Center for Research and Dialogue

SOCIOECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF SOUTH-CENTRAL SOMALIA

DRAFT 1

May, 2004
Mogadishu, Somalia

Somalia
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GLOSSARY

All Somali names used in this document (including people and places) are given in Somali, except in direct quotations from texts or in textual references, where the original is given in the English version. The report follows the current practice in the United Nations documents and other reports by the International agencies operating in Somalia.

ACRONYMS

APD  Academy for Peace and Development
ACAS  Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia
CBF  Capacity Building Facility (UNDP)
COSONGO  Consortium of Somaliland Non-Government Organisations
COGWO  Coalition of Grassroots Women's Organisations
CRD  Centre for Research and Dialogue
EC  European Commission
EU  European Union
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS  Famine Early Warming System
FSAU  Food Security Assessment Unit
HIDI  Human Development Index
HDR  Human Development Report
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Authority
ICD  International Cooperation for Development
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IGAD  Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMC  International Medical Crops
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IRC  International Rescue Committee
MCH  Mother and Child Health
NETSON  Network for Somalia NGOs
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU  Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR  Office for the High Commission of Human Rights
PENHA  Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa
RRA  Rahanweyn Resistance Army
RVF  Rift Valley Fever
SACB  Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SCPP  Somali Civil Protection Programme (UNDP)
SNA  Somali National Alliance
SNM  Somali National Movement
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<th>Abbr.</th>
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<tr>
<td>SNPC</td>
<td>Somali National Peace Conference</td>
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<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement</td>
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<td>SRRC</td>
<td>Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council</td>
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<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
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<td>SYL</td>
<td>Somali Youth League</td>
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<td>TNA</td>
<td>Transitional National Assembly</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Transitional National Charter</td>
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<td>TNG</td>
<td>Transitional National Government</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<td>UNDOS</td>
<td>United Nations Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Centre for Human Settlement</td>
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<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Nations Task Force</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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<td>WSP</td>
<td>War-torn Societies Project</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A number of research studies have been undertaken to assess socio-economic conditions in Somalia. Most of these have focused on specific regions or specific sectors. As a result, there are no current, comprehensive surveys of social and economic trends in Somalia. This study addresses part of this research gap through an examination of economic, social, environmental and governance indicators in south-central Somalia.

South-central Somalia covers the area between the Indian Ocean and Ethiopia, running north to Puntland and south to Kenya. Within this area, there are 11 regions and 56 districts. The capital city of Muqdisho is located within this area's boundaries. The south-central region has felt the effects of the civil war more profoundly than other areas for a number of reasons. This region was the industrial and agricultural heartland of Somalia. Most manufacturing, trade, livestock and agricultural production were located in this area. Consequently, the most fully developed infrastructure and public services could be found here. Muqdisho was also the seat of government, which led to a concentration of tertiary services, such as communications and media, in the region. After the war, this area became a beacon for internally displaced people (IDPs), who hoped to find services in health, education and other social sectors. The militias and criminals were attracted to the south-central region for its riches – all the more to loot and pillage.

Although the south-central region was decimated by the civil war – its infrastructure was plundered and destroyed, public buildings were looted and razed, agricultural land was usurped and successful businesses became targets for bribes or takeovers – there is a visible economic revival underway. After 14 years of war and still without central governance, some Somalis are benefiting from this socio-economic transformation. The business of remittances (where Somalis outside the country send money back to relatives, as well as to invest in new economic activities), the development of the seaports, the participation of women in the economy, the modernization of the telecommunications sector, the growth of the transportation industry, the emergence of privately-funded educational institutions and continued foreign aid for development and humanitarian purposes have effectively contributed to the rebirth of south-central Somalia.

Yet this transformation has impacted the population and the environment adversely, as well. With the exception of social services provided by international agencies (charitable, non-profit or governmental), all social services must be paid for. This harms those who are already vulnerable and impoverished, as they can ill afford basic services, such as electricity, sanitation, health, housing and education. Moreover, some of the most lucrative export
commodities, such as seafood, female livestock, wood and charcoals, among others, seriously undermine the natural eco-system and environment of Somalia. Unregulated trade leads to the import and sale of goods which often do not meet basic quality standards. It has also contributed to the increased consumption of Qat and the proliferation of small arms in the region.

The security situation in Somalia is still tenuous and localized conflicts flare up regularly. The reconciliation process in Nairobi persists, but the Somali people are still without a government. Without a central authority to establish public services, maintain law and order, regulate economic interactions and set minimum standards for goods and services, the majority of the Somali population will continue to suffer, no matter how successful the few are at driving the economy.
INTRODUCTION

This study was commissioned as a complementary study to the Socio-Economic Survey of 2002, conducted under the rubric of the Somalia Watch Brief, a collaborative effort of the UNDP and World Bank. The present study commenced in November 2003, after the official launch of the Socio-Economic Survey 2002 document. This study aims to address the critical data needs required to establish a socio-economic database for the World Bank's re-engagement and reconstruction effort in Somalia. While the focus of the Socio-Economic Survey 2002 was to collect and compile a baseline demographic and socio-economic profile of the whole country, the present assessment focuses on the impacts of the civil war on various socio-economic sectors and recent developments in the south-central regions of Somalia. This study is primarily concerned with the south central region, which represents 11 of the 18 regions of the country and covers roughly 60-70 percent of the population of Somalia. This is the most expansive zone and has traditionally been the food provider for the whole country (UNDOS 1997).

The area known as south-central Somalia stretches from South Galkacayo down to Libooye, a border town between Kenya and Somalia. It is bounded by the Indian Ocean on the east, in the north by north Mudug of Puntland, by Kenya in the south and on the west by Ethiopia. It consists of 11 regions and 56 districts, excluding the Banadir region. South-central Somalia is the largest region of the country, endowed with fertile agricultural land intersected by two rivers. The water from these two rivers makes this region the most fertile of Somalia. In addition, the area accommodates a large number of livestock. The area is also thick with an impenetrable forest that is rich in natural resources.

The total population of Somalia is subject to several “guess–estimates” that are considerably varied. A number of UN agencies estimate the total population at about 7 million\(^1\). The Somalia Human Development Report of 2001 estimated the population of south-central Somalia at 5,000,000 people.\(^2\)

The south central regions can be divided into several zones with distinct topographical features:

\(^1\) UNDOS 1997 report estimated the Somali population at 7 million.


UNDOS, Taxation in Northeast Somalia, p.8, Nairobi, August 1997
• The Coastal Strip (*Deex*): This area is about 1235 km long and extends from Dinoda near Hobyo to Lamu, a Kenyan border town. The coast has rich marine resources, which are currently under-exploited by Somalis. Encroaching sand dunes are threatening the agricultural land, especially the Lower Shabelle region, and blocking the vital roads that link eastern Mudug and the Middle Shabelle regions.

• The Hinterland Zone: This region is found 20-35 km inland from the seashore and covers an immense area. The interior part of this region, which includes much of Middle Shabelle, Hiran, Galgadud and Mudug, is good for rearing livestock and rain-fed farming. Its pastureland, which yields high quality thorn-bushes, acacia trees and small bushes, is particularly suitable for grazing animals, such as camels and goats.

• The Riverine Area: This region is characterized by rich arable land, *dhoobooy or adable*, along the riverbanks, which provides the majority of agricultural products for the country.

In the south-central region, there are very complex, underlying political issues that arise out of the legacy of historical dynasties and cause trans-generational conflict, prejudice and mistrust among the local people. The misuse and abuse of power by subsequent authorities, both colonial and independent state governments, has further aggravated the situation.

Post-independence Somali governments have subjugated the people’s rights to development in this region through the misappropriation of property and the application of state-sponsored violence. As a result, these regions became breeding sites for armed rebel groups and popular uprisings, which later developed into struggles based on clan politics.

The prevailing anarchy in many parts of south-central Somalia threatens the region’s potential to be a source of rich economic resources and activities. The current unregulated informal and war economy undermines the planning and prioritization of future recovery and reconstruction programs in the region.

This study attempts to assess the current socio-economic situation in south-central Somalia. It also undertakes to analyze the impact of the civil war on the social and economic sectors of the region. Chapter One outlines the methodology adopted for this research, providing an overview of the challenges faced during the data collection process, given the difficulty in obtaining relevant and contemporary secondary data.

Chapter Two discusses the population and demographic characteristics of Somalia in general, and the south-central region, in particular. It examines the demographic shifts that have resulted from the civil war. Existing and available
demographic data is reviewed by examining the population distribution, population density and access to resources in the region. Finally, chapter looks into the movement of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs) within south-central Somalia.

Chapter Three addresses the status of governance and security in the various regions. This chapter reveals the challenges facing the Somali people in their attempt to re-establish governance structures, type of governances in region. The chapter also looks into the phenomenon of factionalism and its link to the renewal of localized conflicts and the absence of a governance structure in south-central Somalia. The emergence of Islamic authorities and their impact on local security across the region is also dealt with in this chapter. Finally, the multi-dimensional governance challenges in south-central Somalia are presented.

Chapter Four discusses the extent of economic activities in the region, with special reference to the business dynamic that has evolved over the 14 years of civil war. This chapter also assesses the current productive capacities of various sectors, including agriculture, livestock and the service industry. It also explores how employment and socio-economic conditions were transformed during the civil war. The “double-edged sword” of remittances, a life-line and source of capital for many people which, on the other hand, contributes indirectly to local war economy is examined. An exploration of the impact of Qat consumption is also included in this chapter.

Chapter Five discusses employment and the socio-economic transformation in the region by examining new income sources and employment opportunities. The new income structure that has emerged in south-central Somalia, including the formation of a new socio-economic class and the role women have played in the socio-economic transformation are also explored. Changes in income distribution and the emergence of new income groups form part of this chapter. Four distinct income groups are identified: 1) those below the poverty-line; 2) border-line income groups; 3) middling to high income groups and 4) very high income earners.

Chapter Six focuses on the environment and natural resources, examining the availability of and access to natural resources such as water and energy. Prevailing environmental problems in the region are surveyed in this chapter, as well.

Chapter Seven focuses on the provision of social services. Prior to the civil war, services such as healthcare, education, potable water and sanitation were all provided by the state. In many parts of south-central Somalia, these services are either completely lacking or are provided by private enterprises or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The impact of informal social service
provision on the availability of health care and the quality of those services delivered is also addressed. This chapter examines the discrepancy between the data collected by international agencies and the realities on the ground. It also surveys the new higher learning institutions which have been established in Mogadishu. The pandemic of HIV/AIDS in south-central Somalia is also considered in this chapter.

Chapter Eight reviews the state of physical infrastructure, transportation and roads, the telecommunications sector and its links to remittances, the export activities of the “Ceel-macaar”, a natural seaport and the success of private airline services and airports. All of these are examined for their impact on the socio-economic situation of the region. The introduction of a new mass-media and its effects on society are also discussed.

Finally, Chapter Nine looks into the cross-cutting issues that effect the socio-economic status of the region both negatively and positively. Themes addressed include the militarization of the region, the proliferation of weapons and arms trade in the region, human rights issues in the region and the production and consumption of drugs, such as hashish. The chapter ends with an exploration of trade activities, particularly the import of uncertified or expired products and on the consequences for the population, particularly the most vulnerable - women, elderly and children.
CHAPTER ONE

1. Methodology

1.1 Overview

To conduct a thorough and comprehensive socio-economic study without baseline data or reliable information is a daunting task. More so, if such an assessment is to cover a theme as broad as the socio-economic structures of a society that has had no functioning central authority for over a decade. During the process of conducting this assessment in south-central Somalia, a number of difficulties were encountered, especially in the design of questionnaires, the data collection itself, the travel to the regions and finding skilled enumerators to carry out the survey. The challenges inherent in studying the social and economic dynamics of Somalia resulted in a unique case study methodology. Even to construct a suitable methodological approach for such a particular situation is in itself a risky research venture.

Since the collapse of the state in Somalia, numerous institutions have attempted to collect research data focused on specific regions and specific sectors, but a comprehensive socio-economic assessment has not been undertaken, largely due to the lack of adequate security, the inaccessibility of regions and the overall absence of a national authority to coordinate such research collection. Much of the available and widely quoted data is either too old or is too unreliable for a contemporary assessment. Given the dearth of reliable data, researchers have preferred to employ qualitative methodologies. In this report, primary data sources were collected, in addition to qualitative research methods. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies have their place, when appropriately used, however, when observation or anthropological methods are used to estimate technical variables such as the rate of population growth or per capita incomes, the boundaries of qualitative research are pushed a little too far. In order to enhance its reliability, this report used a three-tiered approach to collect data—1) a review of existing secondary data, 2) survey tools and 3) interviews/focus groups.

This study presents a situational analysis of all sectors of the south-central Somalia economy as of December 2003. Data was compiled during the months of January and February 2004 by the Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD) – an affiliate of WSP International, which is based in Geneva, Switzerland.

1.2 Data Collection in Somalia- A Historical Overview

Systematic data collection and management in Somalia has not been well-developed under the previous administration. Prior to the government’s collapse
in 1991, the Ministry of National Planning and the Ministry of Information and National Guidance regularly published bulletins and assembled a national data bank on socio-economic sectors. From 1991 to date, much of the responsibility for data collection has been assumed by the UN and other international aid agencies and private institutions, on an ad hoc basis. This has created a situation where conflicting data sources are more common than not.

Some of the reports commissioned by international agencies addressed specific objectives and needs, such as country planning and environment assessments. Other studies provided background information for programmes or evaluated programmes that had already been implemented. These studies responded to the operational needs of the user organizations, most of which did not reach beyond the localities served by the various organizations. Data from such studies have severely limited applicability due to the use of unscientific sample frames or an over-reliance on self-selected respondents, who often are motivated by self-interest. One of the significant challenges for these organizations has been to recruit skilled and reliable enumerators for data collection. Often, they have fallen victim to groups willing to gather information whose ultimate objectives are to generate resources for themselves.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP), through the United Nations Development Organization in Somalia (UNDOS), initiated several Sectoral studies that were undertaken by either contracted consultants or its own contacts within the country. These studies profile topical issues and establish some form of a database, which provides a snapshot of information on various subjects. This data offers useful bibliographic information and forms a good starting point for researchers and aid agencies, however, it is limited by its narrow focus from providing much value to a national development strategy. Most of the secondary data used in these studies dates back to the late 1980s or early 90s. The current Watch Briefing programmes of the World Bank and the UNDP fill the data gap only in selected regions of Somalia.

The last known population census, for example, was conducted in 1986. It is widely agreed that the data then collected was unreliable due to claims that the results were doctored to suit the military government’s political strategy. According to these claims, data for certain regions was inflated, while other regional data was understated. However, the figures of the 1986 census seem to form the basis for many present estimates of demographic characteristics. This data has been projected and extrapolated by many agencies over the years, and those extrapolations have now acquired a life of their own. Given the limitations and lack of resources available to collect raw data, this report is obliged to use existing data, despite its shortcomings.
In this assessment, we make no attempt to estimate the current gross domestic product (GDP), gross national product (GNP) or the country’s balance of trade with any precision. The country has a nearly 100% open economy, with free entry and exit to external markets and people, with substantial unrecorded cross-border trade and with a large informal service sector. Consequently, this study’s data is only indicative of some of the basic trends, and not a definitive report on the country’s socio-economic situation.

1.3 Challenges and Data Limitations

Taking into consideration the difficulties in acquiring reliable raw data, the Centre for Research and Dialogue (CRD) held brainstorming sessions with a number of local professional groups, such as intellectual women’s groups, personnel from health and education institutions and new industrialist groups, to gather information pertaining to data collection. During these sessions, participants were first briefed on the objectives of the report. They were then asked to provide information, suggestions and assistance in the information gathering stage. They assisted the enumerators tasked with collecting data from various remote areas in south-central Somalia by using their extensive networks to provide contacts in these areas. Participants were assured that their contributions and inputs would not be used against them, a fear frequently expressed by those invited to the sessions.

The data collection exercise met with a number of challenges. The most difficult was to obtain relevant, up to date information on the south central regions of the country. The focus of most recent studies/surveys has been the capital city, Muqdisho, and the Middle Shabelle, Bay and Bakool regions. These studies mainly addressed humanitarian issues, governance and security. Data on economic production is largely limited to agriculture and food security, most of which is regularly collected by the EU and FEWS Somalia. Many other social sectors have not received much attention. The other difficulties that affect the accuracy of data collection include inaccuracies in data reporting; the impact of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the U.S.; demands for payment in exchange for information; fears around disclosing information and a limited sample. These are discussed below.

Inaccuracies in Data Reporting: There are high expectations among the population whenever researchers visit. Much of the population believes that the purposes of such visits are to generate additional aid. As a result, respondents tend to exaggerate their needs. For example, in 14 out of 27 refugee camps visited in Muqdisho, interview respondents provided inaccurate information on the size of their households, the availability of water within the camp or their employment status.
Because official support for these camps has been either discontinued or suspended, our researchers anticipated that internally displaced persons (IDPs) would operate under the assumption that greater reported needs would result in greater aid to the camps. During their data collection process, enumerators were warned about possible exaggerations. To reduce the margin of error in their analyses, the team complemented their research with additional interviews, focus group meetings, as well as observation and one-on-one interviews with experts.

Inaccurate reporting was also evident in the other direction. Some institutions visited, such as schools and hospitals, were very keen to show the researchers their records of success and achievement in the absence of government regulatory bodies. These respondents also exaggerated their data, however, unlike the IDP population; they reported achievements greater than what was actually accomplished. A major challenge presented by this phenomenon was how to accurately filter the data provided by this category.

**Impact of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the U.S.:** When researchers and enumerators visited remittance companies, they frequently declined to disclose information about their assets, the volumes of money transferred, the number of recipients and their number of employees. It is believed that their refusal to participate was linked to the fear of being vulnerable to external interference. There were concerns that their companies might be targeted as terrorist and shut down outside of Somalia. High level institutional influence was exercised by CRD in order to collect the greatest amount of data possible for this sector. In addition, this study uses the available data supplied by the UNDP’s report on the remittance industry.

**Demands for Payment in Exchange for Information:** On many occasions while collecting information, some institutions and/or individuals demanded resources in exchange for the information they provided. This was the case, for instance, during data collection on the volume of fishing and the import/export volume of commodities entering the seaport of “Ceel-macaar”. In order to obtain up to date information, small incentives were provided to the registry clerks and enumerators assigned to validate the data.

**Fears around Disclosing Information and Confidence-building:** An equally important challenge faced in conducting the research was the need for confidence-building among those individuals and communities surveyed. Some of the respondents struggled to understand the concept of research and, consequently, their responses may have been misleading. Many other respondents showed little interest in the study itself and had no desire to participate in providing information. Other respondents were afraid to exchange information with strangers, particularly given security risks in the region.
A Limited Sample Selection: Collecting samples from the selected sectors was very difficult due to a number of reasons, such as time constraints in undertaking the research; the lack of accessibility to specific regions; the state of insecurity and problems with logistics. A random selection process, representative of regions, was adopted. Enumerators visited the major urban centers throughout south-central Somalia. In some of the districts, enumerators relied upon people from CRD to network with people and communities in the more inaccessible districts.

1.4 Questionnaire Design

Given the main objectives of the assessment and the availability of several publications on some of the sectors, a three-tier approach was used to collect data. Stage One involved reviewing the available secondary data on the subject, Stage two entails survey tools and Stage Three was composed of interviews/focus group discussions as well as open-forum.

During focus group discussions, special consideration was given to the course of events in Somalia over the last 14 years. Several important issues that would affect the research were highlighted during these dialogues. Due to the constraints identified earlier, it became apparent that using the traditional method of surveying and tallying responses would not likely yield reliable data for this report.

Given time constraints, frames for each sector were selected from available secondary data. Simple questionnaires were developed under different headings, depending upon the sector studied. Each questionnaire targeted a specific sector of the economy and included a checklist of areas requiring in-depth interviews. To ensure its proper design, sample respondents from the communities and organizations were consulted. Focus sectors addressed included hospitals, schools, remittance companies, IDPs, households, manufacturing businesses, construction companies, import-export groups, telecommunications, broadcasting organizations, and governance and security structures in various regions. One-on-one interviews for selected individuals, such as administrative officials of various regions, leaders of NGOs and civil society groups, leaders of professional organizations and women’s groups, were also carried out. These specialized interviews provided the researchers and enumerators with an in-depth analysis of the sectors represented.

Prior to actual data collection, the enumerators received 5 days of intensive training in the significance of survey tools, the objectives of the data collection exercise and appropriate ways to conduct the survey. A special emphasis was placed on how enumerators establish a good rapport with respondents, as some of the questions asked were very sensitive. In there sessions, participants were
offered the opportunity to review and comment on the relevance of the questions contained in the questionnaire and their input was incorporated into the final format of the questionnaire. After training, the enumerators carried out 3 days of field-testing in various sectors with distinct target groups. A total of 50 field-testing samples were collected in Muqdisho. The outcome of the field-testing was positive in that the questions served their purpose and the feedback of the enumerators was incorporated into the final questionnaires.

The data collection process included a total of 42 people, including the project coordinator, enumerators, administrative support, consultants, security staff, a data-input clerk and resource persons.
CHAPTER TWO

2. Population and Demography

2.1 Demographic Trends

Estimates of the total population in Somalia have always been complicated by the unequal distribution of national resources, clan hegemony, population movement, and national politics. Compounding the difficulty of estimating the population in a country such as Somalia, is the mass movement of the population due to the nomadic life style of the majority and the periodic movements of large numbers of people from one country to another.

The nomadic life-style of the Somali people consists of regular population movements to secure new grazing lands and ongoing inter-clan conflicts, as a result of land encroachment. Somali ethnic groupings which involve one set of people along the border between Somalia and Ethiopia, on the one hand, and another group near to the Somalia-Kenya border, on the other, further complicates the exercise of estimating population numbers. The state has often inflated population estimates for political reasons, sometimes to incite conflict between clans. In addition, humanitarian aid programmes have encouraged a strong tendency on the part of local authorities to exaggerate population figures, anticipating that higher numbers will yield greater levels of assistance. A combination of all these factors renders nearly impossible the task of estimating the population.

UNDOS undertook a review of the various population estimates in 1995 and determined that the population was 5.5 million. During the last few years, estimates for the Somali population that have been based on reviews of and extrapolation from previous data have been as high as 8.2 and 8.9 million in 1992. These estimates were based on the 1985 government census that claimed a population of 6.4 million (itself widely disputed) and the 1997 population of Somalia was estimate 6.6 million (based on extrapolations of data from various sources, mainly by UNDOS and UNFPA).

