A CASE STUDY IN PLANNING IMPLEMENTATION
JEDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA

Previously published in November 1993 as Working Paper No. 32
By Abdal-Majeed Ismail Daghistani
Centre for Research in European Urban Environments
Department of Town and Country Planning
University of Newcastle upon Tyne

Contact: kim.mccartney@ncl.ac.uk
Abdal-Majeed Ismail Daghistani
BA, MSc, PhD, MRTP, FRSA

- Associate Professor, Department of Urban and Regional Planning, School of Environmental Design, Faculty of Engineering, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1989 - Present)

- Advisor for Environmental Development and Scientific Research and Training to the Mayor of Jeddah (1980-1987)

- Chairman of the Supreme Co-Ordination Committee of Jeddah Projects (1979-1984)

- Deputy Mayor of Jeddah for Planning and Programmes (1977-1978)

ISBN: 0 905770 22 6
1. INTRODUCTION

As a result of sustained national economic development over several decades, most of the towns and cities in Saudi Arabia have grown at rates which had never before been experienced in the Arabian Peninsula. Not surprisingly, the scale and rates of growth which have been experienced, particularly since the early 1970s, created major problems for the agencies responsible for planning and managing urban growth in Saudi Arabia.

This paper concentrates on one particular aspect of the urban planning process - plan implementation - in the belief that the ability of the planning system to implement policies and proposals is perhaps the most important test of its effectiveness. The paper refers to examples drawn from one of the major Saudi Arabian cities - Jeddah. The intention of the case studies is to illustrate in some detail some of the successes and failures of plan implementation, in the context of the general problems of planning and urban development in Saudi Arabia (Daghistani and Lee 1981).

The paper concentrates on two major aspects of planning policy contained in the first Master Plan for the city - the development of the Jeddah Corniche and the proposed policy for retail development - and considers the extent to which they have been implemented. It then tries to draw conclusions from the case studies in order to identify lessons which can be used to improve the effectiveness of the planning implementation process in the city.

The paper has three main parts. The first briefly describes and analyses the main changes that have taken place in the economic, social and physical structure of the city, in order to provide the context for the discussion of the implementation process; the second describes the selected case studies; the third evaluates the effectiveness of the procedures for plan implementation, as revealed by the case studies, and makes recommendations for their improvement.
2. **GROWTH TRENDS IN JEDDAH**

**Population Growth**

Jeddah is Saudi Arabia's second largest city. Located on the eastern coast of the Red Sea, approximately halfway between the Suez Canal and the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, it is the country's largest and most important port.

Until 1947 Jeddah remained a traditional Arabian city with a population of no more than 35,000, living within the city wall which clearly demarcated the city limits. However, following the discovery and export of oil in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, the general level of economic activity in the Kingdom increased dramatically. Because of its traditional role as the country's principal port, Jeddah benefited most from the increased volume of imports, and began a period of sustained growth and change which has not yet ended.

With the removal of the city wall in 1947 the city's population exploded to 150,000 in 1961, reaching half a million in the early 1970s, and by 1987 was just over 1,300,000 (Sert Jackson 1979, p.9; Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 1989, pp.6-7). Between 1947 and 1961 the city's average annual rate of population growth was 11.0%. This fell slightly between 1961 and 1971 to 10.4%, and from 1971 to 1987 the rate of growth had slowed (relatively) to 7.6%. In spite of these variations, the average rate of population growth in the city for the forty year period from 1947 to 1987 has been 9.5%.

**Physical Development and Spatial Structure**

Until 1947 the physical boundary of the city was clearly defined by the city walls, and for much of its early history development was confined to the protected area within the walls. It is generally accepted that this situation continued until 1947 when the wall was demolished, e.g. the consultants preparing the review of the first Master Plan wrote:

"Population growth was slow, and redevelopment took place on the raised mounds of former settlements up until the time of the Turks. By the middle of the thirteenth century AH (19th century AD) a fortified town had been built, and little further change occurred until the late fourteenth century AH (mid-twentieth century AD), when the walls were removed and a very rapid expansion of the city began". (Sert Jackson 1979, Vol. 1, p. 47).

The extent of development outside the city by the late 1940s is revealed by an interesting aerial photograph taken in 1948, shortly after the demolition of the fortified wall towards the end of 1949 (Plate 1).

The photograph shows that there were four principal areas of development outside the boundary of the old city wall: Baghdadiyah to the north, Kandarah to the north-east, Nuzla to the south-east, and Hindawiyah-Nakatu to the south.

The prominent isolated building in the bottom-right corner of the photograph is the old Qasr Khozam (Khozam Palace), the Royal Palace where King Abdulaziz stayed during his visits to Jeddah. The King's residence generated a large village, Nuzla, which can be seen extending to the south, off the edge
of the photograph. The only surfaced road in 1948 was the Makkah Road, reflecting the importance of the connections between the two cities.

With the stabilization of conditions after the incorporation of the Hejaz into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the consolidation of King Abdulaziz's control, the city wall ceased to play its historic role of defence against marauding Bedouins. Moreover, the sudden increase of oil revenues after World War II, and the government development programmes they supported, generated economic and population growth which led to the wall being regarded as a constraining relic that hampered the city growth. It was therefore decided that the wall should be knocked down, in order to allow the city to develop without unnecessary restraint.

As soon as the wall had disappeared the city experienced a building boom which significantly increased the physical extent of the city. An unpublished Municipality report prepared in 1966 described the period immediately after the removal of the wall as follows:

"In the eight years, 1948-1956, Jeddah experienced a remarkable growth rate which set the main pattern for the present form of the city. No accurate information about population is available, but it would seem that the bulk of the population increase took place during this period, which was characterized by unrestrained investment in roads, installations and palaces made possible by the revenue from the first oil boom". (Wilson Murrow International 1966, p.3).

By 1956 virtually the whole of the area within Baghdadiyah - Airport - Palace - Port Ring Road was built-up, and there was a major thrust of development to the north (Sharafiyah) and east (to the south of Makkah Road). Analysis of aerial photographs indicates that between 1947 and 1956 the built-up area of the city had increased by over 3,000 hectares to a total of approximately 3,300 hectares.

The eight years following 1956 saw the end of the first boom period. Although oil revenue had grown steadily, Government expenditures rapidly outstripped them, and there were frequent economic crises, followed by strict austerity measures and restrictions on public-sector expenditures and projects. This brought a temporary halt to the rapid expansion of the city.

When King Faisal assumed power in 1964, the growth of the city resumed again, but not at the dramatic rate of the first boom period. The total increase in the build-up area from 1964 to 1971 was approximately 1,700 hectares. The extent of urban development up to 1971 is shown in Figure 1.

The consequences of the 1974 quadrupling of the price of oil on the Kingdom's revenues were unprecedented. The Third National Development Plan (for the period 1975-80) programmed SR783 billion (£130.5 billion) expenditure. The impact of the accelerated development programme on Jeddah was such that the first 'boom' of 1947-56 seemed modest by comparison.

