OFFSHORE BANKING AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN VANUATU

Professor Jennifer Corrin*

Under the common law, a duty of confidentiality arises from the express or implied terms of the banker-customer relationship.1 However, banks in offshore financial centres are facing increasing demands from government authorities, such as tax offices investigating tax evasion, and police investigating offences such as money laundering, to disclose account information. Whether these demands come from a domestic or foreign authority, they pose a threat to 'the inviolability of secrecy and confidentiality'.2 This chapter examines this problem in the context of Vanuatu, a tax haven in the South West Pacific. The chapter commences with some brief background on Vanuatu and then gives an explanation of the sources of law in Vanuatu, which constitute a complex mixture of common law, civil law and indigenous law (known locally as 'Customary Law' or 'Kastom'). It then sets out the current legal position in Vanuatu regarding a banker's duty of confidentiality, including a discussion of relevant legislation. The chapter explores the exceptions to the duty and analyses the approach of the courts in Vanuatu, with reference to decisions in other common law countries, including England and Australia. It goes on to discuss the competing arguments for and against compulsory disclosure and considers whether the regime in Vanuatu offers any solutions for other small island states.

---

* Professor Jennifer Corrin is Director of the Centre for Public, International and Comparative Law in the TC Beirne School of Law, The University of Queensland. An earlier version of this chapter was published in (2013) 28 (2) Banking and Finance Law Review 249-268 ('Responding to Challenges to a Bank's Duty of Confidentiality in Offshore Finance Centres: The Vanuatu Example'), and this chapter appears with the kind consent of the editor of that Journal.

1 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] 1 KB 461 (CA) ('Tournier's Case').

I   VANUATU AND ITS LAW

A Vanuatu

Vanuatu, formerly known as the New Hebrides, is a small island country in the South-West Pacific, about three-quarters of the way from Hawaii to Australia. The indigenous peoples, known collectively as Ni-Vanuatu, form the majority of the population, which totals about 230,000. There are over 100 local languages, but the official languages are Bislama, English and French. Vanuatu has a land area of 12,189 sq km, which is slightly larger than Connecticut, made up of more than 80 islands, which are mostly mountainous of volcanic origin, with narrow coastal plains. About 65 of the islands are inhabited.

In addition, Vanuatu became independent on 30 July 1980. It has a Westminster style of State government, co-existing with a traditional chiefly system.

Vanuatu is regarded as a tax haven, having no income tax, capital gains tax, withholding tax, estate duties, or exchange control. These factors, together with the high level of confidentiality for financial dealings and limited bureaucracy have resulted in Vanuatu's status as an active offshore financial centre. In 2012, Vanuatu became a member of the World Trade Organisation.

4 About 95% of the population are Ni-Vanuatu.
5 Supra n 3.
8 The Constitution was brought into force by an Exchange of Notes between the Governments of United Kingdom and France, 23 October 1979.
9 Constitution c 4, 7 and 8.
10 Constitution ch 5 acknowledges the chiefly system and gives it a role in State government through a National Council of Chiefs.
11 Having previously been labelled an 'Uncooperative Tax Haven' by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ('OECD'), Vanuatu has since made commitments to the OECD to implement transparency and effective exchange of information for tax purposes. Facsimile from Minister of Finance and Economic Management (Vanuatu) to OECD Secretary General, 7 May 2003, online: <www.oecd.org/countries/vanuatu>.
12 Accession date 24 August 2012: WT/L/823.
B The Law

Since Independence on 30 July 1980, the law in Vanuatu has been comprised of:

- The Constitution,¹³ which is expressed to be the Supreme law;¹⁴
- Decisions of the Vanuatu Courts;¹⁶
- Law in existence on 30 July 1980 (which continue in force until repealed by Parliament), that is:
  - Joint Regulations;¹⁷
  - British and French laws, including Acts of Parliament, subsidiary legislation and English common law and equity ("introduced law");¹⁸ and
  - Customary Laws.¹⁹

The remaining Joint Regulations are not relevant to the duty of confidentiality, so they do not require further discussion. Apart from one possible issue, discussed below, Customary Laws are not relevant either.

On the other hand, the applicability of British and French laws is of relevance, and this is a matter of some debate. Whilst the Constitution clearly provides in Art 95(2) that such laws continue in force, it does not say to whom such laws apply. Prior to Independence, British laws applied to British citizens and 'optants' and French laws applied to French citizens and 'optants', 'optants' being those present in the country who chose to be subject to British or French laws. The status of optant no longer exists in Vanuatu, as the Anglo-French Protocol 1914, which provided for this, was revoked at Independence.²⁰ According to Pentecost Pacific Ltd v Hnaloane,²¹ which involved an alleged breach of contract of employment, the nationality of the parties is a significant factor. The Court of Appeal held that, as

---

¹³ Constitution.
¹⁴ Constitution art 2.
¹⁵ Ibid art 16.
¹⁶ Ibid, art 47(1).
¹⁷ Ibid art 95(1).
¹⁸ Ibid art 95(2).
¹⁹ Ibid art 95(3).
there was no Vanuatu legislation relating to procedure, there was a choice between French and English law, which was to "be decided according to the nationality of the defendant", which in that particular case was French. In Banga v Waiwo, D'Imecourt, CJ held that English and French laws in force apply to everyone in Vanuatu, irrespective of nationality, and irrespective of whether they were indigenous ni-Vanuatu or not. This differs from the Chief Justice's earlier decision in Mouton v Selb Pacific Ltd, where the Chief Justice appears to have been of the view that, normally, French laws would automatically apply to French citizens and optants, and, by implication, that English laws would automatically apply to English citizens and optants. Further, His Lordship appears to have been of the view that French law would automatically apply where a document in French required interpretation.

