**Title and Subtitle**

Freedom isn’t free: a study of compulsory military service in the United States Army.

**Authors**

Thomas Robinson, Jr.

**Abstract**

FM-1 describes the Global War on Terrorism as “the first severe test of the all-volunteer Army.” OPTEMPOs remain high and, in FY2005, all U.S. Army components failed to achieve their recruiting goals. Discussion of reinstating the draft has come to the forefront again. Conscription was used to man the U.S. Army during all major conflicts from the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam Conflict. The draft was sustained through the Cold War to provide manpower for the peacetime Army committed to supporting the Truman Doctrine. The draft remained popular with the American public until the Vietnam Conflict. As the Vietnam Conflict dragged on, the draft became a target of partisan politics and antiwar protests. Richard Nixon won public support and the Presidency on his platform of discontinuing the draft. Shortly after his election, he formed the Gates Commission, whose purpose was to eliminate conscription. This thesis uses the Gates Commission report as a framework to analyze FY2005 data and formulates a conclusion on the utility and feasibility of a conscripted force. This thesis concludes that the draft is a reliable and predictable means of providing manpower for the Army, but is infeasible due to an increasing population and a shrinking Army.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Thomas J. Robinson Jr.

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Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Lon R. Seglie, Ed.D.

______________________________, Member
LTC David W. Seely, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Jonathan M. House, Ph.D.

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

FREEDOM ISN’T FREE: A STUDY OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, by Thomas J. Robinson Jr., MAJ, 93 pages.

FM-1 describes the Global War on Terrorism as “the first severe test of the all-volunteer Army.” OPTEMPOs remain high and, in FY2005, all U.S. Army components failed to achieve their recruiting goals. Discussion of reinstating the draft has come to the forefront again.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement
As the United States enters its fifth year engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), personnel of the United States Army are being stretched almost to their limits. Active Component (AC) forces have been maintaining abnormally high operational tempos (OPTEMPOs) with deployments of a year or longer recurring every two to three years. Reserve Component (RC) units are being mobilized and deployed at a rate incomparable to any other time in their history. The GWOT is the United States’ first protracted war since the end of the Vietnam Conflict and the first since President Nixon ended the draft and transitioned the U.S. Army to an all-volunteer force (AVF). Field Manual (FM) 1 says “this is the first severe test of the all-volunteer Army. The need to conduct sustained operations over a number of years may be the most significant aspect of the early twenty-first century security environment” (Department of the Army 2005, 2-2).

Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan are the missions commonly associated with the GWOT, due in no small part to the media attention those operations have received. But those are not the only operations in which the U.S. Army is engaged. Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) in support of homeland security has been ongoing since the first few days after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Soldiers have been supporting Joint Task Force Guantanamo in Cuba since late 2002. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo have been continuing since 1995 and 1999, respectively, and a long standing mission that still
demands support is the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission on the Sinai Peninsula (The United States Army Home Page 2005). To add to all of this, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in October 2005 President Bush indicated that the Army should play a larger role in natural disaster relief and support to civil authorities. There is certainly no shortage of work for the Army, but a recurring story in the media is that a shortage of personnel might become an issue.

Unfortunately, the stories are not merely media hype. Neither the AC nor RC recruiters reached their recruiting goal (“made mission”) for Fiscal Year 2005 (FY2005). The AC recruiters came closest to making mission, with 92% of their FY2005 goal enlisted. United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) only managed to recruit 84% and 80% of their FY2005 goals, respectively (Army Recruiting and Retention 2005). There has been further speculation in the media that recruiting and basic training standards are being lowered in order to rapidly inject more soldiers into the system (Chenelly 2005; Roque 2005). But once they are in, soldiers in both AC and RC are staying--active Army, USAR and ARNG all exceeded their retention goals for FY2005 (Army Recruiting and Retention 2005).

Although the retention numbers are a good news story, the problem of getting young people to volunteer for military service still remains. The Army has implemented and increased the use of several programs designed to attract and retain quality personnel. Both recruiting and re-enlistment bonuses are soaring, and a new program began recently by which soldiers who are not recruiters can earn money for convincing someone to enlist. The Army is also making liberal use of Individual Ready Reserve call-backs and the infamous “stop-loss” policy, which prevents soldiers from leaving service on their
Expiration Term of Service (ETS) date. Taking into account the extraordinarily high OPTEMPO of multiple, ongoing missions and the problems with recruiting, it is no wonder that over the last few years there has been some debate over bringing back the draft.

**Background**

When speaking of the draft today, there is no one still alive who would recall the draft riots in New York City almost 143 years ago. But there are still many people to whom the mere mention of the draft invokes images of riots and protests in cities across the United States and memories of newsreel footage of American soldiers in the jungles of Vietnam. The draft has almost become synonymous with the Vietnam Conflict and the political and social turmoil surrounding them both. This is most likely the reason the draft has taken on negative connotations. The draft, as it was used then, got its start with the Selective Service Act of 1917. With the United States on the verge of entering World War I, it recognized the need to fill the ranks of a large army more quickly than an all-volunteer force was capable of doing. However, for more than thirty years following the Armistice, the United States reverted to volunteers to man its military.

Despite Manning shortages and issues with enlistments that ended during military campaigns (there was no stop-loss enacted as there is today), it wasn’t until the threat of global domination loomed again that conscription was revived. The United States was faced with the “dilemma of involuntary military service in a free society” (Flynn 2002, 1). Its solution was the draft--a selection system to decide who would be made to answer his nation’s call to duty. President Roosevelt enacted the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, the first peacetime draft. Over the next three decades, some form of limited
conscription was once again the normal way our country provided manpower for its armed services. Finally in 1973, under increasing political pressure at home stemming from an unpopular war in Vietnam, President Richard Nixon ended the draft and began the current era of the All-Volunteer Force.

Research Question

The primary question this thesis will attempt to answer is: Given the current and near-future missions of the United States Army, which would be the better system to man the force--conscription, all-volunteer, or some combination thereof?

In order to sufficiently answer that question, the following secondary questions need to be answered.

1. How was conscription used in the United States in the past?
2. How did it impact the quality of the force?
3. What motivates a person to either enlist or not?
4. What are the current attitudes towards the draft?

Assumptions

It is necessary to make one critical assumption in this study about the expected future missions of the U.S. Army. Without the benefit of psychic abilities or a crystal ball, it is impossible to say, with any degree of certainty, what missions the Army will be involved in over the next ten to twenty years. By looking at the Army’s OPTEMPO over the previous ten to twenty years, a valid assumption can be made that the near future will bring similar periods of limited activity, punctuated by normally brief periods of high activity and deployments, which subside after a few years. For the purposes of this study,
it is assumed that the current OPTEMPO and types of missions will be sustained for an undetermined time.

Definition of Terms

Throughout this thesis, the terms conscription, compulsory, and draft are used almost seemingly interchangeably, but actually denote different meanings as defined by the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.

Conscription: compulsory enrollment of persons especially for military service.

Compulsory: mandatory, enforced.

Draft: (1) a system for or act of selecting individuals from a group (as for compulsory military service) (2) an act or process of selecting an individual (as for political candidacy) without the individual's expressed consent.

The following terms are used as defined by the author.

All-volunteer force (AVF): describes the current method for enlisting soldiers into the Unitites States military, volunteers only.

Active Component (AC): the active duty Army, consisting of full-time Soldiers.

Reserve Component (RC): a single term encompassing both the USAR and ARNG, which will be referred to individually when required.

Scope and Delimitations

This thesis attempts to answer the research questions by studying the history of the draft in the United States in the 20th century. It focuses on the periods the draft was used during World War I, World War II (beginning in peacetime 1940), Korea and Vietnam. It examines the reasons the draft was ended and the Armed Forces transitioned
to an AVF. It attempts to draw conclusions based on the military, political and social factors that ended conscription as compared to those factors today.

This study explores whether or not a change in the U.S. Army’s force-manning system is necessary considering today’s operating environment. It is researched and written by an Army officer, from an Army perspective. It has attempted to remain focused on the Army, but there are instances when it is more appropriate to refer to the Armed Forces or military as a whole.

This study is not a budget or defense spending analysis. There are economic advantages and disadvantages to any of the options for enlisting, training, and equipping personnel, but they are not covered in detail in this study. This thesis also does not study the issue of numbers of installations and associated requirements needed to train large amounts of soldiers. This thesis only examines this problem from a manpower standpoint, but will discuss some of the social and political issues involved. That being said, this study does not attempt to determine the appropriate force size or structure needed to defend the nation and support the administration’s foreign policies. That decision is made based on national strategic guidance and policy.

Finally, this thesis will not try to solve the legal battles that will inevitably be waged over returning to a conscripted force-manning system. It is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the United States Constitution that determines legality, not this researcher.

Significance

This thesis is significant in the near-term with respect to the manning issues currently facing the U.S. Army. It determines whether or not returning to conscription is
a viable solution to relieve the burden on forces in the current operating environment. As long as the United States is committed to the GWOT and other contingencies, the Army will continue to face the OPTEMPO and force manning challenges it does today. This thesis is also significant to the long-term manning issues of the U.S. Army in determining whether or not conscription is a viable solution to prevent such a manpower strain in the future. There have been times in the past when the Army needed rapid force build-up and there will likely be times in the future when it does again. For both the near and long term, this study provides a basis for debating the validity of the AVF. Based on an in-depth examination of the history of the draft in the United States, as compared to the current operational and social climates, this thesis provides a recommendation on manning the force in the future.

Summary and Conclusion

The United States Army is being pushed to its limits maintaining its OPTEMPO, engaged in the GWOT and other contingencies around the world. Although many current soldiers are choosing to reenlist and stay in the Army, there are not enough citizens who are volunteering to serve. Both the AC and RC recruiting fell short of their goals this year. Over the last several years, there has been discussion of the need to reinstate the draft. For many Americans that idea elicits negative images and reminds them of the turmoil of Vietnam and society in the 1960s and 70s.

The history of the draft in the United States is significantly older than four decades. Its modern form goes back to the Selective Service Act of 1917 and, in its most basic form of conscription, was used as far back as the American Revolution. The idea of conscription is not nearly as young as the United States. It is thousands of years old--
probably as old as warfare itself. In Chapter 2, the author studies the history of
conscription in the 20th century United States Army and the debates that swarmed around
it in each generation.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it [society] in the employment of his life, liberty, and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share of the expense of protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary.

Massachusetts Bill of Rights of 1870.
(Lofgren 1976, 62)
(bracket added)

Introduction

The army of George Washington that fought for and secured the independence of the United States of America somewhat resembled the armies that have fought to preserve that same freedom in the 230 years since. That army was a combination of a full-time, federal army and a part-time, state-sponsored militia, a system that is comparable to the Active Component (AC) Army and Army National Guard (ARNG) of today. The army that won our independence from Great Britain was also a combination of volunteers and conscripts, which was the norm in the United States Army until only three decades ago. Given that our armies have almost always been raised (at least partially) by some form of conscription, why has there always been so much debate amongst both lawmakers and the public over the subject? Isn’t it established by the Constitution that conscription is an accepted means of providing manpower to the Army? Yes and no.

For our forefathers, conscription was a normal way to supply an army with manpower. It was a way of life in Europe, as it was in the motherland, Great Britain. And so too it had a place in the brand new United States Army--in the militia. During the war,
a quota system was used to man the Continental Army. That is to say, Congress made the states responsible for supplying a certain number of troops. This proved to be an inefficient and inequitable system in which the degree of compliance varied across the states. The writers of our Constitution addressed Congress’s authority on this matter in Article I, giving Congress the power “to raise and support Armies” and “to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”

The Constitution gave Congress more power over the military than the Articles of Federation had, and created some debate. However, the discussion was not about how the armies would be manned. In his January 1976 article for *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Charles Lofgren assessed that the writers of The Constitution understood the militia would be filled by conscripts. Instead, the contention was whether or not a standing army was even needed. Supporters of the new Constitution took the position that the authority to raise an army was vital to national security and that authority must exist in peace as well as in war. They did concede that a well-regulated and trained militia would decrease the need for a standing army. The Antifederalists, who were against it, downplayed external threats to America’s security and thought having a standing army was an open door for tyranny. Having had unfavorable experiences with the British Army in their colonies, this was an understandable argument. They proposed a two-thirds or three-fourths vote by both houses of Congress before a standing army could be raised in peacetime.