From 1971 to 1978, when the population of the city grew by over 511,000, there was significant expansion to the east, on both sides of Makkah Road, and to the south; however just over 90% of the new urban development was to the north of the city. By 1987, the population of Jeddah had reached 1,312,000, and the built-up area had increased to 18,242 hectares (Ministry of Municipal & Rural Affairs 1988-89, p.7). This is an increase of more than
14,000 hectares in 23 years, representing an average expansion of the built-up area of the city of about 615 hectares per year. (See Figure 1).

The principal feature of the urban development after 1971 is an intensification of the northerly and easterly development patterns, aided by the improvement of the Madina Road to the new airport, the new airport itself, and the Madina - Airport-Jeddah-Makkah expressway. The latter not only provides a new magnet for development, it also (for the time being at least!) defines the new eastern boundary of the city.

Within this structure, it is possible to make a broad differentiation between the development which has taken place to the north and east, and that which has extended to the south of the city. In general terms, the northern and eastern developments have a higher socio-economic status and are built to a generally higher standard, whereas the southern part of the city has a concentration of manual, lower-income households, living at higher densities, and in poorer dwellings. From this broad structure, it could be suggested that Jeddah conforms more closely to Hoyt's model of the "sectoral" city than Burgess's model of the "concentric" city (Hoyt 1939 and Burgess 1925).

The explanation of this sectoral development appears to be relatively straightforward:

a) Because of the importance of the connections between Jeddah and the two Holy Cities of Makkah and Madina, the Makkah and Madina roads (leading east and north respectively) were the first to be surfaced. Properties close to surfaced roads conveyed a certain social prestige, which was still evident until the early 1980s when almost all residential roads were surfaced (land prices have traditionally been higher for plots which front onto asphalt roads - (see Robert Matthew, Johnson-Marshall 1972, p.56 and Sert Jackson 1979, Vol.1, p.58).

b) In the same period that the Makkah and Madina Roads were improved, the Sabeel area to the south of the old city was released by King Abdulaziz specifically to be occupied by low-income immigrants to the city.

c) At an early stage in the city’s development, the northern and eastern areas came under the ownership of large landowners who, in order to maximize their returns, proceeded to sub-divide their land into large grid-iron plots (initially for villa development, but as land values rose, the more central plots were used for high-status apartments).

Thus by the early 1950s the essential characteristics of Jeddah's social geography had been determined, and the 'images' of the south, east and north were well established. High income residents were unlikely to consider dwellings in the south, and low income residents were barred from settling in the north or east (except in a few isolated locations) by high land prices and lack of unappropriated land.

Since then, each further stage of development has tended to reinforce and consolidate the pattern, with the north emerging as the most prestigious area, because of its proximity to the sea and (from the early 1980s) the attraction of the northern Corniche development. The most expensive, attractive and prestigious developments (such as palaces and - before their removal the Riyadh - embassies) have concentrated in the north, while 'negative' developments such as the refinery, steelworks and other industrial developments, have usually gone to the south.
The difficulties of coping with such a high and sustained rate of urban growth would be great even in countries which had a well-developed institutional and policy framework. These difficulties were compounded in Saudi Arabia because the development of the government institutional framework in Saudi Arabia is of relatively recent origin, especially in the field of urban and regional planning.

The Planning Response

As part of the attempt to tackle the problems associated with large-scale and sustained growth, a series of planning studies were commissioned by the Ministry of Interior (Municipal Affairs), culminating in the approval of the original Master Plan for Jeddah in 1973. The Master Plan proposals were supported by a series of Action Area Plans (including several related to the development of the Jeddah Corniche) designed to identify more specific proposals for development within a shorter time-scale. The original Master Plan was subject to review in the period 1979 to 1983.

As explained later, the 'boom' period of 1974-1983 saw the rapid physical development of the city, which was not always in accordance with the newly-established planning policies. The remainder of this paper is concerned with the analysis of two major aspects of the original Master Plan's policies, in an attempt to discover some of the factors which have contributed to the unsuccessful and successful implementation of planning policies in Jeddah. The first of these case studies - the policies for retail development - was largely unsuccessful. The second - the development of the Jeddah Corniche - must be regarded as one of the major planning successes in the city.
3. **CASE STUDIES**

1. **Proposed Retail Development Policy**

Proposals relating to future retailing use are described in Section 3 of the original Master Plan, (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraphs 3.43-3.89). The Master Plan report first examines and discusses the retail pattern in Jeddah, as it was in 1971. The consultants identified two major problems with the existing retail structure in the face of rapid urban growth and change being experienced. First, the provision of shopping facilities was concentrated in the city centre, which was becoming increasingly congested, and was remote from the newly developing residential areas in the north and east of the city. Second, the retail development that was taking place outside the city centre was principally in the form of ribbon development, creating traffic congestion along major roads, and resulting in a diffusion of retail services that was neither efficient nor convenient. Following from this analysis, the consultant postulated a relatively simply policy, best explained by direct quotation:

"The PRIMARY SHOPPING CENTRE for the city within the central business district is at the nodal point of the Primary road network and as such is very well served by the urban transportation system. SECONDARY CENTRES serve the outlying flanks of the city, obviating as much as possible overloading of the primary centre, while DISTRICT CENTRES are interspersed throughout the city providing for the day-to-day needs of the neighbourhood". (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.68).

Essentially, therefore, the policy in the Master Plan calls for a three-tier shopping hierarchy. This concept is illustrated in Figure 2. At the lower end of the hierarchy, the Plan suggests the establishment of district centres. Implicit in the Master Plan is the concept that existing small shops within established residential areas will perform this district centre function. In the new residential areas, the Plan envisages the development of new shopping areas to constitute district centres. The Plan does not specify the precise size of such centres, nor their exact locations, but does suggest certain criteria to be considered in their establishment.

The size of their catchment areas would depend on factors of a variable nature, such as the maximum acceptable distance of housing from the centres, the density of residential development in the catchment area as well as the influence of land-uses such as public open space, main roads, schools and places of employment. A further factor to take into account will be location of the district centre which would inhibit the growth of potential of any "Hara centre". (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.79). (Note "Hara" is approximately the equivalent of neighbourhood).

The middle level of the proposed hierarchy, the secondary centres, were envisaged in the Plan as falling between the primary and district centres in terms of function. Their role was not clearly spelled out in the Plan, but the implication is that they were to provide both convenience and some durable shopping. In terms of number and location of secondary centres, the Master Plan is explicit. It proposed the expansion of two existing shopping concentrations, one at Palestine Roundabout and the other at Kilometre 8, Makkah Road. It also proposes the establishment of a completely new centre north of Jeddah, adjacent to the entrance to the new airport. The choice of Palestine Roundabout and Kilometre 8 was determined "by the potential of
the existing large commercial areas for future growth". (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.73). A total of 234,500 sq.m. gross of space for retail trading was proposed for these two centres.