So, in a case where a bank or customer in Vanuatu is French, or the documentation relating to the account is in French, it would appear that, if introduced law is relevant to the question of confidentiality, it will be French rather than English law which applies. French law imposes a statutory duty of confidentiality, but this article does not discuss the details of French law in any detail. It should be added that, in the case of disputes arising under the Trust Companies Act, the application of English law is supported by the requirement that the guarantee to be provided by every applicant for a licence to carry on business as a trust company must expressly provide that it is governed exclusively by 'British law as applicable in Vanuatu'.

The existing law includes English statutes 'of general application in force in England on the 1st day of January 1976'. The phrase 'general application' is not defined by legislation. In Harrisen v Holloway No 2, the Court of Appeal of Vanuatu appears to have been of the view that to be an Act of general application, the subject matter of the Act must operate in the same way in Vanuatu as in England. Some English legislation relevant to banking has been accepted as

---

24 Mohammed Ahmadu and Robert Hughes, Commercial law and Practice in the South Pacific (London: Cavendish, 2006) 323.
25 [Cap 69] (Vanuatu) ('Trust Companies Act').
26 Ibid s 5(2).
27 High Court of the New Hebrides Regulation 1976, SR & O. 1976/3, s 3.
applicable in Vanuatu. Thus, for example, the *Bankers Books Evidence Act*\(^{29}\) has been accepted as applicable.\(^{30}\) However, where the Parliament of Vanuatu has expressly or impliedly revoked English legislation of general application it will not apply.\(^{31}\) In relation to confidentiality, whilst this is still largely a matter of common law in Vanuatu, there is some specific statutory provision on point. Where such local legislation does exist, it would appear that any potentially applicable English legislation will have been revoked by implication.

The application of English common law and equity is 'subject to such qualifications as local circumstances render necessary'.\(^{32}\) There are two queries regarding the application of common law and equity which are of particular relevance. The first is whether they are subject to a cut-off date, i.e. a date after which they will no longer apply. In contrast to English statutes, which are only in force if enacted prior to 1 January 1976, there is no express cut-off date for common law and equity. However, as it is English common law and equity 'in force or applied in the New Hebrides immediately before Independence' which applies, this might be taken to mean that English decisions after the date of Independence, i.e. 30 July 1980, will not be part of the law. There is little authority directly on point, but in *Swanson v Public Prosecutor*,\(^{33}\) the Court of Appeal expressed the view that there was no cut-off date. This differs from the view of the Supreme Court expressed in *Mouton v Selb Pacific Ltd.*\(^{34}\) In practice, even if not binding, decisions of English courts made after 30 July 1980 will be regarded as highly persuasive. For example in *Spooner v Government of Vanuatu*,\(^{35}\) a case which concerned the recovery of bank deposits upon the collapse of a bank, the Vanuatu Court of Appeal relied on a number of English decisions including the House of Lords decision in *X (minors) v Bedfordshire CC*\(^{36}\) and *Davis v Radcliffe*.\(^{37}\)

---

29 1879 (UK), 42 & 43 Vict c11.
30 *Re Letter Rogatory* (1984) [1980-88] 1 Van LR 90. Fiji appears to be the only regional country to have its own Act: *Bankers Books Evidence Act* [Cap 45] (Solomon Islands).
31 *Constitution* art 93.
36 (1995) 3 All ER 353.
37 (1990) 2 All ER.
The second question of relevance is whether it is the English common law which applies or the common law as developed anywhere in the Commonwealth. The use of the word 'English' suggests the former, but it appears that this is not the view of the Court of Appeal of Vanuatu.\textsuperscript{38} This is in accord with the view taken by the Samoan Supreme Court, which has interpreted an identical phrase as referring to 'a system and body of law', rather than to the law as declared by English courts.\textsuperscript{39} However, in practice, the courts in Vanuatu generally tend to follow the English common law unless it is inapplicable to the circumstances of Vanuatu.

\section{THE COMMON LAW DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY}

Having outlined the complexities of Vanuatu's legal system, this part of the chapter examines the current law governing confidentiality. First, the common law duty and the applicable qualifications are discussed. This is followed by a brief examination of the duty in equity. The last section in this part of the chapter discusses the statute law in Vanuatu, which makes additional provision regarding the confidentiality of information relating to certain specific companies.

At common law, a bank's relationship to a customer is regarded as contractual in nature.\textsuperscript{40} This contractual relationship is complex, having its origins in the customs and usages of bankers.\textsuperscript{41} It has been referred to as:

A remarkable feature of the creation of the contract between banker and customer ... that the terms of the contract are not usually embodied in any written agreement executed by the parties. Thus, there is no formal agreement which provides that a banker must maintain strict secrecy concerning his customers' accounts.\textsuperscript{42}

Of course, where certain types of account are opened documents concerning specific terms will be executed by the bank and the customer, but even in those cases a comprehensive list of terms is rarely included.\textsuperscript{43} In consequence of the lack of express terms, this is an area where implied terms are of fundamental importance. As discussed further below, there is authority to suggest that terms are implied into the banker customer contract on the basis of business efficacy,\textsuperscript{44} and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Olo v Police, [1992] WSSC 1 (Samoa) online: <www.paclii.org>.
\item Foley v Hill (1848), 2 HLC 28.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid.
\item N Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corp [1921] 3 KB 110 (‘Joachimson’).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
more recently it has been suggested that terms are implied on the basis of necessity.45

The implied duty of confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers has been recognised by the English common law for some time.46 The leading English case on this point is *Tournier’s Case*.47 In that case, the plaintiff’s account with the defendant bank had become overdrawn. He entered into an agreement with the bank to pay off the debt by instalments, but did not honour it. The plaintiff was the payee of a cheque, but indorsed it to a third party, rather than paying it into his account. The bank found out about this as the drawer of the cheque was one of its other customers. The bank manager rang the third party’s bank and learnt that the indorsee was a bookmaker. The bank then telephoned the plaintiff’s employer, having obtained its address from the instalment agreement, and allegedly disclosed that the plaintiff’s account was overdrawn and that the promise to repay had not be fulfilled. It was also alleged that the manager had revealed that the indorsee was a bookmaker. As a result, the plaintiff’s employer refused to renew his contract of employment. The plaintiff sued for breach of an implied term that the bank would not disclose the state of his account or any transactions relating to it. At first instance judgment was entered for the bank, but an appeal was allowed by the Court of Appeal. All three members of the court held that a bank owes a duty of secrecy to its customers. However, there was some division of opinion concerning the extent of that duty.

