An Inspection of Border Force Operations at Manchester Airport

July – October 2015

Presented to Parliament pursuant to Section 50 (2) of the UK Borders Act 2007

April 2016
Our Purpose

To help improve the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of the Home Office’s border and immigration functions through unfettered, impartial and evidence-based inspection.

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Border Force is an operational command of the Home Office responsible for securing the UK border by carrying out immigration and customs controls of people and goods entering and leaving the UK. This inspection examined how efficiently and effectively Border Force managed those operations at Manchester Airport.

At the time of the inspection, Manchester was the UK's third largest airport, with three passenger terminals and a freight terminal. It served as a travel hub for the North of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In 2014/15, it had handled over 22 million passengers, with flights to more than 200 destinations (more than any other UK airport). Passenger traffic had been growing year on year, and the owners, Manchester Airport Group, had been driving forward an ambitious expansion plan that had seen new investment and increased flights, including new routes to China.

The inspection found that officers carrying out immigration checks understood and complied with the requirements of the Border Force ‘Operating Mandate’, although a number were not yet trained in the full range of immigration duties and this led to some inefficiencies in processing passengers and some operational risks. Senior managers had recognised the training issue and plans were in place to address it.

Border Force delivered its customs functions in line with relevant legislation and guidance. Customs checks had detected a range of illicit goods, but had been less successful against high priorities, such as Class A drugs. There were questions about whether detector dogs were being used to best effect. Some officers believed that their customs experience was not being put to best use; they risked losing their specialist skills, as they were being deployed to the immigration controls for the majority of the time.

Border Force had retained a dedicated customs team to deal with freight. The team enjoyed a degree of autonomy and dealt directly and effectively with the freight handling companies and other local partners. The morale of this team was noticeably higher than that of many of their colleagues in the passenger terminals, where ‘staff engagement’ had been identified as an issue. The inspection analysed Home Office staff survey results, talked to staff during 130 hours of onsite observation plus interviews and focus groups, and found that many felt undervalued and saw management as inflexible and unfair, despite the latter's efforts to communicate and recognise successes, and more recently to address specific staff concerns.

The report makes six recommendations for improvement.

The report was sent to the Home Secretary on 15 February 2016.

David Bolt

Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
1. Purpose and Scope

1.1 This inspection examined how efficiently and effectively Border Force managed its operations at Manchester Airport, with reference to both immigration and customs functions.

1.2 It included:

- search and analysis of open sources and Home Office statistics and documentation;
- technical research on the latest version of ePassport gates;
- a survey of airlines and discussions with delivery partners and stakeholders including intelligence and law enforcement partners, Manchester Airport Group (MAG), airline operators and freight handlers;
- sampling 230 Border Force cases, for the period 1 November 2014 to 30 April 2015, covering both immigration and customs functions;
- visiting Manchester Airport between 8 and 14 September 2015 and conducting 130 inspector hours of observations including in situ discussions with multiple staff and focus groups; and
- Interviews with staff and managers at all grades.

1.3 The high-level emerging findings were presented to the Home Office on 12 October 2015.
2. Findings

2.1 Border Force officers carrying out immigration functions at Manchester Airport understood and complied with the Border Force ‘Operating Mandate’ by conducting all mandated security checks. A control breach occurred in April 2015 when passengers from a delayed flight were misdirected through an unmanned immigration control. However, local senior management had acted decisively to deal with this breach and a process had been put in place for ensuring that passengers could no longer exit the arrivals hall if the controls were not staffed.

2.2 Arrivals at Manchester Airport’s three passenger terminals had increased and were set to increase further. However, a significant number of Border Force officers were not fully trained in immigration functions and were unable to conduct the further examination of passengers served with Form IS81 and detained because there were concerns about granting them entry. This led to delays and inefficiencies in the processing of passengers. Senior managers thought that 70% of passengers served with an IS81 were landed, but had only recently allocated someone to take on formal analysis and management of local IS81 data. Central electronic records showed that the outcome had not been recorded for around a third of all IS81s served.

2.3 Where an arriving passenger was interviewed by an officer, the decision to grant or refuse entry was well-evidenced. However, the file sampling indicated that Border Force was not adhering to the ‘Operations Manual’ requirement that passengers subject to further examination (and served with a Form IS81) should ‘generally’ be interviewed. Some senior managers did not support the further examination of passengers who already held entry clearance, even where the officer at the control had concerns and had served an IS81.

2.4 Operational pressures had meant that staff had not been released for skills training (in immigration and customs functions), and therefore progress towards the ‘multi-functional’ workforce envisaged in the local ‘Operating Model’ had been limited. This resulted in operational inefficiencies and inequalities in the allocation of work.

2.5 At Higher Officer level, some staff were called upon to supervise immigration functions at a terminal for a shift without the relevant immigration knowledge or training, and while the Airport Duty Manager (a Senior Officer) acted as a safety net, this was both an operational risk and unfair on those Higher Officers and their colleagues. At the time of the inspection, senior managers had recognised the training issue and had put plans in place to address it.

2.6 Border Force was, in the main, discharging its safeguarding duties towards children and other vulnerable passengers effectively. It was also actively involved with partners on wider safeguarding issues, including human trafficking. However, there were two cases in the file sample where the record contained insufficient evidence that officers had fully understood their statutory duties.

2.7 Overall, the quality of record keeping in relation to immigration functions was inconsistent and required greater management assurance. Most of the sampled decisions to refuse leave to enter were well-evidenced and made in line with guidance, indicating that work done locally to improve refusal records had been successful. However, the evidence for other decisions was not recorded fully, particularly in 12 cases where entry had been granted without a clear explanation and despite an accumulation of negative evidence. In March 2015, an internal assurance ‘spot check’ had found
problems with temporary admission records. The inspection sampled 30 temporary admission cases. There was nothing in any of them to suggest poor decision-making. However, in 21 of the 30 cases there was no evidence that a risk assessment had been completed, as required by the ‘Operations Manual’.

2.8 Border Force was detecting, and seizing where empowered, a wide range of illegal and duty or tax payable goods. However, Class A drugs detections were not at the level that might be expected, given their priority in the ‘Border Force Control Strategy’. This suggested a need to review how particular flights were risk assessed and staff and detector dogs deployed, which emphasised previous detections and patterns.

2.9 The deterrent effect of the detection dogs was difficult to measure, but seizures alone represented a low return on investment, given £1.25m spent on new kennels and the costs of operating the unit. A national review had recommended dynamic and flexible deployment of dog units, but while senior managers supported this, it had yet to filter down to frontline teams.

2.10 Border Force North management was satisfied with the levels and performance of the customs functions at the airport, but this message was not clearly understood by staff. Separate anti-smuggling teams had been replaced by officers deployed based on targeting. Many customs trained staff were concerned that being deployed to use their more recently acquired immigration skills (as ‘queue busters’) rather than their customs skills and experience meant that less customs work was being done. Despite regular internal communications from management, most of these officers claimed to be unaware of continuing customs successes.

2.11 By contrast, the dedicated team dealing with air freight, based at the freight terminal and not routinely drawn away to perform immigration duties at the passenger terminals, was able to make the most of its officers’ specialist customs skills and knowledge, which meant greater employee engagement with the work. Because of its physical separation, on the other side of the airport, the team was to an extent autonomous, the range of work was wider and the team liaised directly and effectively with local partners and stakeholders whenever necessary.

2.12 Border Force and Manchester Airport Group (MAG) had collaborated over projections of passenger numbers to help the former to meet the queuing times contained in their Service Level Agreement (SLA). MAG was satisfied that Border Force had been efficient in responding to the increased passenger traffic in summer 2015 and had not breached the queuing times. Nonetheless, to be commercially competitive, MAG was looking for speedier passenger flow in the future. The arrivals areas had been refurbished with new colour-coded signage and surroundings in order to channel arriving passengers more efficiently.

2.13 Five ePassport gates were installed in each passenger terminal. Take-up rates by eligible passengers varied from below 30% to above 50% for the three terminals. The configuration of the terminals dictated queuing arrangements and affected take-up rates for the ePassport gates, while some passengers chose not to use them regardless of encouragement or shorter waiting times. Border Force had worked with MAG to produce detailed training and guidance for arrivals hall ‘presenters’ and ePassport gate ‘hosts’. The latter were particularly important in maximising take up and problem-free use of the ePassport gates.

2.14 Border Force North senior managers were aware of the low employee engagement from staff at Manchester Airport. The 2014 and 2015 staff surveys showed that it was lower than for the North region as a whole, which in turn was lower than for Border Force overall. Senior management described a well-performing port. However, staff appeared to be unaware of operational successes or of colleagues receiving recognition for good work, so these ‘positive’ factors had little overall impact on morale, which remained stubbornly low. Senior managers realised that preventing individuals from applying for lateral transfers had a negative impact, but believed this was necessary in order to deliver the business.
2.15 Recently (post inspection), Border Force management had taken practical steps to address some of the concerns of staff at Manchester Airport, for example in relation to the manning of a custody suite and by starting weekly meetings between G7s and groups of staff. However, it was not clear whether managers fully appreciated the impact of their actions. For example: the continued effect on staff attitudes of previous ‘negative’ decisions, such as the refusal of ‘reasonable’ requests for flexible working; or the effect of failing to provide full training, despite the commitment to a ‘multi-functional’ workforce; or the clawing back of weekend hours for staff attending mandatory training (which was in line with HR policy but not the practice at all other ports). These were regarded by staff as signs of management inflexibility and unfairness, and put considerable strain on the ‘psychological contract’ between employer and employee.
3. Summary of Recommendations

Recommendation: The Home Office should:

1. In relation to the further examination for immigration purposes at Manchester Airport:
   • ensure that ‘generally’ the individual is interviewed ‘fully to establish all the facts of the case’ in compliance with the ‘Border Force Operations Manual’; and
   • ensure that in every case where an IS81 has been served the outcome is entered on the central electronic record.

2. In order to achieve the optimum ‘multi-functional’ workforce envisaged in the ‘Manchester Airport Operating Model’:
   • re-check the preferences of those Border Force officers based at Manchester Airport who previously opted not to train to be fully ‘multi-functional’; and
   • produce a personal development plan for each officer at Manchester Airport that sets a clear expectation in terms of formal skills training in immigration and customs functions (CS1, CS2 and CS3), with timescales for their completion.

3. In relation to immigration record keeping at Manchester Airport:
   • improve record keeping for cases where leave to enter is granted, with a clear audit trail from the evidence gathered to the decision; and
   • overhaul the local record keeping process for temporary admission cases to ensure that a risk assessment (in the approved Home Office format) is retained in line with the ‘Operations Manual’ and signed off as required by the assurance process.

4. In relation to customs functions at Manchester Airport:
   • consider whether the deployment of staff and dogs in the customs channels has become predictable and therefore less effective against experienced smugglers;
   • ensure the detector dogs are targeted against the commodities identified as high priority in the ‘Border Force Control Strategy’;
   • ensure that successful customs actions are communicated more effectively internally so that staff are fully aware of the frequency, type and value of customs work; and
   • implement the senior management vision that officers with specialist customs expertise should have opportunities to practise and retain their skills.

5. In order to be better able to manage the planned increases in passenger arrivals at Manchester Airport:
   • continue to work with Manchester Airport Group (MAG) to identify and promote best practice in relation to queue management and to increase take-up of the ePassport gates by eligible passengers at all three passenger terminals.
6. In order to improve Border Force employee engagement and morale at Manchester Airport:
   - ensure all staff are aware that the Home Office reward and recognition policy is being used;
   - establish an effective means of publicising and celebrating team successes; and
   - ensure that any local initiatives, such as weekly G7 meetings with staff, are sustained, accessible
to all staff (taking account of shift-working) and effective in addressing specific issues, either by
agreeing and implementing changes or by explaining fully why this is not possible.
4. The Inspection

Background

Border Force

4.1 Border Force is a law enforcement command within the Home Office with responsibility for securing the UK border by carrying out immigration and customs controls of people and goods entering and leaving the UK. Goods include freight consignments, cargo containers and vehicles. Border Force largely comprises staff from two predecessor organisations, the ‘detection’ arm of HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Border and Immigration Agency.

4.2 The ‘Border Force Business Plan 2015 – 2018’ sets out its strategic objectives:

• ‘To deter and prevent individuals and goods from entering the UK that would harm the national interest;
• To facilitate the legitimate movement of individuals and trade to/from the UK;
• To protect and collect customs revenues from trade crossing the border;
• To provide excellent service to customers; and
• To provide demonstrable effectiveness, efficiency and value for money’.