The proposed secondary centre adjacent to the new airport is seen, in the Plan, as a major component of the future structure of the city. Initially it was intended to provide shopping facilities for the resident population located between the northern storm-water ditch and the new airport. Eventually, it was envisaged that this centre would expand to become a major mode of activity, becoming, in fact, a primary centre providing..

".. the residents of the area with an alternative service and employment centre to the present city centre, as well as providing the airport with a commercial centre, hotels and other ancillary uses for the incidental activities of the airport" (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.20).

This second primary centre is clearly seen in the Plan as a long-term proposal resulting eventually in a dual-centred city. The primary centres are seen to be located in the northern and southern ends of the north-south linear development of the city, a secondary centre to be located on each end of the main East-West and North-South axes (Makkah and Madina Roads), and district centres being located within individual residential areas (See Figure 2).

The paragraphs above have explained the shopping policy set out in the Master Plan. For the policy to succeed it is clear that an effective mechanism of planning control and decision-making would need to exist in Jeddah. The consultant recognised this and identified one element - ribbon development - that could effectively thwart the proposed policy:

"An important rider to the future growth and location of commercial centres in Jeddah is the need to prevent the development of ribbon-type frontage shops. The continual allowance of such shops will reduce the viability of any new centre proposed within the plan as well as adding to the congestion of roads resulting from on-street parking and servicing facilities". (Robert Matthew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.82).

Actual Retail Conditions (1985)

The actual pattern of retail activities in Jeddah in 1985 is illustrated in Figure 3. It shows major departures from the proposals described above. In the "traditional" medium - and higher density residential areas located in the out central areas, the southern parts of the city (south-east of the Port), the northern side of Makkah Road, and in the old villages of Ruwais and Bani Malik, the dominant form of shopping composes small units either dispersed within the residential areas (the "corner shop" referred to in the Master Plan) or located along the main internal roads. The latter, constituting ribbon development, were termed "Hara Centres" by the consultant, although, in fact, these shops provide day-to-day convenience goods for a relatively low-income local population. From a field survey carried out by the author in 1985 no evidence of widespread vacancies was observed, suggesting that these shops are still economically viable.

A second component of the shopping pattern is ribbon development itself. Unlike the "Hara" shops described above this ribbon development has a wider catchment area than the immediate local population. The consultant
described these shops as the "Extended Street Frontages". The distribution of these has expanded since 1973, principally along Madina, Palestine and Makkah Roads. Ribbon development in the out central area (Airport Road, Siteen Road, Baghdadiyah, Sharfiyah, Sahifa) has generally remained constant, but continues to attract large numbers of customers. Along Madina Road ribbon development has been added to both south and north of the Palestine Road intersection, and several new shops have been established north of the storm-water ditch. Along Makkah Road, the previous scattered ribbon development has been consolidated, extending in an almost continuous strip as far as Kilometre 8. Additional clusters of ribbon development extend beyond Kilometre 12. Random ribbon development (clusters of one or two shops) is also occurring throughout the newer residential areas in the northern part of the city. On secondary streets these shops are mainly convenience shops (baker, small supermarkets, etc). On primary roads speciality shopping (mainly durable goods, stores) is evident.

The large amount of ribbon development concentrated around the Palestine/Madina Road intersections, and in the vicinity of Kilometre 8, Makkah Road, caused the consultant to recognise these locations as future secondary centres. Comment on this aspect of the Master Plan is made later; however, in discussing the existing retail situation, attention should be focused on these two locations. In both cases, retail development has expanded but has taken the form of extensions to the ribbon, rather than in-depth comprehensive development. However, a key component - off street parking - has been provided in one location (Palestine Roundabout) through the construction of car parks. However, it is clear from field observation that this parking provision is inadequate, curb-side parking still being prevalent and representing a major contribution to traffic congestion on Madina Road.

Central Area shopping, identified by the consultant as the major speciality and durable goods shopping centre for both Jeddah and the Western Region, still performs this dominant role. In terms of physical distribution, this shopping does not appear to have changed greatly since 1973. The main shopping components are the souks lying between King Abdulaziz Street and King Faisal Street, extending eastward into Bab Makkah. Additional smaller souks specialising in certain goods (furniture, meat, vegetables) also exist beyond the main central area. These souks, despite changes in shopping habits, appear to be economically healthy. There is no evidence of either contraction of the areas covered by the souks or of vacancies among the individual stalls. Recent improvements in the physical infrastructure (paved courtyards, canopies, a reticulated sewage system, for example) are likely to assist in ensuring the continued attraction of the souk to the people of Jeddah. The souks offer a wide range of goods within a relatively small area, thereby enabling shoppers to compare quality and price. Coupled with the traditional importance of the souk in Middle Eastern society, it is clear that this shopping component will remain important.

In addition to the souks, an important retail component in the central area consists of the speciality shops providing a range of high-value goods. These shops, because of the nature and cost of the goods sold, depend on an extremely wide catchment and are usually located in the central business districts of cities. In Jeddah, many are located on the ground floor of high-rise office development. It is obvious that with the expansion of office development in the central area these shops have also expanded. They are found principally along King Abdulaziz Street and complement the small number of speciality shops (mainly watches and gold jewellery) that are located within the souk itself. Whether or not this form of retailing, which was seen by the consultant as being of major importance for future central
area shopping development, will continue to expand, depends largely on the extent to which decentralisation to pre-planning centres occurs.

At the time of the Master Plan's preparation, there were no pre-planning, comprehensive shopping centres in Jeddah (Robert Mathew, Johnson Marshall 1973, paragraph 3.57). Since that time twenty one large comprehensively-planned centres have opened (see Figure 3). These centres have significantly changed shopping habits in the city.

The pre-planned shopping centre has evolved as a result of numerous factors. Problems of car parking and accessibility at traditional ribbon centres; vehicular/pedestrian conflict and the desire to improve the shopping environment for the shopper; changing patterns of retailing and goods handling; changing shopping habits; all these factors have contributed to the success of the comprehensively-designed shopping centre. In the Master Plan, the consultant noted the correlation between shopping patterns and income. The basic picture presented was that in low-income areas small local shops, situated close to homes, provided for shopping needs. In higher-income lower density areas, with a higher level of private car ownership, larger, more dispersed centres, each containing a range of shops, catered to demand. Since 1973, this pattern has progressed further, incorporating the pre-planned centre. The viability of these centres is based on two factors. The demand generated by an increasing middle and high-income sector of the population is one. Problems of congestion and a generally unsatisfactory shopping environment in the central area is the other.

