SPORT MEGA-EVENTS AND A LEGACY OF INCREASED SPORT PARTICIPATION:
AN OLYMPIC PROMISE OR AN OLYMPIC DREAM?

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Leeds Metropolitan University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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“Unless someone like you cares an awful lot, nothing is going to get better. It's not”.
Dr Seuss (1971), from The Lorax

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Finally to thank my family and friends for just being there; showing an interest in my work and helping in so many ways from dropping in for coffee to proof reading or reassurance that one day I would get to play golf again. Mention must go to two canine supporters, Louis and Dixie, who were fastidious in ensuring that I kept a healthy work-walk balance!
Abstract

This study uses the case of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (London 2012 Games) to investigate the contested notion of the potential for a sport mega-event to leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation in a host country.

A legacy for sport and particularly one of increased mass participation is frequently cited by sport mega-event organisers and supporters (Weed et al, 2009; Veal et al, in press). There is, however, little empirically based research evidence to support the claims (Weed et al, 2009; McCartney et al, 2010). The London 2012 Games make an interesting study as it the first time that a host country has made explicit the aim of a legacy of increased mass sport participation (Veal et al, in press).

The study is qualitative in nature and uses a ‘realist’ approach drawing on the basis of realist evaluation: context + mechanism = outcome (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Emphasis is placed on the study of process; the proposed mechanisms to generate the outcome of increased mass sport participation are investigated to evaluate their potential to succeed based on the relationship with the wider political, economic and social contexts in which they are set.

The originality of the study came from an ex ante approach rather than the more traditional ex post evaluation of event legacy (O’Chalip and Brien, 2007). The benefit of an ex ante approach is that it facilitates immediacy in the investigation of strategies and tactics being used to generate outcomes. O’Chalip and Brien (2007) suggest that this approach which studies the ‘leveraging’ of legacy is needed to further understand what works and what doesn’t, and therefore be of more value to future event organisers.
The primary data was generated through semi-structured interviews with sport policy makers and both senior management and those delivering on the ground in the National Governing Bodies (NGBs). The focus on NGBs is because they were designated as ‘central’ to the delivery of the sport participation legacy (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a). The study also uses secondary sources of data through the analysis of relevant documentation.

The analysis of data examines the logic associated with the presumed relationship between a sport mega-event and increased mass sport participation. Questions are asked of why a presumed consequent relationship has developed between sport mega–events and increased sport participation and how it is presumed the change mechanisms will effectively work.

The findings reveal that for the London 2012 Games, the contexts in which the proposed mechanisms are set are not conducive to producing the desired outcome of increased mass sport participation. It is likened to wanting to create an explosion with gunpowder and a spark in a damp environment. It is also shown that people’s expectations of the Games’ benefits may be unduly influenced by the event’s mythopoetic nature (Coalter, 2007); an aura that stems from both the event’s historical background and the mythos of the power of sport.

This critical analysis is converted into transferable knowledge to benefit other events. As such, the study emphasises that attention has to be given to how legacy will be delivered and what needs to be in place for the delivery context to support the proposed mechanisms. This has to involve giving as much attention to planning for legacy as to the event itself, and for legacy ‘promises’ to be made with a more realistic view of what support can be given to realizing the ‘promise’ through the country’s existing sport development framework.
Student's declaration

I confirm that the thesis is my own work; and that all published or other sources of material consulted have been acknowledged in notes to the text or the bibliography.

I confirm that the thesis has not been submitted for a comparable academic award.

Katharine Helen Hughes
January 2013
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Preface

My interest in this area of research developed (I suggest unknowingly at the time), from an early age when I had aspirations to match the gymnastic performances of Olga Korbett having watched her on television competing at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. Having little talent when it came to sprinting, jumping or poise was to thwart my ambitions and I found myself more drawn to ball games where good stamina, hand–eye coordination and tactical awareness were to facilitate my progress. That I was inspired by the athletic performances of Korbett is an example of the anecdotal evidence that runs through this research; the concept that elite sport can inspire increased sport participation at what is termed the ‘mass’, ‘grass roots’ or ‘community’ level. That I did not succeed in following through my ambitions is an understandable end result. I suggest it was a lack of specific abilities required to be an elite gymnast, to this could be added a whole range of issues such as lack of dedication to one sport, lack of facilities, lack of interest amongst family and friends in gymnastics and simply the wrong body shape. However there are those, and Lord Coe who led the successful bid for the Olympic Games of the XXX Olympiad to be held in London is one of the most immutable, who are firmly of the opinion that the process works. Coe, in reflecting on his own experiences following the performance of John Sherwood at the 1968 Olympics, used the argument in a stirring speech to support London’s bid to the IOC bid committee and has continued to reiterate his point of view.

I grew up taking part in as much sport as possible and went on to train as a PE Teacher hoping that I could help others gain the benefits from sport which I had enjoyed. Maturity taught me that the benefits of sport can be experienced in many ways, not always requiring 100% in commitment and for some people sport could actually bring out their less desirable characteristics. However, I still believed that overall sport was ‘good’ and my working career reflects a determination to use sport as a power for ‘good’.
The relationship between sport mega-events and sport participation was raised again through my involvement with Sport England where I led the sports development programme for the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester and later I co-managed the Euro 2005 legacy programme linked to the UEFA 2005 Women’s Championships. Research (Brown, 2004) has shown that the 2002 Commonwealth Games did not produce any significant increases in sports participation in the NW of England. Staging the 2002 Commonwealth Games did however act as the catalyst for the Manchester Events strategy and through hosting a range of international sport events, there is evidence of benefits being brought to the region including increased community sport participation (Abbas, 2009). Following the UEFA 2005 Women’s Championships, research by Bell (2010), using the data from the Sport England Active People Survey, does indicate a rise in interest in women playing the small-sided game of football since the first Active People survey in 2005-6. The FA also ran a promotional programme ‘Now Go Play’ in the immediate months after Euro 2005 and, having been involved in this programme, I am aware of record crowds attending matches in the FA Women’s Premier League. However, as the Active People survey did not start until 2005-6 and the FA did not carry out any research on pre and post event participation, it is not possible to make any definite conclusions as to the impact of Euro 2005. My reflections would be that lessons learned from 2002, enabled my colleague, Lesley Giddins and me to build a more sustainable programme in 2005 than for 2002. In addition, it was considerably easier to work with a smaller size of event, where there were fewer inflated egos and less complexity of bureaucracy to contend with and more potential to engage with the event participants and gain their involvement in the legacy programme.

The mixed messages from my experiences did leave me surprised to find that a legacy of increased mass sport participation was central to the London 2012 Games bid. There appeared to be little consideration given to the sport participation legacy experiences of the Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games nor any supporting strategy given that was
going to make London any different from any other sport mega-event in terms of its potential to have an impact on mass sports participation. By this stage, I had started following up on some of the research from events such as the 2000 Sydney and 2004 Athens Olympics. There was little evidence to support the notion of a positive association between a sport mega-event and mass sport participation but it still remained firmly set in the discourse of event supporters and politicians in potential host countries. The question was there to be answered, why? Why is the argument made for the association between event and increased participation when there is little evidence to support it? Why is a simple causal link made when there are so many other potential influences on why people do or do not take part in sport? Is hosting a sport mega-event a good platform for community sports development? These and other questions circled in my head while, at the same time, both Lesley and I were frequently asked to speak about developing legacy in association with events. In 2008, an opportunity arose to respond to a comment made by Horne and Manzenreiter (2006,p.15), who suggested that:

rather than simply become cheerleaders for them, boosters rather than analysts, academics need to reflect critically on the effects, both economic and beyond economic impacts, that sports mega-events have.

I successfully applied for a scholarship at Leeds Metropolitan University to conduct research in this field of study. This thesis is the product of that research which has been a fascinating journey. At times the academic nature of the challenge has felt beyond my abilities. What has kept me going has been the challenge of the questions posed to my own experiences and a further understanding of sport through the investigation of the work of others and exploring the results of my research enquiries.
Chapter 1: Context of the study

1.1 Introduction

In July 2012, London will play host to the Olympic Games of the XXX Olympiad (London 2012 Games). Through a network of communications, thousands of spectators will be joined by millions more people across the globe taking part in the world’s largest sporting event. Past experience indicates that over the period of the four weeks a breath-taking drama of passion, excitement, success and tragedy will unfold leaving a wealth of memories for both participants and the audience.

However, sport mega-events are now expected to deliver much more than a limited period of elite sporting competition. Legacy development (and moreover positive legacy) has become a watch word as host cities and international sports organisations look to justify vast sums of public sector investment when there is a whole range of national social issues also demanding financial support (Preuss, 2006; Preuss and Solberg, 2006). The concept of legacy is not a new one, indeed Cashman (1998, p.138) notes, “almost every Olympic city [mega-event], since the Games were revived in 1896, has some form of legacy”. What is new is the planning for legacy and that it has become more of a prospective rather than a retrospective concept (Girginov, 2011).

This thesis uses the case of the London 2012 Games to investigate planning for legacy, specifically a legacy of increased mass sport participation as an outcome of a sport mega-event. A legacy for sport and particularly one of increased participation in sport amongst the host community is frequently cited by sport mega-event organisers and supporters (Weed et al, 2009; Veal et al, in press). Although research in this area is considered to be

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1 The phrase London 2012 Games includes the Paralympic Games. The first Paralympic Games were held in 1948 and from 1960 the Paralympic Games have been a regular feature as a follow-on event to the Olympic Games. In 2001 an agreement was signed between the IOC and International Paralympic Committee (IPC) to secure the practice of ‘one city one bid’. In keeping with the most recent academic literature (e.g. Horne and Whannel, 2012), I use the phrases Olympics and Games in this thesis to refer generally to the phenomenon of the Olympic Games, which more recently has included the Paralympic Games.
limited (Coalter, 2008a; McCartney et al, 2010), the empirical evidence that is available shows little support for the proposal that elite sporting events act as a catalyst for increased grass roots activity in sport (Veal, 2003; Coalter, 2004; 2008a; Murphy and Baumann, 2007; Weed et al, 2009; McCartney et al, 2010; Veal et al, in press).

The London 2012 Games is considered an interesting case to study as it is the first time that a host City has made explicit its intention to leave a legacy of increased sport participation (Weed et al, 2009; Veal et al, in press). London declared its intent during the bidding process (Nations and Regions, n.d.), in the bid itself (BOA, 2004) and as one of five legacy ‘promises’ (DCMS, 2007a).

My study of the planning for legacy is considered unique in its approach as it is conducted during the planning phase and early implementation of legacy plans. O’Brien and Chalip (2007, p.319) note that most event assessments are conducted ex post (as impact assessments) rather than ex ante and suggest that to understand more about how event outcomes are obtained, a “more strategic approach that looks forward to planning how host communities can derive sustainable benefits from sport events” is required. Chalip (2006, pp. 112-113) promotes what he terms the study of ‘event leverage’, the objective of which is to “identify the strategies and tactics that can be implemented prior to and during an event in order to generate particular outcomes”. He continues:

Thus, the outcomes themselves are not important in-and-of themselves (as in impact research), but are pertinent to the degree that they provide information about which particular strategies and tactics have been effective. The ultimate objective is not merely to evaluate what was done, but rather to learn in order to improve future leveraging efforts.
In this study, the formative strategies and tactics of those charged with providing a proposed outcome of increased mass sport participation from the London 2012 Games are analysed. The aim is to provide information on the efficacy of the processes in order to generate knowledge for future event organisers.

1.2 Structure of the thesis

This chapter sets the scene for the study. Having introduced the study to the reader, the chapter initially outlines the specific research aims and objectives of the thesis which includes the research questions that will guide the study.

In the next section of the chapter, there is a discussion on the definitions of legacy and mega-events as used in the literature. The discussion reveals a divergence of views often due to the different meanings attached to words reflecting the influence of different cultures on language.

The attention of the chapter is then turned to the Olympics which are being used as an example of a sport mega-event in this study. A brief history of the Games as the ‘showcase’ event of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Olympic Movement is provided which includes an account of how legacy has become a subject of increased interest to the IOC. This history of the Games also reflects on ‘why bid’: why do countries seemingly value so highly the opportunity to host the Games and are prepared to invest considerable resources to secure the right to host the Games? It is noted that the reasons for bidding have changed over time and that the bids for the Olympic Games of the XXX Olympiad may have marked the start of a new era (Shoval, 2002).

Having come up to date, the next section of the chapter looks specifically at the Games that are the focus of this study: the London 2012 Games. The development of the bid for
the London 2012 Games is outlined which illustrates the importance attached to the
delivery of ‘positive legacies’ and specifically the concept of a sport participation legacy as
a central tenet of the bid. To provide the background to my research into the planning or
leveraging for a legacy of sport participation, there is an overview of the early activity
taken by the UK government in respect of the delivery of the event and the delivery of its
legacy. This section includes the detail of the UK government’s legacy ‘promises’ (DCMS,
2007a) with a particular focus on increased participation in sport as one of three ambitions
within the ‘promise’ to ‘Make the UK a world-leading sport nation’. The ambition to create
a sport participation legacy is seen to act as a catalyst for change in UK sport policy and
to make an impact on the activities on those organisations made central to the delivery of
the sport participation legacy ambitions, principally the National Governing Bodies of Sport
(NGBs).

The chapter concludes by providing the timelines to the research which reiterate the
intended nature of this study as being undertaken ex ante to the event. It is an approach
that looks to provide a prospective rather than retrospective view of legacy considered
important in understanding the efficacy of the processes involved in the ‘leveraging’ of
legacy to the benefit of host communities (Chalip, 2006; O’Brien and Chalip, 2007;
Girginov, 2011).

Chapter 2 - A Review of the Literature: This chapter contains a review of literature
under three headings: the relationship between sport mega-events and legacy; a review of
the development of sport policy in the UK since the mid-20th century and its impact on the
community sport legacy plans and finally a review of the theories of behavioural change
and ‘barriers’ as they have been applied to sport participation.

Chapter 3 - The influence of the ‘mythopoeic’ nature of sport and the Games on
legacy: In investigating why an association has developed between sport mega-events
and the potential of a sport participation legacy, this chapter explores the concept of the
‘mythopoeic’ nature of sport (Coalter, 2007b) and of the Olympics. Many of the people
interviewed as part of this study are seen to bestow on the Olympics an anticipatory aura
of the ‘good’ things the Games will bring but are unable to explain why this is the case or
how it will happen. It is suggested that their sentiments are influenced by the mythopoeic
nature of the Olympics and the philosophy on which it is developed: Olympism.

Chapter 4 – Methodology: This chapter provides a rationale for the chosen research
methods used within this study. Using an approach based on realist evaluation, it provides
an overview of process for each stage of the study. The chapter also includes a section on
reflexivity, where I position myself in the context of the research.

Chapter 5 - The ‘trickle-down’ effect: its impact on the planning for a mass sport
participation legacy: This chapter draws on the framework of realist evaluation to
investigate the thinking of the National Governing Bodies for sport (NGBs) in their
planning to deliver a legacy of increased participation from the London 2012 Games. It is
noted that the NGBs were made ‘central’ to the delivery of the legacy by the UK
government and Sport England. The main mechanism that the NGBs look to benefit from
in the delivery of the outcome of increased participation is seen to be the trickle-down
effect (TDE). The TDE as a mechanism for change is investigated in the various contexts
in which it is deployed to assess its potential to be successful. The selection of the TDE as
a mechanism by the NGBs is seen to be influenced by their history and traditional ways of
working. It is shown that in the overall context of the London 2012 Games, the TDE has a
limited capacity for success in the ambition to leave a Games’ legacy of more people
doing more sport.
Chapter 6 - A Games of two halves? Planning to stage the London 2012 Games and planning for its legacy. In this chapter, an analysis is made of the difference between planning to stage the London 2012 Games and planning to deliver a ‘promised’ legacy of increased sport participation. The comparison reflects noticeable differences in the timing and resources dedicated to each set of plans. Planning to deliver the Games is shown to reflect immediacy of action and driven by bespoke organisations which are well resourced. The plans are also seen to have the protection of a legal contract with the IOC. By way of contrast, the plans to deliver the sport participation legacy were slow to materialise, made reliant on adaptation of existing resource and driven by the activities of 48 individual organisations operating in a competitive environment. The legacy plans are not protected by a legal contract with the IOC.

Finally the mechanisms identified to deliver the legacy plans are assessed as to whether they are ‘fit for purpose’ given the contexts in which they operate. The conclusion is made that in the case of the London 2012 Games, the relationship between mechanism and context is unlikely to provide a successful outcome.

Chapter 7 – Final Conclusions: This chapter brings together the study, reviewing the key findings and assessing the choice of methodology. Some suggestions on directions for future research are provided before a final conclusion addressing the questions posed on p.23.
1.3 Research aims and questions

The opportunities that hosting the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games would bring to the whole of the United Kingdom were a critical factor in the decision to bid for the Games (Allen, n.d.). In the document *Backing the Bid* (Nations and Regions group, n.d.), ten reasons are given for why the United Kingdom’s population should support the bid for the London 2012 Games. The economic benefits are outlined: the boost to investment; new jobs; new business opportunities and increased tourism. There is also considerable attention paid to the social legacy such as improved health through increased participation in sport, inspiration to a generation of young people to make sport central in their lives, delivering inspirational educational programmes, the distribution of sports facilities to clubs and charities after the Games and opportunities to be a volunteer as part of the Olympic experience.

The aim of this research is to critically evaluate the process of planning for one aspect of social legacy that was a central tenet of the bid for the London 2012 Games: an increase in mass sport participation (BOA, 2004; London 2012, 2004). It sets out to add to the limited empirical research on sport mega-events and social legacy (Coalter, 2008a; McCartney et al, 2010) and is considered unique in that it looks at the planning for event legacy whereas most studies are conducted as a retrospective evaluation of the legacy outcomes (O’Brien and Chalip, 2007; Weed et al, 2009). As previously noted, O’Brien and Chalip, (2007, p113) highlight the fact that, to “improve future leveraging efforts”, more research needs to be conducted ‘ex ante’ to investigate the strategies through which it is planned to obtain outcomes.
To assist in achieving the aim of the research, four questions and one sub-question were established:

1: How and why has the association between sport mega-events and social legacy, specifically a legacy of increased mass sport participation, evolved?

Sub question: How has this made an impact on the construction of the proposed sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games and with what consequences?

2: What are the proposed change mechanisms that will deliver the sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games?

3: How do the social, economic and political contexts in which these change mechanisms are activated make an impact on the working of the mechanism?

4: What knowledge can this study provide that can be transferred to the organisers of future sport mega-events who aspire to leave a legacy of increased sport participation?

1.4 Defining mega-events and legacy

1.4.1 Mega-events

In the consultation paper for Event Wales: A Major Events Strategy For Wales 2010-2020 (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010), it was noted that there did not appear to be a single definition of ‘major sporting events’. Further to this observation, the Welsh Government set out four categories of events: major events, signature events, growth events and mega-events. Mega-events are considered to be:

peripatetic events with a global reach. They are distinguished by the fact that they are normally preceded by large scale capital projects, often involving building new venues and supporting infrastructure. They involve a
major bidding effort and demand a high level of government resource and support at all stages from bidding to delivery. Typically, this means the creation of a stand-alone organisation with a dedicated budget to manage the entire process from start to finish (Welsh Assembly Government, p.5).

Mega–events are considered similar to major events which both have the “scale and appeal to attract and influence large scale international audiences and extensive media coverage” (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010 p.5). It is, however, the potential for extensive social, economic, political, environmental and cultural implications to the host region (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Roche, 2000; McCloy, 2002), that are their distinguishing feature. Multi-sports events such as the Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games and Pan American Games in addition to specific international level competitions such as the FIFA World Cup are included in this category (McCloy, 2002).

1.4.2 The nature of legacy

For a term used so widely in both the media and academic literature, it is surprising that a common definition of ‘legacy’ is not available. The IOC describes ‘event legacy’ as the value of sports facilities and public improvement that are left to host communities or sports organisations after the Games. This includes a ‘legacy fund’ to support the facilities which are often very technical by nature and require on-going subsidies (Gratton and Preuss, 2008). Gratton and Preuss (2008) suggest that this definition is very limited given the wide ranging characteristics that are attributed to legacy in the literature. These range from the visible (urban planning and sports infrastructure) to the less tangible, which might include enhanced international reputation, improved public welfare, education, additional employment and renewed community spirit. If these might all be considered to be positive legacies, there are also contrasting examples of negative legacies, for example, debts from construction, infrastructure not needed after the event and socially unjust

In 2002, the IOC, recognizing the growing importance of legacy, convened a congress on ‘The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984-2000’. One aim was to create a definition of legacy but this proved problematic as the delegates “found that there are several meanings of the concept, and some of the contributions have highlighted the convenience of using other expressions and concepts that can mean different things in different languages and cultures” (Morogas et al, 2003, p.491).

An illustration of the potential for meaning to become ‘lost in translation’ is found by using the two official languages of the Olympic movement, French and English, where the French word ‘heritage’ and the English word ‘legacy’ might be judged to be semantic equivalents. In both languages the meaning can imply something coming from the past to the present as well as something left from the present to be given to the future. However in French the meaning is more encompassing and weighted towards the contribution of the past to the present. The English term being referenced in legalese is more concerned with the contribution of the present to the future where a more literal translation into French would be ‘le leg’. This scenario resulted in the congress being advertised in English as one that would address ‘legacy’ and in French as one to address ‘heritage’.

Speaking at the congress, Harry Hiller suggested the use of the term ‘outcomes’ to replace legacy. Hiller noted that outcomes was a more neutral term to that of ‘legacy’, the latter tending to be interpreted as only having a positive effect, ignoring the potential for negative outcomes of an event (Cashman, 2006). However, it is legacy that has remained the favoured term seen to be dominant in the literature and Olympic global discourse.

As previously noted, the term legacy has been seen to have a number of facets and subsequently attempts have been made to sub-divide legacy into categories. Cashman
(2006) identifies six fields of legacies: economics; infrastructure; information and education; public life, politics and culture; sport; symbols, memory and history. Preuss (2006) and Gratton and Preuss (2008) consider that a broader perspective is needed and propose three dimensions of legacy: the degree of planned structure; the degree of positive structure and the degree of quantifiable structure. Further to this they offer a definition of legacy: “Legacy is planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible structures created through a sport event that remain after the event” (Gratton and Preuss 2008, p.1924). The dimensions build a cube made up of eight smaller cubes which would all require to be identified for a holistic evaluation of a mega-event though it is noted that, in reality, most bid committees and pre event studies focus on just one: the planned, tangible and positive (Cashman, 2003; Gratton and Preuss, 2008). This oversight is picked up by Horne (2007), who suggests that “legacies – whether social, cultural, environmental, political, economic or sporting – are the ‘known unknowns’ of sports mega- events” (Horne, 2007, p.86). He adds to this category ‘known knowns’, ‘unknown unknowns’, and a final category of ‘unknown knowns’, that is those things which “We don’t believe we know or remember we know. They are the things that we repress possibly because they can cause us anxiety” (Horne, 2007, p.86). It is undoubtedly the complexity of legacy and the lack of consensus on the nature of the impacts (positive or negative), on the host city, region or country that is the main theme of the literature and will be explored in the following chapter.

1.5 The IOC and the Olympic Movement

The Ancient Olympics were held every four years in Olympia between 776 BC and AD 260. They were held in honour of the gods and the victorious athletes were rewarded lavishly with money and privileges. The last record of the Ancient Olympic Games was in AD 393 further to which they were banned by the Christian Emperor, Theodosius.
1.5.1 Baron Pierre de Coubertin and the revival of the modern ‘Olympic Games’

The revival of the modern Olympic Games in the late 19th century is traditionally attributed to Baron Pierre de Coubertin. Horne and Whannel (2012) suggest that understanding the Games' revival also requires an appreciation of the development of sport practices of the time. During the late 18th and 19th century, a number of multi-sport festivals were held in France, Greece, Scandinavia and the UK, some of which incorporated the word ‘Olympic’, for example the Jeux Olympiques in Paris (Kidd, 1984) and the Liverpool Olympic Festival promoted by John Hulley and first staged in 1862 (Hulley, 2008).

De Coubertin's interest in sport and subsequently the Games was influenced by reading Tom Brown's Schooldays in which Tom “reduced on his first day to a ‘motionless body’ by a rugby scrum is transformed by the end of the tale into an active and rounded person” (Horne and Whannel 2012, p.78). The Rugby school featured in the book is one example of many English public schools of the Victorian era where athleticism and sport was seen as character building and contributed to training the nation’s leaders (Mangan, 1981). Interestingly, as this regime was to become a contributory factor to the revival of the Olympic Games and the philosophy of Olympism which has as its goal “the establishment of a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” (IOC, 2007, p.10), it is suggested by Mangan (1981) that the reality of the late 19th century schooling process was one where order was kept through a system of fagging and brutality.

Born in 1863, de Coubertin grew up during a period of humiliation for the French, their forces crushed by Prussia in 1870 and losing territory to a new united Germany in 1871 (Horne and Whannel, 2012). De Coubertin was concerned that the French youth were no match for the well-trained and disciplined German youth and harboured concerns for the future of his country. As expressed by Horne and Whannel (2011, p.79 “he combined sometimes uneasily” his concern for his country with a “real commitment to internationalism” and believed that sporting competition between countries of the world
could lead to peace through the development of mutual understanding and respect. For de Coubertin, participating athletes in the Olympic Games were considered to act as ‘ambassadors of peace’ (Muller, 2004).

At a conference in Paris in 1892, de Coubertin first publicly articulated his ideas for the revival of the modern Olympic Games. He gained support for the establishment of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to plan for the first modern Olympic Games to be held in Athens in 1896. The structure of the IOC was based on that of the organisation of the Henley Rowing Regatta, which de Coubertin described as ‘three concentric circles’ – the nucleus, the nursery and the façade. In this description, de Coubertin distinguished between “those who were deeply committed, those who could be educated to the cause, and those whose position and influence could be useful” (Horne and Whannel, 2012, p.80). Don Anthony (1997) suggests that this model continues to be evident in the operation of the IOC. The IOC was also established as an organisation whose members were not answerable to any external body, a feature that has subsequently contributed to the IOC being criticised as autocratic and elitist (Jennings, 1996; Lenskyj, 2000).

De Coubertin’s plans extended beyond a four yearly cycle which would culminate with the youth of the world being invited to compete against each other at the Olympic Games. The Games were to be a celebration of the Olympic Movement behind which lay the philosophy of ‘Olympism’, described as the “entire collection of values which, over and above physical strength, are developed when we participate in sport” (Muller 2004, p.7). Olympism was not just to be targeted at the Games’ participating athletes but at all people. De Coubertin used the annual IOC Olympic Congress to propose the promotion of Olympism through sport and education in schools and universities. However, from the early days of the IOC, it was the Games that were of primary interest to the members and de Coubertin failed to find widespread enthusiasm for his educational vision (Muller, 2004).
The Olympic Games have continued to grow in size and popularity. In the inaugural modern Olympics held in Athens in 1896, 241 athletes from 14 countries competed in the Games. The Beijing Olympics in 2008 featured 10,500 athletes from 205 countries (Short 2008). Female athletes have competed from 1900 and in 1948, the first Paralympic Games were staged at Stoke Mandeville (Girginov and Parry, 2005). Since 2001, potential host cities have been required by the IOC to prepare their bids to demonstrate how they will stage both the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The numbers of Games’ spectators also have continued to grow, an important contributory factor being the advent of television and more recently the world-wide web (Horne and Whannel, 2012).

The magnitude of the Games’ growth has attracted criticism which became particularly vocal further to the addition of seven new sports and eighty events to the Olympic Games’ programme between 1980 and 2000 (Cashman, 2002). Cashman (2002) reports that the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, spoke out about the potential for burden on host cities from ‘gigantism’ at an IOC Congress on Games’ legacy in 2002. It was subsequently decided that no new events would be added at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, since when the size of the programme has been ‘capped’ (Cashman, 2002).

As will be discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter, Girginov (2011) suggests it was criticism of the nature of the Games’ growth and its negative social consequences that were the catalyst for attention to be given to the potential for positive legacies – legacies that might include promoting the values associated with Olympism.

### 1.5.2 The IOC and the concept of an Olympic Games’ legacy

Earlier in this chapter it was noted that a legacy of sport mega-events is not a new concept (Cashman, 2002), but what is new is the planning for legacy as a means of providing positive benefits for the host community. Girginov (2011, p.7) suggests that the concept of legacy as an outcome of mega-events “was evoked as a viable alternative
designed to compensate for the negative propensities of capitalist growth through the re-
construction of social order by tackling class, poverty, gender and age inequalities”.

Interest in promoting the potential for positive legacies is nowhere more apparent than in
the bidding to host the world’s largest sporting event; the Olympic and Paralympic Games.
In 2002, ‘Olympic legacy’ was the theme of a symposium sponsored jointly by the IOC
and the Centre for Olympic Studies at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. The
symposium reflected the IOC’s growing interest in legacy, a subject which has
increasingly become a feature of its vocabulary and that of its current President, Jacques
Rogge.

Rogge’s predecessor, Juan Antonio Samaranch, entered the Presidency in 1980 following
a difficult decade for the Olympic movement, including the USA boycott of the Moscow
Games, the crippling debts left to the city of Montreal from the 1976 Winter Olympics, and
by the terrorist attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics. The Olympic movement was,
according to Booth (2003), nearly bankrupt, staging of the Games was hampered by
political interference, corruption and ethical malaise, and public interest at an all-time low.
It required Samaranch to lead a “quiet revolution and unique business turnaround”
(Payne, 2005 p.3) that has resulted in coverage of the Olympics being one of the most
coveted and expensive of broadcasting rights and the opportunity to be associated with
the ‘rings’ attracting sponsorship from many leading global brands.

However, by the end of the 1990s, this model of growth and expansion had attracted
criticism with the suggestion that the Olympic Games had become the “antithesis of
Olympism” (Wamsley, 2004), and that the IOC had become a “transnational corporation
that has increasingly exploited young athletes, labour and aspirations for its own
aggrandisement and profit” (Lenskyj, 2000, p.195). The IOC faced a further image crisis
following the revelations of internal corruption amongst its members, some of whom were
found to have accepted bribes from the Salt Lake City 2002 Winter Olympics bid team (Bale and Christensen, 2004). In the face of such criticism, the IOC has been keen to promote a refocusing on the wider role of the Olympic movement, Olympism, its values and the positive legacies created by the Olympic Games.

MacAlloon (2008, p.2064) reports on the efforts of a potential bid committee member to find out “what the IOC cares about most today”. The conclusion reached by this individual was that ‘legacy’ was an aspect of a bid that would be of foremost interest to the IOC. The IOC now has an explicit mandate regarding Games’ legacies which is found in the wording of both the bidding procedure and the IOC Charter. The Candidate Procedure and Questionnaire for Games of the XXX Olympiad 2012 (IOC, 2004, p.11) requires each potential host Organising Committee to deliver planned outcomes that together “ensure host cities and residents are left with the best possible legacy” and an amendment in the IOC Charter, Article 2:14 (2007, p15) refers to the promotion of “a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to host cities and host countries” and “sport for all”2. This notion was further developed by Rogge (2008, p.5) in his address to the Pierre de Coubertin lecture where he indicated that the selection process for staging the Games should take into account the “passion of the people and the government of the host city to create a positive legacy” and “that a successful city does its best to articulate and share its vision with the world”.

One area of legacy that the IOC has been particularly keen to promote is that of participation in sport by the host population as a conduit to improved health and community well-being. It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the potential for a legacy of increased sport participation in the host community is frequently cited by event

2 “Sport For All” is a collective term used to describe a range of policies adopted by Governments to promote active participation in the community” (Frawley et al 2009 p3). Since its origins in the Council of Europe during the 1960s, it has been embraced by governments worldwide and the IOC as a policy to promote community health and well being particularly against a background of concerns about the rise in obesity amongst children and young people.
supporters (Weed et al, 2009, Veal et al, in press). In the second annual ‘de Coubertin’ lecture, Rogge (2008, p.9) made the link between participation in sport and the potential to “combat ill health and obesity”.

The problem of increasing levels of obesity is not one confined to the UK. However, for the purposes of this study, data from the UK is used to demonstrate how obesity has become a major public health challenge (National Obesity Observatory, 2010). By way of example, Foresight (2007), in its report *Tackling Obesities – Future Choice*, concludes that by 2050 60% of men and 50% of women could be clinically obese and that, without action, obesity-related diseases will cost an extra £45.5 billion per year. In his lecture, Rogge (2008, p.8) proposes that it is the Olympic Movement, through interest in the Games, that can help tackle the obesity crisis by helping to provide “access to sport” as sport “encourages you to value yourself, and your body”.

The IOC has further looked to demonstrate and quantify legacy by the introduction in 2001 of the Olympic Games Impact Study (OGI). This is a 12 year study which requires the host city to map the economic, environmental and socio-cultural impact of the Games through a series of four reports using 120 indicators, of which 73 are mandatory and 47 optional (ESRC, 2010). The London 2012 Games are the first summer Olympic and Paralympic Games that have been mandated to carry out this study.

**1.6 Why Bid?**

It has been noted earlier in this chapter that association with the Olympic ‘brand’ has become a coveted asset amongst international sponsors looking to promote their brand on a global stage. It is also suggested that a feature of recent bids to host the Games is the lure of the potential to increase a city’s global visibility, create a new image and attract new forms of investment (Essex and Chalkley, 1998; Gratton et al, 2005). This being the case, Shoval (2002) questions why cities such as New York and London would bid for the
Olympics. Although the IOC had suggested that if the UK sought to bid it should propose London as the host city, this does not explain why London, like New York, would require ‘brand’ enhancement. These cities are both known to be important as centres of the world economy. They do not need to promote their names as leading tourism destinations or portray a new image of themselves to the world. Shoval (2002) develops his argument by suggesting that the bids for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games were the start of a new era, one where world cities need to make the most of an opportunity to stay ahead of rivals in positioning themselves favourably in the hierarchy of the world’s cities. This view is supported by Nauright (2004) and Gold and Gold (2008, p.300) who note that sport mega-events have become part of a global political economy and are used to gain a competitive advantage in the “never-ending contest between the world’s leading cities for prestige and investment”. Shoval (2002) proposes that this is the fourth era in the bidding history for the Games in their context as a mega-event.

As a means of being the focus of world attention, the first era, from 1851-1939, was seen to be dominated by the World’s Fairs. These were held from the mid-19th to mid-20th century with London hosting the first in 1851 and New York, the last in 1939/40. Three cities: Paris (1900), St Louis (1904) and London (1908) held the Olympic Games as part of each Fair’s events. The main aim of the Fairs was to exhibit industrial achievement and political strength. Towards the end of this stage, the Games also started to be seen as a potential tool for nationalistic propaganda through sport as opposed to technology (Roche, 2000). A classic example was the Berlin Games in 1936, sometimes termed the ‘Nazi Games’, when Adolf Hitler looked to use the event “as a platform to demonstrate his theories about racial superiority” (Horne and Whannel, 2012 p.127)

The period 1948–1984 was marked by the decline of the World’s Fairs as the development of modern technology allowed the distribution of ideas and technology through means other than exhibitions. The Olympics were seen to be ‘given’ to countries
requiring rehabilitation post defeat in the 2nd World War (Rome, 1960; Japan, 1964 and Munich, 1972) and others who looked to “generate worldwide attention on their achievements and agendas” (Shoval, 2002, p.589), for example Finland (1952), Australia (1956) and Mexico (1968). As outlined previously in this chapter, the popularity of the Games suffered from a number of economic and political problems during this period culminating in Los Angeles being the only bid city for the 1984 Games. This was to mark the end of the second era and start of the third.

Los Angeles used its status as the only bidder to negotiate with the IOC and developed a framework for the Olympics to take place on a commercial scale. Local residents had indicated a willingness to host the Games but not to use their taxes to pay for it (Poynter, 2009). Companies were licensed to sell Olympic products and the IOC only received a third of the broadcast revenues, the remainder taken by the private sector ‘not for profit’ consortium of Games’ organisers to cover their costs. Considerable use was made of existing facilities. The result was an Olympics costing US$683.9 million with a surplus of $380.6 million that was awarded to US athletic associations (Preuss, 2004; LA84 Foundation, 2009). Los Angeles also used the opportunity of the Opening and Closing Ceremonies as means of self-promotion, projecting the City as a location for international investment particularly in the fast-growing services sector (Poynter, 2009). Shoval (2002) suggests it was a change of approach from staging the Games for national interests to being more focused on the promotion of the host city that was to mark the period from 1984 – 2000. Other cities that followed the Los Angeles example were Barcelona in 1992, Atlanta in 1996 and Sydney 2000. It is also suggested that the failed bids of Birmingham (1992), Brisbane (1992) and Manchester (1996) were cities looking to boost their world image (Shoval, 2002).

In the UK, this interest in identity change was fuelled by a change in the nature of major cities responding to the decline of traditional manufacturing industries. Henry (2001)
termed this ‘new economic realism’ as cities looked for alternative means of attracting investment and where sport, in particular, was seen as a way of easing the economic decline as an imaginative marketing tool for physical and economic regeneration (Hall, 2001; Gratton et al, 2005; Coalter, 2007b). In addition to the bids above, Sheffield successfully bid for the 1991 World Student Games (Universiade) and Manchester the 2002 Commonwealth Games. As a legacy of hosting the Commonwealth Games, Manchester developed an Events Strategy which continues to flourish. In 2008, it hosted three sport World Championships and six ‘world class’ events and now promotes itself as a ‘global sporting capital’ (Linton, 2011). Through sport, Manchester aims to boost its “international profile and image and demonstrate the City’s ability to make an impact and to deliver on a global stage” (Abbas, 2009). Andranovich et al (2001) suggest that this picture of cities in the UK turning from production-based industries to a more leisure and consumption-based developmental plan was to be seen on a global scale, specifically those cities in or associated with the western-world that have dominated the hosting of mega-events. In the 1980s the phrase ‘event tourism’ was first introduced and by the end of 1990 it was considered to be the fastest growth market in the leisure and travel industry (Jago et al, 2003). It is further suggested that the paucity of mega-events and the potential gains that had been seen (and claimed) to be made, prompted cities to develop bids, risking the costs for the potential gains (Salisbury, 2011). As the competition to host mega-events grew, it helped to boost the power of the IOC and the major International Sport Federations. In terms of the Olympics, this has allowed the IOC to dictate a change of relationship with the host country of the applicant city. Where once the IOC was a partner to a host city, now it has become the client with limited financial responsibility and the requirement that:

The National Government of the country of any applicant city must submit to the IOC a legally binding instrument by which the said government undertakes and guarantees that the country and its public authorities will comply with and respect the Olympic Charter (IOC 2007,p.72).
The requirement of the host government to ‘comply’ with the Olympic Charter is of interest to this research. It was noted earlier in this chapter that this latest edition of the Charter requires the host country to promote positive legacies and ‘sport for all’ in the host community. However, as will be evidenced in this thesis, in the case of the London 2012 Games, there has seemingly been far less attention given to promoting an outcome of positive legacies and ‘sport for all’ than to staging a successful Games.

The recognition, from 2000, of a fourth phase where cities that require no introduction to the world stage, such as Paris, New York and London, are competing to host the Games is also of particular significance to this research. It will later be seen to be part of the discussion about the role of the ‘promise’ of the London 2012 Games to promote a nationwide legacy, where the gains would be felt across the country and not just in the host city. The proposal by Shoval (2002) that London’s bid was part of a competition to maintain its global status has already been alluded to. It is also suggested that by winning the rights to host the Games, London further exaggerated its position as first in the UK urban system thus widening the economic gap between the South-East and the rest of the United Kingdom (Shoval, 2002).

1.7 The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (London 2012 Games)

This research investigates the plans to develop a specific aspect of social legacy, that of increased participation in sport. This aspect was chosen as it had formed a central tenet of the London 2012 bid but, as is evidenced on numerous occasions in this thesis, there is equivocal evidence as to whether sport mega-events can leave a legacy of increased sport participation in the host community. In order to set the scene for the research agenda, the following section sets the historical context of the London 2012 Games by outlining the timetable of the London 2012 bid. It then considers the reasoning behind London’s bid to host a mega-event on the global stage. This is followed by an overview of how the initial plans for the legacy of the London 2012 Games were conceived, the main
organisations involved, the impact of the plans on sport policy in the UK and how the legacy plans have been reviewed as a result of political change in the UK.

1.7.1 History of the London 2012 bid

The announcement of London’s winning bid to stage the Olympic Games of the XXX Olympiad was made on the 6th July 2005 by the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, at the 117th session of IOC General Assembly in Singapore. London had first played host to the Olympic Games in 1908 and again in 1948. On the latter occasion, it followed two cancelled games due to World War II when London was considered one of the only cities capable of staging the event. In the mid-80s and beginning of the 90s, two principal British cities (Birmingham and Manchester) had made unsuccessful bids for the Games, further to which the IOC unofficially informed Britain that for any future bids to be taken seriously, London would have to be named as the host city (National Olympic Academy, 1998). This view is supported by the then co-ordinator of the London 2012 bid at the British Olympic Association (BOA), David Luckes, in an interview with Noam Shoval. (Shoval, 2002).

The BOA had been gaining support for an Olympic bid from 1997. Plans were first shown to the UK government in 2000 prior to a bid team being formed in 2003. From its early days, it was clear that a central tenet of the bid was to use hosting the Games as a catalyst to increase nationwide mass sport participation. In a letter by the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the IOC in July 2003, he stated that his Government wanted to use hosting the Games “as a catalyst to promote sports participation and physical activity in all communities” (Girginov, 2009 p.153). In light of this intent, the decision by the government to support a bid for the 2012 Games might be considered unexpected, given that six months earlier it had launched Game Plan: a strategy for delivering Government’s sport and physical activity objectives, (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002, p.15) which indicated that the government should:
adopt a different approach to hosting mega sporting events. They should be seen as an occasional celebration of success rather than a means to achieving other government objectives.

The authors of *Game Plan* (p.75) concluded that:

it would seem that hosting events is not an effective, value for money, method of achieving a sustained increase in mass participation.

Early in 2004, London and nine other cities officially launched their bids and in May that year, five cities: London, Madrid, Moscow, New York and Paris were short-listed by the IOC. In November 2004 the London candidature file was submitted to the IOC at their headquarters in Lausanne and early in 2005 the IOC Evaluation Committee visited London. At the July 2005 IOC meeting in Singapore, each bid team had the opportunity of a final presentation before voting began. In the final round, this eventually brought London and Paris head to head which was won by the former by 54 votes to 50.

The UK Government used the potential of positive economic, cultural and sporting legacy as justification for backing the London bid which required a massive investment of public funds. Central to the legacy plans was what would later become a ‘promise’ (DCMS, 2007a), that hosting the London 2012 Games would leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation across the country. Promotional material for the London 2012 bid reiterated this notion (Vigor et al, 2004, Coalter, 2008a, Nations and Regions, n.d.) and ‘Creating a legacy to transform sport in the UK’ was one of the four key strategic aims of the bid (BOA, 2004).
In response to winning the bid to host the London 2012 Games, the UK government took several immediate steps to ensure early progress was made towards hosting a successful event. As a successor to ‘London 2012’ (the bid team), the UK government created the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) as a limited company, which is responsible for planning, organising and staging the London 2012 Games (House of Commons Select Committee, Culture Media and Sport (HCSC CMS, 2007b). On the 14th July 2005, eight days after the award of the Games was made, the Olympic Bill was introduced into the House of Commons. In March 2006, the Olympic Bill was given royal assent and became an Act of Parliament. The Bill created the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), the public sector body responsible for building the venues and infrastructure for the London 2012 Games, managing the Government’s interest in the Olympic project and protecting the public money going into it (DCMS, 2006). A Minister for the Olympics was appointed and the post was given a place at the Cabinet. The post holder became Chair of an Olympic Board which first convened on the 28th July 2005. The Olympic Board is made up of the Minister for the Olympics, the Mayor of London and the Chairman (sic) of the BOA and LOCOG. Its purpose is to co-ordinate the work of LOCOG, Government and the ODA (HCSC CMS, 2008a).

The Olympic budget rose dramatically from the original £2.1 billion (as outlined in the bid document) to £9.325 billion (HMCS CMS, 2008a). These additional funds were found from the public purse including a diversion of funds from the National Lottery. At the time of writing there is a general consensus that preparations for staging of the London 2012 Games are on time (HCSC CMS, 2007b) and the IOC has highly commended the work of all the organisations involved in the preparatory phase of the Games (IOC, 2010).

To oversee the legacy of the Olympic Park, including the sport facilities, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) was set up in 2009, its founders being the Mayor of London, the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) and the Department of Communities
and Local Government. It describes itself as “the public sector, not-for-profit organisation responsible for the long-term planning, development, management and maintenance of the Olympic Park and its facilities after the London 2012 Games” (OPLC, n.d).

The DCMS were charged with developing the plans to deliver the Games legacy. A London 2012 Games legacy was detailed in the Public Service Agreement (PSA) 22 covering the budgetary period 2008-9 – 2010-11. PSA 22, as the only PSA on which the DCMS led, states that:

The DCMS will deliver a successful and inspirational Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 that provide for a sustainable legacy and get more children and young people taking part in high quality PE and sport.

It can be seen from this wording that this PSA does not have a specific mention of ‘increased mass sport participation across all communities’. Brookes and Wiggan (2009) observe that in the previous round of PSAs (2004-7), there had been two PSAs relating to mass participation. The first, known as the ‘community PSA’, contained the target set by Game Plan (DCMS /Strategy Unit 2002) of increasing the number of people taking part in at least 30 minutes of moderate intensity activity, at least three times a week. The second PSA targeted sporting opportunities for young people aged 5 – 16 years. Brookes and Wiggan (2009) suggest that the revised PSA represents a change in emphasis where the efforts of the DCMS are being focused on the delivery of the Games to the detriment of sport for the ‘greater good’.

It was nearly two years after London secured the rights to host the London 2012 Games that the HCSC CMS (2008a; 2008b) produced the first official government report on the development of Games’ legacy. Further to listening to evidence from a number of sources,
including members of LOCOG, Sport England and other leading sports development organisations in the UK, the HCSC CMS noted progress being made in a number of legacy areas such as benefits to regional tourism and plans for the future use of the Olympic Park venues but recorded its concerns relating to the lack of planning for legacy of increased sport participation (HCSC CMS 2007a; HCSC CMS 2007b). The detail of the legacy plans for the London 2012 Games are outlined in section 1.7.2. Concern about whether the ‘promise’ to deliver a legacy of increased sport participation will be realized has been a constant source of debate (Girginov and Hills, 2008; Slot, 2008; Moynihan, 2010; Gibson, 2011a; Gibson, 2011d).

1.7.2 The legacy plans for the London 2012 Games

As presented in the London 2012 bid team candidature file, the vision for the Games in London focused on four main themes: delivering the experience of a lifetime for athletes; leaving a legacy for sport in Britain; benefiting the community through regeneration and supporting the IOC and the Olympic movement (BOA 2004). In 2007, the government department charged with delivering legacy, the DCMS, launched Our Promise for 2012 containing five legacy ‘promises’:

Promise 1: Make the UK a world–leading sporting nation;
Promise 2: Transform the heart of East London;
Promise 3: Inspire a generation of young people;
Promise 4: Make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living;
Promise 5: Demonstrate the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in, visit and for business. ³

³ In December 2009, a decision was made to add a sixth legacy promise relating to improving the quality of life for disabled people. The detail of the ‘promise’ is outlined in the document: London 2012: a legacy for disabled people. Setting new standards changing perceptions (DCMS, 2010a).
The delivery of the ‘promises’ was to be supported by a series of action plans. The first action plan was published in 2008: *Before, during and after: making the most of the London 2012 Games* (DCMS, 2008a). The plan outlined how the 2012 Games were to be seen as a catalyst to either speed up or make more effective the delivery of existing national and local strategies and therefore additional funding would not be made available to deliver the ‘promises’. It did however mention the Legacy Trust UK, a London 2012 inspired charity which is funded by existing sources such as the Lottery and the Arts Council whose mission is “to use sporting and cultural activities to ensure communities from across the UK have a chance to take part in London 2012, and leave a sustainable legacy after the Games” (DCMS, 2008a, p.3).

1.7.3 The Inspire Mark

![Inspire Mark logo](image)

**Fig 1 The Inspire Mark logo**

To facilitate the country-wide impact of the Games’ legacy the UK government created the *Inspire Mark programme*. As described on the London 2012 (2011) web page:

> An Olympic and Paralympic first, the London 2012 Inspire programme enables non-commercial organisations across the UK to link their events and projects to the London 2012 Games in an official scope.
The concept of the Inspire Mark was first introduced as part of the government’s legacy action plan (DCMS, 2008a), initially to feature a number of high impact programmes and then to be rolled out more widely. The Inspire Mark is not limited to sport activities; there are six themes of sport; culture; education; business; sustainability and volunteering. At the time of writing, it is reported that there are over 1,500 programmes in operation across the country (London 2012, 2011).