The importance of this debate had less to do with compulsory service and more to do with the distinction between standing armies and citizen militia armies. A drill manual
published shortly before the Revolution stated that militias are composed of men who “thought for themselves” while standing armies were made up of men who only served for their pay (Lofgren 1976, 72). And so, it was never completely spelled out in the Constitution whether conscripting soldiers was within the scope of power of the United States government.

When the United States went to war against itself in 1861, both the Union and Confederate Armies had needs for large numbers of soldiers. The Confederate Congress was the first to enact compulsory service legislation in April 1862. Its law held all white males between the ages of 18 and 35 liable for three years of military service, with exemptions granted to certain vital or productive services of Southern communities. Among these were teachers, pharmacists, printers, editors, and one white man on each plantation with twenty or more slaves (Raymond 2005, 11). The law also allowed a draftee to hire a substitute to serve in his place, or to buy his way out of service with a monetary payment to the government. In what might be the first use of a “stop-loss” policy in the United States, the Confederates’ draft legislation of 1862 required those who were already enlisted to serve a mandatory term of three years. Two years later, that mandatory service requirement was extended through the duration of the war (Flynn 2002, 11).

For the Union Army, the compulsory service legislation was the Militia Act of 1862. It enabled governors to draft their citizens into the states’ units, and gave President Lincoln the authority to draft soldiers from any state that failed to meet its quota of volunteers (Flynn 2002, 10). The Act was never enforced, as the threat of conscription increased the numbers of voluntary enlistments (Raymond 2005, 12). The Militia Act
also had a provision for the enlistment of blacks--free or slaves--and a promise of emancipation upon completion of honorable service (Flynn 2002, 10). Contrary to the Confederate Congress’s conscription legislation, volunteers in the Union Army were allowed to go home when their enlistments were completed (Flynn 2002, 11).

After suffering heavy losses at Antietam and Fredericksburg, the Union simply did not have enough manpower and enacted the Enrollment Act of 1863. This Act made 20 to 45-year old men liable for three years of service and, like the Confederate Congress draft law, allowed for substitution and commutation--paying the government to avoid service (Raymond 2005, 12). Sometimes soldiers who had been hired as substitutes would desert after being paid and later be hired again as substitutes (Flynn 2002, 11). The allowance for commutation was urged by Northern manufacturers who feared that a draft would leave them with few trained workers in their factories (Raymond 2005, 12). This similar theme to protect critical laborers reappears in draft legislations of the 20th century as well.

Needless to say, not every American supported the government cause and not every American supported the manner of acquiring soldiers for battle. At the first national draft lottery, held in New York City in July 1863, there was rioting that lasted four days and resulted in an estimated 1,000 casualties (Raymond 2005, 13). With the military operating the draft, enrollment officers went house-to-house in order to hunt down conscripts. This led to armed resistance and violence--and the murder of 38 enrollment officers (Flynn 2002, 11). Officially 300,000 men were drafted in the North. Only 260,000 actually appeared and, of them, 165,000 did not meet induction standards for a variety of reasons. Subtract out of the remaining number the men who had hired
substitutes or had paid a commutation fee to the government, and only about 50,000 were really drafted over four calls from 1863 to 1865 (Flynn 2002, 11). All told, only about 6% of the 2.67 million men in the Union Army were conscripted (Raymond 2005, 13). Volunteers were offered bonuses for enlisting and veterans received bonuses for reenlisting. Combined with these bonuses, the draft served more of a purpose to encourage voluntary enlistment by the threat of conscription (Raymond 2005, 13).

After the war Brigadier General James Oakes, Assistant Provost Marshall of Illinois, conducted a study of the operation of the draft from 1863 to 1865. Some of the primary changes he recommended in the execution of draft legislation were:

- no bounties (bonuses) for volunteering
- no hiring of substitutes
- civilians should operate the draft, not military
- tours of duty should be the duration of any conflict
- deferments should be granted on an individual rather than class basis

The 1866 Oakes Report later became the basis for the 1917 conscription laws which helped provide manpower for the Army during World War I (Flynn 2002, 12). Figure 1 highlights significant milestones in the history of the draft in the United States from World War I into the first decade of the all-volunteer force.
Figure 1. Draft Timeline
Source: Congressional Digest, May 2004
When the war in Europe began in 1914, President Woodrow Wilson had every intention of maintaining the neutrality of the United States. In his State of the Union address, he called for the country’s distance from the “European war” (Raymond 2005, 14). But with the public’s pro-British support and Germany’s increasing use of unrestricted submarine warfare, America found itself edging closer to involvement. By the end of 1915, President Wilson wanted to expand the Regular Army (RA) from 108,000 up to 142,000 and create a national reserve force of 400,000 men (Flynn 2002, 36). The answer Congress gave him was the National Defense Act of 1916. The Act identified the Army of the United States as consisting of the regulars, the volunteers, and the National Guard, and created an enlisted reserve for the RA. The 1916 Defense Act also expanded the RA to 175,000 men, expanded the National Guard in lieu of a continental reserve, made that guard a deployable, federal reserve force, and gave the president the power to employ a draft to fill the new reserve units (Flynn 2002, 36).

Wilson was still against using conscription to man the RA and believed that volunteers would be “sufficient to meet the nation’s military needs” (Raymond 2005, 14). However, he began to be convinced that conscription was the only way to fill the new reserve units after an unsuccessful mobilization of the National Guard in 1916 to quell unrest on the Mexican border, where many units were understaffed, under trained and under equipped. One of the men who disagreed with the president’s opinion on conscripting for the RA versus the reserve forces was former Army Chief of Staff Major General (MG) Leonard Wood, whose opinion was that...
the voluntary system failed us in the past, and will fail us in the future. It is uncertain in operations, prevents organized preparation, tends to destroy that individual sense of obligation for military service which should be found in every citizen, costs excessively in life and treasure, and does not permit that condition of preparedness which must exist if we are to wage war successfully with any great power prepared for war (Raymond 2005, 15).

With former president Teddy Roosevelt and others, Wood helped form a National Security League who promoted the idea of universal military training. They, along with some other powerful men like J.P. Morgan, created the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) and encouraged training for the upper class. It was these men’s vision of the training camps to be “schoolhouses for citizenship, promoting self-discipline, obedience, and efficiency” (Flynn 2002, 35).

In 1916, the MTCA began trying to “sell” the nation on the idea of universal military training. When the response was poor, they began advocating a draft in the event of war. They argued that conscription was not only fair, but more efficient than volunteerism. It was fair in that it required every eligible man participate, not just the patriotic ones who volunteered. Its efficiency was in that it made manpower management more predictable and put an end to “reckless volunteering by essential workers” (Flynn 2002, 35). This thought was not only about who was included in service, but who was excluded. It was a concept that would carry throughout the history of the draft and lead to the elaborate system of deferments and classifications.

When diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany broke down in February 1917 and America’s entrance into the war became more likely, Army Chief of Staff Major General Hugh L. Scott approached Secretary of War Newton D. Baker with his concerns on how to bring men into the Army. Scott argued that the time was right for the country to resort to universal military training and service. His desire was to start with
a draft system at the outset of war to avoid the British mistake of beginning the war with a volunteer system and being forced to go to a draft later on. MG Scott was able to convince Baker and the two of them brought the idea to the president. Both Secretary Baker and President Wilson wanted to exhaust all possibilities of volunteering before adopting “an institution that had caused riots in the Civil War” (Flynn 2002, 37). But eventually the president recognized the equity and efficiency of the draft and approved the suggestion. The draft bill was written by Major General Ernest H. Crowder, Judge Advocate General of the Army (Flynn 2002, 37).

While the rest of the country assumed only a volunteer system would be used, Crowder, Baker and Wilson were creating the organization of the draft. Secretary Baker coined the phrase “selective service” and it was a system that reflected the lessons learned from the Civil War and the Oakes Report. MG Crowder held that the War Department should not have any direct involvement, that the system should be comprised of localized boards supervised by a national headquarters and staffed by civilians. The age range of eligible men was originally 19 to 25 and draftees would serve for the duration of the war. Voluntary recruiting was still permitted, though it was eventually ended in December 1917. Any forms of bounties were prohibited, as were substitutions or exemptions purchased for money--significant issues during the Civil War. The president had the authority to defer men who were considered essential to the national health and economy, including farm workers and skilled laborers. Ministers and divinity students were exempt. Dependency, which meant a man’s family was dependent on him and him alone, was also grounds for exemption. The draft bill was submitted to Congress
the day after Congress declared war on Germany and the bill immediately generated debate.

Opponents of the bill argued that conscription was undemocratic. They accused the government of destroying democracy in America while fighting to preserve it overseas. Some considered the draft as “involuntary servitude.” Speaker of the House Champ Clark’s opinion was he saw “precious little difference between a conscript and a convict” (Raymond 2005, 18). Rioting and violence similar to the Civil War was anticipated.

Supporters of the draft bill touted it as more predictable, efficient, and patriotic than a volunteer system. According to them, volunteering disrupted industry and economy and wasted good talent in the military that could be put to better use at home. And volunteering did not share the obligation of service to one’s nation equally among citizens. The National Security League conducted a survey of 857 of America’s newspapers. They found 542 for the draft, 63 against it, and 253 were noncommittal. A similar survey of 379 of the nation’s mayors showed 200 supporters, 35 against, and 144 indifferent (Raymond 2005, 18).

After nearly a month of debate over the bill in both houses, Congress voted on 28 April 1917. Only 8 senators and 24 representatives voted against it (Raymond 2005, 18). The liable age range for registration was raised to 21 to 30 and the president was authorized to accept volunteer units into service. President Wilson signed the Selective Service Act into law on 18 May 1917, and set registration day as 5 June.

The local election system was used for the draft registration, as most voter registration was completed within a day. The system comprised 4,000 boards with over
12,000 members and employed nearly 125,000 workers (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 5). The county was the base unit for conducting registration for two reasons. First, there was an average of 3,000 eligible men per county which was deemed manageable by one board in a single day. Second, the county legislature was the normal administration in peacetime (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 7). On 5 June 1917, as prescribed by the president, nearly 10 million men presented themselves for registration and were assigned draft numbers. On 20 June a national lottery was conducted to determine the order in which men would be called to report to their local selection board.

The jurisdictions for the local selection boards were the same as for registration boards. Members of the local board were prescribed as “one member who is in close touch with the agricultural situation of the district; one member who is in close touch with the industrial situation of the district; one member who is in close touch with labor; one physician; one lawyer” (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 13). The board physically examined each man and then considered any claim he had for exemption. Decisions on exemption by the board could be appealed to the next higher echelon—the district board. The Provost Marshal General, in his report to the Secretary of War on the first draft under the Selective Service Act of 1917, assessed that the question of dependency was probably the most difficult decision of the local boards. Dependency was not simply a matter of a man being married—a suggestion which was rejected by the Senate—but that he was the sole means of supporting his wife, children or other family. Any man who failed to report for examination when called was treated as if he had waived his right to claim any exemptions, was inducted into military service, and
subsequently considered delinquent from the service (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 23).