Initially this resulted in the development of convenience outlets (supermarkets) beyond the CBD, giving rise to shops at, for example, the Palestine/Madina Road area. However, there is now evidence that, in addition to convenience shopping, speciality shopping is being sited in pre-planned centres. The Caravan Centre, for example, on Hail Street, contains small shopping units, many of which are occupied by speciality shops. The new Jeddah Centre, on Madina Road, contains, in addition to a supermarket, a department store and individual speciality shops. The long-term consequences of this new factor in the overall retail pattern are likely to be significant.

In summary, the shopping pattern in Jeddah today reflects the broader changes being experienced within Saudi Arabia. The traditional pattern has been one of small, scattered shops providing for local day-to-day needs; of the central area souks offering a range of goods, serving a city wide catchment.

This traditional pattern is now being complemented by new features. The development of new residential areas and the influx of western expatriates and increasing car ownership are resulting in shopping becoming decentralized, with pre-planned centres offering alternative shopping environments. Thus, basically Jeddah is characterised by two forms of shopping, the old and the new, both of which are appropriate and both of which need to be catered for in any city planning scheme.

In detail, assessment of the current retail pattern against the proposals embodied in the Master Plan reveals that:

a) The clear distinction embodied in the three-tier hierarchy between district, secondary and primary centres has not, in fact evolved. It must be concluded that this is an artificial distinction bearing no relationship to the actual shopping pattern either now, or when first postulated.
b) Shops have continued to perform a district centre function in well established residential areas. In the new residential areas such centres have not been established.

c) One of the proposed secondary centres, (Palestine Road Roundabout) has expanded. Without this expansion, growth of the central area would probably have been greater than has actually occurred, with a subsequent increase in general congestion. Thus this aspect of the Master Plan shopping policy has been partly effective.

d) The two secondary centres proposed have not been established. Ribbon development has continued along Makkah Road, but not consolidated. In-depth shopping has been established at Kilometre 8. No shopping development has occurred near the new northern airport due to lack of urban development there.

e) The Jeddah Central Area still remains the major shopping focus for both the city and the regional and therefore retains its function as the primary shopping centre. There is evidence that decentralization of convenience shopping is occurring, and this complies with the Master Plan policy. However, there is also evidence of speciality shopping being established beyond the central areas, and this trend is contrary to the policy.

f) Pre-planned shopping centres, not provided for in the existing policy, have become a major part of the retail scene. Their continued growth is likely to cut across the current shopping hierarchy, both in terms of function and location.

g) A considerable amount of new ribbon development has taken place since 1973. This has strongly influenced the overall pattern of retail development, particularly in relation to the development (or lack therefore) of a secondary centre on Makkah Road.

The Master Plan shopping policy, in attempting to establish a three-tier hierarchy, implicitly reflects the concept that each residential district should have its own district centre, providing for local needs; that initially two secondary centres would provide a wider range of goods, complementing the central area; and that the central area would provide for the speciality and durable goods shopping which require the largest catchment area. A clear distinction in functions is thus implicit in the policy. In practice this does not seem to have happened, and there is no evidence to suggest that it will evolve in the future.

The economically strong, well-established ribbon developments appear to perform the function that, in the Master Plan, was seen to be the role of either the district or the secondary centre. It is thus reasonable to suggest that in devising the tree-tier hierarchy, the strength (in both economic and traditional shopping-habit terms) of ribbon development was under-estimated. Ribbon development, organic in nature, reflects a series of individual decisions, whereas comprehensively planned district centres, alien to the traditional pattern in Jeddah, reflect central decisions made on behalf of individuals, and imply an active role on the part of a planning and development authority.

Evaluation
The description above has concentrated on explaining the policies proposed in the Master Plan, and the development that has actually taken place, in the first case study. This section of the paper tries to assess the main reasons for the differences between the proposals and actual development. The analysis is based on the author's personal experience in the Municipality, and personal interviews with members of Municipality's Planning and Development Department.

There are two main aspects to be considered in trying to determine why the proposed pattern of retailing activity has not been achieved. The first is why retail centres have not developed in locations recommended in the Master Plan, the second is why retail facilities have been provided in locations which were not recommended in the Master Plan.

Examining the first of these issues reveals two important difficulties in implementing Master Plan proposals. The first is that the Plan has not been used as a positive planning tool to try to influence private sector activity. The second is that the Municipality has limited powers to carry out development or acquire land to facilitate development.

In considering the question of the use of the Master Plan as a positive tool to influence or guide private sector activity, it is clear that this approach has not been widely used in Jeddah, and not at all in relation to the development of retail centres. There is a general problem relating to the publication or availability of official documents/reports such as the Master Plan, in that traditionally they are regarded as confidential by government agencies, there is usually a tendency to restrict their availability, and the positive promotion of policies by making them freely available, to the press or to companies and individuals, is rare. One major reason, therefore, for private developers not carrying out commercial projects in the locations recommended by the Master Plan was that they simply did not know what the Master Plan proposed. This was confirmed by personal interview with the Saudi principals of five of the companies which have developed commercial centres in locations other than those proposed in the Master Plan (Caravan Centre, Jeddah Shopping Centre, International Market, Shaker Centre, Sarawat Centre). In no case did they indicate they were aware of the existence of the Plan's proposals for shopping centres, nor were these proposals drawn to their attention when they applied for permission to build their respective centres. It is not surprising that private investors do not follow the requirements of the Plan if they do not know, and are not told, what those requirements are. Although the individual officials who dealt with the applications are no longer with the Municipality, current officials suggest that it is more than likely that the people responsible for approving the building permits were not themselves aware of the recommended policies for the location of shopping. Although they should have been aware of the zoning regulations concerning the areas where the centres were eventually built, it is certainly conceivable that they were not aware of the more 'positive' aspects of the Plan's recommendations for the location of retail activities, for a number of reasons.

1. The proposals of the plan were not widely distributed within the Municipality
2. There was a great separation of the activities of plan making and issuing development permits
3. The building permits department was under-staffed to cope with the large number of applications which followed the development boom of 1974.
It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that in terms of providing positive
guidance to developers about the preferred locations for the development of
shopping centres, the Master Plan proposals were less than successful. This is
a separate point from the argument about whether or not the policies
themselves were 'good', or desirable, or even feasible given the conditions,
attitudes and customs prevailing in Jeddah at the time.

The second difficulty related to implementing the Plan's proposals for
shopping activities is that the powers of the Municipality to purchase land,
carry out development, or to participate in commercial development with
private investors are severely limited. The acquisition of land by the
Municipality is governed by Royal Decree (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1954),
and in general terms is restricted to land required for public use. The
Municipality has no power to purchase land where an area is designated for,
say, a commercial centre but is in fragmented ownership, with a view to
leasing it to a private developer once the land has been assembled. This
applies not only to compulsory purchase of the land, but applies even where
the participation could be shown to produce a high rate of return. It must
therefore be concluded on the basis of this evidence that the Municipality is
not well equipped to play a positive role in the development of the city.