The duty clearly extends beyond the state of the customer’s account to include all the transactions on the account, and any security held with respect to it.48 It would also appear to extend to any other information which is referable to the contractual relationship.49 Information which is already in the public domain is not covered. The obligation continues to apply even though the account has been dormant or has been closed.50

45 *Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd* [1986] AC 80 (PC).
46 See, eg, *Tassel v Cooper* (1850) 9 CB 509.
47 [1924] 1 KB 461. *Tournier’s Case* was approved in *Christofi v Barclays Bank plc* [2000] 1 WLR 937. For a recent consideration of the duty of confidentiality, see *Primary Group (UK) Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc* [2014] EWHC 1082 (Ch).
48 Ibid 473-4.
50 *Tournier’s Case*, [1924] 1 KB 461, 473, 475.
Tournier's Case\textsuperscript{51} has been applied in Vanuatu in \textit{Re Westpac Banking Corporation}\textsuperscript{52} The existence of a common law duty of confidentiality was also accepted by the Supreme Court of Vanuatu, in \textit{Application for Summons}es,\textsuperscript{53} albeit obiter and without reference to \textit{Tournier's Case}. There does not appear to be any direct authority on the nature and content of this obligation from the Vanuatu courts. However, as discussed above, the English common law applies in Vanuatu and accordingly the extent of the obligation and the exceptions recognised in \textit{Tournier's Case}\textsuperscript{54} and subsequent English cases, at least those decided before the 'cut-off date', are likely to be recognised in Vanuatu.

\textit{Tournier's Case}\textsuperscript{55} has also been followed in every other common law jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{56} For example, in the Australian case of \textit{Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd},\textsuperscript{57} the High Court reiterated that the duty of confidentiality was of a contractual nature,\textsuperscript{58} and made it clear that it is not referable to any doctrine of professional privilege.\textsuperscript{59} The case involved the application of a provision of Commonwealth Taxation legislation\textsuperscript{60} allowing the Commissioner to request information. The issue was whether information of a customer's income or assessment could be requested by the Commissioner from bank officers. After some discussion and acceptance of the points of authority established in \textit{Tournier's Case},\textsuperscript{61} the Court found that the legislative power of the Commissioner was not hindered by the contractual duty of confidentiality. The case can be understood as an example of the compulsion of law (with the duty of officers of the Commonwealth to follow law overriding the implied contractual duty) exception to the duty.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} [1992] VUSC 7 (Vanuatu) online: www.paclii.org.


\textsuperscript{54} [1924] 1 KB 461.

\textsuperscript{55} [1924] 1 KB 461.


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid 489.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Income Tax Assessment Act 1936} (Cth) s 264.

\textsuperscript{61} [1924] 1 KB 461, 487.
In many countries, the bank's duty of confidentiality is now confirmed in a code of practice. In Australia, for example, it is endorsed by the Banking Code of Practice.\(^62\)

There is a strong argument that *Tournier's Case* is not limited to commercial banks, but is also applicable to other financial institutions with which customers deposit money. This point has not arisen in Vanuatu, but in Australia it has been held that the duty of confidentiality applies to merchant banks.\(^63\) It has also been held to apply between credit unions and customers,\(^64\) and that, arguably, a similar duty is applicable to building societies.\(^65\)

**A The Exceptions to the Duty**

*Tournier's Case*\(^66\) made it clear that the duty is not absolute, but that it is subject to exceptions falling under four heads:

1. where disclosure is under compulsion of law;
2. where there is a public duty to disclose;
3. where the bank's own interests require disclosure; and
4. where the disclosure is with the express or implied consent of the customer.

Both the common law\(^67\) and the statutory provisions include disclosure under compulsion of law as an exception to the duty of confidentiality. Apart from this commonality, the exceptions differ. As stated above, the common law duty is subject to three other exceptions: where there is a public duty to disclose; where the bank's own interests require disclosure; and where the disclosure is with the express or implied consent of the customer. There is no equivalent of the first two of these additional exceptions under the legislation and only the *Trust Companies Act* specifically provides that authorisation of the customer justifies disclosure.

**B Disclosure under Compulsion of Law**

Compulsion of law is a recognized exception to the duty of confidentiality owed by a bank to its customers.\(^68\) If a banker is under a common law or statutory duty to

---

62 Australian Banker's Association Code of Banking Practice (2004), cl 22.
66 [1924] 1 KB 461.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
disclose confidential information, then he or she must do so and any contractual
duty to the contrary is illegal and void. Accordingly, a bank would not be in
breach of the obligation provided that it has disclosed only the information required
to be disclosed in accordance with the statute or order concerned.

Compulsion of law may stem from a statute compelling disclosure to a
particular official or in particular circumstances, and this is discussed further
below. Compulsion of law may also arise under adjectival law. Good examples of
this are where a bank is compelled to give evidence about a customer’s affairs by
an order for discovery or where an officer is subpoenaed to give evidence in court
about a customer’s affairs. However, there is controversy about whether the
banker must inform the customer about the subpoena and as to whether a bank has
a duty to object to disclosure of irrelevant parts of a document. It appears that there
are no such duties in criminal cases, but that they might exist in civil cases. These points have not yet come before the Vanuatu courts, but the suggestion that a
bank should object, presupposes that it would know what is and what is not
relevant, which is unlikely to be the case.