The attraction of the Inspire Mark programme is that those who receive the award are able to use a logo which features the official London 2012 Games’ logo. This is the first time in the history of the Olympic Games that an organisation other than an Olympic sponsor has been able to use the Games’ logo. It is hoped that this unprecedented concession by the IOC will help people across the country make an association with the London 2012 Games.

1.7.4 The development of plans for a legacy of mass participation in sport

Promise 1: Make the UK a world-leading sport nation, had three ‘headline ambitions’: the first to ‘inspire young people through sport’ and the third focused on the medal table ambitions of Team GB at the London 2012 Games. The second headline ambition, which relates to increasing levels of community sport participation, is the most relevant to this study. The ambition read: “Getting people more active: help at least two million more people in England be more active by 2012” (DCMS, 2008a, p.6). This was sub divided into, 1 million adults playing more sport by 2012/13 and 1 million more adults to be physically active by 2012/13.

1.7.5 Legacy plans and sport policy

To support the community sport related aspects of the legacy plans, the government revised its sport policy from Game Plan (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002) to Playing to Win: A New Era for Sport (DCMS, 2008b). In Game Plan, sport took on the role of ‘sport for good’. Sport was portrayed as a “powerful and often under-used tool” (p.5) to add value
and impetus to strategies in areas such as health, social inclusion and anti-social behaviour. In *Playing to Win*, the catalyst to drive increased participation is the country’s status of Olympic host nation which was considered to be “an unprecedented opportunity for the development of both sport and physical activity” (p.3). Sport is given stand-alone status. It is no longer required to justify its existence through association with other areas of social policy. In paving the way for a new policy, the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, James Purnell, was clear in his opinion that “sport matters in itself” and that “too often sport is justified on the basis of spill-over benefits” (Purnell 2007). In *Playing to Win*, Sport England is the organisation given responsibility for the delivery of the community sport legacy. Sport England is a non-departmental public body which is responsible for the delivery of funds from HM Treasury and the National Lottery for investing in sport and increasing England’s success as a sporting nation (DCMS, 2011). Sport England took up the theme of this change of approach for sport in its strategy for 2008-11 (Sport England, 2008a) which heralded a “significant shift in focus and direction”. The strategy asserted:

In the future Sport England’s role will be to focus exclusively on sport. Sport can and does play a major role in achieving wider social and economic benefits – notably on the health front. However, the driving force behind the strategy and investment is to address the needs of sport participants across the country. This provides a clear distinction with the physical activity agenda driven by some departments, including the Department of Health and Department of Transport (p1).

The influence of the London 2012 Games on this change was evident, the new approach was “designed to capitalise on the once in a life time opportunity presented by the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, and to use its power to inspire more people to take part in and succeed in sport” (Sport England, 2008b). Brookes and Wigan (2009), introducing their research on the sports services delivered by Sport England, suggest the strategy represented a shift in the organisation’s objectives to concentrating on fostering
elite success which might be seen to conflict with its role of delivering the community sport legacy. In the following chapter in the discussion on the development of sport policy, the tensions between the supposed simultaneous delivery of elite sport and mass sport are further explored.

1.7.6 National Governing Bodies of Sport

*Playing to Win* and the *Sport England 2008-11* strategy both identify the National Governing Bodies for Sport (NGBs) as being central to the delivery of the sport legacy plans. These reports indicate that the NGBs are expected to deliver up to 700,000 of the 1 million people doing more sport. Sport England has invested £48 million in 46 NGBs to help them deliver this target (Sport England, 2008a). As central to the planning for legacy and consequently to this thesis, the history and nature of the NGBs merits some attention at this stage.

NGBs play a prominent role in supporting sports development in the UK. NGBs are responsible for managing, developing and promoting participation and competition in a particular sporting activity at a national level (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2010). There are over 100 sports recognised by the Sports Councils in the UK, which in turn are affiliated to around 400 NGBs (Green, 2008). NGBs are non-governmental organisations, the majority established as voluntary organisations in the 19th century to regulate and administer their respective sports. In this early stage their main tasks were to draw up the rules of the sport, organise domestic competitions and select national teams to compete on the international stage (Green, 2008). As the nature of sport within society has changed and there has been a growing intervention by government in its governance (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed account), this has made an impact on the operations of the NGBs. At the beginning of the 21st century they have become subject to meeting government set objectives for both elite and participation sport, being predominantly reliant on government funding (Green, 2008) but aware that the availability of public funding “comes with strings attached” (Houlihan and White (2002, p.164). The most recent
investment of £48 million to help the NGBs deliver the mass sport participation legacy plans has been welcome as a source of funds but has also added some concerns on making them even more reliant on government funding (NGB, 2010). In reflecting on this change, it is useful to consider what Fishel (2008) describes as some of the distinctive features of NGBs as non-governmental (often not-for-profit) organisations: they rely heavily on the input of volunteers; they are not always driven by financial motives; they are created and maintained on a set of values or beliefs about the service or opportunities the organisation provides where differing interpretations can cause tension within the organisation; organisational structures can be complex and they are accountable to a wide range of stakeholders including members, users, government, sponsors and staff. The features described here have undoubtedly contributed and continue to contribute to a difficult period of transition. Internal tensions have been created by the need to balance both the differing needs of elite and grass-roots sport and the response of members to the authoritative demands of government to ‘professionalise’ when for many the “vestiges of amateurism and Corinthian ideals remain important cornerstones of what ‘sport’ is (or at least should be) all about (Green, 2008 p.104).

In the delivery of the London 2012 Games sport participation legacy, the investment of £48 million has been made in the NGBs, who are considered as “recognised experts in their sports” and subsequently been given “greater autonomy over the investment of public funds within their sport – along with greater responsibility for the delivery of the outcomes” (Sport England, 2008b p.2). The funding allocation was made based on an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of interventions put forward by the NGBs in their ‘Whole Sport Plans’4. Sport England made allowances for the range of costs for

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4 Whole Sport Plans’ (WSPs) for NGBs were first introduced by Sport England for the four year period 2005-9 to deliver on their (then) three aims of: Start – increase participation in sport in order to improve the health of the nation; Stay – retain people in sport and active recreation through an effective network of clubs, sports facilities, coaches, volunteers and competitive opportunities; Succeed – achieve sporting success at every level. WSPs are a negotiated contract between Sport England and individual NGBs with funding seen as contingent on meeting targets across the three aims. The targets and funding for the second round of WSPs (2009 – 13) were negotiated with the
participants, reflecting the differing coaching and infrastructure needs of each sport, for example in the initial allocation the average cost per participant was £9 for athletics and cycling, £153 for rugby league and £216 for judo (Comptroller and Auditor General, 2010). Through negotiation between Sport England and the NGBs, the latter have been set sport participation targets. The targets are monitored and, if seen not to be met, there is the potential for an individual organisation’s funding to be reduced (Sport England, 2011a).

It should be noted at this stage that not everyone in the sports development world was convinced that the NGBs were the right choice to manage the participation legacy. As “agents of management” of the legacy, Charlton (2010, p.347), describes the NGBs as “unprepared and under resourced”. The view that the NGBs are ‘unprepared’ to lead on mass sport participation reflects their historical background. As outlined earlier in this chapter, NGBs have traditionally been involved with elite sport and working with people who have already engaged in a sport and are looking to develop further participation and/or expertise. The change in policy resulting from Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008b) when ‘sport for good’ returned to ‘sport for sport sake’ and the consequent increased responsibility given to NGBs led one senior sport’s official to declare that this was a retrograde step. The disgruntled official suggested that this move would close down not widen participation and that funding would now only go to “those sports where you wear a strip or are in a team” (Revill, 2007, p.5). That NGBs are under resourced for the task of managing the legacy of mass sport participation is a concern of a number of observers, given that many NGBs fight a constant battle just to meet existing demands (Green and Houlihan, 2006; Collins, 2008; Green, 2009). As outlined by Collins (2008, p.82):

> The governing bodies in English sport command only some 6m members, not all playing. Without exception they argue they need more volunteers to aim of delivering on the Sport England strategy of ‘grow, sustain and excel’ as the focus of the sport participation legacy ambitions of the London 2012 Games.
cope with the growing roles the government expects them to play; they struggle with working out the expressed aims of equality, of increasing involvement of more women, ethnic minorities, disabled people and other hard-to-reach groups.

The choice of the NGBs as a mechanism for change and whether they are ‘fit for purpose’ for the task of managing the delivery of a mass participation legacy from the London 2012 Games will be seen in later chapters to be the subject of further discussion arising from the analysis of my research data.

1.7.7 Active People Survey

The baseline that is being used by Sport England for the measurement of sport participation is the 2008-9 Active People Survey. This is an annual survey of adults’ (16+) sport and physical activity behaviour conducted by telephone interview by ipsos Mori on behalf of Sport England. It was first conducted in 2005-6. Using the data generated by the Active People Survey, Sport England have defined ‘participation’ as “taking part in moderate intensity sport and active recreation on at least three days a week (at least 12 days in the last four weeks) for 30 minutes continuously in any one session. Participation includes recreational walking and cycling but excludes walking and cycling exclusively for travel” (Sport England, 2008a, p.7).

1.7.8 The impact of a change in government – May 2010

In May 2010, the Labour government was replaced by a coalition of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. The coalition’s legacy plans for the Games were published in December 2010 and contained four main areas of focus:
- Harnessing the United Kingdom’s passion for sport to increase grass roots participation, particularly by young people - and to encourage the whole population to be more physically active.
- Exploiting to the full the opportunities for economic growth offered by hosting the Games.
- Promoting community engagement and achieving participation across all groups in society through the Games; and
- Ensuring that the Olympic Park can be developed after the Games as one the principal drivers of regeneration in East London. (DCMS, 2010, p.1)

At the time of writing, it was planned that the DCMS would publish annual updates to the initial information provided (DCMS, 2010). In March 2011, the government announced that it had dropped the pledge to get 1 million more people physically active but was maintaining the bid to get people playing more sport, this to maintain pressure on the NGBs to meet their participation targets. Jeremy Hunt, Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics Media and Sport did, however, suggest at the time of the announcement that the aim of ‘1 million' might also be dropped to be replaced by a ‘more meaningful' target (Gibson, 2011d).

1.8 Legacy plans and the time frame of this research

One of the unique features of the research is that it has been carried out in the period leading up to a sport mega-event rather than after the event. This has had the benefit of being able to investigate the processes of planning and delivering the proposed participation legacy as they occurred rather than being based on the more calculated post-event reflections of those involved. However, it is also recognised from the contextual information provided in this chapter that the PhD has been set in a rapidly changing policy landscape, sometimes where new directions announced monthly. Policy details are
believed to be correct up to the end of 2011 but further changes will have occurred since then.

To let the reader position the research and its aims in this changing environment, it should be noted that the data generation for this research was predominantly during the period July 2009 and December 2010 when the focus of London 2012 Games sport participation legacy was on the ‘one million people playing more sport’.
Chapter 2: A review of the literature

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is divided into three sections. First it provides the reader with a review of the relationship between sport mega-events and legacy and in particular notes the recent growth in interest in social legacy. Although economic impacts are seen to be the main focus of the available research, the interest in social legacy has developed in tandem with an increase in public sector investment in these events and host country citizens wanting an answer to the question ‘what's in it for me’?

In this chapter social legacy is covered under three headings of education, human and social capital and sport. The broader picture is given to set the context for the specific focus of this thesis, the development of a legacy of mass sport participation which is seen to have considerable anecdotal support but little empirical research evidence (Weed et al 2009; McCartney et al, 2010).

The second section reviews the development of sport policy in the UK from the mid-20th century. Sport is seen to gain increased government attention as a subject of public policy and required to develop proposed symbiotic working relationships with other policy areas to achieve their respective aims. The persistent competition for resources to meet the varying demands of elite sport and community sport is noted and the proposal that elite sport has been prioritised in public policy over the promotion of ‘sport for all’ (Bloyce et al, 2009). Attention is also given to the impact of the government’s modernisation agenda on sports organisations (both public and voluntary) that are at the ‘front-line’ of sport development delivery (Grix and Philpotts, 2011).

In the final section an overview is given of the theories of behavioural change that have been applied to participation in sport. It follows that to ‘play more sport’ people would be
required to change their patterns of behaviour. This potential for change is seen to be
dominated by two areas, firstly the ‘barriers’ that are perceived to prevent participation and
secondly, from behavioural science, research into an individual’s motivation to participate
(Weed, 2010).

2.2 The development of legacy in association with sport mega-events

In Chapter 1, it was suggested that legacy is not a new concept and that nearly all sport
mega-events are considered to have left some form of legacy to the host city
(Cashman, 1998). What is seen to be new is the planning for legacy and that legacy has
become more of a prospective rather than a retrospective concept (Girginov, 2011). It has
also been seen to be growing in complexity as a subject of discourse amongst the many
organisations and communities involved in its development or those who may be legacy
recipients.

This chapter investigates the main aspects of legacy which impact on my research.
Initially legacy is reviewed under two main themes of economic and social legacy further
to which social legacy is sub-divided into three strands of education; social and human
capital and sport, the latter being the main focus of attention.

2.2.1 Economic Legacy

The economic impact of events has attracted 85% of all event related research (Weed,
2007). One reason for the extent of this interest is reflected in a review of literature on the
socio–economic, socio-cultural, physical and political impacts of the Olympic Games
where Malfas et al (2004, p.216) conclude that the “economic benefits are the prime
motive” given for hosting them. Hall (2006) develops this theme suggesting three ways in
which sport mega-events contribute to economic development. First is infrastructure,
which is integral to further economic development; second is the contribution of the event
to business vitality and economic development and third is the ability to attract events that are seen as a positive demonstration of a host city/region/nation to compete on the global stage. In a practical illustration of this proposal, a review of the four summer Olympics from Barcelona 1992 to Athens 2004 concluded that economic benefits may: increase employment (or reduce unemployment); promote skills development; be a catalyst for renewal and the acceleration of infrastructure projects and provide intangible benefits to the host city/region/nation economy of promotion and/or rebranding from media coverage which in turn produces tangible inward investment (London East Research Institute (LERI), 2007).

As outlined in Chapter 1, Shoval (2002) considers that the interest shown by cities such as London and New York in bidding for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games marks a new development in perceived economic benefits. These are cities that are already known as global economic and tourist centres. Shoval (2002) considers this new era to be one of major cities, although aware of their economic status, being fearful of competition and looking to use the status of ‘mega–event host city’ to improve their positioning on a global hierarchy. Nauright (2004) suggests that sport mega-events have become part of the global political economy, the London 2012 Games providing a good example when discussion over the future of the Olympic stadium prompted the direct involvement of leading politicians and Olympians in an attempt to protect the UK’s international reputation with organisations such as the IOC and the International Amateur Athletics Federation (Reedie, 2010; Chadband, 2011).

A legacy of ‘image’ has also been shown to be used by politicians who are increasingly seen to be using association with ‘winners’ from the international sporting stage as means of gaining favourable publicity, either “to be seen as ‘important’ in the eyes of their constituency because of their fraternisation with glamorous sport stars or to be seen as ordinary sports minded people just like the voter next door” (Mules, 1998, p26). Rawnsley
(2006, p.31) further intimates that, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair saw winning the rights to host the London 2012 Games as “adding a grand project to his legacy”, to the extent that once “seized by the notion” he paid little attention to any opposition to the Olympic project.

Although there is support for sport mega-events acting as a catalyst for urban renewal (Preuss, 2004), there is also increased scepticism about the claims made for the direct and indirect economic impact of such events (Gratton et al, 2000; Horne and Mazenreiter, 2004; Coalter, 2008; Kavetsos and Szymanski, 2010). The methodology of economic impact studies attracts considerable debate, in particular that such studies tend to be made in advance and are commissioned by proponents of the event (Kasmati, 2003; Cashman, 2003; 2005). Cashman (2003) identifies four periods during which the impact of a mega-event on a host city can be reviewed and suggests it is in the preparatory phase of bidding for the event that overestimated benefits and underestimated costs are likely to be stated with most conviction. The LERI (2007) report demonstrated that operating and infrastructure costs exceeded the event bid projections in all four Olympic Games’ host cities featured in the study: Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney and Athens. It is already known that the London 2012 Games will follow this trend (Girginov and Hills, 2008; Gilligan 2009) despite the claims of robust financial planning by the bid team (BOA, 2004; HCSC CMS, 2008a). An initial report by Arup in 2002 suggested that the Games could be hosted for a net cost of £500 million (Atkinson et al, 2008), this was revised in the final bid documents to £2.1 billion (BOA, 2004). Addressing the National Olympic Academy in March 2008, Sir Keith Mills, then Deputy Chairman of LOCOG, quoted a Games logistics cost of £2 billion, facilities cost of £2 billion and regeneration costs of £5 billion, reflecting the revised publicised figure of £9.325 billion (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2008). However, more recently, an investigation has indicated that the costs may be at least £12 billion. This figure accounts for additional funds including a £1.5 billion grant by the London Development Agency for land, interest payments and legacy grants, an amount
which is further supplemented by additional transport infrastructure costs and costs to cover additional legacy projects (Gilligan, 2009). The figures from the London 2012 Games might appear to support an observation from the LERI report that, “a city prepares its bid to win the IOC competition; the winning of the competition is a distinct exercise from the actual budgeting for the event” (2007, p.27).

Further methodological concerns in estimating the economic impact of a mega event are directed towards the use of the multiplier. The multiplier analysis is based on the concept of chain spending and re-spending. By way of example the construction of new facilities generates income in the local economy (e.g. workers on site, purchase of materials and visitor expenditure), which becomes income for others (e.g. local business and workers), who in turn spend their wages in the local economy. Crompton (1995) cites 11 common misapplications of using the multiplier which include ignoring the leakages out of the host community (e.g. money spent with multi-national companies), and measuring benefits while omitting costs (e.g. increased congestion detracting regular trade and increased environmental costs). Matheson (2004) adds to this latter point drawing attention to the use of input–output tables based on the normal state of the economy, whereas hosting a mega-event creates a very abnormal local economic state. Such misapplications are used either by those with a vested interest in staging the event or by consultants hired by event proponents in order “not to find the true impact, but rather to legitimize the event’s public support by endowing it with an aura of substantial economic benefits” (Crompton and McKay, 1994, p.33).

A further criticism of economic impact studies is that they provide a limited perspective of the overall impact of an event. This ignores other benefits gained or costs incurred by the event (O’Brien & Chalip, 2007). In line with general business practices that have moved away from merely focusing on economic measures (Brenkert, 2004), O’Brien and Chalip (2007), propose the use of ‘triple bottom line’ event impact reports where the focus is on
the financial, environmental and social impacts. The environmental impacts of mega-
events warrant a study in their own right and are considered beyond the scope of this
study. Readers interested in this area are directed to the work of authors such as Collins
et al (2007; 2009). The social impacts of events are the concern of this study and in the
next section of this chapter, the growing interest in social legacy is reviewed.

2.2.2 Social Legacy

In a report on the potential to develop an Event Impact Framework, Coalter (2008a)
suggests that it is because of the growing scepticism that surrounds economic impact
studies of events that an increased emphasis is being placed on the non-economic, often
intangible benefits of sport mega-events. It has been argued that even where there is a
financial loss to organisers, net gains may be felt by the host community (Dwyer et al,
behind hosting sport mega-events is based on potential benefits to the community and
from a review of the available evidence, Murphy and Baumann conclude that “major
events may result in diverse community benefits including new sporting facilities,
improved transport, social cohesion, community volunteerism and the enhancement of
national sporting culture” (2007, p.194). It has also been noted that when there is need to
demonstrate accountability for large scale public expenditure on a geographically confined
event, social benefits need not be limited to the host city (Weed et al, 2009).

However, despite this growth in recognition of its significance, empirical studies on the
identification and evaluation of the wide ranging aspects of social legacy, particularly in
relation to sport mega-events are not well developed (Haxton, 1999; Coalter 2008a). It
has been suggested that the lack of empirical research on social legacy is because it is
considered to be extraneous, not crucial to event success (Bell, 2010). It is also more
difficult to measure as often such impacts are qualitative and subjective by nature (Cashman, 2002; Fredline et al, 2003; Bell, 2010).

A multitude of headings can be found that might relate to the term social legacy: quality of life; education; community cohesion; school exercise and talent identification in sport were discussed under this term by the Fabian Society (2006). Fredline et al (2003), in reviewing the potential to develop a scale to measure social impacts, refer also to employment opportunities, availability of facilities to the public and property values and Frawley et al (2009, p.3) note that “inspiring people to themselves participate in sport” is promoted by governments as a public benefit of hosting sporting events.

There is also literature on the negative impacts of mega-events on communities which include harassment of the homeless, destruction of low-cost housing and local community facilities, disruption of business, increased crime and traffic congestion (Haxton, 2000; Lenskyj, 2002; 2008; Cashman, 2003; Horne and Manzeneiter, 2004; van Harskamp, 2006).

In this review, social legacy will be explored under three headings: education; human and social capital and, in a separate section as the primary focus of the thesis, sport.

**Education**

A number of national sporting bodies and international sports organisations have used the staging of sport mega-events as an opportunity to produce schools’ educational resources to contribute to a wider legacy. Examples include Edrugby, an online resource produced by Australian Rugby for the World Cup in 2003; the Euro 2004 and 2005 packs produced by The Football Association; and the Paralympic World Cup 2008 Educational Resource website.
Many summer and winter Olympic Games produce as part of their bid an educational programme designed to promote the values of Olympism. As outlined in Chapter 1, Olympism is a ‘philosophy of life’ which underpins the work of the Olympic Movement including its flagship event, the Olympic Games. The IOC has a responsibility to promote Olympism throughout the world (IOC, 2007) and has produced guidance on Olympic Education (Morogas et al, 2003; Binder, 2007). However, the IOC neither takes a lead role in the production nor looks to evaluate the efficacy of any Games-related education programmes which according to Culpan (2007, p.144) facilitate educational legacies “characterized by resource kit production, non-specific and non-related to curriculum requirements, absent of coherent pedagogies and not supported by professional development”.

Further and higher education has concerned itself more with the staging of sport mega-events providing services such as skills training for employees and volunteers, research, Games’ venues, accommodation and Pre-Games training camps. Further to delivering training for the Sydney 2000 Olympics, Tertiary and Further Education NSW (TAFE NSW), established ‘DET International’ which has since delivered customised education and training services skills training at mega-events such as the Rugby World Cup 2003; Athens 2004; Doha Asian Games 2006 and Beijing 2008 (TAFE NSW, 2009).

The first comprehensive study into the role of Higher Education in the Olympic Games was conducted at the Sydney 2000 Olympics (Cashman and Toohey, 2002). It reflected on missed opportunities resulting from the lack of collaboration amongst academics and was in part the stimulus in the UK for ‘Podium - the Further and Higher Education Unit for the 2012 Games’, established in 2007 to “communicate and develop the potential for universities and colleges to support the preparation and delivery of the 2012 Games and to contribute to its sustainable legacy” (Potter, 2009, p.8). Its work to date has “highlighted its role as lobbyist for the contribution the sectors have to offer and to be a communication
hub for opportunities to engage and share examples of good practice” (Potter, 2009, p.8).

A notable contribution has been shown to be made by higher education to the medals haul at events such as Olympic and Paralympic Games. In outlining the importance that the sector will play in determining the 2012 medal winners, it was illustrated that 65% of athletes representing Team GB at Athens (accumulating 15 medals of the Team GB total of 30) and 67% for Beijing had either attended university or were doing so at the time they competed and won (Potter, 2009).

**Social and Human capital**

From the very early stages of the bidding process through to final delivery requires the development of extended social and business networks (Solberg and Preuss, 2007). Anecdotal evidence suggests that one of the early successes of the London 2012 ‘CompeFor’ is the generation of new business links at local, regional and national level and the introduction of small and medium size businesses to the services provided by Regional Development Agencies. On an international level, ‘Business Club Australia’ developed for the Sydney 2000 Olympics has continued to promote Australian business using sport mega-events such as the Rugby World Cup 2003 and the Commonwealth Games in 2006 (Taylor and Edmundson, 2007). In addition, the North West Business Club, originally formed to support the Manchester Commonwealth Games 2002, has staged events linked to the UEFA Women’s Euro Championships and the annual Tour of Britain cycle race, in addition to providing a range of on and off line business support services (Hughes, 2010).

The development of human capital as the skills and abilities of those involved in the planning and delivery of an event, is considered to be a desirable legacy which may add to the attraction of a city or region to stage further events (Solberg and Preuss, 2007).

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5 CompeteFor is a business web site aimed particularly at small and medium sized enterprises that promotes business opportunities linked to the London 2012 Games (www.competefor.com)
However, a number of stakeholders interviewed for the 2002 Commonwealth Games Benefits Study (Faber and Maunsell, 2004) felt that too many people had been employed from the 'circus' of event companies and individuals who travel around the world working on events and consequently the opportunity to leave a legacy of event management skills in the North West of England was missed. The tourism sector of the host city or region may be boosted by the upgrading of skills in the service sector through bespoke courses run by event organizing committees, for example English courses for taxi drivers were provided for the Olympics in Seoul 1996 and Athens 2004 and for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany. Although limited in number, studies of volunteers’ learning and experiences do demonstrate a perceived increase in job skills. A survey of the volunteers at the Commonwealth Games in Manchester 2002 showed that 47% of volunteers felt they had acquired new skills and capabilities through their experiences and 46% agreed that being a Games’ volunteer had enhanced their personal development (Faber and Maunsell, 2004). In a study of the motives of participants in Olympic volunteer programmes, Kemp (2002) focused particularly on students working at the Lillehammer 1994 Winter Olympics and the Sydney 2000 Olympics. The results of the study reflected that up to 79% of Norwegian and 88% of Australian students involved, respectively, felt that they had increased their job skills.

Misener and Mason (2006) explored the potential for using sport mega-events to develop a host community’s social infrastructure through the concept of social capital. Social capital is a much debated topic which has gained increasing status as “academics and politicians alike have searched for ways to conceptualize social, economic, demographic and political changes and their impact on communities” (Nicholson and Hoye, 2008, p.7). Discussion is predominantly generated from three main theorists, Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam where, although interpretations differ, “social capital is taken to refer to the social networks based on social and group norms which enable people to trust and cooperate with each other and through which individuals or groups can obtain certain types of
advantage” (Coalter, 2007a, p.540). Although it is suggested that sport mega-events are purely about the interests of the elites and leave little social infrastructure for the local community (Roche, 2002), Misener and Mason (2006) put forward four propositions that, if addressed, would provide opportunities for community development and social capital: community values should be central to all decision making processes; various stakeholders, particularly community interest groups should be involved in strategic activities related to events; collaborative action should empower local communities to become agents of change and finally open communication and mutual learning throughout strategic activities related to events must be maintained to minimize power brokering. The authors build on a point identified by Putnam (2000), that opportunities for participation in community events have decreased and that sport mega-events do bring together large numbers of people and involve the community in activities such as planning, volunteering and the consumption of an event. Using the example of the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester, they discuss through their four propositions how the Manchester City Council looked to include and collaborate with local citizens to use the event to meet the Council’s broader policy objectives of social integration, poverty reduction and social inclusion.

The concept that sport mega-events might boost social cohesion and renewed civic morale is not a new one. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, de Coubertin, in part, founded the modern Olympics to energize French patriotism and promote national pride (Muller 2004; Horne and Whannel, 2012). Fredline et al (2003) in reviewing the potential social impacts of sport mega-events note the work of Getz (1991) which promotes the idea that events might bring a sense of belonging and sharing to the community. Burns and Mules (1986) researching the impact of the Adelaide Grand Prix, report that being the focus of international attention promotes pride and self-esteem in the host community. More recently, following the FIFA World Cup in 2006, a survey of Munich residents reported that 88% believed the event had strengthened the community (Ohmann et al, 2006). The
experiences of event volunteers also appears to reflect this position: 70% of volunteers at
the 2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games said the Games made them feel much more
part of the community (Faber and Maunsell, 2004).

An important feature of a legacy programme that aims to promote feelings of social
cohesion is to facilitate the community to feel a sense of ownership of the event and its
Olympic experience of 1986 supports this concept where, through the efforts of the Local
Olympic Organising Committee and corporate sponsors in promoting forms of civic
participation, the perception of the host community was one of an elitist athletic event
transformed into a populist urban festival (Hillier, 1990). Conversely, although a pre-
Olympic Games study showed that Sydney’s increasingly polarized socio-economic
groups were united through feelings of community and national pride (Waitt, 2001), post
Games reports reflected contradictory evidence where local and marginalized people felt
excluded from event benefits (Waitt, 2003; Smith and Fox, 2007; Lenskyj, 2008). Lenskyj
(2008) suggests that implementing Games’ community initiatives using a highly
centralised system lacking accountability to the public may have contributed to the
reversal of public opinion.

My experiences of managing legacy programmes also support the need for practical
community engagement particularly if the programme activities are to be sustainable.
Further to our involvement with the legacy programmes of the 2002 Manchester
Commonwealth Games, my colleague, Lesley Giddins and I were recruited to manage the
Euro 2005 legacy programme (Euro 2005 LP) linked to the 2005 UEFA Women’s
Championships held in the North West of England. We found that, within less than three
years, the trails leading to the majority of Manchester 2002 legacy programme activities
were at best only ‘warm’ and therefore looked to improve on the sustainability of the Euro
2005 LP’s activities. A network of regional teams was established across the North West
of England, each consisting of a range of stakeholders operating at a local level from the 
private and public sectors. In this way, it was possible at a community level to identify 
specific needs in planning, build capacity in delivery and engage with existing 
organisations or projects to act as exit routes for the projects associated with the Euro 
2005 LP, increasing both its take up and sustainability (Hughes, 2011).

The themes of papers such as, Selling the city or selling it out (Suurballe, 2008); Lost in 
Translation (van Harskamp, 2006) and Whose Gold Rush (Raco, 2004), add weight to the 
suggestion that legacy benefits may not always reach the community members that are in 
most need. Raco (2004, p.34) develops this theory noting that sport mega-events are 
often associated with claims of “once in a lifetime opportunities for development” and the 
potential to change “problem places into opportunity places”. There is a danger however 
that the social and cultural value of places earmarked for regeneration may be overlooked 
and undervalued. Damaging social impacts to local communities may result as reflected in 
the eviction of small businesses employing local people thriving on low rent and lack of 
developer interest from the Olympic Parks in Barcelona, Sydney and London (Smith and 
Fox, 2007; COHRE, 2007). Other sites that may appear derelict to outsiders may possess 
significant heritage or environmental value (Talling, 2008). Concern is also raised that the 
views of local communities are misrepresented in the official bid books. In a review of the 
bids of all four candidature cities for the 2012 Games, COHRE (2007) noted that all 
claimed to enjoy the full support of the population and an absence of any opposition to 
hosting the Games. However, in reality all cities faced some dissent from community 
groups and activists and, as reported in Sydney, there were concerns that the bid 
campaign was undemocratic and aggressive, where those questioning the bid were made 
to feel unpatriotic (Hiller,1998; Waitt,1999; COHRE, 2007).
2.2.3 A legacy for sport

Although it is suggested that “a sports legacy is the most obvious outcome of a mega-sporting event” (AT Kearney, 2005 p.4), Cashman (2003) notes a relative paucity of research dedicated to this subject.

The most tangible legacy is the facilities although there are mixed reports of whether or not they have become a positive legacy for the communities. In terms of high performance sport, the Winter Olympics in Calgary are considered to be an exemplary case. An endowment fund created from its profits is used to support local and national elite athletes’ use of facilities (McCloy, 2002) but accessibility is a concern for marginalized community groups who cannot afford the entrance fees to either the Olympic park or the specialist facilities (Robinson, 2002). Advance planning for a positive legacy of facility use appears to be a key issue. There is evidence of professional, high performance and community sport working in a symbiotic relationship at the City of Manchester stadium and surrounding facilities built for the 2002 Commonwealth Games (Masterman, 2004). In addition, despite early concerns over its future (Mangan, 2008,) a long-term strategic plan has now been developed to transform the Sydney Olympic Park into a ‘sports town’ (Walters 2008; Cashman, 2010). However, despite the positive nature of the reports from Manchester and Sydney, Mangan (2008, p.1870) reports inadequate attention paid to venue legacy planning, resulting in events that have “given birth to a not insubstantial herd of ‘Limping White Elephants’”.

The Trickle-Down Effect (TDE)

The potential for increased mass sports participation is often promoted as a positive legacy of sport mega-events (Coalter, 2008a; Walters, 2008; Weed et al, 2009; McCartney et al, 2010). One reason, as summarised by Frawley et al (2009, p.3), is that a
mass sports participation legacy may be used to justify staging a sport mega-event to the host community:

Sporting events are seen to have a number of public benefits which legitimise government expenditure; among these is inspiring people to themselves participate in sport.

The association of a sport mega-event with a legacy of increased sport participation is based on a widely held belief that success in elite sport can inspire people at a grass roots level to want to participate in sport (Veal et al, in press). This process, often referred to as the ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE) has seemingly dominated sport policy in a number of countries for decades (Weed et al, 2009). The positive relationship between elite and mass sport was an idea promoted over a century ago by the founding father of the modern Olympics, Pierre de Coubertin (Muller and Poyan, 2006) and more recently Weed et al (2009) cite examples from Australia, New Zealand and the USA where politicians have proposed that elite athletic performance has the ability to inspire increased sporting participation. The association between elite and mass sport is used in publicity material and the candidature file for the London 2012 bid which promised that staging the Games would increase sports participation for all ages and abilities (BOA, 2004; London 2012, 2005).

Although widely used in sport development, particularly in relation to sports policy, the origins of the term ‘trickle-down’ effect in the industry are less determinable. It has been used in marketing terminology, where it relates to the process of a product originally introduced to the ‘socio-economic elite’ becoming more widely available through mass produced copies (Fallers, 1954). In sports development, its application appears to have been taken from the discourse of economics. In the economic sector, the ‘trickle-down’ theory refers to the promotion of economic and political policies that benefit the interests
of the business elite in the belief that that wealth will eventually trickle-down to the lower levels of society (Wamsley, 2004).

The concept of ‘trickle-down economics’ has been mentioned in reference to the proposed positive legacy that will be left to disadvantaged communities of London from the London 2012 Games. However, in a report, Fool’s Gold (The new economics foundation (nef), 2008), it was suggested that the intended legacy for local communities would not occur unless remedial action was taken. The authors of Fool’s Gold indicated that the root of the problem was trickle-down economics. Although it was assumed that the investment being poured into deprived areas of East London would remain for the benefit of local communities, the nef research demonstrated that, in practice, this wealth would leak out to consultants, developers and large companies.

The use of the term ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE) most probably progressed into sport policy in Australia as justification for a change in the country’s sport policy during the late 1970s. In the period 1972-5, the Australian Labor government funded community sport at a level never reached by any previous government (Hogan and Norton, 2000). In 1976 at the Montreal Olympic Games, Australia had failed to win a single gold medal. The consequent public outcry to such ‘failure’ created a climate for change which in 1981 resulted in the development of the Australian Institute of Sport (AIS) designed to:

not only affect the athletes at the top level but also filter through to the grass roots. (Federal Minister for Sport, Bob Ellicott, 1981, in Hogan and Norton 2000, p.204)

The establishment of the AIS, was a catalyst for the Australian Government to favour a sport funding model where the majority of funds were directed towards high performance athletes, particularly in Olympic and Commonwealth Sports. The objective was to produce
world-class athletes from which the benefits of “increased Australian pride, sporting interest and mass participation in sport and physical activity” would follow (Hogan and Norton, 2000 p.205).

The idea that experiencing elite sport can have a positive impact on people’s own sport behaviour is seen to be appealing as it suggests that people are part of a system that links top to bottom (UK Sport, 2011). The appeal is seen to be widespread. Hogan and Norton (2000) provide a number of quotes from Australian Ministers for Sport and national sport administrators that support the TDE. Hindson et al (1994, p.17) quote a New Zealand senior sport administrator saying that world-class performances by the country’s athletes have “clear flow-through to national esteem and increased sports participation”. The success of a country’s athletes in stimulating mass participation was also cited in a statement by the then Prime Minister of Norway, Kjell Magne Bondeevik, at the 1998 Winter Olympics in Japan. Speaking after Norwegian success at the 1998 Winter Olympics in Nagano, Japan, he said:

Olympic gold puts Norway on the map and stimulates the Norwegian people to be active on ice and snow. It [elite sport] is good entertainment and good culture, and it is a positive relationship between elite sport and mass sport (Cited in Hole, 1998, p.54).

Further to their examination of the claim that participation in the Olympics results in “trickle-down” benefits for sports clubs, Hindson et al (1994) propose two antithetical models of the relationship between the performance of top-level athletes and grass roots sport participation. The first follows the argument made earlier in this section that:
Successful top-level athletes gain media attention and attendant publicity and become role models. As role models, these athletes attract new people into the sports and into clubs (Hindson et al, 1994, p.23).

The second model takes an opposing stance and states that:

Demonstrations of sporting excellence can act as a deterrent to grass-roots participation. According to this model, the greater perceived “gap” between the level of excellence achieved by top-level athletes and the competence level of new or would-be participants the greater likelihood that those participants will resist further involvement in sport (Hindson et al, 2004, p.23-24).

Further to outlining these two models, Hindson et al (1994, p.24) conclude their review by posing two questions of promoters of the Olympic Games:

- What evidence do they have of the “trickle-down” effect from previous Olympic and Commonwealth Games?
- What evidence do they have that demonstrations of sporting excellence encourage rather than discourage grass-roots participation?

At the time of my literature review, which started 14 years after the publication of the Hindson et al (1994) paper, the evidence relating to these questions remains equivocal.

In support of the relationship between sport mega-events and increased sport participation, Truno (1995) reports a rise in sport participants in Barcelona from 36% in 1983 to 51% in 1995, although causality cannot be shown from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. In addition, Wang and Theodoraki (2007) demonstrate a rise in sports
participation associated with the Beijing Games in the Qingdao region. The authors do, however, point to the initial comparatively low levels of mass participation (compared to countries of the western world), and following the decision to bid for the Games, the change in emphasis by the government to actively promote community sport as well as the traditional focus on elite sporting success. The report also reflects a growth in the imbalance between levels of mass sport in rural and urban areas in the Qingdao region and the high entrance costs of new facilities restricting general public use.

Two studies reflect that it may not be new participants who are inspired by elite athlete success. A Sport England report (2004) on the impact of the summer Olympics in Athens illustrated that 26% of those questioned had been inspired to do more sport by the success of Team GB athletes. Further analysis of this group revealed that these were people who were already involved in sport and wanting to do more. A similar trend was found in a study of the much publicised Scottish curling Olympic gold medal won by Rhona Martin and her team at the Sat Lake City Olympics in 2002 (sportscotland, 2004).

Questions are also asked of how often the intention to participate in sport results in lasting action (Hamlyn and Hudson, 2005). Despite the annual observation of an increase in numbers of people playing tennis during and immediately after the extensive media coverage of Wimbledon, this increase is not sustained. Coalter (2008b) reports that the positive impact on participation experienced in the aftermath of Scotland’s curling gold medal were short-lived and Armstrong et al (2002), in their review of the impact of the 2000 Sydney Olympics on sports participation in Australia noted an increase in the awareness of the benefits of physical activity but not a transition to participation.

A number of authors reflect that the evidence for a sports development legacy from mega-sport events is negligible (Coalter, 2004; 2008a; Murphy and Baumann, 2007; Weed et al, 2009; McCartney et al, 2010). In Australia, host to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, figures
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics demonstrated lower figures for participation in physical activity or sports in 2000 than in 1999 and 1998 (National Centre for Culture and Recreational Statistics, 2001). In addition, research carried out pre and post the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester also reflected no impact on local sports participation (Brown and Massey 2001; 2004).

Although de Coubertin saw elite and mass sport as being on a continuum and being of mutual benefit, Cashman (2006) reports on the observations of Professor Hai Ren of the Olympic Research Centre in Beijing that propose elite and mass sport have become two different things which are incompatible, even contradictory in nature. In his speech to an IOC congress on legacy, Hai-Ren suggested that elite sport and particularly sport mega-events have become part of a professional, commercially driven entertainment business that bears little resemblance to the less formally structured world of community sport in which people engage within their leisure time. Cashman (2006) suggests that divide between the two forms of sport continues to grow which might seemingly add to the reasoning for the evidence of a lack of a symbiotic relationship.

A further concern is that funding for elite sport mega-events may divert funds away from local sport and community-based initiatives (EdComs, 2007). In keeping with the experiences of Sydney and Athens, where funding for grass-roots sports participation was reallocated to the Olympic cause (Smith and Fox, 2007), the London 2012 Games has already seen £1.1bn transferred from lottery funding to help pay for the rising costs of the Games (Kelso, 2008). This in turn has had a negative knock-on effect for lottery funded community sports projects at a regional and local level (Collins, 2008; Girginov and Hills, 2008). A report by the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture Media and Sport (2007a, p.28) concluded that the transfer of funding already announced because of the Olympics “will reduce Sport England’s ability to undertake non-Olympic related activity to promote grass-roots sport across the country”. Looking at the potential impact of hosting
the Olympics on UK sport, Coalter (2004, p.11) reports the suggestion in Scotland that as a result of budgets being diverted to support the Olympics, the “London bid may cost sport in Scotland £40m”. A more positive financial legacy has been left from the Los Angeles Olympics of 1984. Surplus funds were used to establish the LA84 Foundation a non-profit making organisation which supports youth sport and the advancement of sports knowledge through the provision of scholarships (LA84 Foundation, 2009).

With reference to the second question regarding the potential for demonstrations of elite sporting performance to discourage rather than encourage grass-roots participation, there is further equivocal evidence.

It was noted earlier, that reports by Sport England (2004) and sportscotland (2004) demonstrated that elite success had had a positive impact on those already involved in sport. However, Hindson et al (1994) note the conclusions of a report by Bloomfield (1973, p.3) who, although supportive of promoting elite sport, warned that “so much adulation is centred upon those who are physically gifted that many an average participant is discouraged through fear of embarrassment”. The suggestion here is that new or would-be participants, having witnessed elite sport performances may be discouraged from participation through fear of failure. It is a view supported by Coles (1975, p.14) who reflecting on the findings of the AIS study group, reported that:

A causal connection between excellence at the top and breadth of participation cannot simply be assumed. Excellent performance cannot only serve to encourage but also to discourage popular participation according to the factors involved.

It is the phrase factors involved in this quote that is seen to be key to the impact of excellent performance on mass sport participation. The response to the impact is
stimulated by the role-model effect; the role models that, as seen in Hindson et al's (1994) first model, are created by the *media and attendant publicity*. The role-model effect on sport participation is shown to be complex (MacCullum and Beltman, 2002; Payne et al, 2002; Lyle, 2009). In terms of this study it is a crucial factor. As articulated by Coalter (2008b):

> Although it is rarely systematically articulated, it seems that the assertion that sports events lead to increased sport participation in sport (and physical activity) is based implicitly on a theory of role modelling and emulation.

The theories of behaviour change as applied to sport participation and in particular that of role-model effect therefore warrant special attention and are dealt with in detail in the final section of this chapter.

### 2.2.4 ‘Leveraging’ legacy

The most widely reported claims of event related increase in sports participation relate to England’s Rugby World Cup victory in 2003. Figures released at the end of 2004 obtained from the Rugby Football Union (RFU) member clubs demonstrated an overall 16% rise in participation and 32% in the 7-11 year age group (Barton, 2008). Although the 2003 victory was further publicised through the nationwide Sweet Chariot Tour, it was also preceded by the launch of the RFU’s IMPACT strategy and the ‘Go Play Rugby’ programme. This example supports the idea that to use a sport mega-event as a catalyst to promote legacy, it needs to be part of a wider programme to ‘leverage’ opportunities (Chalip, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Coalter, 2008a; Weed et al, 2009). In the words of Girginov and Hills “legacies are created not given” (2008, p.2091). There is a consensus that advance planning and additional activities are required to maximise the benefits of sport mega-events (Hindson et al, 1994; Chalip, 2004; Coalter, 2004; 2008a; Chalip,
2006; Sport and Recreation Victoria, 2006; Wang and Theodoraki, 200; O’Brien and Chalip, 2007; Weed et al, 2009), however there are three caveats for this approach.

The first is the importance of community involvement in legacy development (Haxton 1999; Smith and Fox, 2007). Reports of the Manchester 2002 NW SRB social and economic legacy programme demonstrate that activities which lacked evidence of local need or community engagement reflected poor uptake and sustainability (Faber and Maunsell, 2004). The second is the need for the public to hold positive perceptions about the event if they are to be used as a basis to develop further activities. “If the population holds negative perceptions of, or attitudes toward a major sports event, the potential to use an event for the development of physical activity or sport, or the promotion of health (or indeed for any other purpose) is likely to be considerably reduced, if not negated” (Weed et al, 2009, p.29). The third is the timing of the programme and an understanding that the opportunities to create an event’s legacy need to be maximised in the pre-event period (Smith and Fox 2007). Robinson (2006, p.26) in discussing the legacy of the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics summarises this well, describing an event as having a “long sunrise and short sunset” where levels of media and public interest (and consequently the event’s potential impact) decline rapidly after the event’s closing ceremony.

A general conclusion from the evidence available is that just hosting an event is not enough to leave major benefits for the host country and that there is a need for all stakeholders to engage in the process of event leverage. There is also a requirement for legacy activities to be linked into wider strategic development programmes which in turn requires advance planning to establish the structures and networks to facilitate the process (ECOTEC, n.d; Hughes, 2011). The requirement for those involved in event leverage to engage with wider strategic programmes makes it difficult to establish a simple causal relationship between the event and a consequent legacy. It is therefore
suggested that what is required is to investigate our understanding of legacy though the processes by which the proposed legacy is being promoted (Girginov and Hills, 2008). It is this theme of the investigation of process which is central to this thesis.

2.3 A review of the development of sport policy in England

The changes made to the government’s policy on sport as a result of winning the bid to host the London 2012 Games have been outlined in Chapter 1. Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008a), with a message of ‘sport for sport’s sake’, replacing Game Plan (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), where the emphasis had been on the added value participation in sport could bring to achieving wider social aims in areas such as health, social inclusion and education. The London 2012 Games were seen to be an ‘unprecedented opportunity’ to use the attention sport would receive and the inspirational effect of the Games to get more people involved in sport and physical activity, without it (sport) having to concern itself with other “spillover benefits” (Purnell, 2007).

To set in context this change in policy that occurred as a consequence of the London 2012 Games and its proposed legacy of an increase in mass sport participation, this section provides a review of growing government intervention in sport from the mid-20th century to the time of writing.

2.3.1 The Wolfenden Report

It has been suggested that one of the earliest sport development interventions was the modern Olympic Games as introduced by Baron Pierre de Coubertin in the late 19th century (Girginov and Hills, 2008). His concerns were founded in the growing international social unrest and the seemingly poor health of young men in his home country of France. His solution was to use a sport based intervention as a means of tackling these issues.
The potential for sport to play a wider role in society was also seen to be the catalyst for establishing the Wolfenden Committee in 1957 which was set up with the following terms of reference:

To examine the factors affecting the development of games, sports and outdoor activities in the United Kingdom and to make recommendations to the Central Council of Physical Recreation as to any practical measures which should be taken by statutory or voluntary bodies in order that these activities may play their full part in promoting the general welfare of the community (CCPR, 1960, p.5).

The *Wolfenden Report* (CCPR,1960) and its recommendations are seen to mark a significant point in the organisation of sport in the UK. The picture painted by the report is of one where, in the post second world war period, sport was run primarily by voluntary organisations and through philanthropic concern for the welfare of the ‘masses’. Successive governments had resisted involvement in the direct funding and organisation of sport (Hargreaves, 1986), it being seen as a pastime and amateur pursuit (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). However, concerns of the time, including the ramifications of the second world war and the need for an increase in social control particularly over young adults in an era of growing affluence and leisure time, were to be a catalyst to increase pressure on government to increase its intervention (Kirk,1992). One concern was the decline of Britain as a ‘force’ in world sport. It was suggested that the country had become a nation of “spectators not sportsmen” and our record in international sport events was one of “failure and defeat” (Times Educational Supplement, 1951). Two factors are of importance here: firstly, the use of sport to create a ‘national identity’ with success in sport acting as a cohesive force across all classes and reflecting the ‘health of the nation’ (Kirk,1992). Secondly, as outlined in Chapter 1, was the growing importance being attached to sport as a means of promoting a country’s status and ideologies. At a time when Britain’s
international status through the decline of its Empire was waning, success in sport was seen as a means to maintain its significance on the world stage.