4.3 It also states four values that underpin how it will deliver its strategic objectives:

• Commitment: we must each personally commit to making our team the best it can be;
• Discipline: we must each take personal responsibility for our actions and support each other to do the right thing;
• Respect: we must each create and help maintain a truly inclusive working environment for colleagues and customers; and
• Moral Courage: we must each do the right thing, even when it is unpopular or in conflict with personal interests, and so safeguard our integrity.’

4.4 The Business Plan further states that Border Force aims to be ‘a fully intelligence-led organisation that targets its activities to greatest benefit’. As part of being ‘intelligence-led’, it had introduced a ‘Control Strategy’. This document assesses and rates the risk at the border and to the UK from each category of illegal, illicit or revenue goods. The ‘Control Strategy’ is sub-divided according to mode of travel. The two sections relating to this inspection are ‘Air Passenger’ and ‘Air Freight’. Senior managers use the ‘Control Strategy’, together with current intelligence from the Border Force Intelligence Directorate, to target resources against the highest identified risks.

4.5 The Border Force Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD) conducts ‘spot checks’ to test compliance with directions and guidance. OAD’s March 2015 report on Manchester Airport was used to inform the scope of this inspection.
Manchester Airport

4.6 Manchester Airport is owned and run by the Manchester Airport Group (MAG), the largest UK-owned airport operator. Ownership of MAG is split between private investors (35.5%), Manchester City Council (35.5%) and nine other Greater Manchester Councils (29%).\(^1\) The airport contributes £4 billion annually to the UK economy (supporting over 130,000 jobs). MAG is driving expansion. It has been marketing Manchester Airport in China, which has resulted in new investment and increased flights (announced in October 2015 when the President of China visited the city). All of which make Manchester Airport a key element of the ‘Northern Powerhouse’.\(^2\)

4.7 The airport is a busy environment for both immigration and customs functions. It is a travel hub for the North of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and is used by a wide range of airlines, see Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Airport terminals and serviced airlines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminal 1</th>
<th>Aer Lingus</th>
<th>Air Transat</th>
<th>Aurigny Air Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aegean Airlines</td>
<td>Balkan Holiday Air</td>
<td>Blue Islands</td>
<td>Brussels Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Airlines</td>
<td>Egyptair</td>
<td>Emirates</td>
<td>Etihad Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easyjet</td>
<td>Germanwings</td>
<td>Icelandair</td>
<td>Iraqi Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnair</td>
<td>Jet2.com</td>
<td>Libyan Airlines</td>
<td>Lufthansa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jet2.com</td>
<td>Pegasus Airlines</td>
<td>SAS Scandinavian Air</td>
<td>SATA International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orbest Airlines</td>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>TAP Portugal</td>
<td>Thomas Cook Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss</td>
<td>Terminal 2</td>
<td>Turkish Airlines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Canada Rouge</td>
<td>Air Malta</td>
<td>Cathay Pacific</td>
<td>Delta Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enter Air</td>
<td>Freebird</td>
<td>Germania</td>
<td>Monarch Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIA</td>
<td>Qatar Airways</td>
<td>Saudia Airlines</td>
<td>Singapore Airlines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Planet Airlines</td>
<td>Thomson Airways</td>
<td>United</td>
<td>Virgin Atlantic (intl flights only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terminal 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air France</td>
<td>American Airlines</td>
<td>British Airways</td>
<td>Eastern Airways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FlyBe</td>
<td>KLM</td>
<td>Ryanair</td>
<td>US Airways</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.8 As the UK’s third largest airport, with three passenger terminals, a freight terminal and 19,000 people working there at the time of the inspection, it had carried over 22.4 million passengers in the previous year, flying to 214 destinations (more than any other UK airport). Figure 2 sets out traffic statistics from 2010 to 2015.

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1. [http://www.magworld.co.uk/magweb.nsf/Content/AboutUsAndOurAirports](http://www.magworld.co.uk/magweb.nsf/Content/AboutUsAndOurAirports)
Figure 2: Traffic statistics for Manchester Airport

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Aircraft Movements</th>
<th>Total Passengers</th>
<th>Total Freight (tonnes)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>160570</td>
<td>17913290</td>
<td>116655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>168406</td>
<td>19312735</td>
<td>106916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
<td>167690</td>
<td>19978700</td>
<td>97609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2014</td>
<td>168135</td>
<td>20905699</td>
<td>95716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>172310</td>
<td>22410544</td>
<td>96798</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Freight tonnage does not reflect the number and value of goods imported in the hold of passenger aircraft. These lighter and smaller freight consignments can be of high monetary value per tonne.

4.9 Terminals 1 and 3 share the same building. The larger Terminal 2 is located a short distance away and houses Border Force’s immigration ‘secondary examination area’ (SEA). A passenger required to submit to further examination, for example to enable extended questioning, a luggage search, or for Border Force to contact any UK-based sponsors, may be referred to the SEA for these further actions.

4.10 Terminal 3 is the smallest of the three terminals and least well-equipped for international arrivals. Whereas Terminal 1 has 10 immigration desks and Terminal 2 has 12, Terminal 3 has only eight. Each terminal has five automated ePassport gates. MAG has plans in place to extend Terminal 2 to become the main terminal of two (Terminal 1 will be demolished), with a view to increasing passenger numbers to 35 million within the next ten years.

4.11 Border Force deals with freight on the opposite side of the airport apron from the passenger terminals. Now the UK’s fourth largest freight handler, MAG expects business to continue to increase with the planned £1 billion investment in the nearby ‘Airport City’ (5 million square feet of business premises including a World Logistics Hub).

Border Force at Manchester Airport at the time of the inspection

4.12 At the time of the inspection, Border Force North had responsibility for Manchester Airport and ports and airports in North West England and North Wales. Manchester Airport Border Force had 285 permanent staff, the majority being operational officers exercising legal powers to secure the border, with some administrative staff providing support. In addition, seasonal staff were employed on the immigration controls from early summer to the autumn (when the airport is still busy with student arrivals), many of whom were former police officers or members of the armed forces. There were 38 seasonal staff when we visited in September 2015.

Methodology

4.13 This inspection examined how efficiently and effectively Border Force manages immigration and customs functions at Manchester Airport, using eight of the Independent Chief Inspector’s inspection criteria.4

4.14 Our inspection process involved:

- familiarisation visits to Manchester Airport, to Martello House at Folkestone (for a briefing on the ‘Border Force Control Strategy’) and to Gatwick Airport South Terminal for a briefing on the latest version of ePassport gates and Border Force policy on their use;

3 [http://www.manchesterairport.co.uk/about-us/publications/traffic-statistics/] Figures are for arrivals and departures, both domestic and international, and may be subject to updating.

4 The inspection criteria used in this inspection are detailed at Appendix 2 of this report. Details of the full set of inspection criteria can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at: [http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/inspections/inspection-programmes/]
research and analysis of open-source and Home Office documentation, including material published on the Home Office intranet, Gov.uk, Hansard and other media (particularly the Manchester Evening News);

• evidence from the Home Office, including staffing information, service standards, performance statistics, other management information, policies and operational guidance and data on e-Passport Gates, including the following internal documents used for the report:
  – ‘Border Force Control Strategy’;
  – ‘Border Force Strategic Risk Summary’;
  – ‘Border Force Operating Mandate’;
  – ‘Border Force Manchester Airport Operating Model’;
  – ‘The Enforcement Handbook’ - a shared resource with HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC); and
  – ‘Border Force Assurance Standards: Assurance Checks (Scheme of Control)’.

• stakeholder engagement, including a survey of airline operators and meetings with airlines, freight handlers and the Manchester Airport Group (MAG);

• meetings with delivery partners including Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and the National Crime Agency (NCA);

• case sampling – 230 cases from the period 1 November 2014 to 30 April 2015, comprising:
  – 50 refusals and 50 grants of leave to enter after the passenger was required to submit to further examination;
  – 30 grants of temporary admission to the UK after the passenger was required to submit to further examination;
  – 25 detections of customs controlled goods/substances in the air passenger environment resulting from targeting activity;
  – 25 detections of customs controlled goods/substances in the air passenger environment not resulting from targeting activity;
  – 25 detections of customs controlled goods/substances in the freight environment resulting from targeting activity; and
  – 25 detections of customs controlled goods/substances in the freight environment not resulting from targeting activity.

• Onsite inspection at Manchester Airport between 8 and 14 September, which included:
  – 130 inspector hours of live observations of busy arrivals periods, including a Friday and Saturday night;
  – Focus groups and interviews with senior managers, managers and officers, including the seasonal workforce.

4.15 Numbers and grades of Home Office staff who attended the pre-planned interviews and focus groups are set out below. Inspectors also spoke to officers and managers informally during the 130 hours of observation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Director (Grade 5)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director (Grade 6)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistant Director (Grade 7)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF Senior Officer</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF Higher Officer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BF Officer and Assistant Officer</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Immigration Controls

UK arrivals

5.1 For immigration purposes, individuals arriving in the UK fall into two categories:

- British, other EEA and Swiss nationals;
- nationals of all other countries.

5.2 EEA and Swiss nationals do not require leave to enter, but may be refused entry by Border Force under certain circumstances. They use the ‘EU’ arrivals channels, which include the ePassport gates. Nationals of other countries are granted leave to enter by a Border Force officer at the immigration controls endorsing their passports, or are refused entry if the officer is not satisfied that they qualify for entry under the Immigration Rules.

5.3 Border Force’s ‘Operating Mandate’ and ‘Operations Manual’ specify how passengers should be managed at the immigration controls.

‘Operating Mandate’

5.4 The ‘Operating Mandate’, which was agreed with Ministers and came into use in July 2012:

> defines the full border security checks to be conducted by Border Force officers, or through automated processes, on people and accompanied goods, freight and post arriving in – and where appropriate – departing from the UK; it also defines the actions to be taken in response to those checks.

5.5 It sets out the mandatory checks officers should complete in relation to ‘all individuals seeking entry to the UK’, and those to be applied to ‘specific cohorts of individuals seeking entry’, plus the further ‘necessary and appropriate’ checks an officer might apply ‘on a case-by-case basis to satisfy themselves of the appropriate course of action to be taken’.

5.6 The ‘Operating Mandate’ sets out what officers should do in situations of ‘temporary technical or operational disturbances’, for example if a computer-based checking system is temporarily unavailable. It also covers when and how cases should be referred and handed on to other authorities.

‘Operations Manual’

5.7 The ‘Operations Manual’ provides guidance on how to operate the immigration controls. It is divided into five main sections: pre-entry, primary checkpoint, secondary examination, criminal investigations and business tools. Customs and HMRC guidance is provided separately for officers via the Enforcement Handbook Border Force Portal. It provides guidance regarding how to deal with specific situations, for example the safeguarding of children or an individual who is an ‘NHS Debtor’ (someone owing £1,000 or more).

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5 For the full list of nationalities see Glossary.
6 Border Force refers to the immigration control as the ‘Primary Check Point’ (PCP).
Operation of the immigration control at Manchester Airport

5.8 We sampled 130 cases where individuals seeking to enter the UK at Manchester Airport between November 2014 and April 2015 had been required by Border Force to submit to further examination:

- 50 that led to refusal of leave to enter;
- 50 that led to grant of leave to enter; and
- 30 where officers granted temporary admission.  

5.9 Of the 130 records, 72 were in standard Home Office hard-copy file format. These should contain copies of all paperwork issued and interview notes (if one took place). Fifty eight of the case records we requested came as ‘dummy files’ – print outs from the central electronic records systems, without the same detail and stored documents as the paper files.

5.10 We observed Border Force operating the immigration control at all three passenger terminals, and we asked officers and managers about their experiences while observing and in interviews and focus groups.

5.11 We looked in particular for:

- compliance with the ‘Operating Mandate’;
- compliance with guidance on how to carry out processes (the ‘Operations Manual’);
- efficient and effective operation of the further examination processes;
- Border Force meeting its specific legal obligations in relation to safeguarding children; and
- the quality of audit trails and record-keeping.

Findings

‘Operating Mandate’ compliance

5.12 The ‘Manchester Airport Operating Model’ set out clearly for all staff how the port would ensure compliance with the ‘Operating Mandate’. For example, it set out the full duties of the Border Force Higher Officer managing each terminal to minimise risk of oversight. These included tasks such as liaison with the airport operator, managing the immigration controls, measuring queuing times, carrying out assurance checks and ensuring the availability of a forgery officer for targeted flights.

