geographical area assigned to a commander by a higher commander - an AO has lateral and rear boundaries which usually define it within a larger geographical area. (FM 100-5) Within these limits, a commander has the authority to conduct operations, coordinate fire, control movement, develop and maintain installations. His authority should include the control of all joint actions supporting his mission.

Armed Reconnaissance
Armed reconnaissance is air missions flown with the primary purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity. (AAP-6)

Attack
Would assume that you are in contact with the enemy. Attack is a general all embracing term to describe offensive operations and therefore care should be taken in its use. In most cases it is the appropriate verb to describe divisional or corps operations. For brigades and units, where a more specific word exists, this should be used. For example, a division could be ordered to attack but subordinate brigades might advance to contact and subordinate battlegroups may be ordered to seize, secure or penetrate to an objective. (See AAP-6 and SOHB)

Battle
A series of related tactical engagements. (FM 100-5)

Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI)
BAI is air action against hostile land targets which are in a position to affect directly friendly forces but which are not yet in contact. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)
Block
(No set definition, but taken from the definition of a blocking position), deny enemy access to a given area or to prevent advance in a given area. (AAP-6)

Campaign
A campaign is a sequence of planned, resourced and executed joint military operations designed to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and space more usually involving the synchronisation of land, sea and air forces. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Centre of Gravity
That aspect of the enemy’s overall capacity which, if attacked and eliminated, will lead either to his inevitable defeat or his wish to sue for peace through negotiations. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

CJTF
Commander, Joint Task Force.

Clear
(Taken from cleared route). Clear of enemy direct fire; keep clear until handed over to another formation or unit. (UK(NAT))

Close Air Support (CAS)
CAS is air action against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces and requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (AAP-6)

Close Operations
Close operations are those which involve friendly forces in direct contact with the enemy. They are usually conducted at short range and in an immediate timescale. Their purpose is primarily to strike the enemy in order to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power: the means range from destruction to arrest. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Coalition
An ad hoc agreement between two or more nations for a common action. (FM 100-5)

Cohesion
At its simplest, cohesion is unity. It is a quality that binds together constituent parts thereby providing resilience against dislocation and disruption. It minimises vulnerability to defeat in detail and the adverse effects of preemption. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Combat Forces
Combat forces are those forces which use fire and manoeuvre to engage the enemy with direct fire weapon systems, as distinguished from those which engage the enemy with indirect fire or otherwise provide combat support to manoeuvre forces. (ATP-35(B))

Combat Power
The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. The total means includes the organization of the main elements of combat power, which are: manpower, equipment, logistics, training and readiness. (BMD)

Combat Service Support (CSS)
The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (AAP-6) CSS sustains the force.

Combat Support Forces
Combat support forces are those forces which provide fire support and operational assistance to combat forces. (AAP-6)

Combat Zone (CZ)
That area required by combat forces for the conduct of operations. (AAP-6)
Combined Arms
Application of several arms, such as infantry, armour, artillery and aviation.  *(FM 100-5)*

Combined Operation
An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. *(AAP-6)* *(See Multinational Operation. Preferred term to avoid confusion with Combined Arms)*.

Command and Control Warfare (C³W)
Command and Control Warfare is the integrated use of all military capabilities including physical destruction, EW, military deception, psychological operations and operation security, supported by intelligence, to deny information to, exploit, influence, degrade, confuse or destroy enemy C² capabilities and to protect friendly C², against such actions. *(AJP-1)*

Commander’s Intent
A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress towards achieving the desired end-state. *(ADP-1 Operations)*

Communications Zone (COMMZ)
The rear part of the theatre of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communication, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. *(AAP-6)* Extends back to national territory.

Conflict
Conflict is a situation in which violence is either manifested or threatened. It is a struggle or a clash between contending wishes. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Conflict Termination
The termination of conflict by force, usually in conjunction with other coercive instruments of policy available to governments - thus transforming the conflict into war. *(AFM Wider Peackeeping)*

Constraint
Limitations placed on the command by a higher command. Constraints restrict freedom of action for planning a mission by stating what must be done. *(FM 100-5)*

Contingency Planning
Contingency planning is the process by which options are built into a campaign plan to anticipate opportunities or reverses. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Counter Attack
Attack by a part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position, and is directed at limited objectives. *(AAP-6)*

Culminating Point
An operation reaches its culminating point when the current situation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Deception
Deception seeks to manipulate perceptions and expectations in order to mislead the enemy into acting in a way prejudicial to his interests. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*
Decision
As the final step in the estimate process, the commander considers the courses of action open to him to accomplish his mission. He selects his COA and expresses it as his decision. From the decision he develops his concept of operations which must include his intent. The commander's decision should embody his will for the conduct of the operation. (ATP-35 (B))