Concern over increased youth delinquency and the potential to use the presumed therapeutic powers of sport in social control was also to be a factor in drawing government into sport (Kirk, 1992). Sport (particularly ‘games’ as played in the English public school system) was considered to encourage the development of courage, endurance, self-discipline, determination and self-reliance (CCPR, 1960). Although the status given to sport in this description is considered by Coalter (2007b, p.9) to be “mythopoeic”, that is, “to contain elements of truth, but elements which become reified and distorted and ‘represent’ rather than reflect reality, standing for supposed but largely unexamined, impacts and processes”, it was central to the recommendations of the Wolfenden Report (1960) and has continued to be used in sport policy debates (Coalter, 2007b). Bloyce et al, (2009) support this view suggesting that sport is entrenched with storylines whose persistence and impact do not relate to quality and quantity of evidence available. The rhetoric of sport’s mythopoeic status was to be heard in Lord Coe’s Games’ bid speech to the IOC General Committee (Slot, 2008) and together with the ‘storylines’ will later receive further attention in considering the part played in the development of the plans for a London 2012 Games legacy of mass sport participation.

The Wolfenden Report (CCPR, 1960) made a number of recommendations including, recognition of the ‘gap’ between sport and physical recreation provision between school and post school years, the lack of sport facilities and the need for more co-operation amongst all those organisations involved in sport development: elite, grassroots and schools. Although the overall picture was considered favourable compared with other countries, the report recognised the ‘backward position’ the country held for elite sport provision in comparison with other countries where direct state subsidies were received. The association that countries made between national prestige and international success
was noted and it was proposed that relevant organisations in the UK would benefit from further study of the “evidence on the ways in which sport in other countries is organised, administered and financed” (p.21).

The report highlighted the problems of gaining an exact figure of state expenditure on sport because this element was not always classified but contained in other budgets. It was subsequently the action taken on the recommendation for an increase in state expenditure on sport and, in particular, the establishment of a ‘Sports Development Council’ with additional revenue from the Treasury, which is seen as the first major influential government sport policy action.

The *Wolfenden report* (1960) was generally well received and as a response to the recommendation of more and better organisation of sport, an Advisory Sports Council was established in 1965 (Kirk, 1992). In 1972 it was given executive powers and became the Sports Council. Although the *Wolfenden Report* had spoken of the role of sport in ‘promoting the general welfare of the community’, the stated aim of the newly formed Sports Council was “to raise standards of performance in sport and physical recreation” (Green, 2004 p.367 – emphasis added) and was considered to be a policy of ‘sport for sport’s sake’. An uneasy relationship had already surfaced. On the one side the demand to raise standards and to generate international success through provision for elite athletes and on the other, the provision of opportunity for mass participation in sport.

### 2.3.2 Sport – an emerging partner in wider social policy

In the 1970s, a background of economic decline and increasing unemployment saw a change of sport policy priorities which became linked to the role of the welfare state, prompting the suggestion by Houlihan (1991, p.99) that ‘Sport For All’ became ‘Sport For the Disadvantaged’. In the early 1980s, *Sport in the Community: The Next Ten Years*
(Sports Council, 1982) further promoted the link between sport and wider government policy in particular towards low socio-economic groups. A programme called Action Sport led to sports leaders working with a range of partners to encourage young people into sporting activity. The pilots for the programme were based in inner cities, where there were high incidences of youth offending, poor socio-economic conditions and a lack of purpose built sport facilities. Partnerships were established with the National Health Service, Working Men’s Clubs and the Women’s Institute in addition to breweries and the probation service (Collins, 2010a). Many of the activities were delivered in non-traditional sporting environments. The design of the programme proved to be popular and the Action Sport model became widely used, particularly by local authorities. Sport became a valued medium for the delivery of a number of social strategies, including education, health and crime but as noted by Coalter et al (1988), elite sport still received the major share of the Sports Council’s budget.

Green (2004) reports that a major obstacle to overall development of sport at the time was the lack of cohesion and clarification of roles between the three main voices for sport: the Sports Council; the Central Council for Physical Recreation (renamed the Sport and Recreation Alliance in 2010) and the British Olympic Association. Promoted by the Sports Council, reform of the situation was sought and came influenced by the arrival in 1990 of John Major (a keen advocate of sport), as Prime Minister.

In 1992 the status of sport as a subject of government interest was heightened by its inclusion in a newly formed Department of National Heritage (DNH). Sport policy was included in its responsibilities which, for the first time, gave sport status at the level of national government. Green (2009) suggests that this was one of three developments introduced by John Major that have shaped sport into the twenty-first century, both as a contributor to wider social policy and developing elite sport as a subject of political interest. Second was the introduction of a National Lottery. Sport was one of five good
causes where fund recipients were required to demonstrate the wider social benefits of their project to the target community. The third was a policy document, *Sport: Raising the Game* (DNH, 1995) which focused on two main areas: young people and school sport and elite sport development. In schools, sport became a national curriculum subject in 1992, a development that was fuelled by growing concerns about levels of obesity amongst young people (Houlihan and Green, 2006). Elite sport in the early 90s was characterised by a lack of international success in the traditional sports of football, cricket and rugby. A call for action in this area increased following the UK’s poor showing at the 1996 Atlanta Olympics when the team won only one gold medal and finished 32nd in the medal table. An early response to this situation was the emergence of the UK Sport Council to lead on the development of elite sport. This move saw the re-organisation of the Sports Council into five bodies (the four home countries and the UK Sport Council). As part of this development, 22 sports (mainly Olympic and traditional team sports) received enhanced provision of resources in a bid to improve performance (Oakley and Green, 2001). In terms of the relationship between elite sport and mass participation, it is notable that funding for the latter became increasingly reliant on sport promoting itself as a benefit to wider government policy objectives (Green, 2004). On a further positive note for elite sport provision, England successfully played host to the 1996 UEFA European Football Championships which prompted discussion on major sport events and economic and social legacy. Later this was to lead to the UK Sport Council (now termed UK Sport) producing the document, *Major events ‘a blueprint for success*, with the aim of bringing world class events to the UK, “harnessing the benefits that major events can bring to our athletes, sports system and the country as a whole” (UK Sport, 1998, p.1).

**2.3.3 New Labour’s Third Way and the ‘politicisation’ of sport**

By the end of John Major’s tenure, sport had gained previously unknown political stature. It had attached itself to areas of social policy which commanded attention and was seen
as having the potential to benefit both the country's international profile and the economy. When Tony Blair’s New Labour government defeated Major and came to power in 1997, it was this elevated status that made sport an attractive tool to deliver the ‘Third Way’ of addressing social and economic problems. The role of sport was to become more clearly defined in social policy (Coalter, 2007b). Dickson (1999) cites Julian Le Grand who has suggested that there are four key values of the ‘Third Way’, the most relevant in this scenario being a belief in the value of the community. Sport’s role in community development was outlined by the Policy Action Group 10 report (DCMS, 1999, p. 23), which stated that “sport can contribute to neighbourhood renewal by improving communities’ performance on four key indicators – health, crime, employment and education”.

In the document, A Sporting Future For All (DCMS, 2000, p.39), although there was still a focus on school sport and elite development, there was also a clear reminder of sport’s “unique contribution” to tackling wider social issues and strengthening communities. Coalter (2007) describes this changing role as one where sport (in the 80s and 90s) was developed to the benefit of all those within the community to one where communities were being developed through sport. ‘Sport for all’ became ‘sport for good’ (Coalter, 2007).

Sport, as a subject of government policy, continued to grow in status. For the first time it was mentioned by name in a government department, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) having replaced the Department of National Heritage. Increased status also brought increased responsibility and government intervention in its organisation. Grix and Phillpots (2011, p.7) suggest that since the Labour government came into power in 1997, the “politicisation of sport”, had been on the increase. Sport like many other policy areas became part of Labour’s modernisation programme, the aim of which was to make public services more responsive to the needs of users, more efficient, effective and delivered to higher standards (Sanderson, 2002). The proposed improvement in service
delivery was to be fuelled by a change from a hierarchical mode of government, with a high degree of central control over policy design and implementation, to governance through ‘arm’s length agencies’ that would build enhanced partnerships and networks with the delivery agencies (Grix and Phillpotts, 2011).

Sport policy could be seen as a good example of this latter style of governance (termed ‘New Public Management’) with a wide range of agencies, associations and charities (including Sport England, UK Sport and NGBs) involved in its delivery. However, it is suggested that rather than decrease central government control, this style of governance, with its use of “explicit and measurable (or at least checkable) standards of performance [ ] as against trust in professional standards and expertise in the public sector”(Hood, 1995, p.97), has seemingly decreased the autonomy of such agencies with the government dictating their priorities and decisions (Bloyce et al, 2009; Grix and Phillpotts, 2011).

The influence of New Public Management, was seen in  A Sporting Future For All (DCMS 2000, p.39) which made clear that sport was now a partner in delivering “efficient, economic and effective policies” for the community and that its funding would be subject to the production of performance plans and meeting specified targets. This performance target approach required many organisations in the sporting community to address their methods of governance. NGBs, for example relied (and still do) on armies of volunteers, many of whom are steeped in long standing traditions of management, where seniority in an organisation may be simply based on longevity of service (Green, 2009). As indicated in Chapter 1, changing styles of management has been a cause of lingering tension in NGBs. Organisations that had enjoyed so much autonomy, although welcoming of the increased government funding, felt that their inherent understanding of how best to run sport was being challenged (Houlihan and White, 2002). New Labour had sown the seeds of “earned autonomy” (Green, p.129), where trust and recognition of professional
expertise was no longer the yardstick for funding and the resources given to organisations were conditional on following a programme of modernisation and meeting targets.

The need for improvement in management systems and to address the complex infrastructure of sport delivery was reinforced in *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002). As an observation of the increasing importance being attached by government to sport, Green (2008) highlights the involvement in this report of the Strategy Unit (which reports directly to the Cabinet Office and the Prime Minister). *Game Plan*: a strategy for delivering Government’s sport and physical activity objectives, saw sport as a “powerful and often under-used tool that can help Government to achieve a number of ambitious goals” (p.5).

In *Game Plan*, the commitment to young people and international elite sporting success was maintained but a further need was highlighted, that of participation in sport amongst adults, particularly for health benefits. *Game Plan* (p.14) reported that the “benefits of physical activity on health are clear, well evidenced and widely accepted” and that regular participation in physical activity could help reduce the risk of “cardiovascular diseases, some cancers, strokes and obesity”. The report also indicated a cost to the country of at least £2billion a year as a result of illness and disease resulting from physical inactivity. The target set for mass sport participation was ambitious. Starting from a reported base of 32% of adults who, at the time, took part in moderate exercise, the target was to reach 70% by 2020. To create this mass participation culture, it was proposed to put “as much emphasis on physical activity as competitive sport” (p.15).

*Game Plan* (p.15) recognised the importance of the role played by local authorities in delivering sport and promoted delivery of sport at a local level: “if participation is to be increased it is at the local not central or regional level that activity must be focused”. The report acknowledged that sport had a very low level of priority in local authorities and recommended that, to change this, sport should link itself to other social areas, where its
value could be evidenced through helping to meet performance indicators. As someone who worked for Sport England from 2001-2005, it was clear to me that providing the ‘evidence’ for sport to contribute to a number of social and economic agendas became a growing concern. The phrase ‘key performance indicator’ (KPI) became part of the everyday office discourse and KPIs an essential component of any programme report.

Making the association between sport and other social and economic agendas was seen to be central to the strategy document: *The Framework for Sport: Making England an Active and Successful Sporting Nation: A vision for 2020* (Sport England, 2004b). The overall aim of the Framework was:

> To change the culture of sport and physical activity in England in order to increase participation across all social groups leading to improvements in health and other social and economic benefits and providing the basis for progression into higher levels of performance (Sport England, 2004b, p.3).

As part of the process of providing the ‘evidence’, Sport England had set up the *Value of Sport Monitor* in conjunction with the University of Stirling (Sport England n.d.) It was recognised that there was a growing body of evidence that linked sport with a number of other policy agendas but this was not always easily accessible. The *Value of Sport Monitor* provides an on-line resource which groups the available research into seven categories: crime reduction and community safety; economic impact and regeneration of local communities; education and lifelong learning; lifelong participation; physical fitness and health; psychological health and well-being and social capacity and cohesion.

On a wider cross-policy agenda, the target driven approach gained greater force with the introduction of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (replaced by the
Comprehensive Area Assessment in 1999) to which all local authorities had to comply (Bloyce and Smith 2010). This assessment included a statutory cultural component and for the first time included performance indicators relating specifically to sport through participation, volunteering and facility provision. Under New Labour, local authorities were seen as central to the delivery of many policies particularly those relating to strengthening communities as a core value of New Labour’s ‘Third Way’ (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).

Sport England responded to the importance given to local authorities and the role sport had to play in delivering desired social outcomes such as, greater educational attainment, reduced crime, community regeneration and improved health by producing a series of reports: *Sport Playing Its Part* (Sport England, 2006). The commonality of these reports was that they all looked to demonstrate the role sport could play in delivering the wider social goals of government (Bloyce and Smith, 2010). Notwithstanding the problems identified in quantifiable assessment of sport’s specific contribution to social outcomes (Pawson, 2006; Coalter, 2007a), it linked sport to some of the most influential government departments, such as health, education and the Home Office.

### 2.3.4 Game Plan – sport mega-events, elite sport and mass participation

As noted earlier in the chapter, *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002) did maintain the government’s commitment to elite sport. The reasons given were firstly the impact of national sporting success on the ‘feel good factor’ in the country which was suggested to be linked to an increase in social capital, when “crime is lower, there is increased bonding between sections of society and possibly an increase in GDP” (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002, p.63). A second reason was the potential for sporting success to create a positive image of the UK. It was noted that both France and Australia used sport to promote foreign policy but that for the UK to follow this example, a more coordinated approach would be required between the relevant organisations. *Game Plan* considered in detail the
various benefits that had been attributed to hosting sport mega-events, including economic, urban regeneration, tourism and sport. The conclusion to the analysis was summarised in one of Game Plan’s three overall aims:

To adopt a different approach to hosting mega sporting events. They should be seen as an occasional celebration of success rather than a means to achieving other government objectives (p.15).

Further analysis was made of the relationship between mass participation, international competition and hosting sport mega-events. Game Plan (p.72) reflected on the paucity of data available to make the analysis but concluded that:

- International success does not, on its own, lead to increased mass participation or vice versa.
- Hosting mega events does not necessarily lead to sustained levels of increased success.
- Hosting events does not necessarily lead to increases in mass participation

Game Plan recommended a number of strategies to develop mass participation policies, including developing a cross departmental Sport and Physical Activity Board and implementing a range of initiatives aimed at adults in the community. The strategies also focused on the need to build an evidence base of ‘what works’ including an annual national survey of participation and fitness.

There is some evidence of these strategies being put into place including the Value for Sport Monitor (Sport England n.d.). In addition, the £750m New Opportunities for PE and Sport (NOPES) was launched in November 2002. I managed this lottery funded initiative
for Sport England in the North West from 2003-2005. The programme’s remit was to improve facilities in schools but to secure the NOPES funding schools were required to develop a partnership with the local community to promote increased community access to the facilities. I observed first-hand how the ‘change management’ required to facilitate the dual-use was fraught with problems relating to issues of status and control. Many projects floundered where it was not possible to gain the level of partnership working and understanding between the community and the school. There was, however, also evidence of numerous new facilities being developed and flourishing (Big Lottery Fund, 2009). The commitment to a national survey came in the form of the Active People Survey which first ran between October 2005 and 2006. It was conducted by ipsos Mori on behalf of Sport England. The technical report (ipsos Mori, 2007) indicates that 363,724 interviews were conducted across England relating to adults’ (16 years and older) sport and physical activity behavioural trends. At time of writing, this survey has been regularly completed on an annual basis, although with a reduced sample size (Sport England, n.d.).

2.3.5 The London bid for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

In light of Game Plan’s recommendations, it might be considered unexpected when, six months after the report’s publication, the government announced its decision to fully support the bid to host the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games in London (BBC, 2003). Indeed, during the bidding period for the London 2012 Games, in the final presentation by the London 2012 bid team to the International Olympic Committee and further to winning the hosting rights, there has been one constant discourse by the government and event supporters, that hosting the Games would promote increased mass participation in sport and physical activity across the country (BOA, 2004; Vigor et al, 2004; Jowell, 2007; 2009; Coalter, 2008; Slot, 2008; Gibson, 2009). Veal et al (in press) in reviewing the intent of Olympic host cities to deliver a sport legacy, conclude that the successful London bid was “arguably the most ambitious of host city statements of intent”. The discourse relating to
the potential to deliver a legacy of increased sport participation will be shown to feature prominently in the majority of interviews carried out for the purpose of this thesis with senior members of sport organisations in the country and specifically those working for NGBs of Olympic and Paralympic sports. This widespread conviction appears to ignore the government’s own recommendations in *Game Plan* and that of the previously evidenced research which fails to show a positive association between hosting sport mega-events and increasing mass participation in sport in the host country.

The outcome of winning the bid to host the London 2012 Games has been noticeable on the sporting landscape both visibly through the development of the Olympic Park in the East End of London and the impact on sport development policy. The changes made to sport policy following the success of the bid, from *Game Plan* and its focus on ‘sport for good’ and *Playing to Win* where sport was given stand-alone status as ‘sport for sport’s sake’, have been documented in Chapter 1. It is relevant to reiterate here that this was a complete reversal of the general sport policy direction that had been followed by New Labour since 1997, a direction that had seen the government accept the salience of sport as providing a solution to a number of policy problems in health and education (Houlihan and Green, 2004). In the changed sport policy environment sport had now become a “single entity and should concentrate solely on sports related issues [ ] it should concentrate on that central issue and not be diluted or distracted by meeting demands of other agendas” (Charlton, 2010, p.353). It was to distance sport from other service partners such as education, health and social services which Collins (2010b) considers will be a cause for concern in the long term. Protection of sports’ central funds may be felt in the run up to the London 2012 but as Collins (2010a) notes, all other host nations have experienced post event funding cuts in sport. It is also the case that as sport is a non-statutory local authority service, it is considered likely that its budget will particularly feel the effects of the government’s austerity measures (Collins, 2008). In 2008, local authorities invested £1.2bn in revenue and £415m capital funding in sport (Sport England
The potential to lose much of this funding by distancing itself from its wealthier service partners may be a cause for regret.

The final observation to be made in this review is perhaps reflective of the concerns for the future funding of sport as outlined above. There have been recent noticeable efforts of leading sport development organisations such as Sport England to highlight once again the contribution sport can make as a partner in other social areas. This activity increased in the build up to and following the announcement of the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review which indicated large scale cuts to sport budgets at local and national level. The cuts included Sport England being required to absorb cuts of 33% by 2014/15 and a proposed £500 million less for sport in communities through the local government sector (Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA) 2010). In concluding its review, the SRA (2010) called for the sport community to work together to “make sure that the value of sport and physical activity is understood as widely as possible” and that it needed to be understood that “a relatively small amount of spending on sport can achieve a lot in improving health, education, cohesion and tackling anti-social behaviour”.

2.4 Behavioural change and participation in sport

Further to the Wolfenden Report’s (CCPR, 1960) conclusion that sport and physical activity could help in promoting the general welfare of the community and the subsequent establishment of the Sports Council in 1971, increasing sport participation has been an overt public sector policy goal (Weed, 2010). In the previous section of this chapter, the development of sport policy since the 1960s was outlined together with the rationale for its association with other areas of public policy such as health and education. In this section, an overview is given of the research that has been either consulted or specifically carried out as part of the effort or to try to understand how to increase mass participation in sport. This is seen to be dominated by two areas: firstly, the ‘barriers’ that are perceived to
hinder or prevent participation and secondly, from behavioural science, the research into an individual’s motivation to participate (Weed, 2010).

In *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), the government set a clear aim: to increase mass sport and physical activity participation to the extent that by 2020, 70% of the population would be reasonably active.6 In the document, *The Framework for Sport in England* (Sport England, 2004), it was noted that to achieve the government’s aim, sport participation would be required to increase by 1% per year to 2020. The nature of this challenge was seen as demanding and cause for Sport England to conduct a systematic review of the evidence about children’s and adults’ reasons for participation and non-participation in sport. The consequent report, *Understanding Participation in Sport* (Foster et al. 2005) highlighted the lack of evidence in this area and showed an appreciation, as outlined by Nick Rowe, the Head of Strategy, Research and Planning at Sport England, that to achieve the aim there was a need for a “more sophisticated understanding of the motivations and barriers to taking part in sport and the likely interventions that will achieve behaviour change” (Foster et al, 2005, p.2).

### 2.4.1 Theories of behaviour change as applied to sport and physical activity participation

‘*Understanding Participation in Sport* (Foster et al, 2005) initially focuses on a number of early studies predominantly based on the work of Skinner (1953), whose theories of operant conditioning proposed that behaviour could be determined by manipulating ‘antecedents and consequences’. Antecedents are physical or environmental stimuli that are the catalyst for behaviour change such as an advert promoting a healthy lifestyle or expert advice. The immediate consequences (or reinforcement) of behaviour are considered to have an impact on the likelihood of it happening again. Positive

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6 In *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002, p.15), reasonably active is described as ‘30 minutes of moderate exercise five times a week’.
reinforcement increases the likelihood and negative reinforcement decreases the likelihood. Examples of positive reinforcement commonly used to promote sport participation activities are rewards such as T-shirts, free tickets to sport events or pin badges. Reinforcement can also be an internal feeling such as enjoyment or heightened self-esteem. Internal reinforcement has been noted to have a longer lasting effect on a change in behaviour than external reinforcement (Deci and Ryan, 1987).

A number of other theories of behavioural change have been used in the design of physical activity interventions. Weed (2010) suggests the two most widely used are the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1985), and self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 1985).

Theory of Planned Behaviour

The TPB has been applied to many health-related behaviours including physical activity. This theory aims to explain ‘intention’ through three belief-based constructs that a person applies to their performance of a future behaviour: attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control (Hagger, 2010). Attitudes, refer to a person’s evaluation of the behaviour and whether it will meet their expected outcomes. For physical activity, outcomes such as ‘loss of weight’, ‘friendship’ and ‘feeling fit’ have frequently been cited (Hagger et al, 2001). Subjective norms, refer to a person’s evaluation of other people’s influence on their behaviour, such as being cajoled by friends and family to participate because of the health benefits or an individual’s feeling that they should conform to remain part of a group. The final construct, perceived behavioural control, is a reflection of the perceptions an individual has about barriers to participation and their capacity to carry out the planned behaviour. This is seen to relate to Bandura’s (1997) construct of ‘self-efficacy’, which refers to the influence of personal capabilities on performance, posing the question, ‘Am I good enough to try this’? Hagger (2010, p.9) cautions that, although the TPB has informed a number of successful physical activity interventions, only a modest
relationship is evidenced between intentions and behaviour where “frequently people do not convert their ‘good’ intentions to engage in physical activity into actual behaviour”.

**Self-Determination Theory**

Self-determination theory (SDT) (Deci and Ryan, 1985), provides a comprehensive overview of the range of motivations that may influence behaviour. The theory has six sub theories but central to them all is the distinction between autonomous (self-determined) and controlling (non-self-determined) forms of motivation. The extent to which people experience motivation as either autonomous or controlling will determine whether or not they will continue with the behaviour (Hagger, 2010). Autonomous forms of motivation are generally from an intrinsic stimulus. In this situation a person engages in physical activity for the satisfaction of the behaviour itself or because they are pursuing some personally valued goals such as weight loss. At the other end of the continuum is controlling motivation which is predominantly determined by external stimuli, for example, feelings of guilt brought on by an outside agency that renders a person feeling lazy. Other forms of controlling motivation are extrinsic rewards such as money or certificates. In terms of the focus of this thesis, that is, the ambition to increase mass sport participation, it is noted that autonomous motivation is more closely associated with long term physical activity adherence (Chatzisarantis et al, 2003; Fortier and Cowal, 2007).

The SDT continuum of motivation from autonomous to controlling is seen to provide more categories than simply intrinsic and extrinsic as the former is considered to be too widely conceptualised and the latter too narrowly conceptualised (Deci and Ryan, 1985). SDT is seen to have six categories of motivation: intrinsic motivation, four categories of extrinsic motivation and amotivation (no intention) (Weed, 2010). In practical use these have been reduced to three: external, internal and integrated (Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2005). External motivation refers to controlling forces, both material and externally referenced approval or disapproval of behaviour. Internal motivation refers to the achievement of
personally relevant and valued outcomes. Integrated motivation combines the original intrinsic category, where behaviour is for the pleasure of the activity itself, with those outcomes of behaviour which are seen to fulfil an individual’s psychological needs such as a release of tension or gregariousness. Based on the findings of the Henley Centre Headlight Vision report (2008a) on people’s experience of sport, Weed (2010, p.13) suggests that the three categories are “closer to the reality of participation than the more traditional intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy”.

More recently, researchers have looked to integrate the TPB and SDT as they are considered complimentary in trying to explain the processes that underlie behaviour change. The motivational constructs provided by SDT may help explain the origins of the attitudes, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control constructs proposed by the TPB (Hagger, 2010). It is suggested that people with high levels of autonomous motivation are more likely to consider the personal value of outcomes of engaging in a future behaviour (Hagger and Chatzisaranti, 2008) and therefore in terms of participation in sport or physical activity are likely to focus on information that promotes the value of the health behaviours which in turn promotes a positive attitude to participation (Hagger, 2010).

**Transtheoretical Model**

A model for behavioural change that initially establishes a person’s level of motivation or ‘readiness’ to change their behaviour and has been applied to many health behaviours is the Transtheoretical Model (TTM) (Prochaska et al, 1992). The components of the TTM that have been applied to physical activity are: stage of change; processes of change; decisional balance; self-efficacy and temptation not to exercise (Spencer et al, 2006).

The TTM was originally developed in relation to the cessation of addictive behaviours such as smoking (Woods et al, 2001). In this format it has six ‘stages of change’ through
which a person progresses from ‘pre-contemplation’, where the person is not considering a behaviour change to ‘termination’, where the person is considered to have ‘given up’ and is not considered likely to return to the behaviour (Foster et al, 2005). In its application to sport and physical activity, the ‘termination’ stage has generally been omitted and the model has five temporal stages which refer to “a person’s readiness to engage in physical exercise” (Spencer et al, 2006, p.428). The five stages are: pre-contemplation; contemplation; preparation; action; and maintenance (Marshall and Biddle, 2001). People may start at different entry points (stage of change) and the time to proceed through the stages of change varies between individuals.

The second component, ‘processes of change’, when applied to physical activity, has five cognitive and five behavioural strategies that a person uses as they progress from pre-contemplation to maintenance (Spencer et al, 2006). Examples of behavioural processes are the engagement of a training partner or rewards. Cognitive processes may include release of tension or an individual’s perceived level of self-esteem.

‘Decisional balance’ refers to the outcome of a person weighing up the pros and cons of undertaking exercise. A rise in pros and decrease in cons will act as a catalyst for a person to move progressively upwards through the stages of change. ‘Self-efficacy’ is a measure of the confidence a person has that they can take part in regular exercise. ‘Temptation not to exercise’, refers to the nature of the ‘barriers’ that may prevent a person from exercising (Spencer et al, 2006). From my review of the literature, it is evident that the main focus of research using the TTM, as applied to physical activity, is the component of ‘stage of change’. Weed (2010) notes that it is only the concept that behaviour changes in stages that has been adopted by sport policy makers. It is suggested that more attention needs to be paid to the “more analytical aspects of the model that examine how and why people change their behaviour” (Weed, 2010, p. 1).
One feature of the TTM that has been more recently observed is that behaviour change is not seen to be an all-or-none phenomenon and that people who stop performing a behaviour may have intentions to start again (Jordan et al, 2002). From a meta review of 71 studies of the TTM as applied to exercise and physical activity, Marshall and Biddle (2001) report that original formulations of the TTM proposed that people moved through the stages of change in a linear fashion but later it was recognised that the pattern of progression is more likely to be cyclical. In the original work of Prochaska et al (1992) it was suggested that the movement was more spiral than cyclical in nature. People who ‘relapse’ are neither seen to move endlessly in circles nor to regress back to their first starting point. As applied to physical activity interventions, this proposes that once a person has progressed from pre-contemplation to contemplation they will not return to the pre-contemplation stage (Weed et al, 2009).

A recognised limitation to the use of the TTM is the lack of studies that have been conducted with ‘hard to reach’ groups (Spencer et al, 2006). As highlighted in Game Plan (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), these are the very communities, for example, those with low incomes or which are ethnically diverse, that organisations such as Sport England are challenged to target in their work. There is also a lack of empirical evidence to show long term adherence to exercise following an intervention based on the TTM (Adams and White, 2003). A further criticism that is widely made of research of the TTM is the lack of a consistent measure of exercise (Marshall and Biddle, 2001; Adams and White, 2003; Spencer et al, 2006). Further to the report: Understanding Participation in Sport (Foster et al (2005), a number of studies have started to use the measure of, ‘3 to 5 times per week for 20-60 minutes per session’ (Weed, 2010) but there are a number of other definitions of exercise identified in the reviews listed above. The lack of consistency in measurement makes it more difficult to make comparisons between studies or for one study to build on the empirical findings of an earlier piece of research.
Role models

On the basis of the earlier discussion of the ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE), it is particularly relevant to this study to consider one specific theory of behaviour change; that of the role-model effect which according to Coalter (2008b, p.13) is considered to be implicit in the “assertion that sports events lead to increased sport participation”.

A role model, as defined by Payne et al (2002, p.4) is an individual who is considered worthy of imitation or one who “inspires individuals or groups of people, through contact and relationship”. The nature of that contact can be categorised “on a continuum from observation and minimal interaction to longer-term and more interactive mentoring relationships” (Lyle, 2009, p.4), factors considered to be relevant to the effectiveness of the role-model process. As reviewed by Coalter (2008b, p.14) both Payne et al (2002), and Lyle (2009) who conducted reviews of the role modelling process reported that “success in changing attitudes and behaviour was related to the length and intensity of contact with any role models”.

The review by Payne et al (2002) proposes that the presumed relationship between sporting role models and an impact on sport participation fails to appreciate the complex nature of behavioural change. In referencing that review, Coalter (2008b) suggests three specific aspects of behavioural change that are of particular relevance to the elite sport role model approach associated with sport mega-events.

Firstly, that the role models need to be relevant and accessible to the target group. By way of example, Payne et al (2002) report on the preference for boys to choose sport stars as role models whereas girls preferred pop ‘idols’ and movie stars. It is suggested that the relative lack of coverage of women’s sport compared to men’s sport by the media may be a contributory factor (Centre for Gender Equality, 2006), leading to a situation where in a Syzygy Leisure/ WSF report, girls felt that “they were not always attracted by
the household [sporting] names perceiving them as too far removed from their daily lives” (in Lyle, 2009, p.29).

Secondly, in line with the constructs of ‘perceived behavioural control’ as part of the TPB (Ajzen 1985), the effectiveness of role models is dependent on their characteristics and their perceived similarity to the learner. In Understanding Participation in Sport (Foster et al, 2005) many of the studies reported that, where elite athletes were used as role models, people could not identify with the models of perfection that were used in promotional material designed to encourage participation. People may therefore be unable to identify with the performances of elite athletes, considering them to be ‘distant and therefore met with a negative response due to a perceived competence gap (Payne et al 2002; Lyle 2009; Weed, 2011a). As a result and further to their observations of the potential impact of role models from the 1992 Summer and Winter Olympic Games, Hindson et al (1994, p.24) recommended that sports organisations looking to exploit the [2000 Sydney] Olympics to enhance grass roots sports participation need to:

ensure that their marketing is sensitive to consumer resistance arising from an awareness of how difficult it is in the 1990s to emulate our sporting heroes and heroines.

Age is seen to be one factor that can influence the self-concept response to role models. As a mechanism for change, reviews of literature by both Payne et al (2002) and Lyle (2009) found some evidence that sporting role models can be influential in the behaviour and values of young people. More recently, results from the analysis of data from the Lloyds/TSB/Bank of Scotland National School Weeks for the Youth Sport Trust narrows the definition of ‘young people’. The analysis illustrated that the demonstration effect can have a positive impact on sports participation amongst young people (Weed, 2011a) but the effect may be less significant with secondary than primary aged school children.
In support of Weed’s observation, Sir Steve Redgrave (2011, p.S12) commenting on the progress of the London 2012 sport legacy, suggests that it is really only at primary school age where elite athletes as role models might make a positive impact. In his article, Redgrave reflects on the importance of perceived competence and makes the observation that “teenagers like to do things they are good at” and therefore may not try to emulate elite role models due to a perceived lack of competence.

In the case of adults and the impact of role models, Lyle (2009, p.5) suggests that:

- Given the importance of relevance, attainability and similarity to the observer’s self-concept, it may not always be appropriate to use elite sporting champions. Peer models have a role to play in demonstrating the attainability of sporting success.

In their review, Foster et al (2005) concluded that ‘real life’ models would be more effective in promoting behavioural change, a finding that held true in studies of teenagers, older people and across diverse ethnic backgrounds (Arkenford Ltd, 2006, GfK NOP, 2006; TSA 2006; Carnegie Research Institute, 2009).

Payne et al’s (2002) third issue is one which seemingly is gaining increased attention, particularly in light of the wide-spread media coverage and public interest – that not all sporting role models are positive (James, 2009; Heffer, 2010; Yallop, 2010). Indeed, despite all Olympians theoretically signing up to the Olympic Oath, incidents of ‘cheating’ continue to be both reported (Lynch, 2004) and anticipated at Olympic and Paralympic Games (Magnay, 2012).

In their conclusion, Payne et al (2002, p44), recognise the research by Mac Cullum and Beltman (2002) which “has identified the general characteristics of successful role model
programs”. With reference to programmes that have “minimal interaction that focus on observation and modelling”, (as in the case of a sport mega-event), MacCullum and Beltman (2002, p.3) suggest the key elements for a successful programme are:

- Role model appears relevant and accessible and demonstrates coping characteristics;
- Role model has an approach consistent with the program’s philosophy;
- Provision of on-going support for young people; and
- On-going concrete reminders of the message or role model.

The first two issues have already been discussed, elements three and four that incorporate the word ‘on-going’ suggest the programme needs to be embedded in the wider work of sport development in the event’s host country. As summarised by Coalter (2008b, p.15):

> Fleeting images of elite and specialised sporting achievement are clearly not enough to ensure that such role models contribute to a substantial increase in sports participation.

Coalter (2008b,p15) concludes his review of theories of behaviour change as applied to sport mega-events by reinforcing the need for:

> a more systematic and integrated approach which links the promotion of national sporting heroes to support for local role models, who can develop on-going relationships with local people and communities.

But even then, Coalter warns that the “link between admiration and emulation seems to be weak and very ad-hoc”.

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2.4.2 Barriers to sport and physical activity participation

Weed (2010) proposes that, although theories of behavioural change used extensively to try and understand how people are motivated to take part in sport and physical activity, they are incomplete as explanations of the process of sport engagement as they do not consider the barriers to participation.

Foster et al (2005) reviewed 15 quantitative surveys of attitudes to physical activity and sport and found that amongst adults, lack of time due to other responsibilities such as childcare or work was cited as the most common barrier. Other common barriers reported were not being the ‘sporty type’ and concern about going out alone, the latter a particular concern for women. Across all the surveys reviewed, ‘feeling tired’ and therefore preferring to rest rather than be active was also a frequently mentioned barrier to participation. In one study amongst children and young people, the physical nature of sport and dislike of associated pain was cited as a barrier by 49% with boredom and tiredness also noted (Sport England, 2002). In the production of Understanding Participation in Sport (Foster et al, 2005), a further 24 qualitative studies were reviewed where the main barriers to participation were noted to be challenges to identity, such as ‘poor body image’ or ‘appearing incompetent’. Women were also concerned that participation in sport might make them appear overly masculine. Further issues were raised about facilities including access, poor state of repair and the cost of joining sports clubs and gyms.

Following on from, Understanding Participation in Sport, Sport England commissioned further studies to gain greater understanding about sport participation in specific groups, for example, lone parents (GfK NOP, 2006); young women (TSA, 2006); retired people (Arkenford Ltd. and Act 2, 2006) and black and ethnic minority communities (Carnegie Research Institute, 2009). The GfK NOP (2006) study developed the categorisation of
‘barriers’ into external and internal. External barriers for lone parents were seen to be factors such as the cost of childcare, time and facility provision. Internal barriers were issues that included lack of confidence, loneliness and anxiety about their bodies. The GfK NOP categories are seen to tie in with the categorisations made by the TSA study of ‘environmental and transition determinants’ (external), such as facilities, workload, time and money and ‘psychosocial determinants’ (internal), such as self-confidence and perception of competence. Although not classified as external and internal, a more recent study of barriers to sports participation for women and girls (Women’s Sport and Fitness Foundation, 2008) labelled these categories practical (such as time, money and transport) and personal (such as body image, and lack of self-confidence).

2.4.3 The relationship between barriers and motivations

Weed (2010) suggested that increasing motivation can have a positive effect on sport participation and increasing barriers inhibit participation but decreasing barriers, where motivation to participate is not present, will have no effect. It appears that “the process of engaging people with sport begins with the stimulus of motivations” (Weed 2010, p.16) but although a decrease in motivation can be a reason for a lapse of participation, it is likely to be an emergent barrier that has triggered this change.

An understanding of this complex relationship between barriers and motivations may be assisted by reference to research into ‘leisure constraints’. Crawford & Godbey’s (1987), leisure constraints model provides three dimensions of constraints: ‘structural’, which are conditions that stand between the individual and participation such as time, money and access; ‘intrapersonal’, which are intrinsic states that limit participation such as fear or lack of perceived ability and ‘interpersonal’, considered to be “the result of interpersonal interaction or the relationship between individuals” (p.123). An example of an interpersonal constraint might be peer pressure or lack of a suitable playing partner.
Leisure constraints are seen to have the potential to inhibit participation, influence the extent of an individual’s participation or their sense of satisfaction from leisure activities (Jackson 1988). Although early research in this area tended to focus on how constraints prevented participation, a more recent trend has been to look at how constraints are negotiated to start, maintain or increase participation (Jackson, 2005).

It is the interaction between constraints and what might motivate a person to consider negotiation of the constraints which is seen to be the basis for a recent model of the sport engagement process, the SPEAR model (Weed 2010). The SPEAR model is of particular relevance to this study as it was used in a report commissioned by Sport England: *The potential of the Demonstration Effect to Grow and Sustain Participation in Sport* (SPEAR 2009).

**2.4.4. The theoretically integrated SPEAR Model of the process of sport engagement**

The SPEAR Model of the sport engagement process was developed in response to a recognised absence of a model that encompassed both the barriers to participation identified by sport and leisure management and the theories of motivation favoured by those working in sport and exercise psychology (Weed 2010). It is suggested that the lack of a suitable model may be the result of a divide in the academic literature where ‘motivations’ are the concern of exercise and sport psychologists and ‘barriers’ considered more by studies in sport and leisure management (Weed 2010). The SPEAR Model integrates perspectives and evidence from the SDT (Deci and Ryan, 2005), the TTM (Prochaska et al, 1992) and the Oxford Model (Foster et al, 1995) together with analyses of sport participation research commissioned by Sport England (see section 2.4.2).
The development of the SPEAR Model is informed by the establishment of a ‘typology of sport participation levels’, which uses the three general behavioural groups proposed by the Oxford Model: the always participates; the never participates and the sometimes participates (Foster et al, 2005).

Weed (2010, p.6) suggests that it is the ‘sometimes participates’ group that is likely to be of most interest to Sport England in looking to achieve its participation targets of 3 x 30 minutes a week. It is assumed that “the ‘always participates’ do not need to be the subject of policy interventions, whilst the ‘never participates category may be largely beyond the reach of sport policy interventions”. The ‘sometimes participates’ group is considered to refer to the contemplation, preparation and action stages of the TTM.

Using Sport England’s definition of participation as 3x30mins a week and the group classification from the TTM and Oxford Model, Weed (2010) creates five target groups for increasing sport participation (See Table 1). The five groups form the basis of the SPEAR Model.

Earlier in this chapter, the discussion on the relationship between motivation to participate and barriers to participation concluded that engaging people in sport starts with motivation (Weed, 2010). It is the motivation to participate that will act as the stimulus for a person to negotiate any barriers to participation. The SPEAR Model assesses each of the five target groups and, using the classification of motivation from the SDT (internal, external or integrated), proposes how to use the types of motivation to engage with people in each group. By way of example, it is the previous experience of participation that will be the most likely source of motivation for those who are ‘lapsed’ participants (Henley Centre for Headlight Vision, 2008b; Weed et al 2009). For these people, it would be important to

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7 The target of 3x 30 minutes a week is the definition of participation as used by Sport England in the Active People Survey. For further information on the Active People Survey, please refer to Chapter1.7.6.
appeal to their ‘latent’ motivations, such as remembering how good it felt to release tension or recalling a feeling of wellness after participation in sport.
Table 1: Target Groups and Goals for Sport Participation Policy (Weed, 2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Group</th>
<th>Participation level</th>
<th>TTM Stage</th>
<th>Previous participation</th>
<th>Goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Criterion Participants</strong></td>
<td>Between 2/month and 2x30mins /week</td>
<td>Preparation</td>
<td>Likely to have participated 1/month or less in the past. May have previously participated 3x30mins/week or more</td>
<td>Increase participation frequency to 3x30mins/week or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lapsed Participants</strong></td>
<td>Sporadically between 1/year and 1/month</td>
<td>Re-contemplation</td>
<td>Likely to have participated at both 2/month to 2x30mins/week and at 3x30mins/week or more</td>
<td>Stimulate new participation at 3x30mins/week or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular Participants</strong></td>
<td>3x30minutes/week or more</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Likely to have previously participated at 2x30mins/week or less. Unlikely to have participated at 5x30mins/week or more.</td>
<td>Stimulate activity switching to participation at 2/month-2x30mins/week for a new activity, with intention to move to 3x30mins/week or more</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>who may be about to lapse to 1/month or less</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regular Participants</strong> in &quot;sometimes participates&quot; category</td>
<td>Between 3x30mins/week and 5x30mins/week</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Likely to have previously participated at 2x30mins/week or less. Unlikely to have participated at 5x30mins/week or more.</td>
<td>Move to “always participates” category (5x30mins/week or more) where it is assumed participation will become stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Never Participates</strong></td>
<td>&lt;1/year</td>
<td>Pre-Contemplation</td>
<td>&lt;1/year</td>
<td>Move to “sometimes participates” category</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4.5 Market segmentation of sport participants and the SPEAR Model

The Sport England market segmentation (Sport England, 2011) was developed from grounded information sources including the Active People Survey, the National Census, the National Readership Survey and the British Crime Survey. It was designed to help those working in community sport to better understand their customers and where they might be located (Sport England, 2011). An initial classification was made of people over 18 years old into 19 segments. Each segment has a given name and generalised description such as, ‘Ben, competitive male urbanites’, ‘Chloe, fitness class friends’ or ‘Brenda, older working women’. A more detailed segment profile is also provided describing the sporting preferences and behaviours of people in the segment in addition to their motivations and barriers to play sport, satisfaction with the sporting experience and the best ways to contact the people in the group.

To help inform the planning to deliver the legacy promise of ‘1 million more people doing more sport’ (DCMS, 2007), Sport England commissioned the Centre for Sport, Physical Education and Activity Research (SPEAR), to compile a report (SPEAR, 2009) on the potential of the ‘demonstration effect’ to increase sport participation. The term ‘demonstration effect’ was coined by Weed et al (2009) in a review of an evidence base to support the development of a physical activity and health legacy of the London 2012 Games. The term is considered similar to the ‘trickle-down effect’, which describes how elite sport performance is considered to inspire mass sport participation (Frawley et al, 2009).

The SPEAR (2009) report: The Potential of the Demonstration Effect to Grow and Sustain Participation in Sport, initially used the SPEAR Model (2010) to identify target groups for a demonstration effect outcome of increasing the overall numbers of people that meet the Sport England definition of ‘sport participation’, i.e., 3 x 30 minutes per week. The report
suggests that there are three demonstration effect outcomes: increasing the numbers of people who participate, increasing frequency of participation and switching participation to another sport.

The two groups selected were firstly, ‘sub-criterion participants’, for a demonstration effect outcome of increased participation frequency to meet the Sport England criterion of 3x30 minutes per week. Secondly, ‘lapsed participants’ were selected for a demonstration effect outcome of increased numbers of participants. People in the ‘lapsed participant’ group may have once met Sport England’s criterion for participation and the demonstration effect may act as a stimulus for re-engagement with sport.

Using Sport England’s market segmentation research, target segments were then identified in each group. Seven segments (such as ‘Ben, the competitive male urbanite’ and ‘Alison, the stay at home Mum’) were identified in the sub-criterion group and eight segments (such as ‘Leanne, the supportive single’ and ‘Tim, the Settling Down Male’) in the lapsed group. It was further proposed that messages based on internal, external or integrated motivations could be individually linked to the individual market segments to “leverage a demonstration effect to grow and sustain sport” (SPEAR, 2009, p.5). For example, for ‘Alison, the stay at home Mum’, the motivation might be the message associated with the fit body shape and healthy diet of Olympic athletes, whereas the motivation for ‘Ben, the competitive male urbanite’, would be messages relating to the fitness levels of Olympic athletes and the levels of exertion required to meet these standards.
2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has charted the growing interest in legacy as a positive outcome of sport mega-events and particularly, social legacy, as a means of justifying the vast sums of public sector investment required to finance both the event and its’ supporting infrastructure. The notion that one specific legacy is that of an increase in mass sport participation has been seen to be a contested. While there is limited empirical evidence to support the idea that a sport mega-event can act as a catalyst for increased mass sport participation in the host community, it is still widely promoted by event supporters as a positive outcome of hosting an event (Weed et al, 2009). The main process by which event supporters claim that such an outcome will occur is the ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE) (Frawley et al, 2009), where the performance of elite sportsmen and women are considered to inspire mass participation.

The TDE has been noted to have influenced sport policy in the UK for many decades (Weed et al, 2009), providing justification for the disproportionate investment in elite sport compared to grass-roots sport (Collins, 2008). Further to the Wolfenden Report (CCPR, 1960), successive governments have been seen to have shown a growing interest in sport as an area of public policy. Success in international sport has been considered to be a marker of the UK’s status on the world stage (Shoval, 2002; Nauright, 2004; Gold and Gold, 2008) and increasing mass participation in sport has become increasingly salient as a means of addressing a range of social issues from obesity to youth crime and educational attainment (Bloyce and Smith, 2010).

The rationale behind participation in sport promoting desirable behavioural characteristics is seen to be rooted in history; sport as played in the English public school system is thought to promote the development of courage, self-discipline and endurance (CCPR, 1960). Although this status is considered ‘mythopoeic’; “to contain elements of truth, but
elements which become reified and distorted and reflect rather than represent reality” (Coalter, 2007b, p. 9), the sport development community has continued to keep faith in sport’s ability to promote ‘social good’. However, despite decades of investment aligned to the ambition of increasing mass sport participation with a view to realising ‘social good’, participation rates have remained static (Rowe et al, 2004).

The unprecedented success of Team GB at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics was seen to legitimise UK Sport’s ‘no compromise’ approach to elite sport funding (Green, 2009), where success on the world sporting stage led to increased funding and failure to reduced funding. It might have been hoped that this form of governance, driven initially by New Labour’s modernisation programme, might have had a similar impact when applied to mass sport participation. Green and Houilhan (2005) propose, however, that elite and mass sport are not compatible as aspects of sport policy. Through the literature it has been seen that getting ordinary people (as opposed to elite athletes) to commit to participation in sport is a complex, challenging process. Elite athletes are the ‘converted’; their personal goals are associated with going ‘faster, higher and to be stronger’ in sport performance. The values and personal goals of people taking part (or who the sport development community are trying to persuade to take part) in mass participation sport are many and varied and it is therefore highly unlikely that there is one single solution.