The next question to be discussed is why large amounts of retail development
have been allowed in areas not shown for retail use in the Master Plan. As
was described above, two main types of shopping development have
occurred outside the provisions of the Master Plan - a number of large, pre-
planned centres, and extensive areas of ribbon development. In both cases,
development permits have been issued which are contrary to the provisions
of the Master Plan. Why has this happened? There are, of course, a number
of reasons, as revealed by discussion with officials of the Planning and
Development Department, the Building Permits Department and the Western
Regional Office of the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs.

The first is that although it is required to consult the zoning regulations when
considering the approval of a Building Permit, it is not legally necessary to
follow the use prescribed in the regulations. In other words, in the present
system the zoning provisions are for guidance only and do not represent an
actual, legal constraint on development. It is possible to find many examples
where building permits have been issued in contradiction to planning policies
and zoning regulations. In the case of the twenty-one new retail centres
which have been referred to, there is not record in the Municipality files of
any comment that the centres should be refused because they do not conform
to the Master Plan provisions. Comments were restricted to detailed matters
of design, access and car parking.

The second is that most of the development which has taken place in conflict
with the Master Plan occurred during the 'boom' period of 1974-83, when the
pace of development was totally unexpected, beyond anything that had been
experienced before, beyond anything predicted in the Master Plan, and totally
beyond the capabilities of the limited staff available to cope with. In addition,
the peak period of development occurred as the Municipality was trying to
adjust to a new role and responsibilities - a most unfortunate combination.
Another aspect of the situation is that, because it was obvious that the growth
which was occurring made many of the provisions of the Master Plan
unrealistic (eg: many of the proposed height restrictions were totally
unrealistic in the light of the dramatic increase in land values which were
taking place), there was no real pressure from the highest levels of decision-
making (ie: the Mayor and the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs) to
enforce them. Instead, the Municipality adopted an almost 'entrepreneurial' style of decision-making, with variances from the Master Plan restrictions being allowed, subject to conditions, which might range from an agreement to adopt a certain architectural style or treatment, to the donation of land for public facilities. Although such an approval is much different from that recommended in, and assumed by the Master Plan, it was perhaps not an unreasonable response to the situation in which the Municipality found itself.

Another aspect which must be taken into account is the actual nature of the proposals for shopping. These were based on a rigid hierarchical structure which was totally unknown in any Saudi city, and which vastly underestimated the significance of, and demand for, the traditional ribbon-type development. It was perhaps expecting too much for a totally new concept to be implemented by a new, inexperienced planning system at a time when it was struggling to catch up with a totally unexpected rate of urban growth. Indeed, some of the Municipality officials have suggested that it would have been difficult to obtain the pattern of shopping provided for in the Master Plan even with a well-established, relatively sophisticated public planning agency with powers to co-ordinate decision, assemble land and control development.

At the time when the critical decisions were necessary such a description could certainly not be accurately applied to the Municipality, because the urban planning function within the Municipality and Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was relatively undeveloped.

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JEDDAH CORNICHE

This section of the paper reviews one example of the Master Plan proposals which were successfully implemented. The purpose of the case study is to throw light on the conditions or factors which were instrumental in helping to achieve Plan objectives, as one of the important elements in the evaluation of the effectiveness of the urban growth management system in Jeddah. Although the Plan proposals were not implemented exactly as specified, the degree of implementation was sufficiently high to be regarded as a successful attempt to translate Plan provision into reality.

The Jeddah Corniche is undoubtedly one of the most successful proposals of the Master Plan, not only in terms of the area of concern of this study (the implementation of planning policies) but also in its impact on the city's population. It has rapidly become established as the most important leisure facility in the city, and attracts visitors from a wide area around the city - even from as far as Makkah, which is about 75 kilometres inland.

The proposals for the Corniche were first outlined in general terms in the original Master Plan (Robert Matthew, Johnson-Marshall 1973) and were subsequently supplemented by a series of Action Area studies which translated the general concepts into more detailed proposals (Robert Matthew, Johnson-Marshall 1975 and 1976). The following description is based on information from these sources. The Master Plan proposed that the opportunity should be taken to develop to the maximum the unique potential of the urban coastline. It recognised the Red Sea as the dominant recreation element in the city, with the fringing coral reefs and the many kilometres of sandy beaches providing a major recreation and leisure asset. The protection of the coastline from building activity for residential and commercial purposes, and its development as a recreational resource, was therefore a major recommendation of the Master Plan.
The original plan for the development of the Corniche covered a 60 kilometre stretch of coast, from 12 kilometres south of the Naval base to 10 kilometres north of Sharm Obhur. It was prepared in three stages:

First, the Central Urban Area (where pressures for development were expected - rightly - to be greatest) from the seaport to the Raytheon Peninsula;

Second, the North Coast area, from Raytheon Peninsula to the old palace north of Sharm Obhur;

Third, the South Coast area stretching eleven kilometres southwards from the Ras Al-Aswad Peninsula.

This study will examine the second of these stages, as it is the one which is most significant in terms of the development of the coastline for recreation and leisure purposes.

Although "the Corniche" is popularly thought of as consisting on only the Corniche Road, the planning concept also involves the development of a range of uses and activity areas along the coastline, linked by the Corniche Road, but involving much more than just the road itself.

The Corniche North Cast Action Area

The proposals for the northern section of the Corniche cover the area from just north of the Ruwais Lagoon to the old palace north of Sharm Obhur (Figure 4). The Action Area includes 53 kilometres of coastline, and covers an area of over 2,000 hectares. The principle objective of the plan was to protect and selectively develop the coastline in order to provide the city with a major recreational and leisure facility.

The most outstanding physical feature of the area is Sharm Obhur, a creek extending more than 10 kilometres inland, and 3 kilometres wide at its widest point. At the time of the preparation of the plan, almost all of the northern shore of Sharm Obhur was in private ownership, and developed with villas and cabins for weekend use. The southern shore was partly developed.

Although the Action Area contained almost no permanent population and almost 85% of its 2,085 hectares were vacant, much of the land had been committed by approved residential sub-divisions. A major problem revealed by the Action Area study was that of the total of 53 kilometres of coastline, only 27% (14.5 kilometres) was immediately available for public access. The remaining 38.5 kilometres was excluded from public access by the development of holiday villas, cabins, walled enclosures or approves sub-divisions.

The Action area was divided into four clearly defined zones (Figure 4). These are:

1. The zone from the northern end of the Central Urban Action Area to Raytheon Point/Desalination Plant
2. The coastline from Raytheon Point/Desalination Plant to the mouth of Sharm Obhur.

3. Sharm Obhur itself.

4. The coastline from the mouth of Sharm Obhur to the northern boundary of the Action Area.

Because the characteristics and existing conditions of each of these zones have important implications for the Action Area proposals, they will be briefly described, prior to the description of the proposals themselves.