5.13 In the sampled cases, we found no examples of systemic failure to comply with the ‘Operating Mandate’ at Manchester Airport. In interviews onsite and in our observations, officers showed a good understanding of its importance. For example, we observed full compliance when two Italian school groups arrived with their teachers for educational visits. As these nationals may use their non-chipped national identity cards in lieu of a passport, officers typed the full names of every passenger and other information from each card into the checking system, as required by the Mandate.

5.14 The ‘Border Force Strategic Risk Summary’ referred to:

‘Controls at risk due to partner activity’ breaking this down into ‘Operator processes and errors result in control breaches’ and ‘Port infrastructure & security not sufficient.’

7 Temporary Admission can be granted at any stage, including after refusal of entry into the United Kingdom.
5.15 At Manchester Airport, the configuration of Terminals 1 and 3 had caused problems in the past with ‘misdirected flights’. These were where arriving passengers inadvertently circumvented the arrivals controls, having been misdirected by airport staff. Border Force had worked with MAG to resolve these problems.

5.16 On 21 April 2015, there was a new breach of this kind when a Ryanair flight landed late at Terminal 3 – at around 02.15. Errors when the handling agent input the flight data led to periods when the flight was not displayed on the arrivals screen. One hundred and forty-seven passengers were able to exit through the immigration and customs halls without being seen by Border Force, but 29 passengers remained at the control and were processed in the usual way. There was a thorough investigation and a number of issues were identified and addressed by Border Force.

5.17 When onsite we asked about the response to this incident. MAG told us that Border Force local management had emphasised the severity of this incident with MAG and the airline involved, making clear the concern at Ministerial level about any incident of this type. MAG also said that local Border Force management had acted decisively to find out what had happened and to minimise any risk of repetition. Border Force and MAG had reviewed the close-down procedure for Terminal 3 after the last announced flight each night and further control measures had been put into place.  

**Record keeping for grants and refusals of leave to enter**

5.18 In 47 of the 50 refusal records we sampled, the decision to refuse was clearly supported by the recorded evidence. A senior manager told us that refusal records had been criticised in the past and efforts had been made to improve them.

5.19 By contrast, in 12 of the 50 cases where leave to enter was granted, the recorded evidence pointed towards refusal, and the officer’s reasons for deciding to grant entry were unclear from the record. In a further 11 cases there was insufficient evidence recorded to allow us to judge whether the decision to grant leave to enter was in line with policy and guidance. Figure 4 refers.

**Figure 4: Recorded evidence in grant and refusal of leave to enter sample cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Refused leave to enter</th>
<th>Granted leave to enter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evidence supported final decision</td>
<td>Evidence supported final decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence did not support final decision</td>
<td>Evidence did not support final decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient evidence on file to judge</td>
<td>Insufficient evidence on file to judge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27

5.20 Figure 5 outlines one of the 12 cases where entry was granted but the record showed a body of negative evidence about the passenger’s circumstances and intentions.

**Figure 5: Case study of grant of leave to enter not supported by the case record**

The passenger, a USA national:
- at 08:20 on 26 October 2014, arrived on a flight from the United States and requested leave to enter for two and a half months as a visitor;
- stated that he had no family in the UK except his aunt, with whom he would stay;
- had US$56 (then £37) with no access to further funds; and
- said he had previously travelled around Egypt pursuing Islamic studies.

Border Force:
- contacted the passenger’s sponsor (his aunt) and established that his mother also lived in the UK;
- requested that US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) check the passenger’s details on their system. CBP reported that, according to its records, he was also known to use another name and had a travel history in the Middle East and Africa; and
- at 09:10, served a Form IS81 to require the passenger to submit to further examination on the basis that he lacked credibility as a visitor, held insufficient funds and had lied about not having family in the UK apart from his aunt.
- conducted a 30-minute interview, during which the passenger stated that:
  - he was unaware that his mother lived in the UK;
  - he hoped that his brother-in-law (also in the UK), would support him during his visit. If not, he thought his aunt would do so;
  - he had been working for a large supermarket chain in the US for three months and it was keeping his job open for the two and a half months of his absence; and
  - he did not use any other name, and had not travelled to the countries indicated by the CBP information.
- at 15.03, decided that the passenger was a genuine visitor to the UK and granted him leave to enter for six months but did not note the reasons for the decision.

Chief Inspector’s Comment:
- The record does not provide evidence to explain how the officer was satisfied that this passenger fitted the Immigration Rules relating to visitors; and
- There was no indication that the two relatives offered as sponsors were asked if they would provide financial support to the passenger during his stay.

‘Operations Manual’ and further examination

5.21 A passenger seeking leave to enter the UK must qualify in one of the categories set out in the Immigration Rules. Passengers unable to satisfy an officer’s initial questioning that they qualify for entry can be required to submit to further examination. They must be notified in writing and Border Force uses Form IS81 to do this. It informs the individual that he or she has been identified as requiring further examination and no decision about entry will be made until the officer is satisfied that the Immigration Rules have been met.
5.22 The ‘Operations Manual’ states:

‘If an immigration officer needs to leave the desk in order to make further enquiries regarding the admissibility of a passenger, they are conducting a further examination under Schedule 2. This is because the passenger is being required to wait, and is not free to leave, until the officer returns. They are therefore being detained from that point. As set out above in order to lawfully further examine an individual under Schedule 2 a passenger must be given a written notice which explains under what powers they have been detained. It follows that an IS81 must be served.’

5.23 Some arriving passengers are served with an IS81 to allow for a straightforward administrative check to be completed. Examples of administrative checks include confirming that an unaccompanied child is being met by an appropriate person, or checking that a student is still attending their course of study.

**Grounds for further examination**

5.24 Figure 6 shows the primary reasons recorded for serving an IS81 in the 130 cases in our sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credibility</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerns about EC/BRP* holder</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of EC for purpose of entry</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative (systems or sponsor check)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (inc. asylum and NHS abuse)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgery concern/impersonation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Entry Clearance (EC) includes visas for designated nationalities. ECs, along with Biometric Residence Permits (BRP), are documents that permit entry after pre-arrival checks. Border Force may overturn these at point of entry in specific circumstances (see paragraph 4.31).

5.25 Aside from 15 forms served for administrative checks and eight cases where the decision to issue an IS81 was not recorded, the primary reasons for serving an IS81 in our sample pointed to serious concerns, such as a passenger’s credibility, which required investigation.

**Further examination and interviews**

5.26 The ‘Operations Manual’ says: ‘Whenever a person has been submitted for further examination, it will generally be appropriate to interview the person fully to establish all the facts of the case.’
Figure 7: Breakdown of 130 sample IS81 cases into those interviewed and those not\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview conducted</th>
<th>Interview not conducted</th>
<th>Not known</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.27 Figure 7 shows how many of the 130 IS81 cases we sampled involved an interview. Of our sample of 50 refusal of entry cases, 41 were interviewed; of our 50 grants of entry, 10 were interviewed; and of our 30 temporary admission cases, 11 were interviewed.

5.28 The ‘Operations Manual’ guidance for considering temporary admission says that ‘When proposing to grant a passenger TA, staff must ensure that the person has been examined as thoroughly as possible and an appropriate risk assessment has been conducted.’ In light of that guidance and the fact that only 11 out of 30 individuals in our sample had been interviewed, we looked at how many of the temporary admission cases we requested had evidence of the required risk assessment. See Figure 8.

**Figure 8: Risk assessments in temporary admission sample cases**

| Paper file provided - risk assessment in the file | 9 |
| Paper file provided - no risk assessment in the file | 12 |
| No paper file provided - no risk assessment provided | 9 |
| **TOTAL** | **30** |

5.29 A Border Force Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD) ‘Standards Spot Check’, conducted in March 2015, reported Manchester Airport’s own internal assurance findings for October to December 2014, which had identified 15 cases that lacked both the required risk assessment and confirmation of whether other checks had been done. OAD sampled nine further files and found that, while the ground for granting temporary admission was noted, some files had ‘limited reasoning’. It also found that the standard Home Office template was not in use locally and assessments were limited. One of the nine cases lacked both the considerations that led to granting temporary admission and authorisation.

5.30 As there was insufficient evidence to support an assessment of whether the decisions to grant temporary admission were fully in line with guidance, we looked at the outcomes from the 30 sampled cases as a proxy measure of decision quality. See Figure 9.

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\(^9\) Not Applicable refers to a case where the person was passed to police custody before a Border Force interview.
Figure 9: Status of passengers granted temporary admission in the sample (August 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removed from the UK (enforced or voluntary departure)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted leave to enter</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision outstanding – individual still in contact with the Home Office*</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused entry – individual still in the UK and in contact with the Home Office*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not known</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This could be for many reasons – the individual may have claimed asylum or made further representations under Human Rights legislation etc.

5.31 Our sample contained 54 nationals who required a visa\(^{10}\) for the UK. A Border Force officer must still be satisfied that the passenger qualifies for entry. The Operations Manual states:

> *In accordance with paragraph 2A of schedule 2 to the 1971 Act, an Immigration Officer may examine a person who has arrived in the UK who holds leave to enter which is in force and which was given to them before their arrival, for the purpose of establishing whether:

1. there has been such a change in the circumstances of their case, since the leave was granted, that it should be cancelled;
2. the leave was obtained as a result of false information given by the passenger or their failure to disclose material facts;
3. there are medical grounds on which the leave should be cancelled; or
4. it would be conducive to the public good for the leave to be cancelled.*

5.32 Border Force officers are not restricted in their examination of those issued with visas and our sample showed that officers were not immediately satisfied on credibility grounds with 25 of the 54 passengers and served them with an IS81. 12 of the 25 were interviewed.

5.33 Border Force officers told us they were concerned that passengers with entry clearance were not always scrutinised sufficiently. However, a senior manager said that visa holders should be granted entry as they had already been through a pre-clearance system and ‘we have far more confidence in that process now’. Managers believed some officers spent too long on concerns about passengers holding entry clearance, with little result.

5.34 Figure 10 gives an example of a visa holder case where more scrutiny, including an interview, could have resulted in a different decision regarding entry.

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\(^{10}\) The UK has designated certain nationalities as requiring a visa (a form of entry clearance issued before travel). They can seek to obtain one from a UK embassy, mission or consulate or via the online system available to some nationals. See Entry Clearance in the Glossary.
The passenger, a Chinese national:

- arrived at 07.23 on 25 November 2014, and was presented to the control by an airline representative as he spoke no English;
- before travelling, had submitted a Visa Application Form (VAF) for a five-day visit from 25 to 30 December 2014, to travel with a Canadian passport holder and stay at a London hotel;
- had stated on the VAF that he had a wife and child in China and no family in the UK and that he intended to bring an amount of money for ‘tourism and shopping’, which was more than his stated disposable income for a year. The visa had been processed in the UK (the process did not include an interview);
- arrived alone on a ticket bought with cash eight days after the visa was issued, stating he would be staying at a Manchester Airport hotel for two weeks; and
- stated he would visit his sister in Manchester, for whom he provided a phone number.

The initial officer:

- at 07.50, served the passenger with an IS81, having looked up the statements made on the VAF and formed concerns about the passenger’s credibility; and
- noted a list of proposed actions for the officer taking over the further examination.

The officer conducting the further examination:

- telephoned the sister (who said her brother was visiting for two weeks) but made no record of checks of this new UK sponsor;
- did not take any other actions, and did not record why there was no interview or luggage examination; and
- at 10.00, granted leave to enter for six months, with the agreement of the Higher Officer but without making a clear record of the rationale.

Border Force responded to our query about this case:

- ‘A lack of evidence stating that checks have been carried out does not necessarily mean they were not done. In order to refuse entry to an entry clearance national, the entry clearance must first be overturned. This can only be done in the following limited circumstances;
- on the basis of a change in circumstances;
- on the basis of a change of purpose
- because material facts were not disclosed; and
- because false representations were employed to obtain the entry clearance.
- The landing card and CID11 notes form the audit trail.’

Chief Inspector’s comment:

- There were grounds in this case for overturning the entry clearance: change of purpose (from tourism to family visit) and failure to disclose material facts (the sister in the UK). In the circumstances, this case merited using an interpreter to conduct an interview in accordance with the Operations Manual.

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11 The electronic system for recording casework.
During our onsite observations, we identified other instances where an interview did not take place. For example, an officer served a Form IS81 on a visa holder because of credibility concerns, but the passenger was not interviewed. Leave to enter was granted after a telephone call to the sponsor in the UK.