Coalter (2008b) suggests that although rarely articulated, the process by which sport mega-events are considered to lead to increased sport participation is the role-model effect. Payne et al (2002) propose that the role-model effect is complex and although it might be thought that elite performance has a positive influence on mass sport participation, evidence from theories of behavioural change suggest that for some people, elite sports performance may be a deterrent to participation caused by ‘fear of failure’.
Notwithstanding such evidence, it was central to the London 2012 bid and the rhetoric of London 2012 Games’ event supporters that it *would be* the inspiration of the event and the performances of elite athletes that would provide the catalyst for people to change their behaviour, to set goals in their lives that reflect a wish to participate in more sport. In the following chapter, I investigate further *why*, despite the contradictory evidence it might be thought that Games could make such an impact.
Chapter 3: The ‘mythopoeic’ status of sport and the Olympic Games

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this study is to gain further insight into the relationship that has developed between hosting sport mega-events and the concept that such events might leave a positive social legacy benefiting the communities of the host country. The specific area of interest is the contested notion that these global events could leave the host community a legacy of increased mass participation in sport. Although the notion is frequently cited by event supporters, as outlined in Chapter 2, the weight of empirical evidence is seen to question the claim.

Despite such evidence the London 2012 bid was explicit in its intent to use the Games to create “a legacy to transform sport in the UK” (BOA, 2004, p.15). Politicians and event supporters proposed that hosting the Games would deliver a radical change to the population’s levels of physical activity and an already sports mad nation would get fitter and healthier (Vigor et al, 2004; Coalter, 2008a).

This chapter builds on the evidence provided in Chapter 2 and asks why the London 2012 bid seemingly ignored evidence, including the advice of its own report (DCMS/ Strategy Unit, 2002), and maintained the premise that the Games could be the “catalyst that inspires people of all ages and talents to lead more active lives” (Tessa Jowell – then Olympics Minister. In Coalter, F. 2008b, p.4). The discussion develops the observation made in Chapter 2 of sport’s mythopoeic nature (Coalter, 2007b) and therefore the potential to use sport to appeal to the host community as a reason to support the idea of the UK hosting the Games and to the IOC as a reason to choose London as the preferred bid for the Games of the XXX Olympiad.
It is further suggested that the status of ‘mythopoeic’ has seemingly been transferred to the Games through a carefully marshalled view of the Olympic Movement and in particular the Games (Wamsley, 2004). The IOC has been keen to build on this status to help re-invent itself following criticism of the elitist, grandiose and corrupt nature of the Olympic movement and its premier event, the Olympic Games (Jennings, 2000; Lenskyj, 2000). Through what has been considered as the ‘gift’ of hosting the Games (MacCrury, 2008) the IOC has looked to gain from the unique features associated with the Games, in particular the wider social ‘good’ as portrayed by Olympism (for an overview of Olympism, the Olympic Movement and the IOC, see Chapter 1.5).

3.2 The ‘mythopoeic’ status of sport

The origins of the status of sport as ‘mythopoeic’ (Coalter, 2007b) have been discussed in more depth in Chapter 2. By way of summary, it is considered that participation in sport has the ability to transmit positive character building qualities such as courage, self-discipline and determination (CCPR, 1960). Although, it is considered that there is some truth in the statement of sport’s ability to promote virtuous characteristics in a person, the truth becomes exaggerated to the extent that it no longer reflects reality (Coalter, 2007b).

A good example of sport’s mythopoeic status was provided by the United Nation’s special advisor, Adolf Ogi (2003), who, in an address to the Sport and Development International Conference, said:

Sport teaches life skills. Sport remains the best school in life. With sport young people learn: to manage victory; to overcome defeat; to become team players and to be reliable and gain the other team members’ confidence; respect for opponents and the rules; that for good results
regular training is needed; and, to know their limits and themselves better.

The positive lessons and values of sport are essential for life.

Giulianotti (2004, p.356) suggests this is a very functionalist approach in that it “assumes sport meets crucial social needs and is a powerful and positive force for integration”. It is noted, however, that there is considerable historical evidence reflecting sport as a dysfunctional force to social order, “intensifying sources of social conflict as expressed, for example, through nationalism, sexism, racism and other strains of xenophobia”. In addition, as is frequently evidenced by accounts of some of the sporting elite, participation in sport can also produce less desirable outcomes of corruption, cheating, and personal abuse through recreational drugs or eating disorders (Heffer, 2010; James, 2009; Yallop, 2010).

It would appear, however, that people are able to let sport retain its more romanticised, positive image. Wamsley (2004), for example, notes that although we are uncomfortable with some of the contradictions, we continue to apologise for sport, seemingly happy as spectators to witness a product we know has, on occasions, been tarnished by drug abuse and cheating. In the presence of sport, we appear to be able to have an alternative set of thought processes and judgements. An example of this might be the status given to leading professional sport people, where their success is as much about what they earn as what they do on the field of play. Rustin (2009) observes that the level and breadth of support for these formerly relatively ‘ordinary’ people is not diminished by their ascent into a world of wealth and celebrity but actually provides more reason to admire them. Rustin (2009, p.17) suggests that this may be because in societies where there are limited opportunities for upward mobility, such sporting heroes offer “images of possibility for everyone, illusory as those might be”.
The public at large would also appear to share the attitude that sport has the potential to deliver ‘good’. Many people reading this will have heard others arguing that the social problems of today (this would include obesity, juvenile delinquency and the numbers of young people who are out of work) have been caused by ‘selling off school pitches and the decline of sport in schools’. The strength of public opinion for the benefit of sport in the UK was demonstrated recently when due to criticism from teachers, sections of the media, young people and notably Olympians, the coalition government was forced to retract, in part, its plans to reduce funding for school sport (Campbell, 2010).

3.3 The mythopoeic status of the Olympics

The mythopoeic status of sport developed from its historical roots and the idealised perception that has been maintained of its potential to be a force for social good. It is suggested here that a similar mythopoeic status has been seen to have been gained by the Olympics; this also developed from selective use of its history and the use of marketing techniques that have subsequently facilitated the Games to retain a romanticised image.

Wamsley (2004) notes that the careful marshalling of the Games and its values have been evident from the earliest musings of Pierre de Coubertin. More recently, the IOC has had its own specific reasons to promote the Games as a catalyst for ‘social good’. The organisation, and the Olympic Movement over which it presides, received considerable criticism particularly towards the end of the Samaranch era (see Chapter 1.5.2). The criticism was based on the elitist model of growth and expansion being followed by the IOC for the development of the Games (Girginov, 2011). It was suggested that it was a time when the Olympic spirit had become a “marriage of the spirit of capitalism with the spirit of sport” (Adair, 2011).
During the 1990s, leadership and governance of the IOC had come under critical scrutiny. Writing in the build-up to the 2000 Sydney Olympics, when the IOC was reeling from revelations of internal corruption in the build-up to the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Milton-Smith (2002, p.140) described IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch as “aloof, arrogant and imperious, [he] operates not as an inspiring leader but as a banana-republic dictator, cultivating a shameless culture of extravagance and excess around him”. Earlier criticism of the IOC had outlined the freedom from surveillance enjoyed by its officials, at times providing sanctuary for those who had compromised themselves in their national communities (Simon and Jennings, 1992). Authors such as Jennings (2000) and Lenskyj (2000) added to this negative commentary describing the Olympic movement as elitist and abusing its power to exploit young people and their aspirations. Milton-Smith (2002, p.141) suggested that to transform this situation would require ‘reinvention’ and a leader “motivated by a heightened sense of civic duty” who would be able to articulate the Olympic values equally well as plans and profits.

The arrival of Jacques Rogge as President in 2001 did mark a noticeable change in the discourse of the IOC. Led by its President, the IOC has actively sought to renew its image and to regain a focus on the values portrayed by Olympism. As proposed by its founder, Pierre de Coubertin, the goal of Olympism is to:

- place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity (IOC Charter, 2007, p.11).

In his address at the Opening Ceremony of the Turin Winter Olympic Games, Jacques Rogge stated “Our World today is in need of peace, tolerance and brotherhood. The values of the Olympic Games can deliver these to us” (Rogge, 2006). The Olympic values, set out in the Fundamental Principles of the Olympic Movement (IOC, 2007), are:
the joy of effort; fair play; respect for others, pursuit of excellence and a balance between body, will and mind. It is suggested by the IOC that promoting these values might create a more harmonious world (Binder, 2007).

The notion that hosting the Games should be a catalyst for increasing ‘social good’ has been further advanced by an amendment to the latest version of the IOC Charter (2007), which now refers to the creation of positive legacies in the host country. Jacques Rogge (2011) has been keen to make the association between the Olympic values and Games’ legacy stating:

Legacies are the lasting outcomes of our efforts. They bring to life the Olympic values of excellence, friendship and respect … Creating sustainable legacies is a fundamental commitment of the Olympic Movement.

A specific reference is made in the amendments to the IOC Charter (2007) of leaving a legacy of ‘sport for all’ in the host country. Jacques Rogge has been keen to draw attention to the link between hosting the Games, sport and all that is ‘good’ about sport participation, citing sport’s potential to “combat obesity, social isolation and encourage a healthy society” (Rogge, 2008, p.9).

In the build-up to the London 2012 Games, there has been some criticism of such claims when they are made by the IOC which has entered into a sponsorship programme with both Coca-Cola and McDonalds, two organisations that produce products considered to contribute to obesity and poor health (Beaumont, 2011; Gibson, 2011b; Norman, 2011). It appears that the IOC is able to dismiss such anomalies, as is further demonstrated in its own ‘Musee Olympique’. The museum’s promotional literature claims it is a place where
the story is told of how people have “come together to make Olympism contribute to a better world through sport” (IOC, 2011). Amongst a number of observations, however, Adair (2011) notes that the ‘story’ omits the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics bribery scandal and presents a sanitised version of the Nazi propaganda of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Such omissions prompt Adair (2011) to suggest that museum visitors might want to consider as much about what is unsaid as what is said in terms of the narratives told through the displays.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in detail how the IOC has managed to maintain its status of guardian of Olympism that purports to ‘make the world a better place’, upholding values such as fair-play, respect and equality, when it only requires a shallow scraping of the surface to discover an organisation lacking in democratic governance and a long history of right-wing personalities and attitudes among its members (Hoberman, 1995; Wamsley, 2004; Lensky, 2008; Jennings, 2011). Wamsley (2004, p.234) further suggests that the contemporary Olympic Games have become the “antithesis of the very ideals they ostensibly cherish”. He poses a number of difficult questions for the relationship between Olympism and the Olympic Games such as: who actually gets to the field of play? does competitive sport at its highest levels balance the body and the mind? and how can sport be a human right when just the bidding process alone costs billions of dollars, requiring the building of both infrastructure and sport facilities that are inaccessible to the average citizen?

What is pertinent to this research is the very fact that, despite a lack of persuasive answers to such questions, the Olympic movement does retain “core groups of loyal adherents and benevolent self-images that in some cases have exercised a virtually global reach for most of a century” (Hoberman, 1995, p.3). In 1967, when a prominent
German sport physician, Dr Hollmann spoke at the opening of the International Olympic Academy in Olympia, he proposed that the ‘Olympic idea’ might inevitably fall victim to the professional and commercial development of sport. The response to his proposal was a storm of indignation and that his views amounted to a desecration of this holy site (Hoberman, 1995). Wamsley (2004, p. 239) notes the enthusiasm of corporations to share in the language of sport and the Olympics that “canonize their competitive champions and business processes” but when these corporations are found wanting and exposed for malpractice, there is not a similar symbolic link to either the Olympic athlete succumbing to cheating through drugs or international sport officials to bribery.

Hoberman (1995, p.3) suggests that this ‘halo effect’ which has allowed an idealised view of the Olympics stems from the origins of the Olympic Movement and in particular the “myths of origin rooted in reverential attitudes toward the personal qualities of their respective founding fathers and the salvational doctrines they created”. In this description, Hoberman (1995) likens the Olympic Movement to other movements, such as Scouting, that were also founded at the end of the 19th century and whose origins were based on concerns of social instability and class conflict. He notes that their histories have been largely left to the movement’s own historians and publicists and therefore any interpretations of the movement that do not meet with its own interpretations are considered criticism.

The IOC is seen to be able to wield considerable power in its efforts to maintain its version of history. To criticise the IOC can lead to judicial action, as discovered by Simons and Jennings (1992) in the publication of ‘Lords of the Rings’, a book which exposed the alleged corrupt activities of the IOC’s inner circle. The authors were charged with libel and defamation of the IOC and its members in a Lausanne court. In 2006, Jennings produced
a paper for a special edition of Sport in Society based on a conference address he had
given at the University of Otago, New Zealand. The paper, entitled ‘Investigating
corruption in corporate sport: The IOC and FIFA’, concluded that “the lack of transparency
and accountability in these global governing bodies goes hand in glove with a propensity
for corruption”. Although accepted by the guest editor, Steven Jackson, Jennings’ paper
was rejected by the Sport in Society’s Executive Editor, based on his concerns for
litigation by the IOC and FIFA. It was a further five years before Jennings was able to get
his paper published (Jennings, 2011).

A further example of the IOC’s strategy to give the public a selective history and
appreciation of the Olympic movement is the Celebrate Humanity campaign (IOC, 2004b).
The campaign was first staged in the build-up to the Sydney Olympics and subsequently
has been used preceding each summer and winter Olympics. Notably developed by the
IOC marketing department, it is “created to remind us all of the special nature of the
Olympic Games and to emphasize the Olympic ideals on a continuing basis” (IOC,
2004b). Produced in both audio-visual and print media in six different languages, the
campaign is fronted by both Olympic athletes and internationally recognised
spokespeople such as Nelson Mandela, Koffi Annan and Christopher Reeve who:

serve as a voice for the Olympic ideals and invite the world to celebrate the
moving and memorable moments of the Olympic Games, as well as the
remarkable inspiration and achievements of Olympic athletes. Each tells
his/her personal interpretation of the Olympic experience (IOC, 2004b).

According to the IOC (2004b,) the campaign provides a positive synergistic backdrop for
its TOP programme sponsors and enables the viewing public to make the association
between the Games and its values, enhancing its public image. Wamsley (2004) suggests
that the Celebrate Humanity campaign is another resource alongside others such as the ‘educational’ programme of a Games organising committee and the IOC’s own Educational Toolkit that ensure that people’s interpretations of the movement are those positioned by the IOC, sports leaders, governments and broadcasters, which enables them to ‘think Olympic’.

3.3.1 The Games as a ‘gift’

It is suggested here that it is the way in which people have been taught how to ‘think Olympic’ that allows them to overcome the evident contradictions between the values extolled by Olympism and the realities of the Olympic movement and in particular the modern Olympics in practice. Cashman (1999, p.5) in discussing whether the FIFA World Cup or the Olympic Games is the premier world sporting event, suggests that the latter is considered by its supporters to be “something more than a mere sporting event”. He proposes that the long history of the Games, its traditions and powerful symbols, such as the ‘rings’ and the ‘torch’ provide the event with the status of a “quasi-religious festival”. A further insight as to how people have given the Olympics a unique status is provided by MacRury (2008, p.303), when he proposes that the “Olympic Good” that has been attached to the Olympics enables the value of hosting the Games to go beyond a basic “commodity character” (p.299) of a cost – benefit analysis to one of a “gift-mode” (p.300). MacRury identifies the wider use of the ‘gift-mode’ in the advertising industry. He uses the example of a television advert for Stella Artois (a type of lager) where the product is represented as being part of the culture of a local French village and “is transposed from the network of commodity provision and market relations and re-embedded – apparently seamlessly – into a depicted network of cultural social reciprocity and sharing” (p.301). In a similar way, the Olympic Games are seen to have the status of a ‘gift’. MacRury (2008) notes that gifts induce a different set of human relations. They are dynamic in that they move between people and they may be seen as reward or a prize for achievement. The value of the gift goes beyond the basic commodity based question of ‘what will it cost and
what do we get'? The ‘gift’ that is gained by hosting the Olympics and reflected in rituals such as passing the Olympic flame between hosts and nations, cannot be given a tangible value (MacRury, 2008). As with the example of the lager which, by association with all that is ‘good’ about the local culture, promotes the values of the community, so the Games through association with Olympism promote the dissemination of the Olympic values through the event’s host community.

3.3.2 The ‘mythopoeic’ nature of sport and the Games

Most recently, the IOC and Olympic supporters have looked to blend the mythopoeic nature of sport with that of the Games; to demonstrate all that is ‘good’ about sport and how this might be delivered through the medium of the Olympic movement particularly to the benefit of the Olympic Games’ host community. Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge (2005) spoke of sport’s potential to combat a number of social ills, including obesity and social isolation. Similarly, Chair of the London 2012 Organising Committee of the Olympic Games, Lord Coe (2009) in outlining the benefits to the UK of hosting the Games, described sport as a “hidden social worker”.

In the final section of this chapter, I assess the influence of sport and the Games' mythopoeic nature on the development of the London 2012 bid and its legacy.


The belief that the London 2012 Games would leave positive social legacies for communities across the UK and, in particular, a legacy of increased mass sport participation is evident in the rhetoric of London 2012’s bid documentation and
promotional material. It is suggested here that this belief was influenced by both sport’s mythopoeic status (Coalter 2007b) and that of, what might be termed, the mythopoeic status of the Olympic Games.

In the bidding stage for the Games of the XXX Olympiad, there was a need to ‘sell’ the idea of the London 2012 bid to the UK population and the IOC. It was important to the success of the bid to have widespread UK public support despite the majority of the economic benefits being focused in London and the South-East. The rhetoric of the potential for increased mass sport participation, as a legacy that did not need to be geographically limited (Weed et al., 2009), in a country considered to be already ‘sports mad’ (London 2012, 2004) was a good medium to ‘sell’ the idea of hosting the Games to UK wide tax-payers. It also appealed to the IOC, keen to demonstrate that the Games could leave ‘positive legacies’ and bring ‘social good’ to a host country.

Hosting successful sport mega-events requires public approval (Atkinson et al, 2008) due to the need to justify public expenditure on infrastructure and facilities to the tax payer (Preuss and Solberg, 2006), ensuring the support of the public to give visitors a hospitable reception (Gursory and Kendall, 2006) and securing the services of volunteers who provide a significant resource for hosting the event (Cuskelly et al, 2006). The IOC are well aware of the need for a host country to have the support of its community, without which the “event hosting process can present challenges such as anger and civil unrest” (Karadakis and Kaplanidou, 2012, p.224). The IOC is keen to avoid the potential for negative publicity, to negate as far as possible organized protests. In the build-up to the election of the host city, the IOC Evaluation Commission analyses each Candidature File which includes carrying out a public opinion poll. To help to influence this poll, as with the London 2012 publication Backing the Bid, (London 2012 Nations and Regions Group,
It is common for governments and event supporters to produce promotional material to convince the public of the event’s value. In a comparison of Toronto’s failed bid for the 1996 Olympics and Sydney’s successful bid for the 2000 Olympics, Lenskii (1996) reflects on the difference made by the reaction of each community to the promotional and negative commentaries being made. Where Sydney’s pro-Games campaign, *Share the Spirit*, was to dominate public opinion, Kidd (1996) suggests that the weight of public resistance to Toronto’s bid, driven by an anti-Games campaign entitled, *Bread Not Circuses*, was to cost it IOC support.

The influence of the mythopoeic status of the Games can be seen in publications such as *Backing the Bid* (London 2012 Nations and Regions undated) which featured leading household names from the world of sport promoting the London 2012 bid. Former Olympic gold medallist and now LOCOG board member, Jonathan Edwards, is quoted as saying “The Olympic Games and the Olympic Movement can change people’s lives. I don’t think there’s anything that could change this country in so many ways as hosting the Olympic Games could” (p.5). Jack McConnell, the then First Minister for Scotland, states “Winning the Games in 2012 will make sure that the Olympic spirit touches every part of the United Kingdom” (p.12). In both these quotes, there is seemingly a presumption that the reader will attach only positive sentiments to people being ‘touched by the Olympic spirit’ or the nature of the ‘change’ made by the Games. These sentiments are considered to be influenced by the reader’s pre-conceived notion of the Olympics, that they do:

- bring to life the Olympic values of excellence, friendship and respect [ ] as a once in a lifetime chance to showcase the human spirit. And each creates a unique set of environmental, social and economic legacies that can change a community, a region and a nation forever (Rogge, 2008b).
A discourse alluding to the potential to leave a positive legacy of increased mass sport participation has been evident surrounding the build-up to the London 2012 Games from the early days of the bid campaign. A central tenet of London’s bid was its potential to leave a legacy of more people playing sport. “Creating a legacy to transform sport in the UK“ (BOA, 2004) was one of four key strategic objectives in the bid and was used by Lord Coe in an emotional appeal to the IOC as part of London’s final presentation in Singapore. On more than one occasion it has been suggested that his approach tipped the voting in London’s favour (Hansard, 2008; Slot, 2008; Green, 2009). The sport participation legacy was further promoted by politicians and event supporters who proposed that the legacy for sport would see “the Olympic ideals flourish at all levels. Grassroots sport would boom in our schools and local communities. Our most talented youngsters would be supported, offering them every chance to fulfil their promise and their dreams” (London 2012, 2004, p.12).

Hosting the Games, can and will bring some benefits to London and the UK but as has been evidenced in Chapter 2, there is evidence of the Olympics bringing negative legacies to a host city and country. In addition, as evidenced earlier in this chapter, sport can bring some ‘social good’ but it can also promote what might be termed unwanted behavioural characteristics such as cheating or self-abuse. In terms of a legacy of increased sport participation, it was reported in Chapter 2 that there is some evidence to show that primary school aged children do respond positively to the TDE through role-modelling (Weed, 2011a). However, when it is known that, at the last three Olympic games, an average of 50 per cent of medal winners were educated at public school (Laing, 2010), is it realistic to propose that the London 2012 Games would give every talented youngster the chance to realize their promise and their dreams?
It was, naturally, to the benefit of the London 2012 bid to focus on solely the positive aspects of the Games and sport. As such the image portrayed is considered to be mythopoeic.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the reasoning behind the rhetoric that has and continues to be articulated by sport mega-event supporters, and in particular proponents of the Olympic Games, that these events will act as the catalyst for an increase in sport participation in the host country. The claim was made central to the London 2012 bid for the Games (BOA, 2004) and subsequently became a cornerstone of one of five legacy ‘promises’ (DCMS, 2007). It is a claim made despite the knowledge that “the evidence shows that past Olympics failed to bring with them a sustained increase in participation” (Vigor et al, 2004, p.xiii).

The discussion has demonstrated that the reasoning behind the claim appears to be through the use of what is termed the mythopoeic status of both sport and the Games, that is “to contain elements of truth, but elements which become reified and distorted and ‘represent’ rather than reflect reality, standing for supposed but largely unexamined impacts and proceses” (Coalter, 2007b, p.9).

Sport’s mythopoeic status is seen to be based in its historical roots, where sport, particularly as played in the English public school system, is considered to promote desirable behavioural traits such as courage, self-discipline and determination (CCPR, 1960). It is a status that is maintained, despite evidence that sport can also promote undesirable behaviour (Giulianotti, 2004; Heffer, 2010). The Games’ mythopoeic status is
also a product of its history and its association with Olympism as the guiding philosophy of
the Olympic Movement, promoting values, such as excellence, fair-play and respect. The
IOC as the ‘guardian’ of the Olympic Movement and the Games, has been seen to be
subject to internal corruption and lacking in democratic governance and the Games
themselves witnessing incidents of cheating by competitors and being used as a vehicle
for political activism (Wamsley, 2004). The Olympic Games however continue to attract
positive public support as reflected by the most recent clamour for tickets for the London
2012 Games.

The synergy of bringing together sport’s and the Games’ mythopoeic status was seen to
be used in the London 2012 bid to ‘sell’ the idea to both the UK population and the IOC.
The support of the host community (in the case of the London 2012 Games’ bid, a
community considered to be ‘sports-mad’ (Vigor et al, 2004)), has been seen to be
important in gaining the rights to host the Games. The Olympics as the world’s pinnacle
sporting event might be considered to be the greatest sporting ‘gift’ a community could
receive. In addition, the IOC was keen to protest (as stipulated in its most recent Charter
(IOC, 2007)) that the Games could bring positive legacies to a host community and
promote ‘sport for all’, with all the ‘social good’ that sport can deliver.
Interlude

In the first three chapters, I have set the context by providing an overview of the elements that provide the background to the field research. In Chapter 1, I reviewed the development of sport mega–events; the definition of legacy; the Olympic Movement and the Olympic Games; the bid for the London 2012 Games; the legacy ‘promises’ and those designated to ‘deliver’ the mass sport participation legacy. Chapter 2, reviewed three areas of literature that provided the basis for the study; the development of legacy, and in particular a sport legacy as a ‘planned’ legacy of a sport mega-event; the influence of sport policy on the London 2012 Games sport participation legacy and theories of behaviour change as they have been applied to sport participation.

Having established in Chapter 2 that, to date, the weight of evidence had been against the notion that a sport mega-event could deliver a mass participation legacy, the question then arises “if such events can be organised and presented in way as to improve their ability to do so, or are such claims simply part of the process of gaining public finance and support?” (Coalter, 2008b, p.13)

Chapter 3, looked more closely at the appeal of the notion of a sport participation legacy as a means of gaining public support. It focused on how sport has gained a mythopoeic status for the ‘social good’ it might deliver. Through its association with the laudable philosophy of Olympism, the Games have seemingly gained a similar mythopoeic status to deliver ‘social good’. The synergy of sport and the Olympic Games was seen to have the potential to deliver a highly charged sales pitch to convince both the UK population and the IOC of the merits of London’s bid for the Games.
The London 2012 Games were noted to be the first Games where the host country has been explicit in its intent to leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation (Veal et al, in press). The pressing question is therefore the one that the members of the IOC failed to ask of Lord Coe, following his emotional presentation in Singapore as Chair of the London 2012 Organising Committee; how are you going to deliver the sport legacy? How are you going to ‘present and organise the London 2012 Games so that they will act as the catalyst to make people change their behaviour and choose to participate in sport?

It is the question of how that becomes the subject of my research. Using the terminology of social policy, hosting the London 2012 Games is considered to be a social programme – termed H2012. It is a programme introduced as an intervention with the aim of increasing mass sport participation in the UK. As a programme it will have a ‘programme theory or theories’; the theory (ies) of what the programme will introduce to the target population that will act as the mechanisms for change.

The dominant programme theory behind the claim, as articulated by the UK government, event organisers and supporters, was that it would be the inspiration of the London 2012 Games and specifically the performances of elite athletes that would inspire people to change their behaviour and participate more in sport. This process, often referred to as the ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE) has been seen to be dominated by the role-model effect, a theory of behaviour change that has been implicit in the notion that sport events lead to increased sport participation (Coalter, 2008b).
In addition further mechanisms were introduced, these also as programme theories as to how H2012 would increase mass sport participation:

- A change in sport policy where the emphasis changed from the added value that sport could bring to achieving other social aims to the main message in *Playing to Win* (DCMS 2008a) of ‘sport for sport’s sake’;

- NGBs as ‘specialists in their field’ were placed as central to delivery of the sport participation legacy;

- The ‘Inspire Mark’ created an official link between the activities of non-commercial organisations across the UK considered to be ‘inspired by’ the London 2012 Games;

- The coalition government invested £135m through ‘Places People Play’, £80m of which was to improve existing facilities and to build new Games’ inspired iconic facilities.;

- The new sport facilities built mainly within the Olympic Park in London.

In the next chapter, I outline my methodology to investigate the efficacy of the programme theories. Finally, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, I discuss my findings as they relate to the ex-ante phase of the London 2012 Games.
Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Research can be defined as the systematic study of a given topic in order to add to current knowledge (Theodorson and Theodorson, 1969). It requires the researcher to understand the interrelated components of research design which refer to the purpose of the research and the theory that surrounds it, as well as the development of suitable research questions, methods and sampling strategies (Robson, 2006).

The purpose of my research is to add to the knowledge of the relationship between sport mega-events and social legacy which is considered to be limited (Haxton, 1999; Coalter, 2008a; McCartney et al, 2010). The specific focus of social legacy in this study is that of the contested notion that a sport mega-event can leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation in the host country. This study uses the case of the London 2012 Games to investigate the claim. The London 2012 Games make an interesting study as it is the first time a host country has made explicit the aim of a legacy of increased sport participation (Veal et al, in press)

In the Interlude, I have summarised the evidence from the first three chapters and set out, as expounded by the UK government and event organisers the ‘programme theories’ designed to illustrate how it was anticipated that the Games would leave a mass sport participation legacy. Having established the purpose of this study and theories that surround it, this chapter sets out the methodology for the research including the questions, methods and sampling strategies.

Kirk (2011) highlights the value of the research questions to justify the research design. As a point of reference, it therefore seems logical to restate the questions at the start of this chapter:
1: How and why has the association between sport mega-events, social legacy and specifically a legacy of increased sport participation evolved? 
Sub question: How has this made an impact on the construction of the proposed sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games and with what consequences? 
2: What are the proposed change mechanisms that will deliver the sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games? 
3: How do the social, economic and political contexts in which these change mechanisms are activated make an impact on the working of the mechanism? 
4: What knowledge can this study provide that can be transferred to the organisers of future sport mega-events who aspire to leave a legacy of increased sport participation? 

4.2 Positioning the researcher in the research 
As outlined in the Preface, the background to my research was my involvement in two legacy programmes linked to sport mega-events and the frustration I felt at the lack of knowledge being transferred from the work I had been involved in to assist the legacy aspirations of future event organisers. This being my motivation, it was important to consider my background and its potential to have some bearing on my research. It is a concept termed ‘reflexivity’ in the literature: 

The concept of reflexivity acknowledges that the orientations of researchers will be shaped by their socio-historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations confer upon them. What this represents is a rejection of the idea that social research is, or can be, carried out in some autonomous realm that is insulated from the wider society and from the biography of the researcher, in such a way that its findings can be
unaffected by social processes and personal characteristics (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p15).

Reinharz (1997) suggests that the researcher brings three ‘selves’ to field work: the research-based self, the brought self and the situationally created self which all come into play in the research setting. My research-based self was as a PhD student with a history of conducting research as an academic and as a consultant in the private sector. My brought self was a white, female, age ranged from 47–50 years old during the course of the research. I had had a working career in teaching physical education, lecturer in golf and event management, public sector sports development manager and regeneration consultant in the private sector. In addition, I have been and continue to be involved in a number of sports as a participant and volunteer. This experience would facilitate interaction in the field and the understanding and meaning of data. The situationally created self was as a researcher working in a familiar environment where I had a broad network of contacts and would be known to many of the participants. The skills and knowledge brought to the ‘situation’ would facilitate the process of undertaking and completing the project.

As my research methodology involved borrowing techniques from ethnographic enquiry where emphasis is put on “the importance of understanding things from the point of view of those involved” (Denscombe, 2007 – italics are in the original text), my background in and wealth of knowledge of the sport development sector would be seen as positive. It provided an element of insider status to balance the outsider status of an academic researcher. Indeed there were many other areas where my reflexive account appeared to be of benefit to my research. The question of access to data, considered crucial but potentially problematic (Denscombe, 2007; Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007), was not considered a cause for concern as I had good contacts and knowledge of the industry and was therefore able to draw on the “intra and inter personal resources and strategies that
we all tend to develop in dealing with everyday life" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p.41). In developing field relations, I felt comfortable with the culture of the environments in which I operated, from board room to sports hall, swimming pool or on cycle trails. This was particularly the case with those involved with the delivery of activities where past experience meant that I could easily relate to their roles. As experienced by Benyon (1983) who, in researching in a classroom environment, found it a bonus to admit to his previous experience as a lecturer/teacher, so I found that people opened up to me when they knew I had been ‘at the coal face’ too. Caution was, however, required in considering how people would react to me, on the basis of their expectations about my intentions and identity. It is suggested that this tends to fall into two main categories, the ‘expert’ and the ‘critic’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). As an expert, I would be considered to be well-informed and have credibility but this could lead to the second image of being critical of their work. I looked to overcome this by avoiding making any judgemental comments based on my previous work. On several occasions, interviewees referred, unprompted, to my involvement in previous legacy programmes and showed interest in relating my experiences to their potential plans. Where advice was sought, I was happy to respond.

The analysis of data is considered to be an iterative process that starts from the very outset of the research where “formally, it starts to take shape in analytic notes and memoranda; informally, it is embodied in the ethnographer’s ideas and hunches” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.158). It is in the difference between what is here termed the ‘formal and informal’ where my background had potential to have an impact. Formally, my background helped me make analytic notes that went beyond the words spoken by the interviewee. Reinharz (2007) considers the skill of the researcher is the ability to get at what is not said rather than said or what lies behind the surface content of the data (Denscombe, 2007). I knew the environments in which my interviewees worked and, for example, the political restraints under which they operated which might lead them to obscure the fullness of their responses. This proved to be of value to my analysis.
Informally, my background had left me with ideas of what I thought might be more or less fruitful approaches to the development of a sport participation legacy and it was important to be aware of the potential to look only for the evidence I wanted to find to support my ‘ideas and hunches’.

My background and experiences placed me in a unique position from which to conduct the research. I had practical experience in the development of social legacy programmes and sport mega-events, an area known to be relatively new and where empirical evidence is limited. I had both practical involvement and a good working knowledge of the wider field in which my research was to be set, that of sport development. I was able to gain easy access to the field to generate data through contacts already known to me. I could be seen by those I met to be ‘credible’ and build positive relationships with the people that I met through the course of my research journey. I was able to look beyond the surface of the data generated and appreciate the potential for the background in which interviewees came to the interview to influence their responses. I recognised the potential for my background to introduce a bias to my research, mainly from personal views developed from my experiences in sport development and the development of legacy programmes. Through acknowledgement of this potential, I took steps to ensure that such impact would be limited.

4.3 The problem of causality

The idea proposed by the London 2012 bid that there is the potential for hosting the London 2012 Games to cause an increase in participation, raises the issue of causality. Hosting the London 2012 Games can be seen as the direct cause of building the Olympic Stadium but it is more difficult to establish a direct causal link between hosting the Games and more people doing more sport at the grass-roots level (Girginov and Hills, 2008). The Games will produce a short term, geographically limited increase in elite sport
participation but there is nothing intrinsic to the Games that increases mass sport participation.

To address the problematic nature of causality, the research design uses a realist approach as a model of scientific explanation which is designed to "avoid the traditional epistemological poles of positivism and relativism" (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p.55). Sayer (2000, p.14) suggests that one of the most distinctive features of realism is its analysis of causation:

causation is not understood on the model of regular successions of events, and hence explanation need not depend on finding them or searching for putative laws [ ]. Explanation depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions.

In this explanation of causation, a closer look is taken at the process of transformation, what are the processes (mechanisms) that are considered to act as the catalyst for change and in what circumstances (contexts) are the mechanisms effective (or not). It is a method that has become more widely used in evaluative research as it has moved away from a positivist paradigm, where evaluators have sought to make an objective quantitative assessment about a programme, to ask more process orientated questions (McEvoy and Richards, 2003). The programme may produce an observable change but what is seen is only part of the picture. This follows the idea that it is not the programme that ‘works’ but what are termed the ‘generative mechanisms’ that are released which may provide reasons and resources to change behaviour (Pawson and Tilley, 2007). The generative mechanisms refer to the structures, powers and relations that lie beneath this surface appearance and may seemingly act independently of observable events (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2006). The criticism of a causal explanation is that it relies on what can be
observed and controlled and may therefore overlook the involvement of unseen conditions and processes that cause the transformation. To summarise:

Cause describes the transformative potential of phenomena. One happening may well trigger another but only if it is in the right condition in the right circumstances. Unless explanation penetrates to these real underlying levels, it is deemed to be incomplete (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p.34).

4.4 Realist Evaluation

The “conceptual backbone” to realist evaluation is contained in the terms in the realist formula: mechanism + context = outcome (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p.xv). Realism’s key feature is its stress on the mechanics of explanation. The programme being examined in my research is given the name of ‘Hosting the London 2012 Games’ (H2012).

Using realist evaluation as a guide, my research evaluates the programme theories behind H2012; the ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) that are introduced by the programme and investigates the impact they have on groups of people in their social and cultural settings (contexts). As explained by Pawson (2009,p.342):

The causal power of an initiative lies in its underlying mechanism (M), namely its basic theory about how programme resources will influence the subject’s actions. Whether this mechanism is actually triggered depends on context, the characteristics of both the subjects and the programme locality.

The realist evaluation seeks to explain the varying relationships that are found between mechanisms and contexts and how this impacts on generating the desired outcome.
Outcomes are explained by the action of particular mechanisms in particular contexts and this explanatory structure is put in place over time by a combination of theory and experimental observation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, p.59).

One of the analogies, provided by Pawson and Tilley (1997) that I have found to successfully explain the realist formula: mechanism + context = outcome, is that of creating an explosion using gunpowder. The desired outcome is an explosion. The chosen mechanism is the use of gunpowder and a spark. The importance of context becomes clear when the potential for the mechanism to work is considered in the context of a damp environment. This context does not provide a conducive environment for the successful deployment of the chosen mechanism.

Pawson and Tilley (1997, p.63) suggest that social programmes (such as the one under investigation in this research – H2012) are social systems that comprise the “interplays of individual and institution, of agency and structure, and of micro and macro processes”. Pawson and Tilley (1997) provide five headings under which the operation of a social system can be described:

- **Embeddedness** – all human action is set within a wider stratified range of cultural, social and economic circumstances. For example, the programme H2012 that is being evaluated in its ability to increase sport participation, is set within a wider base than the set number of days of elite sporting competition. This wider base includes the ambitions the IOC has for the event, the Games’ sponsors, the UK as the host country and London as the host city. This requires the research to investigate the reasons for wanting to bring the Games to London given by those organisations involved. It also requires attention to be given to where the ambition
for increased sport participation for the host community sits in this wider framework.

- **Mechanisms** – these are usefully qualified as underlying mechanisms as they provide a notion of activity beneath the surface of observable appearance. It is the notion of the explanatory mechanism that differentiates between successionist and generative models of causation. In the former, there is considered to be a direct relationship (or not) between events. In terms of H2012, this would propose that hosting the Games was the direct cause of a person taking part (or not) in more sport. In the generative model, the explanatory mechanism is proposed as the ‘theory of change’. It changes the question from ‘does the programme work?’ to ‘what is it about the programme that works or not?’ In this way, the question changes to **“what was it about hosting the Games that was proposed would stimulate people to increase their participation in sport?”**

Mechanisms are considered to take the form of propositions that might trigger a reaction from a subject and to demonstrate how a subject’s potential to react is affected by both their individual reasoning and the resources available to them.

- **Contexts** – programmes are introduced into pre-existing cultural, social and economic contexts. The extent to which causal mechanisms can make an impact is dictated by the context(s) in which they are set. “The relationship between causal mechanisms and their effects is not fixed but contingent” (Sayer, 1994, p.107). For the programme, H2012, the main programme theory is that elite sport performance will have a positive impact on grass roots participation through its inspirational powers. One mechanism introduced to support the programme is additional facilities, both those in the Olympic Park and additional funding for facilities across the country. However, if a person sees an elite swimming performance and consequently feels inspired to ‘have a go’ but, because their
geographical location is not close to either the Olympic Park or one of the new Games inspired ‘iconic facilities’ or indeed the local pool has been closed as a casualty of pressure on a local authority budget, then this mechanism is less likely to be successful in changing the person’s behaviour.

- **Regularities** – these are also termed ‘outcomes’ or ‘associations’ or ‘patterns’ and are the goal of realist explanation. It is the explanation of what it is about a programme that works (or does not) and takes the form of an investigation of the relationship between the proposed mechanism (s) for change and the context(s) in which they are introduced. This is central to this research. It is an investigation of the causal mechanisms that are proposed to bring about H2012’s outcome of increased mass sport participation set within the social, political, economic and cultural contexts that may have an impact on the programme.

- **Change** – this is shown to be the difference between realist physical explanation and realist social explanation. Social systems are not static. They are always in a state of transformation. Analysis of social programmes should take this into account as it demonstrates that the contexts into which mechanisms are being introduced are subject to change even during the period of the programme intervention. One potential influential context that is seen to change over the period of H2012, is the economic climate in the host country. The impact of any changes in context on the causal mechanisms introduced through H2012 requires attention in the analysis of the data.

In looking to appreciate the “interwoven nature of different levels and dimensions of social reality” and the impact this would have on the research design, it was also found useful to refer to Layder’s research map (1993, p.7). The research map has five elements: the self; situated activity; setting; context and history. The first four elements are seen as layers
working from the micro (self) to macro (context), where each layer has its independent characteristics but they are also shown to overlap. By way of explanation, Layder (1993, p.9) provides a basic description of each of these elements:

the term ‘self’ refers primarily to the individual's relation to her or his social environment and is characterized by the intersection of biographical experience and social involvements. In ‘situated activity’ the research focus shifts away from the individual towards the emergent dynamics of social interaction. ‘Setting’ denotes a research focus on the intermediate forms of social organization (such as schools, hospitals, factories) that provide the immediate arena for social activity. Context refers to the wider macro social forms that provide the more remote environment of social activity (such as gender or class relations).

Layder (2007) stresses the importance of seeing the links between the layers as this helps to appreciate how, in social reality, activity is not to be seen in isolation and there are other influences at work. For Pawson and Tilley (1997) this is the nature of the ‘interplays’.

The final element ‘history’, adds an extra dimension to this picture in that it asks, what changes have taken place to this aspect of social life over a specified period of time? In terms of the research design for my study, the historical element prompted consideration of the impact of changes in a number of areas. Such areas included the development and change in sport policy and the interests of those organisations with the potential to influence the programme, for example the IOC, the country's sport development agencies and the government.

The interplay of the ‘layers’ in explaining social reality, is also referred to by Giddens (1984), discussing the ‘self’ and what is termed the ‘knowledgeability of the social actor’.

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Giddens (1984) suggests that people, as subjects of the programme and its proposed mechanisms, have their own insight into the reasons for their behaviour but they can neither be fully aware of the background conditions that prompt their behaviour (and it follows a change in behaviour) nor of the full range of consequences of their behaviour. Giddens (1984) terms this the unacknowledged conditions of action and unintended consequences of action. In the analysis of data, this concept will be seen to be important in the interpretation of the texts of interviews. The reasons interviewees provide for their actions or those of others may be influenced by other factors of which they are not fully aware and/or their actions may produce outcomes which were unintended on their part.

4.5 Ethics

Throughout this study, I have been mindful of Denscombe’s (2008, p.141) suggestion that, in the collection and analysis of data, researchers are expected to, “respect the rights and dignity of those who are participating in the research project; avoid any harm to the participants arising from their involvement in the research; and operate with honesty and integrity”.

Local Ethical Approval under the regulations set by the University’s Research Ethics Committee was gained in July 2009 to conduct the interviews. In gaining this consent, a number of factors were highlighted which, in the main, relate to the Data Protection Act (1998) as a framework for the proper management of personal data. All interviewees were required to provide ‘informed consent’ to demonstrate that they had a clear understanding of the research programme, the role they were to play by taking part in an interview and their choice to withdraw from the programme at any time. In the case of this study, informed consent was obtained by providing all interviewees with a briefing sheet prior to the interview (Appendix B). This gave outline details of the research programme, a
contact on the University’s Research Ethics Committee for further information and a requirement to complete and sign a ‘Consent Form’ prior to the interview (Appendix C).

The Consent Form also informed the interviewee that their involvement in the research programme would be anonymised. Amis (2005, p.113) states that the issue of confidentiality is “one of the more important rules that interviewers need to respect”. To ensure confidentiality and provide anonymity of the interviewees, individuals were assigned an ID reference number instead of the use of a name and job title. In the following chapters, interviewees are initially referenced by a description of their position in the organisation, for example, ‘senior manager’ or ‘development officer’ and, where a quote is used, it is followed by their ID number.

The data generated from interviews was transcribed into electronic format, stored on a password protected computer and referenced by the organisation and ID number. An electronic copy of the relevant transcript was sent to the interviewee who was asked to check for any inaccuracies or to remove any sections that they would not wish to be used in the public domain. One copy of each transcript was then printed off for my use. The anonymised transcripts were shared only with the members of my supervisory team: Professor Jonathan Long and Professor David Kirk. The hard copies of the consent forms, notes from the interviews and printed versions of the transcripts are stored in a secure filing cabinet. Disposal of data will follow the guidelines set by the University in that materials will be kept for 10 years before they are destroyed.

4.6 Data generation

The fundamental requirement of the data generated was to help me address the research questions which were developed with reference to my background knowledge of the nature of legacy programmes associated with sport mega-events and the literature review.
The research questions were designed to address the processes involved in the growing interest in social legacy and sport mega-events, in particular one specific aspect; that of a proposed legacy of increased mass sport participation within the event’s host community. The London 2012 Games were used as a case of a sport mega-event.

Data generation required descriptive, interpretative techniques to investigate the mechanisms and contexts involved in the ambition to leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation from this event. The need for description and interpretation led to the use of predominantly qualitative techniques where data is often in the form of words, pictures or objects. Qualitative research is not set in artificial situations in the laboratory but looks at the practices and interactions of subjects in everyday life where human behaviour is not considered to be reducible to fixed patterns (Hammersley, 1989). It is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, experienced or produced, based on data generation that is flexible and sensitive to the social context in which it is produced (Mason, 1996).

Some quantitative data were used in the study as a point of reference. This was secondary data taken from the Active People Survey, first conducted in 2005-2006 (Sport England, n.d.). An overview of the Active People Survey is given in Chapter 1. By way of summary, the Active People Survey is an annual survey of adults’ (16+) sport and physical activity behaviour conducted by telephone interviews by ipsos Mori on behalf of Sport England. ‘Participation’ in this survey is defined by “taking part in moderate intensity sport and active recreation on at least three days a week (at least 12 days in the last four weeks) for 30 minutes continuously in any one session. Participation includes recreational walking and cycling but excludes walking and cycling exclusively for travel” (Sport England 2008a, p.7).
4.6.1 Research sample

The research sample for this study was based on the population of NGBs as identified by Sport England to receive sport development funding. A population is considered to be an “aggregate of all cases that conform to some form of criteria” (Blaikie, 2000, p.198). NGBs are funded by Sport England if they are: a London 2012 Olympic or Paralympic sport, or already designated as a development sport by Sport England, or to have more than 75,000 people in England participating in that sport (as identified by the Active People Survey). NGBs were chosen as the key elements because they had been cited as ‘central’ to the London 2012 Games’ legacy plans of increased mass participation in sport (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a).

To gain access to all of the NGBs, I used the Central Council for Physical Recreation (CCPR) (now the Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA)) who act as an umbrella organisation for the NGBs. NGBs were introduced to the proposed research programme through an explanatory email sent out during May 2009 on my behalf by the CCPR. The email included an invitation to contact me if the NGB would be interested to be involved. A series of ‘face to face’ or telephone conversations was held with those who expressed an interest and subsequently using purposive sampling (Berg, 2001) five organisations - Amateur Swimming Association (ASA); British Cycling Federation (BCF); England Squash and Racquetball (ESR); Rugby Football League (RFL) and The Football Association - Women’s football (The FA) were selected for a first round of interviews to be conducted at senior management level.

Purposive sampling is used in order to select a sample from which most can be gained (Merriam, 1998). In this scenario, the sample is not chosen at random but “on the basis of the particular insights that they can provide on the events being studied” (Amis, 2005, p.118). Amis (2005, p.118) highlights the importance attached to ensuring that those
interviewed should be able to provide both a “meaningful contribution” and the potential to contribute “different perspectives on a particular incident”.

All NGBs were considered to be able to provide a ‘meaningful contribution’ to the study as they had been cited as being ‘central’ to the London 2012 Games legacy plans of increased mass participation in sport (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a). The original aim, as laid out in, Our Promise for 2012: How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DCMS, 2007), was to get 2 million more people physically active and of those, ‘1 million to play more sport’. The aim did not specify this was about participation in just Olympic or Paralympic sports and therefore, to gain, ‘different perspectives’, it was important that the sample included some non-Olympic and Paralympic sports. The theme of ‘different perspectives’ was also developed by including both team sports and individual sports.