Whilst the exception allowing disclosure under compulsion of law is common
to all sources of state law, it is not in identical terms and the breadth of its shield is
far from clear. In practice, one of the most pertinent questions for a bank in
Vanuatu or other off-shore centre is whether compulsion of law refers only to
domestic law, or whether that compulsion may come from an overseas source.
Under the English common law, in the absence of express agreement to the
contrary, the law which governs the banker-customer contract is the law of the
country in which the customer maintains his or her account. It appears that the
law which compels the disclosure must form part of the system of law which
governs the account. In *FDC Co Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank NA* it was held

---

71 *Commr for Railways (NSW) v Small*, (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564; *Dewley v Dewley*, [1971] 1
NSWLR 264; *Lane v Registrar of Supreme Court (NSW)* (1981) 148 CLR 245.
72 *Barclays Bank plc v Taylor* [1989] 3 All ER 563 (CA); *Citibank Ltd v FCT* (1988) 83 ALR 144
at 157.
73 *Robertson v Canadian Imperial Bank* [1995] 1 All ER 824 (CA).
74 See, eg, *Joachimson* [1921] 3 KB 110.
HKL R 277.
76 Ibid.
that this exception did not include an order directed to the bank by a foreign court. Huggins VP stated that, 'such a construction was never within the contemplation of the judges in Tournier's Case and ... a term so construed would not be reasonable.'

This would also appear to be the case under the legislative provisions protecting secrecy. In the case of the Trust Companies Act, the compulsion of law exception is expressly restricted to cases when disclosure is lawfully required 'by any court of competent jurisdiction within Vanuatu or under the provision of any law in force in Vanuatu'. This makes it clear the compellability is referable to Vanuatu laws only. The Companies Act is equally clear regarding court orders, permitting disclosure only 'when lawfully required ... by any court of competent jurisdiction within Vanuatu'. However the subsection continues 'or under the provisions of any law', thus leaving the question of the effect of an overseas statute more open for argument. The International Companies Act ('ICA') refers only to disclosure required by a 'court of competent jurisdiction'. Thus, it is necessary to look to the courts for guidance as to the extent of the exception under the common law.

In Re Letters Rogatory an order had been made by the Senior Magistrate, on an ex parte application by the Public Prosecutor, allowing evidence of officers of a Vanuatu bank to be taken in Vanuatu, for the purpose of a case under the foreign exchange control regulations in Australia. On an application to the Supreme Court to set aside the order, Cooke CJ took into account the fact that the offence in respect of which the evidence was sought did not apply in Vanuatu. His Honour adopted the following words in the judgment of Knowles CJ in Re Nassau and Trust C Ltd, quoting extensively from a speech by DM Fleming, a former Minister of Finance in the Federal Government of Canada, which he described as 'masterly':

Call it what you will, the Bahamas is a 'tax haven' or an 'offshore financial centre'...

What has brought the financial community to the Bahamas? What has attracted such

78 Section 9.
79 Section 9(1).
80 [Cap 191] (Vanuatu) s 381(3).
81 Ibid.
83 (1977) 1 Bahamas Law Reports 1, 4-5.
a galaxy of banks and trust companies to Nassau? I would answer that there are five factors involved:

(a) The first is undoubtedly the tax structure of the country.

(b) The second is confidence.

(c) Third, the secrecy attached to relations and transactions between the financial institutions and their clients has been another essential factor in attracting financial business here. The statute law of this country, superimposed upon the wisdom of the English Common Law, has strengthened the inviolability of secrecy and confidentiality of this sphere ... any weakening of this guarantee would be harmful to the interest of the Bahamas, any strengthening of it would be reassuring.

... The secrecy provision is one of the pillars of this part of our economic structure, the destruction of which would lead to the collapse of the whole structure which it supports.’

[the other two factors discussed in the speech are not relevant here].

On this basis the Supreme Court set aside the Order.

Similarly, in *Re Westpac Banking Corporation*, the Supreme Court of Vanuatu held, in a case where the bank applied for clarification of its duty to comply with an order from the Family Court of Australia to supply details of a customer's account, that the law compelling disclosure must be a law effective in Vanuatu.\(^84\) From this it seems clear that the Vanuatu courts will not compel disclosure by a bank on the basis of a law which is not part of the law in Vanuatu. By analogy and by reference to Australian case law,\(^85\) it would seem that a foreign law, which prohibits disclosure and purports to have extra-territorial effect, cannot be used as a shield to avoid a duty to disclose.

One question which has not been discussed by the Vanuatu courts, or it would seem any other court, is whether the compulsion of law may arise from a customary law. Given the banking context in which the common law duty and exceptions evolved, it seems unlikely that customary laws would impose any duties or limits in this sphere, or that this question would arise in practice.

\(^{84}\) *Re Westpac Banking Corporation* [1992] VUSC 7 (Vanuatu) online: <www.paclii.org>.

\(^{85}\) *ANZ v Konza*, [2012] FCA 196.


C Statutes Compelling Disclosure

As explained earlier in this section, the common law duty of confidentiality is undoubtedly overridden by a Vanuatu statute compelling disclosure. Further, the statutory duty of confidentiality has been made subject to such Acts. In countries other than tax-havens, the most important instance of a statutory power to compel disclosure is under income tax legislation. For example, in Australia, under the Income Tax Assessment Act\(^{86}\) an officer authorised by the Commissioner of Taxation may obtain certain records and documents.\(^{87}\) In 2012, the Federal Court ruled that ANZ Bank had to comply with a notice from the Commissioner to supply information stored in Australia about bank accounts of its Vanuatu subsidiary's customers who had a link to Australia, such as an Australian address.\(^{88}\) This decision was upheld by the Full Federal Court in Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited v Konza,\(^{89}\) apart from in relation to the validity of one of two notices served on the bank by the Australian Taxation Office to provide information, which was held to be invalid for uncertainty. In particular, the notice referred to 'officer' or 'officers' of the customer, who were not readily identifiable by the bank. That uncertainty was held to have so infected the notice that the invalidity could not be cured by severance of the offending parts.

