In the late 1990s, we spent quite a bit of time trying to envision what Army logistics would look like in 2010. There was considerable discussion of the need for a “Revolution in Military Logistics.” The idea gained momentum, strongly influenced by the Army After Next project and by the emerging requirements associated with supporting the new brigade designs that began to develop. During his tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, General Pete Schoomaker established a task force that was given a blank sheet of paper to “revolutionize” logistics, leveraging all the work that had been done to date. Now, looking back 10 to 15 years, how’d we do? What still needs to be worked on? And what did we miss entirely? The events of 11 September 2001, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 32 deployments diverted our attention from transformation somewhat. However, overall progress has been, I think, substantial. We have leveraged the great work produced in earlier years and incorporated lessons learned from 9 years of combat to give us a very, very capable logistics force. Feedback from the field indicates that logistics transformation is working well, but we know we will never get things exactly right and must continue to adapt.

Our new capabilities were not dreamed up overnight—they were the result of years of study, debate, and experience. Furthermore, many of the principles that drove strategists back then generally remain valid today and will drive us in the future. Uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity will continue to characterize battlefields, and logistics must adapt accordingly.

At a very high level, logistics transformation was about a concept of support for modularity that leverages joint and strategic partners. It created modular organizations that support full-spectrum operations; enhanced our theater-opening and force-reception capabilities; and developed a single Army logistics command and control capability at echelons above brigade that provides joint-capable options to the combatant commander.

With the Army Force Generation process, we also changed the way we generate forces—standardizing capabilities in Active and Reserve components to deliver a steady stream of trained and ready capabilities and centralizing what might be termed strategic reach back through the integration of industry and strategic partners in the national sustainment base, all while helping to scale back large logistics systems and enabling more distributed operations.

What happened to the Revolution in Military Logistics that began in the late 1990s? The events of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan introduced barriers to some changes, but overall progress has been substantial.
Functional Concept for Sustainment 2016–2028, approved in October 2010, expands on the ideas presented in the Army Capstone Concept and the Army Operating Concept and describes the functional capabilities required to sustain the future force while conducting full-spectrum operations. Sustaining future Army forces in austere environments, often at the end of extended lines of communication, requires a logistics network capable of projecting and providing the support and services necessary to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.

However, if the logistics network is to be successful, future Army forces must decrease the demand-side characteristics of the force. Those decreases will serve to reduce the strain and frequency of resupply operations. In support of this approach, TRADOC Pamphlet 525–4–1 serves as a foundation for future force development pertaining to sustainment and the sustainment warfighting function.

I foresee the greatest impact of the new Sustainment Functional Concept to be on our greatest resource, our sustainment leaders and Soldiers.

Concept development leads change for the Army and drives the development and integration of future capabilities. It also provides a framework for analysis, readiness assessments, prioritization, and feedback. The CASCOM team is conducting a number of efforts to hone future required capabilities in the Army Functional Concept for Sustainment by including a sustainment functional capabilities-based assessment (CBA) and conducting a number of organizational-based assessments (ObAs).

Our CBA looks across the 21 functional areas within the sustainment warfighting function and identifies gaps and solutions that enable us to accomplish our sustainment mission in the most appropriate and resource-informed manner. With
or reduce the deployed footprint.

**The 1990s Vision of Logistics 2010**

How did we get to this point? In the late 1990s, the thinking was that because of the expeditionary nature of Army operations—with forces deployed abroad for extended periods of time in locations with little infrastructure or lines of communication (LOCs)—we would require a fundamentally different view of sustainability. Indeed, that has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Back then, the premise of the joint operational concepts was that the key operational challenge would be to gain access to a theater, establish a sustaining capability, and establish a logistics footprint that not only could be smaller but would also take into account the social and political realities of the countries where the Army would deploy. That, too, has been the case.

Our goal was to “evolve a seamless logistics system that ties all parts of the logistics community into one network of shared situational awareness and unified action.” To pursue that endeavor, we set goals for three domains: force sustainment, force projection, and technology application and acquisition agility.

**Force sustainment**

We wanted a single logistics system that would be more predictive and responsive. This was to be the single most important factor in laying the foundation for information supremacy and situational understanding.

**Force projection**

The focus here was on the need for lighter yet more powerful land-power systems that were easier to deploy globally, at lower cost, and with greater speed; strategic pre-positioning of equipment and materiel to reduce initial air and sea transport requirements; and deployment of task-organized, modular logistics organizations to support initial combat operations.

**Technology application and acquisition agility**

The key here was the integration of technology and acquisition processes to work at reducing the physical size of our systems. The goal was to find materials that are lighter, stronger, and more reliable and consume less fuel, along with streamlining the process to quickly and cost-effectively acquire materiel and services necessary to maintain readiness, transition to war, and sustain combat operations.

**What Has Come To Fruition?**

Let’s start at the top. One of the most significant changes has been the movement away from a division-centric force to the modular brigade combat teams and echelons-above-brigade units of today. Modularity has created a major change for logisticians in how we are organized and conduct operations. Overall, we’ve done a pretty good job of adjusting to the new organizations; functions; tactics; techniques; and procedures; and mis-

your support from the field, we are evaluating our theater sustainment command, expeditionary sustainment command, sustainment brigade, and explosive ordnance disposal formations during the ObAs to develop and refine critical required capabilities, gaps, and solutions for the Army and the sustainment community.

However, we are not developing the Sustainment Functional Concept in a stovepipe. We have successfully integrated our concept and CBA effort with the Army Capabilities Integration Center and the other TRADOC centers of excellence. This past winter, I had the opportunity to provide an assessment briefing to the Army Chief of Staff on our Sustainment Warfighting Functional Concept with the five other warfighting functions to ensure an integrated and mutual supporting approach to the future.

I foresee the greatest impact of the new Sustainment Functional Concept to be on our greatest resource, our sustainment leaders and Soldiers. We will emphasize cultural awareness, operational adaptability, and the practice of mission command to our Soldiers at all echelons. Well-trained and informed Soldiers will be our most versatile resource, while training and education will serve to create operational adaptability at the individual and small-unit levels. Sustainment Soldiers will be capable of reacting to unforeseen changes, operating in a degraded network, and making decisions at the lowest level. By the time you read this article, we will have completed our important work on the current edition of the Army Functional Concept for Sustainment, we will be about to complete the Sustainment Functional CBA, and we will start the revisions of the next editions of the Army Operating Concept and the Army Functional Concept for Sustainment. Throughout our efforts, your involvement has proven instrumental to our success, and I value your con-tinued input and look forward to hearing from you on these vital and important concepts for our sustainment community.

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