The official rate of population growth was also equally confusing, according to the previous government sources, in 1995, the population growth rate was 4.6 percent, but later estimates project a much lower annual growth rate of 2.75

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percent\(^5\). This lower figure is often used by UN agencies to determine population figures for the purpose of food aid budgeting. Further extrapolations have found the population to be roughly 6.38 million in 2001\(^6\) at an annual growth of 2.7\% Based on the available figures from UNDOS and UNDP. The population of south-central Somalia is estimated to be 60-70\% of the total population of the entire country (UNDOS 1997).

The immense difficulties in obtaining accurate data for population estimates notwithstanding, there are two additional factors which are often exaggerated or downplayed by various organisations. Firstly, the civil war is believed to have substantially reduced the population of Somalia, mainly through mortality or migration, and secondly, it is believed that the rate of population growth has dropped from 4.6\% in 1985 to 2.76\% in 1997 because of high mortality rates, combined with a low number of births.

According to FEWS\(^7\) data from household surveys does not support these perceptions. Information on the size of households indicates an average family size of 6 children per family in most of the regions where household surveys have been collected\(^7\). The number of children per women in these surveys ought to indicate a more enhanced rate of population growth, and subsequently, a larger total population. Displaced families in refugee camps in Muqdishu that were interviewed for this study report, indicated that an average household size is nine, including parents.

Secondly, the estimated number of deaths from the civil war ranges from between 40,000 to 50,000\(^8\). Those believed to have migrated to neighbouring countries as refugees are estimated at between 250,000 to 300,000. Given that some of these refugees have come back to the country since 1997, the population of Somalia cannot be considered to have substantially reduced.

A correct estimate of the population is perhaps somewhere between the UNDP report of 2002 (at 6.8 Million) and 7.8 million, as has been estimated for this study. The population information collected in this study has come from regional authorities and aid agencies in the regions.

\(^5\) UNDP, Human Development Report, 1997 – You need to be consistent in your citations – pick one style and use it consistently throughout the paper.

\(^6\) Ibid

\(^7\) SAU 2001-2002, Focus bulletins, Nairobi

\(^8\) UNDP, Human Development Report, 1998
Disaggregated data that shows the proportion of the population living in urban or rural communities, or those who lead a nomadic lifestyle is even more difficult to find. Some disaggregated data is available from the Socio-Economic Survey 2002, however, the publication does not elude to the source of its information and is based on the lower population estimate of 6.8 million for the entire country. The publication estimates that 34% population is urban and 66% is either rural or nomadic, with ‘normal’ age structures illustrated in the figure below:

**Figure 2: Population Distribution by Age and Sex**

![Bar chart showing population distribution by age and sex](chart.png)


As illustrated above, the male population is substantially larger across the age group of 0-17 years, but begins to decline from 22-42 years, before rising again from 43 to 80 years. This cannot be definitively interpreted; however, it clearly reveals which age groups have been most and least affected by the civil war. Males between 22 and 42 years of age are commonly known to be most active in civil wars and, consequently, are predisposed to be killed in the fighting. Conversely, the number of women in the age group of 23-37 years is substantially greater than men from the same grouping. These are the ages when most women have children and raise them. The fact that the female population rises above of the male population in this age group (23 to 37) demonstrates that death due to war was less common among adult women.
2.2 Population Density

Regional demographic information is scarce. There are various estimates of population density, however, few of these estimates are accepted by all aid agencies or existing Somali authorities. Most estimates do not fully account for internal displacement. Recently, the populations of Muqdisho and the northeast have increased, while populations in the south and some parts of the central zone have decreased.

Map 2: Population Density in the Country

Population density for the country as a whole is less than 10 persons per km$^2$. If the urban population were excluded (about 35%), the overall rural population density would be about 7 persons/km$^2$. Less than five persons/km$^2$ is found in the low-rainfall, nomadic areas. (UNDP 1998).

The Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) 1997 estimate of regional distribution, as shown on the adjacent map, is still fairly valid. Since the establishment of regional administration in Puntland, leading to relative stability, the population density of Bari and Sanag have marginally increased, especially around the cities of Garowe and Bosaso. The mostly densely populated regions are the farming areas of Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle, as well as Muqdisho, the capital city.

Source: FAO/GIEWS, 2000

2.3 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Since the civil war, the dynamics of internal displacement in Somalia have become very complex. The number of IDPs reported to be living in camps is

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10 During CRD research team’s tour to various cities and towns in the central region, we were pleasantly surprised at the concrete instances of peace and stability that had been negotiated by community consensus and maintained through continuous reconciliation efforts on the part of traditional leaders.
estimated at about 300,000 people (270,000 in Mogadishu and 30,000 displaced in the rural farming areas of Lower Shabelle and Juba). Another complication for reporting IDPs in Somalia is the fact that there are displaced people who cannot be found in camps. These groups are often ignored by surveys carried out, both intentionally and unintentionally. This survey refers to them as ‘Voluntary IDPs’ and their number is very difficult to estimate. The current study discovered that 40% of Muqdisho residents do not live in the houses (homes) they occupied prior to the war. This group of ‘Voluntary IDPs’ do not usually consider themselves IDPs because they are in make-shift residences. Most of them occupy public property such as former colleges, schools, ministries and military compounds. The majority of these people are political IDPs who have come from the central regions of Somalia.

Another group of IDPs worthy of mention are the economic migrants affected by the twin horrors of wars and drought. These people most often come from the rural areas of southwest Somalia (Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakool). They are the most vulnerable of all IDP groups since they do not have clans to protect them from the armed militia or habitual criminals.
CHAPTER THREE

3. Governance and Security

3.1 Background

The violent overthrow of the military regime in 1991, leading to the collapse of the Somali government and a decade long civil war, has left Somalia in a rather unique situation - it is the most enduring example of state collapse in the modern era. A solution to this crisis has been impeded by the legacy of corrupt and abusive political leadership, the emergence of entrenched political and commercial “conflict constituencies”, the interference of regional powers and the neglect of the broader international community. Continued armed confrontations, fierce political rivalry and intense competition for meagre resources in many parts of the country over such a long period of time have contributed to the anarchy found in Somalia, particularly in the south-central regions.

With no political settlement between the various political actors and faction leaders, there is no property functioning authorities. There are, however, de facto governing structures in some parts of south-central Somalia, such as the Middle Shabelle regional administration, the Juba Valley Alliance in the Lower Juba region and the Transitional National Government of Somalia (TNG) in Mogadishu and some parts of Lower Shabelle.

There is relative peace and security most of the major urban area across the South-Central Somalia. The grievances that motivated the original inter-clan wars have subsided considerably and been replaced with localized political interests. Some faction-led conflicts continue to dominate the political discourse in south-central Somalia. In Mq菩提, the epicentre of Somalia’s crises, clashes between various political actors, especially the warlords and the TNG, have decreased. This has allowed people and their businesses free movement, encouraging economic integration between different communities at cross-clan levels. The de-escalation of violence in some parts of south-central Somalia, which in the past hampered access to essential services, has improved security considerably. While large scale violence no longer plagues the region, people in south-central Somalia suffer from poverty, a lack of food security, a lack of public institutions to facilitate commerce and trade, as well as general insecurity.

Despite the occurrence of sporadic violence in some of the major cities in south-central Somalia, many areas of the region are largely peaceful. The social reconciliation efforts of community elders in Hiiran, Galguduud and parts of Mudug have provided relative security to people. This has enabled the clans in these regions to live together using traditional, non-violent mechanisms to resolve their disputes, despite the absence of accepted administrative structures.
The international community has largely ignored this fragile peace, instead continuing to isolate these regions, along with the other conflict areas of the south.\textsuperscript{11}

In south-central Somalia, which has a much more heterogeneous clan population, security still remains a major problem and, unlike the northern parts of the country, widely accepted clan-based governance has not taken strong root. The inability to establish legitimate governance structures has contributed to current prevalent insecurity.\textsuperscript{13}

This situation of confused governance structures has been further exacerbated by the legacy of the United Nations Operation for Somalia (UNOSOM II). In 1993, regional administrative structures were established in some areas, without the consent of local people or the armed faction leaders. Some of the governance structures set up by UNOSOM II are currently contested by district commissioners who have been appointed through traditional leadership mechanisms and commissioners who have been put forward by armed faction leaders.

3.2 Rule of Law

The UN mission has had a negative impact on political dynamics on the ground, inhibiting the attainment of a positive solution to the protracted political crisis in south-central Somalia, especially in the areas of security and governance. The UNOSOM II institution-building effort that was intended to provide assistance to local governance structures, such as district and regional councils and the establishment of judicial structures and a police force, never gained the support of faction leaders and has subsequently failed.

Another negative legacy from the mission has been the emergence of new factionalism. Upon the arrival of the US-led, UN multinational force, only two major political factions existed in south-central Somalia. By the time the UN withdrew from Muqdisho, the two major factions had splintered into multiple groups with alliances across south-central Somalia. One of the main reasons that

\textsuperscript{11} The lack of visible signs and tangible services of the international non-governmental and local organizations in the remote towns and villages of the Central Region is obvious to visitors. There were few international NGOs working in these regions at the time of the CRD research field trip. Given the higher level of security and relative peace in many of these areas, community leaders wondered about “the reasons for the overt embargo” on the part of the international organizations. Nevertheless, the few organizations that found the courage and commitment to work in these communities have made a tremendous impact on the lives of the people in these areas. CRD researchers visited community hospitals and schools run by European NGOs that have become a rallying point for community pride and collaboration.
armed factions were able to multiply is because armed groups were given status in the political debates organized by the UN on Somalia. Whether or not it was intended to deliberately undermine certain political actors in Somalia, the empowerment of junior militia commanders occurred at the expense of the main political leaders, resulting in the recognition of these junior commanders as separate political identities. This produced inflated political demands by numerous warlords, further complicating any possible success toward achieving sustainable governance, law and order to the people of south-central Somalia.

The current rule of law, if it can even be considered to exist, is provided by three distinct authorities: the de facto regional administrations; the Islamic Shari’a courts.

**The de facto regional administrations:** Areas where some form of regional administration exists enjoy relative security, although the culture of impunity for war crimes has extended itself to many leaders of these de facto administrative bodies. For example, part of the Middle Shabeelle region under the control of Governor Mohamed Habeeb (Mohamed Dheere) enjoys relative security and most international NGOs operate in the region peacefully. Similarly, the Juba Valley is controlled by a coalition of the TNG and the former Somali National Front (SNF), under the control of Colonel Barre Hiraale, in what is now called the Juba Valley alliance. Both these regions have no formal police force or any other judicial structure in place. Moreover, the TNG has established a number of as yet unrecognized district commissioners and regional governors with neither local, nor national, support. There is, however, a mobile militia that operates under the banner of the TNG to prevent crime in the Lower Shabelle region.

In Bay and Bakool, the Raxan Weyn Resistance Army (RRA), before it split into three factions, established a de facto security structure, although it had no clearly defined responsibilities. In July 2002, these same structures that had provided a degree of security were destroyed by the devastating internal Raxan Weyne armed conflict. This has led to the current situation of lawlessness that reigns across the region. In some parts of Bay and Bakool, particularly in Tieglow, Hoddour and Dinsoor, security is provided through a combination of traditional authority rule, coupled with some factions from the split RRA.

Hiiraan, Mudug and Galguduud, unlike other regions, enjoy relative security that is supplied by local traditional authorities. In Gedo region, the security situation in the region is adequately improving with the support of the local traditional authorities.

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14 Late last year (2003), an inter-clan armed conflict erupted in parts of central Somalia. In Heraale, for instance, the Mareexaan and Dir clans fought over access to resources. Also, in “Ceel-buur”, similar inter-clan clashes took place. All these armed inter-clan conflicts were contained by traditional authorities who intervened.
authorities in cooperation with some of the armed political factions specially the SNF/SRRC led by Mohamed Sayid.

**Islamic Sharia Law:** Prominent Islamic clerics in south-central Somalia have attempted to establish “Islamic Sharia Courts”, with plans to incorporate the Islamic judicial system into any future Somali government. There have been both positive and negative sentiments expressed about the “Islamic Sharia Courts”. There is disagreement between the Islamic clerics and members of civil society over whether it is more appropriate to adopt secular laws or “Islamic sharia” in future governance structures of the region.

Following the departure of UNOSOM II on May 5, 1995, the first Islamic Sharia court was established in north Muqdisho, later spreading to other parts of Muqdisho, Gedo region, Lower Juba, Lower and Middle Shabeelle and Hiiraan. Most of the Islamic Sharia courts did not last long; however, some of them were very effective at addressing problems of crime and security in their respective areas. Some Sharia courts have re-established the judicial organs of the state, successfully reducing the scale of crime and bringing back relative security in many parts of the region. The judges of these courts are composed of respected traditional religious leaders or come from the pool of new, more fundamentalist Islamic clerics. Some Sharia authorities perform policing and penal functions as seen in north Muqdisho.

There are currently four Sharia courts operating in different parts of Muqdisho. Other Islamic courts operate in other towns in south central Somalia. The oldest and the most active of these Islamic courts are the Hararyaale Islamic court and the Ifka Halan Islamic court. These two courts have been operational since mid 1990, while the last one, the Towfiq Islamic court, was officially launched in November 2003 in north Muqdisho. To avoid confusion and enhance cooperation, the courts formed an umbrella organization, which defines the jurisdiction of each court and outlines methods for working together.

The relationship between the Sharia courts and political/faction leaders is intriguing. On the one hand, there is a marriage of convenience between the two because the political faction leaders wish to avoid the public perception that they are against the Islamic faith. On the other hand, cooperation is limited to specific areas. For example, the active political faction leaders in north Muqdisho


16 Mark Huban, who has written extensively on the impact of Islamic Sharia courts in Somalia, argues that the core of social order for Islamic Sharia lies in the law. The conduct of Sharia courts, for example, reflects the imposition of law over the appeal to religion. In the areas of Somalia where the Sharia is not applied, the element of deterrence in the law is absent and legal structures rely upon internal clan discipline, which has largely collapsed. – The first two sentences are a little unclear – could you make them more meaningful?
officially participated in the inauguration of the Towfiq Islamic Sharia court. The TNG has not only participated in the establishment of some of the Islamic Sharia courts, but also works and cooperates with them through establishment of a joint police forces.

**Hararyaale Islamic Court (An Interview with a Judge)**

The Hararyaale Islamic court was established in January 1995 to fill the vacuum of maintaining law and order which disappeared immediately after the United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operation left Somalia. Since its establishment, the court has succeeded in psychologically rehabilitating about 1,200 inmates who were criminals, drug addicts and those guilty of other criminal offences. Out of the 1,200, 895 were male and 264 female. The court also succeeded in psychologically rehabilitating 50 youngsters who had been brought in by their parents from abroad.

While in detention, inmates are given rigorous physical, mental, civic and religious training. Among the subjects introduced to inmates are Islamic teaching and civic education, simple arithmetic, and the English and Somali languages. The success rate in rehabilitating these former criminals is, according to an Islamic cleric in the court, more than 80%. The cost of imprisoning these people is carried by their families, donations from the public and the people who brought them to the court, according to the Head of Hararyaale Islamic court.

In terms of governance, there are three different structures that boast varying degrees of effectiveness and acceptance found in the south central regions of Somalia. These are the UNOSOM II appointed administrations; the de facto regional administrations established by political faction leaders; and traditional authorities.

**UNOSOM II:** UNOSOM II initiated a process of grassroots political development in the region. In line with the UN Security Council Resolution 814 (1993), UNOSOM II appointed district and regional councils throughout south-central Somalia. UNOSOM II also made an attempt to re-establish the justice sector, composed of a judicial, police and penal system. Instead of consulting and gaining “buy-in” from existing political faction leaders, UNOSOM II appointed an entirely new political structure that was not supported by the armed political faction leaders. In some of the regions of south-central Somalia, political structures are still contested by the armed faction leaders. Examples can be seen...
in most of the districts in the *Hiiraan* region (*Beled Weyne* and *Buulo-burte*), in the *Galguduud* region and in parts of *Mudug*.

### 3.3 Regional Administrations

Various political factions and militia leaders have established a number of administration structures in the region. Part of the Middle Shabeelle region is under the control of Governor Mohamed Habeeb (Mohamed Dheere) while Lower Juba region falls under Juba Valley Alliance leadership. The Transitional National Government (TNG) made an attempt to establish regional and district administrations in selected regions. None the administrative structures established by the TNG have effectively functioned or delivered services required by the public. In some districts, a number of appointees still have a seat in administration nominally, although they have no function whatsoever. However, in many parts of Muqdisho, the TNG has succeeded in providing security, where the police force has remained loyal to the TNG.

### 3.4 Traditional Authority

Finally, the third type of authority found in the region is traditional authority which operates mainly at the district level in most regions of south-central Somalia. The basic services that are provided by this authority include security, crime prevention, mediation and reconciliation between warring clans through the exercise of their moral authority. In many ways, the traditional authorities have helped both local and international actors deliver services in their districts. For example, in the *Wajid* district of the *Bakool* region, along with the help of a number of international aid agencies, traditional authorities established a reconciliation process at the regional level which brought together the *RRA* warring groups to discuss the issues affecting the lives of the people in *Bay* and *Bakool*.

In general, the majority of districts receive limited social services, such as education, health services, water and electricity. The major urban centers, with the exception of *Baydhabo* in the *Bay* region and *Huddour* of the *Bakool* region, have access to limited social service delivery. The lack of legitimate regional authorities has prevented local and external investment strategies from being effective.

### 4.5 Multi-Dimensional Governance Challenges in the South Central Region

The governance challenges of south-central Somalia are multi-faceted, complex and involve different actors at the local, regional and international levels. This
region has been the scene of complex political and military dynamics fuelled from outside. This continues to be the case today.

Some of the armed political faction leaders are allied with and supported by some neighbouring countries. Most of the armed faction leaders have no clear political agenda. Since the evacuation of the US-led multinational forces, there has been a constant shifting in political alliances among the armed groups in south-central Somalia. The contestation of political space has contributed to the inability of local actors to establish legitimate governance structures. Another contributing factor has resulted from the competition over resources between those involved in the war-economy and the armed factions in the region.

The proliferation of weapons in south-central Somalia is no small contributing factor to the chronic instability of the region which has impeded the establishment of governance structures. Neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Eritrea and Libya, disperse weapons into the region for political reasons, while those profiting from the war-economy pour weapons into Somalia for economic reasons.
CHAPTER FOUR

4. Economic Activities

4.1 Dynamics and Trends

The collapse of central authority in 1991 and the prolonged civil war have engendered a decade-long recession with profound impacts on all sectors of the Somali economy. The destruction of both social institutions and physical infrastructure during the war, compounded by recurrent droughts and food insecurity in most parts of south-central Somalia, have led to a serious socio-economic crisis that has made Somalia one of the poorest countries in the world.

Despite the evident challenges placed on an economy that has been through civil war and exists in the absence of a central government, economic activities have proceeded in most parts of Somalia with considerable resilience. The growth of the private sector and free market economy has arguably been stronger during the last 8 years than at any time in Somalia’s history. Besides the export of live animals to the Gulf States, two new and vibrant sectors have emerged as engines of the current Somali economy - the extensive and still growing remittance sector and the competitively-priced telecommunications sector. Together with the Somali people’s entrepreneurial acumen and remarkable resilience to hardship, a wholly informal, yet nonetheless vibrant, economy is emerging out of the vestiges of the 14-year civil war.

In regions of relative stability and security, the private sector is flourishing in the areas of commerce, construction, telecommunications and other social services. The private sector now provides a host of services, including those traditionally provided by the state, such as education, water, health and sanitation. The bottlenecks to further expansion of the economy include the insecurity still prevalent in some parts of south-central Somalia, very low disposable incomes, limited investment capital and the lack of skilled labour in various sectors.

4.2 Extent of Trade and Commerce

Somalia’s economic sectors vary significantly in terms of development, size and growth. Traditionally, the economy was heavily dependent upon livestock and agriculture. It is estimated that livestock alone accounted for up to 40 percent of the GDP and 65 percent of export earnings (WFP, 2000). Bananas were the main agricultural export crop. Since 2001, both crop and animal exports have suffered the crippling effects of food aid, which has distorted Somalia’s commercial markets and constricted local agricultural production, and the recurring ban on livestock exports to the Gulf States.
The economy has also been subject to the inflationary impact of new local currencies, which have been injected into the local market by private individuals and warlords from time to time over the past 14 years. The supply of local currencies is estimated to be growing at between 25-40% per year. In June 1998, for example, it was alleged that an estimated U.S. $4 million worth of Somali currency entered the economy. This caused a 30-35 percent depreciation of the Somali shilling within a short period of time (UNDP 1998). In September 2000, a clique of businessmen allied with the TNG imported 30 billion Somali shillings that had been printed in Canada. Within a year, the value of the Somali shilling plummeted over 250%, from Sh.So. 9,000.00, against 1 US Dollar in September 2000 to Sh.So. 22,000.00 in September 2001.

Flooding the Somali market with this fake money had multiple effects, both negative and positive, on the economy and public confidence. On a positive note, it furnished a badly needed supply of new banknotes to replace the twenty year old notes. This facilitated the expansion of local trade. A negative aspect of this supply was that it created inflation which raised the price of badly needed commodities and reduced public confidence in the currency. This has, unfortunately, accelerated the process of dollarization in the market.

Despite the absence of a central authority to regulate or guarantee international transactions by Somali nationals, Somali businessmen have successfully engaged in both international and local trade, and have built profitable import-export businesses offering a wide range of consumer products. Some of the factors that have encouraged this success are the limited foreign aid supply to the region, the shortage of foreign investment and international lending institutions, the hosting of Somali businesses by the Arabian Gulf states which has enabled the Somali business community to establish bases with internationally recognized business licenses. Given the potential scope of the Somali market, host countries have been willing to provide the facilities and structures needed for their businesses. An equally important facilitator of growth in Somali trade and commerce is the complete absence of taxation on the commodities imported or exported from and into Somalia, thus guaranteeing a close to 100% profit margin.