After the first round of interviews, Rugby Football League dropped out of the programme as it proved difficult to maintain lines of communication with the relevant staff members. England Volleyball later joined the programme to take the place of Rugby League. This is perhaps best described as ‘opportunistic sampling’ (Patton, 1990); taking advantage of an opportunity made during the course of the data generation. It might have been considered preferable to have had a replacement non-Olympic/Paralympic sport (to match the status of Rugby League) but England Volleyball had shown an interest in being involved with my research through a mutual contact in another NGB. I therefore contacted the CEO of England Volleyball to have a discussion and subsequently formally ask if the NGB would take part in my research. Without this interaction with England Volleyball, I would have carried on using just the four NGBs, however on consideration, the inclusion of Volleyball,
as being a team sport and having a similar participant base (as shown by the Active People Survey), was felt to be beneficial.
Table 2: A summary of the relevant descriptive data for each of the NGBs used in the research programme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Olympic/Non-Olympic</th>
<th>Team/Individual</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASA</td>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>200,805 affiliated members</td>
<td>A small number of events are team based, for example the freestyle/ medley relays, and team synchronised swimming.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Source – ASA Annual Report 2009-10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCF</td>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>28,000 competitive members</td>
<td>There are two team events - the Team Pursuit and the Team Sprint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: BCF Annual Report 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESR</td>
<td>Non- Olympic</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>2009 – 10: 790 affiliated clubs. 44,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>affiliated players (Source: ESR membership</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>services)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EV</td>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>403 affiliated clubs</td>
<td>At the time of the interviews, the participation of Team GB Women’s football team at London 2012 was not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: Volleyball England Annual Report 2009-10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA (Women)</td>
<td>Olympic</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>150,000 registered players in 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: FA strategy 2008 -11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFL</td>
<td>Non-Olympic</td>
<td>Team</td>
<td>46,000 registered players</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Source: RFL Annual Report 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To further the investigation of ‘different perspectives’ and based on consideration of Layder’s (1984) research map where it is suggested that social reality is stratified, I decided to conduct interviews with both management and those involved in the delivery of sport development activity. As outlined earlier in this chapter, Layder’s research map works in five layers from micro to macro. Each of the layers has unique characteristics but also overlaps and has an impact on others. In order to get a greater appreciation of NGB activity as it related to an outcome of increased mass sport participation from H2012, it was considered important to investigate NGB activity relating to H2012 across the micro to macro spectrum. At the level of self, it was recognised that people will perceive their own situations, opportunities and resources in different ways based on their perception of the social world. A person’s perception of a social programme will therefore be ‘embedded’ in their level of social reality (Nichols, 2005). I wanted to find out if people’s position in the organisation influenced how they perceived the London 2012 Games and its potential to leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation.

To this end, and following the first round of interviews, a second round of interviews was conducted with people in the organisations who were involved in the delivery of the NGBs’ programmes that looked to increase participation in their sport. For this sample I used a process known as snowball sampling (Amis, 2005), where those who have been previously interviewed are asked for advice on who else to interview. Those people in the senior management of the NGB were asked who would be the most informed or involved in the various NGB programmes we discussed during the interview.

In order to gain ‘different perspectives’ and to cover the full range of social strata from macro to micro, this line of questioning was extended to include a series of interviews with people in organisations that were considered to have a leading or influential role in the development of a mass sport participation legacy from the Games and consequently the
potential to influence the activities of the NGBs. It was thought that data generated from such organisations would facilitate a greater understanding of what Layder (1984) terms ‘context’ or the ‘embedded’ nature of the programme, as identified by Pawson and Tilley (1997). The organisations chosen were Sport England, the CCPR, the Nations and Regions Group, Regional Development Agencies and, towards the end of the data generation period, the ‘Inspire Mark’ programme. A number of indirect approaches were made through personal contacts in the academic and sport development worlds to the DCMS, Ministers of Sport (Labour and Conservative parties) and government members mentioned in Olympic legacy debates as recorded by Hansard. These approaches were not successful in gaining the opportunity to conduct individual interviews. Data relating to the views of members of the government was therefore generated through the study of secondary sources such as records of the House of Commons and House of Lords, IOC documents and a number of media outlets.

In total, 35 interviews were recorded and transcribed. These can be sub divided into the three identified categories of: NGB senior management – 14 interviews; NGB ‘delivery’ or operational staff – 11 interviews and national / regional sport development agencies – 10 interviews. In the following chapters, each quote taken from the interview data has a number after the text. This number identifies the interviewee. The status of the interviewee is also provided in the text.

4.6.2 Types of data

The two main forms of data generation were the analysis of secondary sources of information and semi-structured interviews. The secondary sources of information included policy documents, statements and archival records published by various governmental and non-governmental agencies. These documents were initially used to

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8 For more information on the Inspire Mark programme, refer to Chapter 1
provide background material for the interviews and later as a means of augmenting or corroborating the data generated by the interviews.

**Interviews**

The interviews were predominantly carried out between July 2009 and the end of January 2011. The time-frame is important to reference as there was a change of government during this period (May 2010). Following the replacement of a Labour party government by a Coalition government of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties, changes were made to the participation targets set in the original Promise 1: Make the UK a world-leading sport nation. In June 2010, the target of, ‘1 million people to become physically active’, was dropped as a legacy ambition and the, ‘1 million people to do more sport’, maintained but with the potential for a change to a “more meaningful” measure (Gibson, 2011a). During the period of my interviews, there was no further indication of the new measure. It was also made clear to me by a senior manager at Sport England that the target of ‘1 million people doing more sport’ remained integral to the Sport England 2008–11 strategy to maintain the pressure on NGBs to meet their sport participation targets. The ambition of ‘1 million more people doing more sport’, therefore remained a constant point of reference throughout the interviews.

Amis (2005) suggests that interviews offer a depth of information to explore issues that is not possible with other forms of data collection. Amis (2005) further notes that the most common form of interviewing is the one-to one version and that it is preferable to conduct these face to face. Four types of interviewing formats are described by Amis (2005): closed interviewing, standardized open-ended interviewing, general interview guide and informal conversational interview. My research used the general interview guide (semi-structured interview) where the questions are centred on pre-determined themes. Compared to closed or standardized open ended interviewing, this allowed greater flexibility within the interview. There was a structure that ensured certain themes would be
covered but it allowed variation in the order, to probe more deeply when considered appropriate and to develop new themes. This approach also allowed me to adapt questions to follow up new angles of investigation raised in earlier interviews, a feature of the general interview guide highlighted as useful by Shaw and Amis (2001). A further important feature of this style is that it allows the interviewer to adapt the language of the questions to that most suitable for the interviewee (Amis, 2005).

The structure of the questions was based on the five conceptual elements used by Girginov and Hills (2008), in their study of the processes being used to develop a sport participation legacy from 2012:

1. Sports participation discourse created by the main legacy promoters and lead organisation: involvement in the development of London 2012 bid and legacy plans; how the aims of individual NGB plans relate to the London 2012 legacy plans;

   **Subject area in the Interview schedule:** NGB involvement in the bid and Discourse between main legacy promoters and the NGB re the development of the bid.

   **Sample question:** What involvement (if any) did you as the (e.g. BCF/ASA/RFL) have in the development of the sport legacy ‘promise’ as laid out in the UK Government document ‘Our Promise for 2012’.

2. The process of social learning and knowledge development: how to maximise the benefits of a sport mega-event to implement NGB development plans; the need for additional personnel and/or training of current staff;

   **Subject area in the Interview schedule:** How the aims of the NGB Whole Sport Plans relate to the London 2012 legacy plans – specifically Promise 1: Make the UK a world leading sporting nation and Vision post 2012 – How does 2012 act as a platform to deliver NGB plans in the long term?
**Sample question:** What sort of approach are you taking to London 2012 as part of your wider strategic plan? The event will come and go – what do you feel the role is of 2012 in what you are doing?

3. Engagement with participating members and groups: resources (in particular funding), communication methods and styles used to interact with current participants and to attract new participants;

**Subject area in the Interview schedule:** How the aims of the NGB Whole Sport Plans relate to the London 2012 legacy plans – specifically Promise 1: Make the UK a world leading sporting nation and Vision post 2012 – How does 2012 act as a platform to deliver NGB plans in the long term?

**Sample question:** Let’s take a typical process of sport development – ‘Come and Try It’ and then get picked up there. What it seems you’re saying is that you’ve got to put more into marketing of what you are doing to reach new people because effectively we’re only reaching the same people over and over again?

4. Organizational structures and management models: capacity building, the development of human and sporting capital; empowerment of clubs to deliver locally;

**Subject area in the Interview schedule:** Development of human and sporting capital.

**Sample question:** We’ve talked about sporting capital - in order to put the legacy plans in place what sort of investment has the NGB made in human capital?

5. Capacity to create, test and maintain opportunities for sports participation: these are considered to be based in the four previous processes but also the ability to adapt to a new national sport strategy and related funding streams. How do the London 2012 plans help the NGB realize ambitions post 2012?

**Subject area in the Interview schedule:** NGB evaluation procedures for WSP (and/or London 2012 legacy) and Vision post 2012?

**Sample question:** To bring our discussion to a conclusion, what would you say would be your indicators of success - say 2013, 2014. How will you evaluate – did we make the most of the Olympic and Paralympic Games?
The outline to my questions is provided in Appendix D. There are three schedules. The first for interviews with NGB senior management, national/regional sport organisations pre the change of government. The second schedule is for the same group of people which reflects the need to amend some questions for those interviewed following the change of government. Finally, the third set of questions is an example of a schedule for interviewees involved in the delivery of sport development programmes. This had to be changed each time to reflect the different programmes to be discussed. In the case of Appendix D, this example is for people working with the BCF where the main programme is *Sky Ride*.

As a way in to the initial interviews, I decided to ask the interviewees if they could remember where they were and how they felt when, in July 2005, Jacques Rogge as IOC President announced London as host city for the 2012 Olympic Games. The early responses to this question were found to be so illuminating in terms of generating data about what the respondents felt this meant for sport in the country, that it was decided to maintain this theme of enquiry across all of the interviews. To help build rapport and collect non-verbal data (Amis, 2005), the first interview was conducted face to face but there were a number of occasions where follow-up interviews were conducted by telephone or comments added by the interviewee through electronic mail. During the course of my career, I have had some training as an interviewer and was therefore aware of the importance of qualities of the interviewer such as body language, understanding people (including ourselves) and interviewer affect (Arksey and Knight, 1999). All face to face and telephone interviews were digitally recorded to provide a detailed record as it was appreciated that it would be necessary to refer back to them over a period of months into years. I transcribed all the interviews myself which, although as an untrained typist, was very time consuming, was found to be incredibly worthwhile as I found greater understanding by having to listen so intently to the content. Field notes were also made before and immediately after the interviews which included my reflections on ‘how it went’.  

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This included reference to the location of the interview which varied from the seclusion of an executive office to a sport club café or at a motorway services. As agreed in the detail of the consent form (see ethics section), all transcripts were returned to the interviewee to allow them to make any relevant changes (mainly spelling of names) or to remove any information they would not wish to appear in the public domain.

Despite his support for the use of interviews, Amis (2005, p.105) does point out that interviews “should not be carried out to the exclusion of other data”. In preparation for interviews, secondary data in the form of documents produced by the NGBs, such as their Whole Sport Plans, were analysed in addition to the original London 2012 Games bid (BOA 2004) and the initial legacy plans produced by the DCMS (DCMS, 2007; DCMS, 2008a). During the course of the study, further secondary data was obtained from sources such as Hansard, the popular press and electronic media.

Yin (2009) considers that the analysis of documents has a number of strengths. They are stable and can therefore be reviewed repeatedly, they provide exact names, details and references and they can have a broad longitudinal coverage of events. Yin (2009) also notes that an important use of documents is to augment and corroborate data from other sources. However, he also provides a note of caution in reminding the researcher that the documents will have been written for a purpose and audience other than that of the study being undertaken. To avoid misinterpretation, the researcher is advised to constantly consider the alternative objectives of the document’s author(s). This advice was certainly pertinent to secondary data retrieved from the popular press or the internet in relation to the London 2012 Games. It was necessary to be aware of the political orientation of the source of the information and the consequent potential for the coverage to demonstrate bias.
Building on this observation of the need for caution in considering the origins of secondary data, Scott (1990) addresses the need to consider the overall quality of the data that is generated for analysis. This is addressed by four criteria: authenticity; credibility; representativeness; and meaning. As discussed earlier in the section on reflexivity, it is felt that the authenticity, credibility and meaning of the interview generated data was assisted by my background as the interviewer; I had a good understanding of the interviewees, the positions they were operating in and the subject matter being discussed. The potential for material from the popular press to have a political orientation has been noted and considerable past experience of using data such as promotional material or statistics has made me aware of the need to ask questions of the basic information provided. The representativeness of the data was addressed in the consideration given to the research sample and the variety of sources from which data was generated.

4.7 Data analysis

A good starting point for this section is a specific contribution of Hammersley and Atkinson (2007, p.158) who propose that “data are materials to think with”. This certainly was the case with this data where there was a constant iterative process between the data, development of concepts and theories, a return to the data to find supporting or alternative ideas, redevelopment of concepts and then starting the process all over again. This process also meant that it was often necessary to go back to an interviewee and ask further questions to substantiate the initial data. In some cases the process involved being directed to another person who might be able to provide further insight into the concepts being developed.

Denscombe (2007) proposes five stages to the analysis of qualitative data: preparation of the data; familiarity with the data; interpreting the data (developing codes, categories and concepts); verifying the data and representing the data. The fact that I had to conduct
interviews at the convenience of interviewees and over an eighteen month period did not allow me to follow the staged process in sequence. However, I did use a consistent process in the treatment of the data generated by each interview. In the preparation of an interview transcript, for example, an electronic back-up copy was made, the layout of each transcript was set in a similar format and each was given a unique reference number.

Familiarity with my data was undoubtedly helped by transcribing all the interviews and continuously referring back to documents. I commented more than once that I felt I could almost see the content of each of the documents and transcripts, helped by using visualisation, a skill which I have progressively developed over years of playing golf.

Having completed and transcribed a number of interviews, I was able to start the interpretation of the data by developing a thematic framework (Social Research Association, 2009). I had developed a number of general descriptive themes from the research questions, such as ‘Response to London bid announcement’ and ‘Understanding of legacy’. As recommended by Amis (2005), I started with just two transcripts and inductively developed new themes and sub themes from the data. I then looked to apply the framework to other transcripts. This exercise enabled me to refine the thematic framework by adding new themes, dropping or re-naming some themes and collapsing themes to a higher order category. The refined themes are seen to be influenced by the programme theories of sport mega-events (in particular that of the proposed inspirational effect of elite sport performance) and the theories of how to increase sport participation as established from the literature review. Although it is understandable that such themes would emerge from the interview discourse, I was aware of the need to avoid focusing only on testing the programme theories and to allow explanations to emerge from the field.
The revised thematic framework had seven themes:

1. Ways of working
2. Inspiration – elite to mass
3. Planning/activity for legacy
4. Mind-set
5. Event and social capital
6. Sport participation legacy - the concept
7. Sport policy

Under each theme were a number of sub themes, for example under 'Inspiration – elite to mass' were:

2.1 Role models
   2.11 Sport
   2.12 Non-sport
2.2 Sport success
2.3 Rhetoric
2.4 Lack of evidence

I manually coded each transcript and also used FrameWork (National Centre for Social Research, n.d.), a computer aided qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). In researching how I would analyse data, I was introduced to CAQDAS and in particular the system favoured by Leeds Metropolitan University – NVivo. Having considered the advantages, I decided against using NVivo but did use FrameWork created by the National Centre for Social Research (n.d.). Silverman (2005) suggests four advantages of CAQDAS, the most relevant to my research being speed and rigour. Speed was not considered an issue as I was not dealing with large amounts of data. I had 35 full interviews where the average time of an interview was 40 minutes. In addition, there were a few additional back up notes with interviewees from supplementary emails and/or phone
conversations. Rigour was relevant as it could be seen to add to the credibility of the research. I did need to address the potential for researcher bias. As stated by Silverman (2005, p.191) the researcher should be “demonstrating that you have searched for negative instances by examining the whole corpus of data rather than selecting only anecdotes supporting your interpretation”. It was partly for this reason that I elected to use FrameWork to start the analysis of data. In addition, FrameWork does not as readily ‘consume’ the data as I found in the case of NVivo. FrameWork allows the operator to maintain more contact with the text which addressed one of the suggested limitations of the CAQDAs. Denscombe (2007, p.304) suggests that computers can only focus on the superficial nature of the text and “cannot understand implied meanings which depend on events in the background”. As previously outlined, this was felt important in the analysis of my data to identify as much about what wasn’t said as said (Reinharz, 2007).

Verification of research is considered vital as without it, it would lack credibility (Silverman, 2005). To achieve credibility, the data needs to “demonstrate in some way or other that the findings are based on practices that are acknowledged to be the bases of good research” (Denscombe, 2007, p.296). As Denscombe (2007) suggests, it is not feasible to check the quality of qualitative research in the same way that a scientist can replicate an experiment, for example it would not be realistic to try to replicate a social setting. It is suggested that qualitative research should take steps to ensure that the data is ‘reasonably likely’ to be appropriate and accurate. This is done by use of triangulation, respondent validation and grounded data. ‘Triangulation’ is a process where data from one source should be compared to data from other sources (Amis 2005). In my research triangulation came from the use of different data sources: interview transcripts, interviewing more than one person in each NGB, notes from interviews, written documentation in addition to media sources such as web-sites and newspaper articles. It is also suggested by Amis (2005) that observation can be a useful source of data generation. I attended a number of events and activities being held by the NGBs linked to
their plans to increase mass sport participation in association with the London 2012 Games. By listening to the NGB staff members and the participants at such events, I was able to gain a different perspective on the data generated through interviews about the NGB sport participation legacy plans.

‘Respondent validation’ came from providing the interviewees with the transcripts of the interviews to check for both factual accuracy and interpretation. The data was considered to be ‘grounded’ due to the extent of the field work and care spent in considering the potential impact of the researcher on the research and its findings. The latter point also relates to the reliability of the data. In the section on reflexivity, it has been noted that the researcher’s background will influence the research and the research ‘instrument’ cannot remain neutral. What the researcher can do (and as I have sought to do) is show a detailed audit trail of the research process to allow others to decide how far they “constitute replicable procedures and reasonable decisions” (Denscombe, 2007, p.298).

The final point to consider is that of generalizability (Denscombe, 2007). My research has concentrated on one event and a small number of the available ‘population’ chosen for the study. Questions could be asked of how representative the sample is of the population? To address this question, it is suggested that a more appropriate phrase of, ‘transferability’, (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) is used. In my final research question, I ask about the extent of the transferable nature of the findings as opposed to the presumption that the findings could automatically relate to other events and the development of their legacy programmes.
4.8 Conclusion

Having generated and analysed my data, the next stage of the research was to discuss the efficacy of the programme theories for H2012 and how it might leave a legacy of increased sport participation. Using the terminology of realist evaluation, the programme theories are the *mechanisms* that were being used as the proposed ‘drivers’ to provide the desired *outcome* of a legacy of increased mass sport participation. The analysis also revealed certain *contexts* that had influenced the working of the mechanisms and that mechanisms could be influenced by multiple contexts. The influence of contexts could both promote and detract from the H2012 desired outcome of an increase in mass sport participation.

The following chapters are seen as a discussion or number of discussions generated by the analysis of data from my research. The background to the discussion is a ‘canvas’ of sport mega-events, legacy and the wider sphere of sport development as painted in the opening chapters.
Chapter 5 – The ‘trickle-down’ effect: it’s impact on the planning for a mass sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games.

“When I was 12, I was marched into a large school hall with my classmates. We sat in front of an ancient, black and white TV and watched grainy pictures from the Mexico Olympic Games... That day a window to a new world opened for me. By the time I was back in my classroom, I knew what I wanted to do and what I wanted to be. London's vision is to reach people all over the world to connect them with the inspirational power of the Games so that they are inspired to choose sport” Seb Coe (6th July 2005).

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I use my research findings to explore the notion put forward in the quote by Seb Coe, that the inspirational power of the Games might inspire people to choose to play sport themselves. It is a process termed the ‘trickle-down’ effect (TDE) (Frawley et al, 2009) or demonstration effect (Weed et al, 2009a) based on the belief that the achievements of elite athletes inspire mass participation in sport. In Chapter 2, it was noted by Frawley et al (2009) that “sporting events are seen to have a number of public benefits which legitimise government expenditure amongst these is inspiring people to themselves participate in sport”. In the case of the London 2012 Games, it has been shown that this was the dominant programme theory that was put forward by the UK government and London 2012 Games’ event of how hosting the Games would leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation across the communities of the UK.

The TDE has dominated sport policy in many countries for many years (Weed et al, 2009). It is not a new concept. Indeed it has been suggested that one motivation behind Pierre De Coubertin’s revival of the modern Olympics was to counter a concern about the
lack of physical fitness in young French males (Toohey and Veal, 2007; Girginov and Hills, 2008). De Coubertin writing in the early 20th century claimed:

So that a hundred may train their bodies, it needs fifty to practice sport. And in order for fifty to practice sport, twenty have to become specialized. In order to have twenty specialized, it means that five must be capable of outstanding peak performances (cited in Muller, 2000).

In terms of the TDE as it relates to potential legacy of sport mega-events, the question arises “as to whether the trickle-down effect actually works in the context of major sporting events and, if so, by what mechanisms” (Veal et al, in press).

Using the guidance of realist evaluation, the chapter looks, in part, to address the third main research question:

How do the social, economic and political contexts in which these change mechanisms are activated have an impact on the working of the mechanism?

Using the data generated through my research, the TDE is investigated in its use as a mechanism to deliver the outcome of the mass sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games. The mechanism of the TDE is evaluated in the various contexts in which it has been set to investigate the effectiveness of the relationships between context and mechanism.
5.2 The association of the TDE with sport mega-events

In a House of Commons debate on Olympic Legacy, the then Minister for Sport, Andy Burnham (2008), was clear in his view that “success at elite level will drive more participation at the grass roots” (Hansard, 2008, col.915). In a further contribution to the debate, Burnham hoped that Team GB would build on their success at Beijing 2008 and go further in 2012, because,

if they do, young people will be inspired by the most successful ever British Team, at our home Olympics. Think of the benefit that that will deliver to grass-roots sport in this country. It will be enormous. (Hansard, 2008, col. 924).

Lord Coe, as reflected in the quote at the start of this chapter, is supportive of the concept of the TDE. He has probably been the most vociferous of all the London 2012 Games event organisers and supporters on the Games’ potential to inspire mass sport participation. In the time that I spent between March 2007 and July 2008 at ‘Podium’ (The Further and Higher Education Communications and Co-ordination Unit for the London 2012 Games), I heard Lord Coe speak at conferences and press conferences on several occasions. His belief in the TDE to create a London 2012 Games’ legacy of increased mass sport participation was omnipresent. Coe has continued to reiterate his belief.

Recently when responding to criticism of the plans for a London 2012 Games legacy of increased participation in a report by the Centre for Social Justice (2011), he admitted that the legacy of increased sport participation was a challenge but remained adamant that the Olympics would prove to be the single most significant engine of increasing sport participation adding “it will be the performance of the stars in the Games that gets people involved” (White, 2011, p.S13).
The anomaly is that despite the belief in the TDE as expounded in this quote by Lord Coe, there is little empirically based support for the efficacy of the TDE either in sport policy or in the context of a sport mega-event host country (Hogan and Norton, 2000; Coalter, 2008,b; Weed et al 2009; Hanstadd and Skille, 2010). By way of example, the Hanstadd and Skille (2010) study reviewed the case of the 1998 Biathlon World Championships, where the Norwegian Biathlon Association hoped that success in the event and the fact that the country would be hosting the event in succeeding years would positively impact on mass participation. The Association was later to admit this was not the case and since 2002 has focused its attentions on community involvement in order to reach its participation targets.

As detailed in Chapter 2, although often used as justification for hosting events, there is further evidence to support the lack of a positive relationship between hosting sport mega-events and their ability to promote mass sport participation. It is enough to re-iterate here the summary of a review of the evidence relating to sport mega-events and legacy by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2007, para. 113) which states:

No host country has yet been able to demonstrate a direct benefit from the Olympic Games in the form of a lasting increase in participation.

In Chapter 2, the analysis of the TDE as a catalyst for increased participation by Hindson et al (1994) was discussed. This study concluded that there were two antithetical models of the relationship between elite sport and grass-roots participation:

- Elite athletes become role models and attract new participants to sport
Demonstrations of sporting excellence act as a deterrent to sport participation because of the perceived competence gap between the observer and the athlete.

It is this relationship as it has the potential to impact on the ‘promise’ of increased mass sport participation that is discussed in this chapter through the framework of realist evaluation: Context + Mechanism (in this case TDE) = Outcome.

The views of my respondents were mixed as to whether they thought the process of the TDE London 2012 Games would be a contributory factor to the delivery of the sport participation legacy. Although not always using the specific term, ‘trickle-down’ effect, five out of the six NGBs featured in this study did refer to the process of the TDE. In their interviews, references were made to both the relevance to their own sports and others. During the course of one interview, a senior NGB manager mentioned the much cited ‘Wimbledon-effect’, where for the two to three weeks during and after the tennis ‘major’, courts around the country are reported to be full. This observation was followed by the suggestion that, following the success of the Team GB cyclists at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, “I bet a lot of people have switched to cycling” (2). Although, she lacked the information, evidence from the Manchester Velodrome (the ‘home’ of the British Cycling Federation - BCF), would support this comment (NWDA, 2008). Usage of the track was reported to be at an all-time high in the autumn of 2008 with track hire fully booked through to spring 2009. Support for a surge of interest in cycling following the 2008 Beijing Olympics is also shown by data from Active People 3 (2008/9) showing an increase of over 113,000 people cycling compared to Active People 2 (2007/8) (Sport England 2009). However, data from Active People 4 (2009/10) (Sport England 2010) indicated a slight decrease (-13,700) reflecting that the upward trend had not been sustained despite the reported continued success of the BCF’s elite cyclists on the international stage (British Cycling Federation, 2010).
One senior manager at the BCF acknowledged that “there’s no evidence at the minute to say that a major event or international success will make a lasting difference to grassroots” (7) but then pointed out:

so what we’re trying to do is we are trying to complete that circle and say, yes you can do it – and that is one of the reasons we’ve got Sky involved with the GB team. Sky working with ourselves. We’re launching a pro team next year with aspirations to win the Tour de France in the next five years and that team will be used to link back to the participation programme – so can you use the biggest annual cycling sport event in the world to drive people back to grassroots?

Another senior manager at the BCF, supported the views of Smith (2009) who suggested that sport mega-event organisers could be accused of anticipating ‘legacy by osmosis’. He recalled in the days after the bid that national sport organisations gave the impression that the sport participation legacy would be delivered by “our standard fayre” (9). He went on to point out that the BCF, by having a structured on-going programme to pick up on any interest in elite success, “want to be the first governing body that can say we have delivered inspiration to participation” (9) and to do this they would avoid the scenario where:

like tennis – it [participation] goes up and then disappears, the 2003 Rugby World Cup win – everyone is playing rugby for a month and then it disappears, Freddie Flintoff wins the Ashes single handedly and everyone’s playing cricket for two 2 weeks and then it disappears. Now cycling has not disappeared, it dipped naturally after the rush of Beijing but actually it’s not
disappeared. It's up there all the time with the Sky relationship⁹. This summer [2009] the London Sky ride was billed as the world's largest bike ride- 80,000 people out there on a bike (9).

The suggestion that “legacies are created not given” (Girginov and Hills, 2008) has been discussed in Chapter 2 and the planning for legacy is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6. However, at this point it is worth noting that the BCF felt LOCOG could learn a lesson from their approach. As stated by one senior BCF manager in 2009, “It’s an interesting lesson for London 2012 – we’ve got the places bit but it’s the people bit, in terms of those programmes and activities you are going to run to really drive the participation. The thing about legacy is that it should be starting now” (7).

5.3 The impact of context on the TDE as a mechanism to deliver a mass sport participation legacy from the London 2012 Games.

5.3.1 The TDE and the context of ‘elite success’

During the course of the interviews with senior management of the NGBs, one recurring theme was the importance of having a context of ‘winning’ or ‘success’. In building on a comment about the London 2012 Games being a “phenomenal opportunity” (17), one senior NGB manager explained that the opportunity would come through “making household names of our athletes – provided we get some gold medals” (17). Another NGB senior manager from a non-Olympic sport considered that ‘winning’ was fundamental to the effectiveness of the TDE as a mechanism, commenting that:

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⁹ The Home Page for Sky Ride (www.goskyride.com) states: BCF “British Cycling and Sky have come together to inspire the nation to get on their bikes”. There are two main categories of rides: Sky Ride City and Sky Ride Local and “there is something for everyone” (www.goskyride.com).
It's only of value if you win stuff - for example cycling, and yachting and rowing, their profiles have risen because they have won stuff- not because they have nice kit, nice bikes or looks fun. And that was why ’12’ was such a disappointment to us. Not because we would love to compete in a home Olympics but a home Olympics where quite genuinely our top three to four men and two to three women would be really competing to be on the podium in pretty much everything. And the value of that is incalculable (7).

The incalculable nature of medal winning was also alluded to by another NGB senior manager who suggested:

If Rebecca Addlington can get two gold medals in London she will be the greatest sporting female that the country’s ever had. Double gold medallist at back to back Games – that’s huge! She would have the credibility to walk into any television studio and promote her sport. That’s gold dust for us and that’s why NGBs are focused on that (18).

Both of these excerpts refer to the benefits to be gained from ‘winning’, and the proposed consequent benefits that the increased profile will bring. To use the words quoted in a press release by the CEO of the BCF, Ian Drake (2009), it is seemingly about “delivering impressive performances which turn the athletes into ‘sporting role models’.

5.3.2 The TDE and the role-model effect

Coater (2008b, p.13) states that the role-model effect is considered implicit in the “assertion that sports events lead to increased sport participation”. In Chapter 2 and earlier in this Chapter, it was reported that Hindson et al (1994) put forward two antithetical models of the relationship between the performance of top level athletes and
grass-roots sport participation. The first suggested a positive relationship where the sport stars become role models and attract new participants, the second that the performances of elite athletes can be detrimental to encouraging grass-roots participation due to the negative effect of a perceived competence gap felt by the novice in response to watching elite sport performers.

Later in Chapter 2, in the overview of the theories of behaviour change as applied to sport and physical activity participation, the impact of the role-model effect was seen to be influenced by a number of factors. As a result, it was concluded that role models may have a significant impact on the beliefs and actions of individuals (Payne et al, 2002) but as noted by Andrews and Jackson (2001), this may not always be in the manner intended by those instigating the ‘mechanism’.

**Role models and the context of age**

In Chapter 2, it was noted that the age of the person observing elite athletic performance has an influence on their response in terms of the athlete acting as a role model that they wished to emulate. This is particularly important for the legacy ‘promise’ of ‘1 million people doing more sport’, as measurement of participation is being monitored by the Active People Survey where the target group is of adults over sixteen years of age (see Chapter 1.7.6).

Weed et al (2009) suggest that for adults, elite participants may be too remote to influence behaviour. This proposal is supported by MacCullum and Beltman (2002) who, in researching the effectiveness of role model programmes, identify as good practice the need for elite athletes to appear relevant and accessible. Lyle (2009, p.5) concluded that “Given the importance of relevance, attainability and similarity to the observer’s self-concept, it may not always be appropriate to use elite sporting champions”.

The relevance, attainability and similarity of elite athlete performance for adults was illustrated in a series of interviews held in Manchester which explored the potential impact
of the London 2012 Games on grass roots participation. In one interview, when describing the impact of the Games on her sporting behaviour, a 30 year old martial arts participant said,

The Olympics are up here and we’re down there. It seems unachievable. How many people do you know who do the 400-metre hurdles? (Interview with Longman, 2011).

In an interview with a NGB development manager, he talked of his previous role in the health sector where a piece of work had been commissioned to assess how the London 2012 Games might be used to get people more active. He commented on how he and colleagues were finding making the link between the Games and participation difficult because,

if you are disengaged with sport, is a big sporting event going to make an impact at all? In fact it might put people off because it might make them feel inferior as in “I’m never going to do that” (26).

A further point of view was it was not the role-models that were the cause of the increase in swimming but the impact of the work to improve the customer experience by improving facilities. The opinion of a regional development manager for swimming was,

London 2012 is a focus point. It focuses people’s minds to do something but it’s not because Becky Addlington is going to be swimming here in just over 12 months but because local authorities have made decisions about restructuring pools or making improvements to their pools (18).
However, other interviewees were convinced that the role-modelling effect does work for adults. In discussing the development of the BCF’s Sky Ride programme, one senior manager reported on a meeting he had recently had with Manchester City Council and the PCT where,

they seemed to have taken a lot more interest in sport and the effect on their area and they said – we know cycling has a different appeal and we know it’s going to feature quite highly in the Olympic Games, so help me work out what to do – how do I get the inspiration bit? (9)

The interviewee went on to explain how he talked about Sky Ride and getting the “role models out there, mixing with the people, that is the key to making that visible link”. Interestingly, the fact that the interviewee talks here about making a ‘link’ does show an appreciation of the need for the role model to be relevant, accessible and demonstrate a similarity to the observer. The BCF senior manager went on to explain how the Sky Ride programme has used role-models. He reported how role models were initially used at the Sky Ride City level, which has been built up from five rides in 2009 to 17 in 2011 and a further 17 planned for 2012. Sir Chris Hoy, four times Olympic and ten times world champion, is a frequent participant in the Sky Ride City events. He is used on a promotional web and television video footage (BCF, 2011) in addition to personal appearances at the events. In an interview with a senior manager at the BCF, he described to me the part Sir Chris Hoy would play in a forthcoming Sky Ride City event:

Chris Hoy will spend a day in Glasgow and speak to ordinary people, be on the stage, cycle around the circuit with families, talk to the Mum who has brought her kid in the trailer and everyone’s there seeing it and saying – wow – this is it – I’m touching it. So it’s grounding, it’s allowing people to
touch the product a bit more than this picture of a person in the Sunday Times winning a gold medal (9).

The approach outlined here is to try and make Sir Chris seem more accessible, despite being an elite cyclist he is seen to be joining in cycling with the general public. Making the sporting role model ‘accessible’ lends itself to the idea that people in cycling can all be part of one ‘system’ but have different levels of engagement.

The BCF have also considered the concepts of ‘relevance and similarity’. The Sky Ride programme also uses non-sporting role models, such as media personalities Kelly Brooke, Alexandra Burke and Gethin Jones. The models were described to me as being used as a “draw for a new audience” (9). My interviewee explained,

not every inactive person, non-cyclist wants to listen to Vicky Pendleton and Chris Hoy but they will be drawn by Kelly and Gethin saying ‘do you know what, I haven’t cycled much but I’d love to have a go and I love it’. They are believable characters (9).

This approach is thought to have the potential to appeal to those who may feel the exploits of world class cyclists are beyond their capabilities but are drawn by the potential to engage with well-known personalities.

The idea of using media personalities is also being developed by the BBC (as the official broadcaster of the London 2012 Olympic Games) and the ASA. In an interview with a senior manager with the ASA in 2010, he described to me the plans to develop story-lines in two popular BBC television series, Casualty and Eastenders. The story-lines would promote positive messages about swimming including involvement in the ASA’s main participation programme linked to 2012 – the Big Splash. In 2002, a similar technique was
used by Granada, the producers of another popular television series, Coronation Street. Both Granada and the set for Coronation Street are based in Salford, Manchester, the venue for the 2002 Commonwealth Games. In this instance, one of the Coronation Street cast, Norris Cole, signed up to be a volunteer at the 2002 Commonwealth Games. Although this story-line prompted some media interest (Campbell, 2002), there have been no known evaluation studies made of the impact of this story-line on public engagement with either the volunteering programme for the 2002 Commonwealth Games or more general interest in volunteering.

**Role models and young people**

As noted in Chapter 2, there is some evidence that elite sporting role models can inspire young people. More recently, further evidence has been provided by the results of the analysis of data from the Lloyds/TSB/Bank of Scotland National School Weeks for the Youth Sport Trust. The analysis illustrated that the demonstration effect can have a positive impact on sports participation amongst young people (Weed, 2011a) but the effect may be less significant with secondary than primary aged school children (Weed, 2011b).

In support of Weed’s observation, Sir Steve Redgrave (2011, p.S12) commenting on the progress of the London 2012 sport legacy, suggests that it is really only at primary school age where elite athletes as role models might make a positive impact. In his article, Redgrave reflects on the importance of perceived competence and makes the observation that “teenagers like to do things they are good at”. In addition, although he considers that the Games will inspire the next generation of sportsmen and women, he notes that “these athletes comprise a tiny proportion of society”.

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One of my interviewees was quite emphatic on the subject of the role-model effect and young people. When asked if the NGB was using an elite athlete led approach to increasing participation, he replied:

Definitely one of the strategies. There is no doubt that developing heroes in your sport inspires particularly for young people. The evidence for me is incontroversible (18).

In another interview with a NGB senior manager, the simple answer to my question, “Do you support the idea that young people are inspired to participate through the role-model effect?" was “Absolutely" (9) These positive endorsements reflected a more general belief in the process.

One potential problem in terms of capitalising on any enthusiasm to participate in response to the Games was the lack of a plan to capture potential participants. In late 2009, when discussing the idea with one NGB senior manager that the NGB wanted to see a nationwide legacy, I asked “Are there any plans to make that happen? If a child in Norwich sees the wonderful diving event in London - how are you going to pick that up?” The response was “That’s a very good question and I don’t have the answer at the moment” (17). The subject of planning for legacy is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.

An interesting angle to the discussion on the role model effect was outlined to me in a conversation with Ray Pawson when he gave me an example of how a role-model programme may produce unintended outcomes. Pawson talked about what he terms the ‘Dishy David Beckham' theory; where a health–related programme used David Beckham as a role model for young girls as the ‘mechanism' designed to change their attitudes towards playing football. One group of the girls interviewed as part of the monitoring and evaluation process thought that, although the programme had not impacted on their
attitudes to playing football, they were now keen to watch more football to admire the physical attributes of the players. In this context the mechanism had not succeeded in the intended outcome of getting the girls to consider playing football but they had become more frequent football spectators and might become new consumers in the commercial marketplace.

Whannel (1995) suggests that the concept of a ‘sport star’ as a role model is an over-simplified model of the relationship that has developed between people, sport stars and the media. Sport, according to Bell and Campbell (1999), has, due to its drama, personalities and worldwide appeal (much of this accelerated by the growth of commercial media), become the new Hollywood. Sporting heroes - those distinguished by their achievements may also become celebrities - those distinguished by their image or trademark (Boorstein, 1992). Andrews and Jackson (2001, p.1) suggest that it is through the commercial media that we are “privy to a wealth of information that encourages us to develop a sense of familiarity, intrigue and sometimes obsession with celebrity figures”. It is the complexity of this relationship that led Andrews and Jackson (2001, p.5) to conclude that “there is no guarantee that celebrities will be consumed in the manner intended by those orchestrating the manufacturing process”.

To put this in the context of the planning for a sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games, the inspiration experienced by a person watching an event may not translate into participation in the sport. A Sport England senior manager told me about one planned intervention for the Games where information on participation in the sport being watched will be provided on the back of spectators’ tickets. It is known that interest in the Men’s 100m final is considerable (Pearson, 2011) and many of those that have secured tickets will be there to watch Usain Bolt who, at the time of writing, is the world’s fastest man (BBC, 2011). It would be too simplistic to suggest that the interest in watching Usain Bolt will produce a surge of new interest in the discipline of sprinting. It is likely that
young people will continue to copy the now familiar Bolt ‘pose’, but whether ‘en masse’ they will be inspired to have the dedication he is required to give to training as an elite athlete is less likely.

5.3.3 The TDE and the context of geographical impact

It was noted both in the previous chapter and in Chapter 2 that, compared to economic legacy, one proposed benefit of the social legacy of an event to the communities of the host country was that it does not need to be geographically limited (Weed et al, 2009).

Over the course of my interviews, the potential for the TDE of the London 2012 Games to be an effective countrywide mechanism was one area where there was discord between senior management in sport development organisations and NGBs and the staff delivering the NGBs' programmes.

As outlined on several occasions in this study, a feature of the London 2012 Games’ promotional material and the UK government’s London 2012 Games’ ‘promises’ was that the legacy benefits would be felt on a countrywide basis (Nations and Regions, n.d.; DCMS, 2008a). In my interviews, I found that there was a difference of opinion on whether or not this would hold true between those in senior management and those involved in the delivery of the programmes. Based on my experience of working at Sport England, I would anticipate that those closer to the centre of the enterprise would subscribe to the corporate discourse but it was interesting to find that those closer to the coal-face had such a different thought process.

One London based NGB development officer, who in response to a question on what difference the Games might make on sport participation, reported on the “assumption that seeing people play elite sport in their locality would inspire more people to play more
sport” (26). When asked about the wider impact of the London 2012 Games, a NGB development officer in the South East of England said:

I don’t know enough about what is going on in the rest of the country to comment, but it will be London because it’s held in London and anything that happens in the rest of the country will fade rather more quickly because there is no physical presence left (27).

The same interviewee was not even convinced that using the London 2012 Games was part of the NGB’s strategy to deliver their Whole Sport Plan. Asked when he became aware of the Games impacting on his work, he replied:

It [the London 2012 Games] doesn’t form a strategic part of what we are doing, to be honest. We don’t have a 2012 strategy and there isn’t a 2012 aspect to anything we do (27).

The interviewee quoted above was from a non-Olympic sport, where, as will be discussed later in the chapter, there was evidence to suggest that such sports found it more difficult to make the connection with the Games. However, in terms of stimulating mass participation, a similar point of view was expressed by a development officer in an Olympic sport. Reviewing the activity of the NGB from the introduction of the sport legacy ‘promise’, he suggested that:

looking at the past three and a half years, it looks very London-centric and other than the elite focus, I’m not sure how any messages are being articulated. [ ]. To a large extent 2012 doesn’t mean much to the groups we are trying to target at the moment (32).
The responses of the development officers who were working in the field contrasted dramatically with those in senior management, the latter being much resolute about the sport legacy of London 2012 being experienced on a national basis. In one interview, when answering a question about whether the focus of the legacy would be in London, a NGB senior manager said:

I think there will be some focus on it but this is about the whole country not about London. The sport wants to see a legacy delivered across the whole country (17).

The commitment to having a countrywide legacy was supported by a senior development manager from Sport England when discussing how the Nations and Regions group would operate in the light of the decision to close down the Regional Development Agencies. The interviewee was clear that “the Games are a UK wide Games and we want to continue to have that link” (12).

For those in senior management, there was a general conviction that it was the heightened profile of sport and, where applicable, success in their sport at the Games that would facilitate the TDE to be used as a mechanism to increase mass sport participation on a countrywide basis. The evidence for this observation was noted earlier in this chapter in the discussion on role models. By way of example, medal winning athletes would be a sought-after commodity by the media which would disseminate the athletes’ inspirational stories of success through the various mediums of television, newspapers radio, worldwide web and social messaging. However, in that discussion, discord was also noted between senior management and those working in the field as to the efficacy of role models as a catalyst to increase participation.
An alternative proposal was put forward by one NGB senior manager of a minority sport who was clear that the Games had been the “catalyst” (20) to facilitate the establishment of an enhanced infrastructure of development centres for that sport across the country. The interviewee described how the sport had taken the opportunity to grow by capitalising on increased funding through its status as an Olympic sport. For this sport, increasing its profile, the “visibility of the sport” (20) through the Games was important to its development plans but the legacy of 2012 was not about raising profile through the number of medals won. In outlining the sport’s ambitions for the London 2012 Games, the senior manager explained:

I don’t think we will medal but I think the infrastructure we’ve put in place, the profile we will get and the programmes we can access and will continue to do so will be a real legacy for us (20).

5.3.4 The TDE and the context of ‘What’s it got to do with me?’

It was noted in Chapter 2, that if the Games are to make an impact people need to feel connected to the event and be supportive of it (Weed et al, 2009). In the last section, it was seen that there were differences of opinion as to whether the Games could have an influence beyond London. Following the publication of the legacy ‘promises’, the UK government commissioned Cragg Ross Dawson (CRD) (2007) to conduct qualitative research into public attitudes towards the London 2012 Games. One of the main conclusions of this report was that if participation in the Games’ legacy was to be maximised, it was important to:

make it clear to people that the effects of legacy will be felt beyond London, and in their own communities - there is a wide spread assumption that the Games and the legacy alike will be restricted to London (CRD, 2007, p.11).
A comment that typified the responses from those interviewed outside London as part of the CRD research, came from one respondent in Birmingham, who said:

To be honest I feel a bit left out that nothing is going on about it here, they’re not changing anything or building anything just especially for the Olympics so how is it going to affect me, it’s just as if I was watching it in China or Spain or whatever if it’s in London, because it’s not the UK (p.14).

Another respondent from the north of England said: “It’s too far away to get excited about it. Because it’s in London I feel detached from it” (p.12).

A further conclusion from the CRD (2007) study was that when people were made aware of the wider activities linked to the London 2012 Games they became more supportive and interested in the event. A similar response was found in the study by Deccio and Balugu (2002) of the non-host community benefits of the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in which they noted the importance of drawing people’s attention to the potential benefits of an event, particularly those that local communities feel are relevant.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, a sense that the Games were ‘London-centric’ was reported from the interviews with NGB development officers. It was suggested by the development officers that the London focus of the event made it difficult for them to use the event to promote their work outside the capital. On a countrywide basis, people at a local level were not considered to have made the association with the London 2012 Games and therefore would not be able to answer the question ‘What’s it got to do with me?’, in a positive manner. At the time of writing, a most recent reflection of this situation came from research conducted by ICM Research of 2,000 people in July 2011. The results of this on-line poll showed that people’s excitement about the prospect of the
Games coming to London dropped from 48% in the south-east of England to 38% in the north of England and 28% in Scotland (Kelso, 2011a).

When I worked for Sport England, my experience of trying to engage people with the Commonwealth Games in 2002 gave me a new appreciation of how difficult it is to bridge the mere 25 miles between Manchester and Liverpool. Bridging the much publicised ‘gap’ between the South and North in the UK was always going to be a challenge.

The formation of a London 2012 Games ‘Nations and Regions’ group (NRG) was directed at helping to bridge that gap and stimulate awareness in the potential social and economic benefits of the London 2012 Games. A study by Blake (2005) justified the need for the NRG. In his report, Blake (2005) demonstrated that the economic benefits of the Games would be centred on London and could bring negative impacts to other regions. The NRG has representatives from each of the nine Sport England regions in addition to members from each of the Home Nations. It originally based itself around the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) but, as reported earlier in the interview with a Sport England employee, the recent decision to close these organisations has, at time of writing, left a sense of uncertainty as to how the group will continue to function.

The sense of connectivity to the London 2012 Games has also not been helped by some communication issues between those operating in London and the regions. This was reflected in an interview with one NRG member, based in the north of England. He reported feeling a sense of indignation when “a woman from London came up and told us that, quote, - ‘the regions haven’t grasped the issue of legacy’- when we’ve been trying to get something going for two years” (1). The sense of a north-south divide pervaded this interview. The same interviewee also commented on the subject of the demise of the RDAs and the consequences for the delivery of a countrywide legacy. Referring to the recent change in government (May 2010), he commented that “new people come in and
don't understand the consequences of their actions. How do you get people to realise that the people doing the legacy are the RDAs?" (1).

A similar opinion was expressed by another local government official based outside of London who had been seconded to a developmental position linked to the London 2012 Games. He talked about the “negativity” (19) of opinion that said,

> everything is happening down in London, there are less grant opportunities for us and how are we going to involve ourselves, how are we going to invest if indeed the opportunities to invest are being siphoned off (19).

### 5.3.5 The TDE and the context of non-Olympic sports

During the course of my interviews, a further group that were seen to be challenged in making the association with the London 2012 Games was made up of the sports that would not be featured in the event. Concern was expressed by NGBs of non-Olympic sports that any TDE would be limited to Olympic sports as these would gain the most profile. A NGB senior manager reflected that:

> There are plenty of sports that will in the coming few years get an awful lot of publicity but if we are talking about a sporting nation we are talking about a significant amount of other sports which simply won't feature on any of this material (14).

Later in the interview, this theme was developed to the conclusion that:

> I still don't see ultimately the connect between all sports and Olympic sports and a legacy for those sports and a legacy for sport generally. I find it hard
to make that connection which less than 3 years out is starting to be a concern. I don’t think we are alone in this. Everything is much less sharply focused in the non-London, non-Olympic sport contribution or benefit from part of this legacy. It’s harder to make that connection (14).

The suggestion that Olympic and Paralympic sports might be prioritised in the build-up to the London 2012 Games was disputed by a senior manager at Sport England. In answering a question on the concerns of non-Olympic and Paralympic sports, he explained:

I can understand that perception from those sports that are not directly involved in the Games. As far as Sport England is concerned, it makes no difference whatsoever whether the sports are Olympic or Paralympic or not. The 48 sports we are funding are a mixture of both and we give them due care and attention. There has to be a slightly different approach taken to how the Games are used to benefit badminton or squash. We certainly want to use the power of the 2012 just as much in the non-Olympic sports and I think that’s possible. I don’t think you have to be ‘in it’ to benefit from them (11).