1. This zone contains land which is an extension of the Central Urban Action Area up to the entrance of the Raytheon Military Area. The area of the Raytheon Peninsula, including the Military Training School and the Desalination Plant, are security areas and were excluded from the area of study.

2. From Raytheon Point to the mouth of Sharm Obhur the coast is flat with only minor variations of 1-2 metres. Along the coastline there were narrow strips of holiday villas, cabins or walled compounds containing small primitive buildings. There were some walled compounds containing only vacant land. A small proportion of this coast has low undercut coralline cliffs (1-2 metres high), but for the most part the land slopes gently into the sea. The principle characteristics of the coastline is fringing coral reef, which varies in width from 150 metres in the south to an average width of 360 metres further north. The water over this fringing reef is very shallow averaging only 0.3 metres deep, although there are isolated patches where the water depth increases to 0.5 - 0.6 metres. The surface of the fringing reef consists generally of fairly level coralline limestone with small isolated patches of live coral. At the seaward edge of the fringing reef the coral growth is both vigorous and magnificent, and the almost vertical seaward edge of the reef is the home of a wide range of tropical fish. The vigorous coral growth extends over the vertical face to a depth of approximately 10 - 15 metres from where a sand floor descends to greater depths.

3. Sharm Obhur inlet contains an area of approximately 718 hectares of sheltered water. The north and south sides of the inlet slope gently to a depth of approximately 6 metres. The sheltered waters and gently sloping shores make Sharm Obhur more suitable, and consequently more popular, for swimming and boating than the coastline to the north and south. The centre of the inlet has an average depth of between 3 - 45 metres. However, at the eastern end of the inlet the channel shelves to a depth of 1 metre. Along the beaches on each side of the inlet are some villas, a large number of rentable cabins and two beach hotels. The northern shore was most densely developed at the time of the preparation of the Action Area, probably because the southern shore, which faces the prevailing North-North-West wind, tends to collect drifting debris.

4. From the mouth of Sharm Obhur northwards the coastline has an assortment of buildings and vacant plots along its seaward edge and the fringing reef narrows to come within 200 metres of the shore. The cross section of the fringing reef is identical to that south of Sharm Obhur expect for some 4 kilometres south from the old palace. Here
the fringing reef widens to 600 metres and contains a deep water lagoon with a depth of some 3 - 8 metres which is used for fishing. At the northern extremity of the zone lies the old palace, from which a massive pier extends some 150 metres into the lagoon.

Planning Proposals for the North Coast Action Area

The most important elements of the Action Area proposals are the development of the coastal strip and the shores of Sharm Obhur for recreational development, and the design and alignment of the North Coast Corniche Road to provide both access to the recreational facilities and to be an attractive recreational asset.

The main proposals for each of the planning zones are as follows:

1. **Raytheon Point and the Desalination Plant**

   This zone is a continuation of the Central Urban Action Area, and to the east of the Corniche Road the proposal was for residential development. To the west of the road a coastal recreation area was proposed. Immediately to the west of this area, adjacent to the entrance to the Raytheon Military Area it was proposed that a bird sanctuary be established around the shallow inlet at the north west corner of Ghubbat Asharah. The establishment of such a sanctuary had been proposed by Sir Peter Scott during his visit to Saudi Arabia in early 1976 to attend the Jeddah Conference on Conservation and Pollution Control in the Red Sea. The sanctuary would both provide a safe home for indigenous birds and the resting place for migratory species. As such it would provide an area of scientific, educational and local interest.

2. **Desalination Plan to the mouth of Sharm Obhur**

   As we have seen, the salient features of this coastline are:

   (a) a fringing reef which varies in width between 150-300 metres covered by shallow water, and

   (b) a ribbon of development (ranging from large villas to walled empty compounds) along the water's edge

   In order to create a Corniche Road which provides variety, interest and opportunities of public recreation whilst preserving as far as possible, the privacy of the existing properties, it was proposed that:

   1. the undeveloped areas of land be acquired in order to provide public recreation and views of the sea from the Corniche Road;

   2. where land has been developed, the coastline should be extended by land-filling the shallow waters of the fringing reef at an adequate distance from the villas to preserve privacy.

   Because of the lack of sheltered deep water along this section of the North coast, it was recommended that the public recreation areas should be predominantly for sitting and picnics, with restaurants and cafes. At a point midway in a zone it was proposed that a jetty be built towards the seaward edge of the fringing reef, where a structure would be provided at the top of
the underwater coral cliff to enable people to snorkel over the luxuriant coral growths, scuba-dive or relax.

3. **Sharm Obhur**

This area of 718 hectares of sheltered water was seen as providing the primary opportunity for water oriented recreation. The aim of the Action Area Plan was to distribute the water activities more evenly over the area of usable water and into the areas at present under-used. To achieve this, specific areas for public recreation were proposed. Along the south shore undeveloped sites with a total land area of 144 hectares at the eastern end adjacent to Madina Road were identified, and it was proposed that the shallow waters be deepened to improve the quality of the water and to enable this area to be used for water sports.

Along the northern shore, the Plan proposed the acquisition of a total of 84 hectares of open land and under-developed plots in order to create four areas of public recreation, including a sailing school and a marina with direct access to the deep water as well as opportunities for swimming, shaded areas and land-based recreation, football, volleyball, etc.

4. **From the mouth of Sharm Obhur to the northern boundary**

The intensity of development decreases in this part of the Action Area, and the Plan recommended reserving the area for those residents requiring informal and more remote areas of recreation. The existing sheltered lagoon was recommended as being particularly suitable for public recreation based on swimming and the use of motor boats (suitably separated). It was not considered necessary to be more specific about the future use of this area until the population grew to a level that would require further organized facilities beyond the capacity of those areas already designated for recreation use.

**Road Network**

Within the Corniche North Coast Action Area the primary road system comprises the Coastal Urban Motorway (designated 'New Airport Spinal Route' in the Master Plan report) extending from Ghubbat Asharah to Sharm Obhur where it connects into Madina Road (Figure 5). The function of this road is to provide a high speed, high capacity route linking the proposed urban expansion areas to Central Jeddah. Accordingly, this primary route was planned as a dual three lane urban motorway. Clearly, this route will also provide the main means of access to the Corniche distributor road system from North Jeddah.

The secondary road system comprises the Corniche Road which forms a collector/distributor spine route, and the link roads connecting the spine route to the Coastal Motorway and Madina Road. In sympathy with its role of serving traffic attracted to the sea shore and recreational facilities, the Corniche Road was designed on a meandering alignment in order to encourage moderate traffic speeds and to create scenic interest along the coastal plain. It was also in parts designed on a split level, with the inland carriageway on a higher level to provide interesting and un-obstructed views of the coastline.
IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of the Corniche proposals, especially in its Northern sections, must be considered as one of the major successes of city planning in Jeddah. Although there are a number of aspects of the proposals which have not yet been implemented, the major structural element - the Corniche Road - now runs from the Central Business District to the North-eastern end of Sharm Obhur. The alignment of the road is substantially as proposed in the Action Area Plan, and over most of its length the design concepts of the plan have been closely followed.