The nature of the export-import business in Somalia is quite simple. Main export products, such as livestock, chilled meat and, to a lesser extent, fruits, charcoal, hides and skins travel through various Somali ports, usually bound for the Gulf countries or neighbouring East African countries. With the hard currency earned from the sale of these goods, traders purchase a range of consumer and trade goods, including food items, textiles, automobile spare parts, fuel, tires and

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18 Little, P.D (2003); “Somalia, Economy Without State” African issues, James Curry, Oxford/Btec Books
electronic items, among others. Some of these goods are sold locally and a significant proportion is transported across the borders into Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Transporting these commodities to neighbouring East African countries creates some employment opportunities for local communities while they are enroute. The trade also creates some insecurity in the regions through which commodities pass, as these goods are valuable. Security and a poor infrastructure impose huge transaction costs on commerce. The armed militia guarding the roads collect extortion money from the transit trade. As the extortion increases, so too do the commodity prices and the last destination pays higher prices. For example, a 50 kilo sack of sugar costs U.S. $12 in Muqdisho, whereas its cost in Bakool increases to at least U.S. $18.

Given the steady growth of the commercial sector in recent years, transaction costs must be substantially lower than the profit margins earned. The level of trade to neighbouring countries similarly provides a healthy return for Somali traders. Much of this cross border trade is unrecorded, though it does appear to give Somalia a healthy trade surplus with both Ethiopia and Kenya. The impressive growth of the Somali trade community is tempered by the enormous amount of Qat that Somalis purchase from these two countries (UNDP 1998). The precise volume and value of the cross-border trade that originates from south-central Somalia is difficult to calculate, but it is estimated to be U.S. $20-25 million each year (Little, P.D 2003) substantial percentage of this trade is in livestock and electronic goods. In spite of the margin of trade that comes from Somalia, commerce is fraught with huge risks as report by UNDP:

'A number of major problems shape the behavior of the business community in Somalia. The first and greatest is risk. Because of uncertainty over possible fighting, few are willing to invest in fixed productive assets. Most commercial activity aims for short-term profit as a risk avoidance strategy. Investments promising returns in three to five years are rare. Secondly, lack of credit is a major constraint. Thirdly, businessmen face strong social pressure to redistribute profits to needy kinsmen (a prominent feature of Somalia’s informal social security system is the obligation to assist clan members in need) rather than reinvest in the business. Merchants ultimately must rely on their clan to protect their assets. If they ignore requests for assistance, they risk losing the clan’s protection. Finally, commercial activity throughout the country is increasingly hampered by the rapid deterioration of roads, bridges, ports, and airport runways.'

19 CRD/WSP, “Macro-Economic Analysis of South Central Somalia”. May 2004

4.3 The Remittance Sector

Remittances from relatives living abroad have become one of the most enduring sources of subsistence for a significant proportion of the Somali people. The Somali people’s natural nomadic instinct was extended globally, when tens of thousand migrated to various parts of the world in the aftermath of the civil war. Somalis have always been a migrating community. As early as 1960, they began to migrate to other east African countries for jobs in railway construction. In the 1970s, many Somalis migrated to the oil rich Arab Gulf countries to work and, in the 1990s, Somalis sought refuge in Europe, North America and many other parts of world to escape from the horrors of the civil war. A sizeable Diaspora population has established itself abroad during the last three decades. It is estimated that over 750,000 Somalis currently reside and work in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand and the Gulf States. This Diaspora has become an important social support network for relatives left behind in the country.

Remittance companies have become the only intermediary for transferring money from the Diaspora host countries to Somalia. Remittances are the medium for much of the hard currency movements to and from the country, as well as an instrument for trade and commerce in Somalia and abroad.

Beside financial intermediation, remittance companies provide direct employment to a significant number of people. Many others are employed in spin-off activities, including the telecommunications sector which uses hundreds of VHF radio operators to serve remote locations of the country. Supplementary businesses from the remittance sector have buoyed the country’s economy throughout the many years of civil war.

4.4 Operation of Remittance Sectors

The system of sending money home began as a highly personalised and informal activity in the early 1970s, but this sector has since become the only functioning form of financial institution operating in Somalia. It has filled a major void created by the absence of financial institutions that followed the collapse of the Somali government. Remittances provide basic banking services to Somalis everywhere. This serves as a vital channel for Somalis in the Diaspora to transfer money back home in order to support relatives. The remittance sector has been able to grow so quickly because it is simple, based on mutual trust, offers quick delivery, and provides competitive rates of exchange and transfer. Remittance companies have the ability to transfer money to all the corners of the country (Somalia), as well as to other parts of the world where Somalis live or have business interests.
To assess the accessibility and accuracy of remittance operations, 626 randomly selected people (50 from each of the 10 regions of Somalia and 126 from Muqdisho) were interviewed. They were asked whether they had a relative living abroad and if they sent any money. Fifteen percent said that they had relatives abroad and 5-7% (5% the regions and 7% Mogadishu) said they received money regularly. Amounts of money received depended on several factors, such as the size of the family, the status of employment for the migrant and the needs of the family back home. The amount received ranged from U.S. $50 to $300 per month. This usually paid for food, rent and support of relatives or siblings in school or business. To determine the role played by remittances in the development of small businesses, business owners were interviewed. Between 30-40% interviewed stated that a small amount for initial capital investment was sent by a relative living abroad. The remittance sector has helped to create a fragile, upper middle class in Somalia, composed of those who receive regular remittances.

According to an unpublished report by KMPG, remittances from Somalia’s Diaspora amount to approximately U.S. $360 million annually overall, it is estimated that Somali remittance companies transfer between U.S. $750 million to $1 billion annually. In addition to the remittance of funds from Somalis in the Diaspora, remittance companies effectively act as quasi-banking institutions, facilitating the transfer of funds within and outside the country. They also facilitate foreign trade through business investment and offer deposit and savings facilities for local businesses and individuals.

While remittance companies have filled some of the void created by the absence of financial institutions, there is an urgent need to organise and formalise the sector in order to gain international legitimacy. Unfortunately, the restoration of the formal financial sector is linked to the establishment of a central authority in the country, which has remained elusive to date. There is, however, no reason prohibiting the remittance companies from expanding their services and providing commercial banking services in Somalia, even under their present structures.

As the remittance industry was growing, it began to attract Somali-driven investment, generating employment opportunities and starting to develop

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21 It is important to note that, on top of remittances sent on monthly basis, some respondents received supplementary support on a periodic basis; for example, in the case of death, marriage, traditional family rituals or Islamic holidays. It is also important to consider that, during the holy month of Ramadan, the volume of remittances increases. Given this increase, the remittance companies reduce interest charges, further increasing the amount of money coming in from families in the Diaspora.

credibility as a private banking institution. This all changed with the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States in 2001. The former Barakaat bank of Somalia, the largest remittance company at that time, was planning to contribute to the investment of 1000 public housing structures, the first to ever be built in Somalia. This ambitious project would have created jobs, homes for the public, as well as encouraging the return of many Somalis from the Diaspora.\footnote{Interviews with former CEO of Barakat Company}

Barakaat was suspected of supporting terrorist activities by the U.S. administration and targeted for closure. This created an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty among the Somali population. Large amounts of money were frozen, despite the fact that it belonged to owners (Somalis) who were impoverished, unemployed or had lost their business ventures. This money has never been recovered.\footnote{The U.S. government’s allegations against Barakaat, which state that it is involved and/or supports an international terrorist network, have not yet been substantiated. None of the Bank’s owners has been brought to court. The Somali people, despite their personal losses, have remained sympathetic to the plight of Barakaat and have not launched any grievances.} The impact of the Barakaat Bank closure is felt in every sector of the economy, particularly in south-central Somalia.

The Somali people have shown uncommon patience and tolerance in the wake of the Barakaat Bank closure and the subsequent freezing of their capital assets. Other remittance companies, in an effort to avoid befalling the same fate, have sought formal registration in different countries. Some of these companies are listed in the table below.

**Main Remittance Companies Operating in Somalia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amal Express Dubai,</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mustaqbal Dubai,</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barwaqo Financial Services Dubai,</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cidgal Djibouti,</td>
<td>Republic of Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dahabshiil Hargeisa,</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalsan Nairobi,</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Dubai,</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaah Express Nairobi,</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahaan Dubai,</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salama Money Express London,</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towfiq Nation Bank,</td>
<td>Dubai, United Arab Emirate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.5 Manufacturing, Construction and Small Processing Industries

Somalia has never had a well-developed industrial base. Most industry was agriculturally-based, with some processing livestock by-products. Forest-based products, like frankincense and gum Arabic, were also cultivated. The construction industry was vibrant between 1978 and 1988, the decade in which the government undertook its most ambitious construction of public utilities, including health, education and government institutions. Schools and health centers were expanded into all regions of the country. This construction was managed through the Ministry of Public Works, but sub-contracted out to private companies, which helped the growth of indigenous construction businesses. Even though construction tenders were awarded to a select few companies associated with the Barre regime, the construction sector, as a whole, provided employment opportunities for a significant proportion of the workforce.

Manufacturing capacity was similarly limited prior to 1991, contributing only 7% to GDP. Some of the more prominent factories were the sugar-cane factory in Marerey Village in the Middle Juba region; a milk factory, edible oil processing factory and oil refinery in Muqdisho; and cement, fertilizer, canning factories and tanneries across the region. Most manufacturing was ‘import-substitution’ oriented, with 80% of output destined for the domestic market. However, since there was no real control over the import of commodities, demand for local products was low and most factories ran at 30-35% of their total capacity (MNP, 1987). At the beginning of the civil war, many manufacturing industries had already been run down by government-appointed managers, and much of their machinery installations were looted later during the war.

Since 1995, however, privately-owned small scale industries have mushroomed. Most are family-owned, low-technology industries that service small localities. They include small water purification plants, medium-sized pasta factories, small tanneries and fish canning plants. The biggest constraints facing these small industries are the insecurity in the region and the lack of regulatory body. Despite the security risks in the region and partly due to the lack of import restrictions, the region has attracted small-scale investment, both from Somalis in the Diaspora and Somali business groups based in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates. The newly established Coca-cola factory in Muqdisho is a good example of these activities, with a substantial investment of U.S. $10 million.

Data gathered from 22 manufacturing sites in Muqdisho, which were visited for the study, is fairly representative of the manufacturing sector today. As shown in Table 1, the industry is very much in its infancy. The resilience and ingenuity of Somali entrepreneurs is commendable and these businesses could well benefit from donors investing to organise and expand their capacity.
Table 1: Sample of Manufacturing Plants in Mogadishu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Kind of Production</th>
<th>No. Of Employee</th>
<th>Annual Turnover</th>
<th>What are the Main constraint</th>
<th>% Expenditure On security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H/wadag</td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17000 pairs</td>
<td>Security problem</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H/wadag</td>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12000 pairs</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqshid</td>
<td>Plastic</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>120 tons</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shibis</td>
<td>Fish canning</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19 tons</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliwaa</td>
<td>Mattresses</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36000 unit/year</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karan</td>
<td>ice cubes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21600 cubic meters</td>
<td>Lack of market</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubta</td>
<td>fish canning</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubta</td>
<td>sea canning</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>125 Metric tone</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karan</td>
<td>Boats &amp; plastic containers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqshid</td>
<td>Detergent /powder</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>4800 Kegs /Month</td>
<td>Lack of market</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karan</td>
<td>Boats &amp; plastic tanks</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>240 boats + 360 pt</td>
<td>Scarcity of raw mat.</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gubta</td>
<td>Cartoons</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>275000 paces</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliwaa</td>
<td>Pasta</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1650000 kg</td>
<td>Fake bank notes</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karan</td>
<td>Semi-processed leather</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1000000 paces</td>
<td>Fake bank notes</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karan</td>
<td>Metal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>£ 24,000.00</td>
<td>Lack of market</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h/wadag</td>
<td>Powder soap</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>60000 cartoons</td>
<td>Lack of market</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heliwaa</td>
<td>Aluminium windows/doors</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>300 win + 100 doors</td>
<td>Lack of market</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wardhigley</td>
<td>Pasta</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>USD 87,000</td>
<td>Security problems</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huriwaa</td>
<td>Coca-cola</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>USD 3.2 million</td>
<td>Regulating authority</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.6 Agriculture and Food Production

Agriculture (crop production) provides livelihoods for about 20 percent of Somalia’s population and accounts for 10 percent of the GDP (MNP, 1986). The cultivable area has been estimated at approximately 8 million hectares in 1985, about 13 percent of the total area. In 1984, it was estimated that about 980,000 ha were cultivated, with annual crops encompassing 12 percent of the cultivable area.

The climate of Somalia is arid to semi-arid, with an average annual temperature of 27°C. Annual rainfall is less than 250 mm in the north, about 400 mm in the south and 700 mm in the south-west. On average, the country receives 253 mm of rainfall per year. Rainfall distribution is bi-modal. It falls mostly in the Gu (mid-April to June) and the Deyr (October to December) on a seasonal basis. The country is regularly subject to periods of drought. In most parts of south
Somalia, crop production is dependent on rainfall and its frequency of distribution.

4.7 Crop Production

Since the beginning of the civil war in the early 1990's, levels of food production have generally been low. Adverse weather and a lack of seeds for cultivation, compounded by insecurity and population displacement, has further hampered farming in south central Somalia. Successive crop failures have also denied farmers any surplus production for the purposes of seeds. A lack of pest control and other agricultural extension programmes has resulted in the proliferation of crop destroyers, notably armyworms, stalk-borers and birds.

The majority of agriculture in the region takes the form of subsistence grain production, providing the bulk of household income in the inter-riverine communities, especially along the Shabelle and Juba Rivers. Cereal produced in the south and central region accounts for 70-75% of the total food produced in the country (FEWS/FAO 2002). Sorghum and maize are the major staple crops, grown mostly on unreliable land with uneven rainfall distribution. Along the major rivers of Shabelle and Juba, small farmers, using motorised pumps and gravity flow, are able to irrigate a substantial area of land, estimated at 30% of total planted area. Maize, cowpeas, bananas, beans, groundnuts and vegetables are the major crops grown under irrigation. The most important cereal producing regions have been contested areas under the conflict and, consequently, production of staple crops is below 50% of pre-war levels, as is illustrated in Table 2.

_table_2:_Regional Cereal Production Pre- and Post-War Periods_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Average cereal production Per year 1982-88</th>
<th>Average Cereal production Per year 1995-2002</th>
<th>Current production as a % of pre-war production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiran</td>
<td>14,190</td>
<td>6,308</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>90,410</td>
<td>45,123</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>5,970</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Shabelle</td>
<td>53,390</td>
<td>16,973</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Shabelle</td>
<td>127,240</td>
<td>69,773</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Juba</td>
<td>20,330</td>
<td>12,238</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Juba</td>
<td>18,240</td>
<td>7,778</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>17,450</td>
<td>8,080</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTOL</td>
<td><strong>347,220</strong></td>
<td><strong>169,456</strong></td>
<td><strong>48%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Data Source: SNG, 1988, FEWS/FAO 2003_
Productive capacity is far below pre-war levels in all regions of the country. As indicated in Table 2, current production, as a percentage of pre-war production, is only 48%. The Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions have experienced recurrent and prolonged droughts for most of the last 10 years.

### Table: 3 Trends in cereal production (Maize and Sorghum)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hiran</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Shabelle</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Shabelle</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Juba</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Juba</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Somali Government 1988, FSAU, 2003

Southern Somalia's alluvial plains are home to the country's most fertile soils and, together with the inter-riverine area of Bay and Bakool, account for 90% of all agricultural production. About 400,000 ha are planted in the first sowing and 230,000 ha in the second one. The planted area changes significantly from season to season, depending upon rainfall patterns and the prevailing security situation.

Bananas were the most important export crop before the war, with annual exports exceeding 120,000 metric tonnes. Unfortunately, both production and exportation collapsed during the war. Despite limited recovery in the mid-1990s, commercial banana plantations were hard hit by the El Niño rains of 1997-98, which destroyed an estimated 80% of the country's banana plantations (FEWS, 2002). Commercial banana plantations, once prevalent throughout the river valleys of lower Shabeelle, lower Juba, and parts of Middle Shabeelle and Middle Juba, are today confined primarily to the lower Shabeelle region.

Irrigated banana plantations that were established before the Somali state’s collapse, have either been destroyed or taken over by individuals. A range of other cash-crops (including horticulture) were also grown in areas along the
rivers. These cash crops are currently sold in main urban markets, especially in Muqdisho. Crops available in the markets include grapefruits, lemons, melons, papayas, tobacco, onions, other vegetables and mangoes. Without a central authority providing farmer subsidies, most subsistence farmers invest their limited resources in cash crop production. Farmers prefer cash crops for their quick turnaround time of 90 days from sowing to harvest, their quick liquidity and the fact that they generate much needed income for farmers in the region.

4.8 Challenges and Prospects for Agriculture Productivity

The lack of adequate technology, capital investment and proper planning policies contribute to the under-exploitation of Somalia’s agricultural resources. The civil war badly affected the agricultural sector, more so than even livestock production. Today the performance of the agricultural sector is hampered by a number of factors, including general insecurity, the occupation of farming lands by armed militia, the displacement of farming communities, the lack of agricultural support services, poor infrastructure, inadequate processing facilities and limited market access. Moreover, there is a shortage of entomologists, pathologists and agro-economists who could have improved the management of agricultural assets, production and marketing.

South Somalia’s irrigation potential is estimated at 240,000 ha, yet, before the collapse of the government in 1991, only 50,000 ha were under a controlled irrigation system. These lands produced maize, bananas, grapefruits and sugar cane. Some 150,000 people were employed in either government or privately owned irrigation programmes (FAO, FEWS 2000). The collapse of the central government decimated virtually all controlled irrigation schemes. Presently, a few individuals have taken over most of these former plantations. They use low-technology equipment to drain water from the rivers to feed their subsistence cash crops. A number of international NGOs, such as Diakonie/Bread for the World/DBG (Germany), Concern Worldwide, V, CISP, provide low-income farmers with seeds, light equipment and tools for preventing floods.

In south-central Somalia, there is also the problem of land ownership, since land is contested by indigenous groups and the migrating militias. Revived agricultural production in the river areas will require revisions to land ownership, redistribution of dispossessed farmland, protection of minority farming communities and provision of advanced agricultural technology.

Some parts of south-central Somalia have seen an improvement in the population’s socio-economic situation. Population movements from the southern regions to the wet regions in Hiiran and Banadir, coupled with new farming techniques and the production of new crops, has led to improved conditions. For the past few years, farmers in the Hiiran region have enjoyed record harvests in
crop production, particularly with respect to onions and dried lemons, which are exported to Ethiopia, as well as the northern parts of the country. This marks the first time that this region has produced fruits and vegetables in excess of local consumption needs. Similarly, farmers in Middle Shabelle have increased their production of rice, fruits and vegetables. According to an assessment by FSAU, the Deyr crops of sorghum and maize has increased by 134% in 2001/2002. Lower Shabelle has also registered an increase in the production of all major crops. This region has increased its production of sorghum and maize by 114%, when compared with 2000/2001 (FSAU, 2003).

4.9 Food Security

Somalia is considered to be a country that suffers chronic food insecurity. Limited agricultural cultivation has decreased even more over the last decade. In addition to the civil war, frequent droughts and rainfall failures have made work more difficult for crop and livestock farmers. The national cereal requirement is about 500,000 tonnes, according to FAO estimates. In a good year, local production only reaches about 300,000 tonnes. In order to meet domestic needs, commercial imports amounting to 200,000 tonnes are required. This is mostly funded by earnings from the export of livestock. As can be seen in the FAO's food balance data from 1987-98, as production declines, food aid and commercial imports are essential.

Figure 3: Trends in cereal production and import

Source: FAO/GIEWS, 1987-98

In addition to the steady decline in per-capita food production, Somalia is prone to periodic crop failures due to prolonged drought, floods, pest infestation, and the outbreak of livestock diseases. Crop failures and drought tend to occur once every 3 to 5 years. The most recent droughts have been in 1974-5, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1990-2 and in 1997-98. Pastoralists and small-scale farmers have

25 This assessment only covers a specific time of the year and does not take into account annual production rates.
developed a range of coping mechanisms to help see them through droughts. Farmers along the Lower and Middle Juba, for instance, plant separate plots that are either rain fed, along the riverine banks or flooded through irrigation. Despite these coping mechanisms, many communities in the region are more vulnerable to the effects of drought and crop failure today than at any time in the past.

The widespread looting that followed the collapse of the state in 1991 led to the complete destruction of the infrastructure upon which agricultural production depends. Irrigation pumps were stolen, irrigation pipes were dug up and resold and packing and processing plants were dismantled and sold for scrap metal. Many of the flood gates, irrigation canals, and flood control barriers along the rivers are now dysfunctional. Farmers tend to plant crops on small plots close to their villages, leaving distant plots unattended because of security concerns. This practice drastically reduces the total food production of the region.

The decline of per capita food production, coupled with sharp fluctuations in annual output, would not in themselves constitute a food security crisis if the Somali economy was able to generate the hard currency required to import food and agricultural equipment. The economy has been profoundly dependent on the rural sector as its main source of food production. The large quantity of food aid needed each year is clear evidence of the gap between Somalia’s ability to import food and its total food needs.  

The current economy does not generate adequate resources to increase crop production, and food aid, as a consequence, has become an indispensable component of the country’s economy over the past 20 years. Food insecurity is not only caused by a lack of availability, but also a lack of access. Minor and localised disturbances in household production, due to climatic conditions or civil unrest, cause food insecurity for the rural population. Rural communities whose only source of income has been subsistence farming have faced the greatest food insecurity since the beginning of the civil war. Traditional coping mechanisms have been weakened by the prolonged civil war.

Access to and availability of food varies considerably within communities and even within households in south-central Somalia. Vulnerable groups (those with few food and income sources, such as IDPs) face much more severe food insecurity than others. In times of food shortages, some social groups (weaker clans and minority groups) suffer from limited access to international relief,

26 In the early 1980s, food aid became the means through which the Somali population was fed. Somalia has thus become dependent on food aid for domestic consumption.
despite the fact they are the main populations targeted for aid. Indeed, they are often intentionally denied aid by groups who divert the food. Relief agencies sometimes argue that looted or diverted food aid ends up in the marketplace, thereby driving down the price of food for all; yet this is of small consolation to households with no purchasing power or no connections to clan militias.

There is real danger in Somalia becoming dependent on food aid. The delivery of food aid has evolved in recent years in an attempt to avoid creating disincentives for local agricultural producers. However, in the absence of a coordinated national production system, as well as the under utilization of the productive resources of the country, reliance on food aid is projected to continue well into the next decade.