We looked at the guidance in relation to sponsors. Following on from the guidance on interviewing those served with an IS81, the ‘Operations Manual’ says ‘This will also be necessary with any sponsors that the person may have in the UK and/or any organisations or academic establishments that the person may be coming into contact with during the course of their stay in the UK.’ Where sponsors attended the airport, Border Force was able to ask for proof of identity but, where contact was made by telephone, it was more problematic to establish the sponsor’s bona fides. In the case described at Figure 10, nothing was recorded to show how the officer was satisfied that the woman on the telephone was the passenger’s sister and was a suitable sponsor.

No analysis of further examination process

Figure 11 shows the reasons recorded in the 50 cases in our sample where entry was granted after an IS81 had been served.

While observing the immigration controls, we identified instances where serving an IS81 might have been avoided by asking a few additional questions at first encounter. A senior manager told us that approximately 70% of passengers served with an IS81 were granted entry and, as previous local management information on IS81s had been poor, a manager had been tasked to look into the situation. Figure 12 sets out the IS81 outcome statistics we obtained from central electronic records.
There was no outcome recorded for roughly a third (409 of 1,259) of the IS81s recorded as served between 1 January and 19 September 2015. The Higher Officer responsible for a shift would normally ensure that the manuscript IS81 log at each terminal had been completed with the outcome. However, the central electronic records should have been updated with the outcome in all cases.

Figure 13 shows the elapsed time between the service of a Form IS81 and the resolution of the case in the cases we sampled.

Managers explained that all three terminals tended to be busy at the same time, which created resourcing difficulties as they were required to balance competing priorities across all the operational demands. Many staff told us of their perception that the priority was to deal with the queues to avoid breaches of the published queuing time targets before starting any further examination. We observed busy periods in each terminal. Individuals served with an IS81 initially waited on chairs in front of the immigration control desks. Officers left the desks to try to resolve straightforward queries quickly. Where they assessed that further examination would be more complex, officers left individuals to wait until the controls were quieter.

While further examination cases could be referred to the casework unit in the secondary examination area (SEA) in Terminal 2, caseworkers there had three interview slots per day and were required to deal with cases from other ports covered by Border Force North, particularly Holyhead. In practice, therefore, much of the shorter-term enquiry and investigation work was done at the terminals with a view to reaching a decision without involving the SEA casework unit.
Skills training

5.43 The ‘Border Force Strategic Risk Summary’ identified a risk of:

‘Permeability of the Border: controls at risk due to staff capability
– gaps in professional knowledge or adherence to operational assurance of systems and processes; and
– prioritisation of training/capability in key areas of border security deterrence - imposter identification and forgery.’

5.44 In this context, the ‘Manchester Airport Operating Model’ stated that teams would ‘be made up of multi-functional officers who between them can cover the full range of immigration and customs functions’.

5.45 To be completely ‘multi-functional’ an officer would need to have completed all three of the core skills modules, CS1, CS2 and CS3, or to have acquired the equivalent knowledge and skills prior to those modules having been introduced. The modules comprise:

- Core Skills 1 (CS1) – ‘Equips BFOs with all knowledge and skills including notebooks … and Forgery, to carry out [immigration] duties up to point of further investigation required. All relevant legislation, procedures and policies to ensure compliance to Operational mandate’;
- Core Skills 2 (CS2) – ‘Equips BFOs with all relevant skills, legislation, procedures and policies to carry out Customs duties in the Secondary Examination Area, including Search of person, court procedures with practical court day, to ensure compliance to Operational Mandate’; and
- Core Skills 3 (CS3) – ‘Equips BFOs with all relevant skills and knowledge to conduct further investigations including, Criminal interviews and HO referrals. Referrals and ensuring Operational Mandate compliance’. 12

5.46 Managers and staff told us that training for new joiners was normally provided in order: CS1, followed by CS2, followed by CS3. However, some staff were still waiting for CS3 training more than two years after completing CS2. Senior managers told us that increasing passenger traffic at Manchester Airport had made it difficult to release officers for training, in particular for CS3. In addition, CS3 training involved a mandatory period of mentoring, but the officers capable of acting as mentors were tied up on the immigration controls. A senior manager, who was not previously aware of this situation, described it as ‘disappointing’, as local managers had a responsibility to ensure CS3 mentoring was provided.

5.47 The seasonal staff who covered the immigration controls during the peak months between early summer and autumn had their own short bespoke training course. Border Force told us that 30 of them were trained to the equivalent of CS1, with the remainder trained to a lower ‘Critical Incident’ level (able to deal with the EU queue and monitor ePassport gates only).

5.48 Permanent staff, and seasonal staff who had returned from the previous year, expressed concern that the most recent round of the bespoke training had not been as effective as before. Some managers agreed. The smaller group of the seasonal staff had felt that the training had equipped them to work on the EU control only and not to examine anyone against the Immigration Rules.

5.49 The local ‘Operating Model’ split the permanent staff into 25 teams, each managed by a Higher Officer. The 25 teams were arranged in ‘clusters’ of five with each managed by a Senior Officer. Staff covered 10-hour shifts designated as ‘early’, ‘late’ and ‘night’. We observed all three shifts and noted that, frequently, only a minority of the staff on duty at a terminal were trained to carry out further examination (which required completion of CS1 and CS3). On several occasions, we observed those

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12 From Border Force Operational Training Courses list.
officers dealing with the remaining non-EEA queue and then starting on the further examination of detained passengers, taking cases over from permanent staff who were not CS3 trained, as well as from seasonal staff.

5.50 Staff who were fully-trained for immigration work told us they felt under pressure because so many of their colleagues had not been trained in all of the core skills. One described their group as ‘penalised for having a larger skill set’. A senior manager acknowledged that this meant that the fully-trained staff took on more work while their colleagues were finished as soon as the queues had been cleared.

5.51 In practice, it was not possible for Border Force North management to make every officer at Manchester Airport fully ‘multi-functional’. Those immigration or customs officers who had belonged to precursor agencies and had been assimilated into Border Force, or its predecessor the UK Border Agency, had been able to elect not to undertake Personal Safety Training, which prohibited them from undertaking CS2 (customs functions) training. This meant that resourcing could not be as flexible as it might have been.

5.52 Figure 14 shows the numbers and grades of staff who had completed one or more of the Core Skills modules as at October 2015. Of 237 staff, 62 were ‘multi-functional’ in terms of having completed CS1, CS2 and CS3.

![Figure 14: Training level of Border Force Assistant Officers, Officers and Higher Officers based at Manchester Airport as at 7 October 2015](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Level</th>
<th>Grade Breakdown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Skills 1 only</td>
<td>12 Officers</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Skills 2 only</td>
<td>11 Assistant Officers, 8 Officers</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Skills 1 and 2</td>
<td>1 Assistant Officer, 56 Officers, 5 Higher Officers</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Skills 1 and 3</td>
<td>68 Officers, 14 Higher Officers</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Skills 1, 2, and 3</td>
<td>52 Officers, 10 Higher Officers</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.53 One hundred and forty four Officers and Higher Officers had been trained in CS1 and CS3 and were therefore fully trained for immigration duties. However, not all of the 144 were available to conduct further examination as Higher Officer managers did not carry out these tasks and six CS1/CS3 trained Officers worked in planning. Although available if operational pressures demanded, they were not routinely deployed to the immigration controls.

5.54 For some shifts, Higher Officers who had not received CS3 training were placed in charge of a terminal’s immigration controls. Staff told us this was stressful for the Higher Officers concerned and also posed a potential operational risk. They said that officers with more immigration experience might have to provide support during the shift, and we observed this happening. We also observed the Senior Officer rostered as Airport Duty Manager (ADM) supporting Higher Officers who had not received the full immigration training, and acting as a safety net. The ADM ensured there was a senior manager overview of each shift across the three passenger terminals and the freight terminal. This facilitated the prompt reorganisation of resources if required, for example if an unexpected arrival of a passenger flight at an already busy terminal threatened a breach of the queuing times.

5.55 Senior managers told us that they were aware of the problems with training and explained plans to bring back a cadre of seasonal workers in the autumn to early winter of 2015 to create the capacity to release permanent staff for further training. We checked later and were told that training (including
mentoring) that was within the control of local management would run from 16 November to 28 December 2015. However, CS1, CS2 and CS3 were delivered centrally and depended on the availability of Border Force trainers, so had yet to be scheduled.

**Safeguarding**

5.56 Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 requires the Secretary of State to:

> make arrangements for ensuring that any function in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality, or conferred by or by virtue of the Immigration Acts on an immigration officer, or any customs function conferred on a designated customs official, is discharged having regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom.

5.57 We found two cases in our sample where Section 55 clearly applied.

**Case 1**

- A USA national, who had supported himself in Europe by playing poker, arrived from Germany with baggage consisting mostly of unwashed clothes. He had been refused entry at Manchester Airport earlier that same month. On both occasions, he sought entry to visit a woman he had 'met' on Facebook. He declared himself a user of marijuana for palliative purposes and produced a State of California certificate to that effect. On the second occasion, he had an onward ticket to the USA for five days later.

- He was refused entry, but granted temporary admission to visit the woman until his flight. The reasons for this decision were not clear from the case record. The woman had sons of 14 and 15 at the address. The record of the 15-minute interview with the man did not cover whether he was aware that medical use of marijuana was not permitted in the UK, nor confirm whether he could cope without it until his flight.\(^\text{14}\)

- In view of the age of the children at the address and the passenger’s declared lifestyle, we asked Border Force about the section 55 duty in this case. Border Force replied that ‘There was no evidence that the children were at risk or that the passenger posed any threat.’ There was no reference to this risk assessment in the case record.

**Case 2**

- An unaccompanied 12-year old Japanese boy arrived at 22.55 from Japan via Germany to stay for three months with his father. The officer noted that the father collecting him was dishevelled, that no arrangements had apparently been made for the boy to attend school, and that the father had stated that the boy would be at home alone while he worked. The officer also noted concerns about the interaction between father and son.

- Border Force referred the case to local social services, but there was no caseworker available until the following day. At 03.30, the boy was granted leave to enter. The rationale for this decision was not clear from the case record.

- We asked Border Force to explain how it ensured that the boy would be safe in view of the officer’s observations. Border Force responded that, on his previous arrival in the UK, the boy had been subject to a social services referral and there had been a satisfactory home visit. The record for the grant of entry did not indicate that this information about the previous arrival had been used as the basis for setting aside current concerns.\(^\text{15}\)

5.58 We examined the safeguarding logs held at each passenger terminal. These contained notes of Section 55 situations and the actions officers had taken. The Senior Officer responsible for the

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14 Cannabis is a Class B drug and is not prescribed for palliative purposes in the UK

15 Social Services subsequently made a further visit and had no safeguarding concerns.
regional Safeguarding and Trafficking (SAT) team and the Manchester Airport-based officer who was involved in writing the national training package for SAT told us that there was usually a SAT officer on duty to support referrals via the National Referral Mechanism. There was joint working with Home Office Immigration Enforcement colleagues and with external partners, including Greater Manchester Police, the National Crime Agency, local social services and Barnardo’s. Managers told us that officers regularly acted on concerns about possible trafficking.

5.59 The seasonal workforce included a high proportion of former police officers who were experienced in relation to safeguarding. This group told us that, because some parents objected to questions asked of their children, they kept copies at their desks of a handout from the ‘Operations Manual’ which explained the Section 55 duty to parents. The handout, which is available to print out in a range of languages, is at Appendix 3.

5.60 Border Force had arrangements in place with MAG for dealing with vulnerable passengers. We observed how wheelchair users were brought to the front of a queue and dealt with immediately. Border Force was also active with MAG and the airport Chaplaincy in the annual ‘Travel Safe’ week at Manchester Airport, and had been involved in other initiatives, such as putting posters in the passenger terminals to warn against falling victim to people traffickers. At the time of the inspection, Border Force had an operation planned that focused on safeguarding and trafficking awareness for flights from Hong Kong.

5.61 Border Force was running a pilot scheme at some airports, not including Manchester, to allow UK passport holders aged 12 to 17 to use the ePassport gates. It was aware that this carried certain problems with regard to safeguarding as, unlike at the immigration desks where officers saw children alongside any accompanying adults, passengers passed through the ePassport gates individually. Managers at Manchester Airport told us that if children were to be allowed to use the gates, a roving officer would be deployed to observe their behaviour when queuing to identify any signs that they might be victims of trafficking, or otherwise at risk.