During the course of my interviews with NGBs of non-Olympic sports, the message and reassurance that they would be considered ‘equal’ was not evident. One of the main concerns expressed by non-Olympic sports was that of funding and the potential for funds to be targeted at Olympic sports to the detriment of non-Olympic sports. One NGB senior manager recalled that her first thoughts on hearing London had won the bid was: “it looks like we may not get any funding over the next few years as it will all be ploughed into Olympic sports” (6). Despite the London 2012 Games legacy ‘promise’ not mentioning any bias towards Olympic and Paralympic sports, non-Olympic sports were united in feeling
that they had had to work harder to ensure their involvement. One person mentioned feeling "neglected" (6) when attending forums to discuss legacy development and another actually making the point at a legacy conference that all the speakers were from Olympic sports.

A further context to the efficacy of role-models being created by sport mega-events was put forward by a senior manager of a NGB of a women’s sport that was team-based. She felt that firstly “what I want to see is more profile of women’s sport and sport stars” but added,

and when we do get it it’s the individuals that get the limelight but the teams are so far down the pecking order in terms of TV coverage and positive role models. Women’s team sports get a crap deal. And I just want one Olympics to shoot that out of the water so that everyone thinks that team sports are really cool. We’ve almost cracked it with individuals like Kelly Holmes and Jessica Ennis. People talk about them and know who they are – but you hear little talk about the women’s teams – the cricket team have done so well, the rugby team, the netball team - there are some fantastic women’s teams (2).

Another opinion was that it would be easier to develop a sport participation legacy from a one sport mega-event (e.g. FIFA World Cup, IFNA World Netball Championships, UCI Track Cycling World Championships) than a multi-sport event such as the Olympics, Paralympics or Commonwealth Games. This NGB senior manager said,

I think from a legacy perspective, it [one sport] is an awful lot easier. I think trying to battle for a sporting legacy for twenty something sports – to co-
ordinate it when everyone has different things to aim at is so much more difficult (4).

The idea of competition for profile and resources between different sports, whether included or not in multi-sport event, between team and individual sports or women's and men's, reveals a feature of the current system of UK sport governance. In the words of Linda Plowright, CEO of Sport Leaders UK (2009, p.5), the culture of the sport and recreation industry in the UK is one of:

competition for resources and profile to take forward the objectives of our own organisations, rather than getting behind the vision of a commonly held vision of legacy.

The competitive nature of the UK sport development industry and its impact on the work of NGBs will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. It is sufficient to mention here that NGBs are historically aware of the consequences of competition for funding. For a number of years they have been subject to UK sport's 'no compromise' approach to success and failure on the world stage. The UK government has made it clear that it has advised Sport England to follow a similar strategy for the allocation of funding to NGBs with respect to mass sport participation targets (DCMS, 2008b). Sport England has been seen to have followed the advice. At the time of writing, Sport England has recently announced increases in funding to cycling and netball (Sport England, 2011c); the additional money coming mainly from basketball, rugby union and rugby league who have not hit their participation targets and have subsequently suffered funding cuts (Gibson, 2011d).
5.3.6 The TDE and the development of the Inspire Mark

The London 2012 web site informs the reader that the Inspire Mark is “an Olympic and Paralympic first which allows non-commercial organisations across the UK to link their events and projects to the London 2012 Games in an official scope” (for more information on the Inspire Mark, refer to Chapter 1).

It was created to facilitate the roll-out of the legacy promises on a countrywide basis. Its importance was highlighted to me by one interviewee who, in a previous role, was part of the development team of Inspire Mark. He suggested that:

it [Inspire Mark] is one of the key legacy facilitators for the Games [ ] as without it and allowing people to associate with the Games we were not going to be able to deliver a true legacy (18).

He continued,

It was born because of a need that couldn’t be fulfilled under the current way that the Games are run. Part of the funding model of the Games is through commercial sponsorship. The IOC does international deals, global deals with the likes of Coca Cola and part of that money comes on to the Organising Committee. The main source of revenue for the Organising Committee is local sponsorship in the country that’s hosting the Games. What sponsors are buying is exclusive rights to associate with the brand in their market sector. A number of non-commercial bodies – like us a sport governing body, to regional development bodies to a local cricket club want to find a way to say - we are connected with this massive sports event and want to use that the rings, a London 2012 mark to say to people in their
community - we are working with this event. So the challenge is, how do you give that to that association or organisation without compromising the commercial bids – because often the bodies we are talking about – a local sports club, an NGB – have their own commercial links. A typical example is... we have a commercial deal with British Gas. LOCOG have sold the commercial rights in the energy sector to EDF – British Gas’ main competitor. If the Inspire Mark was given to this governing body or the Olympic rings were given, we could create a situation where our sponsor – British Gas - gained a back door association with the Games. So the IOC said don’t give your logo to anyone other than those who are going to pay, but the political imperative – and I must have done ten meetings with Tessa Jowell as Secretary of State at the time – to try and crack a solution to this. The political imperative was – we’re not going to be able to deliver a true legacy if we can’t allow non-commercial bodies to make a connection. So we said we said why we don’t try creating a derivation of the core logo that made clear what the connection was but kept it separate from commercial associations. That was what the Inspire Mark was about (18).

The word ‘facilitators’ in the first section of the quote from the interview reflects its status as a mechanism to enable people to engage with the London 2012 Games, to be supportive of it and consequently be more receptive to getting involved with legacy activities. Weed et al (2009, p.9) note that if the host country population have negative feelings towards a mega-event, the potential to use the event to promote social legacy is “considerably reduced, if not negated”.

The name *Inspire Mark*, reflects its association with the TDE. In this case, the TDE is the inspiration from the impact of the event as opposed to the impact of the sporting performances of elite athletes. Weed et al (2009, p.39) term this the “festival effect”,
where people are motivated to be part of “something that is significant on a larger scale” and particularly at a community level. Chalip (2006, p.110) uses the phrase ‘communitas’, where the sport element of the event is considered less engendering:

The sporting outcomes may matter to some, but there is a sense that something more important – something that transcends the sport – is going on. It feels as if new energy has been injected into the communal atmosphere – an energy that can be shared by all. There is a heightened sense of community amongst those that are present.

The importance of communities having a sense of engagement with the event has been previously noted. In the quote above, it is the additional ‘energy’ that is being experienced by the community, which is the ‘inspiration’ to ignite the mechanism of the TDE. It is hoped that the community based activities that are associated with the London 2012 Games through the Inspire Mark will facilitate the inspiration of the event to ‘trickle-down’ to the wider population.

Gaining the wider engagement of the community is supported by the advice of Richie (2000) following a five year research programme into the legacies of the Calgary 1988 Winter Olympics. Richie (2000, p.160) suggests that to maximise legacies “a given host city must actively seek to make a given mega-event as regional as possible so as to draw in as many supporters and participants as possible”.\textsuperscript{10} The challenge is to make the London 2012 Games that are primarily to be hosted in London relevant to communities across the country. This may not be through the elite sporting performances but through identifying with the celebration, the sense of festival created by activities associated with the Games staged in a local context.

\textsuperscript{10}When comparing the geographical scale of Canada to the UK, the word regional in this quote can be taken to be national as applied to the UK
A ‘festival’ approach to assist in creating legacy was used by the *Manchester 2002 Commonwealth Games legacy programme* where Smith and Fox (2007) described the legacy programme as ‘event-themed’ as opposed to ‘event-led’. The programme involved seven ‘games themed’ projects such as the *Commonwealth Curriculum Pack* for schools, *Let’s Celebrate* (a minority ethnic group arts project) and *Passport 2K* (activities in sport and arts for 11-18 year olds) all using the spirit of the Games as the motivation for engagement rather than being reliant on the event itself. Smith and Fox (2007, p.1139) describe the use of the Commonwealth Games as a “uniting theme” behind these projects which allowed the use of a wider range of activities not being limited to the stimulus of elite sporting performance.

A similar approach was taken when I co-managed the legacy programme for the 2005 UEFA Women’s Championships in the north-west of England (*Euro2005 LP*). My colleague Lesley Giddins had been the Director of the Commonwealth Games 2002 legacy programme. Using our combined experiences from working on the Commonwealth Games, we used the ‘event-themed’ model to design the activities of the *Euro2005 LP*. The 2005 UEFA Women’s Championship was a women’s football tournament in five regionally based stadia but the themes of the legacy programme were more diverse than just football. The *Euro 2005 LP* ran on a local community basis from eight hubs across the north-west. The projects included a cheerleading programme, a *Women in Business conference* and the *Big Kick*: a lifestyle programme that addressed a number of aspects of health and well-being to benefit homeless women living in hostels and run in association with the Big Issue in the North-West.

The interviewee who had been involved with the development of the *Inspire Mark* reported on the realisation by both government and LOCOG that the Games had to be taken to people and their communities to facilitate their engagement. In the words of an *Inspire*
Mark programme co-ordinator, by taking part in activities branded by the Inspire Mark, it would be “their way of saying, I was part of the Games” (34). The Inspire Mark is being used as a key feature of the coalition government’s revised legacy plan entitled Places People Play (DCMS, 2010b). Mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Places funding stream is being used to make the Games ‘accessible’ to people across country. Over a period of five years from 2010, it is proposed that it will invest £30 million in ‘iconic facilities’ (which will carry the Inspire Mark logo), protect playing fields and give the opportunity for local (non-commercial) clubs to apply for a share of £50 million to support facility enhancement grants. A successful application in this latter scheme is also rewarded with the opportunity to display the Inspire Mark brand (Kelso, 2010).

The idea of trying to help people create their association with the Games at a local level seems plausible as a means of helping to bring people on board and to be supportive of the event. In response to intense lobbying from the County Sport Partnerships (CSPs), as part of the Sport England Commonwealth Games Legacy Programme, I brokered a deal between M2002 (the local organising committee of the Commonwealth Games) and the CSPs to allow them to use modified event branding to enable them to make the connection between the CSPs’ Youth Games and the Commonwealth Games. In an evaluation of the Sport England legacy programme, this initiative was considered to be one of the key positive outcomes in the themed area of ‘Young People and Education’ (Heddon, 2002). However, the Inspire Mark as a programme with a far broader remit, is a more complex initiative.

The context of administration of the Inspire Mark

In the previous section, some of the ‘contexts’ in which the Inspire Mark has been set have been found to limit its potential to successfully ‘fire’ and produce the desired ‘outcome’. One issue that was raised by those involved in trying to use the Inspire Mark was that it involved a seemingly over-bureaucratic system of administration. As expressed
by one development officer “great for those who get it but the hoops you have to jump through!” (26) My experience of the *Inspire Mark programme* was with a group of final year degree students on an Event Management module who were unable to complete the application form without considerable outside help. The observations of the students who were charged with completing the application were that several of the questions seemed to ask for similar information and they struggled to find a new angle for a response. In addition, some of the questions did not seem to be relevant to their project but all questions required an answer. The group’s frustrations were reflected in the comments of an *Inspire Mark* regional co-ordinator who, on arriving for our interview, said that she had recently spent over two hours working with a local group just to “get them to talk in the same way that a professional would – someone who fills in forms all the time”(26).

**The Inspire Mark and the context of event sponsors**

A further concern raised by those who had had some experience of the *Inspire Mark* was the constraint that was imposed by conforming to the contract for its use. The issue at stake was the need to ensure that those awarded the *Inspire Mark* did not in any way detract from the prestige and commercial potential of the official Games’ sponsors as having the sole rights to the Olympic brand. As noted earlier, the use of the *Inspire Mark* and its logo featuring the London 2012 Games’ logo was an Olympic Games’ first. The rights to use Olympic branding are fiercely protected.

The debate over the use of mega-event branding is well rehearsed and particularly in sport development. On one side the question from the development officers: ‘How do we use the inspiration of the event, if we can’t make the association by using the brand?’ The other side of the argument comes from the event organisers looking to protect the commercial gains that sponsors wish to make through their financial investment with the event. The 2002 CSP Youth Games branding and the *Inspire Mark* are both attempts to make that association for non-commercial groups and the evidence provided by the
London 2012 (2011) website suggests that it is having some success. Evidence generated from my interviews with NGBs, however, demonstrated that they were still faced with problems in looking to make the association with the Games. The main problem was seen to be the competing interests of current NGB sponsors and the official Games’ sponsors. The *Inspire Mark* is only available for use by non-commercial organisations or groups. In my research it was noted that both the BCF’s *Sky Ride programme* and the ASA’s *Big Splash*, as the NGBs’ main mass participation initiatives, were linked to their current sponsors, Sky and British Gas respectively. Neither of these organisations are IOC or London 2012 Games’ sponsors. At all levels of the NGBs, from senior management to development officers, people’s concerns about restrictions imposed by being unable to use the Games’ branding was raised. The following two excerpts from interviews provide a good reflection of the comments made:

> a lot of our programmes are sponsored by commercial partners, none of which have rights to the Games so we have to be incredibly careful how we work – which is a big problem – as a governing body we can’t use the logo (33).

and

> this is where it falls down in terms of the legacy programme because obviously LOCOG need to protect the Olympic partners but governing bodies are going to deliver a lot of legacy plans but we’ve got our own commercial partners so it’s a real issue (7).

It was also suggested by one senior development manager, that from the perspective of the Olympic sponsors that they would not be able to deliver any legacy “because they have no rights to any of the grass roots programmes of the sports unless they’ve bought them” (17).
5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, the TDE as a ‘mechanism’ to deliver the outcome of increased mass participation in sport has been explored in the various ‘contexts’ in which it is being used to deliver the ‘outcome’ of a mass sport participation legacy of London 2012 Games.

Using the data generated through my study, two styles of TDE are seen to be used: the TDE that is considered to flow from elite sport performance and the TDE that flows from the sense of celebration and festival that surrounds the event and, at a local level, evoke a community spirit that may transcend the event itself.

The concept of the TDE has been seen to be appealing and provides seemingly plausible rhetoric for event supporters and politicians looking to ‘buy’ public support for an event. It is suggested here that the belief in the TDE is influenced by the mythopoeic nature of sport and as used in association with the London 2012 Games, the mythopoeic nature of the Olympic Movement and its showcase event – the Olympic Games.

Using the realist evaluation framework: context + mechanism = outcome, it has been shown how the TDE as a mechanism to deliver an outcome of increased sport participation in association with a sport mega-event is influenced by the contexts in which it is set. The contexts are many and varied and the impact not only varies between target groups but between individuals in those target groups. It helps to explain why one person might be so passionate in their belief about the potential of the TDE, having witnessed it work in a conducive but exclusive environment, but when investigated on a larger scale, the mechanism is seen to be less effective. The TDE has to be seen as a mechanism that is not a ‘one-size fits all’. If it is to be used successfully by event legacy planners, consideration needs to be given to the contexts in which it is to be applied.
Chapter 6 – ‘A Games of two halves?’ Planning to stage the London 2012 Games and planning for its legacy.

6.1 Introduction

A central tenet to London’s bid to host the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was its potential to leave a legacy of increased mass sport participation across the UK (BOA 2004; London 2012, 2005). In Chapter 2, it was concluded from the evidence available that just hosting the event is not enough to leave major benefits for the host country (Weed et al, 2009; National Assembly for Wales, 2010) and that there is need for advance planning, engagement of a wide range of stakeholders and additional activities to leverage legacy (Chalip, 2006; Coalter, 2008; Weed et al, 2009). In the words of Girginov and Hills (2008, p.2091), “legacies are created not given”.

The UK government demonstrated its understanding of the need for planning for event legacy in the document, Before, During and After: Making the Most of the London 2012 Games, (DCMS, 2008b, p. 2) where Tessa Jowell, the then Minister for the Olympics and London, confirmed:

Too often in the past, governments have expected major events to bring automatic windfall benefits. But we know now that nothing is guaranteed without careful planning and initiative from the outset.

The government may also have been influenced in its thinking by the lessons learned from the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester. In a study commissioned by the North West Development Agency (NWDA) on the benefits of the impact of the 2002 Commonwealth Games, the first lesson learned in planning for legacy was to:
Focus attention equally on the delivery of a successful event and the wider legacy objectives (Faber and Maunsell, 2004, p4).

One of the unique aspects of this study is that it researches the planning for legacy as opposed to the more frequently used approach of evaluation of legacy after the event (Weed, 2011a). An ex ante approach to the study of legacy is promoted by O’Brien and Chalip (2007) to gain more understanding about how event outcomes are obtained. In this chapter the steps taken to plan for a London 2012 Games legacy of increased mass participation in sport are outlined and discussed in a number of contexts. The discussion of context further addresses one of the research questions:

How do the social, economic and political contexts in which these change mechanisms are activated have an impact on the working of the mechanism?

The chapter starts by returning to 2005 in the period immediately after the award by the IOC of the 2012 Games to London and reviews the steps taken to plan for the proposed mass sport participation legacy. Being conscious of the importance placed by the UK government and the bid team on the mass sport participation legacy as part of the Games’ bid, I have made a comparison between planning for legacy and the planning to stage the Games. The comparison reveals striking differences in the two approaches. The approach to staging the Games reflects immediacy of action with a detailed Gantt chart constructed to ensure the Games would be delivered on time. In addition, an Act of Parliament -The Olympic and Paralympic Act - was passed by the UK government to give legal support to the operations of organisations charged with the delivery of the Games (Her Majesty’s Government (HMG, 2006). By way of contrast, it was two years after the announcement of London’s successful bid to host the 2012 Games, that the first report was published into the development of the London 2012 Games legacy (House of Commons Select
Committee – Culture, Media and Sport (HCSC CMS) 2007a). The report raised concerns as to the slow progress of legacy plans, specifically that part of the plan concerned with an increase in mass sport participation; a proposal that had been central to the London 2012 Games’ bid.

In the following section of the chapter, the question is raised and discussed as to why there has been such a discrepancy between the two approaches. The discussion reflects on the observations of Stuart and Scassa (2011, para. 3) that sport mega-events have frequently been seen to fail to deliver proposed benefits to the host communities due to the “impact of a number of key factors: economic, environmental, infrastructural, personal, political and those associated with poor and/or inadequate planning”. Questions may be asked of the proposed mass sport participation legacy such as ‘was it a cynical sales pitch or imaginative idea that was realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver?’ (Cashman, 2011).

Reflecting on the first element of the question, the discussion considers the possibility that the delivery of a legacy of increased sport participation was a means to gather support for the Games’ bid. It had the potential to appeal to the UK tax payers as justification for the large sums of public sector investment in the project. It could also be seen as attractive to the IOC; the sport participation legacy providing an example of the planned positive legacies for host communities and ‘sport for all’ as outlined in the revised IOC Charter (2007). In consideration of the suggestion that the sport participation legacy might have been ‘an imaginative idea but realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver’, a further discussion point considers whether the current structure of the UK sport development sector could provide the resources or accommodate the levels of co-operative working required to deliver the legacy ambitions. It should be noted that Nick Rowe, as Head of Strategy, Research and Planning at Sport England, identified that, despite various policies and interventions, “participation rates have remained stubbornly static and inequities in
participation between social groups have continued largely unchanged over the last 30 years or so” (Sport England, 2004a, p.2). In addition, at time of writing, the data from the most recent Active People Survey (2010 - 11, Quarter 2) shows no significant change from the base-line Active People Survey in 2007 – 2008 (Sport England, 2011b).

The final section of the chapter investigates the resources (or mechanisms) available within the sport development sector to support any proclaimed aims of boosting mass sport participation as a consequence of hosting the London 2012 Games. The mechanisms are evaluated for their potential to deliver a successful outcome based on the contexts in which they are set.

The discussion refers to the suggestion by Coalter (2004, p.12) that, in the event of increased demand by the public to participate, the “current physical infrastructure for sport may not be able to cater for such demand”. Coalter’s view is based on a Davis Langdon (2003) report, The condition and refurbishment of public sector sports facilities, 1995 and 2003 and is later supported by the conclusions of an Audit Commission (2006) report which suggests that the availability and condition of current facilities would require considerable financial investment to support the UK government’s participation ambitions.

The NGBs, considered a central mechanism in the legacy delivery process (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a) are given special attention in this section. Through the data generated by this study, the NGBs’ capacity to deliver the legacy and the steps taken to try and accommodate the additional demands of their role including changes to their ways of working, are discussed. Finally, one of the NGBs’ main resources, volunteers, who are known to be a mainstay of the sport development process (Sport England, n.d.) are also considered for their ability to support the delivery of legacy activities.
6.2 Planning to stage the London 2012 Games

In response to winning the bid to host the London 2012 Games, the UK government took several immediate steps to ensure early progress was made towards hosting a successful event. As the successor to ‘London 2012’ (the successful bid team), the UK government created the London Organising Committee for the Olympic Games (LOCOG) as a limited company, which is responsible for planning, organising and staging the London 2012 Games (HCSC, CMS, 2007b). On the 14th July 2005, eight days after the award of the Games was made, the Olympic Bill was introduced into the House of Commons (HMG, 2005). In March 2006, the Olympic Bill was given royal assent and became an Act of Parliament (HMG, 2006). This bill created the Olympic Development Authority (ODA) as the public sector body responsible for building the venues and infrastructure for the 2012 Games, managing the Government’s interest in the Olympic project and protecting the public money going into it (HMG, 2006). It has considerable powers. The ODA may “take any action considered necessary or expedient for the purpose of preparing for the Olympics” (HMG, 2006 p.2). This includes managing, acquiring, adapting any facilities or premises in preparation for the Games and making arrangements to ensure adequate transport facilities for the Games. A Minister for the Olympics was appointed and the post was given a place in the Cabinet. The post-holder became Chair of an Olympic Board which was first convened on the 28th July 2005, only 22 days after the award of the Games to London. The Olympic Board is made up of the Minister for the Olympics, the Mayor of London and the Chairmen (sic) of the British Olympic Association and LOCOG. The Board’s purpose is to co-ordinate the work of LOCOG, Government and the ODA (HCSC CMS, 2008a) and its work is guided by four strategic objectives and 44 sub-objectives, responsibility for the objectives resting with LOCOG, the ODA, the Mayor of London and HMG (Potter, 2009).
In line with the experiences of other sport mega-events, the original budget for the London 2012 Games ballooned (LERI, 2007) but was accepted as necessary to meet the legally binding guarantees made to the IOC’s through the host city contract (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (HCPAC) (2008). The London 2012 Games’ budget rose from the original £2.1 billion (BOA, 2004) to £9.325 billion (HCPAC, 2008). These additional funds were found from the public purse, including a diversion of funds from the National Lottery (HCPAC, 2008). At the time of writing there is a general consensus that preparations for staging of the London 2012 Games are on time (HCSC CMS, 2007b; HCSC CMS, 2010). The plans to stage the Games have “met every milestone” (DCMS, 2008a, p.8) and the IOC has highly commended the work of all the organisations involved in the preparatory phase of the Games (DCMS, 2008a; IOC, 2010).

The overall feel to this description of decisions made and actions taken in respect of staging the London 2012 Games is a sense of urgency and importance attached to putting the right structures in place, with the necessary authority to facilitate the required resources to ensure that there would be a successfully staged event.

The appreciation that such urgency and structures were needed was articulated well by one of my interviewees, who had previously worked for the London Development Agency. In response to my question of her recollections of the day Jacques Rogge announced that London would host the 2012 Games she recalled:

I remember everyone cheering wildly and then there was a collective gulp as everyone thought what were the consequences of having won it and then it was – ‘blimey we’d better get on with it’(30).

Responding to my question on how quickly the “wheels had started to turn” in the planning for the Games, she replied:
I know that the guys on the land got down to it almost immediately. I remember Tony Winterbottom, who at the time was responsible for the programme, saying within weeks of the decision they had to start moving the power lines because otherwise the entire programme would not be able to happen in time so there was a real sense of we have enough time to do this but we have to start immediately or there will be problems at the back end of the project (30).

The sense of urgency in activity in the interviewee’s recollection reflects the similar nature of the actions of the UK government, outlined earlier in this section. All of these actions taken to ensure the Games would be delivered on time.

6.3 Planning for the legacy of the Games

We don’t think through what we’re trying to achieve and how that is going to be sustainable post whatever the event is and you’ve only got to look at the government, it took them years to actually articulate what they wanted from 2012 (13).

I’m on the International Social Legacy Board for London 2012 which was established last month [September 2009], which speaks volumes. It’s very positive now it exists but you do wonder why it has taken until 2009 to set it up when we won the rights to host the Olympics in 2005 (4).

As reflected in these quotes, one from a former senior manager at Sport England, the second from an NGB senior manager and in contrast to the purposeful, calculated approach taken to stage the Games, it was nearly two years after London secured the rights to host the 2012 Games that there was an official government report on the
development of Games legacy (HCSC, CMS 2007a). Oral evidence and written memoranda were taken from a number of witnesses and correspondents including those from LOCOG, the ODA, the London Development Agency, the five host London boroughs of the Games, representatives from the London 2012 Nations and Regions Group and leading national organisations in skill development, sport and tourism. The report provides considerable detail about legacy in the guise of the regeneration of the East End of London and, in the area of tourism, notes that the DCMS was producing a 2012 Games tourism strategy.

Particularly relevant to this study is the detail given on the legacy of the venues which the Committee acknowledged from the experience of former Games’ hosts would be ‘challenging’. The attention given to the future use of the Olympic Park facilities had been noted to be considerable. Shirai (2008, p.70), reporting on the differences in the initial approach to facility legacy between Sydney 2000 and the London 2012 Games quotes Chair of LOCOG, Lord Coe, as saying that “50 per cent of the organising committee are working on making sure that the Games are working functionally at Games time and the other 50 per cent spend every working hour worrying about what it is we are going to do with these facilities afterwards”. The HCSC, CMS (2007a) report indicates that of five permanent venues to remain in the Olympic Park negotiations for four were at an advanced stage: the aquatics centre, the velodrome, the hockey centre and an indoor sport centre. Controversy is noted however over the future use of the Olympic Stadium, which it identifies as being caused by “the commitment to retain an athletics facility at the Stadium once the Games has finished” (HCSC, CMS, 2007a p.103). At the time of writing, the decision over the future use of the Olympic Stadium has yet to be finally decided.

In 2009, the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC) was set up to oversee the legacy of the Olympic Park, including the sport facilities. Its founders were the Mayor of London, the DCMS and the Department of Communities and Local Government. The OPLC describes
itself as “the public sector, not-for-profit organisation responsible for the long-term planning, development, management and maintenance of the Olympic Park and its facilities after the London 2012 Games” (OPLC, undated). Stuart and Scassa (2011) note that, despite claims made by LOCOG that legacy was being mainstreamed through all its decision-making to avoid negative outcomes, a £1 billion shortfall in funding had been identified which would be required to convert into reality plans for the post Games usage of the Olympic Park (Warner, 2010). Writing for the BBC London web site, Warner (2010) provides evidence of the confusion surrounding the source of capital that would be required to transform the Park into a post Games legacy facility. The article reveals that Baroness Ford, Chair of the OLPC, indicated that she was never under the impression that the capital needed to transform the Park would come from the Olympic budget, but neither was there any indication of the source of the required funding. Baroness Ford’s view suggests that, on this occasion, LOCOG’s decision-making had not fully considered the requirements of providing for legacy.

6.4 Plans for the mass sport participation legacy of the Games

On the subject of a legacy of increased sport participation, the HCSC CMS (2007a, p.112) report opens with the statement “Possibly the greatest prize to emerge from the Games would be a demonstrable increase in participation in sport throughout the community”. It is also noted that the “precedents are not good” as “no host country has yet been able to demonstrate a direct benefit from the Olympic Games in the form of a lasting increase in participation” (HCSC CMS, 2007a p.113).

The report’s authors indicated that responsibility for the increase in grass-roots and community sport had been given to HMG who in turn had designated Sport England (as the country’s leading sport development organisation), to be the lead partner on this objective (HCSC CMS, 2007a). Evidence given to the Select Committee suggested that
progress was slow and lacked a clear strategic lead. In her evidence Brigid Simmonds, as Chair of the CCPR (now Sport and Recreation Alliance (SRA) and chief executive of Business in Sport and Leisure (BISL), welcomed the progress made in promoting country-wide tourist, cultural and skills legacies, but noted the seeming lack of urgency in tackling the question of a “soft sport legacy” (HCSC CMS, 2007b, Q.90). Simmonds acknowledged the recent establishment of the 2012 Nations and Regions groups to promote legacy but suggested that the groups were more focused on regional tourism and regeneration benefits than sport and physical activity. In highlighting the forthcoming DCMS 2012 tourism strategy, Simmonds reported:

We have nothing like that in terms of sports participation and we need to have national co-ordination with a plan because otherwise 10 years after the Olympics we are going to find that some wonderful idea in Essex was completely unknown in Northumberland, and we have this time-bomb of 14 million people according to the NHS who will be obese by 2010 before the Olympics which the Olympics has the power to change if we handle it right (HCSC CMS, 2007b, Q.90).

The concern about the lack of attention that was initially been given to the sport participation legacy was also reflected in my interview with a senior manager at the, then, CCPR. He recalled how the CCPR had become more involved with the development of the sport legacy when it was realised that a consultation document drawn up by the government were only a “re-packaging of the existing plans and existing investment [to increase sport participation]” (16). He continued

We did then go through quite a time of active lobbying and being very vocal about the sporting legacy because we could see a lot of attention being paid to economic legacy throughout the UK. It was all about companies across
the UK bidding in to provide beams, girders and rivets and there was less about the Olympic legacy” (16).

The ‘existing plans and existing investment’ were referenced by Bridgid Simmonds in her evidence to the HCSC CMS (2007a) – this being the remit of Sport England. Simmonds recognised the contribution of Sport England to the development of a mass sport participation legacy, but highlighted the need for increased resources, responsibility to be established in the devolved administrations and an overall lead to be established under the banner of ‘Olympic opportunity’.

The initial lack of consideration for an overall lead for sport was perhaps seen as the ‘excuse’ for the lack of attention given to this area of legacy by an interviewee at the CCPR. When I asked him if he was surprised to have not been involved in the initial planning for a sport legacy he replied,

Yes and no. You imagine that – you’ve won the Games and there is a hell of a lot to do. You need to start establishing LOCOG, the ODA and there’s a lot of stuff that needs doing before they think – oh we should be talking to the CCPR about legacy (16).

It is interesting that a senior manager in a leading national sport development agency, in a situation where increased sport participation had been central to the London 2012 Games’ bid, appears to consider that it was acceptable that planning for legacy would of secondary importance to the planning for the event.

The lack of established strong and effective governance for the sport legacy was also raised by Tim Lamb, chief executive of the CCPR (now the SRA) who, in answering a question about the perceived lack of co-ordination in sport and physical activity,
suggested that this was because sport had only recently started to have a voice in
government circles and that:

Sport England, given the nature of Sport England as a body, just does not
have the political stature to influence cross departmental agendas. It needs
a powerful mandate from the top of government to make this whole area of
increased participation a priority. I do not want the Committee to think we
are banging on about money all the time. It is about organisation, it is about
planning, it is about the timing of that planning (HCSC CMS, 2007b, Q.97).

Sport England’s alleged lack of political stature and influence had already been reflected
prior to this report; the organisation having failed to prevent a second diversion of lottery
funding (£65 million) from community sport to support the revised Games’ funding
package. For the then Chair of Sport England, Derek Mapp, it was to be a ‘cut too far’ and
having declared that the reduction “seriously endangers the creation of a sporting legacy
from the 2012 Games” (BBC, 2007), he resigned. Mapp’s resignation was considered to
be at the request of the recently appointed Minister for Sport, James Purnell, who took
offence at Mapp’s criticisms (Collins, 2008).

In her evidence to the HCSC CMS (2007b), Brigid Simmonds added to Lamb’s point on
the need for a body to co-ordinate legacy that could influence cross departmental
agendas. Simmonds reflected on a suggestion by the chief executive of LOCOG, Paul
Deighton which proposed that people should visit schools around the country to promote
the Games, but she explained:

it [the mass sport participation legacy] will not naturally happen if all you do
is go round and say we all think the Olympics is fantastic. That will not
translate into participation. The reason why I think it needs national co-
ordination is that it is not only an issue for the DCMS. If you want to have new cycle paths, if you want to have new walkways, if you want to have local authorities putting in more funding - who are mainly responsible for funding at the level of community sport then DCLG has got to have a role, DEFRA obviously looks after recreation in the countryside, the Department of Health has got a massive interest in participation. We have Caroline Flint as the Minister for Physical Activity. I do not think these are all resources that necessarily have to go through Sport England, but there has to be a national co-ordination of resources which sees the prize of 2012 and says now we can galvanise people into taking action and indeed participation (HCSC CMS, 2007b, Q.95).

The Select Committee’s report recommended that the DCMS and Sport England should “publish a joint plan as soon as possible” on how to achieve “the maximum increase in UK participation at community and grass roots level in all sport and across all groups” (HCSC CMS, 2007a, p.53). The response to this recommendation came in the form of the publication of the DCMS legacy ‘promises’: Our Promise for 2012: How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DCMS, 2007a), followed later by a supporting Action Plan: Before, during and after; making the most of the London 2012 Games (DCMS, 2008a). The first ‘promise’: Make the UK a world-leading sport nation included the ambition to “help at least two million more people in England be more active by 2012” (DCMS, 2008a, p.6). Sport England’s 2008 -11 strategy (2008a) for community sport is highlighted as a key programme in the delivery of the ‘promise’ which together with Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008b), the government’s revised sport policy, indicate that NGBs are made central to the delivery of the sport participation legacy. In terms of the financial resources to deliver the legacy ‘promises’, the action plan reveals that the:
benefits will come from enhancing existing programmes, and within existing Departmental budgets. There is therefore no addition to the total Games' funding package of £9.3 billion” (DCMS, 2008a, p8).

This picture of no additional resources and responsibility passed down from government to other organisations is a far cry from the suggestion by Brigid Simmonds that the legacy needed increased resources and for co-ordination at a national level with government cross-departmental involvement. It also contrasts with the status of the organisational structures put in place to deliver the Games and to oversee the legacy of the Olympic Park facilities. As described to me by one senior NGB manager:

If you look at legacy and we would split it into three components: the physical legacy- what happens to the facilities and East End of London and then there is the attitudinal legacy - what happens to the country’s attitude to sport, can we give that a major step change? And then the participatory legacy, actually getting more people doing sport. When you look at the three things, you can see how we have a body that can deliver the physical legacy but who has the overall responsibility to deliver the other two? It would be argued that they have been pushed out to Sport England who push it out to the NGBs and that is true to a certain extent - but every sport fights its own and they are always going to be competing. So who’s taking the overview? (18).

The reference in this quote to ‘every sport fighting its own’ reflects the competitive nature of the UK sport development landscape where NGBs are each subject to target setting which determines their future funding. Later in this chapter, the impact of the nature of the sport development landscape on planning for legacy and in particular the work of the
NGBs will be discussed in more depth. It is sufficient here to draw attention to one proposed consequence of this competitive environment in which NGBs operate, that:

instead of one massive Olympics is good message, we are set for 30 smallish marketing campaigns with water polo and weightlifting, handball and hockey going head to head (Slot, 2008).

A further observation on the fragmented nature of NGB activity was made by Lord Addington (2010, HL Deb 5, c.133) in the House of Lords Olympic Progress debate when responding to the Chair who had outlined the detail of Sport England’s funding of 46 NGBs. Lord Addington, who was seeking clarity as to what was and what wasn’t working in terms of the provision of a mass sport participation legacy, noted of the 46 NGBs:

virtually every one of those sporting bodies has its own scheme. Which one has been successful in getting and keeping involved? That is what we are about. I feel that people are not only duplicating effort but wasting effort in this area.

The need for additional resources to be dedicated to the planning for legacy was raised by a former senior manager with Sport England, now involved in the staging of mega/major events across a wide range of areas. In response to my question as to whether the ‘promise’ of increased sport participation was a realistic ambition, he replied:

I think it is but you’ve got to work at it. The way I think of it is - if a private company sponsors an event, there is so much money given to the event-organisers to sponsor that event and over and above that they have their activation budget which can be the same size or even bigger than what they are paying for the sponsorship. If you relate that to major sport events, we
spend money in terms of activation but we don’t have an activation budget to capitalise on it and that’s the bit in cash terms and thinking terms that we’re not good at (13).

In contrast with the urgency in the activity shown by those working on staging the Games, the interviewee later expressed his frustration at the approach to the provision of a sport participation legacy indicating that:

If you leave things too near to the event, you don’t have the time to do anything and that’s the problem. We’ve got to be smarter about these things and be more long term and build in those legacy targets right at the front end of the process. In reality you have to have that activation budget to make things happen, yet it’s almost as if, if you’ve got the event then that is the sports’ legacy (13).

The final comment in this quote, the suggestion that there is a view that a sport legacy is a natural consequence of a sport mega-event is a view about the nature of legacy which was also observed by Danya Hodgetts (2011). In her thesis on legacy of the Australian Surf Live Saving Championships, Hodgetts reports that there is an expectation that the sport participation element of a sport mega-event legacy happens, as if by ‘osmosis’.

6.4.1 The Sports Legacy Board

As a response to the proposal that the sport participation legacy required a national ‘umbrella’ style of organisation to manage its planning and delivery, it is noted that there had been an attempt to establish a Sport Legacy Board (SLB). The SLB is referenced by Lord Moynihan in a House of Lords Olympic debate in January 2010 (Hansard, 2010). Moynihan suggests that establishing the SLB was a government response to a general
concern in the sporting community at the lack of progress on the development of plans for a sport legacy. He notes, however, that it had only had two brief meetings, one of which was without its Chair, Sir Steve Redgrave.

During my interviews with Sport England, I raised the subject of the SLB as, following up on Moynihan’s comments, I had had limited success in finding any relevant published data. In a HMG (undated) document *Sport’s Legacy Delivery Board: Terms of Reference*, the board’s purpose is seen to be “bringing together all of the key sporting stakeholders to promote the sporting legacy”. The document indicates that it is to be chaired by the Director, Sports and Leisure of the DCMS and consists of the leaders of 15 national organisations including Sport England, UK Sport, BOA, BPA, SRA, LOCOG and the NGBs (HMG undated). In response to my question about the nature and purpose of the Board, one senior manager at Sport England said:

> I hope it will be about coordination in its simplest form as opposed to a new and fancy idea. Great- if a Legacy Board can come together and create a joint proposition that individually couldn’t be done, but through the collective it can, then that’s fine but I don’t think the Legacy Board should be inventing new ideas for the sake of it. My knowledge of the sport sector is that there is tons of stuff being done already under various auspices of the various organisations (11).

I suggested to the interviewee that the Board might act as a voice piece for the sector, to advertise the activities that were happening as there might be concern if “it were thought that the sport sector was waiting for this Board to deliver”. In response he said:

> I don’t think that anyone is waiting for the Board to act, in fact quite the opposite. The Board will get together at its meeting and will discuss what is
already going on. I think there is a lot of mischief being spoken and commented about and whilst I don’t disagree that things could be better co-ordinated and everyone is desperate to do their own bit and potentially claim credit for their own bit - I get that - however there’s no lack of effort going in, I can promise you. All the organisations in sport need to concentrate on is what they are good at and what the remit is rather than worrying about what others are doing. I think then it will come together quite well (11).

The response of the Sport England employee appeared to be quite defensive. He seemed to suggest that the various sport organisations did not need to be drawn together to work collectively to deliver the sport participation legacy. His opinion is at variance with the views expressed earlier in this chapter of Lamb, Simmonds and Moynihan. In his speech Moynihan (Hansard 2010) references a strategy document that he had drawn up with the MP Kate Hoey, a former Minister of Sport. *Raising the Bar*, an independent sports review, was conducted shortly after the award of the Games to London and amongst a number of recommendations called for a streamlining of sport organisations with the result of a ‘one stop shop’ called the Sports Foundation. Commenting on the review, Balding (2005) concluded that “it makes an awful lot of sense to simplify the convoluted model that currently exists but, in doing so, it means that an awful lot of noses would be put out of joint”.

6.4.2 H2012 as a programme ‘embedded’ in the UK sport development sector

An atmosphere charged with competitive tension is reflected in the comments made by the Sport England interviewee on the SLB; that the ‘sector’ doesn’t need outside interference, that organisations wanted their individual achievements recognised, that people should concentrate on what they are good at and not concern themselves with the activities of other people and finally that there was plenty of ‘mischief’ being made. The
idea proposed by Balding (2005) that a stream-lining of the organisation would mean “an awful lot of noses would be put out of joint” adds to this atmosphere of competition and status building in the UK sport sector. It is also the case that, at the time of writing, the UK is in a period of economic downturn. Sport and Leisure, like many other parts of the public sector, is facing the prospect of a reduction in funding and consequent job cuts. Many public sector employees are nervous about their future employment prospects. It is suggested here that proposals of stream-lining, for example the merger of Sport England and UK Sport (DCMS, 2010c), has only added to their concerns.

It is within this politically charged atmosphere that the social programme H2012 and it proposed outcome of a legacy of increased sport participation has been ‘embedded’. In this section, the impact of the embedded nature on H2012 is discussed. In Chapter 3, the notion of ‘embeddedness’ was seen to refer to the fact that the operation of a social system (in this case H2012) needs to be viewed within a wider stratified range of cultural, social, economic and political circumstances. Stuart and Scassa (2011) suggest that it is the impact of such circumstances which may result in the ambitions of sport mega-event legacy plans not being achieved. It was a suggestion supported by one of my interviewees reflecting on why he thought disability sport had not capitalized on the success of the UK’s Paralympians following the Beijing Games in 2008. He described the situation as:

It’s been typical sport, sport organisations that can’t get their backsides into gear to sort themselves out - lots of little empires and no joined up thinking. The YST, Sport England, BPA, UK Sport, EFDS - nobody really seen to be in the lead. It’s alright saying someone should take the lead but then the others have to be prepared to follow (33).

The ‘context’ of the competitive nature of the UK sport development sector is not helping the ‘mechanisms’ (in this case any the organisations looking to contribute
to the mass sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games) to operate efficiently.

**6.5 H2012 embedded in the political context of ‘why host’?**

Within the bid document, in the rhetoric of the UK government having won the rights to host the 2012 Games and during the period of my data generation (including a change of government) the intent to leave a legacy of a countrywide increase in mass sport participation has continued to be seen and heard (BOA, 2004; DCMS, 2007; Brown, 2009; DCMS, 2010b; Robertson, 2010). Most recently, Lord Coe declared that the London 2012 Games could be summarised in three words: ‘sport, youth, legacy’ (Coe, 2011b). The UK government made a ‘promise’ to leave a legacy of increased sport participation (DCMS, 2008a). In practice, as detailed earlier in this chapter, the call for a commitment to the urgency and depth of required resources to deliver the ‘promise’ remains unanswered. Evidence has been provided that reveals a distinct difference between the planning to deliver the ‘promised’ sport participation legacy and that of delivering the Games.

The question arises as to why there is such a discrepancy in approach given the importance that has been attached to legacy and specifically that given to a legacy for a mass sport participation in association with the London 2012 Games. In contrast to the implicit ambitions of previous Games’ hosts relating to a legacy for sport, the notion of delivering a mass sport participation legacy has been explicit in both the London 2012 Games bid documentation and the dialogue of the UK government and event officials (Weed et al, 2009; Veal et al, in press).

To try to answer this question, a starting point is to refer back to Chapter 1, where it was noted that countries and cities have used sport mega-events to promote themselves on
the global stage (Shoval, 2002). This was put into context for the London 2012 Games during an interview with a former member of the London 2012 bid team. He reflected:

the world is going to look at us for 6 weeks. The Olympics and Paralympics and Britain is going to be the centre of the world. Now, how does that play? What do we look like as a nation? What are our priorities? Are we at ease with ourselves? (18).

He also reflected on China’s ambitions from hosting the 2008 Summer Olympic Games’,

Beijing was the culmination of a very, very clear trend of Olympics because it was a Games about saying - we the country that is hosting, announce ourselves to the world. This is what we stand for, this is why we are different to what you might think, this is why you should invest in us, this is why you should believe us when we say human rights has changed. So it was an outwardly projecting vestige - it was focused on the strengths of our country as opposed to other countries (18).

It should also be remembered as stated by Mangan (2008, p.1872) that “global exposure is a two edged sword”. Later in his paper, Mangan (2008, p.1876) reports on some of the negative reflections left by a scene of “limping white elephants” that have littered host countries using Sydney and Athens as examples. Cashman (2010) reports on the progress made by Sydney to transform its Olympic Park but Moore (2011,p.7) support’s Mangan’s observations suggesting much of what is left of the facilities in Sydney, Barcelona, Athens and Beijing “remains disused, barren or bankrupt”. Further concern for the future use of purpose built sport mega-event facilities has been raised in the aftermath of the FIFA 2010 World Cup in South Africa (Gibson, 2010).
The future of the London 2012 Games stadium

The desire to protect against such negative imagery has been seen in the story of the main stadium for the London 2012 Games. Earlier in the chapter, it was noted that in 2009 the OLPC had been appointed to oversee the future use of the park and its venues. In 2010, the OPLC went out to tender for the anchor tenancy of the stadium (OPLC undated). The background to this tender was a ‘promise’ to the IOC in the London 2012 Games’ bid to leave a legacy of an athletics track in the main stadium (BOA, 2004).

In November 2010, two main expressions of interest were submitted to the OLPC. One was a joint bid between West Ham United plc and Newham Borough Council that offered a reduced capacity stadium with dual use between professional football and athletics. The other proposal from Tottenham Hotspur plc planned to demolish the original stadium, rebuild a stadium designed for professional football and to provide an upgraded athletics stadium at the existing Crystal Palace track in London (Kelso, 2011b). Although supported by a strong business model (Moore, 2011), the latter proposal outraged those government officials and event supporters involved in the original bid. Under the headline of, It would be shameful if we broke our legacy promises, Sir Craig Reedie, an IOC Board Member and Chair of the BOA when the London 2012 bid was instituted writes, “Let there be no doubt - a track in the stadium was promised. Those who gave the undertakings, Tessa Jowell in the official presentation, Seb Coe and myself worked hard to overcome the indecision and confusion of the past” (Reedie, 2011,p.9). This latter reference is to an incident in 2001 when Britain reneged on the contract it had won to stage the 2005 World Athletics Championships. Following this decision, Jacques Rogge, as President of the IOC, cast doubt on the country’s ability to host sport mega-events (Mackay, 2001). Neither the UK government, who, at the time of writing, have bid to host the 2017 World Athletic Championships nor London, that considers the business of sport as an important factor in retaining its place on the world stage (Shoval, 2002), would want any such similar negative publicity to reflect on their ambitions. A third interested party in this debate is
Lord Coe, Chair of LOCOG and who is in a ‘two-horse’ race to succeed Lamine Diack, as President of the IAAF. It is suggested that Coe’s career prospects will be affected by the outcome of the decisions made by the OLPC on the stadium’s future tenant (Kelso, 2011c).

The future of the ‘promises’ to get ‘1 million people playing more sport’ and ‘1 million people to become more physically active by 2012’.

Two months before the interventions of individuals such as Jowell and Reedie in the debate on the future use of the Olympic stadium, Sport England announced the latest full year figures for the Active People Survey (2009-10). It showed no significant increase in the numbers of people taking part in sport compared to the base-line figures for 2007-8 (Sport England, undated). In May 2011, Jeremy Hunt, the Olympic secretary, announced that the ‘promise’ of one million people to become physically active had been “quietly dropped” by the coalition government. In addition, the target of one million people playing more sport “towards which the sports have made only glacial progress, nominally remains in place for now but it is understood that it too will shortly be dropped in favour of a ‘more meaningful’ target” (Gibson, 2011a).

Neither announcement attracted such forceful intervention from any of those featured in the account of Olympic stadium’s legacy above: former Minister for the Olympics, Tessa Jowell, Craig Reedie, or any other Games’ officials associated with the sport participation legacy, for example Lord Coe. The lack of intervention might seem surprising considering, for example, Tessa Jowell’s declaration in 2009 that London’s bid would not have happened without the integral ambitions to regenerate the East End of London and boost participation in physical activity and sport (Jowell, 2009). Lord Coe has declared himself ‘sceptical’ of the figures from the Active People Survey (Coe, 2011a) and continues to promote his belief that staging the Games will inspire an increase in grass roots sport participation (Coe, 2011b).
In the review provided, a noticeable difference can be seen between the response of the UK government and Games’ officials to ensuring a positive future legacy of the Olympic stadium compared to ensuring a positive legacy for sport in the UK by increasing mass participation. It is suggested here that the difference in approach relates to the reflection that each legacy would have for the UK on the world stage.