### 4.10 Livestock Production

Livestock production has been the backbone of the Somali economy for many centuries. It is the most important source of food and income for the predominantly rural population, as well as the country’s biggest export commodity. Prior to the war, some 46% of the total population were engaged in nomadic pastoralist and livestock accounted for 40% of the GDP and 80% of all export earnings. It was also one of the few production systems to remain unaffected during the civil war, due to the relative mobility of this sector, where livestock can be moved from regions of conflict to more stable environments quite readily.

Information on the estimated animal population and its distribution in the country is scarce and varies by source. This, again, is mainly due to the fact that no census has been carried out since the beginning of civil strife. Information obtained for this study estimates the total animal population between 35 and 39 million. This figure is similar to that reported by the previous government through an aerial survey undertaken in 1987. The rate of real growth (including the export and mortality of livestock) between 1970 and 1987 was 1.8% per year. Except for the 1997 El-Nino period, there has not been much fluctuation in the livestock population throughout the war (Little, 2003). The current livestock population is estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-war number (in millions)</th>
<th>Present Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camel</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

The Somali livestock system is part of a wider pastoral ecosystem, with herds crossing the borders in Ethiopia and Kenya in search of water and fodder, as well as for security reasons during periods of conflict. Livestock production in Somalia is very much a market-oriented enterprise.

Prior to the war, livestock was exported out of three major port cities, Berbera, Muqdisho and Kismayu, each handling livestock from regions close by. Muqdisho and Kismayu ports have been closed since 1995 and most of the livestock exported is now handled by the Berbera port in the north and, to a lesser extent, the Bossaso port in the northeast. The livestock population in south-central Somalia is so large that, in the event of conflict, livestock owners are on the move and, during export, most of the livestock for export to foreign countries and shipped from Puntland and Somaliland originates from south-central Somalia. Exporting livestock from the seaports of Berbera and Bossaso means that potential employment opportunities are taken away from people who do not live near the seaports.

Even though much of the export livestock from the southern and western regions has to travel longer distances to reach the ports in the north of the country, export figures between 1997 and 1998 ranged between 2.5 - 2.9 million in Berbera alone. The estimates for Bossaso for the same period were 528,858 heads of livestock in 1998 and a total of 650,204 in 1997. Both Berbera and Bossaso do a strong business in the export of hides and skins, as well. Livestock from the Juba regions, as well as parts of Bay and Bakool (especially cattle), now travel overland for sale in the Kenyan market.

4.11 Chilled Meat Export

Saudi Arabia, a major export market for Somalia, has banned the import of Somali livestock twice over the last three years, due to the outbreak of Rift Valley Fever. This has substantially reduced export and, subsequently household, incomes in the country. Although the ban is not expected to remain permanent, it is still currently in place. This ban has effectively underscored Somalia’s vulnerability with respect to its dependence on a single export commodity. Hence, the need to diversify exports and markets, through an increase in banana production and a fully developed fishing industry, is all too apparent. Similarly, the export of live and processed meat is hampered by the collapse of the public veterinary system and the absence of an animal health surveillance system, not to mention the lack of a regulatory framework for exports. Valuable animal by-products such as hides, skin and bones, are currently under-exploited for the export market.

28 WSP (2002)‘Regulating the Livestock Economy of Somaliland’ WSP Office, Hargeysa
Since government-funded veterinary services have collapsed, compounded with the depreciation of the Somali shilling, the price of livestock has increased. Privatization of animal health and the dearth of animal feed during periods of drought have resulted in the desiccation of livestock and the way of life of the pastoralist. The commercialization of water and the disregard of rangeland conservation has added to the problem. This sad state of affairs has indirectly served the interests of developed countries. For example, in 2000, Somali cattle exports to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries dropped as Saudi beef imports were supplied from Australia and Europe. The livestock ban imposed by Saudi Arabia, Somalia’s largest livestock market, has still not been removed even though the Rift Valley disease has been eliminated.

The livestock ban from Somalia and the Australian take-over of the livestock market in the Gulf impose an immeasurable burden on Somalia. Not only have Somalis lost their market share in the Gulf, but they are also losing the female livestock population, which is being exported to Australia by illicit traders whose intention is to reproduce the Somali livestock brand in Australia. This will have serious, long-term economic consequences.

Somali livestock traders have resumed the export of chilled meat to some select Gulf States. These export has activities are supported with technical and financial assistance by the UNDP and the FAO. In particular, they have assisted in the establishment of good quality slaughterhouses that produce export-grade meat for the Gulf. New, higher standard abattoirs have been built in all major cities of the south to supply chilled meat to local export companies. Data collected for this study indicates that 20-30 tonnes of chilled goat meat is exported by air on a weekly basis. The flights leave from Essaley and Kilometre 50 airstrips in Muqdisho, while larger cargos of chilled meat leave from the Hargeysa and Bossaso airports. Additional modern abattoirs are under construction in Muqdisho and Beled Weyne in order to help expand the exports of chilled meat. The data below was obtained from the largest chilled meat exporter, Somali Meat (SOMEAT), and shows a nearly 50% growth rate of exports for 2002 to 2003.

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29 This information was taken from interviews with Somali livestock traders.
### Figures 4: Chilled Meat Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export Qty</th>
<th>Price Per MT in US &amp; Total Revenue</th>
<th>Price/Qty in MT US$ &amp; Total US $ Revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 249750</td>
<td>95.3 &amp; 2700 &amp; 257310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 269750</td>
<td>101.6 &amp; 2700 &amp; 274320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 262750</td>
<td>71.5 &amp; 2700 &amp; 193050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 204000</td>
<td>65.9 &amp; 2700 &amp; 177930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 192250</td>
<td>94.7 &amp; 2700 &amp; 255690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 144000</td>
<td>56.2 &amp; 2700 &amp; 151740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 158500</td>
<td>92.4 &amp; 2700 &amp; 249480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 213500</td>
<td>120.8 &amp; 2700 &amp; 326160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 139000</td>
<td>141.5 &amp; 2700 &amp; 382050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 257000</td>
<td>153.3 &amp; 2700 &amp; 413910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 203750</td>
<td>156.8 &amp; 2700 &amp; 423360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>58.90</td>
<td>2500 &amp; 147250</td>
<td>152.1 &amp; 2700 &amp; 410670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>976.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>2441500</strong></td>
<td><strong>1302.1</strong> &amp; <strong>3515670</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRD/WSP International 2004.*

Revenue from chilled meat stood at U.S. $2.44 million in 2002 and $3.52 in 2003. The growth of this sector is limited by serious technical deficiencies, improper refrigeration systems, a poor infrastructure, a diminished air quality and the existence of a fiercely competitive market. As an example, SOMEAT is reported to have tracked up to 20% waste in each shipment, but still managed to make a profit. As illustrated in the graph below, the market has been steadily growing from July 2003. SOMEAT also reported more regular orders and less waste in the months of September, October and November of 2002, while it was gearing up for the Hajj.
Livestock traders in other regions of Somalia are looking into renovating airstrips and slaughterhouses in their areas in order to attract direct exports of fresh meat. There is a rising demand for Somali goats and sheep in the Gulf. Export traders of hides and skins in south-central Somalia have secured their supply from slaughterhouses close to the Balli-dogle airport. Interviews with SOMEAT confirmed that a select few individuals, who possess storage and marketing facilities in the Gulf countries, dominate the export of chilled meat. As a result, increased employment in this sector as it grows is still very minimal and that which does exist is limited to suppliers of live goats, as well as a few labourers at the slaughterhouses.

4.12 Livestock Health Problems

The previous Somali administration had an elaborate animal health programme that covered prevention and management of contagious diseases, comprehensive tsetse fly control and provided watering holes and other facilities in nomadic areas. Pastoral groups were also provided with basic social services, like watering shelters, by the Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and the Range. Since the collapse of the state, all coordinated livestock activities have terminated. Livestock health facilities were destroyed, just as other government installations were. Limited assistance has been provided by a number of international NGOs,
such as TROCHOIRE and EPAK-K in the Gedo region, immediately following the Rift Valley Fever outbreak in 1997/98.

Even though there is no systematic way to report major disease outbreaks at present, livestock health has relatively been stable during the last decade, with the exception of the Rift Valley Fever outbreak. A large number of private veterinarians have recently emerged in some parts of the region. They are mainly involved in importing and dispensing animal medicine. These private veterinarians are unschooled and sell many types of generic medicine over the counter to pastoralists, without the oversight of a regulatory body. Without a regulatory agency to ensure on the quality of imported medicine, livestock health is under threat.

4.13 The Pastoral Household Economy

Somali pastoral society consists of poor, nomadic families. An accelerated urbanization process, a depreciation in the value of livestock and the effects of the civil war have forced thousands of Somali nomads to abandon their pastoralist traditions and ways of life. Camels have long been considered a unit of wealth among the nomadic communities. Those with large herds of camels and cattle were sometimes able to benefit from livestock exports while others kept their livestock for subsistence survival. Agro-pastoralist communities in south-central Somalia who have small numbers of livestock do not directly benefit from the livestock export. Surveys of household income consistently demonstrate that pastoral households in the region have more disposable income than their counterparts in the agro-pastoral communities. This trend may explain why the benefits of the livestock export business do not extend to specific sectors of the Somali society.

At the household level, the profitability of livestock is calculated against the value of "rations" (rice, sugar, and flour). Terms of trade for the sale of livestock are considered good if a goat or sheep fetches enough to pay for a 50-kilogram sack of sugar or rice. Households under economic duress will sell even when prices are low, but will keep their livestock out of the market until prices improve when they are not under hardship.

The household income of pastoralist communities is also affected by unfair trade with developing countries, especially the EU member countries. Subsidized dairy products are imported to Somalia duty-free from the EU states. This has severely affected the pastoral economy. This is escalated further by Somali livestock herders going into bankruptcy, which, in turn, results in grain producers

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30 The major EU member countries that export livestock by-products, such as powdered milk, are Denmark, Holland and the UK. Powdered milk is also imported from as far as New Zealand and Australia.
having to sell their grain for cattle. This vicious circle imposed upon livestock herders and grain producers exacerbates the already frail pastoral economy.

4.14 The Fisheries Sector

Somalia has had rich tropical fishing grounds. Somali waters are abundant with whales, sharks, tuna, lobsters and a wide variety of other fish species. The southeast coast, which lies in the south central part of the country, has a coastline that stretches 1,100 kilometres. It extends from the Mudug region, all the way to Kismayo of the Lower Juba region. Although yet under-developed, the Somali fishing industry could be a future success. Pre-war assessments indicate that about 30,000 Somalis were occupied in the fishing sector, producing more than 20,000 tons of fish products per year, with an annual export value of U.S. $10 million, approximately 2 percent of the country’s GDP (UNDP 1998).

Under successive government administrations, the fishing industry was under-developed, compared with other sectors of the economy. Given the lack of regulatory bodies, poor markets and the lack of proper infrastructure, exploitation of the fishing sector has been extremely limited. Moreover, the lack of central authorities has led to illegal fishing off the Somali coast by international offshore companies. Within south-central Somalia, some of the political factions’ leaders have further exploited marine resources by issuing fraudulent licenses to foreign trawlers. Unfortunately, hard currency generated from illegal fishing is utilized to purchase weapons and other military hardware for leaders. This, in turn, sustains the civil war and the booming war-economy of the region. Unregulated fishing can also potentially damage aquatic resources and the biodiversity of the fishing grounds. Reliable economic data is scarce here, but it is known that the rich diversity of marine life in Somalia offers enormous economic potential, both with respect to tourism and to marine wildlife utilization. In spite of its disadvantages, the fishing sector contributes to the export economy of Somalia. It is estimated that potential export earnings from the fishing industry could be in the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.

Studies carried out by private fishing companies indicate that the maximum sustainable yield within south-central Somali waters could exceed 60,000 tons of fish, without endangering the stocks. Many private fishing companies have emerged in recent years, most of whom are engaged in lobster fishing and shark fin cultivation. A number of businessmen and women have contracted with foreign fishing companies, permitting them to fish along the coastlines.

31 Ibid

32 Small fishing communities found along the coastlines that were interviewed by CRD/WSP International, indicated that fishing stocks are already showing signs of stress as a result of increased fishing activities.
4.15 Current Fish Harvests in South Central Somalia, 2002-2003

The south central region has three fishing zones with about 25 fishing sites between Hobyo in the Mudug region and Kismayo in the Lower Juba region. Currently, more than 4,000 fishermen work the seas and approximately 2,000 other workers have secondary employment in this sector, such as processors, drivers, watchmen and security guards. Although the work is seasonal, it is beginning to show signs of growth. Hundreds of small boats and a small number of larger fishing vessels can be seen, depending upon the season. Lobster is abundant around two small islands, Elesa and Jula, near Kismayo. Other fish species are scattered throughout the 1,100 km of coast-line. Table 5 illustrates that a total of 3,278 tonnes of fish products were exported from the south-central regions and Mogdisho in 2002, while only 934 tonnes were exported in 2003, with proceeds totalling U.S. $17.7 and $7.8 million, respectively.

Table 4: Fish Harvests in South Central Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Fish</th>
<th>2002 Amount in Kg</th>
<th>2002 Price/Kg USD</th>
<th>2002 Total</th>
<th>2003 Amount in Kg</th>
<th>2003 Price/Kg USD</th>
<th>2003 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shark fins</td>
<td>11,159</td>
<td>$89.4</td>
<td>$997,615</td>
<td>7,613</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>$812,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shark meat</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>$0.17</td>
<td>$1,598</td>
<td>33,981</td>
<td>$0.67</td>
<td>$22,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobster</td>
<td>293,326</td>
<td>$21.5</td>
<td>$6,306,509</td>
<td>230,894</td>
<td>$21.7</td>
<td>$5,010,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingfish</td>
<td>435,641</td>
<td>$3.08</td>
<td>$1,341,774</td>
<td>196,209</td>
<td>$2.45</td>
<td>$480,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snake Grouper</td>
<td>2,099,261</td>
<td>$3.14</td>
<td>$6,591,680</td>
<td>465,561</td>
<td>$3.15</td>
<td>$1,466,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrimps</td>
<td>429,164</td>
<td>$5.90</td>
<td>$2,532,068</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Kg</td>
<td>3,277,951</td>
<td></td>
<td>$17,771,246</td>
<td>934,258</td>
<td></td>
<td>$7,792,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ton</td>
<td>3,278</td>
<td></td>
<td>934.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The communities are worried that, if current fishing levels are sustained, some fish stocks could be entirely wiped out soon.
The above figures are not conclusive and only show data available from a few fishermen. Catches from high sea vessels have not been counted above, given that have their own processing facilities. Some fish are exported to the Arabian Gulf States, but the majority is packaged by middlemen and re-exported to Europe and Asia from the Arab Gulf States. Somali businessmen and women interviewed for this study commented that the profit margin for middlemen far outstrips the paltry pay that local fishermen receive for their hard labour.

4.16 Illegal Fishing

The general state of lawlessness in the country has also affected the sea, but on a different level. Hundreds of foreign vessels are fishing illegally in Somalia's territorial waters and have inflicted heavy damage on the fragile environment. Somali coastal waters are becoming dangerous for commercial and tourist sea travel because armed militias, claiming to be coast guards, board and pillage ships. The sea is also full of pirates with armed speedboats. Many commercial and private vessels have been hijacked with their crews taken hostage for ransom. Encouraged by large sums of ransom, more pirates and armed militia are joining the trade, making Somali waters dangerous as a sea route, as well as for fishing grounds.

Between 1995 and 1999, Somali pirates apprehended more than 16 foreign ships, boats and yachts. Some of those aboard were kidnapped and ransom was extorted to the tune of U.S. $740,000. Until a Somali national authority is established, the lawlessness of the Somali Sea will proliferate, with armed militia hijacking even more fishing fleets and kidnapping even more crews. The surge in number of pirates could also attract international terrorist groups to take advantage of the ensuing chaos. This could lead to the illegal dumping of industrial waste products or the infusion of highly toxic chemicals and radioactive materials into the sea, which could inflict irreversible damage to the sea's bio-diversity, and consequently, the Somali people.

4.17 The Qat Trade and Impact

Qat is a mild stimulant that is chewed as cultural pastime in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and many parts of the Middle East. In some parts, such as Somaliland, Qat is chewed by a good number of the adult male population daily. It is an addictive drug known to cause many health and social-economic problems. The import of Qat drains huge amounts of hard-earned currency from Somalia. The implications of Qat consumption are listed below.

33 Scott Coffen-Smout, UN Inter-Agency Assessment Report, March 1998
o **Economic Implications:** Qat consumption in Somalia seriously drains the country’s hard currency, creating a large trade deficit between Somalia and the Qat-growing countries of Kenya and Ethiopia. Conservative estimates suggest that about U.S. $70,000 worth of Qat is imported into Muqdisho daily. This is the single largest consumer of the country’s hard currency. The largest shipment of Qat is flown from Nairobi’s Wilson airport into the Daynile airstrip, about 7 kilometres from Muqdisho. Data collected from the Daynile airstrip for this study shows that a minimum of seven single-engine aircrafts bring Qat daily from Kenya. Taking into account other airports in the south-central area, such as the Balli-dogle, Kilometre 50 and Isalely airstrips, Beled Weyne, Kismayo, Galka’yo and Baidoa handle smaller consignments of Qat, with the total value of foreign currency lost daily to Qat estimated as well above U.S. $70,000. Chewing Qat is also considered by the public to be a serious contributor to the war economy.34

o **Implications for Household Incomes:** At the household level, Qat diverts much-needed and scarce income for food, medicine, and other family needs, by absorbing a substantial portion of the household budget.

o **Implications for Workforce Productivity:** Qat chewing sessions are held by adult male groups and, from time to time, by a few female adults. Chewing normally begins at midday and thus it cuts into time available for productive work.

o **Health Implications:** Although it is not widely known, Qat is believed to seriously affect the health of chewers.

Qat is often taken in combination with several other drugs to magnify its effects. There is also anecdotal evidence that Somalia is becoming a producer and staging point for international drug trafficking. Recent media reports suggest that militia groups now grow illegal drugs like marijuana on confiscated farms in the Lower Shabelle region.

Despite its contribution to health and social problems, Qat is an important source of employment for a large number of the population, especially women who Qat at major urban markets The Qat trade indirectly boosts the informal economy by employing petty traders who normally sell tea or cigarettes. Interviews with female traders in Muqdisho indicate that most local Qat traders are female. The females who sell Qat often leave their children unattended,

34 There is limited data in this area, however, a number of independent sources in currency exchange outlets, from the Bakaraha market alone, indicated that U.S. $ 800,000 changes hands in the exchange kiosks in Muqdisho alone – half of which goes to the Qat traders on daily basis. Qat is sold in local markets for Somali shillings. Somali shillings collected by local Qat sellers is taken to the exchange outlets to trade for U.S. dollars. The dollars are then sent back to the Qat traders in Kenya and Ethiopia.
potentially resulting in child delinquency, children joining armed militias, prostitution and the spread of HIV/AIDS.

Given the violence associated with Qat, all violent outbreaks by armed militia are concentrated in Qat selling markets. For the last few years, a number of people have been killed in these markets by violence linked to Qat. Most of the victims have been women.
CHAPTER FIVE

5. Employment and Socio-economic Transformations

5. New income and employment opportunities

The transformative effects of the civil war and their impact on the social fabric of Somali society have not been properly addressed by Somalis, nor has it been considered by non-Somalis (external donor agencies). While it may take sometime to develop the economy and repair the infrastructure, the social and moral consequences of the civil war will be felt for many years to come.

The Somali people are considered to be a homogeneous society, sharing one culture, religion, language and set of traditions. Somalis have peacefully co-existed among themselves and with others for centuries. In a situation of distress or family tragedy, the traditional Somali clan structure provides moral and financial support to those who suffer personal loss or are in need of help. This social structure tends to foster stability and harmony among clans.

Unfortunately, the Somali civil war left deep social and physical scars. The traditional Somali respect for one another, human life, integrity and authority has been seriously compromised by years of civil strife. The Somali social structure, upheld through kinship, morality, respect and Islamic values, has all but eroded. Equally undermined is the mutual trust between individuals and clans, which has been vital to the maintenance of harmonious socio-economic relationships in society. This has dramatically changed socio-economic structures in Somalia.

The arrival of the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope in December 1992 had an immediate and positive impact in its initial stage. The U.S.-led multinational forces arrived at a time in Muqdisho when inter-clan conflict had somewhat subsided. The pause in the fighting, compounded with the heavily armed US forces present in the area, enabled international relief agencies to supply humanitarian aid and resources. Communities that had been separated by unnecessary power struggles were able to begin social and economic re-integration. The massive influx of U.S. dollars brought into the country by the multi-national forces and international aid agencies generated employment opportunities, encouraged small scale business, and even rejuvenated banana exports. This created new social actors in Somalia through the emergence of a new entrepreneur class and new elites. It also helped to consolidate a new clan hegemony, while other clans suffered economically and had to disengage from fighting.
As discussed by Elizabeth M. Cousins and Chaten Kumar in their book, “Peace-building as Politics: Cultivating Peace in a Fragile Society”, UNOSOM’s presence produced an unintended structural impact on the people in south-central Somalia, arguably one more detrimental than was originally envisioned:

"Large amounts of foreign currency were suddenly pumped into the Somali economy with the arrival of UNITAF, a practice that continued with UNOSOM II, the effect of this distortion was most evident in the rising value of the Somali shillings, which appreciated 100%, from a rate of approximately Sh. So. 4,000 – 8,000 for 1 US Dollar. UNOSOM II’s presence, primarily in south Muqdisho, where it was headquartered, fuelled the local economy with its rental of houses and vehicles. Rather than helping to create conditions that would generate sustainable employment in the region and contribute to long-term peace-building, UNOSOM II itself became the single largest employer, engaging approximately 3,000 Somalis primarily in Muqdisho. Salaries for these employees were exceedingly high, particularly for security guards, many of whom also moonlighted as a part of militias. Aside from the sustainability considerations, high salaries made continued insecurity lucrative for factions that provided security guards."

Another new phenomenon in local dynamics was the emergence of new warlords who inherited the fighting machinery left behind by the multi-national forces, after they departed in 1995. This affected only south-central Somalia, largely because the bases of the intervention forces had been headquartered there. The killing and kidnap of professional Somalis, the multiplication of political armed factions, the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists, the growing militarization of clans and the establishment of a war-economy were some of the legacies of UNOSOM’s departure.