Decisive Point
Decisive points are those events, the successful outcome of which is a precondition to the successful elimination of the enemy’s centre of gravity. Decisive points are the keys to unlocking the enemy’s centre of gravity. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Deep Operations
Deep Operations expand the battlefield in time and space, making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and thus diminish the coherence and tempo of his actions. They are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted timescale against the enemy’s forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Defeat
To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is either unable to participate further in the battle or at least cannot fulfill his intentions. (UK(NAT))

Defence
The immediate purpose of defensive operations is to defeat or deter a threat in order to provide the right circumstances for offensive operations. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Defend
The purpose of defence is to defeat or deter a threat in order to provide the right circumstances for offensive action. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Delay
Delaying operations are those in which a force under pressure trades time for space by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively committed. (AAP-6)

Deliberate Attack
The purpose of a deliberate attack is to defeat the enemy with the emphasis on massing combat power at the expense of time. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Demonstration
The purpose of a demonstration is to distract the enemy’s attention without seeking contact. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Deny
To prevent access by blocking, disruption, dislocation and/or fire. (UK(NAT))

Deployment
The relocation of forces to desired areas of operations; the movement of forces within areas of operations; the positioning of forces into a formation for battle. (AAP-6)

Destroy
To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless. (UK(NAT))

Directive
A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)
Doctrine
Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success. (DGLW)

Electronic Warfare (EW)
EW is military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action to retain its effective use by friendly forces. (AAP-6)

End-State
The end-state is that state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Engagement
Small, tactical conflicts, usually between opposing manoeuvre forces. (FM 100-5)

Envelopment
An offensive manoeuvre in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. (AAP-6) A double envelopment can be carried out by two enveloping forces and a fixing force.

Feint
The purpose of a feint is to distract the action of an enemy force by seeking contact with it. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Find
Spans locating, identifying and assessing. (UK(NAT))

Fighting Power
Fighting is a violent clash between hostile, independent and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose themselves on the other. The means to that end is either the threat or the organize application of fighting power to the enemy. Fighting power defines the Army’s ability to conduct operations. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Firepower
Firepower destroys, neutralises and suppresses; it is essential in defeating an enemy’s ability to fight. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Fratricide
The employment of friendly weapons and munitions with the intent to kill the enemy or destroy his equipment or facilities, which results in unforeseen and unintentional death or injury to friendly personnel. (FM 100-5)

Friction
The accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties, enemy actions, and confusion of battle. (FM 100-5) It is the force that resists all action and which makes the simple difficult and the difficult seemingly impossible. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Frontal Attack
An offensive manoeuvre in which the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces. (AAP-6)

General War
In general war (war of national survival) normal civil activity is either suspended or subordinated to military activity. Such conditions are likely only where national survival is at stake. (ATP-35(B))
Grand Strategic Level of Conflict
Grand strategy is the application of national resources to achieve policy objectives. This will invariably include diplomatic and economic resources as well as military. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Guard
A security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information. *(AAP-6)*

Hasty Attack
The purpose of the hasty attack is to defeat the enemy, trading mass for time, in order to seize fleeting opportunities. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Hold
To maintain or retain possession by force, of a position or an area. In an attack, to exert sufficient pressure to prevent movement or redisposition of enemy forces. *(AAP-6)*

Host Nation Support (HNS)
Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within, or transiting through, its territory during peacetime, times of conflict, or war. The basis of such assistance is dependant upon agreements mutually concluded between nations. *(FM 100-5)*

Humanitarian Aid
Missions conducted to relieve human suffering, especially in circumstances where responsible authorities in the area are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide adequate service support to the population. Humanitarian aid missions amy be conducted in the context of a peace support operation, or as a completely independent task. *(MC 327/ AFM Wider Peacekeeping)*

Infiltration
A technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection. *(AAP-6)*

Information and Intelligence
Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of all operations. Intelligence is the product of the organised efforts of a commander to gather, analyse and distribute information about the enemy and the operational environment. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
IPB is a systematic process which requires the production of a serious of graphic overlays depicting basic data on weather, terrain and enemy deployment; the latter may be based on no more than an assessment of his doctrine. It is also a dynamic process in that data can be added or adjusted at any time before or during combat. The integration of these graphics will show; possible enemy options, own information gaps and decision points for the commander. *(TD Note 26)*

Interdiction
Actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy before he can affect friendly forces. *(FM 100-5)*

JFC
Joint Force Commander.