The strategy of developing the Corniche Road and its associated recreational/leisure facilities on reclaimed land, where sea-front access was in private ownership, was almost entirely successful, in spite of some vigorous protests by major land owners when the reclamation work began. There are a number of major interruptions to the coastal alignment of the Corniche Road, but these are mainly due to large-scale public uses which either require direct access to the water (such as the Coast Guard stations) or where the introduction of 'civilian' recreational activities is not desirable for operational or security reasons (e.g.: the Desalination Plant and the Military Base). However, apart from these few cases, the Corniche Road follows the pre-existing and newly-developed coastline, and has created a stretch of coastal development which is accessible to the general public. In essence, it could be said that the city has been given a second chance to develop its most valuable recreational resource, through an essentially simply strategy that was effectively implemented (Plate 2).

The development of the northern part of the Corniche, at least as far as Sharm Obhur, has followed the plan's proposals very closely. The Corniche Road from the northern end of the Central Corniche to the north eastern end of Sharm Obhur was completed in 1983, six years after work started. More than 300 hectares of land were reclaimed for the construction of roads and recreational areas. The North Corniche is perhaps the most heavily used section, and has proved to be extremely popular.

The detailed progress of implementation by the previously defined planning zones, is as follows:

Raytheon Point and the Desalination Plan

Residential development has been carried out as anticipated by the plan, but there has been no discussion of the feasibility or desirability of the proposed bird sanctuary.

Desalination Plan to the mouth of Sharm Obhur

This section of the Corniche follows the design concept very closely. On both sides of the Corniche Road there are recreation areas (a mixture of formal and informal), a Korean theme garden (donated by one of the contractors engaged on reclamation and road construction), fun fairs and sculpture gardens. A number of hotels have been built on the landward side of the road, and their recreation facilities are open to non-residents. The road is imaginatively designed, with frequent separation of the carriageways which are divided by lagoons (Plate 3).
Sharm Abhur

The Corniche Road has been completed along the southern edge of the creek, thus opening it up for recreational development to the public. The proposal to improve the water at the eastern end of the creek by dredging have not yet been implemented. The proposed acquisition of land on the northern shore to create public recreation areas have not been implemented.

Road Network

It has already been mentioned that the Corniche Road has been completed according to plan. The other principal road related to the development of North Corniche is the Coastal Urban Motorway, and this was also completed in 1983.

EVALUATION

There are a number of features of the Corniche implementation which account for the degree of success experienced in implementing the plan's proposals.

First, it relied on established procedures for land acquisitions. The development of the Corniche was centred around the construction of the Corniche Road, and where land acquisition was necessary, the power to purchase land for road development was available. Implementation was essentially dependent on public initiative and public investment. Control or promotion of private sector activities were not central to the case study. In fact, the few areas of non-implementation of the Corniche proposals were those related to private sector development - for example the failure of the private sector to respond to opportunities presented in the plan, as with the proposed 'coral garden'.

The second important feature of the case study is that because it was a public development project, it was possible for its implementation to be assigned to consultant and contractors. In this way, the difficulties of the Municipality in terms of shortages of trained and experienced staff could be avoided. By hiring external resources for specific activities, it was possible for the internal constraints of the Municipality to be overcome.

The third aspect of the cast study which is absolutely central to its success, is that is was conceived and implemented during a period when there were no serious financial constraints on the Municipality. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the major problem for the Municipality was how to spend its budget, not how to obtain what it required. This meant that there were no serious problems in financing the implementation of the Corniche development. When additional finance was needed to overcome unexpected difficulties, supplementary funds were almost always made available.

One aspect of the implementation of the Corniche project is of particular interest - the way in which coordination between the planning and design work and construction was secured. It has already been mentioned that the Corniche as built was very close to the original design concepts. This can be accounted for in large part by the fact that there was close consultation and liaison between the planning consultants and the consulting engineers, but also to the fact that the proposals of the Action Area Plan were much more
detailed and specific than the general proposals of the Master Plan, so that they were easier to translate into implementation documents.

CONCLUSIONS

The final section of the paper considers the implications of these lessons, and of those from the Retail Policy case study for the process of implementing planning policies and proposals in Jeddah.

It is perhaps useful to start by recognizing that failure to implement the policies and proposals contained in plans is widely recognized to be one of the major weaknesses of planning in newly developing countries (Waterston 1979; Faber and Seers 1972; Ingesias 1976; Conyers and Hills 1984). It is relatively easy to prepare "good" plans. It is much more difficult to identify precisely what has to be done to make a plan or project operational, who should be responsible, the time-scales involved, and the source of the required resources.

And yet these are central problems in the task of implementation (Conyers and Hills 1984, p.154).

The role of the planner in the process of plan implementation is essentially concerned with mobilising, organising and managing the resources needed to undertake the actions required if the plan's objectives are to be achieved. The specific activities this requires have been conveniently summarised by Barrett and Fudge (1981) as follows:

1. You must know what you want to do;
2. The required resources must be available;
3. You must have the ability to assemble, control and manage these resources to achieve what is desired;
4. Where others are involved in carrying out specific implementation tasks, you must be able to communicate to them what exactly is required and by whom, and generally be able to control the way they carry out their responsibilities.

Relating these activities to the case studies provides a useful perspective on their relative degrees of success, and perhaps provides some useful pointers for improving the implementation process. It is also useful to consider the factors which are likely to affect the implementation process, and the extent to which they have operated in the case studies. Conyers and Hills (1984) suggest that four main types of factor affect the process of plan implementation, and their classification provides a useful framework for discussing the case studies. The factors are as follows (Conyers and Hills 1984, p.156):

1. Nature of the planning process;
2. Organisation of planning and implementing;
3. Content of plans;
4. Management of the implementation process.
Nature of the planning process

Conyers and Hills argue that many of the problems of plan implementation can ultimately be attributed to the tendency to view planning and implementation as two separate and even unrelated activities (ibid, p.156). This view is shared by Waterston, who concludes:

"the word 'planning' is often used to refer to the formulation of plans, but not to their implementation. The conceptual separation of 'planning' from 'implementation' is more than a matter of semantics, it is symbolic of an attitude which prevails widely among planners" (Waterston 1979, p.336).