Those who benefited from the war economy, with little or no understanding of the ethics of business, misused their newly acquired wealth and privilege through the introduction of economic practices that negatively affected the existing fragile. A few examples of these set-backs are the importation of fake bank-notes, overshipping millions of Somalis over night, bringing in expired and poor quality commodities, the illegal export of charcoal and female livestock, and the destruction of Somali wild game.

Some of these new economic actors established flourishing businesses in various sectors, such as telecommunications, airline services, Hawala and other small industries. These businesses employed large numbers of Somalis who would otherwise have been unemployed, leaving their families destitute. New employment opportunities such as these have helped to slow the escalation of uncontrollable inter-clan conflicts across the regions.
5.2 The Formation of New Socio-Economic Classes

War-Economy Entrepreneurs: One of the striking outcomes of the prolonged civil war and the absence of a national government has been the formation of a new socio-economic class in Somali society. New social, political and economic interest groups have come together to defend their mutual interests. Many rural people have now settled in cities and are unlikely to go back to rural life. Women have taken up new employment to provide support to their families. A new breed of business owners has established itself in major cities and dominates many business activities. Another common practice in effect since 1995 is the misappropriation of private and public properties, such as houses and state buildings, which were looted by armed groups after the fall of the government. Muqdisho’s electricity needs are currently provided by “businesses” that misappropriated public generators.

The emerging Somali business elite are unwilling to renounce the privileges they have acquired as a result of the civil war. Unfortunately, they are not very interested in contributing to social service delivery. Instead, these elites have heavily armed themselves and are in a strong position to demand further privileges without giving back to Somali society.

A variety of businesses have been established out of the Somali state breakdown. The continuing violence has prevented the formation of a state with regulatory institutions. Those benefiting from the war economy see it in their interests to maintain the status quo. Families of this new socio-economic class enjoy relatively high standards of living, with their children attending schools and the ability to access basic social services.

The Destitute: While this economic elite was forming, the majority of Somali people remained in desperate straights. Among the marginalized population are the Internally Displaced People (IDPs), poor peasants and impoverished pastoralists. The harsh environment in which these vulnerable groups live subjects them to the forced occupation of their land and constant human rights abuses. This group is also increasing in number, with many living in desperate circumstances, unable to access even the most basic social services.

Dispossessed Pastoral Groups: Another group negatively affected by this socio-economic transformation is the pastoral nomad. Their livestock is being decimated by the chronic shortage of veterinary medicine, recurrent droughts, insecurity, the absence of government regulations and the current ban on livestock exports.

Children of these disadvantaged groups do not have access to health facilities and clean water. They grow up in the streets and usually end up joining the
corps of the armed militia. Some of these children establish roadblocks where they can demand money from those passing in order to earn a living; whereas others start chewing Qat and use drugs at a very early age, often leading them into a criminal life. In both cases, the future hope of Somalia poses significant threats to society.

5.3 The Role of Women in the Socio Economic Transformation

The lack of women’s participation in decision-making processes and their lack of access to and control of resources is deeply rooted in Somali social and cultural traditions. Under the former government of Said Barre, women’s rights were improved and their literacy and employment opportunities increased. This has, to some extent, helped to narrow the gap between genders in Somalia. The impact of war on the majority of Somali women has been dramatic. Hundreds of thousands of men have been killed, leaving behind widows and orphans. Somali women have borne the brunt of the civil war. Many have also been killed, raped or had their property looted. The civil war has displaced thousands of Somali women who now live within Somalia as refugees or IDPs. Many others have sought refuge in foreign countries.

In the period since the civil war began, women have had to play a more active role contributing to their family incomes, out of necessity. Although women have been the principal victims of the civil war, many have tried to overcome dire situations by engaging in society with new income roles. Currently, many Somali women are the only breadwinners in the family.

In addition to enduring the stress, pain and depression born from living in perpetual fear for their lives, women have suffered high divorce rates and domestic violence. Moreover, the strict application of Islamic Shari’a law has provided no space for their grievances to be heard. This has forced many professional businesswomen, especially those whose work entails a great deal of social contact, to give up lucrative careers and instead engage in informal petty trade or even travel abroad in order to live a decent life.

Despite being victims of a senseless war, women have been instrumental in the political reconstruction of a failed state by organizing peace rallies, street demonstrations and advocating for the respect of human rights. They have made their presence felt in all for a, both at clan and national levels, arenas where Somali women have been traditionally excluded. Gender development and women’s rights organizations have also become active. They are involved in sensitization, mobilization, and advocacy initiatives at the grassroots level. Gender roles in the family have undergone a dramatic shift, with housewives now the primary breadwinners of the families and men relegated to the status of
absentee vagabonds or to the equally unenviable position of being frustrated and humiliated househusbands.

Somali women have assumed many new responsibilities and, in the process, gained greater social autonomy. According to one recent estimate, a substantial number of Somali households rely exclusively on income generated by female members of the family. In addition, women have been actively soliciting business start-up funds from family lending institutions, the remittance sector or women’s credit and savings schemes. Recently, the political role of Somali women was elevated to the extent where they are now allowed to hold seats in the Somali parliament. This is strongly encouraged by the western countries that support the Somali peace process.

Despite the social transformation afoot, and especially the financial independence woman have gained from their husbands, their apparent autonomy does not translate into more authority over household management and greater involvement in decision-making that affects the family. The traditional structure of women as submissive within the family structure still dominates the household politics. Years of psychological and financial dependence on men has made women respectful of their husbands’ authority.

“My son is married to a wife and they have three kids. Unlike other families, my son is facing an uphill challenge. His wife is an idle do-nothing. It is my son who’s expected to earn for the family, while, in every other neighbouring family, the wives are the sole breadwinners. In this difficult time, the only family that can survive is the family whose mother is actively employed.”

Faay Ali, a grandmother

The shifting roles of the family structure sometimes lead to family feuds between husbands and the breadwinning wives. The enhanced role of women and their subsequently growing authority is believed to lead to family break ups. There are also small, but active, women’s groups that advocate for their rights, for peace-building and for promoting reconciliation among clans. The following illustrates one of the many new roles for women in Somali society.
**Box 3: Women’s Peace Vanguard (WPV)**

WPV is one of the women’s organizations working in Muqdisho. The organization was established a year ago. Its main objectives are to maintain peace and security and improve the delivery of social services. Members of the group, who in the past participated in the civil war by siding with their closest kin warlord, have overcome the past and decided to work together as peace pioneers. Some of their achievements include:

1. Organized public campaigns and peace rallies;
2. Assisted in efforts to lobby for the release of some people taken hostage by armed groups in Muqdisho;
3. Took a leading role in the establishment of youth civil defence units in 8 districts in Mogadishu.
4. Helped raise funds for detainees;
5. Took part in the re-opening of major roads in Muqdisho that had been closed since 1991;
6. Supported the re-establishment of Neighbourhood Watch programmes to boost security in the city;
7. Built a four room school for IDPs camped in the former School of Military Aviation.

*Source: CRD/WSP International - Socio-Economic Assessment, South-Central Somalia, 2003.*

### 5.4 Employment and Income Distribution

The income level of many Somali people was declining long before the civil war started. As the economy continued its downward spiral from the high inflation, unfavourable terms of trade, militarization of the country and high levels of corruption and mismanagement in the mid-1980s, peoples’ income dropped significantly. For example, in the 1980s, the largest employment sector was the public sector. Wages in the public sector had declined by 90% relation to the capacity of government employment during the mid 1970s.\(^{51}\) According to a World Bank report, average wages in the public sector had fallen to U.S. $3 per month, contributing to the inevitable decline of Somali public services.\(^{52}\) Most of this loss was felt in south-central Somalia.

The civil war that erupted on Dec. 31, 1990 caught all the residents of Muqdisho and, Somalia in general, unprepared. Thirty year old government institutions, structures and assets collapsed simultaneously. Similarly, private institutions that had provided employment to thousands of Somalis also fell. This created widespread destitution, unemployment and lawlessness across the country.

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\(^{51}\) Michael Chossudovsky, the Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order, 2003

\(^{52}\) Public sector wages constituted a mere 0.5% of GNP in 1989.
In the early days, thousands of Somalis fled the country, many of them fearing political prosecution (through clan vendettas), while many others left in search of security and food. The desperation caused by man-made disasters (senseless civil war), compounded with natural disasters such as drought, further exacerbated an already precarious situation in the country.

In 1992, following the humanitarian intervention of the U.S.-led multinational force, a slow economic recovery was started. People began to engage in petty trade, mostly selling food, fuel and other basic commodities for living. The infusion of millions of U.S. dollars by the intervening forces encouraged the beginnings of an economic recovery, where people had employment opportunities and entrepreneurial people were able to start new businesses. The standard of living was improving considerably.

To fully capture the range of income distribution in south-central Somalia, CRD interviewed 627 individuals, asking about access to employment and levels of income. Based on the responses, income distribution in the region can be categorized into four broad categories

1. **Lowest level income group**, with a daily income of less than Sh.So. 10,000.00, equivalent to US $0.60.
2. **Low-level income group**, with a daily income of Sh.So. 10,000.00 – 15,000.00, equivalent to US $0.90.
3. **Mid-level income group**, includes salaried/skilled employees of private companies, mid-level traders and families who receive remittances regularly.
4. **Higher level income group**, includes large-scale businesses and import/exporters.

### 5.5 Income Groups

Before the civil war, there were distinct income and employment categories. The scale of payment for skilled and professional employees was much higher than that for unskilled workers. People expected a certain level of salary if they performed a certain type of work. Previous Somali governments had assigned the task of determining employment scales, annual salary appraisals, salary increases to keep pace with inflation and the classification of employment to the

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Ministry of Labor and Social Issues.\textsuperscript{54} Today, none of this exists, as there are no government authorities to determine employment standards.

Of the four categories identified, the first two groups have similar incomes, while the third and the fourth share similar characteristics.\textsuperscript{55} The income levels of many of our survey respondent’s fall below the poverty line established internationally. Most Somalis live on less than one US dollar a day.

5.6 Those Below the Poverty Line (Groups with Lowest Levels of Income)

This category is composed of those whose income falls below the poverty line. These workers mostly come from the agricultural and nomadic sectors and regions most affected and displaced by the civil war. Most of them are on the move in search of a better life. Members of this group are the most destitute and often live in IDP camps or abandoned residences (public or private). Many are beggars and, of those who are not, some periodically pick up casual manual labour as garbage collectors, shoe shiners and porters. A UNDP survey from 2001 indicates that there were 175 camps in Muqdisho, with a total IDP population of more than 230,000\textsuperscript{55}. These people currently have no access to social services. The mortality rate among this population is high and living and sanitary conditions are very poor.

The majority of the group (the adult population) are uneducated and do not have access to income-generating activities. They live in crowded camps or shanty houses, with large numbers sharing water and sanitation facilities. The number of meals eaten each day is reportedly less than one and the level of malnutrition among this group is extremely high. The average income per head is estimated at Sh.Sh. 10,000.00. These people are generally supported by international NGOs from the West, as well as Islamic charities.

According to our survey, the bulk of this group’s income is spent on food, with very little left for other essentials\textsuperscript{56}. The only supplement to their income is money received from begging.

\textsuperscript{54}Although the former government established salary scales, whenever money was devalued, policies were not revised. This created rampant corruption, nepotism and the eventual disintegration of the public sector prior to the collapse of the state.

\textsuperscript{55} UNDP Survey on IDPs, Mogadishu, 2001

\textsuperscript{56} Source: CRD- Socio-Economic Assessment of South Central Somalia, 2003.
5.7 Borderline Income Groups

Many of the people in this category claimed to be involved in petty trade\textsuperscript{57}. This group is dominated by women. People in this category sell small quantities of food, vegetables, milk, *Qat*, second-hand clothes, fuel, tea, cigarettes, and utensils. The average income of this group is approximately Sh.so. 10,000.00 - 15,000.00 a day (about $0.95). Women in this group are unable to care for their children because their businesses keep them away from their families for long hours.

Men in this category tend to perform manual labour, including causal labour. Some of them generate income from other sources, such as selling water and second-hand clothing. Others perform seasonal work such as masonry, plumbing and carpentry. Although many within this category are idle and without work, there are a few who work in transportation services.

The expenditure patterns of this group are not significantly different from the first group’s (the below poverty line group). All their income goes toward daily rations (hand-to-mouth) and other basic necessities like clothing. This group does not usually have savings and is thus vulnerable to price hikes triggered by rising inflation and the dollarization of the commodity prices. Some of their children seek supplementary income by collecting leftover *Qat* from the *Qat* markets. This contributes minimally to the family income. Many of these children are addicted to *Qat*.

5.8 The Middle-High Income Group

While the two groups above share similarities with respect to their income and expenditures, the third and fourth categories also share characteristics. This category is mainly comprised of skilled workers, private sector employees, mid-level *Qat* traders, and those who sell clothing, medicine, groceries, agricultural products, and transportation services. Others included in this category are those who receive monthly salaries and regular remittances from families and friends abroad. While the economic clout of this group is gaining strength, they also tend to bear the brunt of economic shocks in the market.

This group is believed to be the main engine of socio-economic activities in south-central Somalia. They are organized and work in groups to pool resources, invest in medium-sized businesses or light manufacturing factories, engage in commodity import and export, and invest in shares of emerging markets.

\textsuperscript{57} Source: CRD- Socio-Economic Assessment of South-Central Somalia, 2003.
The children of the families in this category have adequate access to education and health. The category also relies on remittances from kinship ties in the Diaspora. Surplus income in this category is often invested in business opportunities. Families of middle to high income earners have housing privileges, proper sanitation, clean drinking water, and some even have access to electricity. Business groups in this category network with international agencies and across the country.

This group has more disposable income than any of the other groups. Their expenditure patterns fluctuate, with expenses often exceeding income. This group generously contributes to the less fortunate among their kin.

5.9 High Income Groups

Estimates indicate that the number in this group is very small, only 2-3% of the entire population. Given their economic power and the privileges it carries, this category exercises considerable influence over society at large and, in particular, over their clan.58 This group dominates the ownership of large-scale businesses and small to medium manufacturing industries. High income groups are responsible for the import and export of large quantities of foodstuffs, fuel, construction materials, and agricultural products. Some among them have other businesses outside the country.

The expenditure pattern of this group resembles group three, with only minor differences. One significant difference is that families in this category invariably have close relatives residing outside the country. Many members of this group prefer to conduct business outside the country for greater security and less political pressure from armed faction leaders. They delegate the management of their businesses in Somalia to their peers or close family relatives. This group spends a sizeable amount of money on security, Zakat (2% of their yearly income all Muslims) and luxury items.

CHAPTER SIX

6. The Environment and Natural Resources

6.1 Natural Resource Endowments

Somalia is a semi-desert country, with an average annual rainfall of 300 millimetres each year. Its vegetation is predominantly composed of acacia trees, shrubs and a patchy forest running along the two main rivers, the Juba and Shabelle. Loose sand forms the soil in most parts, with some alluvium along the riverbanks and plains of the Bay and Bakool regions. Northern Somalia is dry and arid for most of the year. Prior to the civil war, the government had implemented desert control, soil erosion, forest rationing and charcoal production programmes to conserve for the population’s need for wood fuel.

Somalia has no oil reserves and only 200 billion cubic feet of found natural gas reserves (MNP, 1987). The state-owned IraqSoma Refinery Corporation, which operated a 10,000-bbl/d refinery plant near Muqdisho, was totally destroyed in 1991.\(^{59}\) Exploration by four major American oil companies (Chevron, Conoco, Phillips and Pectin), as well as British Shell, has not been successful in locating oil reserves in Somalia. While in the middle of exploration, the unexpected eruption of civil war and the subsequent state collapse forced the oil companies to abandon their premises, equipment and personnel. Within two months, all the equipment of these oil companies had been looted. Successive regional authorities and the TNG have recently attempted to revive oil exploration in Somalia, but to no avail. There is the possibility of oil reserves and other natural resources in Somalia, yet their exploration depends on the establishment of an authority who can sanction agreements and legitimately contract with oil companies.

Potential mineral resources in the country which have not yet been exploited include deposits of uranium, tin, copper, zinc, gold, coal, zircon and Kyanite. Other non-metallic resources include cement, gypsum, granite and lime. Many of these resources have not been commercially exploited, largely due to technical and financial limitations.

6.2 Water Resources

Water and pasture for livestock is of critical importance to most regions in south-central Somalia. Water has always been scarce, particularly in the central regions of Mudug and Galgudud. The destruction from the civil war has heightened the

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\(^{59}\) The remains of the IraqSoma refinery have been completely ransacked and much of the plant and its steel structures have been sold abroad as metal scrap.
need for water. Water scarcity has always been a source of conflict in the region. The civil war destroyed water wells, which were still not adequate for livestock needs in the region. Irrigation canals and other water installations were completely destroyed.

Water is essential to the life of Somali people, their livestock and farms. Previous Somali governments have attached a special importance to this sector. Before the collapse of the final Somali administration, several government institutions shared responsibility for water resource development. National objectives for this sector were “to provide adequate, reliable, safe, and regulated water for domestic use and water for livestock and agriculture at a modest cost throughout the country”\(^{60}\). The aim was to deliver adequate, safe, consumable water to 80% of the urban and 40% of the rural populations by January 1990.\(^{61}\)

Before the war, there were a few cities and towns in south-central Somalia which relied on piped water systems (Muqdisho, Baydhabo, Kismaayo, Afgooye and parts of Jowhar). Piped systems were all run by government water agencies. Muqdisho had two water supply systems; one pumped water from wells located 18 km south of the city, and the other 32 km to the north. When both wells were operational, they served most of the city. For rural populations, the government had constructed deep wells and water reservoirs.

Today in south-central Somalia, there are many areas where the water supply is managed privately and efficiently (for example, in Muqdisho, Jowhar, Baydhaba, Cadale, Afgooye and Daru-Salam). Potable water needs have always been high in Somalia, and, if mismanaged, the consequences would be catastrophic, both in terms of contamination and with respect to the fact that overuse would result in a drop in the water table and a drying up of the wells. UNICEF has been active in the water sector, particularly in shallow well construction and the chlorination of urban wells.\(^{60}\)

In Jowhar, of the Middle Shabelle region, water is supplied by a private company, Farjanno, which was established after the civil war. It provides clean water throughout the city and part of the profits from the water are used to fund a number of elementary schools. This has created employment opportunities for many Somalis and provides clean drinking water for a number of households. It is a success story.

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\(^{60}\) Mohamed Abdulkadir Musa, “An Overview of Water Resources and Management in Somalia”. CARE/Umbrella Grant Project, Water Approaches and Technology Workshop, 4-6 November 1995, Mogadishu, Somalia. P-3

\(^{61}\) Ibid,
The most serious water shortages are in the Mudug and Galgudud regions, where many Somalis and their livestock suffer from chronic water shortages. It has also resulted in the mass movement of people and livestock from one region to another in their perennial search for water and grazing lands. There are other major cities, towns and villages (Ceel-garas, Waajid, Goof-gaduud) that also suffer from frequent water shortages.

In addition to the private supply of water some cities (Baidoa) are supplied by the Mumin Global Water Supply and other international aid agencies like ADRA, UNICEF, Concern Worldwide, Diakonie/Bread for the World (Germany) and the ICRC among other providers of technical assistance. This includes the drilling of water wells and the digging of irrigation canals in Cadale, Bulo-burte, Balcad and many districts of Lower Shabeelle, Cabuud-waaq and Haradheere, as well as the Galgudud region.

Data on access to water supplies is not available for much of the country. However, a relatively small proportion of the total population is believed to have secure access throughout the year, albeit with significant regional variations. Due to erratic rainfall patterns producing both droughts and floods, the inability to access water in rain-fed farming communities also reduces the capacity of grain producers. The regions of Bay and Bakool are known for their production of sorghum for local consumption and commercial purposes. It is a lifeline for its inhabitants that is threatened by lack of water. There is no doubt that the shortage of rainfall and the scarcity of water leads to severe food insecurity in the region.

The level of investment in water had declined long before the civil war was started. The civil war caused major disruptions in the water supply of the whole country, particularly Muqdisho, which had a well-developed water system that functioned effectively. Although the Afgoi water supply station in Muqdisho was not looted, it has not returned to full operations since 1995, when the UNOSOM II forces departed.

The city of Muqdisho, with an estimated population of 1.5 million, currently has adequate access to water. Traditional supply systems are used in many parts, with donkeys supplying water household by household. In other parts of the city, private water companies provide for many households. This sector not only supplies water, but also generates employment for hundreds of Somalis.

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62 A UNICEF study in 1997 estimated that only about 10 percent of the Somali population has access to clean water throughout the year. In the southern parts of Somalia, less than 20% have access to clean water on a permanent, annual basis. In Muqdisho, the figure is much higher, and elsewhere in the central zone, the figures are between 15-25 percent with access in cities, and 4-14 percent in rural areas (UNICEF 1997).
groups with severely restricted access to water are the IDPs who are scattered across Muqdisho. Their water supply is pumped from boreholes that are placed very close to latrines. The possibility of water contamination is very high. Each year, thousands of people contract water-borne diseases. Recently, a number of water purification systems have been erected by private companies that are able to provide clean and healthy drinking water to the few who can afford it.

6.3 Energy Resources

Fuel is imported into south-central Somalia through Muqdisho by a consortium of seven companies, under the umbrella of the Muqdisho Union Petroleum Company (MUPC). The supply line begins in Muqdisho and is carried over land to the regions and across the border into neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya. Tankers that carry between 2,000 to 20,000 metric tons, at variable rates (depending on supply and demand) of U.S. $360 per ton for petrol and U.S. $250 per ton of diesel.

The energy supply available to south-central Somalia is adequately distributed by local, private businesses. The energy sector supports the private transport sector, light industries and electric companies. The direct fuel supply sector is a limited source of employment that uses mostly drivers and tankers to offload oil. The fuel market of major urban centres is dominated by females. The second largest employment source for low income women, after Qat, is fuel distribution.