Each of 4,557 local selection boards heard an average of 70 cases per day, but it was not enough (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 22). Five days before the United States declared war on Germany, the RA strength was only 133,111 (Flynn 2002, 36). When war was declared, Congress authorized expanding the RA to 298,000 and the National Guard to 440,000 as well as authorizing the draft of 500,000 men into a new national army (Flynn 2002, 38). Taking advantage of the threat of conscription, both the RA and National Guard recruited nearly 700,000 volunteers before the first draft call. The quota for the first call was for 687,000 on 1 September, but only 180,000 draftees were delivered by then. By the end of 1917, only 500,000 were actually inducted as draftees. Eventually in 1917, three million men were called and about one third of those were rejected for physical and other reasons (Flynn 2002, 38). By the end of the war, 24 million men had been registered and about three million were inducted (Congressional Digest 1980, 100). Unlike the Civil War in which the draft’s main effect was to encourage voluntary enlistments, the armed forces of World War I were 72% conscripted (Flynn 2002, 38).

“Despite the advances in military technology, quantity had still been crucial in the conflict” and the draft system had proved its effectiveness in supplying that quantity of soldiers (Flynn 2002, 39). The military staff debated on how to most effectively use such large masses of available troops. There were basically two schools of thought. One was a cadre-conscription model, in which the RA would organize and train draftees into effective
units. The other was the citizen-soldier concept in which units mobilized, organized and trained as all-draftee units (Flynn 2002, 39).

In what amounted to a mid-term after action report, the Provost Marshal General reported to the Secretary of War on the results of the first draft under the Selective Service Act of 1917. He wrote, “On May 17, 1917, no advocate of military preparedness could with confidence have forecasted the success of a compulsory service law.” He was mostly impressed by the response of the American public, writing that “at the President’s call, all ranks of the Nation, reluctantly entering the war, nevertheless instantly responded to the first call of the Nation with a vigorous and unselfish cooperation that submerged all individual interest in a single endeavor toward the consummation of the national task.” The Provost Marshal General called the response of local officials and governors “inspiring” and claimed they could have accomplished the registration within a week of the draft bill’s signing had the president not declared 5 June to be registration day. Utilizing the already-established voter registration system was the key to the efficiency of the system, and 90% of registration returns were reported to Washington D.C. by telegraph in 48 hours.

Failure to report for registration was only a minor issue. The Department of Justice reported that through 1 December 1917 5,870 arrests were made for failure to register. Of those, 2,663 were released after having registered. And only 8.2% of registrants failed to appear when called. Aside from simply ignoring the call to report, one reason cited was already having enlisted in either the Army or Navy--or the armies of Canada, Great Britain or France--and failing to inform the local board. Another reason was due to mail problems--either giving the board an improper or insufficient address or
having a foreign name “unfamiliar to English spelling” (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 24).

One of the Provost Marshal General’s major concerns involved exemptions. He warned of the danger of allowing too many groups to be exempt from service. If every group that desired exemption was allowed it, the system of selection would fail and, if the system failed, “the Nation must confess its inadequacy in the virility of fighting Nations of the world” (Report of the Provost Marshal General 1918, 34). The Provost Marshal General recommended a change to the regulations to determine the relative qualifications and domestic situation of each man called and then to classify him accordingly into one of five classes. Finally, he recommended using the classifications as a basis for the way draft call quotas were determined. Initially quotas for men called were based on gross population in an area. That figure was already skewed by non-citizens being counted as part of the population but not required to register for the draft. With the implementation of the new classification system, the Provost Marshal General recommended that quotas subsequently be based on the proportion of men of a given class in any particular locale.

Conscription ended in the United States with the signing of the armistice on 11 November 1918. The United States military reverted to an all-volunteer system and would remain as such until 1940.

The Greatest Generation (World War II)

During the 1920s military needs received little attention as policies of noninvolvement and isolationism were favored by both political parties. The National Defense Act of 1920 described a citizen-soldier force, but made no allowance for compulsory service. In 1926, a Joint Army Navy Selective Service Committee (JANSSC)
drafted a conscription bill under the assumption that a “draft law would be passed only after a declaration of emergency and that the system would follow the World War I scheme” (Flynn 2002, 57). The system would again be a selective system that included deferments for key personnel. As the United States entered the depression, even less attention was given to the military. By 1930, JANSSC had developed a basic organization that utilized reserve personnel to operate a future draft.

Despite being ready to implement a new conscription program if necessary, there were concerns about enacting it during peacetime. A strong pacifist movement had developed in the country and the expectation was that many churches would oppose conscription. In 1934 General Douglas MacArthur warned that “the traditions of our people” permit “no type of compulsory military service in time of peace” (Flynn 2002, 58). The strategic plan between 1937 and 1939 was called the Protective Mobilization Plan and was based on the mission of the Army being restricted to the defense of the United States and its territories. It called for mobilizing the Regular Army (RA) and National Guard into an initial protective force of 400,000 troops. After the plan was in place for eight months, the strength would be increased to 700,000. Still holding onto the idea of reviving conscription in 1939, the War Department sought the counsel of Hugh Johnson, a former draft official during World War I. Johnson’s advice was to keep the idea “in the dark,” saying there was “little hope” of passing a peacetime conscription bill (Flynn 2002, 59).

When Europe went to war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt remained committed to the policy of isolationism but revised existing neutrality laws to allow aid to Britain and France. Even into 1940, Americans wanted to stay out of the European war. A March
1940 poll showed 96.4% of Americans opposed going to war with Germany (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 8). Most citizens advocated sending aid to our friends in Europe, but not troops. In April the House Appropriations Committee cut the defense budget by 10%.

Americans believed that the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans could protect the nation but, with Hitler’s aggression in Europe causing fear and rising concerns for national security, “old notions of American invulnerability gave way to nightmares of totalitarian menace from abroad” (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 6). A Gallup poll in June 1940 indicated that 65% of Americans felt if Britain and France fell, Germany would attack the United States. Five out of eight thought the US would go to war in Europe eventually despite the intent to stay out of it. But only 1 in 14 advocated declaring war on Germany. (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 13).

Public support for compulsory service was up to 64% in June from 50% in May, but the War Department was still reluctant to go forward with a peacetime conscription act until a group of preparedness-minded civilians developed a plan and began lobbying for compulsory military service. The group was led by Grenville Clark and included other former members of the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) from pre-World War I days. Essentially “the Selective Service Act of 1940 was conceived, written, and lobbied through Congress by a determined group of private citizens who had no formal connection with the government” (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 5). Clark’s plan centered on a huge initial registration and blanket deferments based on occupation. Army planners recognized some obvious defects in the Clark plan and the final version looked very much like the JANSSC and War Department plan.
Opponents of the revived draft expressed sentiments similar to those of World War I draft opponents. Some said the United States was “imitating totalitarian governments abroad” (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 4). Nebraska Senator George W. Norris called it “a step in the direction of fastening a dictatorship upon the American Government in time of peace” (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 4). There were some people who thought that President Roosevelt was using the idea of preparedness as a back door into war, despite his intention to only draft for defensive purposes. With the nation still at peace, it was deemed necessary to resort to a wartime measure to raise an army large enough to defend American interests at home. The draft bill was signed into law on 16 September 1940.

The draft legislation established by the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act were similar to those of World War I. The War Department established local boards with the power to call and classify men for active service. The local boards were loosely under the control of state boards, which reported to a national headquarters. Appeal boards were established for every 600,000 draftees. These were supposed to minimize the variance in the interpretation of national guidelines by the decentralized nature of the boards. Civilian control was again emphasized. The system that was established was a civilian-military hybrid. It was operated by civilians, but reserve officers staffed the national headquarters, and eventually the director was a general. The director could be a military officer, but he had to be outside of the military chain of command. Clarence Dykstra was the director of Selective Service in 1940. He described the system as “supervised decentralization--the selection of men by their neighbors and fellow citizens” (Flynn 2002, 99).
In 1940 men between the ages of 21 and 36 were required to register. By the end of the war men registered at 18 years old and were called up at 19. However, the military found little use for men over 26, so the effective age of draftees in World War II ranged from 18 to 26 (Flynn 2002, 99). Draftees only had to complete 12 months of training but were then subject to ten years of reserve duty (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 3).

On 16 October 1940, 16 million American men registered at their local election headquarters. President Roosevelt proclaimed that action demonstrated “the singleness of our will and the unity of the nation” (Flynn 2002, 100). Sticking with his intent to use draftees only for defensive purposes, he also promised “I have said this before, but I will say it again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars” (Clifford and Spencer 1986, 3). The 6,400 local draft boards assigned a number to each man registered and a national lottery was conducted to determine the order those men would be called for examination.

The lottery was only used for the first few draft calls. After that, men registered upon reaching 18 and were called based on oldest first (Flynn 2002, 100). The number of men called was determined by a national quota system. The quota system originated with the War Department which determined the number of soldiers it needed. The director of Selective Service computed the states’ requirements after deducting for deferments and giving credits for voluntary enlistments. A state’s requirement was split proportionately amongst the local boards by a ratio of registrants in the jurisdiction of the local board relative to the total registrants in the state. Finally, the local board called men in for examination and classification.
The system got off to a slow start. Rejection rates were high and time was needed to build up the facilities and personnel needed to train the draftees. Voluntary enlistments were still permitted, which caused problems with manpower management. The Army allowed voluntary enlistments because they enabled the Army to take advantage of “patriotic fever” for enlistments. By February 1941, only 100,000 of the requested 240,000 were inducted (Flynn 2002, 102). By mid-summer, four million men had been called and classified, but only 402,000 had been inducted (Flynn 2002, 103).

Cooperation between the civilian boards and the military was good throughout the war with some minor exceptions. The military resented any deferments other than those that directly benefited defense. The civilian physicians thought the military physicians’ standards at the induction centers were too high. An initial screening was conducted by the local board. When a man passed that, he reported to an Army induction center to be examined by a military physician. 15% of the men who passed the local screening were rejected by the Army physicians. Since the local boards had already weeded out 40% of the men they examined, this amounted to 55% being classified unfit for duty (Flynn 2002, 101). A peacetime army could afford a high rejection rate and seek out the best candidates, but men being turned back caused disruption with the boards trying to meet a specified quota and manage their classifications.

“In theory, the classification system seemed unambiguous...[it] originated with national headquarters” (Flynn 2002, 101). The primary classifications were:

- I-A: immediately available for service
- II: deferred (for example II-B was essential job)
- III: deferred due to dependency or hardship
Most classifications were routine, unless a man claimed a deferment. Local draft boards investigated the nature of a deferment claim using local resources available. For instance, if a man claimed a dependency deferment, the board could contact the local welfare office. To substantiate a job deferment, the board could contact the man’s employer—although it was often the employer who initiated the deferment request. Board officials used schools, local police and other local institutions, and even questioned the registrant himself.

There was a price to be paid for using a system of individual case-by-case deferments as opposed to blanket deferments. The boards had to keep updating and reclassifying the registrants. If a man had a deferment to complete his education, the board would have to reclassify him upon his graduation. A single man who got married and started a family might have to be reclassified. The boards knew that deferring one man meant that some other mother’s son had to go fight, and perhaps die, in his place. It was a responsibility the board members took very seriously.

Throughout the history of the system, board members interpreted national guidelines in their own ways. Sometimes a board might be unwilling to grant a deferment to a young single man if it meant calling an older married man with dependents. In February 1942 the director issued a ruling to classify movie actors and journalists as essential workers. The public complained, and the boards simply ignored the ruling. A similar situation occurred with professional athletes and national headquarters backed off (Flynn 2002, 103). When it came to interpretation of race issues, the Selective Service
System tried to operate more liberally than other public institutions. There were 250 African-Americans serving on local draft boards, 624 serving as advisers, 30 as appeal agents, and 486 physicians and dentists. Despite Jim Crow laws being in effect in most of the country, the draft law specifically prohibited racial discrimination. But the military was segregated, so there were race-specific draft calls. African-American draftees could only serve in the six African-American units which existed in the Army in 1940 or in one of the segregated units being developed. African-American draftees who were sent to the induction center before segregated units or facilities existed to accept them were rejected (Flynn 2002, 103).