There are also broad powers to compel disclosure under corporations\(^{90}\) and securities\(^{91}\) legislation. Other important encroachments on the contractual duty of confidentiality come from trade practices and consumer protection laws.\(^{92}\) More

---

\(^{86}\) *Income Tax Assessment Act 1936* (Cth).

\(^{87}\) Ibid ss 263 and 264.

\(^{88}\) ANZ v Konza, [2012] FCA 196.

\(^{89}\) [2012] FCAFC 127.

\(^{90}\) *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth).

\(^{91}\) *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (Cth).

recently, privacy legislation\textsuperscript{93} and anti-terrorism and legislation dealing with serious crime\textsuperscript{94} have added further powers to demand disclosure.

In Vanuatu, the desire to maintain a safe haven for off-shore investment obviously influences government policy. Accordingly, legislation compelling disclosure is very limited. There is no income tax, and hence no income tax legislation. Nor is there a trade practices Act. However, Vanuatu has ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism\textsuperscript{95} and has as a consequence had to fulfil its obligation to adopt regulations imposing on financial institutions the obligation to report unusual transactions.\textsuperscript{96} Such legislation includes the \textit{Financial Transactions Reporting Act}\textsuperscript{97} which compels financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, which may be relevant to serious crimes or terrorism,\textsuperscript{98} and the \textit{Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime Act}\textsuperscript{99} which compels financial institutions to report the existence of any property owned by an entity linked with terrorism\textsuperscript{100} or any dealing suspected of being related to a terrorist act.\textsuperscript{101}

\section*{D Interests of the Bank}

The extent of this exception to the duty of confidentially has not been discussed in Vanuatu. At common law it clearly extends to circumstances where the bank is suing the customer and reveals information to substantiate its claim. A question of some importance, given that, as discussed above, the compulsion of law exception is restricted to domestic law, is whether a bank can rely on its own interests as

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Privacy Act 1988} (Cth) s 18N(1)(h), permits disclosure of personal info contained in a report relating to creditworthiness where the credit provider believes, on reasonable grounds, that the individual has committed a serious credit infringement and given to another credit provider or a law enforcement authority.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006} (Cth); \textit{Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990} (NSW) ss 51 and 52. Section 51(1) lists a highly qualified and conditional set of circumstances in which a financial institution ‘may’ give certain information to the New South Wales Drug Crime Commission. See also, eg, \textit{Criminal Proceeds Confiscation Act 2002} (Qld) s 249.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Act} [Cap 279] (Vanuatu).


\textsuperscript{97} [Cap 268] (Vanuatu), passed in 2000.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid s 5.

\textsuperscript{99} [Cap 313] (Vanuatu), passed in 2005.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid s 26(1).

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid s 26(4).
\end{flushleft}
reason for disclosing information required by a foreign subpoena. In X AG v A Bank,\textsuperscript{102} it was held that it cannot. However, in that case it was accepted that the duty in Tournier's Case\textsuperscript{103} would constitute a defence to a charge of contempt in the foreign court.

This exception may be particularly pertinent to Vanuatu banks that are subsidiaries of off-shore companies. It is frequent practice for banks in Vanuatu and many other tax-havens to send customer information electronically to the off-shore holding company. To protect confidentiality, the information is sent in a form which does not identify the account holder by name. This is imperative given the views of the court in Bank of Tokyo v Karoon,\textsuperscript{104} where information was passed by a bank to its subsidiary. In that case, the own interest defence was rejected.\textsuperscript{105} In the light of the recent case of ANZ v Konza,\textsuperscript{106} subsidiaries of Australian banks in off-shore centres will also have to consider masking other information, such as Australian addresses, in records sent to Australia. The question also arises whether a foreign bank can be compelled by a government authority in its own country to obtain the information necessary to identify account holders from a subsidiary in an off-shore tax haven, and to reveal the account information to a government authority. A conflict of laws problem arises if the country in which the information is held has domestic laws prohibiting a bank from sharing customer information (whether with a parent company or other third party) unless strict conditions are met, including compliance with domestic confidentiality laws. This question was not decided in ANZ v Konza.\textsuperscript{107} In the absence of a statutory duty of confidentiality applying to the recipient of information outside Vanuatu, whether such third party is bound is largely a matter of contract law. The doctrine of privity is not governed by statute in Vanuatu. Under the common law, in the absence of assignment, a trust or agency relationship, a third party would not be bound in law. However, a third party recipient might be bound in equity by a duty of confidence.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{102}[1983] 2 All ER 464.
\textsuperscript{103}[1924] 1 KB 461.
\textsuperscript{104}[1987] AC 45 (CA).
\textsuperscript{105}See also Bhogal v Punjab National Bank, [1988] 2 All ER 296.
\textsuperscript{107}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108}Seager Ltd v Copydex Ltd (No 1), [1967] 1 WLR 923, 931.
E Consent of the Customer

The fourth of the exceptions in Tournier's Case\(^{109}\) permits disclosure where the customer has given implied or express consent. Only the Trust Companies Act specifically provides that authorisation of the customer justifies disclosure, and it must be express,\(^{110}\) rather than express or implied as under common law.\(^{111}\) However, the legislative provisions allowing disclosure for the purposes of the exercise of functions under the Act in question or where disclosure is necessary for the carrying on of business of the company, and many cases where express authorisation has been given would no doubt fall within these exceptions. In any event, such express consent would be likely to amount to a waiver, even though not also stated as an exception in the Acts.