*Figure 7: Fuel Imports to South Central Somalia (MT)
2002/2003 Fuel Imports*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Petrol</th>
<th>Diesel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,933.58</td>
<td>6,507.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>3,981.63</td>
<td>4,198.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>7,002.71</td>
<td>11,951.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>5,946.40</td>
<td>6,901.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>1387.1</td>
<td>14,990.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1476</td>
<td>16,096.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>10,869.20</td>
<td>8,963.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>7,514.43</td>
<td>5,278.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>11,404.02</td>
<td>4,320.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CRD- Socio-Economic Assessment of South Central Somalia, 2003.*
In 2003, for example, an amount of 4,320.6 metric tones (MT) of petrol and 65,235.4 MT of diesel were imported through Muqdisho for a total value of US $17.8 million. The main seaport of Muqdisho, which has all the necessary facilities to offload fuel tankers, is now closed as a consequence of the current stalemate between the armed political factions. Oil tankers now offload fuel at a small natural harbor near Muqdisho. It takes about 24 hours to offload 1,000 metric tonnes of fuel, according to Mr. Mohamoud Sheikh Osman, the manager of MUPC. The process of offloading is laborious, consuming time, additional resources and the regular loss of substantial volumes of fuel that fall into the sea during the process. In spite of this, fuel is cheaper in Somalia than in neighboring countries, and this is attributed to the competitive nature of Somali markets, the lack of regulations for the supply line and the absence of taxation. Throughout south-central Somalia, people regularly receive fuel as a result.

The demand for wood fuel increases annually, both for domestic and export markets from the Middle East. The rate of tree regeneration, however, cannot keep up with demand and thus, forest resources are in danger of being depleted. A new class of charcoal merchants, motivated by the desire to maximize their profits and operating in the absence of authorities - that would restrict their activities, began to fell and burn forest trees. This uncontrolled logging of trees for the production of charcoal took a severe toll of the countries’ merger forest resources. The resultant unrestricted exports of shiploads of charcoal from seaports along the Somali coast have made a few charcoal profiteers wealthy but it has also caused incalculable environmental damage and degradation the long-term consequence of which may turn out to be irreversible.

6.4 Electricity and Power Generation

The electrical infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed as a result of the war. Ongoing strife has hindered the development of new electric power sources. Planned hydroelectric facilities on the Juba River (The Fanole project in the Jilib district and the Markabley power station in Bardhere) have failed to materialize. Studies indicate that, the Horn of Africa, and especially Somalia, is a prime location for harnessing wind to generate electricity. Given the current state of unrest and insecurity, Somalia is hardly a good candidate for high technology energy production, such as wind electricity.

Privately-owned diesel generators supply electricity to households for five or six hours each day. This service is usually restricted to neighbourhoods adjacent to power supply stations, but, in some cases, power companies have the capacity to supply small towns. Such services are available in most large urban cities (Kismaayo, Muqdisho, Jowhar, Marka, Beled Weyne). The cost of electricity is arbitrarily set by electric power suppliers at a fixed rate per month. In most
cases, fees are charged on a per lamp basis in each household. Access to electricity is dependent on a household’s ability to pay.

Data collected from over 45 power-generating companies in Muqdisho shows that their cumulative productive capacity is less than one tenth the power needs of the city.63 The six major power stations in Muqdisho have indicated that their customer base is between 20,000–27,000 out of every 100,000 households in Muqdishu. These are the few who can afford to pay for electricity. Private power supply stations operate independently from each other and have a fairly large number of vendors whom they employ. Power generators do not only provide electricity and employment, but they also enhance security by providing additional fee lightings in select areas.64

6.5 Environmental Problems

The main environmental problems faced by Somalia are the degradation of rangeland, deforestation, the depletion of wildlife resources, desertification around some coastal areas, the expansion of sand dunes, marine pollution and damage to the marine ecosystem through illegal or over fishing by foreign and domestic fishermen. There have been unsubstantiated reports that tannery waste is being discharged into the sea near Barava and Kismaayo, and on land and around Muqdisho. There are also reports that, in “Ighe” in the central region of Somalia, the visible disposal of toxic materials has people in the area reporting to suffer from a wide range of uncommon diseases.

Without a central government and international donor agencies to help, desertification has become a more serious problem in recent years. The areas most affected are the coastal strips between Mogadishu and Brava and the sand dune ridges stretching north of Kismaayo. Similarly, the north-eastern coastal area of central Somalia - between Hobyo to the Warsheikh district, access to water is strictly limited. A number of districts in central Somalia are badly affected and remain isolated from the rest of other districts in the region.

A recent and potentially threatening environmental crisis has emerged with the illegal production of charcoal for export. High demand in the Gulf has led to the wholesale destruction of acacia forests and woodlands in the south-eastern region of the country. Though this is an illegal practice, high demand drives opportunistic traders to destroy vegetation in the Juba area. Kismaayo’s main

63 CRD Interview with Elman Power Company in Mogadishu, January 2004.

64 Telecommunication companies and light factories in major cities throughout south-central Somalia also provide electricity to many customers through a cost-recovery scheme – where suppliers do not generate much profit, but rather supplement their incomes with electricity.
export is now charcoal and forests have been affected as far as 90 kilometres away from town. Charcoal production in the Bay region, a major source of charcoal, has also been accelerated, with exports flowing out of the Ceel Ma’aan port. A total of 89,600 metric tonnes of charcoal were exported through the Kismaayo and El-Ma’an ports during 2003.

The country’s wildlife population also suffered a similarly disastrous fate. A large number of wild animals was trapped and exported on the hoof. And with firearms flooding the countryside, Somalia’s wild animal populations were decimated by the efficient use of the gun in hunting. Exported or mercilessly gunned down in large numbers, Somalia’s wild animal resource was irresponsibly squandered, with some species probably condemned to total extinction. It seems that Somalia’s marine habitat has not fared any better.

Throughout the 1990s, deepwater fishing vessels flying flags of convenience of twenty or so different countries have regularly been seen fishing illegally within Somalia’s 12-mile territorial waters. This has caused wanton over-fishing possibly upsetting the balance of fish populations so critical for the sustainability of the ecosystem of the marine habitat of Somalia’s coast. A certain amount of marine and air pollution has also occurred as a result of spillage of oil and other contaminants from the fleet of foreign ships fishing within Somalia’s territorial waters.

Another threat, possibly more injurious to the environment than the illegal and indiscriminate over fishing cited above, is represented by the as yet unproven though widely reported, secret dumping of foreign industrial waste on Somalia’s soil and waters that has gone on during the 1990s. The absence of a central government allowed foreigners to dump toxic industrial waste on Somalia’s unguarded land and territorial waters. Scientific proof is not available, but the information contained in many investigative reports written by foreign journalists naming specific sites in Somalia where foreigners have supposedly dumped toxic industrial waste and possibly nuclear material, very hazardous to human life, is too weighty to ignore. Most fingers point to Italian criminal elements, appropriately named Environmental Mafia, who specialize in the business of exporting toxic wastes from industrially advanced countries and illegally depositing them in poorly guarded and conflict ridden third world countries. But it appears that culprits from other nationalities too have also begun to treat Somalia as an international industrial dust pin.
The likelihood of such criminal activities taking place has been enhanced by frequent sightings of containers floating very close to the shore or left behind on the beach by the receding tide or mysteriously appearing in remote inland places. The discovery of these mysterious containers has at times been accompanied by outbreaks of unknown illnesses causing the death of people as well as the demise of much wild and/or domesticated animals and the washing on shore of dead marine animals. These occurrences obviously lend credence to the widely held belief that environmental pollution in Somalia during the 1990s has been further complicated by the deliberate work of international criminal elements that, taking advantage of the absence of government, have secretly dumped unknown quantities of poisonous industrial waste that pose a serious threat to life in, and environment of, Somalia.
CHAPTER SEVEN

7. Social Services

7.1 Education

From the time of Independence in 1960, to the 1991 downfall of the military regime, state ministries and public agencies were responsible for the provision of essential social services in education, health, sanitation and water to most urban and some rural dwellers. These services were never sufficient, but were usually made available to citizens at no cost or at a greatly subsidized price. Most Somalis took these services for granted, considering their provision to be a state obligation, as well as forming part of their constitutional rights.

Among the many tragic consequences of the Somali civil war has been the destruction of the country’s modest infrastructure, which had been patiently built up over a hundred years. Clan militias expropriated all the private and public property they could lay their hands on. Factories, the country’s modest means of industrial production, were quickly dismantled, with the proceeds sold in the markets of neighbouring countries as spare parts or scrap metal. Health and educational institutions and water and sanitation facilities suffered a similar fate. Many schools and hospitals sustained physical damage. Some were occupied by clan militias or were taken over as dwellings by internal refugees, thus bringing to an end the provision of social services that the people had taken for granted.

In the aftermath of the state’s collapse, Somalis started to rebuild the social services sector. This process was accelerated by the intervention of the US-led multinational forces in 1992 which have provided. Limited social services were revived, among them the rebuilding of schools and the renovation of hospitals, providing logistics and technical support to the social services delivery agencies.

Somalia’s education system has passed through different stages throughout the country’s history and reached the most people in the mid 1970s and early 1980s. In order to understand the different cycles that the education system went through, it is important to evaluate these different stages in terms of students

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65 The arrival of massive international humanitarian assistance in the wake of Operation Restore Hope in late 1992, was followed by UNOSOM who took over from UNITAF, the international task force under US leadership that staged Operation Restore Hope. Schools and clinics offering basic education and emergency health services soon appeared in the localities where international forces were stationed. However, few of these facilities remained functional after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 5 March 1995.
reached and quality of education. This report focuses on how each phase distinctively contributed to the next.

**Phase I – 1950-1960:** This phase offered very limited education and only reached children of families who worked for or had good rapport with the colonial administration. Education programs of the colony were confined to clerical and administrative duties, something the colonial administrators needed at the time. During this phase, there were only two secondary schools for the entire south of the country, while the north had four schools, but with low numbers of student enrolment. University level education was non-existent.

**Phase II – 1960-1969:** During this phase, school enrolment increased, although it was limited to urban cities like Muqdisho, Kismaayo, Baidoa, Galkaio and other cities in the north. Private schools run by Christian missionaries, Islamic foundations and other private organizations also sprung up at this time. At independence, the country inherited two different educational systems: one in the northwest, where English was the language of instruction, and another in the south, where the languages of instruction were Italian and Arabic. One of the major challenges faced by successive governments was to establish an integrated system of education in Somalia.

The following two tables clearly illustrate the differences in number of schools and student enrolment during 1960 and 1990. At Independence in 1960, there were only 6 secondary schools, housing a total of 551 students. Just prior to the civil war in 1991, there were 101 secondary schools, with student enrolment at 60,000. In addition to formal education, there were also technical and vocational training schools, colleges and other institutions offering specialized skill development.

**Schools and Student Enrolment in 1960**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>12,767</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>14,072</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 Interview with Ahmed Abdullahi, the former Chairman of FPENS (Formal Private Education Networks for Somalia), Dec. 2003

**Phase III 1969-1990.** This phase marked the military take-over of the government in October 1969. One of the main objectives of the military regime was to fight illiteracy. They embarked on a campaign to revive the Somali education system by building schools, training teachers and developing a new education curriculum, which emphasized self-help called “Iskaa-wax-u-Qabso.” One of the military government’s policies was the introduction of compulsory education, which was offered for free, until students reached higher education.

The government introduced a new script for the Somali language in 1972 and immediately launched a massive literacy campaign to teach the new script throughout the country. Available data indicates that literacy was increased to more than 50 percent of the total population, as a result of this campaign. The Somali National University was established in 1970, with 13 faculties. Student enrolment was 5,432. Of the 719 professors, nearly all of them were foreigners. New faculties established included Medicine, Veterinary Medicine, Engineering (civil and electrical), Economics, Law, Languages, Education and Agriculture. Since 1976/77, the government had earmarked a large percentage of its budget for education (11.3 percent), but this figure dropped to 4.3 percent in 1984.

### 7.2 The Collapse of the Education System

The education system in Somalia was in the process of decline, long before the outbreak of civil war in 1991. Primary education enrolment had fallen to 58% total enrolment, representing less than 10% of the total primary-school age group. According to the available data, one-quarter of all primary schools were closed. Enrolment in secondary and technical vocational schools had sharply decreased from its peak years of 1969-1980. Nonetheless, the current crisis in education began well before the collapse of the military government. There are a number of factors that contributed to the decline of the Somali education system. One of these was years of grossly inadequate financing. The extremely low rate of pay, coupled with tough working conditions, reduced the number of qualified teachers.

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69 Report by Africa Muslims Agency, Mogadishu, 2002
The adoption of Somali as the language of instruction in all primary and secondary schools and the simultaneous enactment of an education policy that mandated free and compulsory primary education had both negative and positive impacts. On the positive side, many poor children, whose families could not otherwise have borne the cost of school tuition fees, benefited from the free education provided. Many adults also became literate by taking advantage of the greatly expanded adult education programs. On the negative side, the expansion of the education system resulted in a significant qualitative decline over time. All levels of education were affected by this decline. The government’s poor management of the education system, along with a growth in the labour market of the Gulf States, led qualified teachers to quit their jobs in Somalia in order to seek better employment in the oil-rich countries of the Gulf. The shortage of financing translated into a severe shortage of textbooks, teaching materials and facilities.

The civil war further damaged the already failing education system. In the early years of the conflict, physical education structures were vandalized and instructional equipment and materials looted. State and university libraries were looted, as were the stores of the National Curriculum Center. Newly published, but not yet used, textbooks were also destroyed. Students and teachers who managed to survive the violence of the civil war became IDPs or refugees in different parts of the world. The school infrastructures that remained became home to great numbers of internally displaced people. Similarly, the traditional Quranic schools attended by children as young as 5 years’ old were destroyed.

7.3 The Revival of Education

The schools and education system that currently operate emerged in the early 1990s, when a number of Islamic charities and Arab foundations began to invest in Somalia’s education sector, after the departure of international aid agencies from the West. Before the Islamic charities started supporting schools, a number of Western aid agencies tried to revive the education system. Many schools were rebuilt and teachers provided with an salary incentives under the process of revival. Currently, the types of schools found in Somalia include:

1. Formal schools that teach standard subjects in Arabic or English. These schools can be divided into three sub-groups:

   - Those run by local individuals or institutions, but assisted by Arab foundations. Attendance fees are subsidized.
   - Schools owned and run by local institutions with a high level of professional capacity and experience.
   - Public institutions that offer limited teaching. These are largely supported by international NGOs, such as Concern Worldwide,
2. Primary-level schools attended by the children of poor families who cannot afford regular school fees. These schools are not as well regarded as the formal schools in terms of curriculum and teaching quality. Nor do they operate regular school hours.

3. Private enterprise schools for adults that are housed in major urban centres in south-central Somalia. The majority of instructors in these schools are not certified.

4. Informal vocational training schools which provide a variety of skills’ training, such as computer technology, literacy and language skills and basic accounting, to name a few.

Despite the limitations of some of these categories, they do engage hundreds of children and youth, who might not otherwise have had the opportunity to be educated. As a consequence, they might have joined a militia or other criminal element of society.

Since the mid 1990s, school enrolment has steadily increased. Educational structures are now regularly being built. The new education sector has enabled families to send their children to schools. Islamic charities and Arab foundations have supported education networks with initial investments that helped to sustain an education system in the major urban areas of south-central Somalia. A significant number of Arab countries provide scholarships to graduates of these Somali schools under the Formal Public Education Network for Somalia (FPENS), based in Muqdisho. An improving security situation in many parts of south-central Somalia and rising expectations of families have encouraged many households to send their children to schools since 2000.

As the following table indicates, there is considerable variation in school enrolment levels across south-central Somalia:
## Schools Enrolment

### Figure 10: Schools and Student Enrolment 2001/2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of schools</th>
<th>Primary schools</th>
<th>Enrolment</th>
<th>% Girls</th>
<th>No. Of Teachers</th>
<th>Per teacher</th>
<th>No of Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7965</td>
<td>8068</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Juba</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7760</td>
<td>11893</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Shabelle</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15233</td>
<td>16073</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banaadir</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>46774</td>
<td>56163</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>1608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/juba</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8635</td>
<td>9972</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galgadu ud</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10509</td>
<td>8319</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>10807</td>
<td>13320</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiran</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11353</td>
<td>12980</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/shabel l</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3558</td>
<td>3598</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>20175</td>
<td>12061</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total SC</strong></td>
<td>564</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>142769</td>
<td>15244</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>37.76</td>
<td>5235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Somali a | 1105      | 119            | 258283    | 2868   | 35             | 35.9        | 8460        | 937        | 31         | 31         |

Source: UNICEF, 1, 2003

### Data Gap:

The authors of this report are concerned about the reliability of data from Table 10. Observations from CRD enumerators point to unexplained discrepancies between the number of schools that have been constructed and student enrolment, as noted in the widely-circulated UNICEF report. Because CRD was unable to conduct a comprehensive survey, largely due to financial constraints and a limited timeline, it was necessary to use the data provided by UNICEF and other agencies. However, the data does raise some serious questions for CRD, such as: a) what is the criterion for determining what constitutes a school; b) for how many hours each day are these schools in
operation; c) what are the qualifications of the teachers? and d) what education curriculum is used? During site visits, CRD enumerators observed that buildings in many rural and urban centres possess school names, but have no rooftops, chairs, tables and/or teachers. Some of the households that were asked whether there are schools in the area responded “no”. It is our experience that many households anticipate receiving funds for schools if they provide information about the existence of schools, even when there are no schools at all. This inherently biases the results. What is most astonishing to researchers, however, is that, according to the data, some regions now have more students and schools (2002) than during Siad Barre’s time, which is highly questionable. A notable example illustrating the unreliability of the data is that small towns like Bula Hawa boast 17 schools and 2,300 students while Garbaharey, a larger town that is also found in the Gedo region, has only 12 schools with 2,200 students. This seems highly doubtful to the CRD researchers.

The figures above reveal that, except in the case of the Galgadud and Bay regions, student enrolment in all regions of southern and central Somalia registered a noticeable increase for the academic school year of 2002. Although most schools share this trend of increased school enrolments, the Middle Jubba, Middle Shabeelle and Hiiran regions experienced much less enrolment than that of other regions. One possible explanation for the reduction in 2002 student enrolment in the Bay region can be attributed to its deteriorating security situation that followed the outbreak of war within the Rahan-Wayn Resistance Army (RRA). An internal power struggle for leadership led to violence and civil strife that has continued to rage on and off since 2002. The figures also reveal that school construction increased in the Bay region during this period, yet without a corresponding increase in student enrolment.

Figure 11: Yearly Growth of Schools

![Yearly Growth of Schools 2001-2002](chart)

Regions in south Central Somalia

![Regions in south Central Somalia](chart)
While the UNICEF data presents a number of inconsistencies, the Formal Public Education Network for Somalia (FPENS) has collected comprehensive and accurate data on education institutions in Muqdisho and its environs. Dating back to 1998, the data below provides a good overview of the development of the education sector.

**Figure 12: FPENS Student Enrolment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>16377</td>
<td>7982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>17633</td>
<td>9934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>25322</td>
<td>12720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>31581</td>
<td>15427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>40362</td>
<td>20805</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Muqdisho, there are currently 253 formal primary and secondary schools, an increase from the 215 in existence a year ago. Student enrolment in primary, intermediate and secondary schools is up from 66,094 in 2001, to well over 81,000 in 2002. This represents an increase of 18 percent in a one year period. In the 2002-03 school year, the number of teachers for these same schools increased from 1,674 to 2,051, an 18 percent increase in the figures of the previous year. Both the number of students and the number of teachers who were female grew during this time. Female students increased from 22,807 in the 2001/2 school year to 28,641 in the 2002/03 school year, an increase of 20 percent. This increase can be attributed to the improving security situation in the region, expanded school construction, the reduction of school fees and the increase in teachers who recently graduated from Muqdisho University’s Faculty of Education, as well as those coming from Sudan and Pakistan.

There are also schools in Muqdisho and the Lower Shabeelle region that are supported by Concern Worldwide Ireland. Four primary schools in Muqdisho benefit from their funding. These schools have a total student enrolment of 2,200. Female students constitute 35 percent of the 2,200.

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70 Source: CRD-Socio-Economic Assessment of South-central Somalia, December 2003

71 Ibid
Box 2: The History of Mohamud Harbi Primary School

Mohamud Harbi Primary School was built in the early 1970s with funds provided by the European Union. After the collapse of the Barre regime, the school was completely destroyed and looted. In early 1993, a group of former teachers, supported by CARE International and the African Muslim Agency (AMA), a Kuwaiti-based NGO, resurrected the school.

With financial help from AMA, the school was converted to become an orphanage with capacity to house 150 boys. An additional structure was built as a primary school with 16 classrooms. Another European NGO (Diakonia of Sweden) added 10 more classrooms, while AMA and CARE built an additional 6. As a strategy to attract enrolment, the school offered free food, educational materials and uniforms. After a few years, however, the school discontinued these incentives. As a cost recovery scheme, the school introduced a small fee of U.S. $0.80 per student per month, which is now up to U.S. $5. Today, the school operates two shifts and has more than 1,900 students, 150 of whom are orphans fully supported by AMA. By the end of 2003, about 1,500 students finished primary education at the school, a majority of whom now continue their education at secondary school. Each academic school year, the three best students from secondary school obtain scholarships in Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, Malaysia, Jordan or Pakistan.

Source: Interview with Abdikarim Hussein Guled, Deputy Director, AMA, Mogadishu, 07 February 2004.

7.4 Higher Education

With the country still in political turmoil and its people suffering economic hardship, it has been all but impossible to generate funds to start and maintain educational institutions in general, and those of higher education, in particular. Somalis’ historical dependence on the state for the delivery of education and other essential social services has been a major obstacle to providing sustainable social services, particularly in the education sector. It is unheard of to have private individuals and businesses invest in education for profit, even though this has begun in Somalia. Investment in higher education is particularly difficult as a substantial amount of money is required for start up.

Many Somalis have recognized the need for institutions offering university level education to the increasing number of high school graduates and a number of Somali academics were able to re-establish higher education institutions in Muqdisho with external support. Today, there are several higher education
institutions offering post-secondary education with internationally-accredited degree and diploma programs.

The Somali Institute for Management and Administration Development (SIMAD)

SIMAD is the only credited institute in south-central Somalia that offers post-secondary diplomas. Since its inception in November 1998, the institute has produced a number of graduates from Accounting, Information Technology and Business Administration programs. The institute currently has 570 students (2004), an increase from 125 in 1999. Out of these 570 students, 66 are female. The institute also offers short-term (6 months) courses in select subjects such as marketing, computer programming, networking, English as a Second Language (ESL) and other continuing education courses.

The institute has a full-time teaching staff of 25, with qualifications ranging from Bachelor’s degrees to PhDs. Forty percent of the teachers are expatriates recruited from outside Somalia, and they include a number of Somali professionals who have returned from the Diaspora. The institute gives scholarships to A-level female graduates and students from disadvantaged backgrounds to pursue post-graduate degree programs in other countries. The institute is able to cover all its own costs for salaries and administration through tuition charges. The institute also regularly receives limited funds for capital construction.