The relevance of this to the case studies is clear. At the time of the preparation of the original Master Plan, the organization of the urban planning function, both in the Municipality and the Central Government ministry responsible for planning, was quite new. There were few qualified and experienced Saudi professionals, and the major planning activities were contracted out to consultants. Perhaps understandably, the first priority was seen to be to develop a planning framework for the city, in the form of the Master Plan. Although this was supplanted by the preparation of Action Area Plans, there was no clear awareness at the time of the relationship between plan preparation and implementation. The majority of the planning effort was concentrated on the one hand on the preparation of plans, and on the other on a desperate attempt to control day to day development activities. This is not so much a criticism of the either the process followed or the individuals involved - it is simply a recognition of the realities of trying to cope with large-scale rapid growth at the same time as establishing a new administrative framework for planning.

Organisation of planning and implementation

"The successful implementation of a plan is largely a matter of proper organization and administration" (Waterston 1979, p.339)

In reality planning is a complex process involving a wide range of individuals and agencies. The planners, as such, may often have very little direct responsibility for carrying out development projects. Within the planning agency, the professionals who prepare the plan may well not be the ones who are most directly involved in either controlling development or stimulating/organising the use of resources to carry out projects.

It is therefore of critical importance that the planning function be organised in such a way as to facilitate the necessary relationships between other planners within the agency, other public sector agencies who are responsible for physical development projects, and the key private sector decision-makers who influence urban development directly through their investments in development projects.

One of the features of the organisation of the planning function in Jeddah at the time of the Master Plan preparation was that there was little direct provision for these important linkage, especially with the private sector, as the case study of retail policy demonstrates. The role of the planner in influencing private sector investment was seen essentially as a negative one, but even at that level there was little direct contact between the plan/policy formulation function and the development control function - partly because
of pressure of work (simply keeping up with the volume of development applications), but also because at the time, the importance of regarding planning as an integrated process including implementation was not clearly understood.

Content of plans

Rondinelli demonstrates that many plans are more or less doomed to 'failure' from the start because of their content and mode of presentation (Rondinelli 1979). There is an obvious difference in the case studies in terms of the relevance of the form and content of the plans used for implementation purposes.

The Mast Plan is essentially a vehicle for setting out the long-term pattern of development to be achieved. It does this in a fairly detailed manner, and is quite an effective tool for describing an image of the city at some future point in time. However, it is not a very effective vehicle for implementation, given its long-term perspective and its lack of concern for how the long-term pattern of development might be achieved. What is required for implementation purposes is not simply a description of the ultimate pattern of development that may be desirable. Information is also needed on the timing of development - especially in relation to other key developments, such as new housing and the provision of infrastructure - and the processes by which the necessary resources (including land) may be assembled and made available. The Master Plan is not a suitable vehicle for these activities, and it is therefore not surprising that, in the absence of any intermediate form of policy document, the retail policies of the plan were less than successful.

Another relevant factor in this discussion is the extent to which the policies themselves were actually suitable for or relevant to the conditions of the city at the time. Comment has already been made on this aspect in the discussion of the case study.

The Action Area plan developed for the Corniche was much more directly related to the needs of implementation. It was short-term, and provided a detailed design framework for the development it proposed - the Action Area Plan proved to be a useful design brief for the range of detailed engineering studies that were necessary for the implementation of the Corniche project.

Management of the implementation process

It was suggested earlier that implementation is essentially concerned with mobilising, organising and managing the resources needed to undertake the actions required if the plan's objectives are to be achieved. It is important to realise that these activities will not take place automatically, because a plan - however good - has been prepared and approved. Specific action is required and specific responsibilities needed to be allocated to ensure that implementation takes place. The case studies suggest that the planning system in Jeddah was better able to respond to the implementation of specific projects rather than general policies, and this can be traced, in part at least, to this question of how implementation is organised and managed.

The difference between the two case studies in this regard is quite marked. The responsibility for general Master Plan policies (ie: those not involving specific public sector projects, or large scale public sector action) was not clearly defined. There was no specific group within the City Planning
Department with the responsibility for taking initiative in regard to general policies. Indeed, because the responsibility for the 'forward planning' function was at that time delegated to consultants, relatively few of the Municipality’s permanent staff had a detailed involvement in policy issues. There were therefore no clearly defined responsibilities for taking a pro-active stance to ensure that private sector activities took place in accordance with the policies expressed in the Master Plan.

The implementation of the Corniche Action Area Plan, on the other hand, took place within a very clearly defined structure. Because the development of the Corniche was regarded as a prestigious development which was a key element in the improvement of the city, the Mayor of Jeddah took a direct interest in supervising its implementation. Moreover, because the detailed design and construction work required skills which were not at that time available within the Municipality, the management design and implementation of the project was contracted out to consultants. The total process therefore was within the control of a relatively small group of people, headed by the most important political and administrative future within the Municipality. This ensured both efficient day-to-day management, and the ability to overcome the administrative and financial problems which inevitably cropped up in such a large and complex project.

It is obvious from the discussion above that a clear and integrated planning framework is an essential element for effective implementation. Government agencies, private developers and individuals need a framework for their key decisions. The Master Plan is not well-suited to specifying the detailed courses of action needed to bring about the long-term future pattern it described although it can influence broad patterns of development for example through the road networks. The Action Area Plan is a very useful and effective tool for small areas where large-scale change is expected, particularly when there is extensive public-sector involvement. However, there are large areas of the city where there will be change (in the form of new development or redevelopment) which are not covered by Action Areas, but where the Master Plan with its lack of detail does not provide adequate guidance for private and public decisions to be effectively made. This situation could be improved by the introduction of an intermediate level of plan for substantial districts of the city which would fill the gap between long-range planning functions of the Master Plan and the carrying out of specific developments. An incidental advantage of this would be that the Master Plan could become more of a general policy plan, whose policies would be translated into more detail in the District Plans. Action Area Plans would still be prepared for large-scale projects where detailed action guidelines are necessary, particularly where extensive public-sector action is required.

A second change which would improve the effectiveness of planning implementation, especially with regard to the influencing of private sector projects, would be to use the approved District and Action Area Plans as promotional vehicles to make the general public and private investors aware of the opportunities presented by the plans. It was observed in the analysis of the case studies that not only were the proposals of the Master Plan not freely available, there was a tendency to regard them as confidential. It can hardly be regarded as surprising that private sector investment does not follow the proposals of a plan if those proposals are not actively promoted. On the other hand, if they are regulatory presented and discussed, particularly emphasizing the timing and sequence of major public investments and projects, it would be surprising if the private sector did not respond to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the plan.
Although the proposal to introduce a new level of plan making could be implemented fairly easily by the City Planning Department, the second proposal involves a major change of practice and attitudes which may be more difficult to achieve without clear and firm guidance from the central Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. However, it seems clear that a significant improvement in the effectiveness of plan implementation could be achieved if both proposals were incorporated into the current practice of the City Planning Department.
References


Burgess, E. w. (1925) "The Growth of the City" in R.E. Park et al (eds), The City, University of Chicago Press


Hoyt, H. (1939) The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighbourhoods in American Cities Federal Housing Administration, Washington