To receive a negative commentary on its ‘promise’ to the IOC of a facility to be able to accommodate world-class athletics and the consequent negative profile with the IAAF, would not contribute positively to ‘showcasing’ the UK and more specifically to London’s ambitions to compete in the ‘table’ of world-leading cities. What importance is attached by the IOC or any other global spectators as to whether or not the UK actually delivers on its Games’ bid ambitions (BOA, 2004; Coe, 2005) or the government’s legacy promises (DCMS, 2007) with respect to increasing mass sport participation? It is suggested here that, based on the scale of interest by the UK government, Games’ officials and the UK media, to the dropping of sport legacy promises, it matters very little.

### 6.6 The status of an Olympic Games’ legacy

In addition to the ‘promise’ of a sport legacy which included increased mass sport participation, there were originally four other ‘promises’ (DCMS, 2007). In December 2009, a decision was made by the UK government to add a sixth legacy promise, relating to the quality of life for disabled people (DCMS, 2010a). The detail of these ‘promises’ is provided in Chapter 1.4.3. What is common to all of the ‘promises’ is that they are governed not by the legal framework that underpins the staging of the Games but by what Girginov (2011, p10) terms a “law-binding spirit”.
As noted in Chapter 1, the IOC through its *Procedure and Questionnaire for Games of the XXX Olympiad 2012* (IOC, 2004, p.11) required each potential host Organising Committee to deliver planned outcomes that together “ensure host cities and residents are left with the best possible legacy” and the revised *IOC Charter*, Article 2:14 (2007, p.15) refers to the promotion of “a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to host cities and host countries” and “sport for all”.

Although Jacques Rogge (IOC, 2009, p.25) has declared that creating sustainable legacies is an “obligation” of the Olympic Movement, what is not provided in these documents and their statements of intent is *how* and *by whom* legacy provision will be enforced? How will the IOC ensure the delivery of best possible legacy? Who will decide the measurement of ‘best possible’? Who will be the IOC’s legacy ‘police’ and what authority do ‘they’ have?

To stage the Games, the *Host City Contract* (IOC, 2005a, p.5) provides the necessary detail about lines of authority:

> The City, the NOC and the OCOG shall ensure that the Government as well as their regional and local authorities, honour all commitments undertaken by the Government and such authorities in relation to the planning, organization and staging of the Games.

Stuart and Scassa (2011), using the example the Sydney Olympic Games, note that the Games’ prospective host national or regional government will already have endorsed or underwritten the guarantees made in the Bid document, often by adaptation or extension of existing legislation. The IOC (2005a, p.10) requires regular updates to be provided on the “general organization and planning process” and standards are set by the *Technical
Manual on Planning, Coordination and Management of the Olympic Games (IOC, 2005b), a document which is considered an “integral part” of the Host City Contract. The Contract makes the City, the NOC and OCOG “severally liable for all commitments that are entered into concerning the planning, organization and staging of the Games” (IOC, 2005 p.5). Later in the same paragraph it is noted that “to this effect, the IOC may take legal action against the City, the NOC and/or the OCOG, as the IOC deems fit”.

In neither the wording of the Host City Procedure and Questionnaire (IOC, 2004) nor the Host City Contract (IOC, 2005) is any requirement found to guarantee planned and positive legacy outcomes or any conditions laid out for the imposition of sanctions for non-delivery of planned or promised legacy outcomes (Stuart and Scassa, 2011). Cashman (2011b) suggests that the management and implementation of legacy strategies is the responsibility of the host cities. The IOC provides the vision but their time limited involvement with each specific Games makes it difficult for the organisation to see through each set of legacy ambitions. Stuart and Scassa (2011, para.9) in their paper, Legal Guarantees for Olympic Legacy, argue that, if the IOC is serious in its' intent to promote positive legacies, it should be more pro-active in obligating the host city to honour its intended legacy ambitions. The authors propose that the IOC could use its “coercive power” over host nations as demonstrated by the model it has developed to protect the IOC’s intellectual property rights. It is suggested that this ‘coercive power’ could be used:

to require host nations to enact legislation as part of their bid to establish a single body to assume full responsibility for the initial planning of intended sustainable legacy outcomes, guaranteeing financial and other management plans are in place before the construction phase starts and to remain accountable for them throughout the intended lifespan of such properties.
6.6.1 The status of legacy for the London 2012 Games

An analysis of the documentation provided by the UK government concerning the legacy ‘promises’ finds little by way of ‘guaranteeing’ legacy or detail of the legacy ‘police’. Girginov (2011) uses the four modes of governance described by Trieb et al (2007) to investigate the construction of the sport legacy of the London 2012 Games. The most legally potent, ‘coercion’, is characterized by “binding legal instruments” (Trieb et al 2007, p.14) and is seen to be used in relation to the second legacy ‘promise: “To transform the heart of East London” DCMS, 2008a, p.3). The delivery of this ‘promise’ is legitimised by its association with the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006 (HMG 2006). As noted earlier in this chapter, this Act of Parliament created the ODA which has considerable power in terms of acquiring and developing land. In the words of Zanine Adams (2010), Head of Event Solutions and UK Sales for Visit London, hosting the London 2012 Games had facilitated the regeneration of the East of London in four years rather than over a forty year period. Referring to the legacy of increased sport participation, Girginov (2011) suggests it is more characterized by voluntarism, targeting and framework regulation.

As outlined in Before, during, after: making the most of the London 2012 Games (2008a, p.3):

the promises provide a framework for organisations and individuals in the UK. We are inviting them to play their part in fulfilling the potential of the Games, and here set out the first steps we have taken to realize our legacy ambitions.

The suggestion here of an ‘invitation’ to take part is a clear link to ‘voluntarism’. It is not a legally binding requirement to be part of the legacy delivery. Girginov (2011) suggests that
the Inspire Mark (outlined in Chapter 5.3.6) is a good example of this form of legacy governance. ‘Targeted’ governance has been heavily employed in the plans to deliver the sport participation legacy:

Targeting uses non-binding but detailed recommendations concerning the activities of various legacy actors (Girginov, 2011, p.10).

To illustrate ‘targeting’ as a form of governance, Girginov (2011) uses the examples of the ASA’s Everyday Swim Programme and Podium as the public sector organisation designed to “communicate and develop the potential for universities and colleges to support preparation and delivery of the 2012 Games and contribute to its sustainable legacy” (Potter, 2009). A further example might be of Sport England negotiating the content of the NGB Whole Sport Plans and the individual NGB targets set for levels of participation. An alternative view of the target setting for NGBs might be considered to be an example of the use of a ‘coercive’ form of governance. As outlined in Chapter 1, NGBs have been set participation targets by Sport England and those organisations which do not meet their targets have been seen to be ‘punished’ by the withdrawal of some of their funding. However, although the targets come with potential financial consequences, they are not governed by law and are therefore seen to lie between coercive and targeted governance.

The picture painted of the ‘status’ given to planning for the London 2012 Games’ sport participation legacy is one that seemingly has taken neither the advice of the lessons learned from the Commonwealth Games 2002 nor of the UK government. Faber Maunsell’s Commonwealth Games Benefits Study (2004) suggests equal attention should be given to the staging of the event and its’ legacy and Tessa Jowell (DCMS, 2008a) notes that the London 2012 Games should learn from the failure of previous Games’ hosts
to deliver their legacy ambitions by the UK initiating legacy planning and action early in the
Games' delivery process.

6.7 The mechanisms to deliver the ‘promise’

In the event of some form of legislation being put in place to deliver the London 2012
Games sport participation legacy, one area that would demand an audit would be that of
the available resources. Using the terminology associated with realist evaluation,
resources such as people and facilities become ‘mechanisms’. The mechanisms are
deployed through strategies and initiatives designed to deliver the legacy plans. This
section reviews three specific resources: firstly, NGBs, identified as central to delivering
the desired increase in sport participation; secondly, volunteers who are considered a
mainstay of the sport development process and finally the current availability of facilities to
support any planned legacy activities. To discuss the potential contribution of the
mechanisms, I take the stance of asking ‘are they fit for purpose’? The nature of ‘purpose’
in this discussion is their ability to contribute the delivery of the desired outcome of a
London 2012 Games legacy of increased participation.

6.7.1 NGBs as a legacy delivery ‘mechanism’

As outlined in Chapter 1, NGBs became increasingly drawn into the mass sport
participation agenda through the availability of more funding from the community sport
targeted funds of the National Lottery, which are distributed to them by Sport England. In
this study, it has been noted on several occasions, that their role in generating increased
mass sport participation has been further enhanced through their new role as outlined in
both Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008b) and the Sport England 2008-11 strategy (Sport
During the course of my interviews, it did appear that NGBs were experiencing some difficulty in adapting to their new role. One reason is the apparent confusion in trying to identify the seemingly ever changing scope of ‘mass sport participation’ compared to the more settled environment that they have experienced in addressing elite sport. As reflected by one NGB senior manager:

the sporting landscape in terms of elite sport has been pretty stable for 10 years - very simply it’s about Olympic and Paralympic medals and they’ve stuck with that for 10 years and you need to stick with it for at least two to three Olympic cycles to make a difference - because things don’t happen overnight (7).

He then compared this to the approach to management of mass sport participation which he suggested was more complex, indicating that:

when you look at the participation side of things that is where the challenge has been in that there’s been the constant changing of goal posts - is it sport, is it physical activity, is it health, is it sport, is it regionalisation, is it nationalisation and the problem is that it has changed every 18 months of the last 10 years (7).

In the interviews with NGB senior managers, the picture painted for me was one where they have not always been clear about their role in the participation agenda. Their view was outlined by a NGB chief executive reflecting on the period prior to London successfully winning the Games’ bid and before the change of sport policy from Game Plan’s (DCMS/Strategy Unit, 2002), ‘sport for good’ to ‘sport for sport’s sake’ in Playing to Win (DCMS, 2008b). The interviewee reported concern amongst NGBs prior to the change in sport policy due to their seemingly diminishing role in contributing to Sport
England’s participation strategy which was about *Sport Playing its Part* (Sport England, 2006). In this series of documents, sport was seen to contribute to a number of different agendas including promoting health, education and social cohesion while also tackling others such as youth offending and anti-social behaviour. Collins (2008, p.82) notes that after a year in office, the newly appointed Chair of Sport England, Derek Mapp, had come to the conclusion that to deliver *Sport Playing its Part* and to reach the participation targets set out in *Game Plan*, emphasis would be put on “informal activities rather than formal sport”.

Looking back at that era, the NGB interviewee recalled a number of his fellow chief executives being summoned to a dinner by Derek Mapp where “we were effectively told by Derek that you’re not as important as you think you are and you’re going to have to justify every possible penny that we put in to you” (14). The chief executive then outlined how he perceived Mapp’s view of how the mass participation targets would be met:

that governing bodies were largely irrelevant to the overall regime of enterprise, local authorities needed a real kick and public-private partnership was where it was at and this would be funded accordingly but it would be done in a regional context. Regional sports boards were going to be the heart of the machine and we were getting some clear messages that we were going to have to work extremely hard to justify our existence. So we’re thinking terrific - if there is a recognition that a growth in sport is something that is critical and genuinely a strategic aim and that we - as all governing bodies do - believe we are at the heart of the enterprise, we’re the ones that can deliver - not on our own - but we are genuinely at the heart of sports - all of a sudden we felt and we were being told that quite definitely that we were just one element and a marginal one at that (14).
Continuing his story of how the change of sport policy to *Playing to Win* in 2008 was to transform the role of the NGBs, the interviewee recalled how their concern about their potential diminished status in the mass sport participation ‘enterprise’ was met with both relief and a sense of renewed status:

It wasn’t overnight, but looking back it felt like overnight, that suddenly it was - right there is a commitment here that actually governing bodies are at the heart of the process. It won’t work without real investment in governing bodies and there’s a real commitment from Sport England in terms of a genuine strategy, real consultation and you thought, well that’s pretty much all you could hope for in the situation. There are always going to be challenges and you are never going to agree all the time but there was a feeling we’re back in - we’re very much back in the centre in the photo rather than being at the margins. That was a real shot in the arm (14).

Although seen to be back in the ‘centre of the photo’, in practice, and as reflected in the interview at the start of this section, it did appear that the NGBs were still more comfortable working in the more stable environment of elite sport performance compared to that of adapting to the ever-changing strategies of mass sport participation. In an interview an NGB manager talking about the use of the TDE and the value of winning medals to their work pointed out:

NGBs are focused on medal delivery - it’s a bit like LOCOG is on the delivery of medal success because that’s what they are measured on and how their funding is given -I know it’s under a different stream. But what a lot of NGBs are looking at now is how can we maximise the money that goes toward the best possible performance in 2012? They know that a home gold medal is gold dust in terms of raising the profile of the sport. That
person will be a hero 5 times the way they were in Beijing. And so finding the focus on grassroots is a real challenge particularly with the complexity of how it is delivered (18).

It is interesting to note here that the interviewee recognises that there are different streams of funding that the NGBs receive for elite and mass participation but clearly sees success in elite sport as the priority while revealing that finding the focus on grassroots is a challenge for NGBs. One way in which NGBs have looked to address that challenge is to change their ways of working.

**NGBs and changing their ‘ways of working’**

In Chapter 1 it was noted that the historical operational background to NGBs revolved around the internal governance of their individual sports, organising national competition structures and selecting national teams to compete on the international stage. An important feature of their operational structure has been the ‘club’ that provides its members with opportunities to play, be coached and compete. Club members affiliate to the club through membership fees and, in turn, clubs affiliate to their sport’s NGB who provide a number of membership services. By way of example, the British Judo Association (BJA) states that the benefits of club membership include: international recognition; insurance; technical information updates; access to funding and the opportunity to contribute to the development of the sport through representation of ideas to the BJA Board (BJA, 2011). The importance of the club membership structure to the operations of NGBs was made clear by one of my interviewees, who said:

> for governing bodies it’s about clubs, it’s about people taking part in sport, that’s what we do, for us our plan is positioned around creating these participation pathways (7).
The importance of the members as a source of income to the NGBs was also made clear. It is income over which they have control compared to that of the funding from Sport England and UK Sport which, as has been identified in both Chapters 1 and 2, makes the NGBs subject to target setting and the potential funding penalties that may arise if targets are not met. The relevance of the difference in nature of the two streams was outlined to me by one NGB senior manager in a discussion on how their organisation needed to work at bringing those people who play their sport into the club structure. She explained:

we’ve got to convert more of those people who play into members by having creative and flexible memberships. If we do that we will have less reliance on - at the moment we have too much reliance on Sport England funding. Most governing bodies are in the same position unless you are in the top five that are commercial - but we are too reliant. If you go back four years when governing bodies were saying that we need to be less reliant and more reliant on own funding but now, the extra revenue that has come in because of 2012 has made us more reliant. So we have to grow our own income (15).

Another NGB senior manager reflecting on what he hoped the impact of the 2012 sport legacy would be revealed that:

One of the critical things for us is our membership figures. We’ve now set a target of 100,000 by 2012/13. We really want to make a big statement because what that does as well is it gives us our own increased revenue to reinvest back into areas of sport that are important to us but might not necessarily fall in terms of the government targets or outcomes from Sport England. The problem we have at the minute - well it’s not a problem - but 90% of our revenue is tied in with UK Sport, Sport England and commercial
and whichever direction they go in, we have to go with them. So you’re all the time jiggling with that. So we just need to grow and get more of our own, to increase our revenue streams and then our plan is to really position in terms of being able to really support the core of the sport (7).

As reflected in the interview above, the opportunity that the NGBs had been given through increased funding and autonomy over the use of the funding was definitely seen as a way of increasing their membership - the ‘core of the sport’. What also became clear from my interviews was that, to realize the ambition, their staff would also have to change the focus of their work; to pay less attention to the activity within the ‘core’. There was a requirement to drive activity and generate interest in the NGB initially outside the club structure. One NGB senior manager acknowledged “most people who play, play outside of the of the affiliated club structure so what are we doing ignoring that - now we are trying to embrace that, we are trying to make some headway” (14). Another recently appointed NGB senior manager, reflecting on the changes she had made since joining the organisation recalled:

So I said, you need to think differently, people don’t want to train every night, they want fun, they want recreation. Our strategy, our focus went more to a casual outdoor playing. And that’s the change we’ve seen and a huge amount of investment has come to us because of that. A whole philosophical change - that people want to have fun first and then think about being serious players (20).

The ‘philosophical change’ towards the NGB ways of working was also identified by a NGB senior manager outlining a programme to encourage participation called the Big Splash, a programme that they were working on with the BBC, the latter being the London 2012 Games official broadcast network in the UK. When asked if he hoped the programme would encourage club membership he said:
It could do but it’s more focused at the level below that - your personal participation. The idea is that someone who might not regularly play sport, only swims once a month or who plays other sports will look at swimming as being something they’d like to do more regularly. Now it would be great if what it produces is people who are more committed to swimming and therefore join a club but I think it is a longer term prospect. This is about your average punter getting into the pool rather than joining clubs. Club networks are very much based on competitions and this isn’t about competition - this is about participation - although clubs will help deliver it (18).

The idea put forward in these last two quotes, that people might move on from recreational sport to ‘serious players’, serious enough to want to join a club set up, was still evident. It was described to me as “creating the stepping stones into club sport” (7). The interviewee, a NGB senior manager continued:

I mean some people were never going to join a club. What we are trying to do constantly is make sure we’ve got those pathways in place and those interventions in place so somebody can start to take part in an organised led ride for instance but then they might take part in an event and we’re trying to basically make sure we’ve got those pathways in place. It’s kind of about can you connect with something the governing body’s providing? (7).

One strategy being employed by the NGB featured in this interview is the use of social networking. For a person to be involved in the NGB’s activity programme they have to register on-line. The NGB senior manager explained:
Once registered the idea is that people can create their own groups and networks, you’ll be able to see all the networks around you, to go onto a map and see local events near you and it’s a bit like Amazon and itunes – where it will say – people like you who did that event also enjoyed these events” (7).

People registered with the NGB also receive regular e-updates and membership offers.

The change in the NGB’s ways of working to accommodate a more recreational focus was seen to be prompted by the influence of Sport England and the development of their Sport Market Segmentation Tool (SMST) (Sport England, n.d.). In my interviews, five out of the six NGBs specifically referred to using the tool and associated data. The SMST was developed as part of the strategy taken by Sport England to meet the UK government’s ambitious targets for mass participation in sport and physical activity set in Game Plan (DCMS/ Strategy Unit, 2002). Sport England initially looked to associate with organisations delivering other social services, outlined in documents such as the Value of Sport Monitor (Sport England, 2005) and Sport Playing its Part (Sport England, 2006). In addition, Sport England commissioned three reports (Henley Centre Headlight Vision, 2008a; 2008b; 2008c) to investigate the quality of people’s sporting experience, the reasons why people ‘lapsed’ from sport participation and what influenced people to engage in formal and club based sport. The SMST was set up using the data generated from these reports, the Sport England Active People Surveys and the DCMS Taking Part Surveys. The SMST provides 19 market segments designed to “help us understand the nation’s attitudes to sport, their motivations and barriers” (Sport England, n.d.).

The discourse of marketing is evident in the transcripts of the interviews carried out during the course of this study. A Sport England senior manager described the fact that “what punters want from sport is very different from what they wanted 10-20 years ago. Society
has changed and become more fragmented and people are thinking about how they consume their sport to fit in with their own life” adding “and therefore the traditional club setting might not be right for everyone” (11). The interviewee went on to outline how Sport England had been:

encouraging NGBs to think about the consumer rather than the supply side which is the stuff that NGBs will always be strong at. What facilities they have, how many coaches they need, where to put the cones and how long the sessions should be - that kind of thing. Governing bodies have always been masters of that. What they’ve been less good at is knowing about the motivations behind the people playing sport. Why they come? When do they come? How often do they want it? How do they want the coach, teacher or volunteer to speak to them? All that kind of stuff -the sort of information that retail works very hard at. How to get those customers and how to keep them once they’ve got them (11).

The data from my interviews with NGB senior management reflects a positive response to Sport England’s promotion of the use of marketing strategies. The use of marketing strategies and marketing terminology is referenced in the interview transcripts. One NGB manager reported “you’ve got to put more into the marketing of what you’re doing to reach new people” and then mentioned that the NGB had “put a new accessible product on the ground” (7). Another NGB senior manager talked about their sponsor using sport “as their CSR programme to help soften their brand” but the NGB was “using the fire power” of their sponsors to take the “product to new audiences” (9). In a discussion on the need to appeal to new markets, one senior manager talked about their research into the sport being based:
in areas such as calorific burn because that interests a lot of women. It's about how can I keep fit and have fun in a social setting and then using that research as a catalyst to do some advertising in lifestyle magazines because that's where our future market is going to be. It's not about - why haven't we got a report about some of our top players in the Daily Telegraph? That isn't going to sell our game - it's looking at different audiences in different contexts (15).

Marketing was also seen to start to have an influence on the people working for NGBs. One senior manager at an NGB had previously been employed as ‘Head of Marketing’ at a company with global influence. Another NGB had recently invested in a marketing and communications team where one of the reasons for their investment was to be “well placed in the market” to “put yourself in the best place to be noticed and picked up as something accessible” and making the most of the “buzz” of the London 2012 Games when “there is the thought, I really ought to go out and do something” (14).

The capacity of NGBs to adapt to new ways of working

It was noted in Chapter 1 that not everyone was convinced about the NGBs being the most effective ‘mechanism’ to deliver the mass sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games. In discussing the NGBs’ role Charlton (2010, p.347) describes them as “unprepared and under resourced”. This view was supported by the comments of a former Sport England senior manager during an interview where we were discussing what Sport England had done to drive the sport legacy ambitions. In response to my observation that Sport England had given the NGBs an enhanced role, he replied:

but as you know from your experience, the governing bodies either haven’t necessarily got that as their priority or are just not set up to do that and very often live day by day to get through current demands (13).
The capacity of NGBs to accommodate their enhanced role in mass sport participation was also highlighted by as senior manager at the, then, CCPR. In response to my suggestion that a criticism of NGBs acting as the driving force for legacy was that “they were not adequately resources for the task and not reflective enough of community based sport”, he replied:

You have to look at the primary purpose of the organisations. Governing bodies are there to support their members and their sport first and foremost. You are probably right to say that we are not going to look to a governing body to solve car-crime but what you can do is ask the governing body to work with the people that do focus on car crime and that’s where you have strength. So if you have a Local Strategic Partnership having a nightmare in an area, such as lots of disorderly behaviour they can then go and contact a club and say – we’ve got outreach skills and you have the specific skills, let’s sort something out and I think that’s what we need more of. But, then you have look at the capacity of clubs to respond to that. Have they got enough volunteers, for example, to meet that needs? (16)

The idea of NGBs needing to develop new partnerships, new networks to deliver mass sport participation was raised in an interview with a member of the Nations and Regions group. His reservations about NGBs were that “they’re the ones with the least networks” (1). It was his opinion that drivers of the sport participation legacy should be organisations with cross community networks such as the police or the church and that “the idea that you can only deliver legacy through the NGBs is bollocks” (1).
The suggestion that the NGBs might not have the capacity to cope with both the demands of their previous core focus of formal and elite development of sport through the club structure and the demands of a focus on more recreational sport was more noticeable with the NGB development managers than senior management. The change in focus was pointed out by one development officer who, in describing the nature of his work, said:

if I get a club saying you’re not spending as much time with us, my response is “Sebastian Coe said we’ll get two million more people active. Sport England has clearly taken that bat and as NGBs we are working our nuts off to get more people swimming”. So although we’re not talking about London 2012 every day it’s reflected in my working life in a substantial way-to hit that target. The biggest part I do is participation - to get more people swimming. Of four meetings today – three are about that. There is no doubt that is the focus at the expense of everything else. You can’t ignore them but clubs are having to take a back-seat (33).

Another development officer reflecting on his work which was about changing the customer experience of the sport suggested that “to a large extent 2012 doesn’t mean much to the groups we are trying to target at the moment” (32). He continued:

this is a about the grow agenda and where centres and clubs often have a tricky relationship, it’s having the conversations and saying you can both win from this and this is how we are going to do it but there are some challenging conversations to be had (32).

The intimation in this interview that tension could develop between the demands of elite and mass participation forms of sport reflects back to the observations made earlier in this chapter; in the UK sport development sector there has been a historical battle for
resources and status of organisations. It is suggested that, if over time, clubs started to feel they were being neglected, this could have a negative impact on the NGB. As noted earlier in the chapter, the income from clubs is highly valued. If neglected, members might start to question from where they were getting value for their membership fees.

The senior management at Volleyball England had recognised that resources could be stretched and particularly smaller clubs would need help to deliver their mass participation strategy. Clubs were being asked to deliver introductory sessions to volleyball at events such as County Shows and Fun Runs. As part of the Go Spike campaign, teams and small clubs (not always affiliated to the NGB), were invited to apply for “a package of tools and information to help them run a successful local campaign to attract new members, make key local contacts and grow their club. Worth over £250, the package includes free or discounted affiliation, a media pack and a £60 grant to support an event” (Yorkshire Volleyball, n.d.).

One resource that was referenced by all the NGBs as being vital to their work but as one that was a cause for concern, was that of ‘volunteers’. The issues relating to the retention of volunteers and the need to develop the volunteer sector in order to deliver the participation agenda are discussed in the next section.

6.7.2 Volunteers as a legacy delivery mechanism

The part played by volunteers in the work of the NGBs was a specific focus of my interview questions. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed review of the part played by volunteers in the delivery of sport in the UK. It is sufficient to note that the people who provide voluntary services, those who give their “time and effort without any financial reward” (Running Sport, n.d.) are known to provide a valuable service (Sport England, 2002), and are considered “vital to the success of the UK’s national sporting life”
(GHK consulting, 2010, p.4). One of my interviewees suggested that “even if all governing bodies stopped doing what they are doing right now, people would still play sport because of the volunteers that are out there willing to give up their Monday nights, when it’s throwing it down with rain, to coach kids” (7).

In their responses, all of the NGBs stressed the importance of volunteers to their work and were looking at ways of using the catalyst of hosting the London 2012 Games to help them tackle the omnipresent issues relating to retention and extending their volunteer base. In reviewing the available research evidence, the GHK (2010) study concluded that the number of volunteers had remained relatively constant. Given the importance attached to volunteers, it seems logical that to accommodate more participants would require more volunteers.

One NGB had developed a volunteer recruitment programme targeted around London 2012. In practice, volunteers on the programme working at an event did not make the connection between the London 2012 Games and the programme they were following. Another NGB acknowledged that, whatever activities they planned for the delivery of the London 2012 Games’ participation legacy, there had to be a specific focus on an “impact on those people who make sport happen”(7). That interviewee spoke of providing free membership of the NGB for volunteers and providing clothing with the NGB brand which it was felt helped to make the volunteers associate their contribution with the success of the elite athletes.

In conversation with another senior manager in the same NGB, it was evident that the London 2012 Games were seen as the opportunity to build up the skills and sport mega-event experiences of their officials. An Officials Development Strategy for 2012 had been created to “identify gaps and opportunities to bring in new officials, building up new competition managers” (8). This senior manager suggested that 2012 had promoted more
“strategic thinking going into decisions around who do we want to see in senior roles come 2012 and what do we need to do to get them there” (8). A similar approach was identified by a senior manager in another NGB who spoke of:

Made sure we have the opportunity to increase our knowledge in the delivery of sport events and the opportunity to train and recruit volunteers and give them meaningful roles because within the delivery of London 2012 we want Brits - our people delivering these (17).

The strategies relating to the development of NGB competition officials relates more to elite sport. It is a further reflection of the increased expectations placed on NGBs who are required to attract and train volunteers from grass roots participation to international competition.

In my interview with Sport England, it was definitely the potential for NGBs to use the London 2012 Games to attract new volunteers to help deliver the participation legacy that dominated our conversation on volunteers. One senior manager spoke of the 70,000 ‘Games makers’ that will provide volunteer services at the event. The Games makers were considered to be a potential “fantastic resource for sport” (12). Although acknowledging that not all 70,000 would continue in voluntary service after the event, he suggested that there was:

an opportunity for local clubs to showcase and let people know what volunteering opportunities may be available. By volunteering at the Games it could lead onto - I enjoyed that! Now I want to do that at my local tennis or rugby club (12).
I asked the interviewee what steps had been taken to avoid the problem I had encountered in relation to the Commonwealth Games 2002, where it had not been possible to have an integrated database of all volunteers from the event. The limitations of the Data Protection Act resulted in three separate databases being created by Manchester City Council, Sport England and the Pre-Volunteer Programme. This situation was considered detrimental to promoting the further involvement of Commonwealth Games 2002 volunteers in sport (Heddon, 2002; GHK, 2010). The response from the Sport England interviewee was “I don’t know! It’s something we need to think about” (12). A response which suggests lessons had not been learned and a similar problem of multiple databases may arise from the London 2012 Games.

Amongst the NGBs, there was a greater sense of realism about the transfer potential of event volunteers to grass-roots sport volunteers. One senior manager acknowledged that a legacy of Manchester 2002 had been the “huge number of people who come and help with events, they are highly motivated and experienced” (14). He accepted that the draw was “being associated with something that is high profile” (14). In answering my question about whether he thought the London 2012 Games would provide a source of new grass-roots sport volunteers he replied:

I think we will have to sell it very carefully, to assume that would be an enormous mistake because there is a world of difference. I started here just before the Games (Commonwealth Games 2002) and came up here on the train and there were volunteers on the train all keen to tell me about where they were going and what they were doing. But that’s because they were associated with something that is high profile. Going on to be the welfare officer on a cold Saturday morning at the junior coaching at the club - you can’t just presume people will equate one with the other (14).
In our discussion, the interviewee also recognised the difference between volunteering for a time-limited event and the unknown demands of signing up to help out at the local club. He reflected that “it’s very difficult to get people to sign up for volunteering because there is still the perception of saying, if I agree to do this, will I have to do it for the next 25 years like the bloke who did it before?” (14).

The interviewee’s observations are supported by research evidence conducted by MORI (2004) following the Commonwealth Games held in Manchester in 2002. Despite the Games having produced (at the time) the biggest volunteer force ever assembled in the UK in peacetime, the impact on the culture of volunteering in the North West was seen to be “relatively modest” (GHK, 2010, p.3). Adding to the discussion on the potential for a cross-over effect between event volunteerism and grass roots sport volunteerism, Baum and Lockstone (2007), report on ‘volunteer motivations’. The authors suggest that there are differences in the characteristics between those people who participate in ‘sustained’ volunteering and those involved in ‘episodic’ volunteering. Sport event volunteering is considered to be an example of the latter type where participants do not easily transfer to becoming on-going volunteers.

The Sport England (2002) survey on volunteering reported that there were three main challenges identified by NGBs: a shortfall in numbers of volunteers, recruitment of new volunteers and, consequent to the first two challenges, people currently in the system being overloaded in their volunteer duties. In the excerpts from my interviews provided earlier in this section, all three challenges have been noted. One issue identified by the GHK (2010) report was that, despite the numerous government initiatives and programmes aimed at volunteering in the UK, there is no one specific national strategy/framework for volunteering in sport. The report notes that volunteering in sport in the UK is regulated through existing general laws. GHK (2010, p.18) conclude that this
has led to a complex legislative framework where “over-regulation has emerged as a key concern on the voluntary sector’s side”.

To use the terminology of realist evaluation, it is suggested here, that the identified complex approach to the management of volunteers is not the best ‘context’ for the optimal performance of the ‘mechanism’. It is recognised that the management of volunteers, given the fact they give their time and energy for no financial reward, is a sensitive issue and requires sensitive handling to avoid discouraging volunteers in their work (Ockenden, Stuart and Hill, 2011). By way of example, it has been shown that the introduction of recent legislation regarding checks by the Criminal Record Bureau (CRB), although recognised as well-intended has been seen as a burden on volunteers and has had a negative effect on sport (MacDougall, 2007). However, given the importance attached to volunteers in the delivery of sports development and the increasing demands being placed on them to provide a service that conforms to the growing bureaucracy associated with the litigious society of the 21st century, it seems the context of the management of sports volunteering needs to be addressed. As recognised by Balding (2005) in her assessment of the conclusions in Raising the Bar (2005), “it makes an awful lot of sense to simplify the convoluted model that currently exists”.

### 6.7.3 Facilities as a legacy delivery mechanism

Writing in a report published before London had won the rights to host the 2012 Olympic Games, Coalter (2004) raised concerns about the capacity of current public sport facilities to deliver a legacy of increased sport participation. Coalter (2004) cited the Davis Langdon (2003,p.i) report, The condition and refurbishment of public sector sports facilities, 1998 and 2003, which concluded that the “national stock of sports centres requires some £550 million to be spent now to bring the condition up to a good and acceptable standard”. The conclusion is supported by the observations ofAudit
Commission (2006) report, *Public sports and recreation services: Making them fit for the future*. The report used evidence from both Davis Langdon (2003) and the *Carter Report on Sport* (DCMS/Lord Carter of Coles, 2005). In light of the evidence, the Audit Commission (2006, p.4) report reflects on the government’s “challenging” ambitions to increase participation in sport and physical activity and suggests, “the quality and accessibility of public sports and recreation facilities are in danger of failing to support and match these aspirations”. By way of example it is noted by Collins (2010b) that in 2009, 63 public swimming pools closed and only 28 opened. In addition, there was a 27% decrease in the number of school pools from 2002-2009. In concluding his presentation, Collins suggested that, without intervention, by 2014, levels of public sector leisure provision could have regressed back to the levels seen in the 1960s. A report by Sport England (2003), *The condition and refurbishment of public sector sports facilities, 1998 and 2003*, concluded that to sustain the current level of public sector sports halls would require £110 million extra expenditure per year for five years. This led Coalter (2004) to suggest that if the Olympics did inspire increased sport participation, the physical infrastructure may not be able to cope with the demand.

To deliver its London 2012 Games’ sport legacy plans, *Places People Play* (DCMS, 2010b), the coalition government may point to the investment of £135 million, £50 million of which is to upgrade 1,000 community sport facilities and a further £30 million for provision of new ‘iconic’ Games inspired facilities. However, this investment does not match the figures provided by the Audit Commission (2006) in its assessment of the finance required to support the provision of public sport facilities to meet the government’s sport participation ambitions. It is also noted by Kelso (2010) that of the £135 million, £37 million comes from Sport England’s existing budget and all the funds from the National Lottery. Kelso (2010) also comments on the fact that £135 million is approximately only

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11 It should be noted that the Labour government’s ‘promise’ of 1 Million people playing more sport’, was not given any additional resources as to deliver the legacy promises there was to be “no addition to the Games’ funding package of £9.3 billion (DCMS, 2008a, p.8).
1.5% of the £9.3 billion budget being spent on the delivery of the Games and its associated infrastructure.

There has been some additional upgraded facility provision made in regions where overseas teams will be based for Pre-Games training camps (PGTC). LOCOG has made up to £25,000 available to National Olympic Committees to bring their teams to the UK prior to the Games and be based in accredited PGTC (London Business Network, 2012). Although some of the PGTCs are based in places such as Leeds and Manchester, it is evident from the information available that where contracts have been signed, the venues are predominantly in the south of the UK (London Business Network, 2012). In an interview with a Sport England senior development manager, mention was made of plans to make available sports equipment provided for the Games to NGBs after the event. It was suggested that Sport England had influenced LOCOG to purchase rather than hire the equipment so that it might later be distributed to NGBs for future use. The interviewee did admit, however, that this would not be an extensive resource, particularly as some of this equipment might be “damaged and maybe not be able to be re-used” (12).

It is evident from this review of facilities that there is a discrepancy between the ambitions of the government to deliver the original ‘promise’ of increased mass sport participation and the provision of adequate country-wide facilities to support the envisaged increase in the demand to participate. The current context is one where there is insufficient investment in the mechanism of facility provision to support the desired outcome of a legacy of increased sport participation.
6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has had a specific focus on the role of context as it impacts on the working of the mechanisms that were put forward to deliver the outcome of increased mass sport participation as a legacy of the London 2012 Games.

A suggestion was made of the London 2012 Games sport participation legacy - was it a ‘cynical sales pitch or imaginative idea that was realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver?’ (Cashman, 2011). In this chapter, I have used the comparison of planning to stage the London 2012 Games with the planning of its ‘promised’ sport participation legacy to address the two scenarios posed by the question.

Using the basis of realist evaluation: context + mechanism = outcome (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) as a guide, evidence has been found to support both proposals. The relationships between the main mechanisms that were put forward to deliver the outcome of increased mass sport participation are seen to have been considerably influenced by the social, economic and political contexts in which they were set.

Throughout this thesis it has been noted that increased sport participation was a central tenet of the London 2012 bid to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In Chapter 4, the concept of increased sport participation was seen to be used to gain favour with the British public to generate support for the bid. It was also seen to be used to influence the voting of IOC members in making their decision as to which city should host the 2012 Olympics. In the build up to and during the bidding phase for the Games of the XXX Olympiad, the IOC was looking to re-invent itself following accusations of internal corruption and gigantism (Wamsley 2004, Girginov 2011). The IOC has been keen to promote ‘positive legacies’ amongst the host community as an outcome of hosting the Games. What better, it might be suggested, than for the IOC to be seen to be associated
with an Olympic Games legacy of increased mass sport participation and positive characteristics that are presumed to be attributable to sport (CCPR, 1960; Ogi, 200; Burnham, 200)?

An early commentary on the planning for the delivery of the legacy has been evidenced as being slow to progress and seemingly lacking the required resources (HMSC CMS, 2008a). In this chapter, this impression has been supported by the observations of a number of my interviewees engaged in the UK sport development sector. The planning for legacy has been seen to contrast dramatically with the planning to stage the London 2012 Games. The latter has been supported by a legally binding framework and progress has complimented on its timely progress by the IOC (2010). By way of contrast and at the time of writing, the figures provided by the latest Active People Survey do not reflect a significant increase in sport participation as a marker towards the legacy target (Sport England, 2011b). Jeremy Hunt, the Culture Secretary for the coalition government has admitted to “dropping”(Gibson 2011a) the ‘promise’ of one million more people being physically active and it would now appear that the “2012 legacy plan for a fitter Britain is [being] quietly scrapped” (O’Connor 2011, p.12).

The conclusion to the paragraph above might be that the sport participation legacy was a ‘cynical sales ploy’. However, evidence provided in this chapter may also point to deeper issues that have impacted on H2012, providing support for the suggestion it was an ‘imaginative idea but realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver’. As noted in Chapter 3 and earlier in this chapter, H2012 cannot be considered in isolation. H2012 and its desired outcome of a legacy of increased mass sport participation is ‘embedded’ in a wider range of social, cultural, economic and, in this case, most noticeably, political circumstances.

To summarise using the framework of realistic evaluation, the mechanisms that have been put forward to deliver the outcome have been hindered by the contexts in which they
are currently required to operate. In this chapter, the mechanisms of the NGBs, volunteers, availability and access to facilities have been discussed. These mechanisms have to operate in the context of the fragmented, competitive climate of the UK sports development sector. It is an environment where organisations rely on being recognised for their own achievements to support their funding. This context certainly does not provide the synergy of national co-ordination proposed by Brigid Simmonds (HCSC CMS, 2008b). In her evidence, Simmonds also indicated the need for an organisation to have the necessary authority to be able to provide such a strategic lead, a proposal supported by Tim Lamb, chief executive of the SRA. The context for the delivery of the sport legacy is one where responsibility has passed down the line from government to Sport England to regional associations and the NGBs, yet none of these organisations is considered to have the required “political stature to influence cross departmental agendas” (Lamb, HCSC CMS, 2007b Q.97).

A further context that inhibits the success of the mechanisms is the absence of any legally binding support for the mass sport participation legacy ambitions. Stuart and Scassa (2011) consider this to be a significant contributory factor to the seeming frequent occurrence of the non-delivery of sport mega-event legacy and call for the IOC to use its ‘coercive power’ to address the situation. There is little doubt that it was the legally binding framework of the Host City Contract that significantly influenced the government to increase the London 2012 budget from the original £2.1 billion to £9.3 billion (HCSC CMS, 2008a). The reaction to the early figures from the Active People Survey which indicate that the original sport legacy ‘promise’ will not be met was less dramatic. The coalition government has already looked to move the goalposts by dropping the physical activity target of the original ‘promise’ (Gibson, 2011a) and it is suggested that sport legacy plans, central to the UK’s bid for the Games and considered decisive in Lord Coe’s emotional speech to the IOC in 2005, are to be “quietly scrapped” (O’Connor 2011, p12).
The evidence provided in this latter section leans more to the idea that a legacy of increased participation was an ‘imaginative idea but realistically if not impossible to deliver’. Those promoting the idea of a sport participation legacy may not have appreciated, for example, the challenges faced to deliver the legacy posed by the current operational structure of the UK sport development sector. An alternative point of view is that the government, through reports such as *Game Plan* (DCMS/Strategy Unit 2002), *Raising the Bar* (2005) and the *London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games: funding and legacy. Second report of Session 2006 -7* (HCSC CMS, 2007a), had been made aware of many of the issues associated with the operation of the proposed legacy delivery mechanisms and the contexts in which they were set. During the period of my research and at the time of writing, the government has yet to address the limitations set by those contexts. The debate between ‘cynical sales pitch’ or ‘imaginative idea but realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver’ continues.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This chapter has three main elements:

- A review of the choice of methodology
- A summary of the key findings of the research
- Directions for future research

7.1 A review of the choice of methodology

7.1.1 Why Realist Evaluation?

The choice of using a research methodology informed by realist evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) was influenced by wanting to be an “analyst” rather than a “booster” (Horne and Mazenreiter, 2006, p.15) of the effects of sport mega-events. As explained in the Preface, this aspiration was in turn influenced by my previous experiences of management of legacy programmes connected with sport mega / major events and the questions that I was asking of myself and my work:

- Why is the argument made for the association between mega-events and increased participation when there is little evidence to support it?
- Why is a simple causal link made between events and increased mass sport participation when there are so many other potential influences on why people do or do not take part in sport?
- Is hosting a sport mega-event a good platform for community sports development?

It was always my aim that my research would have the potential to influence sport development policy. Coalter (2007b, p.2) points out that the
major methodological limitation on producing evidence for policy-making and practice is the absence of an understanding of processes and mechanisms which either produce, or are assumed to produce, particular impacts or outcomes.

The framework of realist evaluation which, through the study of process, looks to explain ‘what works for whom in what circumstances’, therefore provided a suitable methodology. The formula that acts as the backbone to realist evaluation is: context + mechanism = outcome (C+M =O). I gave the term, ‘Hosting the London 2012 Games’ (H2012), to the social programme that was being evaluated in its capacity to deliver a desired outcome of increasing mass sport participation. Using the formula C+M =O, I initially identified the main mechanisms that were proposed to bring about the outcome. The mechanisms were then studied in the contexts in which they were set to investigate how context impacts on mechanism.

As a social programme, H2012, will have a programme theory or theories as to why it is proposed that the programme will ‘work’. I transpose the concept of a ‘mechanism’(s) from realist evaluation to be the programme theory(ies). In the case of H2012, the primary programme theory articulated by the UK government and event supporters was that it would be the inspiration of the London 2012 Games and more specifically the performances of elite athletes that would inspire people to change their behaviour and participate in more sport. Further supporting theories were also proposed to assist the overarching theories (see Interlude, p).

Pawson and Tilley (1997) consider that also of importance in the investigation of a social programme, such as H2012, is the notion of ‘embeddedness’. The embedded nature of the programme demonstrates that it does not sit as a stand-alone feature. My research shows that H2012 has been influenced by a wider range of cultural, social, economic and
political circumstances such as those imposed by engagement with the ‘owners’ of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC). By way of example, the IOC uses a competitive selection process to award the rights to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games. The London 2012 bid therefore needed to appeal to the IOC, to illustrate why it would be the best bid to support the IOC and the Olympic Movement. In the knowledge that social ‘legacy’ has become a subject of increased interest to the IOC (MacAcloon, 2008), the decision to feature a proposed legacy of increased sport participation as central to the bid might be seen to have been influenced by its potential to appeal to the IOC selection committee.

H2012 has also been influenced by politics within the UK. The idea that the hosting the Games would act as a catalyst for increased sport participation was used by the government to win the country’s support to ‘Back the Bid’. It has also been noted that Tony Blair, as Prime Minister during the development of the bid, “shrugged aside any opposition once he got seized by the notion of adding a grand project to his legacy” (Rawnsley, 2006, p.31. Italics are in the original quote).

Authors such as Shoval (2002), Nauright, (2004) and Gold and Gold (2008) have demonstrated how countries and cities have used hosting mega-events to promote themselves on the world stage. As outlined in Chapter 1, although London is already known to be a world city, the UK government was keen to use the status of Olympic Games’ host country to showcase Britain, and moreover London, to boost its position as a centre for international business in the hierarchy of world cities.

Particularly relevant to this study as a reflection of the embedded nature of H2012 were the expectations that have historically built up around the Games’ benefits as a medium to deliver increased sport participation and all that is ‘good’ about sport. Reflecting on their responses to hearing that London had won the bid to host the London 2012, respondents
reported feelings of euphoria using phrases such as “a phenomenal opportunity” (17), “awesome for sport in England” (12) and a “one-off perhaps never to be repeated opportunity to really grow sport” (11). Another respondent talked about how if, 

kids on a difficult estate in a big city get excited about a big sport event and feel pride in their country, their community and their physical surroundings so it reduces their vagrancy and their crime levels - that would be a fantastic result (18).

However, as Coalter (2007b, p.9) notes sport has gained a mythopoeic status, where sport is proposed to have the potential to deliver positive behavioural characteristics but the reality is that this status has become exaggerated and stands for “largely unexamined, impacts and processes”.

Finally and perhaps a crucial embedded feature of H2012 are the characteristics of the proposed target group for the intervention – the host community of the UK and specifically their interest in sport participation. The literature review explored the research that has been carried out using theories of behavioural change as applied to sport participation. It is seen to be a very complex area seemingly posing as many questions as answers. It was revealed that role-model effect was implicit in the notion that sport events lead to increased sport participation (Coalter, 2008b) and that this theory of behaviour change had more potential to impact positively on the behaviour of young people (Payne et al, 2002, Lyle, 2009). Respondents were seen to support the theory summarised by one interviewee who stated “There is no doubt that developing heroes in your sport inspires particularly for young people” (18). However, despite this knowledge, London 2012 was seemingly aiming to use the London 2012 Games to inspire people aged 16+. The legacy ‘promise’ was to get 1 million people to take part in more sport, this target being measured by the Active People Survey which reports on the activity of people over the age of 16.
7.1.2 The timing of the research programme

My research programme was conducted as an ex-ante evaluation of the proposal to use H2012 as a social programme to increase mass sport participation. The decision on the timing of the research was also linked to the ambition to be an ‘analyst’ of the plans to leave a proposed legacy of increased sport participation.

The research questions ask ‘what works?’ and ‘what doesn’t?’ but more importantly how does it work and/or why is it not working? These are questions about the processes involved in legacy development. In their early investigation into “creating the link between the London Olympics and sport participation”, Girginov and Hills (2008, p.2091) propose that more research needs to be undertaken on process; to understand how legacy is being constructed. In the quest to investigate process, my research methodology also looks to answer the call by O’Brien and Chalip (2007) for more research to evaluate planning for legacy. It is an approach which involves an ex ante event evaluation of the strategies by which it is proposed to deliver outcomes, rather than the traditional approach of evaluation of legacy after an event.

It was following a similar line of argument to O’Brien and Chalip (2007) that originally set me on the path to investigate the processes taking place during what has been termed the period of event ‘leverage’ (Chalip, 2006). The objective of studying event leverage is to “identify the strategies and tactics that can be implemented prior to and during an event in order to generate particular outcomes” (Chalip, 2006, pp.112-113).

My empirical investigations were conducted between July 2009 and December 2010. During this period, there was no change to the anticipated outcome of an increase in mass sport participation from the London 2012 Games. By way of contrast, an observation, that has been made very clear from conducting an ex ante study, has been
the ever-changing sport policy landscape. As identified in Chapter 6, the strategies and tactics to leverage the mass sport participation legacy have not remained constant. In this study, policy details are believed to be correct up to the end of 2011 (set as the end of the research period) but further changes will have been made since then.

7.1.3 Limitations of the study based on the methodological design

Through the use of a methodological framework based on realist evaluation, there is recognition of the importance of the embedded nature of the programme. Each sport mega-event will have its unique embedded state and therefore the focus on the London 2012 Games does limit the potential to transfer knowledge to other sport mega-events. Any conclusions drawn about the planning process for the London 2012 Games sport participation legacy may therefore not be fully applicable to other sport mega-events.