F Duty to the Public

The duty to the public is the most poorly defined of the exceptions.\(^{112}\) In Tournier's Case, danger to the State seems to have been viewed as within this category.\(^{113}\) A clear example is where the customer's dealings indicate trading with the enemy in war time. Another example would be where disclosure is required by the police to assist in the investigation of a serious criminal offence which they reasonably suspected to have been committed. In Initial Services Ltd v Putterill,\(^{114}\) Denning LJ stated that,

> The exception should extend to crimes, frauds and misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in contemplation, provided always – and this is essential – that the disclosure is justified in the public interest.

Given the lack of authority, a bank would be unwise to rely on this exception in all but clear cut cases.

III EQUITABLE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY

As noted above, Vanuatu inherited the doctrine of equity, alongside the common law. Equity imposed a duty of confidentiality on banks, and this may be important in cases where no contract exists. An example is where information has

---

109 [1924] 1 KB 461.
110 Section 9.
111 Tournier's Case [1924] 1 KB 461.
112 Allan Tyree, Banking Law in Australia, 6\(^{th}\) ed (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) [5.18].
been supplied by a prospective customer, who may be under the impression that such information is confidential. Another example of the circumstances in which an equitable duty might arise can be seen in the recent English case of Primary Group (UK) Ltd v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc. The bank in that case had disclosed information about its first customer (the claimant) to a second customer (the second defendant). The two customers were business competitors. The disclosure was made without the consent of the claimant, in order for the second defendant to advise the bank about the claimant's financial position. It was contended that the second defendant had acted in breach of its equitable duty of confidence by reading the report containing the information and using it to advise the bank, as a reasonable person standing in the position of the second defendant would have appreciated that the bank was not entitled to disclose the information, or at least, would have made inquiries of the claimant. The High Court held that the second defendant was not in breach of its duty as it was entitled to assume that the bank would act consistently with its duty of confidentiality, particularly when the purpose of the disclosure was to enable the second defendant to advise the bank.

It may also be important because the contractual duty may be amended by contract, that is, it may be qualified or abrogated by consent. The duty of confidence arises where confidential information is imparted by the customer in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. However, it is unclear exactly when the circumstances will import an obligation of confidence. To decide the question an objective test is taken.

**IV STATUTORY DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY**

To date, there is no privacy legislation in Vanuatu. In a number of other Commonwealth countries, such legislation regulates rights of access to personal information, and organisations must not engage in any practice which breaches the applicable privacy code. It is not entirely clear how privacy legislation and codes interact with the common law duty of confidentiality. However, that question is, as yet, academic in the context of Vanuatu. In some cases, a statutory

---

115 A-G (UK) v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1988] 3 WLR 776, 806.
116 [2014] EWHC 1082 (Ch).
117 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41.
118 Ibid.
119 See, eg, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), applying to private sector organisations from 21 December 2001.
120 In Australia, this is the National Privacy Principles ('NPP'): Privacy Act 1988 sch 3.
121 Tyree, supra n 112, 190.
obligation of secrecy has been imposed in favour of certain types of companies established in Vanuatu. These statutes are framed in broad terms to prohibit disclosure by 'any person', but appear to be aimed primarily at banks and trust companies. They differ from the common law duty in that they impose criminal sanctions on unauthorised disclosure of banking information. The statutory obligation of secrecy arises where the customer is a company within the terms of the ICA, or established under the Trust Companies Act. In limited circumstances, a duty of secrecy also arises under the Companies Act. These provisions will now be discussed in more detail.

A ICA

The ICA contains a very broad provision preventing 'any person' from divulging certain 'information concerning or respecting' an international company, being a private company which does not carry on business in Vanuatu. Confidential information includes 'any of the business, financial or other affairs or transactions of the company'. The term 'person' is not defined, but 'person resident in Vanuatu' is defined and the definition makes it clear that a person includes a company. In any event, 'person' is defined by the Interpretation Act to include, 'any statutory body, company or association or body of persons corporate or unincorporate'. Inducing or attempting to induce other persons to divulge such information is also prohibited. The penalty for breaching these provisions is a fine of up to US$100,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years.

Like the common law, the statutory duties of confidentiality are subject to exceptions. Under the ICA disclosure is permitted where it is required,

- by a court of competent jurisdiction;
- for the purposes of the administration of the Act; and
- for the carrying on of the business of the company in Vanuatu or elsewhere.

---

122 [Cap 222] (Vanuatu) s 125.
123 Section 9.
124 Section 381.
125 ICA s 1.
126 [Cap 132] (Vanuatu) Sch.
127 Ibid s 125(1).
128 Ibid s 125(2).
129 Ibid s 125(1).
'Court of competent jurisdiction' is not defined. However, as discussed above, under the common law, the Supreme Court of Vanuatu has held that the court order must be one effective within the jurisdiction.\(^{130}\)

Section 125 was briefly examined in *Barrett v McCormack*.\(^{131}\) In that case, the appellants were partners in a Vanuatu accounting firm. They had incorporated a company in Vanuatu for a client and were signatories to that company’s bank accounts. The respondent had paid money into the account to acquire shares in a separate company, which turned out to be a scam. The Court of Appeal upheld the Supreme Court’s decision that the appellants had knowingly assisted in dishonest and fraudulent activity as trustees and de facto directors,\(^{132}\) in respect of shares purchased with the respondent’s funds. The appellants claimed a defence of confidentiality, relying on the *Companies Act* and the ICA. They submitted that in a tax haven such as Vanuatu, where secrecy laws were imposed, it was not business practice to undertake an investigation as to the source of shares to be bought. In response to this argument, the Court briefly discussed the aim and effect of s 125, stating:\(^{133}\)

The provisions provide a guarantee against disclosure of the specified information about the affairs of companies and the transactions of companies, but the legislation assumes that those affairs and transactions will be carried on in accordance with the general law of the Republic of Vanuatu. It is noted that s 125 excludes from the secrecy requirement that it imposes information that is 'for the carrying on of the business of the company.'