Record keeping and assurance

5.62 The March 2015 OAD ‘Standards Spot Check’ noted that ‘Assurance has been slow to embed at Manchester.’ It identified several areas for improvement, including ‘a poor and inconsistent management assurance process’ and ‘a lack of management oversight’. It summed up that ‘Record keeping needs particular attention’.

5.63 The ‘Border Force Assurance Standards: Assurance Checks (Scheme of Control)’ required Senior Officers to ‘randomly select 10% of immigration port files…and check whether:

- the files have been correctly stored;
- the decision and to subject to further examination has been justified on the file, including a copy of the IS81;
- the file notes confirm that the decision taken was reasonable and in accordance with the Immigration Rules.’

5.64 Our sampled cases included records where relevant information was missing. For example, we found 11 cases with no rationale given for the decision to grant entry; 12 further landings with no audit trail to show what new positive evidence had come to light that overrode the body of negative information that had been noted; and, roughly one third of the electronic records for IS81s served with no outcome recorded.

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16 The National Referral Mechanism is a consensual process where a Potential Victim of Trafficking (PVOT) is referred for support. This process is supported by Border Force First Responders at ports and airports.
17 An annual partnership event at Manchester Airport focused on spreading awareness amongst the airport community in areas such as human trafficking, child welfare and forced marriage.
Managers told us that because there was no record of an action, such as an interview, it did not mean that it had not taken place. They said it was possible that, in those cases we identified where the recorded evidence pointed to a refusal of entry, enquiries had been made that satisfied officers that a grant of leave to enter or temporary admission was justified.

**Conclusions**

Border Force officers carrying out immigration functions at Manchester Airport understood and complied with the Border Force 'Operating Mandate' by conducting all mandated security checks. A control breach occurred in April 2015 when passengers from a delayed flight were misdirected through an unmanned immigration control. However, local senior management had acted decisively to deal with this breach and a process had been put in place for ensuring that passengers could no longer exit the arrivals hall if the controls were not staffed.

Arrivals at Manchester Airport's three passenger terminals had increased and were set to increase further. However, a significant number of Border Force officers were not fully trained in immigration functions and were unable to conduct the further examination of passengers served with Form IS81 and detained because there were concerns about granting them entry. This led to delays and inefficiencies in the processing of passengers. Senior managers thought that 70% of passengers served with an IS81 were landed, but had only recently allocated someone to take on formal analysis and management of local IS81 data. Central electronic records showed that the outcome had not been recorded for around a third of all IS81s served.

Where an arriving passenger was interviewed by an officer, the decision to grant or refuse entry was well-evidenced. However, the file sampling indicated that Border Force was not adhering to the 'Operations Manual' requirement that passengers subject to further examination (and served with a Form IS81) should 'generally' be interviewed. Some senior managers did not support the further examination of passengers who already held entry clearance, even where the officer at the control had concerns and had served an IS81.

Operational pressures had meant that staff had not been released for skills training (in immigration and customs functions), and therefore progress towards the 'multi-functional' workforce envisaged in the local 'Operating Model' had been limited. This resulted in operational inefficiencies and inequalities in the allocation of work.

At Higher Officer level, some staff were called upon to supervise immigration functions at a terminal for a shift without the relevant immigration knowledge or training, and while the Airport Duty Manager (a Senior Officer) acted as a safety net, this was both an operational risk and unfair on those Higher Officers and their colleagues. At the time of the inspection, senior managers had recognised the training issue and had put plans in place to address it.

Border Force was, in the main, discharging its safeguarding duties towards children and other vulnerable passengers effectively. It was also actively involved with partners on wider safeguarding issues, including human trafficking. However, there were two cases in the file sample where the record contained insufficient evidence that officers had fully understood their statutory duties.

Overall, the quality of record keeping in relation to immigration functions was inconsistent and required greater management assurance. Most of the sampled decisions to refuse leave to enter were well-evidenced and made in line with guidance, indicating that work done locally to improve refusal records had been successful. However, the evidence for other decisions was not recorded fully, particularly in 12 cases where entry had been granted without a clear explanation and despite an accumulation of negative evidence. A March 2015 OAD spot check had found problems with temporary admission records. The inspection sampled 30 temporary admission cases. There was nothing in any of them to suggest poor decision-making. However, 21 of the 30 cases offered no evidence that a risk assessment had been completed, as required by the 'Operations Manual'.

## Recommendations

**The Home Office should:**

1. In relation to the further examination for immigration purposes at Manchester Airport:
   - ensure that ‘generally’ the individual is interviewed ‘fully to establish all the facts of the case’ in compliance with the ‘Border Force Operations Manual’; and
   - ensure that in every case where an IS81 has been served, the outcome is entered on the central electronic record.

2. In order to achieve the optimum ‘multi-functional’ workforce envisaged in the ‘Manchester Airport Operating Model’:
   - re-check the preferences of those Border Force officers based at Manchester Airport who previously opted not to train to be fully ‘multi-functional’; and
   - produce a personal development plan for each officer at Manchester Airport that sets a clear expectation in terms of formal skills training in immigration and customs functions (CS1, CS2 and CS3), with timescales for their completion.

3. In relation to immigration record keeping at Manchester Airport:
   - improve record keeping for cases where leave to enter is granted, with a clear audit trail from the evidence gathered to the decision; and
   - overhaul the local record keeping process for temporary admission cases to ensure that a risk assessment (in the approved Home Office format) is retained in line with the ‘Operations Manual’ and signed off as required by the assurance process.
6. Customs Controls

‘Passenger’ and ‘freight’ customs controls

6.1 Border Force conducts customs controls on ‘passenger’ and ‘freight’ movements into and out of the UK. ‘Freight’ covers goods transported in bulk, which may be checked for customs purposes because they may be subject to types of licensing and control, while some may be restricted or prohibited. Manchester Airport is the fourth largest UK airport for freight-only aircraft. It has a dedicated freight terminal with over 100 freight forwarders and couriers operating from the World Freight Centre and the transit sheds, which are just outside the airport perimeter to permit public access.

Legislation and powers

6.2 Border Force officers operate customs controls under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA), which contains most of their powers to search and question. The officers are customs trained and accredited. Border Force officers exercising customs functions are empowered to detect, detain and/or seize illegal goods, such as Class A drugs or firearms, and goods where duty or taxes have not been paid, including cigarettes or alcohol. Officers rely on specific intelligence and risk assessments, as well as their own experience and knowledge, to select a passenger or freight item for examination.

6.3 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) enables officers to seize cash they suspect is linked to criminality. If an individual in possession of cash in excess of £1,000 is unable to satisfy an officer that it was legally acquired, or offers no explanation, the full amount can be seized. The person can go to court to recover the money, but often chooses to forfeit it to the Crown at the airport and continue their journey.

General guidance

6.4 The ‘Enforcement Handbook’ provides customs and HMRC guidance. It is owned by HMRC and accessed by Border Force staff via the Enforcement Handbook Border Force Portal.

Intelligence and targeting

6.5 Border Force policy operates intelligence-led customs controls, meaning that officers do not attend arrivals as a matter of routine but are deployed on the basis of risk, intelligence and targeting. To support the intelligence-led approach, Border Force Intelligence Directorate produced the ‘Control Strategy’, which highlights areas of risk for the customs (and immigration) controls, breaking them down by theme and severity.

6.6 The National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC), located in Manchester, conducts targeting for air passenger movements. Freight targeting is dealt with at various hubs around the UK. There is a dedicated hub for each type of freight, for example air freight or unaccompanied containers. Officers assigned to

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18 Commercial passenger aircraft also bring unaccompanied freight in the hold. This is then transferred to the freight handling area.  
19 A temporary storage area that stores goods on behalf of an airline operator or agent until they are released by Border Force.  
20 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/2/contents   
21 When an officer finds something of customs interest, this is called a ‘detection’. The officer may then ‘detain’ the item pending ‘seizure’, or immediately seize it.  
22 Defined by Section 57(1) of the Firearms Act 1968 as ‘a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged’, which includes imitation, realistic, and readily convertible firearms, as well as their components, CS gas, PAVA spray and stun guns.  
freight duties at Manchester Airport also conducted their own research on freight movements, selecting items according to previous finds and the risks as assessed in the ‘Control Strategy’.

**Audit trail requirements**

6.7 Where officers detect an illegal item, or one where duty or taxes have not been paid, and question passengers or consignors/consignees, make an arrest, or seize or detain items, they are required to make a detailed record of the encounter.

6.8 The Border Force Enforcement Handbook stated:

‘*It is important that you make a record of every intervention where you or a colleague may think there might be a need to refer to it in the future*’.

6.9 However, the same guidance permitted officers not to record details of an encounter:

‘*where you stop a traveller and, having conducted a standard examination, decide that they are of no further interest, no further action is required, no feedback is required, there is no indication that the person will complain and no intelligence is generated, you are not required to make a record in your notebook*.’

**Operation of the customs controls at Manchester Airport**

6.10 To test the overall efficiency and effectiveness of customs activity at Manchester Airport, we examined a sample of 100 cases (50 passenger and 50 freight) where goods had been seized between November 2014 and April 2015.

6.11 We looked at compliance with legislation and guidance with regard to:

- the selection of an individual or an item of freight for customs examination;
- the processing of the detection and seizure;
- the treatment of individuals when detained, arrested and/or searched; and
- the record keeping of the selection, both electronic and in notebooks.

6.12 Figure 15 sets out the types of goods seized in our sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig 15: Goods seizures in sampled cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goods</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Rolling Tobacco (HRT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products of Animal Origin (POAO)²⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁴ Includes certain live animals for direct human consumption, foodstuffs, by-products and goods that may have come into contact with animals. Most POAO controls apply to countries outside the EU. [https://www.gov.uk/guidance/animal-products-import-and-export](https://www.gov.uk/guidance/animal-products-import-and-export)
6.13 At the time of our inspection, the ‘Control Strategy’ placed Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) as a ‘high’ priority within air freight. Typically, smuggled (including excess) cigarettes were relatively straightforward in terms of customs action, whereas IPR cases required more specialist customs knowledge. Where most customs work relied on targeting from the hubs, from the case records and from onsite observations, we noted that IPR detections usually resulted from an officer’s product knowledge and previous IPR experience, with support from intelligence and targeting. IPR detections were more complex administratively as they required Border Force to contact each of the rights holders affected, and it was common for a consignment of such goods to involve more than one rights holder (one detection in our sample affected seven rights holders).

6.14 Border Force corresponded formally with the rights holders, setting a deadline for the latter to decide whether to take legal action. Border Force could not seize or process the goods until it had secured the co-operation of the rights holder. An example from the sampled records is at Figure 16.

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**Figure 16: Case study of an IPR detection in the freight area**

**Border Force officers:**

- using profiling, identified a shipment of goods, ostensibly from an internationally-renowned company, as suspicious;
- intercepted and examined the shipment, detecting a large number of counterfeit ‘spin-off’ merchandising items that infringed the intellectual property rights of two major film studios;
- processed the shipments promptly, involving two freight team shifts; and
- notified both rights holders, maintaining clear and concise records.

**Rights holder 1:**

- confirmed the items were not genuine and requested they be seized, saying they were ‘very appreciative’ of Border Force’s efforts.

**Rights holder 2:**

- did not respond to Border Force by the deadline, so the items were released to the consignee in accordance with Border Force guidance.

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25 A broad category that includes any article likely to deprave or corrupt the viewer.
26 Goods that infringe on the rights of the intellectual property’s owner, including counterfeit goods, or goods designed to look like another brand in order to fool the consumer.
27 CITES regulates the movement of protected flora and fauna. This also includes products made of or derived from listed animals or plants.
28 The prevention of the illegal exportation of strategic and technological goods subject to sanctions.
6.15 The Anti-Counterfeiting Group (ACG)\(^{29}\) has noted increased levels of fake goods entering the UK. A recent ACG report\(^{30}\) highlighted Manchester as the leading area for counterfeiting in the UK and China as the main source of counterfeit goods, raising concerns that the planned increases in passenger and freight traffic from China will increase the IPR risks at Manchester Airport and put pressure on the customs functions. As well as infringing copyright laws and interfering with legitimate trade, counterfeit goods can cause other harms. For example, some imported counterfeit toys are unsafe for children (bringing them within Border Force's Section 55 safeguarding duty).\(^{31}\)

### Origins of detections and seizures

6.16 The sample of 50 passenger records showed that where the nationality was recorded, the majority (30) of passengers who had had goods detected and seized were UK passport holders, with two Chinese, two Qatars and one Indian. In the remaining 15 cases the nationality was not recorded.