As outlined earlier, although the study was intentionally designed to investigate the planning period for the proposed sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games, the design might also be considered to be a limitation. Using the framework of realist evaluation, the study investigates the social programme termed H2012. By restricting the time-frame of the study, it is not possible to evaluate the full impact of H2012. This would require an ex post evaluation of the event legacy as well. Earlier in the chapter I have explored the advantages of conducting an ex-ante study of planning for legacy.

Finally, in this section on limitations, it is acknowledged that the main focus of the research has been the activities of a select number of NGBs. This is because NGBs were designated as central to the mass sport participation legacy process (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a). Although the sample of NGBs was selected to reflect both Olympic and Paralympic and individual and team sports, it is acknowledged that the evaluation cannot demonstrate the full range of activity undertaken by all NGBs.
7.2 Key Research Findings – Programme Theories and Contexts

This section summarises the key findings in relation to Questions 2 and 3 set out in Chapter 1:

2: What are the proposed change mechanisms that will deliver the sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games?

3: How do the social, economic and political contexts in which these change mechanisms are activated make an impact on the working of the mechanism?

To address the questions, I refer to the social programme that I have termed - Hosting the London 2012 Games (H2012) - and its associated programme theories (change mechanisms) as introduced by the UK government to increase mass participation in sport. Weiss (1997, p.503) notes that “Programs are invariably based on theory – in fact, often on several theories – about how activities are expected to bring about desired changes”.

7.2.1 The Primary Programme Theory: The Trickle-Down Effect (TDE)

The dominant programme theory of H2012 was that it would be the inspiration of the performances of athletes that would inspire people to change their behaviour and participate in more sport.

The literature review revealed that the TDE had had a significant influence on sport policy over a number of decades in a number of countries including the UK (Weed et al, 2009). The TDE has been used as the justification for the prioritisation of funding to elite sport (Green, 2009). As revealed in the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee report (2006, p.Ev2), the TDE is considered to have a “huge impact on people in this country in motivating them to participate in sport and compete in sport”.

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Hindson et al (1994) concluded that there were two antithetical models of the relationship between elite sport and grass-roots participation:

- Elite athletes become role models and attract new participants to sport
- Demonstrations of sporting excellence act as a deterrent to sport participation because of the perceived competence gap between the observer and the athlete

There are several factors (contexts) that impact on the relationship between role-models and participants. One most pertinent to H2012 is age (Lyle, 2009). As reflected in the use the Active People Survey as a yardstick (Sport England, n.d), the target population for H2012 was people aged 16 years and over. However, although Weed (2011) has provided evidence to show that role models can have a positive impact on young people and sport participation, adults are more likely to reflect the second statement provided above and be dissuaded by seeing elite athletes perform as they perceive they can never reach such a standard (Payne et al, 2002; Lyle, 2009).

In general, my research data supported such observations. When asked "Would you support the idea that young people are inspired by the role-model effect", one respondent simply replied "Absolutely!" (9), another interviewee declared "The evidence is incontrovertible" (18).

Sir Steve Redgrave (2011) raised the issue of age and the TDE when he stated that it was only really at primary school where elite athletes could make a difference, observing a fact known to most parents that teenagers only want to do things they are good at. The competence factor was evident in an interview with a NGB senior development manager when he suggested that the performances of elite athletes at a sport mega-event:
might put people off because it might make them feel inferior as in “I'm never going to do that” (25).

However, it was the opinion of the BCF that the role-modelling effect does work for adults. One BCF interviewee suggested that, through their Sky Ride programme, driven by ‘inspiration to participation', more people were being inspired to take up cycling. This has recently been corroborated through a BCF report (BCF, 2012) which indicates that one million people have got onto a bike since the start of the programme.

It is possible that the difference in views relates to the social context of cycling. Most people have at some stage in their life had the opportunity to ride a bike, particularly as a young person. It was noted in Chapter 2, that the people who had been inspired through the TDE to participate by the success of the Scottish curling team at the 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Olympics were those who had already participated in sport (sportscotland, 2004). This observation is supported by a report (Weed et al, 2009, p.12) which identified “that the 2012 Games subject to caveats may have the potential to contribute to increasing the frequency of participation in sport of existing sport participants, or to rekindling interest in lapsed sport participants”. It may be that the people who are taking part in the Sky Ride programme are previous cycling participants who, in the words of a BCF senior manager “have fond memories of cycling” (7) and are therefore more likely to be persuaded to rekindle their interest.

In their report, Weed et al (2009) also identified a significant amount of activity switching amongst these groups where the overall effect on participation is neutral. The observation that people might just switch sports was more recently noted by former Olympian and now sport journalist, Matthew Syed (2012). When questioned in an interview on the potential for people to 'swap their shoes for trainers' as a result of the London 2012 Games, Syed outlined the trend for people, following sport mega-events to switch sports rather for
people to be inspired to be new participants. Syed also highlights a further social context impacting on the TDE that, in terms of making the link to Team GB success, the TDE might be limited by the fact that a number of the sports targeted by UK Sport for funding were those “not particularly conducive to mass participation - rowing, sailing, equestrianism”. Syed continued “There is no way that people from inner metropolitan areas are going to be able to see success in those areas because it is far too expensive”.

It is a view reiterated by Catherine Bennett (2012, p31), who writing for The Observer under the headline “The real Olympic winners? Sports played by the elite”, proposes that “While the government invests vast sums in yachting and rowing, countless children are being left behind”.

7.2.2 A supporting programme theory: A change in sport policy – from Game Plan to Playing to Win

Following the success of the London 2012 bid a change was made to UK sport policy from Game Plan and its focus on ‘sport for good’ to Playing to Win where sport was given stand-alone status. This was a complete reversal of the general sport policy that had seen the government accept the salience of sport as providing a solution to a number of policy problems in health and education (Houlihan and Green, 2004). In the changed sport policy environment sport became a “single entity and should concentrate solely on sports related issues [ ] it should concentrate on that central issue and not be diluted or distracted by meeting demands of other agendas” (Charlton, 2010, p.353). It was to distance sport from other ‘wealthy’ service partners such as education, health and social services, a move considered by Collins (2010b) to be a cause for concern in the long term. Collins (2010b) suggested that although protection of sport funds may be felt in the run up to the London 2012 Games, he went on to explain that all other host nations have experienced post event funding cuts in sport. It is also the case that as sport is a non-statutory local authority service, it is considered likely that its budget will particularly feel the effects of the
government’s austerity measures (Collins, 2008). In 2008, local authorities invested £1.2bn in revenue and £415m capital funding in sport (Sport England, 2008a). The potential to lose much of this funding by sport distancing itself from its wealthier service partners may be a cause for regret.

The concerns raised above by Collins (2010b) were reflected in the responses of my interviewees. When asked ‘what he thought would happen to funding post 2012’, one NGB development manager responded

There will be less funding anyway - economy wise - and the emphasis on sport will die a bit, certainly from central government. The whole emphasis has been based on the participation legacy promise so once that is taken away and that stimulus isn’t there – my gut feeling is that the funding will diminish (26).

The coalition government’s austerity measures have put increasing pressure on local authorities (LAs) to make dramatic cuts to their budgets. Sport and leisure is not a statutory requirement for LAs. In the light of a survey (BBC, 2012) that more than a third of UK councils had cut or closed some public sports facilities in the past three years, it does not come as a surprise that in the immediate aftermath of the Games, the then Chair of the BOA, Lord Moynihan called for a change to current legislation of sport provision. Speaking to the Daily Telegraph, he said “When we see facilities being cut back then those who have been inspired by the Games don’t get the opportunity to really engage in sport. We should be looking at changing the law to make provision of sport and recreation opportunity a statutory requirement” (Hope, 2012). Furthermore, following the SRA (2012a) publication of Game of Life, which brings together “350 independent research resources to evaluate and highlight the far-reaching benefits that sport and physical activity can bring to the nation’s wealth, well-being, social cohesion and productivity”, the
SRA (2012b) used the launch of the document to reiterate an earlier call to the government (HCSC CMS, 2007) for a cross departmental approach to UK sport’s policy.

**7.2.3 A supporting programme theory: NGBs as ‘specialists in their field’ were placed as central to the delivery of the sport participation legacy**

In the action plan, *Before, during and after, making the most of the London 2012 Games* (DCMS, 2008a), Sport England was designated as the lead body to deliver on the ‘promise’ of 1 million people doing more sport. In turn, Sport England, in their 2008 – 11 Strategy (Sport England, 2008a) identified the NGBs as being central to the delivery of the ‘promise’. The programme theory was that as ‘specialists in their field’, NGBs would be best placed to lead the developmental work. Through my research data, the theory has been seen to be flawed due to contexts in which the mechanism of using NGBs as a catalyst for change has been set.

**NGBs and the context of their historical background**

In Chapter 1, it was noted that NGBs were originally established in the 19th century as voluntary organisations to regulate and administer their respective sports. Chapter 2 described how, during the latter half of the 20th century and continuing into the 21st century, sport became more salient to the UK government as a subject of policy and subsequently successive governments became more involved in the operation and funding of both elite and community sport. A notable landmark in this process was the election of the Labour government in 1997 which was committed to a modernization programme to provide more efficient, effective public services delivered to a higher standard (Sanderson, 2002). Sport organisations, including NGBs, became subject to this process which it is suggested looked to “promote managerialism with its unquestioned assumptions about the superiority of private sector values and practices over those operating in the public sector” (Houlihan and Green, 2009, p.4).
The demand on NGBs to ‘professionalise’, to replace trust in NGB expertise with techniques such as audit, inspection and service agreements, has been a source of tension between NGBs, the government and its public sector paymasters, Sport England and UK Sport. Many members of NGBs still adhere to their historical roots in voluntarism and an “ethos of autonomy” (Green, 2009, p.129), where, for example, a person may be promoted as a reward for longevity of service rather than for the relevant qualifications on a curriculum-vitae. In such circumstances, the authoritative business-driven demands of government have not been welcomed. A phrase often used to describe the modernisation process is ‘earned autonomy’ but as Houilhan and Green (2009, p.15) ask, “autonomy on whose terms”? As outlined in Chapter 6, in their interviews, NGBs were seen to be aware of the increased reliance they had on Sport England for funding and therefore the control Sport England could exert on their activities. In this respect if the autonomy is being earned and earned by way of a “range of disciplinary techniques of manipulation” (Houilhan and Green, 2009, p.18) including reward and punishment by control of funding, then it is possible that the modernization process will make NGBs more concerned to meet their targets than to respond to the operational needs of their members. This was illustrated by an interview with a development manager who admitted that, in prioritising his time, “clubs were having to take a back seat” (33). It is suggested here that this could lead to further tension between clubs and the NGBs with the former questioning the value of their affiliation to NGBs.

This study has reaffirmed the impact of government-led change management on NGBs, tension between clubs and their NGBs that had previously been noted by Abrams et al (1997). The importance to the NGBs of the revenue gained from clubs was illustrated in my interviews and any reduction in this funding stream from clubs would only serve to increase the reliance of NGBs on state funding.
NGBs and the context of the UK sport development sector

A further impact of target-setting was seen to be the contribution of this process to the competitive nature of the sport development sector; the context in which the NGBs operate. It was noted in Chapter 6 that the lack of an influential lead organisation for the sport participation legacy was considered to have had a negative influence on the planning for legacy. As indicated by one interviewee, NGBs were known to “fight their own” (18) and as explained by Slot (2008) this would result in the NGBs competing against each other, where, “instead of one ‘massive Olympics is good’ message, we are set for 30 smallish market campaigns”. It was further suggested by Lord Addington (2010) in a House of Lords debate on the Olympics, that this internal competition between NGBs would cause duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. It was a view supported by my interview data summarised by one NGB senior manager when asked who should be leading the sport legacy promise. He replied:

If we are trying to get all sports on side it should be Sport England because we report to them and they fund us and they should be saying to us we need you all to show a bit of 2012 emphasis on what you are. And that would be filtered across all sports with some consistency because I think it may be counter-productive for us to go one way and another takes a different approach (26).

As noted in the early chapters of this study, the UK sport development sector has witnessed a continuous struggle for resources between the competing demands of elite and mass participation sport. In this context, although it is claimed that the two forms of sport are compatible, trying to fulfil their respective objectives with one policy may result in a case of the Scylla and Charybdis (Green and Houlihan, 2009).
As the agents to deliver, ‘mass’ sport participation, the potential sphere of influence of NGBs has been questioned. Although figures are seen to vary, Collins (2008) suggests that there are only six million members of NGBs and, if it is accepted that some people may be members of more than one NGB (as I am), the six million members may actually only be four million individuals. Respondents in this study have acknowledged that NGBs will need to work outside the club structure to meet their mass participation targets but even then, concern has been expressed at their capacity to accommodate both the demands of current members and the demands imposed by their new role in the mass participation agenda (Charlton, 2010). As outlined by a former senior development manager at Sport England in discussing the NGBs’ enhanced role in promoting increased mass participation:

the governing bodies either haven’t got that as their priority or are just not set up to do that and very often live day by day to get through current demands. (13)

Reflecting on the nature of the work of NGBs, Revill (2007, p.5) reports on the comments of a sport official who suggested the influence of NGBs was dominated by those sports “where you wear a strip or are in a team”. In this study, it has been noted that the NGBs involved were trying to change their ways of working, to work outside the club structure. Examples were given through the accounts of interviews such as the BCF’s Sky Ride programme and British Swimming’s Big Splash. In outlining the nature of the Big Splash, one senior manager in describing a potential programme participant said “this is about your average punter getting into a pool rather than joining clubs” (18). However, through their interviews, NGBs also reflected on the importance of the club structure and members to their work, particularly as a source of funding.
The evidence from this study suggests that there are different needs of elite sport and mass participation supporting the claim by Green and Houlihan (2005, p.189) that “elite sport and mass participation are incompatible functions” (Green and Houlihan 2005, p.189).

7.2.4 A supporting programme theory: H2012 will facilitate an increase in sport facility provision.

The apparent logic to this programme theory is the belief in, ‘Build it and they will come’! The UK government and event supporters have been keen to demonstrate that there will be a legacy of community sport provision from the new facilities built in the Olympic Park and in subsidiary venues such as Weymouth and Eton Dorney. Furthermore the coalition government put forward £135m to support their Games’ legacy programme, Places People Play (DCMS, 2010b) of which £50m is to upgrade 1,000 community sport facilities and a further £30 million for provision of new ‘iconic’ Games inspired facilities (DCMS, 2010b). A senior development manager at Sport England told me that this fund would not have been made available without the intervention of the Games.

In principle, the theory may seem to have some merit but it needs to be considered in a number of influencing contexts. The first relates to a report by the Audit Commission (2006) which advised that it would require an investment of £550 million then to bring the country’s public sport facilities to a standard able to facilitate the government’s sport participation aspirations. The figure of £80m from Places People Play (DCMS, 2010b) is welcomed by the sport development sector but recognised as being insufficient to meet demand. In addition, it has been noted earlier in this chapter that local authorities are being forced to close or cut the opening hours of public sport facilities as they make spending cuts to meet new budgetary targets.
A further context is that of the new facilities built for the Games and their geographical sphere of influence. The majority of the new Games facilities have been built in the Olympic Park, East London and the South East of England. There has also been an upgrade to existing facilities to create the Weymouth and Portland National Sailing Centre. The London 2012 Games will leave London with a number of additional world-class sporting venues but realistically this will not contribute to increasing participation on a country-wide basis. As noted by one interviewee,

it [the legacy] will be London focused because it’s held in London and anything that happens in the rest of the country will fade rather more quickly as there is no physical presence left” (26).

There has been some additional upgraded facility provision made in regions where overseas teams will be based for pre-Games training camps. At time of writing, over 50 different agreements have been made between teams and venues across the country with others ‘to be confirmed’ (London Business Network, 2012). In addition, an interview with a Sport England senior development manager revealed plans to offer Games time sports equipment as “relocatable assets”(12) to NGBs. In a more recent conversation with a member of LOCOG (2012), I was told that the principle of NGBs working as a distribution medium for equipment remained, but the detail was not yet decided. In one of the interviews with England Volleyball, it was disclosed that they would be receiving the ‘competition’ sand from the Olympic Beach Volleyball courts. However, under the title: *Wrestling chief slams Britain*, Hart (2011b), reports on the disappointment expressed by the President of FILA (the world governing body of wrestling), at the decision by LOCOG to change its original plans to buy competition mats (to become a legacy for British Wrestling) and, further to a short term lease, the mats will return to the manufacturers in France.
7.2.5 A supporting programme theory: The development of the *Inspire Mark*

The Inspire Mark was created to allow non-commercial organisations across the UK to make a tangible link with the London 2012 Games. Its importance was highlighted to me by one interviewee who, in a previous role, was part of the development team of Inspire Mark. He suggested that:

> it [Inspire Mark] is one of the key legacy facilitators for the Games […] as without it and allowing people to associate with the Games we were not going to be able to deliver a true legacy (18).

In the case of the Inspire Mark, as a programme theory it adds to theory of the TDE and the inspirational potential of the Games. The *Inspire Mark* aims to use the inspiration from the impact of the event as opposed to the impact of the sporting performances of elite athletes. Weed et al (2009, p.39) term this the “festival effect”, where people are motivated to be part of “something that is significant on a larger scale” and particularly at a community level. As outlined to me by an *Inspire Mark* programme co-ordinator, by taking part in activities branded by the Inspire Mark, it would be “their way of saying, I was part of the Games” (34).

The contexts that made an impact on the *Inspire Mark* were firstly the administration of the programme which was described by many as over-bureaucratic system of administration. As expressed by one development officer “great for those who get it but the hoops you have to jump through!” (26) and on arriving for her interview with me, an Inspire Mark regional co-ordinator reported that she had just spent two hours working with a local group “just to get them to talk in the same way a professional would – someone fills in forms all the time” (34).
A further limiting context on the *Inspire Mark* was the context of the restrictions on its use as dictated by event sponsors. The issue at stake was the need to ensure that those awarded the *Inspire Mark* did not in any way detract from the prestige and commercial potential of the official Games’ sponsors as having the sole rights to the Olympic brand.

For NGBs using the *Inspire Mark* was problematic as they had existing sponsors which in a number of cases would be competitors to Games’ sponsors. At all levels of the NGBs, from senior management to development officers, people’s concerns about restrictions imposed by being unable to use the Games’ branding were raised. The following two excerpts from interviews provide a good reflection of the comments made:

>a lot of our programmes are sponsored by commercial partners, none of which have rights to the Games so we have to be incredibly careful how we work – which is a big problem – as a governing body we can’t use the logo (33).

and

this is where it falls down in terms of the legacy programme because obviously LOCOG need to protect the Olympic partners but governing bodies are going to deliver a lot of legacy plans but we’ve got our own commercial partners so it’s a real issue (7).

### 7.2.6 An overarching context: The population of the UK and its interest in increasing levels of sport participation.

One context that can be applied to all the programme theories is that of the potential for the target market to engage. What do we know about changing people’s behaviour so that they might become more physically active?
The literature review indicated that government intervention in sport policy started in the 1960s with the Wolfenden Report (CCPR, 1960). However despite “substantial investment” (Rowe, 2012, p1) of public funding being invested in promoting sports participation, Rowe (2004) records that over a forty year period from the 60s to the noughties, “public policy in sport [has] struggled to ‘shift the curve’ of participation and drop out to achieve sustained growth” (Rowe, 2012, p1).

In Rowe’s (2012) paper (written after my original literature review on theories of behaviour change and sport participation), the former Sport England ‘Strategic Lead for Research and Evaluation’, suggests that what is needed is a new approach to the development of public policy in sport. Rowe (2012, p1) contends that:

rather than look for the solution to these challenges in a shopping list of interventions – whether new or tried or trusted – the start of the road to better public policy is better insight and understanding of the phenomenon that is ‘sport participation’.

Rowe (2012, p.1) suggests here that interventions, such as H2012, lacking a theoretical base are not the solution to increasing mass sport participation. Sport development policy needs to be shaped by a “coherent and robust theoretical foundation” as opposed to sport programmes more traditionally designed “on the basis of experience, practice knowledge and intuition” (Weiss, 1997, p.503).

Rowe (2012, p2) argues the case for a greater understanding of ‘sporting capital’, which he defines as:
The stock of physical, social and psychological attributes and competencies that support and motivate an individual to participate in sport and to sustain that participation over time.

Referring back to Chapter 2 and in unravelling that definition, reveals reference to the various theories of behaviour change as related to sport and to the proposed ‘barriers’ to participation.

The NGBs featured in my study were starting to show an understanding that they needed to think more about the people’s individual characteristics. This approach perhaps driven by Sport England’s market segmentation (Sport England, 2011) and the view expressed by a senior manager at the SRA who told me:

What they’ve [NGBs] been less good at is knowing about the motivations behind the people playing sport. Why they come? When do they come? How often do they want it? How do they want the coach, teacher or volunteer to speak to them? All that kind of stuff -the sort of information that retail works very hard at. How to get those customers and how to keep them once they’ve got them (11).

It is notable here that the SPEAR Model (2009) (see Chap 2.4.4), created through a Sport England commissioned report in an attempt to find out more about the TDE, does attach importance to understanding more about people’s motivations to participate. It does address theories of behavioural change and tries to apply these to Sport England’s market segmentation. However, this model was not referenced by any of the NGBs profiled in this study. It is further noted that, at time of writing, I am not aware of any independent studies that have been carried out using the SPEAR model.
The literature review indicated that there is a considerable amount of literature on behaviour change and sport and physical activity. My research indicated that there have been some limited attempts to use this data. The current trend is to consider sport and physical activity as something that can be ‘sold’ to the customer. In talking about how they were trying to increase participation, respondents used phrases such as putting “an accessible product on the ground” (7), “using the fire power” of their sponsors to take the “product to the market” (9) and doing “some advertising in lifestyle magazines because that's where future market is going to be”.

However, the major revelation is the overall lack of consideration of theoretical knowledge of behaviour change as it relates to sport and physical activity participation. There is seemingly still a reliance on initiatives based on past experience as the foundation for sport strategy rather than using a more theory based approach that considers why and what it is about a person that might act as the catalyst for behaviour change.

7.3 Key research findings – the impact of the embedded nature of H2012

This section summarises the research findings as they relate to the first question set out in Chapter 1:

1: How and why has the association between sport mega-events and social legacy, specifically a legacy of increased mass sport participation, evolved?

Sub question: How has this made an impact on the construction of the proposed sport participation of the London 2012 Games and with what consequences?
7.3.1 The mythopoeic nature of sport and the Games

This line of enquiry was generated by trying to understand why, when it was known that no previous Olympic Games or other major tournament has ever led directly to an increase in people taking part in sport, it was anticipated that the London 2012 would be different?

My conclusion is that consideration needs to be given to the H2012 as being embedded in the status that is given to sport as having the potential to deliver positive behavioural characteristics. As suggested by Coalter (2007b, p.9), this status is “based on popular and idealistic ideas”. Lacking empirical evidence, myths have grown up around the ‘power’ of sport which reflect the concept that sport has the ability to meet “crucial social needs and is positive and powerful force for social integration”(Giullianotti, 2004, p.355).

Sport’s mythopoeic nature appears to have developed from the values attributed to playing sport during the Victorian era in English public schools – those of Tom Brown’s school days. Such values were evident in the Wolfenden Report (1960), where it is suggested that sport is able to transmit to participants desirable behavioural characteristics such as determination and self-discipline. A United Nations special advisor, Adolf Ogi (2003), suggested that sport teaches young people to manage victory, overcome defeat and become team players. It is possible to locate any number of similar statements about the positive outcomes from sport participation. As recently as November 2011, I attended the Sport Management of Australia and New Zealand (SMANNZ) conference in Melbourne where, in the opening address, the chief executive of Foxtel, Kim Williams, spoke of boxing being a ‘role model’ sport. Williams suggested that boxing promoted courage and self-discipline in participants. It is reasoned here that this is to a certain extent true but, as mythopoeic, the benefits become exaggerated and distorted. Equally what becomes overlooked is that sport can also promote negative outcomes and
personal characteristics. Boxers have been known to suffer brain damage as a result of their time in the ring and reports of sports-people cheating, abusing officials and their opponents are commonplace in both amateur and professional sport.

I further suggest that the Games have developed their own mythopoeic status. As indicated earlier in this chapter, it was a view promoted by my interviewees in their responses to the announcement by Jacques Rogge that London had been awarded the Games of the XXX Olympiad in 2012. The mythopoeic status has been developed through two strands. Firstly, the association with sport and, as outlined in the paragraph above, all that is ‘good’ about an individual’s participation in sport. It is an association that President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, has promoted in his efforts to promote the Games as a positive influence on a host country and its community (Rogge, 2009). The second wave of mythology associated with the Games is thought to come from its background. Pierre de Coubertin, founder of the modern Olympic Games, originally saw the event as the showpiece of a wider movement; a philosophy of life that he termed ‘Olympism’. His was an educational mission, to change the way society behaved by placing “sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity” (IOC, 2007, p.2). The ‘practice’ of Olympism has as its guide a set of fundamental principles which Naul (2008) suggests have been drawn together and called Olympic values. These include friendship, fair play, joy of effort, equality and mutual respect. Despite the observations by some, including Lenskiy (2000; 2008) Jennings (1996; 2011), Jennings and Sambrook (2002), Wamsley (2004) that the practice of such values is not to be found in the activities of the IOC and its flagship event the Olympic Games, the Games are still revered as an international sporting event (Wamsley, 2004).

Cashman (1999, p.5) suggests that, through its history, its traditions and the power of its symbols such as the torch and the rings, the Games have been given the status of a
“quasi-religious festival”. MacRury (2008) develops the idea of the unique status of the Games with the proposal that being given the opportunity to host the Games is as if given a ‘gift’. As a gift, its value goes beyond the tangible nature of the event and the associated infrastructure. The Games come with the gift of all the ‘good’ associated with the Olympics and its values. It is a gift of ‘goodness’ that is destined to be bestowed on the host community.

My knowledge of the history of the Olympic Games tells me that, over a period of nearly 120 years, the Olympic Games have provided some remarkable moments reflecting incredible feats of sporting achievement. Commendable sporting behaviour has been evident and some people in the Games’ host communities have reported feeling a sense of elation from being involved with the event particularly when working as a volunteer. However, recollections of the Games have become idealised. Vigor et al (2004, p.3) warn that the Games “are also quite good at myth-making”. As outlined in Chapter 4, it should also be remembered that the Games have been the target of terrorist attacks, used as platform to promote Nazism, have featured incidents of drug abuse by athletes and some people in host communities have been made homeless to make way for Games’ infrastructure. Wamsley (2004) suggests it is the Games’ mythopoeic status that allows us to overcome such evident contradictions between the Olympic values, the realities of the Olympic movement and in particular the modern Olympic Games in practice.

There is nothing intrinsic to the Games that might facilitate them to deliver a legacy of mass sport participation. I suggest that the embedded nature of H2012 in the mythopoeic status given to sport and the Games is what facilitated and continues to facilitate the idea that sport mega-events can indeed promote increased mass sport participation in the host country.
Having reviewed the evidence for why an association has developed between sport mega-events and a legacy of increased sport participation, the next section will consider what impact this has had on the proposed sport legacy of the London 2012 Games.

7.3.2 Engagement with the IOC

As noted earlier, the IOC employs a competitive selection process in the award of hosting the Games. It has been noted that in the mid ‘noughties’, at the time of bidding for the 2012 Games, the IOC was looking to reinvent itself. The organisation faced global criticism following the revelations of internal corruption and a backlash against the model of growth and expansion that had been used to promote the Games to the extent they were described as an “antithesis of Olympism” (Wamsley, 2004), the philosophy on which the Olympic Movement had been founded.

As part of the ‘re-invention’, the IOC under the stewardship of a new president, Jacques Rogge, placed growing importance on the notion of positive legacies for the host community. In acknowledging this situation, Cashman (2011) asks was the London 2012 bid a “cynical sales pitch?” By putting an increase in sport participation as a central tenet of the bid, it appealed to the IOC’s host community legacy ambitions and what better way through the focus on sport and all the ‘good’ that purportedly sport can deliver. The bid team were also aware of the importance to the IOC of seeing that the whole nation was supportive of the bid. An appeal was made to the UK, described as passionate about sport (Vigor et al, 2004), that hosting the Games might provide a ‘step-change’ in the provision of sport for all. A belief in the potential for a step-change was evident from my data. As noted earlier in the chapter, respondents recalled feelings of euphoria on hearing that London had been awarded the Games.
The ‘sales-pitch’ worked with both the IOC and the British public. The IOC awarded London the bid, despite wide-spread recognition that Paris had, by far, the best technical and cost-effective bid Perryman (2012). One major factor in Paris’ favour was that there was no need to build a new stadium, the Stade de Paris being designed to accommodate both athletics and football. The British public ‘Backed the Bid’, a public opinion poll commissioned by the IOC (2005c) showed that support for London’s ran at 68% support in London and 70% support throughout the country. In 2007, according to a London 2012 survey this level of support had risen to 79% (London 2012, 2007).

The problem was that behind the sales–pitch there was no clear plan as to how the claims about increased sport participation would be delivered. As articulated by one interviewee in 2009, looking back on the planning for a 2012 sport legacy:

> We don’t think through what we’re trying to achieve and how that is going to be sustainable post whatever the event is and you’ve only got to look at the government, it took them years to actually articulate what they wanted from 2012 (13).

The plans for the delivery of the ‘stage’ on which to host the Games were quickly put into place, within eight days a Bill was introduced to the House of Commons which subsequently created the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). The ODA was given considerable authority to carry out the required work through a legal process underpinned by the Host City Contract (IOC, 2005a) and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games Act 2006 (HMG, 2006). The cost of staging and managing the Games rose from £2.1 billion to £9.325 billion which was sanctioned by the UK government (HCPAC, 2008).

By way of comparison, the planning to deliver the mass sport participation legacy has been seen to have lacked a lead organisation with a similar status to that of the ODA.
Although the DCMS was originally given responsibility for ‘legacy’ and it produced a series of legacy ‘promises’ (DCMS, 2008a), responsibility for the mass sport participation legacy was devolved to Sport England who in turn designated NGBs as central to the legacy process (DCMS, 2008b; Sport England, 2008a). In September 2011 it was admitted by both Sport England and the government that the proposed legacy outcome of ‘1 million people doing more sport’ will not be met. There appeared to be no suggestion of additional resources or measures to meet the target. The target had been “quietly dropped” (Gibson, 2011d).

By way of summary, the evidence from this study suggests that the ‘promise’ of sport legacy was more a sales-pitch to promote winning the bid than a strategically planned ambition to enhance mass participation in sport. It is a suggestion supported by the observation that in January 2013, plans for an ‘Olympic legacy’ are still in the discussion stage (Coe, 2013).

7.4 Key research findings: Transferable knowledge

This section summarises the key research findings as it relates to Question 4 as set out in Chapter 1:

4: What knowledge can this study provide that can be transferred to the organisers of future sport mega-events who aspire to leave a legacy of increased sport participation?

Although it is important to acknowledge the comment made in 7.1.3 that every sport mega-event will have its own ‘embedded’ nature and therefore caution needs to be taken about the extent of knowledge that can be transferred, it is felt that some findings are applicable to future events.
7.4.1 To deliver a sport mega-event legacy, equal attention must be given to planning for the event and planning its legacy.

As reviewed in section 7.3.2, this study highlights a clear distinction between the planning to stage a successful London 2012 Games and the planning to realize the proposed legacy of increased mass sport participation.

Although the UK government in its document, *Before during and after; making the most of the London 2012 Games* (DCMS, 2008b) acknowledged the importance of planning and initiating early action to deliver a legacy, the reality was that, for sport, seemingly it was hoped that legacy would happen by ‘osmosis’ (Hodgetts, 2010). As articulated by a former Sport England senior development manager who, on the subject of creating a sport legacy, suggested “it seems as if you’ve got the event then that is the sports’ legacy” (13) and of Sport England’s plans for the London 2012 legacy:

Sport England has been very poor at articulating how that are using the Games in terms of sports development. I just don’t see any evidence of it.

So their stock approach is we’ve got our stock objectives; 1 million more taking part in sport but I don’t see what they are doing differently because of the Games to capitalise on it. I just don’t see it (13).

This study reaffirms the statement made by Faber and Maunsell (2004) in their review of the Legacy Programme for the Commonwealth Games 2002, that in order to leverage legacy you need to put as much into the planning for legacy as into the planning for the event itself.

It is suggested that if the IOC(2007, p.15) is serious about its intent to deliver a “positive legacy” from an Olympic Games, then it needs to be pro-active in obligating the host city to honour its intended legacy ambitions. Although Cashman (2011b), notes that the IOC’s time-limited involvement with each specific Games makes it difficult for the organisation to see through each set of legacy ambitions, Stuart and Scassa (2011, para 9) propose the
IOC should ‘enforce’ legacy ‘promises’ by use of its “coercive power” as used through the contract to protect the IOC’s intellectual property rights. Stuart and Scassa (2011) further suggest that if such action was taken by the IOC, it would prompt the ‘owners’ of other sport mega-events to take similar action to ensure the delivery of legacy ‘promises’.

7.5.2 More attention needs to be given to the relationship between the proposed mechanisms to deliver a sport-mega event legacy of increased sport participation and the contexts in which the mechanisms will ‘fire’.

Using the same logic that is built into the understanding that it is not possible to create an explosion (outcome) with gunpowder and a flame (mechanism) if the environment (context) is damp, so this study has shown that the relationship between context and mechanism in looking to create increased mass sport participation as an outcome of H2012 has not always been the most conducive.

Of the five programme theories (mechanisms) reviewed in section 7.2 which were proposed to increase mass sport participation in the UK as an outcome of H2012, four:

- the TDE;
- the change in sport policy;
- NGBs
- new sport facilities

were all seen to be more sympathetic to supporting the needs of elite sport or specific groups of people rather than mass sport participation.

The primary programme theory – the TDE was seen to have the potential to positively impact on young people in association with sport mega-events. In terms of the potential for a transfer of knowledge, this observation is discussed in the next section as an area that warrants further research.
7. 5 Directions for future research

On the basis for the results from this research, some directions for future research are proposed:

1: The identified main programme theory behind H2012 as a means of increasing mass sport participation was that of the ‘trickle-down effect’ (TDE). In the case of H2012, the theory was seen to be flawed based on the contexts in which it was set. What is needed is a greater understanding of the TDE as it relates to sport mega-events; in what contexts does it work. It is further suggested that this investigation should follow the proposal by Rowe (2012) and look to study what it is about the TDE and sport mega-events that might contribute to an individual’s sporting capital.

2: The TDE has been seen to be dominated by the role-model effect - a theory of behaviour change that has been implicit in the notion that sport events lead to increased sport participation. With reference to the literature on the role-model effect, it is suggested that:

- the impact of the role-model “seems likely to be sport specific” (Lyle, 2009, p.36);
- that to be successful role models need to appear relevant and accessible (Payne et al, 2002)
- needs to on-going interaction between the young people and the role models (Callum and Beltman, 2002)
These suggestions pose questions for the role-model effect as it relates to sport mega-events, for example,

- Can the performances of elite athletes have a generic positive impact on sport and physical activity participation?
- What are the implications of the role-model effect as it relates to young people with a disability. Are able-bodied athletes considered ‘relevant’ to a young person who, because of a physical or mental health condition, could never aspire to ‘be’ that able-bodied athlete?
- Can the “fleeting images” (Coalter, 2008b, p15) of elite athletes at a sport mega-event act as a platform for a sustainable role-model effect?

3: The study was intentionally conducted with an ex ante approach in order to study processes being employed in the build-up to the event. To conduct an ex post evaluation of the NGBs featured in the study and their post-event evaluations of how London 2012 has helped (or not) their mass participation targets would create a more longitudinal study. It would then be possible to conduct a true realist evaluation, working with the NGBs to shape their participation strategies associated with future events, such as the Commonwealth Games, Glasgow, 2014 or Olympic and Paralympic Games, Rio de Janerio 2016.
7.6 An Olympic Promise or an Olympic Dream?

A ‘promise’: *an assurance that one will or will not undertake a certain action or behaviour* (Oxford English Dictionary, 1996).

Assurances were made by event organisers and supporters, including the UK government that, in association with hosting the London 2012 Games, they would undertake to increase mass sport participation. Despite the assurances made, the evidence provided in this study points to the conclusion that the terms of the mass sport participation legacy ‘promise’, to get ‘1 million people doing more sport’,\(^\text{12}\) will not been met.


It was both an aspiration and ambition of hosting the London 2012 Games that it would act as a catalyst for increased mass sport participation. However, it is also noted:


As identified in a conversation with Chris Gratton (2011), the reality is that there are, as of yet, no examples across the globe of sport development programmes having the right mix of mechanism and context to drive the outcome of a sustainable increase in mass sport participation. It is suggested that we need to establish that combination before proposing any transferability to sport mega-events and that the proposal by Rowe (2012) to consider an approach based on theory rather than anecdotal evidence is a suggestion worthy of consideration by policy makers.

\(\text{12} \) The original ‘promise’ was 1 million people doing more sport 3 x 30 minutes a week. This was changed by the coalition government to 1 x 30 minutes a week and in December 2012 it was announced in the results of Active People 6 that this reduced target had been met.
To answer the question ‘promise or dream’, I return to the question posed by Cashman (2011a); was the proposed countrywide mass sport participation legacy of the London 2012 Games “a cynical sales pitch or an imaginative idea that was realistically difficult if not impossible to deliver”? I suggest that this study provides evidence of both elements of Cashman’s proposal.

It was a ‘cynical sales pitch’ designed to appeal to people throughout the UK to back the bid for the London 2012 Games which would realistically benefit an ‘elite’. It is an ‘elite’ who will gain from the economic benefits being primarily confined to London, an ‘elite’ of the small number of sports-people who will be involved in the event, an ‘elite’ of the people who will be able to first-hand witness the Games and an ‘elite’ of the people who will benefit from new infrastructure including the use of new sport facilities after the event.

It was also a cynical sales pitch to the IOC. The London 2012 bid team had established that creating a positive legacy was of paramount importance to the IOC. A revised version of the IOC Charter reflects the organisation’s legacy ambitions in a bid to re-invent itself, focusing on the values associated with Olympism to detract from the claims that the IOC and the Games had become elitist.

It was an imaginative idea in that it was certainly born from imagination; it was known that no previous Olympic Games had succeeded in leaving a legacy of increased mass sport participation. This knowledge, which was supported by empirically based evidence, made the legacy realistically difficult to deliver. Support for the idea that it might have been impossible to deliver is found in this study’s audit of the planning to deliver the mass sport participation legacy. Unlike the planning to stage the event, planning for legacy has lacked the necessary resources.
To refer back to the definitions provided above of a promise and dream: the ambition of a legacy of increased mass sport participation as a legacy of the London 2012 Games lacked an appreciation of reality. There was not a precedent of a similar legacy of an Olympic Games. There was not any guidance on how to get more people doing more sport as a legacy of the Games. The situation reflects that of the UK sport development sector which has yet to provide conclusive evidence on how to change the sport participation behaviour of the population.

To use the terminology of realist evaluation, the lack of knowledge led to a situation where the relationships between the proposed mechanisms to drive the legacy process and the contexts in which they were being deployed were ineffective. As ineffective, the relationship between mechanism and context failed to produce the desired outcome.

The London 2012 Games’ legacy of mass sport participation was made as a promise but in reality, it was a dream.
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Appendix A : Published articles and presentations arising from this study

Publications


Hughes, K.H (2011b) The Olympics and Golf – Positive or Negative Synergy? LSA Newsletter, Eastbourne, LSA.


Presentations


Hughes, K.H (2010b) Mega sports events and the potential to create a legacy of increased sport participation: a London 2012 Olympic promise or Olympic dream? Presentation given as part of: Insights from across the pond: UK perspectives on sport tourism and sport events research. Roundtable Workshop at NASSM Conference. 3rd June, Tampa, Florida, USA.

Hughes, K.H. (2010c) Using the power of a sporting mega-event as a catalyst for creating social legacy: A Case Study of the 2005 UEFA Women’s Championships. Presentation given at the LSA conference. July 8th, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK.

Hughes, K.H. (2010e) Now that the *Game Plan is Playing to Win*, can this deliver the ‘promise’ of a London 2012 sport participation legacy? *Presentation given at PSA conference*. July 19th, University of Birmingham, UK.

Hughes, K.H. (2010f) Mega sport events and the potential to create a legacy of sustainable sports development: Olympic promise or Olympic dream? *Presentation given at the ESDN conference*. September 9th University of Hertfordshire, UK.

Hughes, K.H. (2010g) Understanding the social legacy of mega sporting events - linking theory to practice. *Presentation given to the LOC of the Kazan 2013 Universidad*. October 28th, Tartarstan, Russia.

Appendix B: Information sent to prospective interviewees to inform their consent to participate in the study.

**Research Title:** Sport mega-events and creating a legacy of increased mass sport participation.

**Background**

In 2012, London will play host to the 30th Olympic and the Paralympic Games (London 2012 Games). Past experience indicates that during this period a breath-taking drama of passion, excitement, success and tragedy will unfold leaving a wealth of memories for both participants and the audience.

However, sporting mega-events are now expected to deliver much more than a limited period of elite sporting competition. Legacy development (and moreover positive legacy) has become a watch word as host cities and international sports organisations look to justify vast sums of public sector investment when there is a whole range of national social issues also demanding financial support. This is no more apparent than in bidding to host the world’s largest sporting event; the Olympic and Paralympic Games. In 2002 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) started framing the concept of legacy and in 2007 the IOC Charter was amended to include a reference to the creation of positive legacies for the host cities and host countries and the promotion of sustainable development in sport.

A major focus of the London 2012 bid was the potential for enhanced nation-wide sports development. Publicity material produced in association with the bid claimed that the Games would deliver a step-change in the nation’s physical activity and that an already sports-mad nation would get fitter and healthier. This potential has been developed by the DCMS into one of five legacy promises with three headline ambitions:

**Promise 1: Make the UK a world leading sporting nation**

- Inspiring young people through sport: offer all 5 to 16 year-olds in England five hours of high-quality sport a week and all 16 to 19 year-olds three hours a week by 2012.
- Getting people more active: help at least two million more people in England be more active by 2012.
- Elite Achievement: aim for 4th in the Olympic medal table and at least 2nd in the Paralympic medal table in 2012.

**Research programme**

Although the potential for increased sports participation is often promoted as a positive legacy of sports mega-events and elite sports performance, a general conclusion from the evidence available is that just hosting an event is not enough to leave a legacy of sustainable sports development and that there is a need for all stakeholders to engage in the process of leveraging legacy. It is also suggested that to promote a sustainable legacy, activities should be linked to wider strategic development programmes which in turn makes it difficult to quantify the specific event effect. It is therefore possible that we will probably never know for certain how sports mega-events affect sports participation and, for the development of future strategy, what we need to understand is how the concept of legacy is being constructed, the processes involved and whether this can deliver sustainable sports development.
Your involvement as a representative of a participating National Governing Body of Sport / National Sports Organisation / Local Authority / County Sport Partnership

This research will use the forthcoming London 2012 Games and the associated work of a number of National Governing Bodies (NGBs) of sport as a case study to evaluate the current and emerging legacy plans and their ability to develop a legacy of sustainable sports development.

NGB/NGO involvement will initially require a member of senior management taking part in an interview with the researcher to discuss the organisation’s levels of engagement with the London 2012 legacy promises, their Whole Sport Plans (2009 – 13) and the emerging vision of how London 2012 might be used as a catalyst to support their plans up to and beyond 2012. Further work would then be carried out with identified NGBs and their delivery partners such as LAs and CSPs at regional/local level to investigate the processes used in delivering the plans and to conduct an evaluation of outcomes – what works for whom in which circumstances.

Participation in the research programme is entirely voluntary and you will have the option to withdraw from the research at any stage.

**Researcher: Kate Hughes**

Kate Hughes is a PhD scholar at Leeds Metropolitan University. Kate’s interest in this work is based on her practical involvement in legacy work and wanting to improve the transfer of knowledge from one event to another so that it might benefit the development of positive legacies (and in particular sport legacies).

Kate managed the Sport England Commonwealth Games 2002 Wider Opportunities Programme and co-managed the FA/Sport England Women’s Euro 2005 Legacy Programme. More recently she was Director of Podium, ‘The Further and Higher Education Unit for the 2012 Games’.

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**Further information**

If you have any questions, concerns or complaints regarding the research programme that you would like to follow up independently, please contact:

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Appendix C: Informed consent form

Leeds Metropolitan University – Carnegie Faculty of Sport and Education

CONSENT FORM

Title of project: Sports mega-events and creating a legacy of increased mass sport participation.

Researcher: Kate Hughes

Please read and initial each of the following statements to acknowledge your understanding and agreement to take part in the research project.

1: I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above research and have had the opportunity to ask questions.

2: I understand that my involvement with the research project will be anonymised.

3: I understand that I may request a copy of the transcript of the interview and asked to indicate any of the text that I would not wish to be used within the research project.

4: I understand that my participation in the project is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw from being involved with the research project at any time.

Name of participant:

Date: Signature:

Researcher:

Date: Signature:

Participant ID number:
Appendix D: Semi-structured interview - outlines

PhD research programme – Kate Hughes

Working Title: Sports mega-events and the potential to leave a legacy of sustainable sports development.

Timetable: July 09 – May 10

Subject areas for initial interviews with NGB senior management

1: NGB involvement (if any) in the development of the London 2012 bid

2: Initial response / actions of the NGB to London winning the bid

3: Discourse between the main legacy promoters (LOCOG / DCMS) and the NGB re the development of London 2012 legacy plans.
   - National level (Our Promise for 2012: How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games / Before, during and after; making the most of the London 2012 Games. DCMS 2007/8)
   - Regional level (Nations and Regions Group – regional strategies)

3a: On going involvement in legacy discussions – national and regional level. General feeling of engagement (or not) in 2012

4: How the aims of the NGB Whole Sport Plans (WSP) relate to the London 2012 legacy plans – specifically Promise 1: Make the UK a world leading sporting nation.

What impact did London 2012 have in the development of the 2009 – 13 WSP by the NGB?

5: Development of human and sporting capital
   - Current management/organizational structures
   - Plans underway or in discussion regarding any additional staff training and/or additional personnel required.
   - National level
   - Regional level
   - Community level

7: NGB evaluation procedures for WSP (and /or London 2012 legacy).
How will the NGB evaluate its contribution to a London 2012 sport legacy?
What will be the measures of ‘success’ for the NGB (this may lead into Qu 8)

8: Vision post 2012?
   - Physical legacy – sports structures
- Sporting legacy – knowledge and experience (including ability to attract other events)
- How does 2012 act as a platform to deliver NGB plans in the long term?

9: Next steps – who else to speak to – for example staff with specific 2012 remit (this may have already have come out of discussions)

Kate Hughes July 2009
PhD research programme – Kate Hughes

Working Title: Sports mega-events and the potential to leave a legacy of sustainable sports development.

Timetable: May 10 – Jan 11

Subject areas for initial interviews with senior management of NSOs/LOCOG/NGBs

1: Involvement (if any) in the development of the London 2012 bid

2: Initial response (personal and professional) to winning the bid

3: Involvement in discourse between the main legacy promoters (LOCOG / DCMS/Sport England/NGBs) re the development of London 2012 legacy plans.

- National level (Our Promise for 2012: How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games / Before, during and after; making the most of the London 2012 Games. DCMS 2007/8)

- Regional level (Nations and Regions Group – regional strategies)

- How will N&R continue without RDAs?

4: The Sport Legacy Board (Steve Redgrave et al)???????

5: Changes to legacy plans resulting from change of government?

6: Other legacy potential eg human and sporting capital

- National level
- Regional level
- Community level

7: Evaluation procedures for London 2012 legacy


Kate Hughes June 2010
PhD research programme – Kate Hughes

Working Title: Sports mega-events and the potential to leave a legacy of sustainable sports development.

Timetable: 10.10 – 1.11

Subject areas for interviews with development managers and project delivery teams.

1: Initial response (personal and professional) to London winning the bid to stage the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics.

2: Where has your knowledge of London 2012 come from? For example, TV, radio, newspaper, web, friends, work briefing.

   - Logistics – facilities/timelines/budget
   - Legacy – economic, sport

3a: (If applicable) When did the impact of London being host to 2012 start to be mentioned in your work schedule?
3b: Who do you work with on any London 2012 projects? Are you part of a dedicated London 2012 orientated team?

4: How do you feel (if at all), London 2012 impacts on the current work you are doing (in this case Sky Ride and Sky Ride Local)?

5: Do you find people talking about London 2012 when taking part in organised events such as Sky Ride?

6: How do you think the sporting landscape will have changed in 2013?

Thankyou

Kate Hughes October 2010