Joint
The term joint denotes activities, operations, organizations etc in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. *(AAP-6)*

JSCP
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
J-Stars  
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System.

Liaison  
That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (AAP-6)

Lines of Communication (LOC)  
All the land, water and air routes that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (AAP-6)

Lines of Operation  
Lines of operation describe how military force is applied in time and space through decisive points on the path to the enemy’s centre of gravity. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Logistics (AAP-6)  
The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

a. Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel.

b. Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.

c. Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities.

d. Acquisition or furnishing of services.

Logistics Bases  
A principal or supplementary base of support; a locality containing installations that provide logistic or other support. (FM 100-5)

Main Effort  
The Main Effort is expressed as the activity which the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time. (ADP Vol 2 Command)

Major Operation  
The coordinated actions of large forces in a single phase of a campaign. A major operation could contain a number of battles or could be a single, critical battle. (FM 100-5)

Manoeuvre  
To manoeuvre is to seek to get into a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Such manoeuvre should be directed towards a decisive point or directly at the centre of gravity. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Manoeuvre Warfare  
Manoeuvre Warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion - his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole - rather than by destroying him physically through incremental attrition. (ADP Vol 2 Command)

Military Strategic Level of Conflict  
Military strategy is the application of military resources to achieve grand strategic objectives. Thus the Grand Strategic and Military Strategic Levels, together, encompass the art and science of employing armed force to achieve a political objective. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)
Minimum Necessary Force
The measured application of violence or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate; and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Mission
A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (AAP-6)

Mission Command
Mission Command is designed to achieve unity of effort at all levels; it is dependent on decentralization. It requires the development of trust and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates throughout the chain of command, and timely and effective decision-making together with initiative (a quality of a commander) at all levels, the keys to "getting inside" the enemy’s decision-action cycle. (ADP Vol 2 Command)

Mobile Defence
Mobile defence focuses on the defeat of the attacking force by permitting it to advance to a position which exposes it to counterattack and envelopment by a mobile striking force. The emphasis is on destroying the enemy rather than retaining or retaking ground.

Mobilization
The process by which the Armed Forces or a portion thereof is brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency; (AAP-6) includes activating all or part of the TA and regular reservists, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and materiel.

Multinational Operations
An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
Operations that relocate threatened civilian noncombatants from locations in a foreign country or host nation. These operations normally involve UK citizens whose lives are in danger. They may also include selected host nation and third country nationals.

Offence
The purpose of offensive operations is to defeat the enemy by imposing our will on him by the application of focused violence. It is the decisive operation of war. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Offensive Air Support (OAS)
OAS is a combination of Battlefield Air Interdiction and Close Air Support. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Operational Art
The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. In war, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time. (FM 100-5)

Operational Framework
In order to execute the core functions of Finding, Fixing and Striking the enemy, operations are organised within a framework of deep, close and rear. These terms are used to describe how these three operations relate to each other by function, by what they are to achieve, and by geography or where they are to achieve it. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)
Operational Level of Conflict
Joint campaigns and major operations are constructed and directed at the Operational Level in fulfilment of a strategic directive. It is the level that provides the gearing between military strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre of operations. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Operational Objectives
These are the military strategic goals that need to be achieved in the campaign to achieve the desired end-state. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Operational Pause
Because operations cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while retaining the initiative in other ways. (ADP-1 Operations)

Operational Security (OPSEC)
The aim of OPSEC is to provide a military operation an additional degree of security, using active or passive means, to ensure that knowledge of friendly dispositions, capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities are denied to an enemy. (ATP-35(B)) OPSEC measures concentrate on identifying and protecting those aspects of a plan which are considered vital to the success of an operation.

Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
OOTW are those military operations which are conducted in situations of conflict other than war. Such operations, in which military activities are likely to be firmly subordinated to the political throughout, will be designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation to war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after conflict or war. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Order
A communication, written, oral or by signal, which conveys instructions from a superior to a subordinate. (AAP-6)

Peace
Peace is a condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence. (International Peace Academy, New York)

Peace Building
Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (UN Report: 'An Agenda for Peace'/AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Peace Enforcement
Operations carried out to restore peace between belligerents who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Peacekeeping
Operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Peacemaking
Action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. (Report: 'An Agenda for Peace'/AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Peace Support Operations
The generic term used to describe those military operations in which UN-sponsored multinational forces may be used. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping)
Penetration
In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy’s defence and disrupt the defensive system. (AAP-6)

Preventive Diplomacy
Action to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping).