6.17 Targeting of passenger flights arriving at Manchester Airport was mostly based on intelligence. Previous successes, for example, multiple seizures from flights arriving from Pakistan, informed the intelligence picture. Figure 17 shows the most recent point of departure for the 50 passenger flights in our sample where successful customs detections were made.

![Figure 17: Point of departure of passenger flights for successful detections](image)

6.18 Figure 18 shows the most recent point of departure for the 50 freight cases in our sample.

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29 The ACG is a leading authority on the worldwide trade in fakes and now represents around 160 organisations globally.
30 [http://a-cg.org/guests/publications](http://a-cg.org/guests/publications)
31 Cross-border trade in counterfeit goods generates illicit profits for organised criminal gangs which they can use to fund other illicit activities and sustain their lifestyles.
6.19 We discussed targeting with staff. Some told us that the traditional targets were definitely the right ones. Officers were aware, for example, of a history of successful seizures from particular countries. Others felt that current deployments failed to make best use of resources.

6.20 Many staff told us that the intelligence-led approach was not delivering effective targeting, that there were fewer successes than before and that commodities were being missed. Passengers entering the red channel with something to declare were required to telephone for an officer to attend, but could leave before an officer was able to arrive. Senior managers commented that Border Force would continue to take an intelligence-led approach, and officers needed to contribute to its improvement by being more active in ‘completing the feedback loop’.

6.21 Senior managers also told us that the staff view that Border Force no longer did customs work was a ‘myth’ and that there had been some ‘fantastic successes’. They wanted team leaders to practise the ‘confidence to target the right things’ and to ensure that staff had opportunities to practice and keep up their customs skills.

Compliance, record keeping and basic assurance

6.22 In order to ensure compliance with legislation and provide an audit trail of actions, Border Force officers were required to maintain notebooks when operating in the customs environment. These must be used to record how a person or item was identified for attention and the actions the officer subsequently took. We looked at the overall quality of the record keeping.

6.23 Seventy notebooks (33 passenger and 37 freight) were completed in accordance with Border Force record keeping guidance. Twenty six contained only small errors and inconsistencies. Two contained insufficient detail, and two notebook records were missing. The assurance regime required 10% of customs notebooks to be checked monthly, but managers and officers gave us a mixed picture of when and how assurance was actually carried out.
Border Force guidance required all seizures to be recorded accurately on ‘Centaur’, an IT system owned by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs but also used by Border Force. We found that the electronic and paper records matched exactly in 59 of 100 records (26 passenger and 33 freight). Where there were discrepancies between the electronic record and the notebook these were mostly regarding the times of events, although the entries usually differed only by a few minutes. Some staff told us that new Centaur accounts were not being created, so they would have to wait for a colleague to make the entry.

While onsite, we observed officers following the guidance. For example, specialist cargo staff detected an unlicensed importation of products of animal origin (POAO) material. Two cardboard boxes, sent by a family in Dubai to someone studying in the UK, contained cartons of thick UHT cream. Staff ensured that the opening of each box was formally witnessed and the contents recorded via CCTV.

**Detector dogs**

The Manchester Airport dog unit consisted of a team of trained Border Force dog handlers (Assistant Officers), a team leader (Officer) and a Higher Officer. In 2010, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (who then managed the dogs) proposed a new kennel facility at a cost of £1.25 million with capacity for 12 dogs. We visited the kennel as part of the inspection. It housed six detector dogs (plus one in training). The dogs could be deployed within Border Force North region to search arriving passengers and freight for various commodities: drugs, tobacco, cash and meat (or other products of animal origin). Some dogs were trained to search for more than one commodity, for instance cash and drugs.

In order to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the dog unit, we requested data on detections and seizures between November 2014 and June 2015, see Figure 20.

**Figure 20: Numbers of seizures made by the dog teams at Manchester Airport**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Product of Animal Origin (POAO) Seizures</th>
<th>Amount (kg)</th>
<th>Cigarettes Seizures</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Hand rolling tobacco (HRT) Seizures</th>
<th>Amount (kg)</th>
<th>Other tobacco seizures</th>
<th>Amount (kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21,980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 This table contains internal management information provided by the Home Office. It has not been quality assured to the level of published National Statistics so should be treated as provisional and therefore subject to change, similarly Figure 21.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Detections</th>
<th>Seizures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Total Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov-14</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>£503,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec-14</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>£90,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan-15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>£7,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb-15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>£91,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar-15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>£58,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr-15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>£92,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>£35,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>£31,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>£909,815</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.28 We also considered overall data relating to cash detections and seizures, see Figure 21.

6.29 In focus groups, staff were particularly interested in how the dogs could be deployed more efficiently and effectively, and they told us of a need for innovation. For example, the dogs were routinely deployed to meet high risk flights but not used for some other flights. They thought there had been a decrease in the variety of work tasked to the dog unit and in the number of operations in support of stakeholders, such as the National Crime Agency (NCA).

6.30 Although the dogs were making detections, they were not delivering effectively against ‘Control Strategy’ priorities. Heroin and cocaine were assessed as ‘very high’ priority within both air passengers and freight. Yet, according to the data provided by Border Force, the dogs had made no Class A drugs detections in the period November 2014 to June 2015. When deployed, the POAO dog made multiple accurate detections, but most were of small amounts of cheese or sausages, wrongly brought back by returning British holidaymakers and posing minimal risk to UK public health, whereas it would be of more strategic value to target flights where the dog might detect ‘bushmeat’.

6.31 A senior manager agreed that there was a lack of innovation in the use of the dogs, and told us that a new management structure was being put into place to take a fresh look at their deployment. This included a response to a national review of all Border Force’s dog units that reported in February.

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33 Detection does not necessarily result in seizure as the passenger may satisfy the officer that the cash has been acquired legally, or a judge may rule that detected cash should be returned. It may also be some months before the court makes a decision.
34 In our own sample from 1 November to 30 April (Figure 16), the six detections were three small amounts of Class B drugs and three lots of tablets – Human Growth Hormone, Viagra and Bromazepam.
35 This is a term for meat from non-domesticated mammals, reptiles, amphibians and birds which can pose a considerable threat to public health.
2015,\textsuperscript{36} which made nine recommendations, the second of which was that ‘The business should be accountable for the success of the dogs and ensure they are utilised effectively.’

**Partner and stakeholder relationships**

6.32 Border Force routinely worked in partnership with other law enforcement agencies. For example, it worked with the NCA on a joint Offensive Weapons Campaign, which had been successful in seizing items at the border such as stun guns,\textsuperscript{37} knuckledusters, batons and pepper spray. Our sample of 50 detections included one involving stun guns. In this case, a Border Force officer considered that a male passenger was acting suspiciously in the customs channels and found two stun guns (designed by the manufacturer to look like torches) in his luggage.

6.33 When a firearm is detected, an authorised Border Force firearms ‘make safe’ officer must be called.\textsuperscript{38} Border Force must have enough trained ‘make safe’ officers available to deal with firearms issues in the terminals, as well as to attend aircraft carrying armed sky marshals in order to collect their firearms on landing and to return them on departure.

6.34 In order to understand their business needs and discuss their relationship with the Border Force team assigned to freight duties, we spent time with freight handlers and agents. They told us that Border Force staff were professional, approachable and worked with them to resolve challenges. The freight team worked with other parties outside the airport environment. For example, we observed the team working swiftly with a local aquarium to preserve a consignment of live coral which had arrived at the airport in preparation for export but without the necessary paperwork. This safeguarded the coral from further harm and demonstrated the officers’ understanding of the importance of protecting endangered species covered by CITES legislation.

**Specialist skills and training**

6.35 Until April 2015, there had been a separate anti-smuggling team in the passenger terminals. They were replaced by teams of multi-functional officers undertaking both immigration and customs work. Many customs-trained staff who worked within the passenger terminals dealing with immigration queues told us that, in their view, Border Force no longer saw customs activity as a high priority and no longer valued their specialist skills, which they felt were being eroded through lack of use.

6.36 The staff perception was that senior management focused on training officers to be immigration ‘queue busters’. Some individuals remained specialist customs officers (see Figure 14), but most had received basic immigration training (CS1), and some the more advanced immigration training (CS3), and were now deployed on the immigration controls.

6.37 Cash detection was cited as an example of the perceived disregard for specialist expertise. Cash detection and its potential links to criminality was one of the highest priorities in the ‘Control Strategy’. However, dedicated cash teams had been phased out across Border Force, and specialist officers had become part of the general resource. A manager acknowledged that there was little cash detection work being done at Manchester Airport, but said there were plans for a short exercise dedicated to this and the experienced cash detection officers would take part in it.

6.38 According to the ‘Border Force Business Plan 2015-2018’, ‘selected Border Force Officers will be trained in behavioural profiling and other techniques’. This was listed as a ‘priority output’ for 2015/2016. Some officers at Manchester Airport were already trained in behavioural profiling, but we were told by staff that there was not the time or capacity to use their training due to the demands of the immigration controls.

\textsuperscript{36} ‘Detector Dog Review’. The ‘Final Draft’ of February 2015 was provided for this inspection.

\textsuperscript{37} A stun gun is a weapon using an electrical discharge to incapacitate someone by disrupting muscle functions.

\textsuperscript{38} An officer trained to render any form of firearm safe for storage.
6.39 The team assigned to full-time freight duties was based some way from the main airport buildings and enjoyed an element of autonomy, although the Airport Duty Manager was in daily contact. The team interacted directly with freight companies and handlers, and continued to develop their specialist skills and knowledge in terms of the types of cargo and situations they could encounter. The freight team's managers had been proactive in producing local desk notes on operational practices, designed to support staff in carrying out their roles and promote efficiency. We examined three examples and found them to be explanatory and detailed.

6.40 Freight managers also celebrated team successes. This had included giving a presentation to senior Border Force managers on the team's top seizures. As shown by our sampled cases, record-keeping was more accurate in the freight environment. Many managers we spoke to across the airport valued the freight team's effectiveness and recognised that members of the team were motivated and engaged with their work.

**Conclusions**

6.41 Based on sampled cases and observations, customs functions at Manchester Airport were carried out in accordance with relevant legislation and guidance. Border Force was efficient at maintaining working relationships with partners and airport business stakeholders in order to be able to deliver its customs functions effectively.

6.42 Border Force was detecting, and seizing where empowered, a wide range of illegal and duty or tax payable goods. However, Class A drugs detections were not at the level that might be expected given their priority in the 'Control Strategy'. This suggested a need to review how particular flights were risk assessed and the staff and detector dog deployment, which emphasised previous detections and patterns.

6.43 The deterrent effect of the detection dogs was difficult to measure, but seizures alone represented a low return on investment given the recent expenditure of £1.25m on new kennels and the costs of operating the unit. A national review had recommended dynamic and flexible deployment of dog units but, while senior managers supported this, it had yet to filter down to frontline teams.

6.44 Border Force North management was satisfied with the levels and performance of the customs functions at Manchester Airport, but this message was not clearly understood by staff. Teams doing solely anti-smuggling activities had been replaced by teams of multi-functional officers undertaking both immigration and customs work, and deployment to the customs channels was based on targeting. Many customs trained staff were concerned that being deployed to use their more recently acquired immigration skills (as 'queue busters') rather than their customs skills and experience meant that less customs work was being done. Despite regular internal communications from management, most of these officers claimed to be unaware of continuing customs successes.

6.45 By contrast, the dedicated team dealing with air freight, based at the freight terminal and not routinely drawn away to perform immigration duties at the passenger terminals, was able to make the most of its officers' specialist customs skills and knowledge, which meant greater employee engagement with the work. Because of its physical separation on the other side of the airport, the team was to an extent autonomous, the range of work was wider and the team liaised directly and effectively with local partners and stakeholders whenever necessary.

6.46 Record keeping in relation to the customs functions was generally in line with guidance. However, the fact that it was not possible to determine the nationality of the passenger in 15 of the 50 'passenger' cases sampled demonstrated a need for greater attention to detail.
## Recommendations

**The Home Office should:**

4. In relation to customs functions at Manchester Airport:
   - consider whether the deployment of staff and dogs in the customs channels has become predictable and therefore less effective against experienced smugglers;
   - ensure the detector dogs are targeted against the commodities identified as high priority in the ‘Border Force Control Strategy’;
   - ensure that successful customs actions are communicated more effectively internally so that staff are fully aware of the frequency, type and value of customs work; and
   - implement the senior management vision that officers with specialist customs expertise should have opportunities to practise and retain their skills.
7. Co-Operative Working and Staff Engagement

Working with Manchester Airport Group (MAG) to manage passenger queues

7.1 In August 2008, the then Home Secretary signed a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the Manchester Airport operator. It agreed maximum queuing times of 25 minutes for EEA nationals and 45 minutes for other nationals in line with the national standard.