Rates of compliance with the draft were high. Failing or refusing to register or serve in the armed forces constituted a draft law violation. Knowingly providing counsel or assisting a person to evade registration or service was also a violation. Draft law violations carried a $10,000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both. Peer pressure and board members belonging to the community helped keep compliance rates high. Some citizens volunteered to round up “shirkers,” and a New York draft official encouraged veterans’ organizations to check young men for draft cards. Activities such as these were generally kept to a minimum. The Justice Department investigated 10,000 alleged cases of draft violations, but only made 116 convictions by June 1941. As they were during World War I, many cases were simply a problem with the mail or ignorance of the law. In January 1941, President Roosevelt issued an order that allowed anyone convicted of violating the draft law to be paroled into military service (Flynn 2002, 102).

The United States fought World War II with a civilian-soldier military. Over ten million men were inducted out of a total force of 16,354,000. Draftees were used in all
services and units, but for the first time all-draftee units were used--55 divisions were manned as such. The draftee divisions had a 12 month training requirement directed by the War Department and therefore did not face the enemy until 1944, but draftees in other units served much earlier.

The World Wars in the first half of the 20th century were total wars that involved the fully mobilized nation. Over the next three decades, the system of selective service was tested (and eventually beaten) by limited mobilizations for limited, unpopular wars.

The Forgotten War (Korea)

With the end of World War II in both Europe and Asia in 1945, Americans expected to return to peacetime conditions and an immediate end of conscription as it had happened after World War I. However, conscription did not end the day peace was signed to close the war. The system remained active and provided replacements for occupying forces in Europe and Japan. However, Congress did not renew the draft legislation after the war and it expired on 31 March 1947. The American military was once again volunteer-only. Yet, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 committed the United States to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressure” (Flynn 2002, 71). This policy essentially ensured the Armed Forces would continue to find employment across the globe.

Over considerable congressional opposition, the draft was revived in 1948 after only a brief hiatus. In response to unsettled conditions in the world, President Truman called for an extension of the draft in 1950. At the same time, he cut the Armed Forces by 200,000 personnel. The two decisions may have seemed counterintuitive, but sustaining
the draft and shrinking the total end-strength saved money. It allowed Truman to lower defense spending by stimulating enlistments without raising pay or benefits.

Congress was hesitant about extending the draft law, yet a public opinion poll in January showed 57% in favor of continuing the draft for another three years (Flynn 2002, 71). The Cold War and Soviet occupations in Europe were making the draft an acceptable institution after having been called “un-American” only ten years prior. Congress had been offering the president only a temporary extension of the draft bill, until North Korea attacked across the 38th Parallel in June 1950. Six hundred reserve units were called up for active service. Many of them were under strength, under trained, and unfit for deployment. Veterans who staffed these units complained about being recalled. A call for volunteers failed. Congress passed a draft law that resembled the existing system with very little changes (Flynn 2002, 72).

The selective service system that had been developed before World War II and refined during the war was the same basic system used throughout the 20th century. During the Korean War, men aged 18 to 26 were required to register. The tour of duty for draftees was initially 21 months (it later became 24 months) followed by a reserve obligation of six years. A man could not be inducted until he was 19 years old, but he could enlist voluntarily at 18 (Flynn 2002, 105).

The call-up process was also nearly identical to that of World War II. The local board prepared a monthly list of eligible men, oldest first. Upon receipt of their quota the board members selected names from the top of the list. Men with deferments were passed over. Notices were sent out and men had ten days in which to report. If a man passed the
physical, he was ordered to report for induction. If a man failed to report for examination or induction, he was prosecuted for draft law violation (Flynn 2002, 105).

The draft system had not changed very much, but the mission of the Army had. A mass mobilization was not needed and there were more men reaching draft age than the military had use for. Inductions continued, but at reduced rates. The system of selection became more of a system for managing deferments than for inducting soldiers. During the war, college students were deferred only until the end of the academic year. After 1953 they were deferred until they completed their degree (Flynn 2002, 105).

After World War II and through the Korean War the draft fulfilled its mission of providing men to the military directly and also by indirectly spurring enlistments (see Table 1). It was a system that was designed for total mobilization and was then expected to support a limited war of a much smaller scale. In the first three months of the war only 180,000 were inducted. The limiting factor was not the selection system, but rather the training capability of the armed forces. Basic training for draftees was 14 weeks, but it was shortened to six and the system could handle the greater inflow of draftees. When the Chinese entered the conflict on the side of North Korea draft calls increased. 260,000 men were called from March to June in 1951. The system performed so well that by June the Army was faced with the problem of being over its authorized strength (Flynn 2002, 73).
Table 1. Enlisted Men Entries by Source (in thousands) (Flynn 2002, 74, Table 5.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Enlistees</th>
<th>Draftees</th>
<th>Reserve</th>
<th>% Draftees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>281</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>564</td>
<td></td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The system functioned smoothly throughout the war. By June 1952, 13.2 million men had registered with 4.6 million deferred or rejected, but the pool was sufficient to meet the needs of the military. Not only did the draft provide men to the military, but it provided a higher quality of soldier. Commanders in Korea testified to the “superior quality of draftees as combat soldiers” (Flynn 2002, 73). A Department of Defense (DoD) study found that draftees outranked enlistees both in efficiency and discipline. It also showed that draftees were more likely to complete their two-year obligation than enlistees were to complete their three-year tour (Flynn 2002, 73).

By 1952, President Truman’s popularity was declining and there was growing disenchantment over the “unwinnable” war in Korea, but there was little criticism of the draft. Low draft calls combined with ample deferment opportunities resulted in a favorable opinion of the draft. It was a trend that continued into the early 1960s, but was not a prediction of things to come during the Vietnam. “The Vietnam conflict proved to be the occasion for both the resurrection of the draft and also for its destruction” (Flynn 2002, 74).
The Last Draft (Vietnam)

In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson directed DoD to conduct a study on the current manpower procurement system. At the time, enlisted personnel entered the services by a combination of volunteerism and partial conscription. President Johnson was interested in whether or not it was feasible to man the military totally with volunteers. The study resulted in what may seem like some fairly obvious conclusions. During times when civilian unemployment rates are higher, it was projected that there would be more volunteers entering the military (Table 2). It further determined that during periods of higher world tensions and therefore a higher likelihood of being drafted, voluntary enlistments would be lower. Fall and spring quarters of the year seemed to have higher enlistment rates than summer and winter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>18-19 Year Old Male Population</th>
<th>5.5% Unemployment Level</th>
<th>4.0% Unemployment Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Other Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>3,875</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>4,090</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>4,255</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Projected Supply of Enlisted Volunteers with a Draft, FY 1970-75 (In Thousands) (Altman and Fechter 1967, Table 1)

For officers, the study found similar results. At the time, some colleges and universities required all physically able men to enroll in the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), while at other schools enrolling in ROTC was voluntary. In either case, an ROTC student was not required to accept a commission upon his graduation. The DoD study projected that pressure of the draft led more ROTC candidates to seek
commissions. This is an understandable conclusion--if a man was going to have to serve anyway, he might as well do it as an officer.

The bottom line of the study for President Johnson was that changing to an all-volunteer system to man the armed forces would have an adverse effect. If there was no draft, not only would the services lose their numbers of inductees but voluntary enlistments would drop. Table 3 shows that better educated (some college or more, or scoring in Mental Groups I and II) and slightly older men (20 to 25-year olds) were less likely to enlist without an active draft.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Yes, Definitely</th>
<th>Yes, Probably</th>
<th>No, Probably</th>
<th>No, Definitely</th>
<th>No Idea</th>
<th>Draft Motivated³</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>8.9</td>
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* The questions asked, “If there had been no draft and you had not had any military obligation at the time you first entered Active Military Service, do you think you would have entered the service?”

1 Number answering “No probably” or “No definitely” as a percent of the total, excluding “No idea”

2 At the time of entry on active military service


Table 3. Responses of Regular Enlisted Personnel on Their First Tour of Active Duty to “Would You Have Enlisted if There Had Been No Draft?” - by Selected Characteristics (Per cent Distribution) (Altman and Fechter 1967, Table 3)
In 1963 the draft enjoyed a favorable reputation in America and it “seemed as permanent as the Post Office” (Flynn 2002, 75). There was little activity and a huge demographic pool from which to draw. The registration age was still 18 and men were liable to call-up between 18 1/2 and 26 years old. The tour of duty for draftees was 24 months plus a reserve obligation. Call-up and examination procedures were identical to those used during the Korean War and in the decade since. But from 1955 to 1964 there were only about 10,000 inductions per month. The force stood at approximately 2.7 million with another 3 million in reserve (Flynn 2002, 74). It was a force that was committed to the United States policy of containing Communism.

There had been a significant demographic change in America since the Korean War. The number of 19 to 25-year old males increased from around 8 million in 1958 to nearly 12 million by 1964. Deferment could make a man eligible up to age 35, but men over 26 were rarely accepted into the service. In 1964, a total of 16,834,000 men were registered and 12.8 million of those had deferments (Flynn 2002, 75). When the possibility of call-up grew, the number of applications for deferment grew as well.

As draft calls drastically increased in 1966 and after, men began trying to find more ways of escaping a 1-A classification. Many (2.4 million) were below acceptable physical standards (classified 1-Y) and the Armed Forces refused to accept them or anyone over 26 years old (Flynn 2002, 77). With more men trying to beat the system and use loopholes to avoid service, it became more difficult to obtain deferments. The number of classification appeals increased more than they had during Korea or World War II as support of the war declined.
By June 1969 there were 98 appeals per 1,000 1-A classified registrants as compared to 47 per 1,000 in 1953. By comparison, the number was only three per 1,000 at the end of World War II (Flynn 2002, 77). In the summer of 1966 local draft boards began to call men who were other than single non-students. An order of call was established that included delinquents, volunteers, singles, and men who had gotten married after August 1965. It also included men who were over 26 years old or between 18 1/2 and 19, starting with the youngest first (Flynn 2002, 77). Local boards were operating the same as they had during the Korean War and the classification system was the same. Now however, the system that had seemed fair and had been designed to protect families, education, and communities seemed like class discrimination. Draft card burning and protest became common antiwar actions.

The percentage of draftees in the total force as well as troops in combat was much higher in Korea and World War II than in Vietnam. Only 40% of the total forces in Vietnam were draftees. Of the six million active duty soldiers who saw duty in Vietnam only 25% were drafted. But the draftee served harder in Vietnam than in Korea or World War II. Most of the infantry troops in Vietnam were draftees. In 1969 that number was 88% as compared to 16% of the total force in theater that were draftees. 70% of the combat deaths in 1969 were draftees (Flynn 2002, 76).

Although the draft was accomplishing its mission for the military, it began to lose support in Washington, D.C. The draft had become a partisan target. Republicans could oppose the draft or call for its reform as a means of opposing President Johnson without outwardly opposing the war. Johnson had to have a draft law to be able to continue the
war in Vietnam. His efforts to create national guidelines, reduce student deferments, and to implement a lottery system were all rejected by Congress (Flynn 2002, 78).

What was lost in all the protest was that the draft system worked well. It was designed to provide manpower to the military, and it did. It was designed to ensure community commitment to the fight, and it did. Until “the community consensus on the war broke down” and the draft became “one of the first institutions to reflect this failure” (Flynn 2002, 76).

The All-Volunteer Force and the Global War on Terrorism

The root cause of the protest was the disenchantment with the conflict in Vietnam and the draft, as an institutional symbol of that conflict, bore the brunt of the protest. The draft system had still maintained favor with the American public through the early years of the war, but as the war went on the popularity of the draft faded. In a December 1965 poll of high school juniors and seniors, 61% felt the draft was fair. A national poll in October of the following year indicated that 69% of the American public agreed that all able-bodied 18 year-old men should be required to serve in the Armed Forces. By 1969 only about 50% of the population continued to support the draft (Flynn 2002, 228). In author George Flynn’s mind “ending the war would have ended the protest, even if the draft continued” (Flynn 2002, 255). When Richard Nixon was elected President, he took the opposite approach--first he ended the draft, then the war.