Principles of War
The principles of War are guides to action and fundamental tenets forming a basis for appreciating a situation and planning, but their relevance, applicability and relative importance change with the circumstances. (Application of Force)

Protection
Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
PSYOPS are planned psychological activities in peace, crisis and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (AAP-6)

Raid
The purpose of the raid is to destroy or capture a vital enemy asset. Its wider purpose is to disrupt the enemy. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Rear Operations
Rear Operations both increase the overall depth of operations and provide the resources to vary the tempo of operations. Their purpose is to ensure freedom of action by protecting the force, sustaining combat operations and retaining freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. They are not synonymous with combat service support, but are much wider in scope. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Reconnaissance in Force
The purpose of reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or possibly the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Reconstitution
The expansion of force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the raising of new units and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the procurement of equipment and stocks. (D/(Pol & Nuc))

Refurbishment
See rehabilitation.

Regeneration
The timely activation in full or in part of existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of manning, equipments and stock to all levels. (D/(Pol & Nuc))

Regional Conflict
A form of war which occurs when there is open hostility, generally between states, within a given geographic region, and ordinary international law (and probably normal diplomatic activity) between the opposing parties is suspended and the use of direct military force by one state or group of states against another, coordinated with other instruments of state policy, is either in prospect or in being. (ATP-35(B))
Rehabilitation
The processing, usually in a relatively quiet area, of units or individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements, issued replacement supplies and equipment, given training and generally made ready for employment in future operations. (AAP-6)

Reorganization
The internal distribution of personnel and equipment in a formation or unit to render it battleworthy again, albeit at a reduce size. Formation/unit integrity remains. (AFM Vol 1 Pt 6)

RISTA
Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition. This is a structure within which information collected through systematic observation is integrated with that collected from specific missions and processed in order to meet the commander's intelligence requirements. It also permits the detection, identification and location of targets in sufficient detail and in a timely enough manner to allow their successful engagement by offensive strike assets. (Int Branch, DGLW)

Rules of Engagement (ROE)
ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which force may be used. ROE will reflect legal, political and diplomatic constraints and will have been developed at the highest level. (AFM Wider Peacekeeping)

Scheme of Manoeuvre
At the tactical level, the superior commander's concept of operations should include both his intent and his design for operations, normally expressed as a scheme of manoeuvre. (ADP Vol 2 Command)

Screen
Observe, identify and report information; only fight in self protection. (AAP-6)

SEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences. That activity which neutralises, destroys or temporarily degrades enemy air defences in a specific area by physical attack and/or EW. (AAP-6)

Secure
To gain possession of a position or terrain, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action. (AAP-6)

Seize
Gain possession of a position or terrain, with or without force. (UK (NAT))

Sequencing
Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's centre of gravity. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Simultaneity
Simultaneity seeks to overload the enemy commander. He is attacked or threatened from so many angles at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time or even establish priorities between them. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Spoiling Attack
The spoiling attack is similar to the counter attack in that it is directed at enemy offensive operations but with the limited aim of disruption. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)
States of Command (AAP-6)

a. Full Command (Full Comd). The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and remains a national responsibility which cannot be delegated.

b. Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to re-assign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not include responsibility for administration or logistics.

c. Operational Control (OPCON). The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administration or logistic control.

d. Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

e. Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and usually local direction and control of movement and manoeuvre necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Synchronization

Synchronization is the focusing of resources and activities to produce maximum combat power at the decisive time and place. *(ADP Vol 2 Command)*

Tactical Level of Conflict

Battles and engagements within a sequence of major operations are planned and executed at the Tactical Level in order to achieve the operational objectives of a campaign. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Tactics

Tactics is the art of disposing troops on the ground, deploying them for combat and handling forces of all arms on the battlefield to achieve a decision which furthers the operational aim with the maximum economy of effort. *(Application of Force)*

Tempo

Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. *(ADP Vol 1 Operations)*

Transitional Phases

Transitional phases link the primary operations of war. They are:

a. Advance to Contact.
b. Meeting Engagement.
c. Link-Up Operations.
d. Withdrawal.
e. Relief of Troops in Combat

Turning Movement

A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear, force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. *(AAP-6)*
War
A state of war may be characterized by the cessation or suspension of normal political and diplomatic activity between the warring parties and open hostility. War may be subdivide into general war and regional conflict. (ATP-35(B))

Weapons of Mass Destruction
Weapons that, through use or the threat of use, can cause large scale shifts in objectives, phases, and courses of action. (FM 100-5)

Wider Peacekeeping
The wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile. (ADP Vol 1 Operations)

Withdraw
Disengage from the enemy either in or out of contact with the enemy. A force seeks to disengage combat forces from the enemy although contact may be maintained through indirect fire, recce or surveillance. (UK (NAT))
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