7.2 Representatives of MAG told us that they and Border Force worked together continuously on predicted passenger flows to identify risks to queuing times. MAG was aiming for growth in all short- and long-haul markets (particularly focusing on India, China and the USA) and in passengers using the airport for transfers between flights.

7.3 The airport had been short-listed to be one of those to work jointly with the US authorities to pre-clear certain passengers, allowing them to enter the USA without queuing at US immigration controls. This was another strand of the airport expansion plan, as reduced queuing time in the USA could attract more passengers to fly from Manchester.

7.4 We found numerous media reports and messages on social media from 2014 containing complaints from passengers about queuing times. Some of these coincided with the ePassport gates not being open late in the evening and periods of limited availability when older gates were being removed and the latest versions installed.

7.5 We asked MAG representatives about recent queuing times. They told us that in summer 2015, despite the increased passenger numbers, Border Force had been consistently meeting the queuing time targets. They felt that Border Force had become more efficient at managing queues. Border Force measured queue times at Manchester Airport by handing a card to selected passengers when they joined the back of the queue and retrieving it when the passenger reached the immigration control desk. MAG’s view was that Border Force was ‘marking their own homework to a large extent’. MAG was concerned that measurement was often taking place at quieter times and the sample sizes were small.

7.6 MAG did its own measuring, and its figures indicated an average queuing time at Terminal 1 of about 15 minutes for EU passengers and 25 minutes for non-EU passengers. MAG’s concern was that these times were longer than queuing times at Stansted, its other major airport. MAG representatives told us that it had considered paying to have additional Border Force officers deployed to the immigration controls at Manchester Airport in order to reduce queuing times.

7.7 Border Force managers told us that queuing times were a priority. We found that Higher Officers, including officers covering that role temporarily, were focused on avoiding breaches of the SLA. More senior managers told us that they were relaxed about breaches caused by operational pressures, since there were exemptions in the SLA when:

- ‘there is severely disrupted operation due to increased security requirements or specific border agency operations. In these instances, National Security and public protection will be a priority’;

39 http://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/travel/usa-long-haul/manchester-airport-shortlisted-queue-busting-united-5994222
• there is a severely disrupted operation due to weather, e.g. flights re-directed or delayed due to fog;
• there is severely disrupted operation due to an evacuation, e.g. a bomb scare resulting in passengers or vehicles being held;
• throughput is in excess of 10% above planned levels over a period of 1 hour or more; and
• ‘cyclamen portals\(^{40}\) identify a potential threat.’

7.8 We observed a number of instances when flight arrival or disembarkation delays caused unexpected increases in the numbers of passengers queuing at the immigration controls. During 130 hours of observation, regardless of how busy the control areas became, we noted that the Border Force officers were always civil in their dealings with passengers.

7.9 Border Force collaborated with MAG on procedures for the efficient operation of the arrivals halls. ‘Managing Passenger Flows through Border Force Arrival Controls’ set out a standard operating procedure with roles and responsibilities delineated for Border Force officers and MAG employees who manage passenger queues for the immigration desks and the ePassport gates.

7.10 Border Force and MAG had also collaborated on training material, entitled ‘Working Together: Effective Management of Passengers in the Arrivals Halls’, and on new signage for arrival halls. The signage was colour-coded to help arriving passengers quickly differentiate queuing areas. EEA passengers followed the ‘EU’ signs, which were in a strong blue, and this signage continued across ceilings, walls, moveable barriers and desks. Non-EEA passengers followed bright orange signage etc. Border Force managers considered that the new signage and use of colour-coding had contributed to more efficient throughput of passengers in summer 2015.

**Working with MAG on the use of ePassport gates**

7.11 In order to meet its objectives and to manage resources efficiently, Border Force needs to ensure that all those passengers who do not require permission to enter the UK, or who pose a low risk in immigration terms, are processed quickly and with the minimum necessary involvement from Border Force officers. The ePassport gates have a key part to play in achieving this.

7.12 There was a bank of five automated ePassport gates in each of the three passenger terminals at Manchester Airport, all of which were working throughout our periods of observation. The ePassport gates use facial recognition and document checking software to offer a ‘self-service’ immigration control for EEA nationals aged over 18 with a biometric travel document (one containing the holder’s information on an embedded computer chip).

7.13 Members of the Registered Traveller scheme could also use the ePassport gates.\(^{41}\) The new direct flights from China and general expansion would bring more nationals who could not use the ePassport gates, but MAG told us that, even after expansion, it expected that about 85% of passengers using Manchester Airport would be UK nationals or residents. However, MAG expressed some concerns that Border Force’s planning for dealing with increased passenger volumes relied on the expanded use of ePassport gates when the new routes and expansion would also increase the numbers that could not use the gates.

7.14 The latest version of the ePassport gate (Version 3) was more efficient than earlier versions. The gate was longer, making it quicker and easier for passengers to wheel in carry-on luggage before the entry gate shut behind them. A Border Force officer (both permanent and seasonal staff carried out this role) monitored a screen displaying the outputs from the bank of five gates, which included what the camera was seeing live and the photograph held on the passport computer chip.

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40 Cyclamen is the Government programme under which fixed and mobile portals have been installed at UK ports to screen traffic (people, vehicles and goods) entering the UK to identify radiological or nuclear material.
41 Registered Traveller members are pre-cleared nationals of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the USA, aged over 18 and holding biometric passports. Details at [https://www.gov.uk/registered-traveller](https://www.gov.uk/registered-traveller)
7.15 If all the electronic checks were satisfactory, the ePassport gate opened and the passenger was allowed through, removing the need to see an officer at a desk. Those rejected by the gates for any reason were directed straight to a manned desk and so were not unduly delayed. Where the gate did not open automatically, perhaps because the passenger’s stance was misaligned and the camera had not quite achieved the level of match required, the monitoring officer could, if otherwise satisfied, open the gate remotely.

7.16 Manchester Airport customer service operatives (‘presenters’) were under instruction to encourage use of the ePassport gates. For Terminal 3 they were told to direct every eligible passenger to the gates (excluding adults obviously travelling with young children). Because of its smaller size this was easier in Terminal 3, which was running at over 50% of eligible passengers using the gates. The average uptake at Terminal 2 between July and October 2015 (the inspection period) had been 26%, but a recent reconfiguration of its wide passenger hall meant that arriving passengers could clearly see the gates on arrival and the new brightly coloured décor and signage also helped with their orientation.

7.17 The gates in Terminal 1 were running at about 30% take-up. Terminal 1 received the highest proportion of young families. Also, the gates were positioned awkwardly due to the configuration of the arrivals hall. The queue for these gates could not be serpented around retractable barriers to contain it within the arrivals hall as this would block access to the EU queue. The result was that the queue sometimes extended back into the corridor leading into the arrivals hall, drawing more attention to its length.

7.18 We observed some individuals who chose not to use the ePassport gates. Some showed animosity towards presenters, with a number of British passengers loudly passing derogatory remarks about the gates, and others resisting the presenters’ encouragement to get them to join the queue. We noticed passengers who glanced quickly at the length of the queue for the gates before joining what appeared to be a shorter EU queue. From our observations, individuals who chose the ePassport gates queue invariably cleared the controls more quickly than those who chose the EU queue, even in cases where the gate had not opened and they had to be re-directed to a manned control desk.

6.19 We witnessed the key role played by the ePassport gates ‘host’ (MAG employees). Frequent travellers were comfortable with the gates and needed no help. We spoke to a number of elderly British passengers who told us that they had queued to use the gates for the first time. When they reached the gates their host was meticulous in explaining quickly everything they needed to know – including the need to remove spectacles and hats and to stand on the footprint marks in order to align to the camera – ensuring they transited the gates successfully.

7.20 The most effective hosts were also on alert to assist anyone having difficulties once inside the gates. Two common problems we saw were the passenger failing to slide their passport far enough into the scanner or standing slightly askew so that the camera could not see the shape of their head as well as their features. These hosts took responsibility for ensuring people used the gates correctly, leaving the Border Force monitoring officer free to concentrate on the security checks and to make any necessary interventions.

7.21 We observed other hosts who were much less proactive in advising the waiting passengers how to use the gates and in dealing with misunderstandings, which might have avoided delays through failures and re-directions. The training materials set out everything the hosts needed to know and do. However, we established that each host worked permanently at a particular terminal, so they were unable to observe and learn from one another.

Staff engagement

7.22 The Operational Assurance Directorate’s (OAD) ‘Standards Spot Check’ in March 2015 reported ‘staff engagement concerns’ and senior managers told us that they were concerned that they had a workforce which was performing well but had ‘low morale’.
The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills commissioned a review of employee engagement in all sectors, which reported in July 2009 as ‘Engaging for Success: enhancing performance through employee engagement’. The underlying premise was that the more engaged employees were with their role and their organisational objectives, the better they would perform. Poor engagement would lead to less effective performance and, particularly, less ability to cope with change, reduced discretionary effort and more staff attrition and loss of skills and experience. A key finding of the report was that ‘Engagement can enable organisations to retain their employees’ support while taking and implementing difficult decisions.’

The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) defines employee engagement as ‘being positively present during the performance of work by willingly contributing intellectual effort, experiencing positive emotions and meaningful connections to others’. According to CIPD, a further factor in employee engagement is the ‘psychological contract’ between employer and employee, composed of perceptions and expectations and separate from the contract of employment. Employees’ expectations include being treated fairly and having effective performance recognised.

The Civil Service began running departmental staff surveys in 2009. The Home Office runs its own, known as the ‘People Survey’, each October. It covers a range of staff perceptions of the workplace in the following areas:

- Leadership and managing change;
- My work;
- My manager;
- Learning and development;
- Pay and benefits;
- Organisational objectives and purpose;
- Resources and workload;
- My team; and
- Inclusion and fair treatment.

The survey includes five questions that produce the ‘engagement index’. This is the average level of employee engagement in a business unit (on a range between 0 and 100%). In 2014, 28% of staff at Manchester Airport completed the survey and the engagement index was 26%. In 2015, 42% of staff completed the survey. The engagement index was again 26%. By comparison, the overall Border Force engagement index for 2015 was 40%.

Senior management told us that efforts had been made to improve staff participation in the 2014 survey, with an expectation that this would lead to an improved employee engagement score. This did not happen. The management team told us that it was trying to understand the issues and improve the situation. We were given the example of the creation of a dedicated briefing room, where previously the officers’ rest-room had been taken over for team briefings. However, this had simply returned the situation to the status quo ante rather than being a genuine improvement.

We compared Manchester Airport’s results with those of Border Force North as a region and with Border Force overall. In every category, the lowest results were for the airport, with North region next and with Border Force overall scoring the highest. The widest gaps between Manchester and overall...
Border Force responses were in relation to ‘Organisational objectives and purpose’, ‘Resources and workload’, ‘Inclusion and fair treatment’ and ‘My manager’.

7.29 Figure 22 sets out the positive response levels (excluding neutral responses) in 2013, 2014 and 2015 to three key statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are opportunities for me to develop my career in Border Force</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have the skills I need to do my job effectively</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I want to leave Border Force as soon as possible</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.30 We identified a number of factors that potentially had a negative impact on employee engagement. In particular, senior management had issued a letter to staff in April 2015 explaining that, other than in exceptional circumstances, they would no longer be released for transfer to another post at the same grade, only on promotion. This moratorium on lateral moves, which was a response to operational and business pressures as well as a projected increase in airport passenger numbers of 12.85% in 2015/16, was due to remain in place until April 2016.

7.31 Senior managers explained that they had to protect staffing levels at Manchester Airport as, previously, significant numbers of staff had been lost to new posts at the nearby National Border Targeting Centre at a faster rate than it had been possible to recruit replacements. Senior managers were aware that loss of any fully-trained officers was identified as a risk in the ‘Border Force Strategic Risk Summary’, which referred to ‘controls at risk due to staff capability’ and specifically cited ‘gaps in professional knowledge’.

7.32 There was also dissatisfaction with what staff saw as an unreasonable management approach to weekend working. Most operational staff were on an Annualised Hours Working (AHW) contract, which meant they were contracted to work a certain number of weekend hours in a year with a percentage of salary reflecting the flexibility that Border Force had purchased. Mandatory training ran from Mondays to Fridays, with weekends as the scheduled days off. Officers in Border Force North, who had attended such courses, were required to make up the weekend hours later in the year in order to meet their contractual obligations. The ‘Manchester Airport Operating Model’ was specific on this point – ‘Training: Training undertaken will not be offset against AHW hours. Staff at all grades in receipt of AHW will be required to fulfil their contracted hours.’