As Vice President running to succeed President Eisenhower in 1960, Richard Nixon was a staunch supporter of the draft and called it “indispensable” (Flynn 2002, 235). When he again sought the Presidency in 1968, his staff pointed out that going against the draft would gain him a positive image, especially among the college crowd. In
response to charges from his opponent, Nelson Rockefeller, that he was a supporter of the draft. Nixon “insisted that he wanted an all-volunteer force as soon as the war was over and, if elected, would move to reform the current system” (Flynn 2002, 237). Upon winning the election, President Nixon quickly took measures to decrease the political problems of the war, the antiwar protests, and the draft. He immediately called for reform of the draft system that included a lottery system to determine order of call, and he called for a full study on ending conscription.

On 27 March 1969, President Richard Nixon announced the creation of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force whose purpose it was to eliminate conscription as the primary force-manning system of the United States Armed Forces. The Commission was headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates and was therefore commonly called “The Gates Commission.” As directed by President Nixon, it was the Gates Commission’s charge to develop a plan for “moving toward an all-volunteer armed force.” Included in this primary task were secondary considerations for the Gates Commission to study. They would look at increased pay, benefits, and recruiting incentives that would make a career in the military a viable option for young men. Naturally, they would study the cost benefits of changing from the draft to an all-volunteer system. In a broader sense, the Commission was tasked to study the social and economic implications that an all-volunteer system would have on society. And finally, the Gates Commission was directed to recommend a “standby” draft system to be enacted in the event of a national emergency (Gates 1970, iii).
Thomas Gates’s introductory letter to *The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force* (more commonly known as “The Gates Commission Report”) of 20 February 1970 stated the following conclusion:

> We unanimously believe that the nation’s best interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts...We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on our military as well as the rest of society (Gates 1970, iii).

The transition from a draft force to an all-volunteer force in the early 1970s was not a particularly smooth one. Then, in 1975, President Ford suspended the requirement for men to register with the Selective Service Administration. With developments in world events that included the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, President Carter reinstated the registration requirement. His original proposal would also have required women to register, as their roles in the military and society were growing. That idea became lost in debates over women in combat, and Congress limited draft registration to men only (Solomon 2003). It has been a requirement for 18-year old men to register with the Selective Service Administration ever since.

The AVF proved itself in the limited conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s, including an overwhelming victory against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, Representatives Nick Smith (R-Mich.) and Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) introduced the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 2001. Their bill would have instituted the conscription of all male citizens and residents between the ages of 18 and 22 for one year of compulsory military training. It was
strongly opposed by the Pentagon as well as antimilitarists and it “died in committee” (Schaeffer-Duffy 2003).

More than a year later, and just prior to the start of ground combat in Iraq in March 2003, Representative Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) introduced a new draft legislation bill. The Universal Service Act of 2003 would have required two years of compulsory military or civilian service by all American men, women, and legal permanent residents between the ages of 18 and 26. The method of selection and required number would be determined by the President, with deferments limited only to those who were completing high school, up to age 20. There would be no exemptions or deferments for college or graduate students. In October 2004, the Universal Service Act of 2003 was defeated in the House of Representatives by a vote of 402-2 (Moniz 2004). Despite both Presidential candidates, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry, having said they were opposed to reinstituting a draft, each party accused the other of using draft rumors and debate as a way to influence the election.

Representative Rangel said his bill was a way to get Americans to think about sharing the burdens of war. “Everyone who loves this country is bound by patriotic duty to defend it, or to share in the sacrifice of those placed in harm’s way” (Scaeffer-Duffy 2003). He noted that only a few members of Congress have children serving in the military. Representative Rangel believed that if those who were calling to go to war knew that their children would likely be placed at risk by their decision, they would have a greater appreciation of the consequences of their decisions and be more cautious in their use of military force. He felt that service in the Armed Forces is no longer a common experience. There is a need to return to the “tradition of the citizen soldier” and make
available an alternative of national service for those who cannot physically or conscientiously serve in the military (Rangel 2004, 142).

Representative Pete Stark (D-Ca.) supported Representative Rangel’s bill and agreed with his views that returning to a draft would share the burdens of war more equitably across society. Especially with those who make the decisions to go to war. Representative Stark wrote (directed at his fellow members of Congress), “It won’t be us mourning the loss of a child or loved one. Maybe some of you in this Congress would think twice about voting for war in Iraq if you knew your child may be sent to fight in the streets of Baghdad.” (Stark 2004, 146).

Mr. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Adviser of the Center for American Progress, supported a return to the draft even before Representative Rangel’s bill. Mr. Korb’s view was that the Armed Forces were undermanned before becoming involved in the GWOT and the only way to resolve their “serious shortages” was to bring back the draft. He felt that a return to the draft would “dramatically upgrade” the quality of forces because it would provide the military with access to a truer cross-section of the nation’s youth. He stated the educational and moral quality of enlisted soldiers had dropped in the last decade. Mr. Korb noted that over one-third of recruits failed to complete their voluntary enlistments as compared to one in ten draftees who did not complete their obligations during the last draft. “It’s much better to have most soldiers serve a short term honorably than to have large cohorts discharged for cause,” he wrote (Korb 2004, 148).

Mr. Korb’s recommendation for a 21st century draft is based on four points: 1) men only, but women should be allowed to volunteer, 2) active duty service should be short--perhaps 18 months, 3) active duty service would be followed by assignment to the
USAR or ARNG, and 4) easy options for alternative but equally demanding civilian service should be provided for Conscientious Objectors and those who would not make decent servicemen. He further recommended a “two-track” pay system wherein long-term voluntary enlistees would be paid better than short-term draftees. Mr. Korb suggested that if the draft were reinstated, selection should begin with the “top of the social ladder--who better to serve a short term for their country than those benefiting most from living here?” (Korb 2004, 148).

Representative Ron Paul (R-Tx.) did not hold those same opinions. He argued that conscription violates the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and the “prohibition of involuntary servitude” but that this has been ignored so many times in the past that few would challenge the constitutionality of a renewed draft (Paul 2004, 145). Representative Paul compared conscripted soldiers to slaves, saying that conscripted soldiers were better off in the long run because their “enslavement” was only temporary. He also believed that conscripted soldiers are worse off in the short run than slaves because at least slave owners had an economic interest in their slaves’ lives. Soldiers were meant to put their lives at risk (Paul 2004, 145).

Representative Paul called the idea that an 18-year old owes service to his country “hogwash.” It could as easily be said that a 50-year old “chicken hawk” who promotes war and places the danger on the younger men owes more. “Forced servitude with risk of death and serious injury as a price to live free makes no sense,” wrote Representative Paul. His view was that all drafts are unfair and discriminatory by nature, since not all 18 and 19-year olds are ever needed. The elite quickly learn how to avoid service and the burden then falls on the less fortunate (Paul 2004, 145).
Similar to the sentiment expressed by some during the Vietnam Conflict, Representative Paul felt that without conscription unpopular wars are more difficult to sustain. He gave credit to the undermining of the draft in the late 1960s and early 1970s with bringing about the end of the war. His view was that unpopular wars, like the current war in Iraq, invite conscription because volunteering decreases and truly just wars bolster popular support. Representative Paul said that “liberty cannot be preserved by tyranny” and “a free society must always resort to volunteers” (Paul 2004, 147).

Mr. Joe Volk, Executive Secretary of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, held that Representative Rangel introduced his bill in order to provoke public debate about current U.S. foreign and military policies. Mr. Volk felt that resuming a military draft was not the answer to prevent a war, if that was the desired result. He did not even agree that it was a good way to promote the “shared sacrifice” others thought was needed. As Mr. Volk pointed out, history has shown the privileged have always found a way to avoid service.

Mr. John Judge, cofounder of the 9/11 Citizens Watch, agreed that the burden of military duty is not shared equally. His view was that volunteering for service appeals to many as a way to improve their economic and educational standing. Despite extremely limited deferment options, a draft today would be just as discriminatory of class and race as it ever was. Mr. Judge also felt that a draft would provide an unlimited supply of manpower and encourage the use of the military abroad rather than give the President and Congress cause to think twice about it. His view was that the solution is not in the draft, but rather in the nature of the U.S. military itself. The country’s Armed Forces have been engaged around the world since the end of World War II, not merely for defense of the
nation, but in containment policies in both overt wars and covert operations. The real solution to stemming the use of the military is to make the Pentagon and the military truly democratic institutions. What Mr. Judge had in mind was the size and budget of the military, its roles and proper functions, and which wars it should carry out should all be decided by the public instead of a few individuals behind closed doors (Judge 2004, 153).

Mr. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, referred to the quality of the military rather than their usage, saying bringing back the draft “would be a very bad idea--the equivalent of replacing the New York Yankees with a bunch of middle-aged weekend softball players” (O’Hanlon 2004, 157). He did see a need to consider new ways to attract people to military service, but not to conscript them. He said today’s military is outstanding, and cautioned against fixing something that isn’t broken. Mr. O’Hanlon said that after three decades the AVF has transitioned to a truly professional force and is the best in world history. He held that there is not an excessive misrepresentation of minorities, but rather the military was one of the most integrated and equitable institutions in the country. Also, he noted that military service provides good opportunities for disadvantaged members of society and that should not be taken away in an attempt to make the military more “diverse” (O’Hanlon 2004, 159). Mr. O’Hanlon feared that returning to the draft would risk a return to the “hollow Army” of the 1970s, and that it would “go against the grain” of virtually all major NATO countries who have recently recognized that a draft does not produce high quality forces.

Not all of the recent draft debate has come from in and around the beltway, and neither has it only been as a result of the GWOT. Author Stephen Ambrose (Citizen
Soldiers, Band of Brothers) was a supporter of the military and those who serve in it. In 1999, he published an article lamenting that fewer people serving in the armed forces has a negative impact on society. Recruiting numbers were down, he wrote, because civilian employment offered better opportunities. It offered better pay, better hours, and more predictability—essentially a better life, in most people’s view. This results in many recruits coming from the “poorer end of our society” and staying in the service longer. That is good for the Army, but creates a growing trend of the military being separated from society. Ambrose wrote about the way large numbers of World War II soldiers from every walk of life, placed together in often difficult situations, created a common bond between them. Regardless of where they came from, what their race was or which religion they practiced, their experiences in training, living in close quarters and even combat brought them together. It was his thought that we need to recapture something like that again.

Mr. Ambrose believed today’s young adults are only interested in what they are entitled to whether or not they’ve done anything to earn it. He was fearful of America’s youth growing up without a sense of a common past, which was provided in our fathers’ and grandfathers’ times by military service. According to Ambrose, we no longer have the need for a large standing army so returning to the draft and putting everyone in a military uniform is not the answer. What is needed, however, is some form of national service that requires high school graduates to serve one year between high school and college. It is effective in Europe, where teens work in a variety of services from building levees to assisting in hospitals. Mr. Ambrose felt that this is the way to cure some of society’s ills and help to boost the military’s sagging recruiting, as many young people
would choose to serve in the military and it would bring back a “sadly lacking” sense of patriotism.

Summary and Conclusion

The debate over how best to manage the nation’s military manpower began with our forefathers granting Congress the power “to raise and support armies” and has hardly eased since. The draft riots in New York City during the Civil War provided key learning points on which the manpower management policies of the early 20th century were based, particularly with regards to exemptions from service. As the country became embroiled in World War I, the only logical method by which to raise the massive amounts of manpower needed was by conscription. It was the same just prior to the nation’s entry into World War II. Since these wars were so heavily supported by the public and involved the essential mobilization and sacrifice of nearly every citizen and industry, the draft was supported and military service was popular.

After World War II, President Truman needed to continue drafting soldiers into the Army to support the United States’ policy of Communist containment. During the 1950s and early 1960s, liability for military service was accepted as a part of being an American citizen. Later in the 1960s, as the war in Vietnam dragged on and American casualties mounted, antiwar sentiment grew. As an obvious symbol of the administration and the war, the draft system became the target of many antiwar protests. When Richard Nixon ran for President, he vowed to put an end to an unpopular war and the increasingly unpopular institution of the draft. Upon taking office, he made good on that promise by forming the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, chaired by former
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. The Gates Commission’s report was the final nail in the coffin of the draft being used to man the United States Armed Forces.