Muqdisho University

Muqdisho University was inaugurated in 1997, after several earlier attempts to open it failed due to security-related constraints. The university has six faculties: Law & Islamic Shari’a, Education, Economics, Arts, Computer Science and an Institute of Nursing. The number of students currently enrolled at the university is 1,800, and it has produced 300 graduates thus far. The university employs both Somalis and expatriate professors from Kenya and India. It has established formal academic linkages with institutions and universities in Sudan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait. The tuition fees range from U.S. $300 to 800 per year.

The university has always faced, and continues to face, the challenge of providing education under extremely difficult conditions. Among these many challenges are the shortage of qualified instructors, equipment, books, library resources and research facilities. Other challenges include the constant insecurity in the city, a weak academic base resulting from the country’s current system of

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72 Interview with Hussein Iman, MU Community Coordinator, Mogadishu, February 2004
education and the inability to gain international recognition for the degrees it offers.

7.5 Critical Issues in Educations

- The present education system in south-central Somalia is different in terms of access and quality from the one that existed before 1989. Today, the focus of education is on primary schooling, even though the need for secondary and higher education is on the increase.

- Another key issue related to access is affordability. Almost all educational services are fee-based in Somalia. The most expensive schools are those owned by local NGOs which are not supported by either donor or charity organizations and must sustain themselves with school fees.

- The quality of education is generally poor because most teachers are either not trained or academically unqualified. Those who were trained before the civil war has been absent from the profession for some time and have not updated their skills before rejoining the profession.

- The lack of a standardized national curriculum presents a serious problem for education. The curriculum varies from school to school. Usually, teaching materials and methodologies are either based on the pre-war Somali curriculum or on the curricula of Arab countries. UNESCO and UNICEF recently completed a joint project to “rewrite” and “improve” the last national curriculum, using Somali and Kenyan resource people.

7.6 Health

Somalia’s health services started to decline years before the outbreak of civil war in 1991. The country’s public health infrastructure, like all other public buildings, was either looted or physically destroyed with the advent of war. The country was left without any institutions to care for the sick and the wounded. Seventy-two percent of the Somali population has either minimal or no access whatsoever to healthcare. As a result, Somalia has fallen to the bottom position in healthcare rankings in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most studies place the average life expectancy of a Somali at 46 years for men and 47 for women. The infant mortality rate is estimated at 125 per 1,000 live births (higher than the average in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is 97 per 1000). Nearly a quarter of all children (22.4%) die before their fifth birthdays. There are less than 15 qualified doctors per one million people in the country. (MFS 2003 and UNDP 2002).
Prior to the civil war, there were 411 healthcare facilities across the country. These consisted of 94 MCH centres, 50 primary health care units, 52 district hospitals, 19 regional hospitals, 4 general hospitals and 17 specialized hospitals. Most of these facilities were operating at less than optimum levels, even before the civil war. By 1999, 90% of these facilities had been seriously damaged or looted. The Somali National University, which had over 250 medical students enrolled at the start of the civil war, closed and a substantial number of qualified or qualifying health workers migrated out of the country. Most of those remaining in the country moved to urban centres, where they opened private practices.

Available research estimates that only about 35% of Somali children are immunized against diphtheria, measles and polio before the age of one. Approximately 10% of women during pregnancy or at childbirth are attended to by trained personnel. 1997/8 UNICEF surveys indicate that, in the north, health professionals care for 19% of women during childbirth. The figure is even lower in the central and southern regions (around 10%). Urban residents have better access to private healthcare than people in rural areas, since healthcare facilities do not exist in small rural communities. Muqdisho boasts the best health service facilities of all towns in the southern and central regions of Somalia. Most of the health professionals who remained in the country now live and practice only in urban areas, such as Muqdisho, Beled Weyne and Marka. For more than a decade, there have been no healthcare training institutions in the southern and central regions of Somalia. Consequently, health workers in the area have not had the opportunity to upgrade their knowledge and skills. This has resulted in the region having the least skilled medical personnel attending to patients in need.

Some former government hospitals continued to operate in Belet Weyne, the Hiran region, Jowhar, the Middle Shabeelle region, Marka in Lower Shabeelle and Jilib in the Middle Juba region. These are the only hospitals to have retained of the capacity to care for public health. Low income groups and IDPs have access to these health centers. They are heavily dependent on external support for medical and pharmaceutical supplies, as well as payment of doctors’ salaries. The table below lists some of the hospitals that were re-opened in 1995. A majority of healthcare centers operate far below their capacity, due to a shortage of medicine and qualified health workers.
Table 5: List of Public Hospitals (formerly government-run, that remain open to the public)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of Hospitals</th>
<th>No of qualified Doctors</th>
<th>Main diseases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Mudug</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>TB/malaria &amp; diarrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galgaduud</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>TB/malaria &amp; diarrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiran</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TB/malaria &amp; diarrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Shabelle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>ARI/bilharzia &amp; malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Shabelle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>TB/Malaria &amp; diarrhea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anemia/TB/worms &amp; STD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakool</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bilharzia, TB, STD and malaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>TB/malaria &amp; intestinal disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L/Juba</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>TB/Malaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M/Juba</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Malaria/worms/bilharzia/STD &amp; TB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banadir</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>TB, Malaria, Diaphone, STD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CRD socio-Economic Assessment of South Central Somalia, 2003

These hospitals often have only one or two qualified doctors. These doctors are usually supported by visiting medical professionals when they perform specialized operations. Most serious cases are referred to the private clinics in Muqdisho.

For the rest of the south-central regions, there are some regional hospitals and MCH posts that are run by local health personnel and sometimes supported by visiting expatriates.

Businessmen with no pharmaceutical training dispense drugs without requiring prescriptions. Medical drugs are also available for purchase from street vendors. It is widely believed and supported by many of those interviewed, that expired drugs are sold openly in the markets of south-central Somalia.

7.7 Major Health Challenges

Medicines sans frontiers (MSF) has found, based on 16 years of involvement in Somalia’s healthcare sector, that the greatest sources of illness and mortality in the country are diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, cholera, malaria,
tuberculosis and measles. Somalia is a high-risk zone for outbreaks of dysentery and meningitis (UNICEF, 2001). Poor living and sanitary conditions, unclean drinking water and non-existent or substandard healthcare services all contribute to the high rate of infant mortality and shortened life expectancy in Somalia.

According to the MSF, since 1994, regular epidemics of cholera and measles have occurred because of the collapse of sanitation systems and overcrowding in the IDP camps. Outbreaks of measles are frequent as a result of low immunization levels among children in the region. An outbreak of Rift Valley Fever, in the aftermath of the 1997/98 floods, affected both humans and livestock, causing serious devastation to the population and the land of the Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions during the long period of drought that followed the outbreak.

Malaria, another major killer, does not uniformly affect the regions of south-central Somalia. The areas within, or close to the river valleys and the territorial belt bordering the ocean record the highest infection rates. Nomadic groups are also vulnerable to malaria. This makes south-central Somalia particularly susceptible to malaria epidemics, given the fact that IDPs, usually the first line of infection, have settled in the region. The World Health Organization (WHO) has begun to implement a program to ‘roll back’ malaria in some parts of southern Somalia. Populations are targeted in the Hiiran, Lower Juba, Middle Shabelle and Banadir regions.

Other major contributor to mortality includes intestinal parasites, skin infections, malnutrition and anaemia in children. The leading causes of death among Somali mothers are bleeding after childbirth and a lack of antenatal or postnatal care, in addition to the other ailments and causes that they share with the general populace.

7.8 HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention is extremely limited. According to SAID, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Somalia was 0.9 in 2002. However, this was not based on any systematic data collection. The Al-Hayat Hospital, one of the largest in Muqdisho, had 5 confirmed cases from 2001 to 2003. The hospital’s medical staff, however, admitted that they frequently come across poor patients who appear to have AIDS’ symptoms, but can either not afford to have proper HIV testing or simply refuse to be checked. As in many other parts of Africa, the negative cultural stigma attached to the disease makes it much harder to detect. The highest awareness levels of the disease can be found among travellers, lorry drivers and returnees from the Diaspora. AIDS’ awareness campaigns are in their infancy and are regularly challenged by Islamic and traditional cultural leaders. Recently, an AIDS rally to raise awareness was chased off the streets of Merka
and accused of introducing immoral and alien values into society. The leader of the group SOM explained the following in an interview with IRIN after the incident:

It is going to be very difficult to convince Somalis about this. Ignorance mixed with denial is the biggest impediment. People, even educated ones, are likely to say, "This disease cannot happen here". In some areas it would be next to impossible to bring together groups to openly discuss AIDS. In my case, I lost two very close relatives to HIV/AIDS. That is why I am involved. I know it is real and it kills.\(^{73}\)

While this group’s experience is all too familiar in Africa, and the consequences for not acting are very serious, there does not appear to be any urgency on the part of health organizations to get involved in the prevention of the epidemic.

### 7.9 War Casualties

After fourteen years of civil war, Somalia's war-dead and wounded exceed more than 400,000.\(^{74}\) At the MSF health centre in Xudur, gunshot wounds accounted for 46 percent of all pathologies in the surgery room between January and June 2002.\(^{74}\) In Galkaayo's hospital, war trauma accounted for 48 percent of all morbidity in the hospital's emergency room (ER), for both 2000 and 2001. A further 500 wounded patients are brought annually to the ER room.

Even though a majority of combatants are male, war trauma affects women and children, as well. MSF's outpatient facility (OPD) in Yaqshid, Muqdisho, saw 3,063 'trauma and burn' cases among the male population older than 15 in 2001. Among women, the figure was only 334. Looting and pillaging lead to violent death, displacement and the loss of livelihood among civilians.

Landmines are responsible for wounding and killing civilians on a regular basis. There are large numbers of unexploded mines scattered throughout south-central Somalia, including in some areas with high-density populations like Muqdisho. Most mines were that were placed by militias during the civil war were not recorded. Many hospitals routinely see and treat victims of landmine explosions every day.

Hospital records obtained for this study show that 40 – 50% of all hospital beds are occupied with people recuperating from or waiting for an operation from gunshot wounds. A physical count of patients during a visit to the Daynile Hospital in southwest Muqdisho, which was opened only a few weeks earlier,

\(^{73}\) IRIN Report July 2003

\(^{74}\) MSF Regional Report, 2002
revealed that, 12 out of 16 of patients booked into the hospital during the previous five days, had sustained gunshot wounds while in the vicinity of Muqdisho and were awaiting various types of operations.

As illustrated in Table 18, only four (highlighted in the table) out of 28 health centres in Muqdisho provide free or subsidized medical care to the public. Patients are treated on a cost-sharing basis (the patient and hospital share the costs), but emergency cases are all attended to, regardless of their ability to pay. Most of these hospitals are affiliated with international NGOs, such as the ICRC who pay the salaries of senior staff and supply the medical equipment. These hospitals are referred to as public health service providers, in part, because they are located in former government hospitals that have been reconstructed. Some private hospitals such as the Arafat Specialist Medical Center and Al-Hayat offer free medical check-ups, one day each week, for the most vulnerable and lowest income sector of the population.

Individuals, whose qualifications cannot be readily established, run most of the other private clinics. There are strong indications that a good number of these institutions are run by unqualified ‘doctors’. Of the 51 doctors listed as working in hospitals below, the Somali Medical Association recognizes only 38.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Center Name</th>
<th>Ownership</th>
<th>No. Of Doctors</th>
<th>No. Of Beds</th>
<th>No of war Related casualties</th>
<th>Average No. Treated daily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Keysaney Hospital</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Al-imran Hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Mogadishu Vol. Hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Xabeb Vol. Hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Xannaano maternity hos.</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Al-rahma clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Furqan clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Kulle clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ayan hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Wayo-arag clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Hassan jiis hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ciro medical hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Lafweyn maternity hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Al-xayat medical group</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. SOS mother &amp; child clinic</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>N/a</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Shifo voluntary hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Bexani voluntary hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Arafat specialist medical hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Madina hospital</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Sinai medical center</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. MCH wadajir</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Sheikh muhudin clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Royal medical &amp; diagnostic center</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Guled medical center</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Daarushifaa clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Daynille Hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Cosob clinic</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Ramadaan hospital</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>51</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2864</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER EIGHT

8. Infrastructure

Before the outbreak of civil war, Somalia’s physical infrastructure, only partially developed to begin with, was in dire straits. The severe shortage of resources, coupled with a lack of any investment in infrastructure, contributed to its deterioration through a lack of maintenance. The only resources available for capital investment were funds donated by aid agencies. Over the last eight years, much of the country’s infrastructure has not only suffered neglect, but has been deliberately looted.

The hardest hit has been the transportation infrastructure. Somalia’s road network consists of over 21,000 roads, including primary roads which link to major urban centres. There are also secondary roads that connect to rural feeder roads (unpaved). The main road linking the south (Kismaayo) to the central region (Galka’yo) stretches 2000 km long, less than one-fourth of these roads are passable. Mogadishu’s main airport and seaport have remained closed since 1995. The modern Kismaayo airport and seaport, which was rehabilitated by the U.S. government and inaugurated in 1986, are infrequently used, due to limited business activities in Lower Juba and the surrounding regions.

All public telecommunications and electric facilities have been destroyed or looted; some parts are even sold as scrap in different parts of the world. Most of the public buildings that used to house ministries, agencies, schools, and universities are now occupied by politically-motivated IDPs. Some buildings have been converted into commercial enterprises by their occupiers. Landmark hotels, monuments and other official or heritage buildings have largely been destroyed.

8.1 Transport Roads

The most important road network in the southern and central regions of Somalia consists of highways linking Kismaayo to Muqdisho, Muqdisho to Baidoa and Muqdisho to Beled Weyne and Galka’yo. About 460 km, out of a total of 2000 km, from Kismaayo to Galka’yo is completely worn and out of commission. The only good paved all-weather roads in the whole 11 regions are the Muqdisho to

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75 A framework for planning long-term reconstruction and recovery was developed by a multi-donor task force, under the coordination of the World Bank in 1993.

76 In this report, politically motivated IDPs refers to the large wave of migrants from the central regions who occupy state-owned buildings and consider themselves official residents of the urban cities. For further information, please refer to CRD’s country note to be released in the spring 2004.
Baidoa and Beled Weyne to Gaalkayo roads, which are less than 700 km. The major highways that link Muqdisho to the agricultural regions of the Middle and Lower Shabeelle (90 km north and south of Muqdisho) are completely worn out. The poor condition of these roads, coupled with insecurity and many militia checkpoints, has significantly increased the cost of transporting goods and services to and from these regions. As a result, agricultural production and investment in other sectors has been reduced. Some regions in south-central Somalia are full of landmines, further impeding the transp of goods.

Some remote regions (the coastal districts of the Galguduud region, parts of the Hiran region, Middle Shabeelle and Bay and Bakool) that are vital to peoples’ livelihoods also mined. This has limited the movement of people and goods in a myriad of ways.

While roads have deteriorated, the vehicle trade through the Ceel-Maan seaport in Muqdisho has been growing. Vehicle dealer, Ahmed Mohamed Nur, asserts that an average of 35 vehicles, mostly buses and small cars, are imported every month through the Ceel-maan natural seaport. Unfortunately, the condition of the roads makes traffic movement slow and difficult, once the vehicles have arrived.

### 8.2 Post and Telecommunications

Before the civil war, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications provided both postal and telephone services throughout the country. Telephone lines were not available outside of the capital and a few other major cities, and services were poor and outdated. There are a number of factors that contributed to the unsatisfactory services, including weak institutional arrangements, a lack of trained service technicians, limited financial resources and corruption. A former officer of the Post and Telecommunications Ministry indicated that, in 1988, a bilateral agreement between Somalia and Japan was intended to develop the telecommunications sector. During the first phase, Muqdisho was provided with modern switchboards offering landlines to businesses, offices and households. This new telecommunications system was completely destroyed during the war - cables were dug up, switchboards dismantled and telephone poles uprooted.

In the first few years of the civil war, communication between Somalis in the Diaspora and their relatives in the country was difficult. The use of VHF radios made communication between people easier. In 1993, a number of Somalis from the Diaspora were encouraged to establish modern telecommunications networks in Muqdisho. Access to telecommunications began to improve for people. The

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77 Source: CRD-Socioeconomic Assessment of South-Central Somalia, December 2003
cost for both local and international calls was drastically cut, and households and businesses were able to take advantage of effective telecommunications. Out of an estimated 1.5 million people in Muqdisho alone, 0.3 telephone lines are available for every 100 people, according to interviews with the three major telecommunications companies in Mogadishu.

All the three major telecommunications companies based in Muqdisho offer fixed rate landline services, as well as mobile and Internet services charged by the minute. Telecommunication services are rapidly expanding, with increased access provided by local, privately owned companies.\textsuperscript{78}

A major drawback of the telecommunications boom is the inability, or unwillingness, of the three companies to integrate their services, enabling customers of all three companies to communicate with one another, without incurring additional distance charges. Recently, there have been some negotiations between the three companies to amalgamate their services. A test project is underway.

The expansion of remittance companies, which depend heavily on the telephone service, has accelerated the growth of telephone services throughout Somalia, and in the south-central regions, in particular. The two services (remittances and telecommunications) go hand in hand, as family members call each other when sending and receiving remittances. The provision of these services has not only helped people and businesses, but it has also generated employment opportunities for many Somalis.

Telecom companies offer other services, such as power, water and remittances, to many customers living in the regions and districts where they operate. They usually buy generators with the capacity to provide surplus electricity to many households and businesses in all major towns of south-central Somalia. In some areas, rural households are also provided with an electricity source to pump water from boreholes. The provision of electricity to households, especially in the rural areas, is usually free of charge (Abudwak, Guriel, Beled Weyne, Baidoa, Kismaayo and others receive this service). Since the outbreak of civil war in 1991, the emergence of telecommunications companies has created employment opportunities, increased the standard of living of people and attracted professionals back to towns in south-central Somalia.

\section*{8.3 Ports}

Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and has established four main seaports: Muqdisho, Kismaayo, Bossaso and Berbera. Muqdisho’s main seaport

\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Nation Link’s Managing Director, Mogadishu, February 2004
has been closed since 1995, following the departure of the US/UN intervention forces. Nor is the port of Kismaayo fully functional. Attempts to re-open the Muqdisho seaport have failed, since the competing interests of the different armed political factions have continued to fight for control over potential resources generated by the seaport. Instead of being stymied by this struggle, a number of businessmen got together to open a small, natural seaport outside of Muqdisho, the Ceel-maan seaport. This is the largest of the present natural seaports and handles most of the import and export traffic, including commodities such as construction materials, consumables, fuel and vehicles.

Ceel-cadde, a smaller port operated by one businessman, handles the traffic of fuel tankers, as well as charcoal and metal scrap export. There are also three other natural beach ports in south-central Somalia: Hobyo, which mainly handles fishing export and small-scale livestock exports; Marka, which oversees the export of bananas and charcoal, and the import of internationally donated food to the region; and, finally, the Barava district seaport, which engages in small scale fishing export. The development of other potential natural seaports that could engage in small scale export and import of goods is underway.

These natural ports export a substantial amount of commodities to various destinations around the world. For example, in 2003, imports at the Ceel-maan port exceeded 478,000 metric tonnes. The following tables illustrate the volume of imports and exports of different commodities that were handled by Ceel-maan over the last two years. More than 90% of the export volume from Ceel-cadde port is charcoal, which is shipped to the Arabian Gulf. It has been difficult to obtain data about the port city of Kismaayo because the Juba Valley alliance (JVA), currently controlling the area, is sensitive to accusations of environmental disaster. Estimates of charcoal export from the Kismaayo port claim that the volume is three times that volume of Ceel-cadde, according to interviews with officials in the seaport.

Table 7: Import/Export from the Natural Seaports of Muqdisho in Metric Tonnes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import Totals</th>
<th>Export Totals</th>
<th>Charcoal</th>
<th>Livestock</th>
<th>Sesame</th>
<th>Hides</th>
<th>Scrap metal</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>395,069</td>
<td>46,602.30</td>
<td>29,069</td>
<td>8301</td>
<td>303.5</td>
<td>8624</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>184.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>478,113</td>
<td>51,942.9</td>
<td>48,467.2</td>
<td>2514</td>
<td>560.7</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>873,182</strong></td>
<td><strong>98,545.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,536</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,815</strong></td>
<td><strong>864.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>8983</strong></td>
<td><strong>229.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>204.18</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79 CRD-Socio-Economic Assessment of South-Central Somalia December 2003
The operation of these small natural seaports will continue until the major seaports are rehabilitated. Among the problems facing these main seaports is the need to repair and maintain marine structures, quays and breakwaters. Unfortunately, pavement, pollards and power supplies – which existed before the civil war has been damaged or destroyed; they all require extensive repairs and replacement and maintenance.

8.4 Airports and Airlines

Prior to the civil war, south-central Somalia had two international civilian airports, one in Muqdisho and one in Kismaayo. Two military airports were also established at Baidoa and Balli-dogle. The main Mogadishu airport has been closed since the departure of the UN peacekeepers in 1995. However, there are still a number of airstrips across the region where commercial airlines takeoff and land. There are an estimated 29 airstrips in south-central Somalia that are mainly used by the small planes chartered by aid agencies. Commercial Qat aircraft and very limited passenger flights are also routed through these airstrips. The movement of goods and people has improved dramatically as a result of the establishment of these airstrips.

Before the civil war, there was one state-owned commercial airline (Somali Airlines), which connected the country to the rest of the world. There are now three trans-national carriers that are privately-owned by Somali businessmen and women. The three major airline companies are DAALLO Airlines, Juba Airways and Air Afrique. The nascent airline industry, most of it privately owned, is the first of its kind since Independence. Together these three airlines make more than 10 flights a week from Muqdisho, enroute to Nairobi, Dubai, Sharjah, Jeddah, Paris, Asmara and Djibouti.
Juba Airways alone has exported thousands of metric tonnes of chilled meat from Muqdisho to the United Arab Emirates. The total value of this meat cargo is more than U.S. $2 – 3.3 million.\textsuperscript{80} Dubai is the major gateway linking Somalia’s cargo exports to the outside world. Armed groups control most of these airstrips and charge landing and passenger exit fees.

The airline industry has had a notable impact on the socio-economic situation in Somalia, particularly in south-central Somalia. The industry has created employment for a number of Somalis. It has also eased and expanded Somalia’s link to the outside world, encouraging the Somali Diaspora to access Somalia’s different regions. The airline also facilitates the expansion of Somali trade with the regional states and other countries.