7.33 Many staff told us that while Border Force North required all weekend hours to be made up, regardless of the reason they were missed, some other ports did not do so. Senior managers were aware that some other ports wrote off ‘lost’ weekend hours but told us that North region was interpreting the HR policy correctly.

7.34 Some management decisions, though now very dated, continued to have a negative effect on staff thinking. For example, a number of staff told us of previous requests for part-time working that they saw as reasonable being rejected. Senior management told us the current situation was that requests for flexible working arrangements might be granted if the applicant were willing to negotiate to find an arrangement that was acceptable to management.46

46 Border Force subsequently told us that 13 applications for flexible working were made between 01/09/14 and 31/08/15, of which 3 were refused.
7.35 Part-trained staff expressed their frustration to us about the fact that the local ‘Operating Model’ spoke of ‘multi-functional’ staff but they had not been given the full immigration training.

7.36 An issue had arisen about custody duties and at the time of the inspection appeared to be escalating. Staff told us that a recent change in rosters and role requirements had reduced the number of custody officers available to be on duty at any one time. However, senior managers told us that they believed that custody resourcing was at the correct level, and that having only one custody officer and one assistant in the suite was the Border Force national model.

7.37 We were later provided with email correspondence that showed that a meeting had taken place soon after our visit. This had clarified for staff what was required, how more volunteers would be trained and that refresher training would be provided regularly. It had dealt with the minimum staffing level required in the custody suite. This was set at three officers in order to facilitate meal breaks, which addressed a key staff concern regarding difficulties in taking meal breaks.

7.38 We found one team at Manchester Airport that was celebrating success. This was the dedicated freight team, which already had a strong sense of identity arising from its specialist freight environment and direct engagement with stakeholders. No other staff reported to us any sense of celebrating successes, even though senior managers told us that there were successes in both immigration and customs work. The regular internal communication email, ‘Manchester Matters’, let staff know about customs and immigration successes, but many staff told us they did not have time to read all emails. One member of staff summed up their experience of recognition and celebrating success as ‘no praise, no recognition, no gratitude’.

7.39 We asked for reward and recognition statistics. Figure 23 shows that awards were made to about 15% of staff, with the majority at Executive Officer grade, which includes the Border Force Officer specialism. Staff and managers did not mention official recognition for staff and that the formal Home Office recognition policy was in use at the airport.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Assistant</th>
<th>Administrative Officer</th>
<th>Executive Officer</th>
<th>Higher Executive Officer</th>
<th>Senior Executive Officer</th>
<th>G7</th>
<th>G6</th>
<th>Senior Civil Servant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.40 Visibility and accessibility of senior managers is known to be a key driver for improving staff engagement. Senior managers at Manchester Airport felt that they were visible. However, staff told us that the shift system meant they might not be on duty when the managers visited, or might not be able to engage during a busy shift. After the onsite phase, managers provided us with a schedule for a new local initiative, which included weekly meetings up to Christmas 2015 between a Grade 7 and designated groups of seven or eight staff.

**Conclusions**

7.41 Border Force and Manchester Airport Group (MAG) had collaborated over projections of passenger numbers to help the former to meet the queuing times contained in their Service Level Agreement (SLA). MAG was satisfied that Border Force had been efficient in responding to the increased passenger traffic in summer 2015 and had not breached the queuing times. Nonetheless, to be commercially competitive, MAG was looking for speedier passenger flow in the future. The arrivals areas had been refurbished with new colour-coded signage and surroundings in order to channel arriving passengers more efficiently.

47 The figures provided for Figure 23 do not include any performance bonus payments at the end of the reporting year but these are done confidentially and would not be publicised to staff.
7.42 Five ePassport gates were installed in each passenger terminal. Take-up rates by eligible passengers varied from over 50% to under 30% for the three terminals. The configuration of the terminals dictated queuing arrangements and affected take-up rates for the ePassport gates, while some passengers chose not to use them regardless of encouragement or shorter waiting times. Border Force had worked with MAG to produce detailed training and guidance for arrivals hall ‘presenters’ and ePassport gate ‘hosts’. The latter were particularly important in maximising take up and problem-free use of the ePassport gates.

7.43 Border Force North senior managers were aware of the low employee engagement from staff at Manchester Airport. The 2014 and 2015 staff surveys showed that it was lower than for the North region as a whole, which in turn was lower than for Border Force overall. Senior management described a well-performing port. However, staff appeared to be unaware of operational successes or of colleagues receiving recognition for good work, so these ‘positive’ factors had little overall impact on morale, which remained stubbornly low. Senior managers realised that preventing individuals from applying for lateral transfers had a negative impact, but believed this was necessary in order to deliver the business.

7.44 Recently (post inspection), Border Force management had taken practical steps to address some of the concerns of staff at Manchester Airport, for example in relation to the manning of custody suites and by starting weekly meetings between G7s and groups of staff. However, it was not clear whether managers fully appreciated the impact of their actions. For example, the continued effect on staff attitudes of previous ‘negative’ decisions, such as the refusal of ‘reasonable’ requests for flexible working; or the effect of failing to provide full training, despite the commitment to a ‘multi-functional’ workforce; or the clawing back of weekend hours for staff attending mandatory training (in line with HR policy but not the practice at some other ports). These were regarded by staff as signs of management inflexibility and unfairness, and put considerable strain on the ‘psychological contract’ between employer and employee.

**Recommendations**

The Home Office should:

5. In order to be better able to manage the planned increases in passenger arrivals at Manchester Airport:
   - continue to work with Manchester Airport Group (MAG) to identify and promote best practice in relation to queue management and to increase take-up of the ePassport gates by eligible passengers at all three passenger terminals.

6. In order to improve Border Force employee engagement and morale at Manchester Airport:
   - ensure all staff are aware that the Home Office reward and recognition policy is being used;
   - establish an effective means of publicising and celebrating team successes; and
   - ensure that any local initiatives, such as weekly G7 meetings with staff, are sustained, accessible to all staff (taking account of shift-working) and effective in addressing specific issues, either by agreeing and implementing changes or by explaining fully why this is not possible.
The role of the Independent Chief Inspector (‘the Chief Inspector’) of the UK Border Agency (the Agency) was established by the UK Borders Act 2007 to examine and report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the Agency. In 2009, the Independent Chief Inspector’s remit was extended to include customs functions and contractors.

On 26 April 2009, the Independent Chief Inspector was also appointed to the statutory role of independent Monitor for Entry Clearance Refusals without the Right of Appeal as set out in section 23 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, as amended by section 4(2) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006.

On 20 February 2012, the Home Secretary announced that Border Force would be taken out of the Agency to become a separate operational command within the Home Office. The Home Secretary confirmed this change would not affect the Chief Inspector’s statutory responsibilities and that he would continue to be responsible for inspecting the operations of both the Agency and the Border Force.

On 22 March 2012, the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency’s title changed to become the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. His statutory responsibilities remained the same. The Chief Inspector is independent of the Home Office and reports directly to the Home Secretary.

On 26 March 2013, the Home Secretary announced that the UK Border Agency was to be broken up and brought back into the Home Office, reporting directly to Ministers, under a new package of reforms. The Independent Chief Inspector will continue to inspect the UK’s border and immigration functions, as well as contractors employed by the Home Office to deliver any of these functions. Under the new arrangements, UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) and Immigration Enforcement (IE) became operational commands under the direction of Directors General.
Appendix 2: Inspection Criteria

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Decisions on the entry stay and removal of individuals should be taken in accordance with the law and the principles of good administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Customs and immigration offences should be prevented, detected, investigated and, where appropriate, prosecuted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Resources should be allocated to support operational delivery and achieve value for money.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>All individuals should be treated with dignity and respect and without discrimination in accordance with the law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Enforcement powers should be carried out in accordance with the law and by members of staff authorised and trained for that purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>All border and immigration functions should be carried out with regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>The implementation of policies and processes should support the efficient and effective delivery of border and immigration functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Risks to operational delivery should be identified, monitored and mitigated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Border Force Explanatory Handout for the Section 55 Safeguarding Duty

Border Force has a duty under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

We take this duty very seriously and work to protect vulnerable children and those who may potentially be trafficked.

If you are travelling with a child (under 18) and are not the child’s parent, or may appear not to be the parent (for example, if you have a different family name), we may ask you a few questions to establish your relationship with the child. We will always do this as quickly as possible and in a way which is sensitive to the interests of the child and the adult involved.

We hope you appreciate the importance of the additional checks we carry out for children travelling into the UK and understand the reasons for them should you feel you have been unduly delayed.

We do not wish to delay your journey any longer than necessary. It may help you next time you travel if you could carry evidence of your relationship with the child and/or the reason why you are travelling with the child.

This evidence could include copies of:

- a birth or adoption certificate showing your relationship with the child;
- divorce / marriage certificates if you are the parent but have a different surname to the child; and / or
- a letter from the child’s parent/s giving authority for the child to travel with you and providing contact details if you are not the parent.

Border Force officers will seek to establish the relationship between children and the adults who are accompanying them, or who are meeting them on arrival in the UK, before allowing them to leave the UK border. Performing these checks does not affect the right to freedom of movement for UK and other EEA citizens.

[ENGLISH]
## Appendix 4: Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barnardo’s</td>
<td>The UK's largest children's charity. Its services help children in poverty, support young carers and help families looking to foster or adopt a child. <a href="http://www.barnardos.org.uk/">http://www.barnardos.org.uk/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biometric chip</td>
<td>The chip inside biometric passports which contains information about the holder’s face – such as the distances between eyes, nose, mouth and ears – which are taken from the passport photograph. It also holds the information that is printed on the personal details page of the passport. The chip contains an antenna which means it can be read electronically on the passport reader by a Border Force Officer or by an ePassport gate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Force</td>
<td>Following the separation of Border Force and the UK Border Agency on 1 March 2012, Border Force became a Home Office operational command responsible for immigration and customs, including UK passport controls in France and Belgium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Force Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD)</td>
<td>Provides objective second line assurance of Border Force operational activity through development and management of Standards, and an assurance and testing regime informed by operational risks and issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Force Operating Mandate</td>
<td>Internal guidance to Border Force officers setting out mandatory roles and responsibilities, including initial checks which officers must conduct on arriving passengers in any given scenario.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Force Operations Manual</td>
<td>Internal guidance on how to operate the immigration and customs controls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A Drugs</td>
<td>Drugs which are designated as ‘Class A’ under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Examples - cocaine, ecstasy, heroin, LSD and magic mushrooms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclamen</td>
<td>Cyclamen is the Government programme to install fixed and mobile portals at UK ports to screen traffic (people, vehicles and goods) entering the UK to identify radiological or nuclear material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
| **Entry Clearance** | A person requires Leave to Enter the United Kingdom if they are neither a British nor Commonwealth citizen with the right of abode, nor a person who is entitled to enter or remain in the United Kingdom by virtue of the provisions of the 2006 European Economic Area Regulations. Entry Clearance takes the form of a visa (for visa nationals) or an entry certificate (for non-visa nationals).
These documents are taken as evidence of the holder’s eligibility for entry into the United Kingdom and, accordingly, accepted as ‘entry clearances’ within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971. The United Kingdom Government decides which countries’ citizens are, or are not, visa nationals. Non-visa nationals also require Entry Clearance if they seek to enter the United Kingdom for purposes other than to visit and/or for longer than six months. |
| **European Economic Area (EEA)** | The EEA is comprised of the European Union countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) plus, via separate agreement, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Switzerland also benefits via another arrangement. |
| **European Union (EU)** | See the EEA entry above. |
| H | 
| **Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)** | UK government department responsible for customs and taxation. The HMRC customs function was one of the legacy organisations that made up the UK Border Agency. The function is now carried out by Border Force staff at air, rail and sea ports. |
| I | 
| **Immigration Rules** | The Rules laid before Parliament by the Home Secretary about the practice to be followed in regulating the entry into and stay in the UK of people subject to immigration control. |
| U | 
| **United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)** | The Agency of the Home Office formerly responsible for enforcing immigration and customs regulations. |
| Warnings Index | A database of names available to Border Force staff of those with previous immigration history, those of interest to detection staff, police or for matters of national security. Also known as the ‘Home Office Warnings Index’ (WI). |
Acknowledgements

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Andrew Ould

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