Over the three decades since, the AVF has become stronger and smaller, based on advancing technologies and a lack of significant adversaries. That force is now involved in a protracted war which has put a severe strain on the limits of the Army. Some have called for reinstatement of the draft. Naturally, there are others who oppose such an idea. Despite its name, the GWOT is not a global war in the sense that World Wars I and II were. It is more similar to the limited scope conflicts of Korea and Vietnam. Initially popular, both the GWOT and President Bush have lost favor in the public opinion--also similar to the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Based on many of the lessons learned and issues surrounding the history and implementation of the draft system, over the following chapters, this study continues to examine whether or not the idea of bringing back conscription as a means of manning the Army is feasible or necessary.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Wise men say, and not without reason, that whosoever wishes to foresee the future might consult the past.

Nicolo Maciavelli, The Prince.

Since 1973, the draft has ceased to be an institution in the United States and it is therefore impossible to conduct a first-hand analysis of the system. The historical research conducted and described to this point has examined how the system was implemented in the past. Based on records and writings by others who have studied the draft, the development and implementation of the Selective Service System as we know it today is laid out in the previous chapter. This is the starting point for the analysis of whether or not it is feasible to reinstate the draft today. The historical examination of the draft system in the United States identified some common issues throughout the administration of the draft. It also identified some issues that developed due to changing political, societal, and military conditions. These issues are analyzed using a Historical-Comparative methodology.

Historical-Comparative methodology is a qualitative analytical method. Qualitative analyses are those in which the data are more words than numbers, and are more subjective than objective. They are less structured than quantitative analysis and strive to look beyond the numbers to understand the context and meaning of phenomena. Qualitative research “frequently falls within the context of discovery rather than verification” and is “not necessarily guided by ‘traditional’ perspectives” (Ambert et al. 1995, 880).
Historical-Comparative methodology is the process of analyzing specific aspects of society over time. In this particular study, it is the analysis of the draft system over the course of the 20th century and its implementation during four major conflicts—World War I, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Thus far, the historical study of conscription in the United States shows that it was successful in providing the necessary manpower to fight the nation’s wars. Nonetheless, it was ended during the Vietnam Conflict and has not been reinstated since. *The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Force* (1970) provided the rationale for President Nixon to end the draft, and will now be used as a framework for determining whether or not it is feasible to reinstate the draft in 2006.

**Analyzing Conscription**

The Gates Commission report is divided into two sections. Part I is the summary of findings and issues and is the section of the report that will be used as the framework for analysis. Part II is the more detailed discussions which led to the commission’s conclusions of Part I. The Gates Commission report addressed several common arguments against transitioning from a conscription-based system to an all-volunteer force. Included among those arguments are issues such as equity, pay, cost, and flexibility. All of those arguments are discussed in detail in Chapter 4 in the same order the Gates Commission addressed them in their report. The analysis that follows compares the Gates Commission’s arguments against those same arguments made using current data to determine whether the same findings should be accepted today or if the all-volunteer system has run its course after three decades. The historical-comparative analysis of the Gates Commission Report draws on a variety of sources of current
information which include U.S. Census Bureau data, Department of the Army documents and information, Department of Defense documents and information, the Selective Service System, and Gallup polls.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

When reconsidering the Gates Commission report, it is important to acknowledge the wholly different circumstances which warrant that study’s reanalysis. In the three decades that have passed since the Gates Commission’s report the world, the country, and the Army have all changed. The population of the United States has grown from 205 million in 1970 to an estimated 295.5 million at the end of 2005 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006). While the total population of the United States has grown in size by almost half, the personnel strength of the active component of the US Army has shrunk by almost two-thirds. Part of the reasoning behind downsizing the Army (and the Armed Forces as a whole) is the dramatic improvements in technology. Another part is the increased use of civilians and contractors to perform many of the functions that were formerly performed by soldiers. However the most significant aspect of the ever-shrinking Army is the changes in the world and national security posture that have taken place since the end of the Vietnam Conflict.

During the Cold War our country’s primary adversary was the Soviet Union. Beginning with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, our priority for defense was to contain Communism, prevent its further spread in the world, and to support smaller countries which were faced with the threat of Communist takeover. That was the world for which Thomas Gates and his commission on an AVF were planning. Without attempting to assess the size of the Armed Forces necessary to defend the Nation and the World, the Gates Commission used a range of estimations from two to three million men (Gates
Based on the information at the time, those were probably sufficient numbers. There is no way the Commission could have anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991.

The mission of the United States Army has always basically been the same—provide land combat power in defense of the nation and its interests. More often than not since the 1970’s, defending the nation’s interests has consisted of limited conflicts and operations other than war (OOTW). OOTW have gone by several names over time and are currently called Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. As of 1 April 2006, the U.S. Army has over 160,000 Soldiers deployed in more than ten countries around the world performing a range of missions including SSTR and Humanitarian Assistance operations (Army Times, 10 April 2006, 7).

Gates Commission Revisited

Part I of the Gates Commission Report is subdivided into two primary parts. The first deals with the question “Is an all-volunteer force feasible?” (Gates 1970, 1) The Commission determined how many additional new recruits would have to be attracted to military service each year in order to maintain force strengths of 2 million, 2.5 million, and 3 million personnel. Using the mid-range figure for explanation purposes, the Commission determined that 440,000 new enlisted men would be required each year if conscription were continued. Then taking into account lower turnover rates if the draft were discontinued, that figure drops to 325,000 per year. The fact was that the majority of the forces were actually composed of volunteers, with about 500,000 having volunteered in the few years prior to the Commission’s report. It was the Commission’s “best estimates” that half of those were “true volunteers,” meaning they were not draft-
motivated to enlist voluntarily. Based on those numbers, the Gates Commission determined that it was simply a matter of enticing an additional 75,000 young men each year to volunteer for military service in order to maintain the Armed Forces at 2.5 million strong. The size of the population pool they were targeting was approximately 1.5 million young men who turned 19 each year and met “the physical, moral, and mental requirements” of military service (Gates 1970, 7).

There is no need for this study to estimate the size of armed forces necessary to defend the country. That figure is determined by the National Defense and National Military Strategies, and approved by Congress each year. In FY2005, the total authorized strength of the United States Armed Forces was nearly 2.8 million including Reserve Component forces. It is also not necessary for this study to attempt to determine the number of new recruits needed each year to maintain that end strength. That figure is determined by some of the highest levels of personnel management and becomes the recruiting goals for the various services. The total recruiting goal of all four branches of the military--for both AC and RC--was 299,333. The Army’s portion of that for FY2005 was a total of 171,487 (Kapp 2006, 12-13). This is a relatively small number considering the size of the manpower pool from which it is drawn.

Anyone who is between 18 and 40 years of age is eligible for voluntary enlistment in the United States Army. That particular demographic is a huge portion of our population--nearly 95 million men and women from which to attract 171,487 for service in the U.S. Army, USAR, or ARNG. Normally it is not the case for older citizens to enlist in the military and neither are they the target audience for recruiters and advertisers. The prime age for new enlistees is generally between 18 and 25 years old, which has normally
been the age of draft liability. U.S. Census data for the end of calendar year 2004 shows this age group is approximately 33,157,200 men and women, of which about one half of one per cent are needed to enlist in the Army.

The Selective Service System requires only men between the ages of 18 and 25 to register. Using that demographic as a base means the available manpower is 17,056,000 men, and the Army’s requirement would be one per cent of that. If there were a national emergency which required the President to activate the draft system, the most immediately liable to be called for service are 19-year old men. This means that if the draft had been used to fill the FY2005 manpower requirements of the Army, 171,487 men would have been selected out of a potential 2,151,000--a mere eight per cent. With such huge numbers available to supply personnel for such limited requirements, it would seem that the Army should be able to fill its ranks easily. In FY2005, that was not the case as recruiters significantly missed their marks.

The Gates Commission considered a similar dilemma when studying the transition from a compulsory to an all-volunteer system--how to entice people to join the military when it was not a legal requirement. In 1970, the Commission decided it was an almost simple matter of “reasonable improvements in pay and benefits” to obtain the additional enlistees that would no longer be provided by the draft. Because conscription would supply whatever manpower requirements were not filled by volunteers, pay for first-term servicemen was kept at a very low level. The Gates Commission estimated it to be about 60 per cent of comparable civilian pay (Gates 1970, 7). By their calculations, it would cost the government some $2.7 billion to balance the pay of first-term enlisted men and officers. Since the majority of this money was personal pay, the Commission
also argued that $540 million would be recovered in income tax and the budget increase was not as severe as it appeared on the surface. On top of the pay and benefit improvements, the Gates Commission recommended proficiency pay increases for personnel with special skills, pay increases to keep the RC in line with the AC, additional medical corps, recruiting, ROTC and miscellaneous expenses. The Gates Commission explained that “hidden” costs (which included the output of the civilian economy affected by the draft) would be saved by switching to an AVF despite the apparent dollar amount increase.

The second section of Part I of the Gates Commission report deals with the questions: “Regardless of whether an all-volunteer force is feasible, is it desirable? Will voluntary recruitment weaken our democratic society and have harmful political and social effects?” (Gates 1970, 1) In this section, the Gates Commission addressed nine arguments (objections) against changing from conscription to all-volunteer Armed Forces. These objections generally fall into three categories: feasibility (objections 1 and 2), undesirable political and social effects (objections 3 through 7), and military effectiveness (objections 8 and 9). Although the Gates Commission’s conclusion was that arguments for an AVF were stronger than those against it, they addressed the objections against an AVF in an attempt to present a fair and balanced look at the issues.

Objection 1

An all-volunteer force will be very costly--so costly the Nation cannot afford it. (Gates 1970, 12)

This argument has been partially addressed previously in both this thesis and the Gates Commission report. The Gates Commission’s response to this issue was a very
bureaucratic answer, writing “It is true that the budget for a voluntary force will generally be higher than for an equally effective force of conscripts and volunteers; but the cost of the voluntary force will be less than the cost of the mixed force” (Gates 1970, 12). This again refers to the “hidden” costs the Commission mentioned earlier in the report. A specific portion of these costs that are given as an example are costs related to the training of new soldiers.

It was the Gates Commission’s analysis that the absence of the draft would create less personnel turnover and therefore the government would spend less money training raw recruits. Their contention was that draftees and draft-induced volunteers were not as committed to a military career as voluntary enlistees were. Re-enlistment rates for first-term draftees pre-Vietnam was one-fourth as high as for first-term volunteers (Gates 1970, 29). There are currently no draftees in the Army to compare re-enlistment data with, but first-term re-enlistments for FY2005 exceeded the Department of the Army’s established goal by 883 soldiers (Kapp 2006, 15). From a recruiting perspective, the retention surplus meant fewer personnel were required to enlist. From a training perspective, the retention surplus meant experienced personnel stayed in the Army and fewer personnel had to be trained. From a monetary perspective, the retention surplus meant a savings on cost for initial entry training of nearly a thousand soldiers. However, depending on the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) of those 883 soldiers, the retention surplus also certainly meant the government paid millions of dollars in re-enlistment bonuses to those soldiers.

At the time of the Gates Commission report, draftees were inducted for a period of service of only two years while RA enlistments were for three. The combination of
shorter terms of service and lower re-enlistment rates for draftees resulted in more frequent personnel turnover in the lower enlisted ranks. Under the current stand-by Selective Service System, a viable option to balance the difference in terms of service and thereby lessen turnover could have been to extend the draftees’ length of induction.