\textsuperscript{80} Source: CRD-Socio-Economic Assessment of South-Central Somalia, December 2003
CHAPTER NINE

9. The Media

9.1 Media Services

As the civil war erupted and state institutions disintegrated, Somalis, weary of decades-long media censorship, established private newspapers and radio outlets. Unfortunately, the new media quickly became a vehicle through which to fuel conflict among rival clans. Each media outlet represented a different clan and used propaganda to defend its clan and denigrate the others. The media thus contributed to increasing polarization in Somalia. It was one of the tools exploited by warlords to feed the civil war and it lasted for about a decade.  

As conflicts subsided, the media began to reinvent itself in order to work within the new social framework. Militancy and warmongering became outdated. The process of evolution has been very gradual – this change did not happen overnight.

The first privately-owned commercial FM radio station was established in 1999 by Somalis from the Diaspora and has subsequently developed into a multimedia enterprise with Radio, TV and Website. Over the years, other private FM radios, newspapers and more than two dozen websites operated by Somalis in the Diaspora began operations. Currently, there are about seven FM radio stations in Muqdisho and one each in Beled Weyne, Baidoa, Jowhar, Marka and Kismaayo. The range of transmission of these FM radios is limited; nonetheless, they provide news, entertainment and other useful programs to Somalis.

The environment in south-central Somalia is not yet ripe for freedom of speech. Guns are widely available in the bigger cities like Mogadishu, Kismaayo, Baidoa and Beled Weyne. Warlords have divided the region into clan fiefdoms. The media cannot serve its purpose in objectively reporting the actions of political leaders. The very fact that communities are armed jeopardizes a reporter’s life. Yet, there are cross-cutting business interests that supersede clan-based interests.

Over time, the media has positioned itself to adapt to the new situation in Somalia. Media owners shifted from disseminating propaganda to a business orientation. Clan interests have given way to fierce competition for markets. Community-oriented programs targeting different population groups emerged. Now, more airtime is given to issues that promote peace and education.

The Somali public is skeptical that opinions stated in newspapers and other media outlets are devoid of clan-based biases that serve the interests of the owners’ clan affiliates. A lack of ethics in journalism and the dearth of proper training does, at times, result in the production of tabloid stories that have no basis in truth. This fact, coupled with the heightened political consciousness and wary nature of Somalis, means that news in Somalia can create violence and unrest through propaganda.

According to the CRD/World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework report, the media in south-central Somalia can be divided into six categories: 1) media owned by political factions (mainly radio); 2) media owned by the Transitional National Government (TNG) – both radio and newspapers; 3) media owned by business groups; 4) externally-funded media outlets; 5) internet-based websites that take the form of radio and electronic wire news reporting; and 6) private print media, such as newsletters and bulletins.

1) Media owned by political factions: A number of armed political faction leaders and de facto regional administrations have established local media outlets for the purpose of disseminating their political agenda.

2) Media owned by the TNG: The government established in Arta, Djibouti on August 2000 has established a local radio station with limited capacity to reach the wider region. The station suffers from chronic cash shortages, a lack of skilled journalists and poor programming. The TNG newspaper has not been in existence since 2001, due to a shortage of incentive (staff salary and cash).

3) Media owned by business groups: These radios are intended to provide profits through advertising services. They also provide listeners with advertisement-supported programs, such as peace, education and other public services. Business-owned media is mainly found in an electronic format that reaches the largest audience across south-central Somalia. In Muqdisho, there are two main TV networks owned by businessmen, the first of their kind since Independence.

4) Externally-funded media outlets: There are a few radios stations based in Muqdisho that are funded from external sources. They broadcast specific programs targeted to specific constituencies.

5) Internet & Websites: These are internet sites that disseminate clan-based information. These sites are housed abroad and controlled and managed by Somalis in the Diaspora.

6) Newsletters: In Muqdisho alone, there are nearly a dozen locally-produced new letters. These tend to be in tabloid style and report on daily events in the region. Because of their cheaper cost and their ease to read, they have substantial readership in the region.

(CRD/World Bank Report 2004).
Operating mass media in present-day Somalia is not an easy task, even in the absence of government censorship. To freely operate a media business, owners must have the capacity to defend themselves militarily against ever-present threats of violence. Faction leaders and other interest groups frequently resort to bribery and intimidation when their interests are violated through the media. The ethics of responsible journalism, the pursuit of excellence in quality and respect for others’ rights have not been trademarks of many media operations. In spite of all these problems, and, contrary to earlier predictions, the mass media in Somalia is thriving as a profitable enterprise.

On the other hand, the media has facilitated the open discussion among average citizens of issues relating to security, socioeconomic problems, politics, religion, and family and community affairs. Live, daily radio talk-shows address a variety of topics and offer opportunities for the public to contribute to discussions through call-ins. However, as the media begins to intensify its commercialization, its influence as a credible social force diminishes with the public.
CHAPTER TEN

10. Cross-Cutting Themes

10.1 The Militarization of Somalia

Somali governments, prior to the civil war, were beneficiaries of the Cold War through funding from its patrons—the former Soviet Union and the USA—Somalia was able to build one of the most powerful armies in Africa. Supplying the army depleted the meagre resources of the country. It is reported that nearly 60% of Somalia’s state budget was used for military purposes.

The easy access to weapons has created an anarchic environment, where clan militia and freelance gangs perpetuate violence. Since there are no rules of engagement to protect disadvantaged groups, the militarization of Somalia has led to serious human rights abuses.  

The collapse of the Somali Army, and the subsequent abandonment of its arms depots, created a huge supply of weapons that even the decade-long civil war could not exhaust. This weapon supply found its way into the hands of the Somali public, thereby creating a militarized society. The weapons market flourished in Muqdisho and elsewhere in Somalia, but was especially concentrated in the south-central region, where the major military weapon’s depots were situated. Somali’s neighbouring countries have also provided a fair supply of weapons, particularly when peace processes in their countries have collapsed.

Although the war has subsided and its intensity abated, weapons are still in abundant supply in Somalia. The difference is that much of it has been transferred into the hands of businessmen, who, unlike the warlords, are driven by profit rather than political motives. For business owners, weapons are used to protect their business interests. This has helped to transform the war from being clan motivated to being profit oriented.

10.2 The Proliferation of Weapons

Most weapons entering Somalia come from Ethiopia, Yemen, Libya and Eritrea. Since 1993, after the cease-fire declaration between warring factions in Somalia, the U.N. has imposed numerous Security Council Resolutions that ban the import of all kinds of weapons into Somalia, but none have been followed. In response to the mass influx of small arms into Somalia, the UN Security Council appointed

82 CRD/World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework Report 2004
a Panel of Experts to “investigate the violations of the arms embargo covering access to Somalia by land, air and sea, in particular by pursuing any sources that might reveal information related to violations” (May 3, 2002). The panel was also expected to provide recommendations on practical steps to further strengthen the enforcement of the arms embargo.\textsuperscript{83} This, like many of the resolutions that preceded it, is not likely to work, despite the fact that the current National Reconciliation Conference appears to support effective implementation.\textsuperscript{84}

It is currently estimated that more than 500,000 small to medium-sized arms are in the hands of five different categories of people in southern and central Somalia\textsuperscript{85}. These groups are comprised of:

1. The Transitional National Government (TNG),
2. Faction and Clan Leaders,
3. Armed Business Militias,
4. Freelance Criminal Gangs, and
5. The Armed Public.

Claiming to be the national government responsible for maintaining peace and security in the country, the TNG asserts that it has legitimate reasons to possess arms. Its authority has been consistently challenged since its arrival in the national capital. Whatever the case, the TNG has acquired arms from different sources like friendly African and Arab countries.\textsuperscript{86} The commanders put in charge of the TNG’s security forces have managed to stash most of the arms acquired by the TNG.

Weapons that have found their way into the hands of business groups were either bought in local arms’ markets or bought from faction leaders in need of cash. This is especially common when faction leaders receive new arms shipments. Armed faction leaders have substantial amounts of weapons and other forms of armaments. Most weapons possessed by criminal gangs and the general public are light weapons (AK47 automatic), easily found in the open markets of major cities. The price of these weapons varies, depending on the supply and demand, both in the southern and central regions and in other parts

\textsuperscript{83} United Nations Security Council Resolution 733 (1992)

\textsuperscript{84} Participants in the current Somalia National Peace Conference in Eldoret, Kenya have signed a “Declaration on the Cessation of Hostilities”. The declaration commits the signatories, among other things, to “implementation of the United Nations Arms Embargo”.

\textsuperscript{85} Interview with General Mohamed Abdi, Demobilization expert, Mogadishu, December, 2003

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
of the country. The following table illustrates the different types of weapons sold in the markets of south-central Somalia.

**Table 8: Weapons Available in the Open Market**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Light Weapons</th>
<th>Automatic Guns</th>
<th>Mines &amp; Bombs</th>
<th>Heavy Weapons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT-Pistol (Russian)</td>
<td>AK 47 Korea</td>
<td>F1 Russia</td>
<td>DCK/Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium Pistol</td>
<td>M 16 USA</td>
<td>ANTI-TANK missile KOREA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft barrel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Caliber 9 USA 45 Revolver</td>
<td>SAR 80 USA</td>
<td>BTM 1157 Russia</td>
<td>ZKU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA 45 Revolver G.3 (DKM)</td>
<td>SAR 80 USA</td>
<td>RPG 2 and 7</td>
<td>M69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M 52 India/ DKM</td>
<td>106 recoilless antitank cannon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BKM (Russian)</td>
<td>60, 80 and 120 Mortar</td>
<td>B10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the major problems with weapons’ proliferation is the vicious cycle of killings that occur in the regions and are perpetuated by the endless supply of lethal weapons to the armed groups.\(^{87}\) The availability of small arms and light weapons and their subsequent use in conflicts in south-central Somalia poses a serious threat to thousands of children, women and the elderly. Since 1990, thousands of Somali children have been killed in war; many more have been seriously injured; and families have been driven from their homes.\(^{88}\) There would be no casualties were it not for the availability of weapons in open markets.

A UNICEF-commissioned report compiled by CRD indicates that a high percentage of Somali children have access to weapons. This means that uncontrolled arms proliferation in Somalia has a serious and direct impact on the most vulnerable groups in the society – children. Each year, hundreds of children are caught between warring factions and many are killed through direct participation in armed conflicts.\(^{89}\)

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\(^{87}\) On Dec. 24, 2002 unidentified gunmen opened indiscriminate fire on a school bus, killing 3 and injuring 11 others in Muqdisho. Similarly, in early 1991, 75 innocent civilians from minority clans (mainly women and children) were massacred in north Muqdisho.

\(^{88}\) A report submitted by Olara Otunnu, UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict to the Security Council, 1998

10.3 Human Rights’ Issues in a Lawless State

Human rights violations have been a serious problem in Somalia, particularly after the collapse of the state. The civil war has left behind permanent emotional scars. The traditional Somali respect for human life and dignity has been sharply undermined by years of turmoil. The state of anarchy in the country has provided a breeding ground for human rights’ violations of great proportions. Fortunately, it now appears as though violations are on the decline. Since there is neither a functioning judicial authority, nor are there law enforcement agencies, the abuse of human rights is likely to continue.

Over the past 15 years, unarmed civilians, particularly women, children, the sick and the elderly, have been subject to indiscriminate killing and ransom kidnappings. Women have also suffered from rape. An annual report compiled by the Ismail Jimale Human Rights’ Center shows that murder, rape and kidnappings have increased in some parts of the country, and Muqdisho has the highest rates of these crimes. \(^90\) For example, between July 2002 and July 2003, 530 innocent people lost their lives at the hands of criminals in Muqdisho. Senseless crime in other major towns of south-central Somalia has followed a similar pattern. During that same year, 31 women were raped, while 185 people were kidnapped. \(^91\)

There are a number of civil society groups focused on advocacy issues and the protection of human rights in south-central Somalia. The hope for recovery rests on the creation of a vibrant and deeply-rooted network of civil society organizations that mediate between conflicting groups in south-central Somalia. One of the most active human rights’ advocacy organizations in south-central Somalia is the “Ismail Jimale Human Rights Center”, which daily records human rights abuses.

10.4 New Drug Farming and Consumption

One of the consequences of the prolonged civil war and the ensuring lawlessness in the country is the surge in drug use and trade. The consumption of drugs has dramatically increased, leading to new drug cultivation in large sections of the agricultural land of the Lower Juba and Middle Shabeelle regions. Many farmers have switched their crops to cultivate marijuana. Data collected during this study indicates that drug production and trade have substantially increased in the southern regions of Somalia. In Muqdisho, large quantities of these drugs are sold openly in major markets.

\(^{90}\) Special Report for Somali Human Rights’ Day, 22 July 2002 to 20 July 2003, Dr. Ismail Jumale, Human Rights Organization, Mogadishu, 2002-03

\(^{91}\) Ibid.
The cultivation, distribution and sale of homegrown drugs is handled by a network of militias and business groups. Using the profits generated from the sale of these drugs, they promote their business and militia activities. While some of the drugs are consumed locally in south-central Somalia, a substantial amount is sold in northern Somali towns, such as Hargeysa and Bossaso. Interviews with traders indicate that these drugs also have a high market value in Djibouti and Yemen.

10.5 Health Hazards

The Somali health sector has traded public sector domination for uncontrolled private ownership. Before the civil war, Muqdisho housed the majority of the country’s health facilities, including two general hospitals (the police and military hospital and the maternity hospital) and a few private clinics. All regional capitals had fully staffed hospitals that referred specialized cases to the capital city for treatment. There are now approximately 110 doctors working at different health centers in Muqdisho. Another 23 doctors are scattered throughout south-central Somalia.

After the collapse of the state, the quality of imported pharmaceutical drugs became extremely poor. Today, drugs are rarely manufactured in certified factories. Research conducted by CRD indicates that drugs are often prepared on request and according to the specifications of private profit-seeking groups. There is no quality control, nor are there any records available to indicate the country of the drugs’ origins. In rural areas where health professionals are very rare, unqualified drug sellers tend to become the quasi-doctors of communities. In remote places, food items like sugar and oil can be found alongside drugs on store shelves and they are handled by the unqualified shopkeepers.

10.6 IDPs

Internal population displacement is considerable, although the concept of "internally displaced persons" (IDPs) is difficult to define in a society with a tradition of a nomadic and highly mobile population. Given the fact that populations regularly move for economic reasons and security threats, it is difficult to estimate the number of refugees and IDPs in south-central Somalia. CRD interviews with IDP community leaders in Muqdisho, for example, estimated a figure of 270,000 IDPs who have been residing in various parts of the city for

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92 Many Somalis have died as a result of consuming uncertified or drugs that were not legally prescribed. Sadly, there are no records available attesting to the deaths of those Somalis believed to have consumed inappropriate, contaminated or expired drugs.
the past 13 years. In 2001, the UNDP estimated that 30,000 additional IDPs live in other major cities, bringing the estimated total of IDPs to 300,000 throughout the country. The majority reside or are located in Kismaayo, Muqdisho or Marka. The IDPs are by and large supported through donations from the international community.

The IDP population lacks the most basic of services, including clean drinking water and proper hygiene facilities. In many areas, they have caused serious sanitation problems, since there are not enough latrines or waste disposal units in the IDP camps. This has also resulted in recurrent outbreaks of diseases such as cholera, typhoid, malaria, and diarrhoea, among others. The unhygienic conditions inside the camps cause serious environmental degradation. This constitutes a significant health hazard and jeopardises life in the city and its surrounding areas.

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93 CRD, Socio-Economic Assessment of South Central Somalia, 2003

CONCLUSION

The Somali economy has survived for more than a decade without government support structures. Humanitarian aid has both hampered and enhanced the economy. While some food aid has encouraged subsistence farmers to give up farming, it has helped to keep the price of essential consumer goods low, thus controlling inflationary pressures. In fact, the Somali economy can be said to have weathered shocks that would destroy some of the most dominant economies in the world. The commercial sector is slowly but surely transforming from very personalized small-scale production to medium-scale production and distribution that takes advantage of economies of scale.

Because of its geographical location and long coastline, Somalia is strategically well placed to take advantage of regional trade, and with its large communities in the Diaspora, it can access a strong and reliable trade network in many parts of the world. It is growing in importance as a transit route for the Ethiopian import-export trade. Increased trade with Kenya and the expansion of its ports offer significant economic opportunities for Somalia. Unfortunately, the southern part of the country, formerly considered to be the breadbasket of the country, remains a heavily divided region. This is heightened by its dependence on a limited range of export products, making the country highly susceptible to price fluctuations, as well as other shocks of the international trade system.

There are difficulties that are peculiar to a country without a central or decentralized authority that can regulate financial institutions and economic sectors. The Transitional National Government (TNG) and the half a dozen other factions that control different parts of the region are likely to face more intractable political, social, economic and governance challenges in the future.

The regions have been divided along clan lines and sub-national political units that are clan-dominated have been established. These clan-based political entities and de facto administrations in the regions have allowed for a resumption of civilian social and economic life, albeit a weak one. Low intensity fighting has subsided in most urban centres of south-central Somalia. These informal governing structures seem to operate quite efficiently across south-central Somalia.

Although the majority of people live in abject poverty (on less than one dollar a day), many have been able to generate some income through petty trading. This is especially true of women. Their increased participation in the economy and other sectors of society has had a negative impact on families.

The telecommunications sector, light industry, airlines and private health care seem to be thriving and they are employing a good number of the Somali
population. The Somali Diaspora continues to invest substantially in the economy through remittances.

The cultivation and consumption of drugs and alcohol is growing in the region. Large areas of farmland along the Juba and Shabelle rivers are cultivating marijuana. Some drugs are consumed locally, but larger quantities are secretly exported to neighbouring countries.

The absence of a central government does, however, inhibit economic activities, such as health certification for livestock and agriculture products. The lack of regulatory institutions to oversee the quality of exports inhibits international trade. International relief and donor organizations, including the UNDP, NGOs, and various bilateral donor agencies, maintain vital programs in many parts of south-central Somalia. These agencies provide healthcare, education and humanitarian support to many vulnerable groups in the region.

Major environmental catastrophes cannot be far in the future for Somalia. The depletion of Somali forests is accelerated by the export of charcoal. Uncontrolled dumping of waste products in the Somali seas and the export of female livestock and wild game have further degraded an already fragile environment.

The effect of all these factors on the socio-economic situation has been mixed. The productive capacity of the Somali economy is slowly, but steadily, improving. The production of certain commodities, such as fish hides, skins and agricultural crops has increased. Some of these products are consumed locally and others are intended for export. Remittances, on the other hand, play a key role in the growing Somali economy. They are used for investment in business ventures more often than they are used for consumption. Some small to medium-sized manufacturing plants are reviving industrial production. Communication networks and internet services are also rapidly expanding. An important drawback to all this productive activity is that the benefits accruing from these business improvements tend to be unfairly distributed within a small group of business entrepreneurs. The country’s resources are increasingly concentrated in their hands.

The delivery of social services to the Somali population is slowly improving. More people now have access to safe drinking water than ever before. Student enrolment in schools is on the rise. A number of institutions now offer post-secondary technical training while also new universities have been established in recent years. Many healthcare facilities have opened and a few former state hospitals have been resurrected and made operational with the help of local Somali investments and donations from international NGOs. Yet, the health sector still has a way to go before the quality and sustainability of its services can be assured.
SHORT-TERM INTERVENTION

Following are the main areas of short term possible intervention:

I. Governance and Security

1. To re-establish (and encourage, where it exists) civil security in south-central Somalia through community support network.
2. To help re-establish judicial organs such as custodial corps, prison systems, police force etc.
3. Strengthen the capacity of local authorities and civil society organizations where available in areas of governance and civic participation in local security.
4. The UN and other international and inter-regional organization should help harmonize their efforts and support the current Somali peace process in Mbagathi, Kenya.
5. Assist in the demobilization; disarmament and re-integration of armed militia with meaningful alternatives in the form of skills training that will enable them sustain themselves productively in their local communities.

II. Social Services

1. Address the broadest possible access (for the public) to the fundamentally essential services, with community involvement in both management and financing of the services.
2. Support local and regional administrative institutions to establish national agents that formulates policy and provides certification of the technical/quality standards of the social services i.e. licensing and, finally to coordinate international assistance.
3. Assist local communities with the expertise in the development of health and nutrition surveillance systems to detect imminent trouble spots and provide, at the same time, an early warning program for timely intervention in case of need.
4. Help local professional institutions i.e. education centres clinics etc. by providing an effective and technically sound health personnel training.
5. Assist the educational networks to unify their different curriculum widely used by the different education institutions.
6. Help emerging higher education institutions to develop proper standardized and accredited education system.
7. To develop, in partnership with communities, cost effective and innovative ways of increasing and improving access of children to education.
8. To improve capacities of the local education institutions and its networks including mobilization and management of financial resources.
9. Provide immediate support to the thousands of orphans and other disadvantaged children recently abandoned by the Al-Haramayn charity organization.

III. Economic Activities

The unregulated private sector in Somalia and the privatization of all economic activates has brought major challenges to the Somali people. Although the private sector has contributed positively in providing many services, it has nevertheless, caused hardships and suffering for many people. The following are short interventions:

1. To repair the major irrigation systems such as reconstruction of barrages, canals, water reservoirs etc.
2. Help in the rehabilitation of major roads linking between the agricultural fertile lands and main urban centres.
3. Assist in the development of viable livestock marketing and quarantine facilities.
4. Restore private markets for agriculture inputs like seeds, smaller machinery etc.
5. Help communities develop peer-lending scheme in the efforts of developing of small scale/individual macro-businesses.
6. Assist local communities and business groups to diversify their economies.
7. Assist local authorities and civil society organizations to raise public awareness against the social and economic effects of the Qat to the people.
8. Encourage local telecommunication agencies to set-up a body that regulates and develops policy framework under which the telecommunication sector would provide services to the public.

IV. Data Gap

1. To help establish, in partnership with local professional agencies, a data collection centre in the absence of national authority in south-central Somalia.
2. Facilitate in the collection of a comprehensive macro-economic data to compliment available records for future use.
3. To train data collection professionals that could be utilized by the local authorities, international agencies and other interested parties.
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ANNEXES

List of annexes to be included in the final draft

- Questionnaires
- Aggregated Data
- Maps
- TOR
- CRD Profile
- Sources Consulted