**B Trust Companies Act**

The *Trust Companies Act* imposes a duty of confidentiality, but not in such broad terms at the ICA. It provides that 'no person shall … disclose to any other person any information entrusted to him in confidence, or acquired by him, in his capacity or in the course of his duties as public officer, employee, agent, liquidator, receiver or in a professional or similar fiduciary relationship, respecting the affairs of any trust company whatsoever',\(^{134}\) As with the ICA, the term 'person' is not defined, but the definition in the *Interpretation Act* set out above would apply. It seems clear that the duty of confidentiality would extend to a bank, as the

\[^{130}\text{Re Westpac Banking Corporation [1992] VUSC 7 (Vanuatu) online: <www.paclii.org>}.\]

\[^{131}\text{[1999] VUCA 11 (Vanuatu) online: <www.paclii.org>}.\]

\[^{132}\text{The claim was essentially under Barnes v Addy (1874), LR 9 CH App 244.}\]

\[^{133}\text{Barrett v McCormack [1999] VUCA 11, 36-37 (Vanuatu) online: <www.paclii.org>}.\]

\[^{134}\text{Trust Companies Act s 9.}\]
customers' information is entrusted to it in 'a professional or similar fiduciary relationship'. The penalty for breaching these provisions is much less than under the ICA, being VT 100,000 (about US$1,100) and or imprisonment for up to six months.\textsuperscript{135}

As under the ICA, there are exceptions. Disclosure under the \textit{Trust Companies Act} may be made:

- when lawfully required by any court of competent jurisdiction within Vanuatu or under the provisions of any law in force in Vanuatu;
- under express authorisation by the trust company concerned; or
- in the case of any public officer, for the purpose of the performance of duties or the exercise of functions under the Act.\textsuperscript{136}

To date, the courts in Vanuatu do not appear to have been called on to discuss this provision. However, it is of interest that, unlike the ICA, the \textit{Trust Companies Act} restricts the compulsion of law exception to orders of courts within Vanuatu. It follows that the order of an overseas court will not justify disclosure on the basis of compulsion of law.

\textbf{C Companies Act}

The \textit{Companies Act}\textsuperscript{137} imposes a much more limited duty of secrecy, and only in favour of exempted companies,\textsuperscript{138} being companies that carry on business outside Vanuatu.\textsuperscript{139} Section 381 states that 'no person shall disclose to any other person or body any information acquired by him respecting the affairs of any, exempted company whatsoever in the course of the administration of this Act, or any information furnished to the Minister (in relation to an application to form an exempted company)'. The section is clearly aimed at preventing disclosure of information obtained by persons carrying out functions under the Act, including officers in the Ministry dealing with applications for registration.\textsuperscript{140} This interpretation is supported by the fact that the section goes on to say that it extends

\begin{itemize}
  \item 135 Ibid s 9(2).
  \item 136 Ibid s 9.
  \item 137 Section 376.
  \item 138 Exempted companies are essentially those which carry on business or pursue their objects outside Vanuatu: \textit{Companies Act} s 376.
  \item 139 Ibid s 381.
  \item 140 Ibid s 381(1).
\end{itemize}
to persons acting 'while employed in any official capacity or after he has ceased to be so employed'. 141

As is the case with the other two Acts, there are exceptions, and disclosure may be made:

- for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his functions under this Act;
- when lawfully required by any court of competent jurisdiction within Vanuatu or under the provisions of any law; or
- for the purpose of audit of government accounts.

Unlike the ICA, but in keeping with the Trust Companies Act, the compulsion of law exception is limited to orders of a Vanuatu court. 142

Disclosure may also be made by a court appointed liquidator at the written request of a public officer in any country of relevant information respecting the affairs of a company which is the subject of winding-up proceedings. The consent of the Attorney General is required. 143

Auditors of an exempted company are also prohibited from disclosing to any other person any information respecting the affairs of an exempted company which he or she acquires while acting in the capacity of the company’s auditor. In addition to the normal exceptions, where disclosure is required by a court of competent jurisdiction, an auditor may disclose information in his or her report to the members or in order to fulfil other functions and duties under the Act. 144

A further provision to safeguard confidentiality of exempted companies is made in respect of evidence admitted in court proceedings. Where such evidence would otherwise result in the public disclosure of information about the company's affairs the court must direct that the evidence be heard in camera and must order that the relevant part of the proceedings not be made publically available. 145

A penalty of up to VT 1,000,000 (about US$11,500) and/or imprisonment for up to five years may be imposed for breaching this duty.

141 Ibid s 381(3).
142 Ibid s 381(3).
143 Ibid s 381(3), proviso.
144 Ibid s 381(4).
145 Companies Act s 381(5).
In addition to the secrecy relating to an exempt company, the *Companies Act* contains another provision protecting a bank's customer from disclosure of information. The Act empowers the relevant Minister to appoint inspectors to investigate ownership of a company or to require any interested person or any legal representative or agent, to provide information as to persons interested in shares or debentures of the company. Section 181(b) exempts a company's bankers from the duty of disclosure to the Minister or an inspector in respect of any information as to the affairs of any of their customers other than the company.

The courts have only considered these provisions briefly in *Barrett v McCormack,* which is discussed above.