Objection 2

The all-volunteer force will lack the flexibility to expand rapidly in times of sudden crises. (Gates 1970, 13)

The Gates Commission assessed that “military preparedness depends on forces in being, not on the ability to draft untrained men” (Gates 1970, 13). This was the purpose of reserve forces in the Commission’s view. A reserve force provides cohesive, trained units which are available on short notice. The draft provided untrained civilians who had to be inducted, trained and integrated into units which took several months. Not involving RC forces in the Vietnam conflict was a political decision rather than a manpower decision, but given the size of the AC force in the 1960s, it was possible to fight a limited conflict with only AC forces.

By design, in today’s Army, it is not normally possible to conduct full-spectrum operations without using RC forces. The USAR provides specialized units and capabilities that compliment those forces in the AC such as Civil Affairs units.

Objection 3

An all-volunteer force will undermine patriotism by weakening the traditional belief that each citizen has a moral responsibility to serve his country. (Gates 1970, 14)

The Gates Commission concluded that compelling service undermined respect for government and forced individuals to serve where and when the government chose,
regardless of their values or talents. A similar sentiment could be expressed regarding the U.S. Army’s stop-loss program over the last several years. Stop-loss extends soldiers on active duty beyond their ETS date for purposes of operational deployment. This policy can have a tendency to cause resentment among soldiers for higher authority and Army policy makers.

The Commission further recognized that not everyone is suited for military service, nor does everyone qualify. It was their conclusion that when only a small number are needed, a voluntary decision to serve is best both morally and practically. In today’s Army, it is precisely the case that only a small number are needed. Referring back to the earlier discussion on page 55 of this paper, it shows that even if only the 19-year olds were drafted into the Army, the requirement would only be for 8% of them.

It has been proposed that a solution to the morality issue of conscripting some and not others is to conscript everyone--a universal service program. If a program were enacted which required all 18-year olds to complete a term of service it would involve 4,124,000 young men and women (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 18). Clearly, they could not all serve in the military and most would have to perform some sort of alternative civilian service. President Truman was in favor of a universal training and service program at the close of World War II. It was his belief that if everyone had some military training, they would be better able to help defend the homeland in the event of attack. It was a good theory.

After subtracting the 6% of the 18 to 44-year old population whose activity is limited by a disability there are 3,876,560 to be trained (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 126). That is more than ten times the number of new enlistees that are trained by all of the
Armed Forces, both AC and RC, every year. Training of that many personnel would require a massive amount of infrastructure to accomplish. It would require a significant amount of additional personnel to support those training facilities and to conduct the training. It would require large amounts of equipment with which to train those young men and women. In short, it would require billions of dollars be spent. Once their initial training was complete, there would have to be a program of sustainment training to prevent skills from diminishing. The follow-on training programs would add to the facility, equipment, and funding requirements of the system. Finally, after spending all of that time, money, and effort on an additional 3.9 million young men and women each year, they would merely be standing by to defend the country if it were attacked. After only four years of operating the universal training system, we would be able to muster a force comparable in size to the force which fought in World War II--nearly 16 million strong. It is highly unlikely that our country will ever be attacked by an enemy force which requires that many militiamen to fight.

Objection 4

The presence of draftees in a mixed force guards against the growth of a separate military ethos, which could pose a threat to civilian authority, our freedom, and our democratic institutions. (Gates 1970, 14)

The Gates Commission assessed this as an unwarranted concern. There was not then nor is there now any danger of the military staging a coup or somehow taking control of the government. If for some reason the President and Congress ever authorized unlimited powers for the military, the debate of whether the military was manned by volunteers or conscripts would be irrelevant to this issue. Either conscription or
volunteering only provides new enlistees at the lowest levels of the military and not in any position to influence any kind of revolution.

Objection 5

The higher pay required for a voluntary force will be especially appealing to blacks who have relatively poorer civilian opportunities. This, combined with higher reenlistment rates for blacks will mean that a disproportionate number of blacks will be in military service. White enlistments and re-enlistments might decline, thus leading to an all-black enlisted force. Racial tensions would grow because of white apprehension at this development and black resentment at bearing an undue share of the burden of defense. At the same time, some of the most qualified young blacks would be in the military--not in the community where their talents are needed. (Gates 1970, 15)

This is not an uncommon argument, especially considering that this particularly worded argument was addressed at a time when racial tensions were coming to a head in America. The Gates Commission regarded this argument as having “no basis in fact” (Gates 1970, 15). Their research indicated that transitioning from a draft military to an all-volunteer military would not significantly change the composition of the Armed Forces. The Commission asserted that this argument confused the nature of voluntary service with compulsory service and that by freely choosing to serve, a man’s service could not be considered “unfair.” Essentially this argument is a question of whether or not the military is representative of society.

In 1969, as evidenced by the wording of the argument, the Gates Commission studied inequity in the force from a black-white perspective. At the time, 10.5% of the total enlisted force was black. Including the officer corps, the percentage of blacks in the Armed Forces was 9.5%. In the Army specifically, the percentage of enlisted blacks and total percentage was 12.8% and 11.7%, respectively. Across the nation, blacks accounted for 12% of the population--clearly not a significant disparity when compared to the
Armed Forces. Even the argument that there were more black soldiers serving in Vietnam was inaccurate, as 11.4% of the Army in Southeast Asia was black--almost equal to the percentage of black soldiers in the Army altogether. America today is a seemingly more diverse culture, as is the Army.

According to the Office of Army Demographics *Army Profile FY04*, the racial profile of the Army is: 60.1% white; 22.7% black; 10.3% Hispanic; and 3.8% Asian Soldiers. The U.S. Census Bureau’s *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006* lists the 2004 population profile as follows: 67.4% white (non-Hispanic); 12.8% black; 14.1% Hispanic; and 4.2% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 16). There is a significant difference in the white and black populations of the Army as compared to the nation as a whole. When looking at the racial profiles of the officer corps compared to the enlisted statistics the difference is more pronounced. 75.4% of officers are white as compared to 12.3% who are black, and only 5.0% who are Hispanic. Among the enlisted ranks, 57.2% are white, 24.6% are black, and 11.3% are Hispanic (Office of Army Demographics 2004, 4). Most of the difference in the officer corps can be attributed to the fact that half as many blacks as whites are college graduates and a college degree is required to serve as an officer (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 147). It is clear that the ethnic mix of the AVF has changed significantly from what the Gates Commission had anticipated.

Returning to a draft could theoretically balance the ethnic disparity between the Army and the rest of the nation. A truly random draft would place all men at equal liability for service if, and only if, deferments were limited to those physically unable to perform military service. The current Selective Service System does not allow deferments for students, which became a serious point of contention as the draft was nearing its end.
Under the current system, college students who are selected for induction can postpone their service until the end of the semester or the end of the academic year, in the case of seniors. This would not completely affect officer procurement because Cadets and Midshipmen enrolled at Service Academies are not required to register with Selective Service. Students enrolled in Officer Procurement programs at certain schools--The Citadel, Norwich University, and Virginia Military Institute to cite a few of several examples--are not required to register either. However, students enrolled in ROTC at colleges not specified by the Selective Service System are required to register (Selective Service System 2006). There are still deferments for Conscientious Objectors, ministers and ministerial students, aliens and dual nation residents, and hardship deferments. Considering the very limited nature of deferments available under the current standby system, a draft enacted today could potentially be more equitable in selecting men for service than it was in the 1960s.

Throughout the history of the draft in the United States, both sides of the draft versus AVF debates have used the argument that the Army is unrepresentative of the society for their own. Those who favor conscription claim that an AVF appeals to minorities and lower class Americans who have no other opportunities. Those who favor an AVF claim that the draft drew disproportionately from minorities and the lower classes by allowing deferments for certain occupations and college students. Whenever this topic of discussion appeared, however, it was with regards to ethnic minorities. In today’s Army there are many more opportunities for women to serve than there were in 1970. As of 2004, women make up only 14.7% of the active duty Army despite being slightly more than half of the population at large. Part of this can be accounted for by the
fact that the active duty Army contains many combat arms MOSs for which women are ineligible. Looking at the racial profile of women serving in the active duty Army, it is: 41.7% white; 38.8% black; 11.1% Hispanic; and 4.6% Asian. Apparently, black women are inclined to volunteer for Army service in larger numbers than women of other races. Theoretically this disparity could also be made more equitable by a random draft with limited deferment options.

If the draft were reenacted today, however, it would only serve to lower the overall percentage of women in the Army. Under the current system, women are not required to register with Selective Service. Based on that fact alone, the potential for a truly equitable draft is restricted. Gallup polls conducted between 2001 and 2005 indicate that the nation is seriously divided on the topic of women serving in the military. In almost all polls regarding women in combat roles, the Yes/No responses are nearly half-and-half.

A 2001 Gallup poll showed the following:

50% believed women should not be required to participate in a draft.

52% favored women serving as ground combat troops.

63% favored women serving as Special Forces.

A 2005 Gallup poll showed that there has not been much change in public opinion in the last four years:

72% favor women serving anywhere in Iraq.

67% favor women serving in combat zones as support for ground troops.

44% favor women serving as ground troops who are doing most of the fighting.

(There was no question regarding women and the draft.)
Based on these figures, it appears the public is still of the mindset that serving in combat is a “man’s job.”

Objection 6

Those joining an all-volunteer force will be men from the lowest economic classes, motivated primarily by monetary rewards rather than patriotism. An all-volunteer force will be manned, in effect, by mercenaries. (Gates 1970, 16)

The Gates Commission here restated their assertion that an AVF would not look significantly different demographically than the mixed draft/volunteer system which had been in use. Their answer to this argument was that “mercenaries” are men who serve for pay alone--usually in the service of a foreign power--but men who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces do so out of a sense of duty among other things. It was also the contention of the Commission that increasing the basic pay for first-term enlistees would attract not only those who were desperate for work, but also those who had the potential to earn a decent living outside the military.

In today’s Army, soldiers’ salaries are a recurring topic of discussion. There are those in society who feel that soldiers deserve to be better paid for the sacrifices they have to make and the danger they may someday encounter. There are also those who feel that most of the time soldiers are not in combat, not risking their lives, and that their salaries are more than sufficient. Each year, Army Times publishes an issue which compares the salaries of servicemen and women with the salaries of their civilian counterparts who do approximately the same job. Most of the comparisons are for mid-level and higher NCOs and officers who perform rather specialized tasks such as pilots, attorneys, technicians, recruiters, etc. In the 2004 report, the lower enlisted ranks are represented by an Air Force security forces dog handler E-4, a Marine band member E-4,
a Navy damage control fireman E-3, and an Army medical lab technician E-3. Their salaries are compared to similar jobs both in the region where they are stationed and to the national average. On average, the service members’ salaries were anywhere from $1600 to $6100 more than their civilian counterparts (ArmyTimes.com, “How Your Pay Stacks Up Comparisons”). This is not an all-inclusive study of soldiers’ salaries, but rather a brief snapshot to show that military salaries are not as far behind the civilian workforce as they used to be.

An important consideration when looking at military salaries is that base salary is not MOS-dependent. A soldier who performs a highly technical or critical duty which requires much training (such as a medic) does not get paid more for his skills than a soldier who performs a simple duty (such as cannon crewmember) does. It is also important to remember that military pay increases with rank and years in service similar to many civilian jobs. As well, there are benefits included with military service that most civilians have to pay for out of their salaries such as health and dental care, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, cost of living allowance, clothing allowance, and low-cost life insurance. Some of these benefits can vary depending on a soldier’s marital status, family situation, and duty location.

The comparable pay between military and civilian salaries can be credited to a concerted effort by Congress and the Pentagon to decrease a perceived pay gap. Part of that effort was to mandate that annual pay increases for the military be 0.5 percentage point above civilian wage increases. They credit high retention rates with their success in narrowing the military-civilian pay disparity. In the early 2000’s, the Defense Department also sought to lessen the growing difference between lower ranking
personnel and seniors—similar to the significant discrepancy highlighted by the Gates
Commission in 1970. Through a series of rank-targeted raises, as opposed to the standard
across-the-board annual increase, Congress and DoD feel they made strides toward that
end. The narrowing of this internal pay gap is also given some credit for higher retention
rates among junior enlisted personnel (ArmyTimes.com, “Pay and Benefits”).

While it is true that enlisting in the Army may provide opportunities for some
young Americans that they might not otherwise have, many enlist simply out of a sense
of duty. A recent and prominent example of that is Corporal Pat Tillman. Pat Tillman was
a professional football player who turned down a multi-million dollar contract so he
could enlist in the Army in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States. He was killed in combat in Afghanistan in 2004 fighting alongside his 75th
Ranger Regiment brethren. An example of selfless service and patriotism like Pat
Tillman’s shows that voluntary enlistment should always remain an option.

Objection 7

An all-volunteer force would stimulate foreign military adventures, foster an
irresponsible foreign policy, and lessen civilian concern about the use of military
forces. (Gates 1970, 17)

The Gates Commission called this argument “absurd” and said that it implies the
President and other decision-makers in Washington care less about the lives of soldiers
who are drafted than they would of soldiers who were serving voluntarily (Gates 1970,
17). At the time of the Commission’s report, decisions to deploy troops could have also
had nuclear consequences and were, therefore, even more severe than just risking the
lives of soldiers. This argument is really about more than soldiers’ lives. The heart of this
argument is really whether or not the Army will be able to maintain its troop strength in the face of an unpopular war. It revolves around public opinion.

When an army is manned entirely by volunteers, the will to serve must exist among the population. If a President gets the country involved in an unpopular war, he risks losing the support of the people and subsequently their will to enlist in the military and participate in a war with which they do not agree. Over the course of his Presidency, President Bush’s approval rating has steadily declined overall with a few exceptions. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, his approval rating spiked to 90% and remained above 80% through the first few months of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). President Bush’s approval rating began a slow, steady decline after Operation Anaconda in March 2002. It fell below 60% in the early months of 2003, but jumped back over 70% the week after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began. After two months of combat in Iraq, the President’s approval rating again started to decline and was below 60% by the summer of 2003 (The Gallup Poll 2006). There are many issues and events that can affect the President’s approval rating, but it seems that OEF and OIF had major impacts on the public’s opinion of President Bush.

As the President’s approval rating continued to decline through 2003 into 2004, the Army’s recruiting statistics did not correlate. By the end of FY2003 the Army had recruited 100.4% of its goal, which was 73,800 (U.S. Army Recruiting Command G5 Directorate 2006). The numbers for FY2004 were better, with 77,586 enlisted against a goal of 77,000 for 100.7% (Kapp 2005, 10). It wasn’t until FY2005 that the Army failed to reach their recruiting goal. It has been speculated that failure was in part due to the goal being raised to 80,000 as the Army increased its authorized end strength. However,
the number of personnel who enlisted in FY2005 (73,373) would not have even met the FY2003 goal (Kapp 2006, 12). At the end of FY2005 President Bush’s approval rating was down to 45%. By way of comparison, in 1966, President Johnson’s approval ratings were about the same (The Gallup Poll 2006).

Objection 8

A voluntary force will be less effective because not enough highly qualified youths will be likely to enlist and pursue military careers. As the quality of servicemen declines, the prestige and dignity of the services will also decline and further intensify recruiting problems. (Gates 1970, 18)

The Gates Commission was “impressed” by the number of higher quality recruits who were choosing to serve in the military despite conscription (Gates 1970, 18). They recognized the importance of recruiting qualified personnel and recommended improvements in basic pay, proficiency pay, and quality of life towards that end. Their intent was to make military service more appealing to the skilled as well as the unskilled.

Today’s Army is interested in attracting and retaining intelligent and skilled individuals for service.

DoD’s benchmark for quality of new recruits is that 90% should be high school graduates and 60% score in categories I-IIIA (above average) on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) (Kapp 2006, 12). In FY2004 recruiters easily surpassed that goal, with 92% of new recruits having high school diplomas and 72% scoring in category I-IIIA on the AFQT (Kapp 2005, 10). The numbers for FY2005 were not as good. That year only 87% of new recruits had high school diplomas and 67% scored in AFQT category I-IIIA (Kapp 2006, 12). Not only did the Army fail to meet its quantity goal, it also fell slightly short of its quality goal.
Going into the new recruiting year of FY2006, recruiters were authorized to enlist high school dropouts who do not have a General Educational Development (GED) credential. This new recruiting plan is called “Army Educations Plus.” Under this plan a new recruit would complete whatever courses needed to complete his GED at the expense of the Army before being sent to basic training. Individuals are only eligible for this program if they can pass the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) (Chenelly 2005).

After the first quarter of FY2006, recruiting does not appear to be any better than last year. As of December 2006, the Army has reached 104.7% of its goal. They have enlisted 11,522 new recruits against a goal of 11,000. Although that seems like an improvement, it is not. Army recruiters enlisted 101% of their first quarter FY2005 goal. The goal was 14,135 and 14,219 individuals enlisted (Chenelly 2005). Recruiters eventually ended up falling short of their annual goal by 8.3%. The annual goal for FY2006 is 80,000--the same as FY2005 (Kapp 2006).

The quality of recruits in the first quarter of FY2006 is slightly less than last year’s end totals as well. Of the 11,522 new enlistees as of December 2005, only 86% have a high school diploma and only 60% scored in categories I-IIIA on the AFQT (Kapp 2006, 12). Across the country, the percentage of persons who are high school graduates or more is 85.2% (U.S. Census Bureau 2006, 147). These numbers indicate that, from an educational perspective, new enlistees are comparable to society as a whole. However, when compared to the quality of previous years’ recruits, the quality has declined.
Objection 9

The defense budget will not be increased to provide for an all-volunteer force, and the Department of Defense will have to cut back expenditures in other area. Even if additional funds are provided initially, competing demands will, over the long term, force the Department of Defense to absorb the added budgetary expense of an all-volunteer force. The result could be a potentially serious deterioration of the nation’s overall military posture. (Gates 1970, 19)

The Gates Commission concluded that military spending depended on the “public attitudes toward national defense” (Gates 1970, 19). The Commission felt that the public had supported large forces since World War II because the public deemed large forces necessary for national security. In the last few years about half of the country thinks that we are spending about the right amount on national defense and that our national defense is strong enough (The Gallup Poll 2006).

The following are tables compiled from The Gallup Poll:

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Table 5. Gallup Question - National Defense Strength

Interesting to note from these charts is the effect our operations since 2001 have had on these opinions. Even after the September 11, 2001 attacks, the beginning of OEF, and the beginning of OIF, half of the public’s opinion is that our military is strong enough. Looking at Table 4 over the same times, only the beginning of OEF seemed to convince more of the population that we were spending about the right amount on our national defense as opposed to too little.

Summary and Conclusion

The Gates Commission report effectively put the last nail in the coffin of the draft in the United States. Reconsidering the points made by the Commission after three decades of the AVF shows that although the roles of the Army and the threats to national security have changed, the arguments are basically the same. Most important is the feasibility of the draft. The size of the Army has decreased, requiring fewer enlistees from a population which has continued to grow. The nature and ability of the RC
provides for rapid augmentation to the AC forces. Unless a massive mobilization of forces becomes necessary, the RC should suffice.

Secondly are the political and social effects of the draft. While some may believe that citizenship bears certain responsibilities, many do not. Requiring universal training and service of every young man and woman would be a major logistical undertaking. It would also be a political headache, as 62% of the population opposes universal service (The Gallup Poll 2006). Despite arguments to the contrary, the Army is as ethnically diverse as the rest of society. Basic pay for all servicemen has improved over the years and is comparable in many cases to similar civilian salaries. However, declining public support for the President’s foreign policies and his use of military force appears to have negatively impacted voluntary enlistments.

Finally is military effectiveness. As a result of recruiting lags, the Army has begun accepting individuals who had formerly been considered substandard. The ability to be more selective about new recruits would certainly have a positive influence on the overall quality of the Army. Regardless, the public is of the opinion that enough money is spent on national defense and that our military is strong enough. Chapter 5 explains the best method to keep it that way.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

From strictly a manpower perspective, a combination of volunteer and conscription is the best system to man the force. A volunteer force-manning system allows those patriotic young individuals who desire to serve their country to do so. This should never be taken away from our young citizens. Conscription, on the other hand, provides a predictable number of personnel on a predictable timetable established by DA. Each fiscal year, the DA Human Resources Command knows how many personnel are required in order to maintain the force strength. If that number of personnel does not voluntarily enlist, DA can establish a draft call for the additional required number of inductees. Also, reverting back to partial conscription from the AVF could save the Army some money. The budget for advertising and recruiting could be significantly reduced along with enlistment bonuses, with the knowledge that any shortfall in enlistments would be made up by inductions. This type of combination volunteer/conscription system is similar to the Vietnam-era draft. Although it was a successful system for providing personnel to the Armed Forces, it became increasingly more impractical as the population grew and the military shrank.

Recommendation

A combination volunteer/conscription system would be better for providing manpower to the force, but manning is not the only or most important consideration. Therefore, the AVF should be sustained, although it might not be the most economical or predictable force-manning system. Reverting to a mixed conscript/volunteer manning
system would fill the ranks in the event of a recruiting shortfall, but it will not ease the OPTEMPO woes. The size of our Army is based on national strategic guidance and is limited by authorization from Congress. Only increasing the end strength will provide some relief from the high OPTEMPO. Based on the size of the force versus the size of the population, a conscription system would once again be a system to manage those who do not serve vice those who serve.

A popular recommended alternative (even President Truman favored it after World War II) to the lottery style draft system that was used in our country is a system of universal training. The theory is that all 18 year-olds are required to perform military training and service or some other variation of national service upon completing high school or turning 18. On the surface, this surely seems like the most equitable way to involve the youth of the nation in its defense and future. On casual glance, it also does not seem to pass the cost/benefit common sense test. Billions of dollars would be spent training young men and women for whichever role they are destined to play in support of the country without seemingly getting a significant return for the taxpayers’ investment.

However, if the world situation and the threats to our nation become so great that a mass army is needed, a compulsory system of universal training and service is the best solution. It is clearly the only equitable method of involuntarily inducting personnel to serve in the military or the government. Serious and careful consideration should be used to determine what kinds (if any) of deferments or exemptions to apply to that universal program. A system of universal compulsory service would benefit both the Armed Forces and the civilian support infrastructure in a time of mass mobilization. For anything short
of a mass mobilization, a system of universal compulsion, for any type of service, would be overkill.

Recommendations for Future Study

1. An in-depth economic study on the actual potential and financial benefit or detriment of implementing a partial conscription system for manning the Armed Forces.

2. A feasibility study of a universal training and service program, based on the size of the teenage population and available opportunities for national civilian and military service.

Throughout the history of our nation and the conflicts we have been involved in, the draft served our Armed Forces well when we needed it. In the first half of the 20th century, when nearly the entire world went to war twice, the draft provided millions of men for military service. As the wars and the Armed Forces grew smaller, the draft continued to provide the thousands of men needed to maintain the force strength necessary to contain the spread of Communism. The growing population and shrinking military turned the draft into a system of managing who did not serve as opposed to who did. When the war became unpopular, the draft became a victim of politics and unpopular foreign policy.

In the three decades since its inception, the all-volunteer force (AVF) has proved a viable method of maintaining the Armed Forces. The AVF did what some had thought required conscription—it contained the spread of Communism. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, our Army has adapted to a wider variety of missions and has gotten significantly smaller. New technology is allowing us to accomplish more
with less. Our Army continues to shrink while the American population continues to
grow. Our adversaries have become smaller as well, making it highly unlikely that we
will ever see a mass mobilization requiring the resurgence of the draft.
REFERENCE LIST

Books


Periodicals and Articles


Roque, Ashley. 2005. Army working to graduate more recruits from basic training. *Inside the Army* (October 10, 2005). Via email to author.


**Government Documents**


Other Sources


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CALL
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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Jonathan House
DMH
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
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