### V RATIONALE FOR RETAINING THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY

In assessing the current position and considering the need for reform of the law relating to a banker's duty of confidentiality to its customer, it is necessary to consider the rationale for this duty. Recognition of the duty of confidentiality follows from the historical banker and customer relationship, founded on the custom and usages of bankers. There are a variety of more specific reasons for the existence of the duty. In *Tournier's Case* the court suggested that the duty was required to protect the customer's credit. Certainly, the bank's duty of confidentiality protects the customer from 'unwarranted attempts by outsiders to enquire into his affairs'. The disclosure of a customer's financial affairs to 'the wrong person or at the wrong time, could do the customer harm', and in the past has resulted in awards of damages against banks.

---

146 Ibid s 178.
147 Ibid s 179.
150 *Tournier's Case* [1924] 1 KB 461, 474.
152 *G S George Consultants and Investments Pty Ltd v Datasys Pty Ltd* (1988), (3) SA 726 (W) 726, 736.
From a legal perspective, it has been said that although the banker/customer relationship is that of debtor and creditor, in many instances the bank acts as an agent. An agent has historically been viewed as in a position of trust in relation the principal’s interests. This position of trust carries with it a duty of confidentiality by the agent to its principal with regard to information obtained during the agency.

From a commercial perspective an implied term of confidentiality has been justified on the basis of business efficacy. Confidentiality is required in order for the customer to retain confidence in the bank. The duty ensures that the bank can rely on their customer giving them all the detailed knowledge that the bank requires in order to deal with their affairs efficiently. In other words, the law encourages the client to engage in full and frank disclosure in relation to their finances, which is beneficial to the bank's business. Further, to abolish this duty could result in a loss of customer confidence. The recent global financial crisis provides a graphic example of what can happen when confidence in the banking system is lost and nervous investors demand their money. Importantly, in small offshore jurisdictions such as Vanuatu, the financial services sector is an important constituent of economic development. More recently the duty of confidentiality has been justified on the basis of necessity. Banks often have access to information about their customers' businesses which their customers do not wish to reveal to competitors. In Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, damages were

154 Foley v Hill (1848), 9 ER 1002, 1005; Laing v Bank of New South Wales (1952), 54 SR (NSW) 41; Bank of New South Wales v Laing (1953), 54 SR (NSW) 76; Croton v The Queen (1967) 117 CLR 326; Grant v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 503.

155 For example, a bank acts as the customer's agent when collecting cheques: see Tyree, supra n 112, 43.

156 Parry Jones v Law Society [1969] 1 Ch 1, 9; Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All ER 378; Ellinger, Lomnicka & Hooley, supra n 151, 165.

157 Joachimson [1921] 3 KB 110.

158 Ellinger, Lomnicka & Hooley, supra n 151, 167.

159 Ibid 165.

160 Ibid. See also Review Committee on Banking Services Law (UK), Banking Services: Law and Practice Report (London: HMSO, 1989) [5.26].


163 G S George Consultants and Investments Pty Ltd v Datasyx Pty Ltd (1988), (3) SA 726 (W) 726, 736.

awarded for the loss of profit arising from disclosure by the bank to its customer's trading partner in breach of its duty of confidentiality.

On the other hand, there are some arguments against the continuing existence of the duty, at least in its present form. As discussed above, the duty can sometimes clash with the duty to the public. Whilst, disclosure in the public interest is an exception to the duty of confidentiality the boundaries of this exception are particularly obscure. This creates a situation of uncertainty, particularly in cross-jurisdictional requests of disclosure, resulting in costly litigation.\(^\text{165}\)

The other argument against the current law is that confidentiality may encourage a culture of secrecy and lower the standard of honesty in the management of companies. Although legislation such as the ICA, Trust Companies Act, and Companies Act in Vanuatu, is not intended to do this, as was discussed in Barrett v McCormack,\(^\text{166}\) the statutory duties may discourage proper investigation into business practice.

Finally, there is the argument that confidentiality and secrecy is a barrier to combating transnational crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering and human trafficking.\(^\text{167}\)

VI CONCLUSION

The current position in Vanuatu and in most other common law countries is that a duty of confidentiality is implied into a contract between banks and their customers. This duty and the exceptions are outlined in Tournier's Case,\(^\text{168}\) which has been applied in most common law countries, including Vanuatu\(^\text{169}\) and Australia.\(^\text{170}\) In Vanuatu, the common law is bolstered by statutory obligations of secrecy applying in favour of certain companies. However, there is no privacy legislation in force, as there is in some other parts of the Commonwealth.

Exceptions to the duty, both at common law and under statute, provide for disclosure in limited circumstances, in particular where required by law, ensuring a


\(^{166}\) [1999] VUCA 11 (Vanuatu) online: <www.paclii.org>.

\(^{167}\) Chaikin, supra n 55, 266.

\(^{168}\) [1924] 1 KB 461.

\(^{169}\) Supra n 51.

\(^{170}\) Smorgon v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1976) 134 CLR 475.
bank is not held liable for disclosure where it is legally obliged to disclose information. In Vanuatu, this legal obligation must stem from Vanuatu law. However, other aspects of the duty and the exceptions to it are unclear. In some countries, considerable inroads have been made into the duty by legislation empowering various authorities to demand the release of a customer's information by the bank. To date, such legislation is fairly limited in Vanuatu. In particular, there is no income tax or trade practices legislation compelling disclosure.

The courts in Vanuatu have taken a robust stance on protection of confidential information. They have refused to compel disclosure demanded by overseas authorises under foreign legislation. However, beyond accepting the existence and general inviolability of the duty of confidentiality, the courts have not taken the opportunity to expand on its precise boundaries, leaving some aspects of its scope unclear. There is an urgent need to define the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality in order to instil some certainty in this area of law. Until this is done, banks are at risk when disclosing confidential information and may be forced to pursue costly litigation to protect themselves. From the customers' perspective, they are at risk of losing their right to privacy regarding their financial affairs. Loss of confidence in banks may ensue, with a consequent risk to the off-shore banking sector in countries such as Vanuatu.
